Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. I-II, q. 19.

162. Principle I. The goodness and malice of an interior act properly and of itself depends on its object. For moral good and evil are of themselves and properly differences of the act of the will as moral, just as truth and falsehood are differences of reason, because good of itself pertains to the will just as true pertains to reason. Whence a morally good and bad will differ according to moral species. But an act properly and of itself has its moral species from the object proposed by reason, as was proved. Therefore goodness and malice in acts of the will properly and of themselves depend on the object.

163. Principle II. The goodness and malice of an interior act depend on the object alone.

Thus S. Thomas, whom P. Lehu, Phil. Mor. et Soc. I, n. 182, explains almost as follows: « The sense is not that the circumstances and end are altogether impertinent to the morality of interior acts — which would be altogether false... (for the circumstances of intensity or duration avail for the increase of goodness and malice, q. 20, a. 4)... Thus therefore it is to be understood...: An interior act receives its morality only from the object, i. e., from the thing willed, immediately, and herein the interior act differs both from the exterior act, and from the human act considered in its integrity, which receive their morality from the object, circumstances, and end, as from three distinct independent sources; whence there can be an exterior act good from its object and bad from its circumstances or end. But there cannot be an interior act good from its object and bad from its circumstances; « supposing the will to be of good, no circumstance can make it bad » (q. 19, a. 2, ad 2)... For, when « it is said that someone wills something good when he ought not or where he ought not, it can be understood in two ways. In one way, so that this circumstance is referred to the thing willed. And thus the will is not of good; for to will to do something when it ought not to be done is not to will good. In the other way, so that it is referred to the act of willing; and thus it is impossible that someone wills good when he ought not, because man ought always to will good; unless perhaps accidentally, inasmuch as someone, willing this good, would prevent himself from then willing another due good. And then evil does not arise from this, that someone wills that good; but from this, that he does not will another good. And the same is to be said of the other circumstances ».

A bad circumstance therefore will make the thing willed, i. e., the object of the will, bad, and only through the medium of the object will it render the interior act bad, which does not happen in an exterior act. Therefore we assert: the morality of an elicited act depends on the object alone immediately.

It is proved: The principle in any kind is something one and simple. But the principle of goodness and malice of all human acts is from the act of the will, and this of itself has goodness from the object, as said in the preceding n°. Therefore the goodness and malice of the will is attended to from the object alone and not from accidental circumstances¹.

Therefore, since the end is the object of the will, in acts of the will the goodness which is from the object does not differ from the goodness which is from the end, except accidentally if it happens that the end depends on an end and the will on a will (a. 2, ad 1), e. g., if in one act one wills medicine for health and health for the good of the republic, or if in a twofold act one wills adultery because one wills theft.

164. Corollary I. — The goodness and malice of an interior act, since it depends on its object, therefore it depends also on those things on which the goodness of the object depends:

1. On reason, because the object is proposed to the will by reason which apprehends it as a good proportioned to the will, whence the proposing reason is the measure of the goodness of the will.

2. On the eternal law: for every effect depends more on the first cause than on the second cause, which does not act except by the virtue of the first cause. But that human reason shows us what is good and so is the rule of our will, it has from the eternal law or the divine reason, of which it is a participation in the created mind. Therefore much more does the goodness of the will depend on the eternal law than on human reason.

Hence a twofold rule of human acts is distinguished: first, fundamental and extrinsic, namely the divine reason by which God from eternity in his own essence contemplates the order to be observed by creatures, namely the essential relations of natures both to God their end and to one another; — and secondary, relative and intrinsic, namely human practical reason inasmuch as it dictates that this order is to be observed. The first rule is objective and altogether remote; the other is twofold: for reason can be considered

a) objectively inasmuch as it is common to all men, and is the habitual light which is by nature to dictate in a universal manner what acts in general are good, what evil (e. g., it is good to praise God, evil to fornicate), and indeed is by nature to dictate the same to all, and generally dictates the same: thus it is law or the knowledge of law;

b) subjectively it can be considered inasmuch as it is proper to each one, and is the act by which someone judges of particular that such an act in the individual is to be placed here and now as conformed or disformed to the law: it is the application of the law to particular acts, which is called conscience and often varies in different men.

