Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. I-II, q. 20, a. 1-4 and 6 ; q. 19, a. 8.

168. Principle I. An external act can have a twofold goodness and malice, namely:

1. One subjective and formal, which it has immediately from the end of the agent, and this is prior in the interior act of the will and from it is derived into the external act and wholly depends on the will.

2. The other objective and material, which it has immediately from the due object and due circumstances, and this is more from reason than from the will, whereas on the contrary the goodness of the will depends on it insofar as it is borne upon it as upon its object; — whence in the ordering of reason and intention the objective goodness is prior to the goodness of the will, but in the execution of the work the goodness of the will is prior (a. 1 and 2). Hence sometimes the interior and exterior acts are in the same species of goodness or malice; sometimes in a different species, and then each, just as the complete act composed of both, contracts a twofold species (a. 3), as was said in n° 155.

Therefore, for an external act to be simply good, the formal goodness from the intention of the end and from the will is not sufficient, but also there must be no defect in the external act from the part of the object and circumstances: for good depends on the whole cause, evil on any defect whatsoever (a. 2).

169. Principle II. An external act of itself, i. e., inasmuch as it is the mere execution of an efficacious interior act, does not add to it a formal and simply so-called goodness or malice (a. 4).

It is proved: a) From Scripture, which holds a sincere will for the deed, Gen. XXII, 16 ; Mt. V, 28.

b) By reason: Freedom is the foundation of morality; whence goodness and malice formally are only where there is freedom. But only the interior act of the will is of itself intrinsically and formally free; the external act is not free except from an extrinsic cause and by analogous denomination¹: for it is voluntary only by the voluntariness of the interior act of which it is the effect. Therefore formal goodness and malice are not of themselves in the external act, but this is not so good or evil except by the goodness or malice of the interior act.

It has been said:

1. Of itself, for accidentally or by reason of another it adds accidental goodness or malice, both by reason of the interior act, inasmuch as the external act is often the occasion for the interior act to be multiplied, exercised more intensely, continued longer; — and by reason of the effects, inasmuch as special grace, value, privilege is connected with it, such as the grace given to a sacrament, the aureole to martyrdom, an indulgence to a pious work, or evils and inconveniences follow from it, e. g., the burden of restitution, censure, irregularity. Hence:

a) While the will is ready to act if it could, and does not act solely because it cannot or because it does not have the occasion to act, the will is just as good or bad without the external act as with it, because the absence of the external act is simply involuntary; whence it simply and essentially merits the same praise or punishment.

b) He who gives alms, fasts, afflicts his body, does not merit more than he who has the efficacious will to do so; he does, however, make more satisfaction, because the satisfactory value depends also on the external work inasmuch as it is penal, i. e., by punishment as it is actually inflicted.

2. *As it is the execution of the interior act, and not as it is its object: for thus its objective goodness (if it has it) is communicated to the will that intends it, and so formal goodness is already had. But supposing it is the object of the will, the very external execution does not add.

3. Formal goodness or malice; for the external act inasmuch as it perfects and consummates the goodness or malice of the will, adds material and secundum quid goodness or malice: for although it does not increase the formal goodness or malice, it nevertheless extends that same one to the external act and thus perfects it; whence it merits an accidental reward or punishment.

4. Efficacious, i. e., one that of itself suffices for placing the external act and would work it, if it could. For if it were inefficacious for this, it would not be a proportionate means to the external act and to obtaining its effect: thus the will to convert the whole world, to feed all the poor, to liberate all the souls of purgatory, although it is most good because it participates in the goodness of the external act which is its object, does not, however, have the same goodness as the work itself, because a single act of will is not able to effect it (q. 19, a. 8).

170. They object: The interior and exterior acts are two moral acts; therefore there is more morality. — R. S. Thomas, de Malo q. 2, a. 2, ad 8: « As much is added to a thing when it is called greater, where both are called a quantum according to the same reason. But where one is the reason of the other being a quantum, this is not required. Just as if a piece of wood is long, the line will be long, and it is not required that the piece of wood with the line be longer than the line, because the line is the reason of length in the piece of wood: similarly it has been said that the external act has the notion of fault from the act of the will ».

171. Remark. — The external act is rightly and truly called good and bad, because it is conformed or disformed to reason, together with being voluntary; it also has formal goodness or malice, not indeed proper but derived from the interior act. With it, in fact, it constitutes one moral act to which it concurs as the material element (n° 155); whence also in confession not only evil wills or intentions are to be declared, but also external acts: for sins are to be confessed not only as distinct in species, but entire, such as were in fact committed, namely perfect and consummate. In other words, the whole evil is to be told (which is truly evil), even if it is evil only participatively and analogically (cf. the treatise on Sins).