Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. I-II, q. 18, a. 2, 3, 4, 10.

138. Notions. — After we have spoken of the ultimate foundation, and of the first objective principle of morality, there must now be considered the immediate principles which are called the sources of morality; namely, the elements of a human act from which it immediately comes about that it is conformed to the rule and good, or disformed from it and bad, and that more or less. They are the object (the primary source), and the circumstances (the secondary source) of which the chief is the end, because it most influences the act.

A. The object is here considered 1) not as the whole objective element, or the complex of all circumstances, but in the proper sense as distinct from the circumstances: it is that which is first and of itself attained by the act, or the matter (thing or person) about which it is concerned, that into which it primarily and of itself by its nature tends; whence it is the same as the intrinsic end¹;

2. not according to physical being, but according to moral being, i. e., insofar as it is conformed or disformed to the rule of reason.

B. Circumstances are secondarily attained by the act as accidents that affect and determine the human act in its being to be constituted. Some affect the human act according to physical being, and these are indifferent (e. g., that one steal in the morning or in the evening); others according to moral being, which increase or diminish (e. g., that one steal much or little): these are called moral, to which alone we attend here.

C. End is here understood not the end of the work or intrinsic end, which is the same as the object, but the extrinsic end of the agent and added « by which the agent is moved to the work ».

Since reason, however, is not determined to one thing, but can primarily and of itself tend to all things, hence the same thing can be the object with respect to one act and only a circumstance with respect to another, and indeed: a) moral being can be the circumstance of an act considered according to physical being, e. g., that a thing is another's or deposited in a sacred place is a circumstance with respect to the act of taking, but is the substance of theft or sacrilege; b) indeed the circumstance of one act can be the object and substance of another act: thus it is not a circumstance with respect to theft that it be another's property, but that it be sacred, although this is not a circumstance with respect to sacrilege.

139. Remark. — The object (similarly the end and the circumstance) can be considered in a twofold way: physically and materially in the being of an entity, insofar as it is something in the nature of things, and so it is always good (by the goodness of nature or of entity); — or morally and in the being of mores, insofar as it is the object of such an act and insofar as it is attained by the agent, and so it can be morally good or bad. It is said:

1. With respect to the objective element: insofar as it is the object of such a human act or has due proportion to such an act or not, i. e., insofar as it is subject to the rule of reason and conformed to it and morally good, or disformed and evil, that such a thing or person is attained by such an act. Thus the object of theft is not the property of another in itself and physically considered, but insofar as the rule forbids that it be taken from its owner; the object of temperance is not food in itself considered, but insofar as it is conformed to reason that it be taken in the necessary quantity. Hence:

a) A physically good object can be morally bad and vice versa. Thus, although God and sin in themselves are a good or bad object, nevertheless God as to be hated is a bad object, sin to be destroyed is a good object conformed to reason.

b) An object that is physically one and the same can be morally good or bad, such as to seize and to restore another's property, to love and to hate a man.

c) The same act according to physical being can be of diverse species according to moral being: thus to give money is a donation if done as a favor, an almsgiving if for relieving misery, a payment if for the extinction of a debt, a restitution if for the recompense of an injury, a compensation if for merit;

d) An act physically the same can be morally good or bad according as it is done by different subjects, or by the same but at different times, e. g., the act of fornication and the conjugal act, the eating of meat on feria 5 and feria 6, the killing of a man by a robber or by a soldier.

e) Acts of the same physical species can be of different moral species, e. g., to know one's own woman or another's, love of God and of wine, of virtue and of vice; on the contrary, acts of the same moral species can be of different physical species, e. g., the love and desire of the same object.

2. With respect to the subjective element: insofar as it is attained by the agent, i. e., is known as conformed or disformed to the rules, or insofar as the object and its morality is known by the conscience of the agent as conformed or disformed to reason. For it can happen that the object is in itself bad and nevertheless through invincible ignorance is thought good: thus if one takes another's property which he thinks is his own, the act will be formally good; and vice versa, if one thinks that today is a fasting day and does not fast, the act will be formally bad.

All of the foregoing things also hold for circumstances and for the end.

140. Principle I. The morally considered object gives the act its morality, i.e. goodness or badness, and that fundamental, principal, and primary.

It is said: 1) fundamental, because it intrinsically and essentially belongs to the action, as the object without which the act cannot be;

2. principal, because it gives the act its moral species by which it is distinguished from others;

3. primary, because it is conceived before every other which arises from circumstances and even persists when these are changed. Thus in the theft of a sacred thing for vain glory, the malice from the object, i. e., the injustice, is the first and fundamental; the malice from the circumstances of the sacred and the end is called secondary and accidental.

It is proved 1) by reason: That is good which has the fullness of being due to it, evil if it does not have the whole being which it ought to have. Now something has being, and therefore goodness, first from that which gives it its species, namely from its form, e. g., a man generated from this, that he is a rational animal; on the contrary, principal and fundamental malice if it does not have the being of the species which it ought to have, e. g., if instead of a man a monster is generated. But a human act has its species from the morally considered object, as from a form. Therefore from a fitting object it has goodness, and that primary and fundamental; likewise malice if it does not have the fitting object which it ought to have.

Prob. minor: A human act is a motion or tendency to the morally considered object, as to a terminus. But every motion has its species from the terminus as from its form, because it is to the terminus as potency to act. Therefore a human act has its species from the morally considered object, as from a form.