Reason objectively considered, although it is a nearer rule than the eternal law, is nevertheless more remote in relation to conscience, which is the altogether proximate and immediate rule.

165. Corollary II. — The goodness and malice of an interior act, since it depends on its good end, therefore depends on all from which the goodness of the end depends, namely on the ultimate end and on the divine will.

It is proved: That which is first in any kind is the measure of the others of that kind. But the ultimate end of the human will, which it must intend first, is the Supreme Good, which first and of itself is the proper object of the divine will. Therefore for the human will to be right or conformed to its measure, it must (at least implicitly) tend to the Supreme Good and thus be conformed to the divine will.

166. On the way in which our will must be conformed to the divine will. — Our will can be conformed to the divine will, both negatively by not contradicting it, and positively by willing the same as it; moreover a threefold object willed is distinguished: the material thing willed or that which we will, e. g., the life of a father; — the formal thing willed or the reason, end, motive for which we will, and indeed the particular or proximate one, e. g., because the father is good, necessary to the family; — the formal thing willed or the ultimate and universal motive, i. e., the glory of God.

Now 1° we are bound in all things to be conformed to the divine will negatively, i. e., we can never disapprove what God wills (or on the contrary murmur against it), because he is the supreme Lord who disposes all things wisely; — 2° we are bound to be conformed to it positively in the ultimate formal thing willed, for God wills all things for himself and his glory, to which the human will must refer all acts at least implicitly (n° 159, 2°), as we do when we tend toward good under the aspect of good (a. 10, ad 1); — 3° generally we are not bound to be positively conformed to it in the material and formally proximate thing willed: for the same thing under different respect can be good or bad, e. g., the death of a robber considered by a judge or by his wife; but God considers things under universal aspects, i. e., in relation to the common good and his own glory (e. g., the damnation, death, illness, hunger of a father), whereas a private man is not bound to attend to this but can consider things under particular aspects (i. e., in relation to the particular good), under which they can be bad; therefore he can will the opposite of what God wills, e. g., the life of a dying father, but under a different aspect. And yet there is no opposition of wills, because we will different things but not according to the same reason (ad 3); — 4° we are bound to be conformed to it in the material thing willed, if God at some time commands or forbids something, because then God wills that we will it, i. e., he wills to oblige us to will it.

Hence a) we ought not to positively will virginity or other things which God only counsels, but it is sufficient negatively that we hold them as good and do not disapprove them; — b) we cannot will what God only permits, e. g., sins, but we can will his permission of them, and we are bound not to disapprove it; — c) we can conform our will even in the material thing willed to the divine will, which is most right, provided we will it for the same reason, indeed it is best thus to act from a better motive; — d) God wills many things by an antecedent and conditioned will or by a preceptive will (e. g., the salvation of one to be damned, the life of a dying father), which nevertheless he does not will by a consequent or efficacious will, indeed thus he wills the opposite. Hence sometimes we are bound to will the opposite of what God wills by an efficacious will, indeed we are bound to endeavor to obtain it, because God wills that we will it and procure it; the fact being posited, however, we are bound not to contradict the will of God nor disapprove it.

167. Remark. — In a twofold way we can be conformed to the divine will: according to the reason of final cause, by willing

Summa Theologiae Moralis I — 11 under the same aspect of the divine good, and according to the reason of efficient cause, by willing what God wills us to will. « In both ways in some manner the human will is conformed to the divine will: because insofar as it is conformed to the divine will in the common reason (formally) of the thing willed, it is conformed to it in the ultimate end; insofar as it is not conformed to it in the materially willed thing, it is conformed to it according to the reason of efficient cause; because this proper inclination... or apprehension in particular of this thing the thing has from God as from an efficient cause » (a. 10).

S. Th. I-II, q. 20, a. 1-4 and 6 ; q. 19, a. 8.

168. Principle I. An external act can have a twofold goodness and malice, namely:

1. One subjective and formal, which it has immediately from the end of the agent, and this is prior in the interior act of the will and from it is derived into the external act and wholly depends on the will.

2. The other objective and material, which it has immediately from the due object and due circumstances, and this is more from reason than from the will, whereas on the contrary the goodness of the will depends on it insofar as it is borne upon it as upon its object; — whence in the ordering of reason and intention the objective goodness is prior to the goodness of the will, but in the execution of the work the goodness of the will is prior (a. 1 and 2). Hence sometimes the interior and exterior acts are in the same species of goodness or malice; sometimes in a different species, and then each, just as the complete act composed of both, contracts a twofold species (a. 3), as was said in n° 155.

