Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. I-II, q. 19.

162. Principle I. The goodness and malice of an interior act properly and of itself depends on its object. For moral good and evil are of themselves and properly differences of the act of the will as moral, just as truth and falsehood are differences of reason, because good of itself pertains to the will just as true pertains to reason. Whence a morally good and bad will differ according to moral species. But an act properly and of itself has its moral species from the object proposed by reason, as was proved. Therefore goodness and malice in acts of the will properly and of themselves depend on the object.

163. Principle II. The goodness and malice of an interior act depend on the object alone.

Thus S. Thomas, whom P. Lehu, Phil. Mor. et Soc. I, n. 182, explains almost as follows: « The sense is not that the circumstances and end are altogether impertinent to the morality of interior acts — which would be altogether false... (for the circumstances of intensity or duration avail for the increase of goodness and malice, q. 20, a. 4)... Thus therefore it is to be understood...: An interior act receives its morality only from the object, i. e., from the thing willed, immediately, and herein the interior act differs both from the exterior act, and from the human act considered in its integrity, which receive their morality from the object, circumstances, and end, as from three distinct independent sources; whence there can be an exterior act good from its object and bad from its circumstances or end. But there cannot be an interior act good from its object and bad from its circumstances; « supposing the will to be of good, no circumstance can make it bad » (q. 19, a. 2, ad 2)... For, when « it is said that someone wills something good when he ought not or where he ought not, it can be understood in two ways. In one way, so that this circumstance is referred to the thing willed. And thus the will is not of good; for to will to do something when it ought not to be done is not to will good. In the other way, so that it is referred to the act of willing; and thus it is impossible that someone wills good when he ought not, because man ought always to will good; unless perhaps accidentally, inasmuch as someone, willing this good, would prevent himself from then willing another due good. And then evil does not arise from this, that someone wills that good; but from this, that he does not will another good. And the same is to be said of the other circumstances ».

A bad circumstance therefore will make the thing willed, i. e., the object of the will, bad, and only through the medium of the object will it render the interior act bad, which does not happen in an exterior act. Therefore we assert: the morality of an elicited act depends on the object alone immediately.

It is proved: The principle in any kind is something one and simple. But the principle of goodness and malice of all human acts is from the act of the will, and this of itself has goodness from the object, as said in the preceding n°. Therefore the goodness and malice of the will is attended to from the object alone and not from accidental circumstances¹.

Therefore, since the end is the object of the will, in acts of the will the goodness which is from the object does not differ from the goodness which is from the end, except accidentally if it happens that the end depends on an end and the will on a will (a. 2, ad 1), e. g., if in one act one wills medicine for health and health for the good of the republic, or if in a twofold act one wills adultery because one wills theft.

164. Corollary I. — The goodness and malice of an interior act, since it depends on its object, therefore it depends also on those things on which the goodness of the object depends:

1. On reason, because the object is proposed to the will by reason which apprehends it as a good proportioned to the will, whence the proposing reason is the measure of the goodness of the will.

2. On the eternal law: for every effect depends more on the first cause than on the second cause, which does not act except by the virtue of the first cause. But that human reason shows us what is good and so is the rule of our will, it has from the eternal law or the divine reason, of which it is a participation in the created mind. Therefore much more does the goodness of the will depend on the eternal law than on human reason.

Hence a twofold rule of human acts is distinguished: first, fundamental and extrinsic, namely the divine reason by which God from eternity in his own essence contemplates the order to be observed by creatures, namely the essential relations of natures both to God their end and to one another; — and secondary, relative and intrinsic, namely human practical reason inasmuch as it dictates that this order is to be observed. The first rule is objective and altogether remote; the other is twofold: for reason can be considered

a) objectively inasmuch as it is common to all men, and is the habitual light which is by nature to dictate in a universal manner what acts in general are good, what evil (e. g., it is good to praise God, evil to fornicate), and indeed is by nature to dictate the same to all, and generally dictates the same: thus it is law or the knowledge of law;

b) subjectively it can be considered inasmuch as it is proper to each one, and is the act by which someone judges of particular that such an act in the individual is to be placed here and now as conformed or disformed to the law: it is the application of the law to particular acts, which is called conscience and often varies in different men.

