Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

135. Thesis. The cognitive faculty of morality is none other than the intellect, which under this aspect is called practical.

It is proved: A. indirectly, by the exclusion of other opinions. The cognitive faculty of morality is not experience, nor sense, nor instinct, nor subjective affection. Therefore (cf. nn. 136-137).

B. directly: 1° Morality is conformity or fittingness with the rule of reason and the ultimate end, or disformity or unfittingness. But that pertains to the object of reason or the intellect. Therefore morality is known by the intellect.

2° Judgment about moral things is a kind of truth. But truth is the proper object of the intellect. Therefore judgment about moral things pertains to the intellect.

It is called practical because it has as its object the proportion of means to the end, and so is ordered to directing the acts of the will toward the end. The practical intellect, however, is not different from the speculative intellect. A faculty is not diversified by an accidental difference of object. But the object of the speculative intellect and the object of the practical intellect differ merely accidentally: for it is accidental to something apprehended by the intellect that it is ordered to work or is not ordered. Therefore the practical intellect does not differ really from the speculative intellect (I, q. 79, a. 11).

136. To the foregoing doctrine is opposed Moral Empiricism, which derives the knowledge of morality solely from experimental observation of utility. All things are mutable; the absolute is a metaphysical illusion; and therefore morality is essentially mutable according to circumstances. Whence the system in fact is reduced to evolutionism, which rests on impulses from repeated sensible experiences through all generations, had and transmitted. In which reason has only secondary parts: for it follows inclinations, and experiences what is, but does not dictate what ought to be. And so ethics is a descriptive and explanatory science, not normative.

Now organic ethics, as it is usually called:

A. As to its foundation, it supposes materialism or positivism, and therefore acknowledges only the ethics of utilitarianism or sensualism.

B. As to its method, 1) it is incomplete: for determining the rule of morals it is certainly useful, but the historical and psychological observation of factors and actions is not sufficient, because not only is it asked what men have done or do, but also and chiefly what it is fitting or necessary to do. For the determination of this, experience is not sufficient, but the exercise of reason itself is required, by which we know the cause and origin of this fittingness or moral obligation;

2. it is defective: it asserts indeed that there is no man who ultimately acts except for his own advantage. And yet experience also teaches that there are men who, for God or for their neighbor, spend themselves and all that is theirs; and that the notion of the honest and the just (with many at least) is distinct from the notion of happiness: for there are certain acts held as good, indeed most good or heroic, which not only do not bring pleasure, but cause sadness and detriment; others on the contrary, although wicked, procure advantage, as if someone, by fraud used in playing, should obtain for himself the victory and a large sum of money.

C. As to the matter: 1) it is insufficient. The value of a necessary principle is not from experience, and instinctive impulses do not constitute a principle of morality. For it must be asked whether the instinctive or organic impulses are a true manifestation of the good, or rather hallucinations. If the former, this will be only because of conformity with reason, and thus we return to our criterion. If the latter, it would be necessary to explain the universality and persistence of those hallucinations;

2. it is illogical, as opposed to experience: for if moral ideas and inclinations come from heredity, how does ethics give us the faculty and sometimes the duty of acting against instinct?

3. it is erroneous: it falsely asserts that duty is by natural or intellectual instinctive necessity; that obligation, however, arises from intrinsic sanction (e. g. harmful effects) and extrinsic (or fear of punishments), which is threefold: social, which the stronger impose on the will; civil, by which the prince necessary for social order is feared; religious, by which the souls of the dead (especially of princes) are feared. Now

a) this is not the notion we have of duty or obligation;

b) many do not perceive these moral sanctions; those, however, who know them could say that they yield to force, but do not recognize obligation;

c) such obligation has no force and efficacy in conscience, but is rather the destruction than the explanation of moral obligation: for it would be only an action extorted by fear alone.

4. Whence the system is not founded in positive experience, but is rather constituted from a series of hypotheses.

137. Moral Intuitionism is also opposed, by which generic name are designated all who agree in this, that good and evil are affirmed immediately by some intuition of a faculty (as Nativists and Innatists for psychology), or who assert that morality is known by instinct or a special sense, by which spontaneously man affirms good and evil without induction of experience and without deduction of reason. Which

A. others say is known by a physical or bodily sense, like Sensists and Phrenologists, who admit only sensitive knowledge. Against:

1. The assertion rests on a false foundation; it supposes materialism and a false system of the criterion of truth.

2. In the Sensist system, no freedom remains, which supposes indifference of judgment, which cannot exist without intelligence. Whence it destroys morality in its principle.

