Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

129. False systems are opposed to the Catholic doctrine on the nature, rule, and foundation of morality, which places moral goodness in the honest good alone and grounds it in rational human nature, the eternal law of God, and the tendency toward perfect happiness to be obtained in the other life; — whether by defect or by excess. It is itself conformed to Aristotelian philosophy, and can be called rational eudaemonism, because it intends rational perfection, the supreme good of man. To it

a) by defect is opposed pure eudaemonism (εὐδαιμονία = happiness, bien-être, welzijn, lust) or ethical voluntarism (gemoeds-, begeerte- of strevingsmoraal, geluksmoraal, gelukstrevingsmoraal, geluksdrang), which tends toward earthly happiness and places it either in the delectable good: Hedonism or sensualism, or in the useful good for temporal happiness: Utilitarianism, which subsists under various forms, e. g. individual, or social, or evolutionist utilitarianism, sociological ethics, progressivism, pragmatism, etc.

b) on the contrary, by excess is opposed pure rationalism or formalism: namely autonomistic and ethical rationalism, which proposes the honest good exaggeratedly and indeed of autonomous reason, without respect for human nature considered in its totality, for the eternal law of God, or for happiness, or for reward even of the other life. It exists under various forms of which the chief are Stoicism and Kantianism¹.

130. Hedonism (ἡδονή = pleasure) or moral sensualism (genietingsmoraal) says: Happiness is the sum of pleasures. Good is in sensual pleasure, evil in pain. The supreme good is the greatest present pleasure of the body, and every pleasure is good, even if obtained by the most shameful action. Whence the supreme norm is: pleasure is to be sought, pain to be fled; to which nature impels. Hence actions are good which bring more pleasure than pain; and therefore virtue is good only as a means to pleasure.

Against this system can be opposed:

1. Hedonism is founded on the system of moral positivism: for pleasure varies and depends much on circumstances, custom, the laws of times and places, and the character of individuals, and corresponds to particular tendencies: each one is drawn by his own pleasure!

2. It falsely supposes the ultimate end to be in the supreme pleasure of this life.

3. The delectable good is not the first object of appetite, for pleasure follows from appetition and operation which naturally precedes it and produces it. Whence pleasure will be good (or evil) according to the very nature of the operation. Therefore it is not the principle or norm of morality.

4. Hedonism denies the classic distinction between the honest, the useful, and the delectable good: yet historically and really there is a difference between what is delectable to sense and what is fitting for man; whence the system is opposed to the natural conscience of man; and reduced to the state of the present life, it justifies all crimes.

5. It considers only one element of man: but man is spirit and heart, not only heart.

6. The delectable good is relative to the individual, and therefore subjective and variable; therefore it does not constitute a criterion of objective and intrinsic discrimination between good and evil.

7. Pleasure sought without restriction and discretion destroys itself: experience shows that it brings pain and is transformed into pain. If however pleasure as such is good, it will never be excessive; and nevertheless pleasure can be excessive: for its quantity displeases, so that it is no longer pleasure.

They object: 1) Natural inclinations are true; therefore the pleasure to which nature inclines is the true end and the true good. — R. Those inclinations are true, not because they tend toward pleasure, but because they show the internal nature of man. Whence it is not absolutely good to follow them, but insofar as they suit human nature as such, and reason itself, to which all other inclinations must be subordinated, as the lower to the higher.

2. Not every pleasure is good or an end, but pleasure of a certain kind or quality, which is discerned by reason. — R. Then pleasure as such is no longer the ultimate norm; but a determined quality or condition of pleasure. Which is already a denial of the system.

There is nevertheless in it something true: namely the connection between virtue and happiness and pleasure, not indeed the baser one of sense, but the nobler one of mind. The exercise of virtue alone can procure true happiness: it can cause an imperfect one in the present life, and merit a perfect one in the other life. But an act will not be good because it makes us happy; it makes us happy because it is good.