Reason objectively considered, although it is a nearer rule than the eternal law, is nevertheless more remote in relation to conscience, which is the altogether proximate and immediate rule.

165. Corollary II. — The goodness and malice of an interior act, since it depends on its good end, therefore depends on all from which the goodness of the end depends, namely on the ultimate end and on the divine will.

It is proved: That which is first in any kind is the measure of the others of that kind. But the ultimate end of the human will, which it must intend first, is the Supreme Good, which first and of itself is the proper object of the divine will. Therefore for the human will to be right or conformed to its measure, it must (at least implicitly) tend to the Supreme Good and thus be conformed to the divine will.

166. On the way in which our will must be conformed to the divine will. — Our will can be conformed to the divine will, both negatively by not contradicting it, and positively by willing the same as it; moreover a threefold object willed is distinguished: the material thing willed or that which we will, e. g., the life of a father; — the formal thing willed or the reason, end, motive for which we will, and indeed the particular or proximate one, e. g., because the father is good, necessary to the family; — the formal thing willed or the ultimate and universal motive, i. e., the glory of God.

Now 1° we are bound in all things to be conformed to the divine will negatively, i. e., we can never disapprove what God wills (or on the contrary murmur against it), because he is the supreme Lord who disposes all things wisely; — 2° we are bound to be conformed to it positively in the ultimate formal thing willed, for God wills all things for himself and his glory, to which the human will must refer all acts at least implicitly (n° 159, 2°), as we do when we tend toward good under the aspect of good (a. 10, ad 1); — 3° generally we are not bound to be positively conformed to it in the material and formally proximate thing willed: for the same thing under different respect can be good or bad, e. g., the death of a robber considered by a judge or by his wife; but God considers things under universal aspects, i. e., in relation to the common good and his own glory (e. g., the damnation, death, illness, hunger of a father), whereas a private man is not bound to attend to this but can consider things under particular aspects (i. e., in relation to the particular good), under which they can be bad; therefore he can will the opposite of what God wills, e. g., the life of a dying father, but under a different aspect. And yet there is no opposition of wills, because we will different things but not according to the same reason (ad 3); — 4° we are bound to be conformed to it in the material thing willed, if God at some time commands or forbids something, because then God wills that we will it, i. e., he wills to oblige us to will it.

Hence a) we ought not to positively will virginity or other things which God only counsels, but it is sufficient negatively that we hold them as good and do not disapprove them; — b) we cannot will what God only permits, e. g., sins, but we can will his permission of them, and we are bound not to disapprove it; — c) we can conform our will even in the material thing willed to the divine will, which is most right, provided we will it for the same reason, indeed it is best thus to act from a better motive; — d) God wills many things by an antecedent and conditioned will or by a preceptive will (e. g., the salvation of one to be damned, the life of a dying father), which nevertheless he does not will by a consequent or efficacious will, indeed thus he wills the opposite. Hence sometimes we are bound to will the opposite of what God wills by an efficacious will, indeed we are bound to endeavor to obtain it, because God wills that we will it and procure it; the fact being posited, however, we are bound not to contradict the will of God nor disapprove it.

167. Remark. — In a twofold way we can be conformed to the divine will: according to the reason of final cause, by willing

Summa Theologiae Moralis I — 11 under the same aspect of the divine good, and according to the reason of efficient cause, by willing what God wills us to will. « In both ways in some manner the human will is conformed to the divine will: because insofar as it is conformed to the divine will in the common reason (formally) of the thing willed, it is conformed to it in the ultimate end; insofar as it is not conformed to it in the materially willed thing, it is conformed to it according to the reason of efficient cause; because this proper inclination... or apprehension in particular of this thing the thing has from God as from an efficient cause » (a. 10).