Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. I-II, q. 18, a. 6-9 ; 19, a. 7 and 10 ; 20, a. 1, 3 and 6 ; C. G. III, 26 ; De Malo, q. 2, a. 2, ad 5 and 11, a. 3 ; II Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 4.

Let the notions about ends, treated above, nn. 9 and 10, be recalled.

155. Principle I. Human acts have the species of goodness or malice from the end.

It is proved: A human act has its species from the object. But there is a twofold human act: the interior act of the will whose proper object is the good or end, and the exterior act whose object is that about which it is concerned. Those two acts, because they say order to one thing, are one moral act, in which the interior act is the formal element because the will determines the external members to act, and because the external act is not voluntary and human except dependently on the will; whence it is the material element. Therefore they have one and the same goodness or malice, and therefore

1. the interior act has its species and morality principally from the end and participates in the morality of the exterior object;

2. on the contrary, the exterior act has its species and morality from its object and participates in the morality of the end;

3. the complete act is principally and formally considered according to the end intended, materially and secondarily according to the object of the exterior act, whence he who steals that he may commit adultery is more an adulterer than a thief.

Therefore 1° one physical act a) can have according to moral being two or more species of goodness or malice, or be multiplex in species according to moral being, if it has an object and an end, or even ends of diverse species, subordinated to one another, as if one steals for fornication and this for extorting a secret; — on the contrary b) if the end is of the same species as the object, goodness or malice is only increased in the same species, as if one steals a key from one to steal gold from another.

Indeed 2° one physical act, as it seems, can be multiplex in number according to moral being: a) if it is done for several ends, not indeed subordinated but equally principal, disparate and independent, e. g., alms for mercy and to please a friend, a gift for vain glory and for fornication. For there are as many acts numerically distinct as there are independent ends, because an act having several total objects is virtually and according to moral being multiplex; for example, there are as many morally acts as there are objects according to moral being distinct or total¹; — also b) it can be good and bad under different respect, not only successively by a change of the moral object, as the eating of meat begun before feria 6 and continued after it, but also simultaneously if one acts for good and bad ends, equally principal, because then the bad end does not affect the good, nor vice versa. Thus e. g. almsgiving given to relieve misery and at the same time for vain glory.

156. Practical rules follow from the foregoing:

1° An act good from its object referred to a good end has a double goodness if both are intended, as if one wishes to relieve the poor and this for penance; — if the goodness of the object is not intended, it has only the goodness of the end, because then the object is considered as the sole means to the end, e. g., if one abstains from wine, not for the good of abstinence about which he cares not at all, but solely for easier preservation of continence².

2° An act bad from its object referred to a bad end has a double malice of object and end, e. g., theft for fornication.

3° An act, good in itself and from its object, referred to a bad end which is the total and adequate reason why it is chosen, is in no part good but altogether bad, e. g., if one gives alms solely for fornication or to turn a poor man away from religion.

It is proved: a) from the Scriptures Mt. VI, 2, 5, 22-23; Prov. XXI, 27;

b) from the general principle: Goodness is not contracted unless it is intended and the agent is moved by it (n. 146); but in the present case the object is intended not as in itself good but as a means to a bad end: for it is not apprehended except as something bad, and therefore inasmuch as it is the object of this act it is not good but bad. The object namely communicates no goodness actually, but only the end intended passes into the notion of object. — In other words: to will the good under the aspect of evil is not good but evil; but he who acts solely for a bad end wills goodness only under the aspect of evil; therefore the act is totally evil.

4° An act good in itself or from its object which is referred to a bad end but partial, so that this is not the sole

whence one act of the will intends the principal end to which the external act is ordered, another act of the will intending the secondary end merely accompanies the execution of the work.

reason for acting, is bad from the end but good from the object, even if the end is mortally bad, e. g., if one intends to give alms for mercy and also to honor an idol; in practice, however, it almost never happens that a mortally evil act has a sufficiently disparate good end.