131. Utilitarianism (nuttigheidsmoraal; Nützlichkeitsmoral; Erfolgsmoral) in general does not place the end precisely in pleasure alone but in the sum of goods; — and moral good in whatever good is useful for earthly happiness either of the individual or of society, even in pleasure which reason approves as truly useful. Thus pleasure remains the secondary criterion of morality.

Now the aforesaid norm, besides falsely supposing that created good is the end of man:

1. Is not sufficient, as not being universal: for there are many honest or dishonest acts without respect to private or social good, e. g. contrary to utility, faith given is preserved. Social utilitarianism in fact denies the duties of man toward God and toward himself, except as they are ordered to the social good; individual utilitarianism does not prove duties toward God or toward others. If they say that individual good is joined to the social, R.: perhaps so in the abstract, let it pass; in the concrete, I deny, for in fact they are often opposed and at war.

2. It is practically impossible: for all the consequences (of advantage or disadvantage) present and future would have to be adequately perceived and mutually compared, in order that it could be established what is truly useful.

3. It is not immutable: for earthly happiness appears subjective and relative, and is therefore not conceived in the same way by all, but for various times and regions and individuals is understood in different ways, so that nothing is more mutable than such a rule; whence it would render morality subjective and changeable.

4. It is false: for acts held by all as dishonest can be useful to man, e. g. theft and homicide, or can be ordered to the social good, e. g. perjury, homicide, falsehood; and vice versa, acts certainly honest can be useless. Whence the norm of the happiness of life is vague and indeterminate because it can legitimize everything; and at the same time so restricted that it cannot legitimize many duties, as already said under 1°).

5. It is incomplete and defective: it considers more the empirical and affective aspect (egoism or altruism) than the rational aspect, to which it assigns the second place and which it subordinates to inclination and tendency; whereas reason had the first place in morality, as directing and regulating.

In particular A. Individual, private or egoistic utilitarianism (welbegrepen eigenbelang) places morality in whatever good which each one, for his pursuit of happiness, has proposed to obtain for himself. Whence it is not pleasure alone, but that which of itself and by its effects and circumstances offers greater utility also future for the whole life.

Against individual utilitarianism many things can be brought which are opposed to hedonism, namely: 1) It is founded on moral positivism: utility depends on many circumstances, laws, custom, and personal character.

2. It falsely supposes the ultimate end to be in the happiness of this life.

3. It denies the classic distinction between the honest, the useful, and the delectable good. And yet the useful as such is not an end but a means. Whence the end must be either the delectable good (hedonism), or the good considered in relation to the end of nature (rational ethics). Utility therefore is not the primary criterion. Whence the system is opposed to the moral conscience of all times, which refuses to admit as moral perfection the question of profit, just as of pleasure.

4. It considers only one aspect of man; but man of himself is individual and of himself by his nature is social. Whence not individual utility alone is the end of the moral order.

5. The useful good is not a universal criterion: for it is relative and variable, whence it is not a criterion of objective and intrinsic discrimination; indeed it can lead to the greatest crimes; — on the contrary, the best acts, such as shedding blood for God, virtue, the defense of country, can be useless.

6. Hence individual utility is denied to have to do with education and legislation.

7. Whence is condemned prop. 58 of the Syllabus: « All moral discipline and honesty must be placed in accumulating and increasing riches in every way and in satisfying pleasures ».

B. Social utilitarianism or altruism establishes that the common happiness is the norm of morality. Actions therefore are good or bad according as they promote or hinder the common happiness, and the more an action contributes to the common good, the better it is; the more it hinders it, the worse.

Against this form in particular can be opposed:

1. In order that the happiness of others be the end, one must know in what that happiness consists. Whence the system does not give an ultimate answer, nor definitively solves the question, but pushes it back. The useful is not a measure, because it is a means, not an end. Therefore it is not the supreme criterion.