Therefore, for an external act to be simply good, the formal goodness from the intention of the end and from the will is not sufficient, but also there must be no defect in the external act from the part of the object and circumstances: for good depends on the whole cause, evil on any defect whatsoever (a. 2).

169. Principle II. An external act of itself, i. e., inasmuch as it is the mere execution of an efficacious interior act, does not add to it a formal and simply so-called goodness or malice (a. 4).

It is proved: a) From Scripture, which holds a sincere will for the deed, Gen. XXII, 16 ; Mt. V, 28.

b) By reason: Freedom is the foundation of morality; whence goodness and malice formally are only where there is freedom. But only the interior act of the will is of itself intrinsically and formally free; the external act is not free except from an extrinsic cause and by analogous denomination¹: for it is voluntary only by the voluntariness of the interior act of which it is the effect. Therefore formal goodness and malice are not of themselves in the external act, but this is not so good or evil except by the goodness or malice of the interior act.

It has been said:

1. Of itself, for accidentally or by reason of another it adds accidental goodness or malice, both by reason of the interior act, inasmuch as the external act is often the occasion for the interior act to be multiplied, exercised more intensely, continued longer; — and by reason of the effects, inasmuch as special grace, value, privilege is connected with it, such as the grace given to a sacrament, the aureole to martyrdom, an indulgence to a pious work, or evils and inconveniences follow from it, e. g., the burden of restitution, censure, irregularity. Hence:

a) While the will is ready to act if it could, and does not act solely because it cannot or because it does not have the occasion to act, the will is just as good or bad without the external act as with it, because the absence of the external act is simply involuntary; whence it simply and essentially merits the same praise or punishment.

b) He who gives alms, fasts, afflicts his body, does not merit more than he who has the efficacious will to do so; he does, however, make more satisfaction, because the satisfactory value depends also on the external work inasmuch as it is penal, i. e., by punishment as it is actually inflicted.

2. *As it is the execution of the interior act, and not as it is its object: for thus its objective goodness (if it has it) is communicated to the will that intends it, and so formal goodness is already had. But supposing it is the object of the will, the very external execution does not add.

3. Formal goodness or malice; for the external act inasmuch as it perfects and consummates the goodness or malice of the will, adds material and secundum quid goodness or malice: for although it does not increase the formal goodness or malice, it nevertheless extends that same one to the external act and thus perfects it; whence it merits an accidental reward or punishment.

4. Efficacious, i. e., one that of itself suffices for placing the external act and would work it, if it could. For if it were inefficacious for this, it would not be a proportionate means to the external act and to obtaining its effect: thus the will to convert the whole world, to feed all the poor, to liberate all the souls of purgatory, although it is most good because it participates in the goodness of the external act which is its object, does not, however, have the same goodness as the work itself, because a single act of will is not able to effect it (q. 19, a. 8).

170. They object: The interior and exterior acts are two moral acts; therefore there is more morality. — R. S. Thomas, de Malo q. 2, a. 2, ad 8: « As much is added to a thing when it is called greater, where both are called a quantum according to the same reason. But where one is the reason of the other being a quantum, this is not required. Just as if a piece of wood is long, the line will be long, and it is not required that the piece of wood with the line be longer than the line, because the line is the reason of length in the piece of wood: similarly it has been said that the external act has the notion of fault from the act of the will ».

171. Remark. — The external act is rightly and truly called good and bad, because it is conformed or disformed to reason, together with being voluntary; it also has formal goodness or malice, not indeed proper but derived from the interior act. With it, in fact, it constitutes one moral act to which it concurs as the material element (n° 155); whence also in confession not only evil wills or intentions are to be declared, but also external acts: for sins are to be confessed not only as distinct in species, but entire, such as were in fact committed, namely perfect and consummate. In other words, the whole evil is to be told (which is truly evil), even if it is evil only participatively and analogically (cf. the treatise on Sins).

S. Th. I-II, q. 20, a. 5 ; q. 73, a. 8 ; q. 77, a. 7 ; II-II, q. 64, a. 7 and 8 ; q. 79, a. 3, ad 3 ; q. 150, a. 4 ; Quodl. IX, 15.

