Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

147. State of the question. — We have seen the supreme species in morality, namely goodness and malice, arise from the object, circumstances, and end; but the lowest species of moral acts must also be considered, according to which they have such special goodness or such special malice. Whence it is asked

a) whether this distinction arises from the same three sources; indeed

b) since a natural entity is placed in only one species, it is doubted whether several moral species can be found in one moral act.

To which we shall give the answer, with the object, circumstances, and end considered separately.

S. Th. I-II, q. 18, a. 2 ; a. 4, ad 3 ; a. 6 ; a. 7, ad 1 ; a. 10 ; q. 1, a. 3, ad 3 ; De Malo, q. 2, a. 6, ad 3.

148. Principle I. The morally considered object gives human acts not only generic but also specific morality.

Declaration. The sense is: The object not only makes the essential distinction between good and bad, and constitutes the supreme species of goodness and malice in human acts, but also the lowest species by which various good or bad acts are distinguished from one another.

It is proved: A moral act is essentially a motion to the morally considered object, as to a terminus. But every motion essentially has its lowest species from the terminus. Therefore every human act has its lowest moral species from the morally considered object. — And therefore according as objects say diverse fittingness with reason or opposition, various species of good acts are distinguished (e. g., love of God and of neighbor, faith and charity, fortitude and temperance), or of bad acts (e. g., homicide and theft, blasphemy and detraction, lust and anger).

Against this doctrine there is no obstacle from 1) the circumstance's being able to constitute the lowest moral species in a human act, because then it enters into the object, and becomes the principal condition of it and, as it were, the specific difference of the human act, as will be explained below, art. 2;

2. the human act's receiving its species from the end, because a) the end is the object of the will; b) with respect to the external commanded act, the end of the work is the same as the object, the end of the agent added is a circumstance adding species, which is considered by the agent as the accessory condition of the object coming extrinsically, insofar as the act is done under the influence of the will whose object is the end of the agent (cf. art. 3).

149. Principle II. One and the same moral act can have multiple species of morality.

It is proved: 1) This is not verified of a human act according to physical being, because a physical entity is specified by a natural form which is determined to one thing, and therefore is of one species; but according to moral being, an act is specified by the object apprehended by reason, which is not determined to one thing, but under different consideration can be referred to different species according to the moral conditions supervening, whether the species are of themselves subordinated to one another, or are disparate, as if theft is ordered to drunkenness (a. 7, ad 1). Thus to take another's property from a sacred place includes a different specific repugnance to the order of reason, which dictates that an injury not be done to a sacred place; and yet the object remains one, but composed of several.

2. Moral being accrues as a quality to the physical being itself, and therefore just as one physical thing can be of different species

Summa Theologiae Moralis I — 10 of perfection or defect according to accidents, e. g., the same man white and musical, blind and deaf, so one physical act can pertain to several moral species. Whence nothing prevents the same act from being in different species of virtue or sin.

150. Principle III. One and the same moral act cannot, however, be at one and the same time good and bad.

It is proved: For an act to be simply good, goodness is required from every part; for it to be simply bad, malice from any part is sufficient. Therefore.

And nevertheless, an act evil from one part is not thereby deprived of every goodness coming from other sources: thus an act good according to species can be bad by reason of a circumstance, or an act good according to species and circumstances can be ordered to a bad end, because, as S. Thomas says, « the posterior being removed, the prior nevertheless remains » (I Sent., d. 41, q. 1, a. 2 (Cf. I-II, q. 18, a. 4, ad 3).— It is excepted if the act is done from the sole or total cause of evil, because then no goodness is intended nor contracted, but the act is considered as a mere means of evil, insofar as the object is considered as altogether evil.