2. It is not a universal criterion. Ethics precedes the organization of society. Conscience testifies that, besides social good, there are good and bad actions, such as intemperance, blasphemy, parricide, which are evil even in individual or family life. Moreover, the individual and society remain distinct, although they are not disjoint or separate. — Besides, man is referred directly to society only through external acts; and yet internal acts are moral, indeed moral in the first place and essentially.

3. It is not the first criterion. For the end of society is the end of individuals. Whence the distinction between social good and evil is subordinated to the distinction between individual good and evil; and if the good of one is not moral, neither is the good of many. It is natural for man to enter society, because the good is what is conformed to reason. There properly is the end, where there properly is the operation. Society is not one per se, but has only a unity of order; and therefore as such it is not apt to attain happiness.

4. It places the end in the present life and legitimizes all crimes, e. g. of powerful nations against the weaker.

5. According to the very principles of empiricism and utilitarianism, egoism prevails over altruism; and in the case of conflict between social good and individual happiness, according to the principles of utilitarianism the conflict cannot be solved.

132. Pure Rationalism or Formalism. In general, followers of autonomistic rationalism, having rejected the eternal law and excluded every relation to the person of God, to his reason and will, deduce morality and moral obligation solely from the conformity of the act with reason itself or nature as rational, without respect for utility, or pleasure, or happiness, or sanction. Whence they preach a purely rational morality, and moral good is only in the rational part of man; and therefore it consists in rational fittingness, and must be sought solely from the motive of fittingness, i. e., of virtue or duty, for its own sake (formalism).

It arose first in Greece, in the Cynic school, but there it flourished especially in the Stoic school.

The foundation of morality is: « to live conformably to nature », and since human nature is rational, virtue is in a life instituted according to reason. The supreme and unique good is a life according to virtue; whence virtue is an end in itself: for the good is to be loved and sought for its own sake, not for the sake of something else. Virtue and happiness are really the same: « it is the same to live happily as to live according to nature », says Seneca; besides virtue nothing else is needed for happiness. Nevertheless virtue is not to be sought for the sake of happiness; happiness is never to be sought as an end.

All else either are indifferent things (such as health, riches, sickness, poverty) to be sought or avoided according to circumstances; — or are things always to be avoided, such as the passions which are evil, against reason: to follow passion or affection or pleasure is against morality. Virtue is wisdom: the truly wise man patiently endures all inconveniences, and abstains from various pleasures (sustine et abstine); he subjects all affects and passions to reason, indeed he extirpates them by a certain apathy or impassibility, so that he is raised above all and cannot be disturbed by any influence of pain or pleasure: thus he is freed from affection.

But against this: 1) The identity of virtue and full happiness or beatitude does not exist here on earth, in which there are numerous and excessive sorrows.

2. The fundamental error by which it teaches that virtue must be cultivated solely for its own sake, so that every consideration of one's own happiness is excluded, is common to it with Kant; and therefore the arguments brought against this point of Kantian doctrine also have force here (cf. n. seq., 2 and 3).

3. The nature to which one must live conformably, it calls reason; but it understands reason in a thoroughly exclusive sense. So that it is not merely the preponderance and domination of reason, but pure rationality, with all else excluded from morality.

4. Hence the affective life lacks all morality. The passions must be reduced to slavery and extirpated, rather than ruled and moderated, so that there may be perfect apathy (by which one is not affected by them), and one's very life becomes indifferent to oneself!

5. Moreover, many false things are also contained therein. Thus: no degree of morality is admitted, but goodness or malice is held equal in all acts, the passions are also held as evil in themselves.

6. Finally, in the application of principles many errors occurred, and indeed most pernicious ones, since falsehood, suicide, and many foul things against nature were in fact held as lawful.

133. Kantianism. Stoicism was followed to some extent by Kant (1724-1804), author of the critical philosophy. After he had attempted to show that by pure speculative reason we can know only phenomena, and not noumena, or what things are in themselves; but that about them we have a merely subjective knowledge without objective value, and therefore the existence of God, the freedom of man, and the immortality of the soul cannot be proved with certainty; — he decided to lay the foundations of ethics by another way, through pure practical reason.

