Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

120. Object of the question. — Having supposed the distinction between moral good and moral evil, we must now inquire into the reason, criteria, and foundations of this discrimination, as well as its more fundamental principle. To which we shall say 1) about the intrinsic difference between moral good and moral evil; 2) about the subjective criterion or norm according to which morality can be determined; 3) about the objective criterion of morality and its ultimate foundation; 4) about the errors to be noted and refuted in this matter; 5) about the cognitive faculty of morality: for the question is connected with the foregoing.

S. Th. I-II, q. 18, a. 1 and 8 ; C. Gent. III, 129.

121. State of the question. — First there arises the question about the reason for the discrimination between good and evil, namely whether

there are given some human acts which are objectively good or bad from the intrinsic, or according to the nature of the thing, or on the contrary are only so from extrinsic determination and positive will. Around this there are several errors, which are comprehended under the common name of Moral Positivism¹.

They are reduced to a twofold class:

1. For some say that the positive determination of good and evil was made by men, either a) by civil laws (Hobbes) or by the social contract (Rousseau), or b) by education (Montaigne), or c) by public opinion and the custom of the people (St Lambert), or d) by the invention of sages and the powerful (Mandeville), or e) by the evolution of the moral sense or of the collective conscience or culture (Evolutionists, v. Hartmann, Levy-Bruhl, Durkheim).

2. Others derive the discrimination from the free will of God; so the Nominalists like Occam and Gerson, Descartes, Pufendorf, likewise the commentators on Grotius like Osiander, Gronovius, Cocceius².

Against these the Catholic doctrine holds that certain actions are by their nature good or bad, independently of any positive will.

122. Thesis. There are given some actions intrinsically good or bad, independently of any will even divine.

We admit indeed that there are many actions which are morally good because they are prescribed by some divine or human law, and similarly many bad because they are forbidden; but there are some which are commanded or forbidden as in themselves honest or dishonest.

It is proved: 1) By the argument of conscience and historical induction. Psychologically and historically it is established that there are certain actions which, according to the common conscience and the perpetual and invincible persuasion of men, have always been held as naturally in themselves honest or dishonest: thus for example to love parents, to do good to one's neighbor, to speak the truth, to keep covenants, etc.; on the contrary to pursue parents with hatred, to kill the innocent without legitimate reason, to betray friends unjustly, to break promises, to utter a falsehood harmful to one's neighbor, and other things of the same kind, are held as something base and dishonest. This persuasion indeed prevails among all nations, even barbarian ones; nor is it diminished or lost by anyone, except as the moral sense is diminished or destroyed. But a persuasion so constant and universal, deeply rooted in minds so diverse and dissenting in nearly all other things, does not arise from civil law or custom, which is different among various nations, and moreover laws and customs are themselves called good and bad, for which reason they are not the primary criterion; — nor from education, the social contract, or public opinion, which likewise are not the same among different peoples; but it is derived from nature itself.

Neither can it be said that the morality of these acts depends on a free institution by God: for this institution is not known to many peoples who do not have revelation, and therefore does not explain the universality of the fact. Moreover, certain actions appear in themselves and essentially so honest or dishonest that not even a divine positive will could change their morality (e.g. God cannot make blasphemy a praiseworthy act, nor make piety a sin) : the essence of things therefore does not depend on the free will of God, nor therefore the essential relations between them. Whence S. Thomas, Q. D. de Ver. 23, a. 6 : "The will does not have the character of a first rule... ; for it is directed by reason and intellect, not only in us, but also in God... ; to say that justice depends on simple will is to say that the divine will does not proceed according to the order of wisdom, which is blasphemy".

2. From philosophical reason: The good of an entity is that which suits its nature, evil that which does not suit. And there are several actions which in themselves and naturally suit or do not suit rational human nature. Therefore there are several actions which from their very nature in themselves and naturally are good or bad.

The minor premise is proved from S. Thomas, III c. Gent. 129: « Of whatever there is a determined nature, there must needs be determined operations which suit that nature (or on the contrary do not suit it): for the proper operation of anything follows its own nature. Now it is evident that the nature of men is determined. Therefore there must needs be some operations in themselves fitting to man » (or on the contrary unfitting).