S. Th. I-II, q. 18, a. 10 and 11 ; De Malo, q. 2, a. 6-8.

151. A moral circumstance is an accident of a human act morally affecting it in its moral being already constituted.

For which three conditions are required:

1. that the act already be constituted in moral being, i. e., have morality from the object independently of the circumstances: for an accident presupposes a substance. Thus it is not a circumstance with respect to theft that it be another's property, but that it be notable; similarly an act indifferent from its object has its first specific morality from the circumstance first and principally intended, which therefore becomes the object because it is first and of itself intended under the aspect of good or evil;

2. that the circumstance be outside the substance of the act and affect it, and therefore that it does not destroy or essentially change the substantial moral being which the act has from the object, as if one does a good act solely for a bad end: for then it would not be an accident but would pass into the substance and object;

3. that the circumstance affect the act according to moral being, increasing or diminishing goodness or malice: thus that one steal with the right or left hand is a physical and indifferent circumstance; but that the thing be precious or cheap is a moral circumstance.

Moreover, by reason of their influence on morality, some circumstances change the species, others only aggravate or diminish within the same species¹.

**152. Principles. I. Moral circumstances changing the species are those which add to the act a goodness or malice specifically diverse from that which the act has from the object, because of themselves, separately and independently of the morality that comes from the object, they import some fittingness or repugnance to right reason, or a special and distinct conformity or disformity to the rules of mores: thus when one gives alms to make satisfaction for sin or steals a sacred thing, the circumstance of the end says a special conformity with reason, and the circumstance of the sacred a special disformity. These circumstances do not remain in the notion of circumstance but rather are considered as the principal condition of the object (or as a partial object), and become, as it were, the specific difference thereof: the genus is to take another's property or to give alms; the species to take a sacred thing, to give satisfactory alms.

II. Moral circumstances only aggravating or diminishing within the same species, are those which do not import something of itself fitting or repugnant to reason and of themselves say no order to the rules of mores, but only by reason of a prior circumstance or condition of the object have the morality which they presuppose and only modify, such as more and less, much and little, intensely and remissly. Thus to take much or little, of itself does not say goodness or malice, but to take much or little of another's property.

Among these some are:

1. Notably aggravating or diminishing. Such are:

1. Several authors teach that there are not circumstances truly and properly diminishing moral good or evil; but in this there is only a different way of speaking.

a) in quantitative matter which consists in number, weight, measure, those which taken separately and apart from the act suffice for mortal sin, e. g., if someone besides 100 gold pieces steals another 100, or steals a gilded watch which he thinks is gold, will be a notably aggravating circumstance of theft; on the contrary if he steals a gold watch which he thinks is silver, a notably diminishing circumstance;

b) in other matters (duration, intensity, execution), those which notably exceed the ordinary manner of acting well or badly in these matters, e. g., if someone perseveres in hatred for a year, or spends the whole night with a woman in unchastity; or only consents to it for some instant. Sometimes they so notably increase or diminish that they make a sin from venial mortal or from mortal venial, and so are said to aggravate or diminish infinitely, e. g., the circumstance of grave harm to a neighbor from a slight theft, or the circumstance of semi-full deliberation in blasphemy, imprecation, base delight.

2. Others are lightly aggravating or diminishing, such as:

a) in quantitative matter those which taken separately do not suffice for mortal sin, as if someone instead of 100 fr. steals 101 or 99;

b) in other matters, those which do not much exceed the ordinary manner of acting, as if someone after a quarrel remains angry for a little while in hatred.

153. Practical rules follow from the foregoing:

1° An act indifferent from its object can become good or bad from circumstances: thus to eat temperately to refresh one's strength is good, to do this with excess is bad; then the circumstance passes into the notion of object because it is first and of itself intended under the aspect of good or evil.

2° An act good from its object is made bad by circumstances, gravely or lightly, according to the degree of malice inherent in them, e. g., commerce in a sacred place, servile labor on the Lord's day, marriage with a person bound by a vow of chastity. Then the circumstance becomes the principal condition or part of the object.

3° An act good or bad from its object can receive from circumstances a new species of goodness or malice, e. g., he who keeps chastity from a vow contracts the goodness of chastity and of religion; he who steals a sacred thing contracts the malice of theft and of sacrilege. This circumstance also becomes a condition of the object.