In human acts the external effect merits entirely special consideration, since, according as it is good or bad, morality can depend upon it, especially in an exterior act. For the doctrine on the morality of the effect is of the greatest moment in practice and as it were the key by which many and difficult cases must be solved, — such as cooperation, scandal, harming, etc. Now the following hold about this matter.

172. Principles on the morality of the external effect.

I. A good or bad effect, directly and in itself voluntary, is imputed to the agent for either goodness or malice, whence it increases the goodness of an otherwise good act, and the malice of an otherwise evil act; but if to an evil act a good effect is joined, this does not remove the malice of the act, although it can diminish it.

II. A good effect only in its cause or indirectly willed is not imputed for goodness, because good is not rightly done, as right reason dictates and as it deserves to be done, unless it is willed for its own sake, whence goodness is not contracted unless it is intended in itself (n. 146).

III. A bad effect in its cause or indirectly willed is imputed to the agent for malice, if three conditions are verified:

1. if it was in some way foreseen, at least in a confused way: nothing is willed unless it is first known;

2. if it could have been prevented, insofar as the cause could have not been placed, or, having been placed, removed — for the effect is not more voluntary than the cause;

3. if it ought also to have been prevented, i. e., there was an obligation of avoiding the effect, or of not placing the cause or of removing the cause so that the effect would not follow (nn. 60 and 63).

To prevent an evil effect, one can be bound either by office, e. g., parents or a teacher to drive away from the children committed to them wicked companions, lest they be corrupted; or by justice, as a guardian or administrator regarding the things or affairs entrusted to him; or by religion, as a consultor for the divine honor; or by every virtue, lest an effect directly contrary to it be produced; or by charity, which e. g. demands that you cry out lest another unknowingly fall into danger of life. — On the contrary, if you do not have necessary care of health, it will not be imputed to you that on some day you cannot fast, just as it will not be that you experienced a pollution because you ate meat on a forbidden day: for these are not precisely to be avoided so that such an effect does not follow.

173. Principle on the lawful manner of causing a bad effect. — Each virtue generally obliges to avoiding the cause that produces an evil effect opposed to it, e. g., harm to a third party, scandal, dishonest movements; but not always. It is lawful to place a cause that simultaneously produces a good and a bad effect, if the good effect follows from the cause at least as immediately as the bad, or not through the bad, and there is present a proportionately grave reason, with the two others always necessary being supposed, namely the action being lawful in itself, and the right intention of the agent.

Four things therefore are required: a) Two on the part of the effect, that the bad effect not be imputed; namely:

1. That the good effect follow from the cause at least as immediately as the bad, or not through the bad effect; otherwise this would be the means to obtain the good effect, whereas evils are not to be done that goods may come (n. 156, 5°): hence it is illicit to lie in order to save a man, to procure an abortion to avoid infamy, or to kill the fetus to save the mother's life, to steal money to give alms, etc.

2. That there be a reason for placing the cause, and indeed proportionately grave, i. e., that the good procured surpass or equal the evil: for reason dictates that one good is not to be procured in act from which a greater evil follows; — on the contrary, if the good compensates the evil, no reason appears why the evil should be avoided: thus it is not lawful to kill an aggressor to preserve goods of less value, it is lawful to preserve life. Hence the greater the malice of the effect, the greater must be the excusing reason; and it is always required that the good effect cannot otherwise suitably be obtained: otherwise there would no longer be a reason for bringing about the bad effect.

b) So that not only the bad effect not be imputed, but also that it be lawfully caused, or so that the action itself be honest, moreover two other things are required on the part of the action:

3. That the action in itself (i. e., setting aside the circumstances) not be bad, but honest or at least indifferent: for a cause in itself bad includes fault of itself.

4. That the end of the agent be honest, and therefore that the bad effect not be intended but only the good, otherwise it would be bad in itself voluntary or at least willed; whence it is also required that there not be a proximate danger of consenting to evil or approving it¹.