The conclusion is inductively proved from three principal matters about which human action is concerned, i. e., about a) social relations with others, insofar as man is a social being; — b) the use of external things and the governance of the body and lower powers, insofar as he is a rational being; — c) relations with God as ultimate end, insofar as man is a created being. And in these three matters actions are by their nature fitting or unfitting:

a) about social relations with other men: « Whatever something is natural, that without which it cannot be had must needs be natural: for nature does not fail in what is necessary. Now it is natural to man that he be a social animal; which is shown from this, that one man alone is not sufficient for providing all that is necessary for human life. Therefore those things without which human society cannot be preserved are naturally fitting to man: such things are that each one preserve what is his, and abstain from injuries. Therefore there are some human acts naturally right ».

b) about the use of external things and the governance of the body and lower powers: « Man naturally has this, that he use inferior things for his life's necessity. Now there is a determined measure (naturally) according to which the use of the aforesaid things is fitting for human life, which measure, if it is passed over, becomes harmful to man, as appears in the immoderate taking of foods. Therefore there are some acts naturally unfitting to man.

Likewise according to the natural order the body of man is for the sake of the soul and the lower powers of the soul for the sake of reason; just as in other things matter is for the sake of form and instruments for the sake of the principal agent. From the fact, however, that something is ordered to another, it ought to receive help from it, not indeed an impediment. Therefore it is naturally right that man so provide for the body and the lower powers of the soul that from this the act of reason and its good is not hindered, but rather helped. If however the contrary happens, it will be naturally a sin. Drunkenness therefore and revelling and the disordered use of venereal pleasures, by which the act of reason is hindered and the soul subjected to passions which do not allow the free judgment of reason, are naturally evil ».

c) about relations with God: « To each one those things naturally suit by which he tends toward his natural end; those however which are to the contrary are naturally unsuited to him... Man is naturally ordered to God as to an end. Therefore those things by which man is led to the knowledge and love of God are naturally right; whatever indeed is to the contrary is naturally evil to man ».

« Therefore it is evident, as S. Thomas concludes, that good and evil in human acts are not only according to the position of law, but also according to the natural order ».

3. From the consequences of the adverse opinion: If there is no essential and objective discrimination between good and evil, a wide road is opened to moral scepticism. For a) what today is held as bad, tomorrow, with changed legislation, or tradition or education, can be held as lawful; and therefore the true notion of moral obligation perishes: for this is conceived as something permanent and universal, not hypothetically but categorically prescribing certain actions, whereas civil laws and traditions of peoples are something unstable and particular, and can only create a hypothetical obligation. With this discrimination removed, therefore, the moral order itself collapses; — b) there have existed some most wicked customs, the attack on which by heroic and saintly persons is generally praised as progress. Yet according to positivism all customs are good; nor is there an ideal and permanent rule by which to measure progress; — c) the adversaries must assume as foundation the principle: To a God who commands (or to men who command) obedience is good and resistance is evil. Therefore something is to be admitted as good or bad before the positive precept of God (or of men). And if nothing is admitted, the foundation of the whole moral order collapses.

123. They object, the positivists and evolutionists, certain examples of polygamy, of human sacrifices, of the killing of parents out of piety, namely to avoid the burdens of old age or captivity, which are sometimes reputed honest and just; whence they conclude that the public conscience is not offended by wrongdoing, because

R. The error exists not with respect to all intrinsically honest and dishonest things, but with respect to some: for nature can fail not in all things but in some, and so some have a depraved reason from passion, or from bad custom, or from a bad disposition of nature, and they could have erred with respect to some, as in the case of polygamy, or human sacrifice, or brigandage which among some was not held unjust, or the killing of parents done to remove misery. But they erred rather about the manner of practising piety than about the very obligation of loving parents; as about the manner of worshipping God, of keeping justice, or of ordering matrimony, not about the principles themselves, that it is good to love God, to live justly, and to protect the education of the human race through matrimony. Whence already S. Thomas, in Eth., b. 3: « Some things (not all), which by some are held just and honest, by others unjust and dishonest according to the difference of times and places and persons. For something is held vicious at one time or in one region which at another time or in another region is not held vicious. And from this difference it comes about that some think that nothing is naturally just or honest, but only according to the position of law ».

S. Th. I-II, q. 19, a. 3 and 4 ; 21, a. 1 ; 71, a. 6 ; 72, a. 4 and 8 ; 74, a. 7 ; 86, a. 1 and 2 ; 63, a. 2 ; De Malo, q. 2, a. 4 ; q 16, a. 2.