It is proved: An act is good from its object if the goodness in itself and for its own sake is intended and that intention is not vitiated. But in the case the goodness of the object in itself and for its own sake is intended, for the act is not done solely for the bad end; and on the other hand that intention is not vitiated, because the good end is not sought for the bad end to which it is not subordinated, nor is the bad intended for the good end. Therefore the act is good from its object. For example, two independent and equally principal ends are intended: the intrinsic end of the object and the extrinsic end of the agent, and therefore one physical act is a double moral act.

5° An act bad from its object or circumstance referred to a good end remains bad, because an evil means to a good end is not proportioned to it, and the goodness of the end does not prevent there being a defect in the object and the means being evil, and the will appetite for evil; whence S. Paul, of those who calumniously reproach us with the contrary, says; « And not (as we are blasphemed, and as some say that we say) let us do evil that there may come good: whose damnation is just » (Rom. III, 8; cf. Eccli. XXXIV, 23-24).

Nevertheless: a) It is less bad, 1) than an act bad for a bad end, and indeed the less bad the better the good end, because the affection for malice is the smaller; — also 2) than an act good exercised for a sole bad end, because then the goodness of the act is corrupted; but to corrupt the good is worse than to order evil to good.

b) The very intention of a good end, however, is good, if this is intended absolutely and for its own sake, to be obtained by some indeterminate means; and therefore was sometimes rewarded by God (Exod. I, 20, 21); — it is bad if the end is not intended absolutely but precisely as moving to the evil means, or as to be obtained by evil and no other means, because then the end is intended not as in itself good but as a moving cause to evil.

6° An act indifferent from its object and circumstances becomes good or bad from the end, which then passes into the notion of object, which gives the first morality: thus to sing for the praise of God or for lust.

157. Remark. — A partial end can stand to the action in a threefold way: a) it can merely precede it, so that it does not influence the action to be placed afterwards, but is rather its occasion, as if one from a human respect goes to sacred rites, to which he then assists with the proper intention: this occasional end does not vitiate the action;

b) it can accompany it, so that at the same time with another good end it is the cause of the action, as if one plays the organ to praise God and for vain glory: this vitiates the action in part;

c) it can follow, if, the action having been begun from a good end, a bad end is added, as if one begins to sing to the praise of God and then there creeps in also some ostentation: this end likewise vitiates the action in part, on the supposition that it truly becomes the end of the action which is then continued for both the good and the bad end; — otherwise if, during a good action, another evil act is placed, e. g., of ostentation or vain glory, because this is not a circumstance of the prior action but merely accompanies it (n. 154; q. 19, a. 7, ad 2).

158. Principle II. For an act to be not bad but good, it is required that it be done for the due honest end.

It is proved: Man acting deliberately, in his human acts, must act as a man, i. e., according to the exigence and dignity of his nature as a rational being insofar as he is distinguished from brutes. But man differs from brutes a) in this, that he positively acts for an end as end; and indeed b) for an end proper to himself, i. e., for the good suitable to his nature, or the honest. Therefore in all human acts he must positively intend an end, and indeed an honest one. Hence:

1. Bad are idle acts (Mt. XII, 36), which are not so called because they have a bad end, but because they do not have the due end: for idle is he who does useless things which he ought not to do while he could or ought to do other useful things. Idle are acts placed solely because it pleases (or displeases) to act thus, and acts omitted because they are not prescribed: for they lack a good end; they are not idle but good if they are done for a good end, e. g., for relief or moderate recreation.

2. Bad are acts that are done solely for the useful good, stopping in it, because it is not an end, since it is not to be desired for its own sake but only for the sake of another; hence it is illicit to seek money or honor for their own sake.