This principle, however, is not always rightly explained by everyone.

a) Some assert that it is not required that the good effect be immediate, but it suffices that it does not come through the bad, even if it is more remote. But this seems to be a question of manner of speaking: for then the possibility of obtaining the good effect already results immediately from the action and this already is a certain good effect.

b) Others understand the principle of the cause per se with respect to the good effect and of the cause per accidens with respect to the bad effect, so that the good effect must follow per se and as it were necessarily from the action, and the bad effect only per accidens. But, although in this case it can more easily be a reason for placing the action, or that there is a compensation of the bad effect by the good, it is not, however, proved that this is a sine qua non condition, so that otherwise one would have to abstain from the action. For it does not seem impossible to have a cause from which simultaneously per se would follow a twofold effect: one good, the other bad (say health, and drunkenness or abortion); which nevertheless it would be lawful to apply if it were necessary to obtain the good effect, provided this compensates the bad. Indeed if the bad effect followed from the cause per se, the good only per accidens, why could we not order that cause per accidens to obtain the good effect, if it would thus certainly be produced and truly preponderate over the evil? By such a restriction, therefore, the principle seems unduly limited.

c) Others finally apply the principle too materially, and seem to think that the good effect in itself considered must always be equal to the bad effect. But it suffices that the goodness of the effect, together with the utility which it procures for the agent or others, and the inconvenience and harm (which if the cause were not placed would arise) avoided, compensates the evil, i. e., not always the bad effect but at least the influence of the action on this effect: for the bad effect must be compensated by the agent because his action influences it, whence it must be compensated in so far as the action influences. Hence a graver reason is required for placing the cause:

1° the graver or worse the effect is, both in itself and with respect to the harm of others, especially of society; e. g., a greater reason is required for killing an aggressor than for lightly wounding, a greater one for producing a harmful effect on society than on an individual;

2° the more actively and necessarily the bad effect proceeds from the action, the more closely it coheres with it, and the more probably it follows from it; e. g., a greater reason is required for one who concurs proximately than for one who concurs remotely in another's sin (e. g., the making of a wicked book or drunkenness), a greater one for reading a wicked book than a book of lighter nature from which movements of concupiscence arise more remotely, a greater one for placing a per se cause than a per accidens cause; likewise a very urgent reason is required that a maidservant be able to exercise service in a house where she is often allured to sin by the son, a much less motive suffices if an outsider coming into the house now and then solicits;

3° the less right the agent has to place the cause and the more certain it is that, if he does not act, the effect will not be produced; i. e., the greater the obligation ex officio of preventing evil; e. g., a greater reason is required for letting a building to heretics if they can find no other than if they can easily rent one elsewhere, a greater reason for a bookseller to be able to sell a wicked book if no one else is found to sell it than if someone else is at hand to sell it.

All of which must be considered together, to prudently judge whether the good compensates the evil.

174. How great is the imputability of a bad effect. — For determining the gravity of the fault incurred by him who places the cause of a bad effect, the axiom holds: An effect voluntary in its cause is not more culpable than the cause itself. Which is not to be understood of the cause in itself and independently of the effect considered: for it can happen that an action in itself good, indifferent, lightly bad, contracts grave malice from the effect, e. g., if the throwing of a stone or a slight falsehood is the cause of homicide; on the contrary that an action in itself gravely bad has slight malice by reason of the effect, e. g., drunkenness which produces slight anger, homicide inflicting some other small harm. But it is to be understood of the cause considered as cause, i. e., insofar as it influences the effect; whence the nature and gravity are to be considered, both of the influence or causality, and of the effect itself. Hence

1. a cause which of itself, proximately, and gravely influences a bad effect, besides its proper malice which it perhaps has from itself, acquires in addition grave or light malice of the effect; whence a cause per se gravely bad, which proximately influences a lightly bad effect, has light malice superadded; on the contrary a cause per se lightly bad, which proximately influences a gravely bad effect, has grave malice from this;

2. a cause which of itself but lightly and remotely, or only per accidens, influences even a grave effect, by reason of the influence contracts only light malice, e. g., if from immoderate food or from drunkenness or from a delectation morosa not protracted a pollution follows. A small influence in a grave thing of itself is not something notable. Such a cause has, however, grave malice by reason of the effect, if this is strictly prohibited so that all things must be avoided which even lightly contribute to it (as happens in matters of justice, lest grave harm be inflicted on a neighbor), or if by reason of office or state there is a special obligation to avoid the effect². Thus drunkenness's influence on pollution is lightly, on homicide gravely culpable.