Having supposed an intrinsic discrimination of moral good and evil, we must now inquire into the foundations of this discrimination, and first into its subjective criterion or norm of morality; then into the objective criterion and ultimate foundation. About the first, two theses are laid down.

124. Thesis I. The nearer and intrinsic norm of morality is right human practical reason.

Explanation: It is called: 1) reason, and not only conscience, which is the rule of subjective morality of human acts, since here we are primarily concerned with the norm of objective morality: for conscience is particular reason, by which a definite person judges about the morality of such an act in particular and applies the law to a definite concrete case, whereas here we are more concerned with universal reason which judges about the morality of acts in general and enunciates the law, and is by essence common to all men; 2) right, i. e., judging conformably to the eternal law, from which it flows as from a fountain and rule of all good; for, as S. Thomas says, II Sent. d. 24, q. 3, a. 3, ad 3: « A corrupted reason is not reason, just as a false syllogism is not properly a syllogism, and therefore the rule of human acts is not any reason whatever, but right reason », which alone is able to order suitably toward the end and as is fitting;

3. is a nearer norm, rather than a proximate norm: for the latter is conscience, which applies the law to the concrete act, and so is the altogether proximate and immediate rule of acting, and with respect to it universal reason or law is already a remoter rule; and nevertheless this is the near rule with respect to the supreme and ultimate rule which is the eternal law of God himself;

4. and intrinsic: for reason is intrinsic to man, while the eternal law of God is extrinsic to him.

The thesis is proved 1° By facts: A moral action is to be called good, like any entity, when it reaches its end, or at least rightly and orderly tends toward its proper end. But it belongs to practical reason of man to discover what our ultimate end is, what means are necessary

The minor is proved:

a) Generally by experience;

b) Specially from the difference between rational and irrational nature (I-II, q. 91, a. 2): for it is evident that man rules himself and orders his acts toward an end; since therefore order is according to a rule, man must needs have implanted in him a rule by which he could rule himself and order his acts: which is nothing other than reason.

c) For just as speculative reason is by nature able to know the true, so practical reason is able to perceive the good (under the aspect of the true), i. e., the ordered relation of acts to the ultimate end, e. g., it dictates that blasphemy is evil as contrary to God the ultimate end, that intemperance is a sin because men thereby abuse

Briefly: The judgment of practical reason has as its object the fittingness and unfittingness of an act with an end. But the goodness of action resides in the relation of fittingness and subordination to the ultimate end of rational nature; malice in the relation of unfittingness. Therefore the judgment of practical reason

2° By reason drawn from S. Thomas, I-II, q. 90, a. 1: In each kind, that which is the principle is the measure and rule of that kind. Reason is the first principle of human acts, because it is its office to order toward the end, which is the first principle in matters of action. Therefore the rule and measure of human acts

125. Thesis II. The supreme and extrinsic norm and ultimate rule of morality is the reason of God, or the eternal law itself.

It is called: 1) the supreme norm, because morality depends more on this than on the near rule. For an effect depends more on the first cause than on the second cause, since the second cause does not act except by virtue of the first cause; whence that human reason is the rule of morality, this it has from the eternal law. Therefore moral good d

2. ultimate: the nearer norm is founded ultimately in the remote and fundamental norm or eternal law. Whence human reason is called the near, subordinate and regulated norm of morality; the eternal law the ultimate and supreme and regulating norm (q. 71, a. 6 ; q. 21, a. 1);

3. is the eternal law, i. e., the divine reason inasmuch as it conceives the ordering of all actions and orders them to the ultimate end, the will of God inasmuch as it necessarily wills this ordering to be observed by man, and the reason of God inasmuch as it commands this ordering and imposes it upon us.

It is proved: 1) Human reason is true or false according as it is conformed to truth or not: for it is cognitive, not productive, of truth.

But the measure of all truth is the reason of God, which is the first truth and productive of every other truth.

Therefore human reason is a true rule according as it is conformed to the reason of God (q. 19, a. 4).

2. In human acts good and evil are said according to the order to the ultimate end. But the ultimate end is constituted and intended by the author of nature. Therefore the supreme ordering of human acts is from God; and acts are good or bad according to the ordering of God.

3. Hence was condemned the proposition of the Syllabus, 3°: « Human reason, without any respect at all for God, is the sole arbiter of true and false, good and evil ».