3. Bad are acts that are done principally for the delectable good. For God has attached the principal pleasures as an effect to certain necessary or useful operations, for the sake of those operations, namely that man might not abstain from working, but rather be allured to work; but other secondary pleasures as a means to a better understanding of things, the relief of the mind's fatigue, and recreation in rational life. Whence pleasures are intrinsically ordered to the placing of the work. Therefore it is not lawful to intend pleasure as a principal end, but as secondary and subordinate, namely for the honest good either of the operation or of the recreation; not indeed as a mere means to obtain it but as its effect for the cause, or as a help to placing the work more surely, pleasantly, and easily. For example, to seek the operation for the sake of pleasure is to invert the due order of things³. Hence theologians after S. Augustine say: it is not lawful to enjoy things to be used or to use things to be enjoyed.

4. A fortiori bad are acts that are done solely for pleasure, stopping in it, both because the delectable good must be sought for the honest end, as said under 3), and because animals act solely for pleasure, stopping in it: but man must in all things follow the rule of reason, and therefore seek pleasure insofar as reason dictates it to be proportioned and fitting to his nature, and so it already becomes the honest good. Therefore to seek pleasure for its own sake is to pervert the order. Hence were condemned props. 8 and 9 by Innocent XI⁴.

Hence: a) Bad are acts that are done for any pleasure, if another end is excluded.

b) Acts that procure sensible pleasure of themselves are indifferent, and therefore they are bad if they are not referred at least implicitly to the honest good; otherwise the lower powers, because by their nature they do not tend toward the honest good but to pleasure alone, do not serve the higher, but on the contrary reason and will serve the lower pleasure, which is an inversion of order.

c) On the contrary, they are good if from the circumstances or from the custom of acting the honest end of necessity or utility is sufficiently known, and this is at least implicitly intended: thus he who, without explicitly thinking, at the ordinary hour tends toward the place of recreation.

d) A fortiori good are acts that procure spiritual pleasure from the honest good: for this by its nature is connected with the honest good, which is therefore implicitly intended.

The aforesaid evil acts, in which the due end is only excluded in affection or affectively, of themselves are only lightly evil, because the inordinate use of a thing not illicit is not a grave disorder. If, however, one also effectively should wish to prevent the due end, it could be grave.

159. Principle III. The due intermediate end, or the ultimate in a certain respect, is whatever honest good, because this is conformed to rational nature; — the simply ultimate due end is the Supreme Good, that is, God.

Hence:

1° For an act to be good, we cannot positively exclude God, whether explicitly, or implicitly by loving a creature above all things or preferring it to God.

2° But we ought not in every act expressly to tend toward God, but it suffices implicitly, inasmuch as every honest participated good is by its nature ordered and tends toward the supreme good (cf. props. 16 and 38 of Baius condemned).

3° Sometimes, however, there is a precept of explicitly tending (or turning oneself) toward God through charity: but he who loves God above all things by that very fact refers implicitly to God all things that can be referred to him⁵.

If a sinner omits this, he sins by the omission at the moment the precept urges; but the other works which at this moment or later are done will not therefore be sinful, because the omission is not a true circumstance influencing and affecting the work itself, but only merely accompanies it (unless they have been the occasion of it). Otherwise it would have to be said that all the works of infidels are sins; likewise works performed for the sake of an eternal reward or from fear of hell would be evil, which was condemned by the Church (prop. 16 of Hus; props. 22, 35, 38, 40 of Baius; prop. 15 condemned by Alex. VIII; props. 45 and 59 of Quesnel; prop. 23 of Pistor.; C. Trid. sess. 6, can. 31; sess. 14, c. 4).

4° There is no other precept of explicitly referring all or even individual works to God. But the words of the Apostle (I Cor. X, 31) can be understood either of counsel, — or negatively of the obligation of doing nothing against the glory of God, and of doing nothing that cannot be referred to God; i. e., of doing only honest works which are implicitly referred to God; — or positively of the act of charity which orders the whole subsequent life to God implicitly as to the ultimate end.

Let it be noted, however, that not all things can be referred to God even by him who has charity: namely acts that are not proportioned to the glory of God, such as venial sins, and many indifferent acts, e. g., walking, eating, etc.; these of themselves are not proportioned to the end of the glory of God and of themselves contribute nothing to the honor of God, and therefore in order that they can be done for God they must first be referred to an honest end proportioned to them, e. g., to health, to sustenance, etc.

