Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

About the principal circumstance propter quid (for what reason) enough has been said where we treated of the end; likewise about the circumstance quid (what) where we treated of the goodness and malice of the effect; moreover what we noted about the passions has already considered the quomodo (how) of circumstances (as to its part). It remains, therefore, to say about the rest not exposed, and indeed in relation to the interior act together with the exterior, because all can modify the latter, many the former.

181. The circumstance who does not denote the very person of the agent as such (for thus it pertains to the substance of the human act), but his condition or accidental quality, by reason of which in the moral estimation the act either altogether or more or less morally avails, e. g., that the agent be a religious, a priest or a layman, married or free, a superior or a subject, rich or poor, a child or an old man, etc.

Often it indicates an office or special obligation (of justice, piety, fidelity), and then it brings to the good or bad act a new species of goodness or malice, as, if bound by vow he keeps chastity, or being married he fornicates; otherwise it is only aggravating: thus other things being equal with the same deliberation or negligence supposed, a religious acts better or sins more gravely than a secular, a learned man than an unlearned, because he operates more perfectly or sin is more fitting for him.

182. The circumstance about what does not signify the very object or matter (for that pertains to the substance of the act), but the accident joined to it, e. g., quantity or quality, as that the thing be sacred or profane, of one's father or of a stranger, much or little, grave or light, etc.

Often the quality changes the species, namely if it brings a distinct goodness or malice, as alms given to a poor person of the Church, or theft of a sacred thing, praise or striking of a father or cleric. So in acts toward another, in the matter of chastity by reason of the accomplice, in the matter of religion toward sacred things. Sometimes namely the quality on the part of the agent changes the species; the same quality on the part of the object or matter also does so; whence it is understood that there is a twofold malice in adultery or carnal sacrilege if both persons are married or sacred, because the twofold circumstance changes the species. Sometimes the quality only aggravates, as to love one's enemy or to do good to orphans and widows, to wound one altogether innocent.

Quantity of matter only aggravates, e. g., to give or steal two hundred francs instead of one hundred, to pray or labor many hours on the Lord's day.

183. The circumstance with what aids indicates the accidental instruments or means (even companions) which we use for acting, e. g., to employ the help of a saint or a demon, to get drunk with money stolen, to use a sacred thing for fornication, to kill with forbidden arms, with a sword or with poison.

It changes the species if the means import a special morality, such as the use of magic arts to seduce a girl, of sacred rites to deceive another (Gen. XXXIV, 15); confessions to solicit; otherwise it aggravates, as if you induce a priest to lie, or choose for killing arms for exquisite torture, or if the Lord's feet are anointed with precious ointment (Luc. VII, 46; Mt. XXVI, 7; Mc. XIV, 3; Ioh. XII, 3).

184. The circumstance how signifies the accidental manner in which the interior or exterior act is done, e. g., with full deliberate or imperfect will, directly or indirectly; intensely or remissly; from malice, passion or ignorance; from contempt, levity, force, deceit; prudently or imprudently; in good or bad faith, etc.

Sometimes it changes the species: thus violence makes of simple theft robbery, of fornication rape; likewise the modes against nature in lust. Ordinarily it aggravates, e. g., to act with perfect knowledge or will strengthened in good or in evil, to kill limb by limb, — or diminishes, e. g., to act from grave fear, vehement temptation, sudden passion. Thus intensely or remissly does not change the species but increases or diminishes.

185. The circumstance where does not denote the bare place (for every act must be done somewhere), but the accidental quality of the place contributing something of goodness or malice to the act, as that the place be sacred, with respect to prayer and worship, or theft, fornication, homicide, etc.; or public, in scandal or good example (II Reg. XVI, 21).

More often it changes the species in external acts by adding special morality of religion or charity; it also gives the first species of morality if the work is in itself indifferent and is prescribed or prohibited by reason of place, as to uncover oneself or to carry on commerce in a church. More rarely it aggravates, namely in internal acts which do not so directly have relation to the place, e. g., meditation done in a church, complacent dwelling on an evil thought there.

186. The circumstance when denotes the accidental condition of time, as the quantity or duration if the act lasts long or short (e. g., love or hatred or desire), or the quality if the act is done on a holy day, in a sacred time, in a more difficult time.

The quantity of time is an aggravating or diminishing circumstance; the quality, however, of itself and set aside the direct intention of honoring or dishonoring does not contribute much to increasing morality, unless the act good or bad in itself is specially prescribed or prohibited by reason of the sacred time (Mass, breakfast), or by it special reverence or irreverence to divine worship is wrought, or scandal is present, e. g., if one on Good Friday should exhibit public games or immediately after communion should go to a concubine or get drunk.

Time differs from place: the latter, because of its stability, is capable of consecration and permanent sanctity; time, continually passing, only accidentally, by reason of the mystery or action then recalled or done, is called sacred; whence of itself it does not change the species.

If an act in itself neither good nor bad is prescribed or prohibited in a sacred time, the circumstance of time passes into the notion of object, and gives the first morality, e. g., to work on a sacred day or to abstain from work.

187. Case. — That the concurrence of circumstances in one act may be better understood, we note the following case, classic in theology: « John, the custodian of a church, a consecrated golden ciborium, containing hosts necessary for paschal communion, with the help of accomplices and with the intention of profaning the Sacrament, on the very feria 5ª of the Lord's Supper, in the church violently and from the hands of the parish priest, steals. How many and what circumstances intervene in this case? »

R. All of them; namely 1) the circumstance who: the custodian of the church; 2) about what, by reason of quantity: a golden ciborium; by reason of quality: a consecrated ciborium; 3) what, by reason of the effect: the privation of paschal communions; 4) where: in the church; 5) with what aids: with the help of accomplices; 6) why: from the intention of profaning the Sacrament; 7) how: violently; 8) when: on the very feria 5ª of the Lord's Supper.