They object: We do not know the eternal law; therefore it is not a rule. — R. It is made known through creatures and especially through the knowledge of human nature, for all things have from the eternal law that they are ordered and moved toward their end and toward the end of the whole universe: « Although the eternal law is unknown to us according as it

126. Corollary. — Human reason is the secondary and nearer proper or homogeneous and immanent rule; the eternal law the primary and supreme, heterogeneous, and transcendent rule (q. 19, a. 4, ad 2 ; q. 21, a. 1 ; q. 71, a. 6).

Not only must we inquire into the subjective criterion of morality, or the norm by which it is discerned, but also into the objective criterion and the foundation of the intrinsic discrimination between good and evil, or the ontological principle from which the rule of morality has its origin and force, and on which right reason relies for judging what is good or evil.

127. Thesis. The objective foundation of morality, the proximate of the rule of reason, is human nature with its end and essential relations; the ultimate, of the eternal law, is the divine essence itself.

Many recent authors say that human rational nature as such in itself is the proximate norm of morality; — or even human nature completely considered with all its essential relations, namely as rational (and not merely sentient), as social, and as created¹; — some even add that the fundamental norm or the foundation of the eternal law and the will of God itself². But all these confuse the norm with its objective foundation. — On the contrary, some deny that morality depends on the ultimate end to which human nature is nevertheless ordered³, or even on the essential order of things⁴. But we must say:

1° Human rational nature as such, or even completely considered with its relations, is not the formal rule and measure or criterion by which morality is distinguished (and even if one wished to call it a rule, it would at least not be the proximate rule), but the objective foundation according to which reason discerns what is good or bad: for from this the object or act is discerned to be good or bad because it has a relation of fittingness or unfittingness with rational nature. Whence the near norm and subjective criterion of morality is only the practical judgment of reason. And therefore S. Thomas distinguishes between physical good and moral good, between works of nature and works of will, and says that nature is the rule of natural works, reason the rule of acts of will⁵.

For reason is right from its conformity to the eternal law. The eternal law is made known through creatures, and especially through human nature. Therefore human nature stands as a medium between the eternal law and reason, and in this sense it is said to be so, but it is not a rule, except fundamentally, i. e., as the foundation of the rule of reason.

2° Consequently, even the ultimate end of man to which rational nature is itself naturally ordered, and the very essential order of things or the objective order arising from the necessary relations of the human agent to various entities, for the same reason, can be called the objective foundation of morality. They are a rule fundamentally, or the foundation of the rule of reason⁶.

3° Human nature, however, and the essential order of things, are not the fundamental rule nor the foundation of the supreme rule and the eternal law, because before the idea of God and independently of it, created essences and the order among them are nothing at all and have no being either real or ideal; whence the foundation of the eternal law, as of all things, is the divine essence alone, which is the absolutely ultimate end.

128. Remark. — Lest a difficulty arise from the fact that we define good and evil according to conformity or disformity, whether to rational nature, or to reason, or to the ultimate end; for these all come down to the same thing. For good is that which suits some nature; rational nature is constituted by reason; nature is also the principle of operation tending toward its proper end. Therefore it is the same to say: moral good suits rational nature, or reason, or the ultimate end of human nature.

129. False systems are opposed to the Catholic doctrine on the nature, rule, and foundation of morality, which places moral goodness in the honest good alone and grounds it in rational human nature, the eternal law of God, and the tendency toward perfect happiness to be obtained in the other life; — whether by defect or by excess. It is itself conformed to Aristotelian philosophy, and can be called rational eudaemonism, because it intends rational perfection, the supreme good of man. To it

a) by defect is opposed pure eudaemonism (εὐδαιμονία = happiness, bien-être, welzijn, lust) or ethical voluntarism (gemoeds-, begeerte- of strevingsmoraal, geluksmoraal, gelukstrevingsmoraal, geluksdrang), which tends toward earthly happiness and places it either in the delectable good: Hedonism or sensualism, or in the useful good for temporal happiness: Utilitarianism, which subsists under various forms, e. g. individual, or social, or evolutionist utilitarianism, sociological ethics, progressivism, pragmatism, etc.

b) on the contrary, by excess is opposed pure rationalism or formalism: namely autonomistic and ethical rationalism, which proposes the honest good exaggeratedly and indeed of autonomous reason, without respect for human nature considered in its totality, for the eternal law of God, or for happiness, or for reward even of the other life. It exists under various forms of which the chief are Stoicism and Kantianism¹.