160. Are there indifferent acts? — From the foregoing it follows that there are no indifferent acts, if acts are not considered in the abstract, from the part of the object alone and according to species only, but in the concrete or in the individual, i. e., from the part of the thing with all its circumstances. For man acting deliberately, either acts in the due circumstances for the due honest end indicated by reason and fitting to nature, and then the act is good; — or does not act in the due circumstances, or at least does not act for the due honest end indicated by reason, and then the act is bad. To act for an indifferent end would be an idle act; but there is no concrete indifferent end, because the end is good, and this is either the true good, or according to appearance only, and then it is bad.

It is said: man acting deliberately. For many acts are placed from imagination alone, such as to rub one's chin, to move a foot or hand, etc., and such acts are not properly human, good or bad, but are indifferent existing outside the genus of morality.

161. Corollaries. — From the foregoing it is understood that one must not admit:

1. The opinion of the Scotists, who say that it is illicit to act solely for pleasure when the act from itself, by its intrinsic end, is ordered to something other than pleasure; such as eating, drinking, the conjugal act; it is not illicit when the pleasure is the end which the act by its nature intends, e. g., recreation of the ears in music, of the eyes in the vision of beauty, of the nostrils in the smell of flowers; these namely acts, according to them, are in the individual indifferent. — But we have seen that there are no indifferent acts in the individual.

2. Nor the opinion of Ballerini, whom many Jesuits follow (Génicot, Noldin, Vermeersch), saying that acts exercised for the end of pleasure are morally good even if the will does not intend another honest end, provided it does not positively exclude the end, nor have anything disordered in the action itself. — But this opinion is too benign. For in order that man act as a man, it is not sufficient for him to avoid evil, but it is also required to will and do the good fitting to his nature, namely the honest, which is impossible unless he positively intends it. For a) on the one hand, the good is not contracted unless it is positively intended for its own sake (n. 146); but the sensitive appetite of itself does not tend toward the honest good but to the delectable good alone; therefore the delight of the sensitive appetite will not be good unless it is positively intended for the honest good. Otherwise in the concrete it will be bad. b) On the other hand, to avoid evil is not a positively honest end, because between the objectively evil and the objectively good there mediates the objectively indifferent; therefore it is not sufficient to will to avoid the objectively evil for the act to be objectively good, but a positively honest end must be intended. Otherwise the act in the concrete will be idle and bad, as lacking the due circumstance of a right end.

c) Innocent XI condemned eating and the conjugal act as illicit because done solely for pleasure. And if the Scotists can explain the condemnation of the propositions by Inn. XI by saying that eating, drinking, the conjugal act are not ordered from their intrinsic end to pleasure, Ballerini cannot explain this without distorting the words from their obvious sense, and saying that the positive exclusion of the honest end is prohibited, but not the negative exclusion.

Therefore, in order that an act exercised for sensible pleasure be good, it is not sufficient that it not be in itself disordered, nor that it be in fact fitting to rational nature; it is also required that as such it be known in some way by the agent, and at least implicitly as such intended.

3. On the other hand, some have exceeded in the manner of speaking, saying that a good act requires that one will the good formally as honest, or even act from the general intention of living rightly and always acting according to reason. For it is sufficient that one in some way intend the good which is honest and is known as such, without willing it precisely and expressly because honest; and so one already implicitly tends toward the ultimate end.

4. A fortiori the Jansenists and Augustinians (such as Noris, Berti) erred, requiring that a good act be explicitly referred to God, the ultimate end.

Practically the opinion of S. Thomas does not differ much from the more recent opinion of Ballerini and his followers, for when someone wills, in seeking pleasure, to act moderately and admits nothing disordered, this person ordinarily not only does not positively exclude the honest end, but could scarcely not implicitly include it. Indeed this opinion is more benign than the Scotist opinion, for acts which the Scotists consider indifferent, according to us easily become good, since the fittingness with rational nature, namely the good habitudo of mind, is easily perceived in them.