175. When the morality of the effect is contracted. — The whole goodness or malice of the effect is contracted inchoatively interiorly and as to the affect, when the cause is voluntarily placed, even if per accidens the effect does not follow: for then the effect is intended at least in a confused way; consummatively exteriorly and as to the effect, when the effect really occurs, unless at this moment the past will, as far as possible, has been retracted: for then the effect will be only materially good or bad.

176. Remark for understanding the doctrine of S. Thomas. — In q. 20, a. 5, briefly and with several other principles supposed, S. Thomas teaches several things about the morality of the effect, which can be understood from what has been said:

A. In the order of execution, the following event, willed, whether it follows or does not follow, does not add formal goodness or malice to the external action, just as « he does not make an act bad which was good, nor good which was bad; e. g., if someone gives alms to a poor man, who abuses it for sin, nothing is lost to him who gave the alms; and similarly, if someone suffers the injury done to him, he who did it is not excused by this ».

For morality depends on the voluntary. Whether the intended effect follows or is accidentally prevented is involuntary. Therefore it does not change the morality of the act.

B. In the order of intention about the event he teaches three things:

1. The following event pre-cogitated, i. e., distinctly foreseen and in some way willed³ (in that diverse manner which is required for contracting goodness and malice), increases the formal goodness or malice of the external act.

2. The following event not pre-cogitated, i. e., not distinctly foreseen, if per se as in many cases follows from such an action, directly adds to the goodness or malice of the act, which is better in its kind from which many goods are wont to follow, and worse from which many evils are wont to follow. In this doctrine, however, the general principle is supposed: for that goodness to be in fact contracted it must be intended; for malice to be contracted it must be in some way at least in a confused way foreseen, which nevertheless easily happens if the action is of itself apt to produce the bad effect.

3. The following event not pre-cogitated, if per accidens as in fewer cases follows, directly does not add to the goodness or malice, e. g., the abuse of alms by a poor man.

These things are to be understood, supposing that from the same act there does not follow as immediately a twofold effect: bad and good but greater and compensating. For then what was said n° 173 must be applied.

177. Corollary. — From what has been said it is understood, why and how far it is illicit voluntarily to expose oneself to the danger of doing evil or sinning: for this is not sufficiently to avoid the bad effect or even to place the cause of the bad effect. This danger, however, can be from an internal cause (such as evil imagination or passion) or external (i. e., occasion, such as a thing alluring to evil); — absolute, i. e., for all in common, or relative to such a determined person; — proximate or grave, which in many cases or more frequently is connected with sin, or remote or slight, which is rarely connected. Now:

1. It is illicit without a just and proportionate reason to expose oneself to a proximate or grave danger of doing evil. For he who without sufficient reason wills a thing, by that very fact imputably wills everything which is probably connected with it, and therefore he who intends to incur the danger of doing evil, by that very fact wills the evil probably connected with it. And he who is bound altogether to avoid sin, is also bound to avoid the means that probably leads to it. Whence he who does not avoid such danger, when he can, is convicted of not sufficiently avoiding it but of loving that evil, the danger of which he loves (Eccli. III, 27).

Hence everyone is bound under grave obligation to avoid a proximate grave danger of committing evil; under light obligation, a proximate light danger of committing evil.

2. It is lawful from a just proportionately grave reason, namely a compensating good effect, to expose oneself to even a grave and proximate danger of doing evil. The reason is that he who for a just reason exposes himself to danger, does not love the evil, but the good cause for which he so acts, nor properly exposes himself to danger but rather unwillingly undergoes the danger. Understand with this restriction: provided there is a founded hope of overcoming the danger and suitable precautions are employed by which the danger is made remote; for certain sin is absolutely to be avoided.

3. For a slight and remote danger (of some moment), even of committing grave evil, to expose oneself without a reason is illicit but lightly; but it is lawful for any reasonable, even slight, cause: for there is some disorder against reason in that someone, without cause, places a useless action, with which is also connected the danger of evil.

S. Th. I-II, q. 24 ; Q. 26 de Verit., a. 6 and 7.

178. Principle I. Passions also can contribute to the morality of human acts¹, and indeed not only for the morality of interior but also of exterior acts.