4° An act good or bad from its object can acquire or lose from circumstances some greater degree of goodness or malice, e. g., a poor man giving alms, a man excellent in doctrine who puts himself below others; a priest sinning, a rich man as if forced to give alms, a poor man committing theft. Such remain mere circumstances,

154. Remark. — From the circumstances properly so called which affect the act, differ those internal or external actions which during the principal action are sometimes done, and only accompany it, without influence upon it. These are truly distinct acts which can be evil, but do not affect the goodness of the principal action. Thus if the care of the sick, communion, the hearing of Mass is done also because of a sensible affection for the sick, vain glory, curiosity, it will be an evil circumstance; on the contrary if they are done with a movement of impatience, affection for venial sin, distractions, these will be only evils that accompany them themselves.

S. Th. I-II, q. 18, a. 6-9 ; 19, a. 7 and 10 ; 20, a. 1, 3 and 6 ; C. G. III, 26 ; De Malo, q. 2, a. 2, ad 5 and 11, a. 3 ; II Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 4.

Let the notions about ends, treated above, nn. 9 and 10, be recalled.

155. Principle I. Human acts have the species of goodness or malice from the end.

It is proved: A human act has its species from the object. But there is a twofold human act: the interior act of the will whose proper object is the good or end, and the exterior act whose object is that about which it is concerned. Those two acts, because they say order to one thing, are one moral act, in which the interior act is the formal element because the will determines the external members to act, and because the external act is not voluntary and human except dependently on the will; whence it is the material element. Therefore they have one and the same goodness or malice, and therefore

1. the interior act has its species and morality principally from the end and participates in the morality of the exterior object;

2. on the contrary, the exterior act has its species and morality from its object and participates in the morality of the end;

3. the complete act is principally and formally considered according to the end intended, materially and secondarily according to the object of the exterior act, whence he who steals that he may commit adultery is more an adulterer than a thief.

Therefore 1° one physical act a) can have according to moral being two or more species of goodness or malice, or be multiplex in species according to moral being, if it has an object and an end, or even ends of diverse species, subordinated to one another, as if one steals for fornication and this for extorting a secret; — on the contrary b) if the end is of the same species as the object, goodness or malice is only increased in the same species, as if one steals a key from one to steal gold from another.

Indeed 2° one physical act, as it seems, can be multiplex in number according to moral being: a) if it is done for several ends, not indeed subordinated but equally principal, disparate and independent, e. g., alms for mercy and to please a friend, a gift for vain glory and for fornication. For there are as many acts numerically distinct as there are independent ends, because an act having several total objects is virtually and according to moral being multiplex; for example, there are as many morally acts as there are objects according to moral being distinct or total¹; — also b) it can be good and bad under different respect, not only successively by a change of the moral object, as the eating of meat begun before feria 6 and continued after it, but also simultaneously if one acts for good and bad ends, equally principal, because then the bad end does not affect the good, nor vice versa. Thus e. g. almsgiving given to relieve misery and at the same time for vain glory.

156. Practical rules follow from the foregoing:

1° An act good from its object referred to a good end has a double goodness if both are intended, as if one wishes to relieve the poor and this for penance; — if the goodness of the object is not intended, it has only the goodness of the end, because then the object is considered as the sole means to the end, e. g., if one abstains from wine, not for the good of abstinence about which he cares not at all, but solely for easier preservation of continence².

2° An act bad from its object referred to a bad end has a double malice of object and end, e. g., theft for fornication.

3° An act, good in itself and from its object, referred to a bad end which is the total and adequate reason why it is chosen, is in no part good but altogether bad, e. g., if one gives alms solely for fornication or to turn a poor man away from religion.

It is proved: a) from the Scriptures Mt. VI, 2, 5, 22-23; Prov. XXI, 27;

b) from the general principle: Goodness is not contracted unless it is intended and the agent is moved by it (n. 146); but in the present case the object is intended not as in itself good but as a means to a bad end: for it is not apprehended except as something bad, and therefore inasmuch as it is the object of this act it is not good but bad. The object namely communicates no goodness actually, but only the end intended passes into the notion of object. — In other words: to will the good under the aspect of evil is not good but evil; but he who acts solely for a bad end wills goodness only under the aspect of evil; therefore the act is totally evil.