From the testimony of the conscience of all men, nothing is simply good except the good will (ratio-will); and this alone is moral. But the will is good not from the object, but from the motive by which it is moved to act: this can be nothing other than the fulfilling of duty; which duty is nothing other than conformity with the universal moral law. Therefore the will, in order to be morally good, must do what is commanded and solely because it is commanded: « to act according to duty and for the sake of duty ». Whence morality is from the form alone (which alone is universal), independently of the matter²: for if it fulfils the law for some empirical or eudaemonistic end (such as the satisfaction of natural tendency, fear of power, avoiding evil), or for the sake of some happiness or utility to be obtained, then the will pursues the useful, and has an egoistic motive, destructive of morality, and therefore it is not good morality; but only when it is impelled from pure reverence for the law. Kant therefore not only formally distinguishes every eudaemonistic element from morality, but excludes it as something incompatible with it.

Whence Ethics a) must be pure from every empirical element of experience and proceed a priori; and therefore does not depend on concrete human nature and is without respect to psychology;

c) obligation does not depend on morality, but morality on obligation.

But the universal moral law presents itself to man as something commanding, not conditionally and hypothetically (if you wish to be happy, do this), but absolutely and categorically (do good): whence it is a categorical imperative of practical reason, which must be obeyed simply and without any respect to the object and to the consequences of the act or to obtaining a reward, and without further inquiry into its foundation or authority; hence it is called a formal imperative. For the moral law proceeds from reason or rational nature as such, which is an end in itself, so that man cannot be ordered as a means to another end. Morality is essentially autonomous, by which the will observes its own law; for reason, as it is the sole measure of morality, so also its unique foundation. For in heteronomy, if one is subjected to the law of another, even of God, we are always led by a utilitarian or eudaemonistic motive (of love, hope, fear), and the imperative will not be categorical but conditional: « if he commands, if you wish to obey, in order to obtain something material, do so ». Whence the ultimate end is the fulfilment of duty that is fully possible, or the pursuit of autonomy of duty, which is an end in itself and has absolute value in itself: in the domain of ends he is subject to the legislator. Autonomy is only the foundation of proper value, as the ultimate foundation of morality and obligation.

But the categorical imperative is an unconditional and universal rule. Whence

a) the first and fundamental subjective rule (or « maxim », as it is called), which will be the criterion of morality, is this: « So act that the rule of your will can always become the principle of universal legislation », i. e. before you act carefully consider whether something absurd would follow from your action, if all were ordered to do the same, and so in fact acted. From which rule two others follow;

b) another which determines the end of morality: « So act that you hold humanity in yourself and in others as an end, not however as a means which you use »; for if you use yourself or others as a means, by that very fact you act for utility or pleasure, not for duty, and the imperative will already be conditional, not categorical;

c) a third which indicates the source of morality: « So act that you consider your will (as to matter) as a universal legislator »; autonomy is altogether necessary, otherwise we would no longer act for duty.

Now, in order that ethics be possible, there are three postulates of practical reason, which although theoretically indemonstrable, must be admitted and believed as truths. For

1. the moral law postulates freedom: if the will were forced to act, it could not be morally good; whence it is not phenomenal freedom, but there is given a numenal freedom which determines phenomenal operations³; 2) the necessary object and end of the created will is to bring about the supreme good, which consists in the intimate union of happiness and virtue. This, however, cannot be attained in the present life, for by that very fact the obligation would cease. Whence the will is destined to tend perpetually toward progress toward the supreme good; for which it is postulated that the soul is immortal;

2. man cannot think the supreme good unless joined with supreme happiness. But the moral order is opposed to the order of happiness. Therefore it is postulated that there be some cause which unites morality with beatitude, and this can be nothing other than God. Hence there will be retribution, because virtue is worthy of retribution, although it cannot be exercised for the sake of retribution. Retribution in this life is impossible. Therefore it is in the other life, and therefore there is a God.