For passions can be considered in a twofold way:

1° as to the being of nature or the physical, inasmuch as they are common to us with brutes, and so are physically good, since they are implanted by God;

2° as to moral being, inasmuch as they are proper to man, and so

a) they are not of themselves bad, nor good, but indifferent: for the movements of the sensitive appetite are not of themselves from reason, nor therefore human;

b) if they are considered as subject to the command of reason and will, so they are good or bad, inasmuch as they are voluntary, whether directly inasmuch as they are commanded by the will, or indirectly inasmuch as they are not prevented by it.

It is proved: 1) « For the sensitive appetite is nearer to reason and will than the external members ». But the acts of the external members are morally good or bad according as they are voluntary. Therefore much more the passions themselves, according as they are voluntary, are morally good or bad (a. 1).

2. From the Scriptures, (which a) commend certain passions (Ps. IV, 5; II Cor. VII, 9; Rom. XII, 15); b) assert that they are found in Christ although bound by reason (Mc. XXVI, 38; Mc. III, 5; XIV, 33; Lc. XIX, 41; Ioh. XI, 33); c) and praise men for them or reprove them for their absence (Exod. XXXII, 19; Num. XXV, 11; I Reg. II-III).

Whence to be ruled by passions is not evil because they are in themselves evil, but because the order is inverted, according to which the higher part ought to rule the lower; but it is good to rule them, provided this is conformably to the order of reason (a. 2).

179. Corollary. — Therefore the passions, if they are considered as to their natural being, are not morally good or bad according to species, but indifferent; but if they are considered as regulated by reason, they can be, just as external acts, according to species good or bad, according as their proper object is fitting for reason or unfitting: thus e. g. shame or fear of base things is good, and envy or sadness at another's good is bad (a. 4).

180. Principle II. Voluntary passions increase the goodness or malice of the act. — It is proved: The more perfect the good of reason or moral good is, the more it is derived to the many things that are fitting for man; whence it also pertains to moral perfection that external acts be directed by reason. But the sensitive appetite can obey reason. Therefore it pertains to moral perfection that the passions be regulated by reason. Just as therefore it is better that man will the good and do it by an exterior act, so it is better that he be moved to the good, both according to the will and according to the sensitive appetite, for promptness in operating (a. 3).

Which, however, is to be understood of passions willed, which are chosen and commanded by the will (in the respectively diverse way in which it must be done for good and evil; cf. n. 146). For a passion which moves man toward a sensible good, if it precedes the will, diminishes liberty and consequently goodness and malice; — if it follows by redundance, it is not the cause but the mere effect of the will: not the cause namely but « the sign of a more intense will (or of a greater voluntary), and so indicates greater moral goodness » or malice; — if it follows by election, it adds to the goodness or malice (ad 1).

About the principal circumstance propter quid (for what reason) enough has been said where we treated of the end; likewise about the circumstance quid (what) where we treated of the goodness and malice of the effect; moreover what we noted about the passions has already considered the quomodo (how) of circumstances (as to its part). It remains, therefore, to say about the rest not exposed, and indeed in relation to the interior act together with the exterior, because all can modify the latter, many the former.

181. The circumstance who does not denote the very person of the agent as such (for thus it pertains to the substance of the human act), but his condition or accidental quality, by reason of which in the moral estimation the act either altogether or more or less morally avails, e. g., that the agent be a religious, a priest or a layman, married or free, a superior or a subject, rich or poor, a child or an old man, etc.

Often it indicates an office or special obligation (of justice, piety, fidelity), and then it brings to the good or bad act a new species of goodness or malice, as, if bound by vow he keeps chastity, or being married he fornicates; otherwise it is only aggravating: thus other things being equal with the same deliberation or negligence supposed, a religious acts better or sins more gravely than a secular, a learned man than an unlearned, because he operates more perfectly or sin is more fitting for him.

182. The circumstance about what does not signify the very object or matter (for that pertains to the substance of the act), but the accident joined to it, e. g., quantity or quality, as that the thing be sacred or profane, of one's father or of a stranger, much or little, grave or light, etc.