4° An act good in itself or from its object which is referred to a bad end but partial, so that this is not the sole

whence one act of the will intends the principal end to which the external act is ordered, another act of the will intending the secondary end merely accompanies the execution of the work.

reason for acting, is bad from the end but good from the object, even if the end is mortally bad, e. g., if one intends to give alms for mercy and also to honor an idol; in practice, however, it almost never happens that a mortally evil act has a sufficiently disparate good end.

It is proved: An act is good from its object if the goodness in itself and for its own sake is intended and that intention is not vitiated. But in the case the goodness of the object in itself and for its own sake is intended, for the act is not done solely for the bad end; and on the other hand that intention is not vitiated, because the good end is not sought for the bad end to which it is not subordinated, nor is the bad intended for the good end. Therefore the act is good from its object. For example, two independent and equally principal ends are intended: the intrinsic end of the object and the extrinsic end of the agent, and therefore one physical act is a double moral act.

5° An act bad from its object or circumstance referred to a good end remains bad, because an evil means to a good end is not proportioned to it, and the goodness of the end does not prevent there being a defect in the object and the means being evil, and the will appetite for evil; whence S. Paul, of those who calumniously reproach us with the contrary, says; « And not (as we are blasphemed, and as some say that we say) let us do evil that there may come good: whose damnation is just » (Rom. III, 8; cf. Eccli. XXXIV, 23-24).

Nevertheless: a) It is less bad, 1) than an act bad for a bad end, and indeed the less bad the better the good end, because the affection for malice is the smaller; — also 2) than an act good exercised for a sole bad end, because then the goodness of the act is corrupted; but to corrupt the good is worse than to order evil to good.

b) The very intention of a good end, however, is good, if this is intended absolutely and for its own sake, to be obtained by some indeterminate means; and therefore was sometimes rewarded by God (Exod. I, 20, 21); — it is bad if the end is not intended absolutely but precisely as moving to the evil means, or as to be obtained by evil and no other means, because then the end is intended not as in itself good but as a moving cause to evil.

6° An act indifferent from its object and circumstances becomes good or bad from the end, which then passes into the notion of object, which gives the first morality: thus to sing for the praise of God or for lust.

157. Remark. — A partial end can stand to the action in a threefold way: a) it can merely precede it, so that it does not influence the action to be placed afterwards, but is rather its occasion, as if one from a human respect goes to sacred rites, to which he then assists with the proper intention: this occasional end does not vitiate the action;

b) it can accompany it, so that at the same time with another good end it is the cause of the action, as if one plays the organ to praise God and for vain glory: this vitiates the action in part;

c) it can follow, if, the action having been begun from a good end, a bad end is added, as if one begins to sing to the praise of God and then there creeps in also some ostentation: this end likewise vitiates the action in part, on the supposition that it truly becomes the end of the action which is then continued for both the good and the bad end; — otherwise if, during a good action, another evil act is placed, e. g., of ostentation or vain glory, because this is not a circumstance of the prior action but merely accompanies it (n. 154; q. 19, a. 7, ad 2).

158. Principle II. For an act to be not bad but good, it is required that it be done for the due honest end.

It is proved: Man acting deliberately, in his human acts, must act as a man, i. e., according to the exigence and dignity of his nature as a rational being insofar as he is distinguished from brutes. But man differs from brutes a) in this, that he positively acts for an end as end; and indeed b) for an end proper to himself, i. e., for the good suitable to his nature, or the honest. Therefore in all human acts he must positively intend an end, and indeed an honest one. Hence:

1. Bad are idle acts (Mt. XII, 36), which are not so called because they have a bad end, but because they do not have the due end: for idle is he who does useless things which he ought not to do while he could or ought to do other useful things. Idle are acts placed solely because it pleases (or displeases) to act thus, and acts omitted because they are not prescribed: for they lack a good end; they are not idle but good if they are done for a good end, e. g., for relief or moderate recreation.

2. Bad are acts that are done solely for the useful good, stopping in it, because it is not an end, since it is not to be desired for its own sake but only for the sake of another; hence it is illicit to seek money or honor for their own sake.

