Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. I-II, q. 18, a. 5 and 8 ; I, q. 48, a. 1, ad 2 ; C. G. III, 9 ; De Malo q. 2, a. 4 and ad 10 ; II Sent., d. 40, a. 1.

That good and evil in the physical order do not constitute a specific difference is manifest: thus a good and a bad garment, a healthy and a sick man, are not species of garment or of man. Hence it is asked whether in human acts goodness and malice are also a merely accidental difference, or on the contrary differ of themselves and essentially, and therefore according to species. About which we must hold what S. Thomas first of all taught.

144. Thesis. Human acts according to a good or bad object differ in moral species. — It is proved:

a) From the fact that the human act is rational. An act has its species from the object. But an act is human and moral insofar as it proceeds from deliberating reason. Therefore it has its species from the object considered as it is set against reason, or by comparison to reason. But good and bad in the object precisely and of themselves differ insofar as they are compared to reason, inasmuch as the object suits it or is repugnant to it¹. Therefore a good and a bad object make human acts differ in species (a. 5).

b) From the fact that the human act is voluntary. An act has its species from the object. But an act is human and moral insofar as it is voluntary. Therefore it has its species from the object by comparison to the will. But the object of the will is the good or end. Therefore a human act has its species from the comparison to the end. But good and bad are said of themselves according to the relation to the end: good inasmuch as it says order to the end, evil inasmuch as it lacks this order. Therefore in human acts good and bad differ in species (II Sent., d. 40, a. 1, ad 2 ; De Malo, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4 ; q. 2, a. 4, ad 10).

145. Is indifference a third species of morality? — I answer: 1) It is certain that not all human acts are of themselves according to species good or bad, but some are indifferent. For an act has its species from the object, and a human act from the object compared to reason from which the act proceeds. Therefore if the object of itself suits the order of reason, the act will be good according to species, e. g., to give alms; if it includes repugnance to reason, it will be bad according to species, e. g., to steal. But there are objects which say nothing that pertains to the order of reason, e. g., to walk, to lift a straw from the ground, to give money, etc., and then the act will be indifferent according to species.

2. Acts by their nature indifferent do not seem to be moral. For indifference, which is between goodness and malice, because it is neither conformity nor disformity to the rule, is not a species of morality but a negation of it. For morality says relation to the rule; but the indifferent says no relation to the rule: for it is that about which the rule does not care, and it is the same as if the rule were not. For morality is spoken of in relation to reason, to which it has conformity or repugnance; but the indifferent says nothing that pertains to the order of reason; therefore indifference exists outside morality (a. 8).

There are nevertheless some who say it is an incomplete species of morality.

3. Among indifferent acts some are called good-sounding or bad-sounding, whose object, — although it is neither good nor bad, — nevertheless inclines more either toward goodness, and these acts for the most part have formal goodness, such as to go to church, to visit the poor, to give money, etc.; — or on the contrary toward malice, and then it more often has injustice attached, such as to take another's property, to set up a cause from which even the death of someone can follow, to use amphibological speech or restriction, etc., and therefore the act cannot be placed unless there be a reason justifying, e. g., in case of necessity.

146. Remark. — In order that goodness (of object or circumstance) be contracted, it is required that it be intended in itself and for its own sake; but in order that malice be contracted, it is sufficient that it be foreseen and indirectly voluntary. For right reason dictates that the good is to be sought and to be loved in itself because it is worthy to be desired for its own sake, and therefore he who does not intend the good in itself does not will it well and rightly, and laudably, and in such a way that it deserves to be intended. It is therefore required that the good be the end intended by the agent or the motive by which he is moved to place the act, or, as S. Thomas says, q. 19, a. 7, ad 3: « for the will to be good, it is required that it be of good under the aspect of good, i. e., that it will good and for good ». Wherefore no one is praised because he visited the sick only for the sake of chatting, or fasted to save money; because formal honest mercy or fasting is not intended.

Yet one should not explicitly intend this honesty or conformity with the rule as such, but it is sufficient implicitly, by willing the act under some honest aspect, e. g., alms because it relieves the poor. — On the contrary, evil must not only not be loved but also be foreseen and avoided, even if not intended; which is not done by him who foresees and will not prevent it.

Hence, in order that an act be good, it must be good from an integral cause and from every part, i. e., both of object, and of end, and of circumstances; in order that an act be evil, a defect is sufficient either on the part of the object, or on the part of the circumstances or the end.