Thus God is introduced as the end of ethics, without being the foundation of morality.

From which postulates results the primacy of practical reason and of the will over speculative reason.

Many have followed Kant as to substance; and several of his principles have had influence on modern philosophy as a whole. Many things, however, can be opposed to his system⁴.

1. It rests on three false foundations, namely it supposes a) the ideological and critical system of speculative reason; b) that the characters « universal » and « necessary » cannot be derived from what is known experimentally; c) that all « material » principles place the motive in the lower appetitive faculty and that men are moved by them only through pleasure; whence man cannot act honestly except « for the sake of the form » of the law, namely from pure reverence for the law. Where there is a twofold error, namely a) that the law does not move except through the lower faculty, since the good can be desired by a twofold faculty; b) that one acts from pure reverence for the law or from the motive of pleasure, for there are many other motives of the higher appetite, e. g. agreement with human nature or with the right order, love of God, excellence of virtue, etc.

2. It does not explain morality or the norm of morality, for a) it removes the real end, beatitude; whence it makes impossible the relation of acts to the end and consequently removes the rule of mores;

therefore b) if there is no moral rule, neither will there be a true law or obligatory rule. For obligation is the necessity of acting. But the will is not solicited except by a final cause or a good willed. Therefore the categorical imperative, which intends to exclude every real end, cannot found a real obligation, and therefore is not law;

indeed c) the rule given is psychologically impossible. For one must act solely from the motive of duty, without consideration of one's own good and affect of the appetitive faculty. But this is impossible. The will has the good as its proper object, and whatever it wills, it wills under the aspect of the good. Therefore it cannot act from pure reverence for the law, unless this be fitting and good for it; — otherwise the good would be something foreign to the will and could not move it. It is therefore impossible to exclude the affect of the appetitive faculty: that something be good for man and pertaining to happiness, if it is not always the principal motive, is nevertheless the sine qua non condition of appetition. Hence Kantian ethics maims human nature, and therefore is antinatural and unfruitful;

in fact d) it assumes as known from common persuasion that only that will is simply good which wills and what the law commands and because it commands. But such persuasion does not exist, for men often call honest actions which are commanded by no law, e. g. if someone freely devotes himself to the service of the poor and sick or to the obsequies of his country; moreover, they also hold prescribed acts as good if they are done from another motive (not forbidden by another law) such as mercy, love of neighbor, etc.: thus a good will is manifested.

3. The honesty of an action is not necessarily corrupted by a eudaemonological intention. For there is a twofold grade of perfection, namely a) to act for honesty or for a deontological end; b) to act for happiness, although not exclusively for it alone, but with due subordination to the deontological end, using the hope of reward or fear of punishment to pursue honesty more efficaciously⁵. Which remains good, because in this way man acts according to nature adequately considered. This nature, by an invincible appetite implanted by the Creator, tends toward its good or happiness. Whence by thus acting the honest good, man wills that to which he is led by nature by the Creator. On the other hand, the Kantian rule is not proportioned to nature: for it is impossible that a being who by the whole weight of nature is inclined toward his own happiness should continually neglect this in acting; as is confirmed, ceteris paribus, by the universal way of acting of even the most perfect men.

It is therefore false that reason forbids following the inclination toward happiness or pleasure: this appetite can be directed by right reason.

4. For it contradicts itself: a) asserting on the one hand that an action elicited for the hope of beatitude is not good, and on the other hand that the supreme good consists in the conjunction of virtue and beatitude. If this is true, why will it be forbidden to desire and seek it? For it is not evil to seek what is perfect; but it is perfect to cultivate virtue and at the same time to be happy;

therefore.

b) likewise asserting on the one hand that the only honest motive is the fulfilling of duty; and on the other hand that man is to be considered as an end, indeed that the rule of acting must be constituted by each one so that it can hold for all. But this is to introduce a material element distinct from duty, and therefore to make the imperative conditional.