This can be briefly stated as follows: Every thing has its being and goodness (and therefore its malice) fundamentally from its species. But a human act has its species from the object, because it is a motion to it as to a terminus. Therefore a human act, just as in the physical order so in the moral order, has its species from the object by which it is terminated.

Hence 2) in the Scriptures and in the doctrine of Tradition it is often affirmed that good things are to be done, whatever evil things are to be avoided; which is to be understood at least of those things which are good or bad by reason of their matter. Thus e. g. Ps. XXXIII, 14: Depart from evil and do good; Prov. III, 7: Fear (i. e., worship) God and depart from evil; Is. I, 16, 17: Cease to do perversely, learn to do well. Alluding to which the prince of the apostles says, I Pet. III, 10-12: He who will love life and see good days, let him refrain his tongue from evil and his lips that they speak no guile; let him depart from evil and do good; let him seek peace and follow it; for the eyes of the Lord are upon the just and his ears unto their prayers; but the countenance of the Lord is against them that do evil things.

Whence Christ, to the young man asking: « What good shall I do that I may have eternal life? » (Mt. XIX, 16), answers (v. 17-19): « If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments; .... Thou shalt do no murder, thou shalt not commit adultery, thou shalt not steal, thou shalt not bear false witness. Honor thy father and thy mother, and thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself »; which precisely are evil or good from the object.

141. Principle II. Moral circumstances as such give human acts goodness and malice, but secondary and accidental.

It is said: a) moral circumstances, because they are not considered in themselves and physically, but morally i. e. 1) as to this act, insofar as it is conformed or disformed to the rule of reason that the act be placed with these circumstances; and 2) insofar as this is known by the agent.

b) as such, because they sometimes give even the first and essential goodness or malice, as if a work indifferent from its object becomes good by reason of a circumstance, e. g., to drink moderately; but then the circumstance first and of itself is intended and becomes the object, or that which is first attained.

c) secondary and accidental morality, because circumstances as such supervene upon the act in its constituted moral being and species.

It is proved 1) by reason: The fullness of being and goodness in things is not only had from that which gives them their species, but also secondarily from supervening accidents, e. g., in a man from figure, virtue, color, etc., of which if anything that ought to be is missing, or if something that ought not to be is present, according to this the thing will be bad. Therefore also in human acts the fullness of being and goodness does not wholly consist in the species which comes from the object, but is added secondarily from fitting accidents which are the circumstances; which if something due is missing or something undue is present, according to this the action will be bad.

Confirmed: Circumstances can import a relation of fittingness or unfittingness to the rule of reason just as the object itself, e. g., not only is it unfitting to steal, but also to steal in a sacred place; not only is it fitting to pray, but also to pray on bended knees. Therefore.

Hence 2) in the Scriptures, Christ himself (Mc. XII, 41-44) declared that the poor widow who gave two mites gave more than the rich who gave much, because she gave of her want.

And 3) from Tradition we know that in confession the circumstances changing the species of sin are to be declared, or so aggravating or diminishing it as to make it mortal from venial or vice versa (which the Council of Trent defined, sess. 14, c. 5, can. 7). There would be no reason for this if they did not increase or diminish malice.

142. Principle III. The extrinsic and added end as such and morally considered gives human acts goodness or malice, but secondary and accidental.

It is said: 1) extrinsic end: for the end of the work or intrinsic end is the same as the object; wherefore we speak of the extrinsic and accidental end which is added by the agent to the object².

2. as such: for the end sometimes takes on the notion of a moral object and gives the first morality, as if one does an indifferent act for a good or bad end, or an act good from its object solely for the sake of the extrinsic end;

3. morally considered, i. e., insofar as it is conformed or disformed to reason that such a thing be intended as an end and such an act be chosen as a means to obtain it.

It is proved 1) by reason: A thing which depends on another has not only the fullness of being and goodness from its species and accidents, but also from its relation to the cause on which it depends; but as being depends on an efficient cause and species, so goodness depends especially on a final cause. But a human act depends on an efficient and a final cause. Therefore besides the absolute goodness which it has from being and species, it has relative goodness from the end if it has the due end, and malice if it does not have it.

Confirmed: The end expresses conformity or disformity to reason, e. g., not only is it conformed to reason to give alms, but also to give in satisfaction for sins; just as it is repugnant to reason not only to steal, but also to steal in order to get drunk. Therefore it cannot but be that the end, if good, influences goodness, and if bad, malice.

Hence 2) in the Scriptures Christ says: « Take heed that you do not your justice before men to be seen by them... The lamp of thy body is thy eye. If thy eye be single, thy whole body shall be lightsome. But if thy eye be evil, thy whole body shall be darksome » (Mt. VI, 1, 22-23). Which is to be understood of the perverse intention which blinds the mind and takes away the pleasure of God in works; while the right intention which directs all things pleases God and is rewarded by him. Whence v. 33 says: « Seek ye therefore first the kingdom of God and his justice; and all these things shall be added unto you ». And the Apostle admonishes, I Cor. X, 31, that all things be done to the glory of God.

143. Corollary. — In a human act, therefore, a fourfold goodness can be found: one according to genus insofar as it is an action, because insofar as it has act and entity, so much has it of (physical) goodness; another is according to species, i. e., according to a fitting object; a third is according to circumstances, as according to certain accidents; a fourth according to end, as according to a relation to the cause of goodness (a. 4).