Often the quality changes the species, namely if it brings a distinct goodness or malice, as alms given to a poor person of the Church, or theft of a sacred thing, praise or striking of a father or cleric. So in acts toward another, in the matter of chastity by reason of the accomplice, in the matter of religion toward sacred things. Sometimes namely the quality on the part of the agent changes the species; the same quality on the part of the object or matter also does so; whence it is understood that there is a twofold malice in adultery or carnal sacrilege if both persons are married or sacred, because the twofold circumstance changes the species. Sometimes the quality only aggravates, as to love one's enemy or to do good to orphans and widows, to wound one altogether innocent.

Quantity of matter only aggravates, e. g., to give or steal two hundred francs instead of one hundred, to pray or labor many hours on the Lord's day.

183. The circumstance with what aids indicates the accidental instruments or means (even companions) which we use for acting, e. g., to employ the help of a saint or a demon, to get drunk with money stolen, to use a sacred thing for fornication, to kill with forbidden arms, with a sword or with poison.

It changes the species if the means import a special morality, such as the use of magic arts to seduce a girl, of sacred rites to deceive another (Gen. XXXIV, 15); confessions to solicit; otherwise it aggravates, as if you induce a priest to lie, or choose for killing arms for exquisite torture, or if the Lord's feet are anointed with precious ointment (Luc. VII, 46; Mt. XXVI, 7; Mc. XIV, 3; Ioh. XII, 3).

184. The circumstance how signifies the accidental manner in which the interior or exterior act is done, e. g., with full deliberate or imperfect will, directly or indirectly; intensely or remissly; from malice, passion or ignorance; from contempt, levity, force, deceit; prudently or imprudently; in good or bad faith, etc.

Sometimes it changes the species: thus violence makes of simple theft robbery, of fornication rape; likewise the modes against nature in lust. Ordinarily it aggravates, e. g., to act with perfect knowledge or will strengthened in good or in evil, to kill limb by limb, — or diminishes, e. g., to act from grave fear, vehement temptation, sudden passion. Thus intensely or remissly does not change the species but increases or diminishes.

185. The circumstance where does not denote the bare place (for every act must be done somewhere), but the accidental quality of the place contributing something of goodness or malice to the act, as that the place be sacred, with respect to prayer and worship, or theft, fornication, homicide, etc.; or public, in scandal or good example (II Reg. XVI, 21).

More often it changes the species in external acts by adding special morality of religion or charity; it also gives the first species of morality if the work is in itself indifferent and is prescribed or prohibited by reason of place, as to uncover oneself or to carry on commerce in a church. More rarely it aggravates, namely in internal acts which do not so directly have relation to the place, e. g., meditation done in a church, complacent dwelling on an evil thought there.

186. The circumstance when denotes the accidental condition of time, as the quantity or duration if the act lasts long or short (e. g., love or hatred or desire), or the quality if the act is done on a holy day, in a sacred time, in a more difficult time.

The quantity of time is an aggravating or diminishing circumstance; the quality, however, of itself and set aside the direct intention of honoring or dishonoring does not contribute much to increasing morality, unless the act good or bad in itself is specially prescribed or prohibited by reason of the sacred time (Mass, breakfast), or by it special reverence or irreverence to divine worship is wrought, or scandal is present, e. g., if one on Good Friday should exhibit public games or immediately after communion should go to a concubine or get drunk.

Time differs from place: the latter, because of its stability, is capable of consecration and permanent sanctity; time, continually passing, only accidentally, by reason of the mystery or action then recalled or done, is called sacred; whence of itself it does not change the species.

If an act in itself neither good nor bad is prescribed or prohibited in a sacred time, the circumstance of time passes into the notion of object, and gives the first morality, e. g., to work on a sacred day or to abstain from work.

187. Case. — That the concurrence of circumstances in one act may be better understood, we note the following case, classic in theology: « John, the custodian of a church, a consecrated golden ciborium, containing hosts necessary for paschal communion, with the help of accomplices and with the intention of profaning the Sacrament, on the very feria 5ª of the Lord's Supper, in the church violently and from the hands of the parish priest, steals. How many and what circumstances intervene in this case? »

R. All of them; namely 1) the circumstance who: the custodian of the church; 2) about what, by reason of quantity: a golden ciborium; by reason of quality: a consecrated ciborium; 3) what, by reason of the effect: the privation of paschal communions; 4) where: in the church; 5) with what aids: with the help of accomplices; 6) why: from the intention of profaning the Sacrament; 7) how: violently; 8) when: on the very feria 5ª of the Lord's Supper.