5. Indeed, from the system several absurdities follow:

a) that human nature is an end to itself, and its perfection is absolute autonomy: for human nature is not autonomous, since dependence is essential to man;

b) that reason is at once superior and inferior, making the law and rebelling against itself: « it is at once rule and at the same time subject » and « not rarely rebellious »;

c) that practical judgments are synthetic a priori (by which, namely, a priori the idea of obligation is joined with action), which rest on a blind faith in the goodness and holiness of the law of reason; a priori it is supposed that human reason commands good things, whereas on the contrary in its judgments it ought to depend on objective truth. Thus obligation is built up without an ontological foundation;

d) that the matter of action in no way pertains to morality: for how is it discerned that a rule is apt to be made a universal principle, e. g. that an act (falsehood) is worthy to be prohibited by a universal law, except because the matter or object has in itself turpitude and is against reason?

e) that no act is good which is not prescribed by a categorical imperative; yet there is a distinction between the licit, the obligatory, and the heroic, between the prescribed good and the unprescribed good; indeed the obligatory is posterior to morality;

f) that goodness and malice are constituted by the categorical imperative: is an act evil solely because prohibited, good because prescribed, or on the contrary prohibited as in itself evil, and prescribed as in itself good?

6. Finally it leads to fatalism or pantheism. For one must obey reason, either blindly because reason dictates, not seeking any further foundation, and this is fatalism; or have human reason as absolute and God, which is pantheism.

134. Conclusion. — From these things it is already evident what must be thought of morality absolutely independent or laic. Besides the fact that it is incomplete, it seems under some aspect to include something utopian. For in general:

1. In logical order, it is impossible to justify ethics without an absolute end that subsists in itself, and which is none other than God, the supreme and infinite good; otherwise all our aspirations toward good would go into the void or nothing. Hence beyond contingent created goods there must be an absolute End, which is the end in itself.

2. In ontological order, all things are founded on this, that God loves himself with necessary love and cannot will anything except for his own sake; otherwise he could not communicate himself to other entities which participate in his perfection, nor give them an end, the communication of his goodness.

3. In practical order and execution, without recourse to God, the observance of morality will not be sufficiently obtained, for want of an efficacious sanction; namely, if man were not certain that God, infinitely just and omnipotent, will establish an eternal harmony and concord between virtue and happiness, vice and unhappiness.

In particular, those who uphold an independent morality, in place of theistic or Christian morality, propose either

1. The ethics of solidarity, by which we are bound toward others. The obligation would arise either from a contract, or from inheritance by which we obtain all things from preceding generations. Not from a contract, for a contract is valid only if freely entered into; but individuals are not bound, because they have not assumed the obligation, indeed they have not freely undertaken society. Not from inheritance, because the patrimony of earlier generations has no determined natural heirs, but pertains to all and each; whence if we use it, we contract no debt from this toward others⁶. — Or

2. Sociological ethics, which founds morality on the idea of society, which is a moral person distinct from and superior to individuals, which can command. But society is not a person or entity really distinct from individuals, nor is it an absolute end in itself: it is for the good of individuals and these are not simply for it. Since individuals must obey, it is not because society has an absolute right to command for commanding's sake, but because the commanded thing contributes to the good of individuals and so can be legitimated. — Or

3. The ethics of nature, which is founded on the subjection of man to his nature. The ultimate end is: to be ourselves, to conserve and perfect ourselves under individual respect and in relation to society. In a right sense this can be understood of rational nature as such, ordered to the ultimate end, God; but in fact those who do not recognize God and the author of the universe, what do they understand by the name of nature which is the norm? In various and opposite ways they interpret it. Moreover, the instincts which are to be reformed for the good ordering of nature proceed from nature itself as do those which are to be stimulated; therefore there must be another discriminating rule: human reason, an irradiation of the divine reason itself.