3. Bad are acts that are done principally for the delectable good. For God has attached the principal pleasures as an effect to certain necessary or useful operations, for the sake of those operations, namely that man might not abstain from working, but rather be allured to work; but other secondary pleasures as a means to a better understanding of things, the relief of the mind's fatigue, and recreation in rational life. Whence pleasures are intrinsically ordered to the placing of the work. Therefore it is not lawful to intend pleasure as a principal end, but as secondary and subordinate, namely for the honest good either of the operation or of the recreation; not indeed as a mere means to obtain it but as its effect for the cause, or as a help to placing the work more surely, pleasantly, and easily. For example, to seek the operation for the sake of pleasure is to invert the due order of things³. Hence theologians after S. Augustine say: it is not lawful to enjoy things to be used or to use things to be enjoyed.

4. A fortiori bad are acts that are done solely for pleasure, stopping in it, both because the delectable good must be sought for the honest end, as said under 3), and because animals act solely for pleasure, stopping in it: but man must in all things follow the rule of reason, and therefore seek pleasure insofar as reason dictates it to be proportioned and fitting to his nature, and so it already becomes the honest good. Therefore to seek pleasure for its own sake is to pervert the order. Hence were condemned props. 8 and 9 by Innocent XI⁴.

Hence: a) Bad are acts that are done for any pleasure, if another end is excluded.

b) Acts that procure sensible pleasure of themselves are indifferent, and therefore they are bad if they are not referred at least implicitly to the honest good; otherwise the lower powers, because by their nature they do not tend toward the honest good but to pleasure alone, do not serve the higher, but on the contrary reason and will serve the lower pleasure, which is an inversion of order.

c) On the contrary, they are good if from the circumstances or from the custom of acting the honest end of necessity or utility is sufficiently known, and this is at least implicitly intended: thus he who, without explicitly thinking, at the ordinary hour tends toward the place of recreation.

d) A fortiori good are acts that procure spiritual pleasure from the honest good: for this by its nature is connected with the honest good, which is therefore implicitly intended.

The aforesaid evil acts, in which the due end is only excluded in affection or affectively, of themselves are only lightly evil, because the inordinate use of a thing not illicit is not a grave disorder. If, however, one also effectively should wish to prevent the due end, it could be grave.

159. Principle III. The due intermediate end, or the ultimate in a certain respect, is whatever honest good, because this is conformed to rational nature; — the simply ultimate due end is the Supreme Good, that is, God.

Hence:

1° For an act to be good, we cannot positively exclude God, whether explicitly, or implicitly by loving a creature above all things or preferring it to God.

2° But we ought not in every act expressly to tend toward God, but it suffices implicitly, inasmuch as every honest participated good is by its nature ordered and tends toward the supreme good (cf. props. 16 and 38 of Baius condemned).

3° Sometimes, however, there is a precept of explicitly tending (or turning oneself) toward God through charity: but he who loves God above all things by that very fact refers implicitly to God all things that can be referred to him⁵.

If a sinner omits this, he sins by the omission at the moment the precept urges; but the other works which at this moment or later are done will not therefore be sinful, because the omission is not a true circumstance influencing and affecting the work itself, but only merely accompanies it (unless they have been the occasion of it). Otherwise it would have to be said that all the works of infidels are sins; likewise works performed for the sake of an eternal reward or from fear of hell would be evil, which was condemned by the Church (prop. 16 of Hus; props. 22, 35, 38, 40 of Baius; prop. 15 condemned by Alex. VIII; props. 45 and 59 of Quesnel; prop. 23 of Pistor.; C. Trid. sess. 6, can. 31; sess. 14, c. 4).

4° There is no other precept of explicitly referring all or even individual works to God. But the words of the Apostle (I Cor. X, 31) can be understood either of counsel, — or negatively of the obligation of doing nothing against the glory of God, and of doing nothing that cannot be referred to God; i. e., of doing only honest works which are implicitly referred to God; — or positively of the act of charity which orders the whole subsequent life to God implicitly as to the ultimate end.

Let it be noted, however, that not all things can be referred to God even by him who has charity: namely acts that are not proportioned to the glory of God, such as venial sins, and many indifferent acts, e. g., walking, eating, etc.; these of themselves are not proportioned to the end of the glory of God and of themselves contribute nothing to the honor of God, and therefore in order that they can be done for God they must first be referred to an honest end proportioned to them, e. g., to health, to sustenance, etc.