3. Universals, abstracts, and immutables (such as the moral norm) are not known by sense, which is essentially mutable, and varies according to circumstances and subjective dispositions. Therefore it destroys morality in its essence.

4. The moral rule orders human acts. To order pertains to the intellect. Therefore to the intellect pertains the knowledge of morality.

5. Sense experiences from objects only pleasure and pain; therefore logically Sensism must lead to hedonism or sensualism¹.

B. Others say it is known by a certain spiritual sense of intuition or instinct, which differs from the intellect and corresponds to a blind instinct by which we immediately know first principles, both speculative and practical. Which sense is of the affective order, and consists in a certain internal affection or sympathy or taste. So the Scotist school, Sentimentalists, and many recent authors; who all in fact are altruists. This system:

1. Is for the most part founded on a false system of the criterion.

2. Is inadequate. It denies the rational element, and assigns the first parts to the affective element, which is only secondary. For reason, according to them, only observes, does not dictate; and social utility is to be embraced not because it is conformed to reason, but because affection and instinct incline to it! On the contrary, affection is only a prejudgment or resonance of the judgment of reason, which is the norm of morality.

3. It does not provide a certain but a fallacious criterion. For one is not always affected with sympathy toward the moral good, nor always with antipathy toward evil; for other non-moral causes also, such as talents, qualities, happy outcome, enjoyment, joy, can excite the same affects.

4. It does not provide a universal criterion: for the multitude and society toward which we are held by the affect of sympathy are subject to changes; but what if we are inclined toward different men, toward whom we are held to be affected by sympathies?

5. It does not provide an objective but a subjective criterion: sympathy and antipathy change according to circumstances and persons.

6. It does not provide an ultimate criterion: for sympathies and antipathies themselves are good or bad. Why, except because they are conformed or disformed to reason?

7. As human reason reasons about speculative truth, so also about practical truth. But it is absolutely repugnant that the first principles of speculative reason be admitted by a blind instinct and without evidence. Therefore the same is repugnant for the first principles of practical reason, in practical or moral matters.

8. There are other instincts and intuitions, namely egoistical ones. Why, however, should we follow the inclinations of sympathies, and not the egoistical ones? Either because they are conformed to reason; — or because they have been made by evolution: in this latter case it does not follow that they are legitimate and good. And besides, persons of egoistical character can provoke antipathy.

The moral sense cannot be distinguished from other experiences unless a certain notion of morality is present beforehand; i. e. unless reason has investigated the idea and value of morality, and distinguished it from impressions merely sensitive, aesthetic, or social.

They object the spontaneity and universality and persistence of the moral conscience in all men and through all times; which cannot be explained except by instinct and a special sense; — and this is the only argument they bring. — R.: this proves a constant and innate disposition toward knowing the first moral principles, namely synderesis or the habit of the first practical principles (as there is the habit of the intellect for the first speculative principles), but does not prove a blind instinct or a special sense. For it is useless to have recourse to a distinct special faculty; because practical reason informed by synderesis is able to explain this, and it is not a faculty distinct from speculative reason.

C. Others who profess transcendental objectivism, or the transcendental or absolute idealism originating from it, have recourse to a blind instinct of the intellect itself, by which abstract and universal truths are admitted in such a way that their value is not demonstrated, because it cannot be demonstrated that they correspond to reality. So Kant and after him those who, resting on his principles, have fallen into Pantheism, like Fichte, Schelling, Hegel. — Against this:

a) As to the foundation, this is a false criteriological system, or even pantheistic monism, in which case morality will be impersonal and supra-individual.

b) As to the method, 1) this is incomplete: for although reason is chiefly necessary for defining what we ought to do, historical and psychological observation of human nature, to which the rules of morality must be adapted, must nevertheless be added;

2. therefore it is not accommodated to human nature: for if an act elicited with the hope of reward or the fear of punishment is said not to be good, when historically and psychologically it is established that men do not act well without respect for beatitude or fear of punishment, it follows that such a method and norm is not proportioned to human powers;

3. it introduces blind faith: for if speculative reason is incapable of knowing speculative truths with certainty, why will practical reason be more certain about the existence of obligation?

c) As to the matter, with regard to the Kantian system enough has been said, n. 133. With regard to the pantheistic systems:

1. in fact, the moral conscience attributes value to acts that uniquely tend toward the perfection of the individual; in the individual man there is also an exigency of morality;

2. indeed if it does not exist there, there will be no longer any exigency of morality: for obligation toward others is, in order that they may be perfected.