Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. I-II, q. 18, a. 10 and 11 ; De Malo, q. 2, a. 6-8.

151. A moral circumstance is an accident of a human act morally affecting it in its moral being already constituted.

For which three conditions are required:

1. that the act already be constituted in moral being, i. e., have morality from the object independently of the circumstances: for an accident presupposes a substance. Thus it is not a circumstance with respect to theft that it be another's property, but that it be notable; similarly an act indifferent from its object has its first specific morality from the circumstance first and principally intended, which therefore becomes the object because it is first and of itself intended under the aspect of good or evil;

2. that the circumstance be outside the substance of the act and affect it, and therefore that it does not destroy or essentially change the substantial moral being which the act has from the object, as if one does a good act solely for a bad end: for then it would not be an accident but would pass into the substance and object;

3. that the circumstance affect the act according to moral being, increasing or diminishing goodness or malice: thus that one steal with the right or left hand is a physical and indifferent circumstance; but that the thing be precious or cheap is a moral circumstance.

Moreover, by reason of their influence on morality, some circumstances change the species, others only aggravate or diminish within the same species¹.

**152. Principles. I. Moral circumstances changing the species are those which add to the act a goodness or malice specifically diverse from that which the act has from the object, because of themselves, separately and independently of the morality that comes from the object, they import some fittingness or repugnance to right reason, or a special and distinct conformity or disformity to the rules of mores: thus when one gives alms to make satisfaction for sin or steals a sacred thing, the circumstance of the end says a special conformity with reason, and the circumstance of the sacred a special disformity. These circumstances do not remain in the notion of circumstance but rather are considered as the principal condition of the object (or as a partial object), and become, as it were, the specific difference thereof: the genus is to take another's property or to give alms; the species to take a sacred thing, to give satisfactory alms.

II. Moral circumstances only aggravating or diminishing within the same species, are those which do not import something of itself fitting or repugnant to reason and of themselves say no order to the rules of mores, but only by reason of a prior circumstance or condition of the object have the morality which they presuppose and only modify, such as more and less, much and little, intensely and remissly. Thus to take much or little, of itself does not say goodness or malice, but to take much or little of another's property.

Among these some are:

1. Notably aggravating or diminishing. Such are:

1. Several authors teach that there are not circumstances truly and properly diminishing moral good or evil; but in this there is only a different way of speaking.

a) in quantitative matter which consists in number, weight, measure, those which taken separately and apart from the act suffice for mortal sin, e. g., if someone besides 100 gold pieces steals another 100, or steals a gilded watch which he thinks is gold, will be a notably aggravating circumstance of theft; on the contrary if he steals a gold watch which he thinks is silver, a notably diminishing circumstance;

b) in other matters (duration, intensity, execution), those which notably exceed the ordinary manner of acting well or badly in these matters, e. g., if someone perseveres in hatred for a year, or spends the whole night with a woman in unchastity; or only consents to it for some instant. Sometimes they so notably increase or diminish that they make a sin from venial mortal or from mortal venial, and so are said to aggravate or diminish infinitely, e. g., the circumstance of grave harm to a neighbor from a slight theft, or the circumstance of semi-full deliberation in blasphemy, imprecation, base delight.

2. Others are lightly aggravating or diminishing, such as:

a) in quantitative matter those which taken separately do not suffice for mortal sin, as if someone instead of 100 fr. steals 101 or 99;

b) in other matters, those which do not much exceed the ordinary manner of acting, as if someone after a quarrel remains angry for a little while in hatred.

153. Practical rules follow from the foregoing:

1° An act indifferent from its object can become good or bad from circumstances: thus to eat temperately to refresh one's strength is good, to do this with excess is bad; then the circumstance passes into the notion of object because it is first and of itself intended under the aspect of good or evil.

2° An act good from its object is made bad by circumstances, gravely or lightly, according to the degree of malice inherent in them, e. g., commerce in a sacred place, servile labor on the Lord's day, marriage with a person bound by a vow of chastity. Then the circumstance becomes the principal condition or part of the object.

3° An act good or bad from its object can receive from circumstances a new species of goodness or malice, e. g., he who keeps chastity from a vow contracts the goodness of chastity and of religion; he who steals a sacred thing contracts the malice of theft and of sacrilege. This circumstance also becomes a condition of the object.

4° An act good or bad from its object can acquire or lose from circumstances some greater degree of goodness or malice, e. g., a poor man giving alms, a man excellent in doctrine who puts himself below others; a priest sinning, a rich man as if forced to give alms, a poor man committing theft. Such remain mere circumstances,

154. Remark. — From the circumstances properly so called which affect the act, differ those internal or external actions which during the principal action are sometimes done, and only accompany it, without influence upon it. These are truly distinct acts which can be evil, but do not affect the goodness of the principal action. Thus if the care of the sick, communion, the hearing of Mass is done also because of a sensible affection for the sick, vain glory, curiosity, it will be an evil circumstance; on the contrary if they are done with a movement of impatience, affection for venial sin, distractions, these will be only evils that accompany them themselves.