160. Are there indifferent acts? — From the foregoing it follows that there are no indifferent acts, if acts are not considered in the abstract, from the part of the object alone and according to species only, but in the concrete or in the individual, i. e., from the part of the thing with all its circumstances. For man acting deliberately, either acts in the due circumstances for the due honest end indicated by reason and fitting to nature, and then the act is good; — or does not act in the due circumstances, or at least does not act for the due honest end indicated by reason, and then the act is bad. To act for an indifferent end would be an idle act; but there is no concrete indifferent end, because the end is good, and this is either the true good, or according to appearance only, and then it is bad.

It is said: man acting deliberately. For many acts are placed from imagination alone, such as to rub one's chin, to move a foot or hand, etc., and such acts are not properly human, good or bad, but are indifferent existing outside the genus of morality.

161. Corollaries. — From the foregoing it is understood that one must not admit:

1. The opinion of the Scotists, who say that it is illicit to act solely for pleasure when the act from itself, by its intrinsic end, is ordered to something other than pleasure; such as eating, drinking, the conjugal act; it is not illicit when the pleasure is the end which the act by its nature intends, e. g., recreation of the ears in music, of the eyes in the vision of beauty, of the nostrils in the smell of flowers; these namely acts, according to them, are in the individual indifferent. — But we have seen that there are no indifferent acts in the individual.

2. Nor the opinion of Ballerini, whom many Jesuits follow (Génicot, Noldin, Vermeersch), saying that acts exercised for the end of pleasure are morally good even if the will does not intend another honest end, provided it does not positively exclude the end, nor have anything disordered in the action itself. — But this opinion is too benign. For in order that man act as a man, it is not sufficient for him to avoid evil, but it is also required to will and do the good fitting to his nature, namely the honest, which is impossible unless he positively intends it. For a) on the one hand, the good is not contracted unless it is positively intended for its own sake (n. 146); but the sensitive appetite of itself does not tend toward the honest good but to the delectable good alone; therefore the delight of the sensitive appetite will not be good unless it is positively intended for the honest good. Otherwise in the concrete it will be bad. b) On the other hand, to avoid evil is not a positively honest end, because between the objectively evil and the objectively good there mediates the objectively indifferent; therefore it is not sufficient to will to avoid the objectively evil for the act to be objectively good, but a positively honest end must be intended. Otherwise the act in the concrete will be idle and bad, as lacking the due circumstance of a right end.

c) Innocent XI condemned eating and the conjugal act as illicit because done solely for pleasure. And if the Scotists can explain the condemnation of the propositions by Inn. XI by saying that eating, drinking, the conjugal act are not ordered from their intrinsic end to pleasure, Ballerini cannot explain this without distorting the words from their obvious sense, and saying that the positive exclusion of the honest end is prohibited, but not the negative exclusion.

Therefore, in order that an act exercised for sensible pleasure be good, it is not sufficient that it not be in itself disordered, nor that it be in fact fitting to rational nature; it is also required that as such it be known in some way by the agent, and at least implicitly as such intended.

3. On the other hand, some have exceeded in the manner of speaking, saying that a good act requires that one will the good formally as honest, or even act from the general intention of living rightly and always acting according to reason. For it is sufficient that one in some way intend the good which is honest and is known as such, without willing it precisely and expressly because honest; and so one already implicitly tends toward the ultimate end.

4. A fortiori the Jansenists and Augustinians (such as Noris, Berti) erred, requiring that a good act be explicitly referred to God, the ultimate end.

Practically the opinion of S. Thomas does not differ much from the more recent opinion of Ballerini and his followers, for when someone wills, in seeking pleasure, to act moderately and admits nothing disordered, this person ordinarily not only does not positively exclude the honest end, but could scarcely not implicitly include it. Indeed this opinion is more benign than the Scotist opinion, for acts which the Scotists consider indifferent, according to us easily become good, since the fittingness with rational nature, namely the good habitudo of mind, is easily perceived in them.