130. Hedonism (ἡδονή = pleasure) or moral sensualism (genietingsmoraal) says: Happiness is the sum of pleasures. Good is in sensual pleasure, evil in pain. The supreme good is the greatest present pleasure of the body, and every pleasure is good, even if obtained by the most shameful action. Whence the supreme norm is: pleasure is to be sought, pain to be fled; to which nature impels. Hence actions are good which bring more pleasure than pain; and therefore virtue is good only as a means to pleasure.

Against this system can be opposed:

1. Hedonism is founded on the system of moral positivism: for pleasure varies and depends much on circumstances, custom, the laws of times and places, and the character of individuals, and corresponds to particular tendencies: each one is drawn by his own pleasure!

2. It falsely supposes the ultimate end to be in the supreme pleasure of this life.

3. The delectable good is not the first object of appetite, for pleasure follows from appetition and operation which naturally precedes it and produces it. Whence pleasure will be good (or evil) according to the very nature of the operation. Therefore it is not the principle or norm of morality.

4. Hedonism denies the classic distinction between the honest, the useful, and the delectable good: yet historically and really there is a difference between what is delectable to sense and what is fitting for man; whence the system is opposed to the natural conscience of man; and reduced to the state of the present life, it justifies all crimes.

5. It considers only one element of man: but man is spirit and heart, not only heart.

6. The delectable good is relative to the individual, and therefore subjective and variable; therefore it does not constitute a criterion of objective and intrinsic discrimination between good and evil.

7. Pleasure sought without restriction and discretion destroys itself: experience shows that it brings pain and is transformed into pain. If however pleasure as such is good, it will never be excessive; and nevertheless pleasure can be excessive: for its quantity displeases, so that it is no longer pleasure.

They object: 1) Natural inclinations are true; therefore the pleasure to which nature inclines is the true end and the true good. — R. Those inclinations are true, not because they tend toward pleasure, but because they show the internal nature of man. Whence it is not absolutely good to follow them, but insofar as they suit human nature as such, and reason itself, to which all other inclinations must be subordinated, as the lower to the higher.

2. Not every pleasure is good or an end, but pleasure of a certain kind or quality, which is discerned by reason. — R. Then pleasure as such is no longer the ultimate norm; but a determined quality or condition of pleasure. Which is already a denial of the system.

There is nevertheless in it something true: namely the connection between virtue and happiness and pleasure, not indeed the baser one of sense, but the nobler one of mind. The exercise of virtue alone can procure true happiness: it can cause an imperfect one in the present life, and merit a perfect one in the other life. But an act will not be good because it makes us happy; it makes us happy because it is good.

131. Utilitarianism (nuttigheidsmoraal; Nützlichkeitsmoral; Erfolgsmoral) in general does not place the end precisely in pleasure alone but in the sum of goods; — and moral good in whatever good is useful for earthly happiness either of the individual or of society, even in pleasure which reason approves as truly useful. Thus pleasure remains the secondary criterion of morality.

Now the aforesaid norm, besides falsely supposing that created good is the end of man:

1. Is not sufficient, as not being universal: for there are many honest or dishonest acts without respect to private or social good, e. g. contrary to utility, faith given is preserved. Social utilitarianism in fact denies the duties of man toward God and toward himself, except as they are ordered to the social good; individual utilitarianism does not prove duties toward God or toward others. If they say that individual good is joined to the social, R.: perhaps so in the abstract, let it pass; in the concrete, I deny, for in fact they are often opposed and at war.

2. It is practically impossible: for all the consequences (of advantage or disadvantage) present and future would have to be adequately perceived and mutually compared, in order that it could be established what is truly useful.

3. It is not immutable: for earthly happiness appears subjective and relative, and is therefore not conceived in the same way by all, but for various times and regions and individuals is understood in different ways, so that nothing is more mutable than such a rule; whence it would render morality subjective and changeable.

4. It is false: for acts held by all as dishonest can be useful to man, e. g. theft and homicide, or can be ordered to the social good, e. g. perjury, homicide, falsehood; and vice versa, acts certainly honest can be useless. Whence the norm of the happiness of life is vague and indeterminate because it can legitimize everything; and at the same time so restricted that it cannot legitimize many duties, as already said under 1°).

5. It is incomplete and defective: it considers more the empirical and affective aspect (egoism or altruism) than the rational aspect, to which it assigns the second place and which it subordinates to inclination and tendency; whereas reason had the first place in morality, as directing and regulating.

In particular A. Individual, private or egoistic utilitarianism (welbegrepen eigenbelang) places morality in whatever good which each one, for his pursuit of happiness, has proposed to obtain for himself. Whence it is not pleasure alone, but that which of itself and by its effects and circumstances offers greater utility also future for the whole life.

Against individual utilitarianism many things can be brought which are opposed to hedonism, namely: 1) It is founded on moral positivism: utility depends on many circumstances, laws, custom, and personal character.

2. It falsely supposes the ultimate end to be in the happiness of this life.

3. It denies the classic distinction between the honest, the useful, and the delectable good. And yet the useful as such is not an end but a means. Whence the end must be either the delectable good (hedonism), or the good considered in relation to the end of nature (rational ethics). Utility therefore is not the primary criterion. Whence the system is opposed to the moral conscience of all times, which refuses to admit as moral perfection the question of profit, just as of pleasure.

4. It considers only one aspect of man; but man of himself is individual and of himself by his nature is social. Whence not individual utility alone is the end of the moral order.

5. The useful good is not a universal criterion: for it is relative and variable, whence it is not a criterion of objective and intrinsic discrimination; indeed it can lead to the greatest crimes; — on the contrary, the best acts, such as shedding blood for God, virtue, the defense of country, can be useless.

6. Hence individual utility is denied to have to do with education and legislation.

7. Whence is condemned prop. 58 of the Syllabus: « All moral discipline and honesty must be placed in accumulating and increasing riches in every way and in satisfying pleasures ».

B. Social utilitarianism or altruism establishes that the common happiness is the norm of morality. Actions therefore are good or bad according as they promote or hinder the common happiness, and the more an action contributes to the common good, the better it is; the more it hinders it, the worse.

Against this form in particular can be opposed:

1. In order that the happiness of others be the end, one must know in what that happiness consists. Whence the system does not give an ultimate answer, nor definitively solves the question, but pushes it back. The useful is not a measure, because it is a means, not an end. Therefore it is not the supreme criterion.

2. It is not a universal criterion. Ethics precedes the organization of society. Conscience testifies that, besides social good, there are good and bad actions, such as intemperance, blasphemy, parricide, which are evil even in individual or family life. Moreover, the individual and society remain distinct, although they are not disjoint or separate. — Besides, man is referred directly to society only through external acts; and yet internal acts are moral, indeed moral in the first place and essentially.

3. It is not the first criterion. For the end of society is the end of individuals. Whence the distinction between social good and evil is subordinated to the distinction between individual good and evil; and if the good of one is not moral, neither is the good of many. It is natural for man to enter society, because the good is what is conformed to reason. There properly is the end, where there properly is the operation. Society is not one per se, but has only a unity of order; and therefore as such it is not apt to attain happiness.

4. It places the end in the present life and legitimizes all crimes, e. g. of powerful nations against the weaker.

5. According to the very principles of empiricism and utilitarianism, egoism prevails over altruism; and in the case of conflict between social good and individual happiness, according to the principles of utilitarianism the conflict cannot be solved.

132. Pure Rationalism or Formalism. In general, followers of autonomistic rationalism, having rejected the eternal law and excluded every relation to the person of God, to his reason and will, deduce morality and moral obligation solely from the conformity of the act with reason itself or nature as rational, without respect for utility, or pleasure, or happiness, or sanction. Whence they preach a purely rational morality, and moral good is only in the rational part of man; and therefore it consists in rational fittingness, and must be sought solely from the motive of fittingness, i. e., of virtue or duty, for its own sake (formalism).

It arose first in Greece, in the Cynic school, but there it flourished especially in the Stoic school.

The foundation of morality is: « to live conformably to nature », and since human nature is rational, virtue is in a life instituted according to reason. The supreme and unique good is a life according to virtue; whence virtue is an end in itself: for the good is to be loved and sought for its own sake, not for the sake of something else. Virtue and happiness are really the same: « it is the same to live happily as to live according to nature », says Seneca; besides virtue nothing else is needed for happiness. Nevertheless virtue is not to be sought for the sake of happiness; happiness is never to be sought as an end.

All else either are indifferent things (such as health, riches, sickness, poverty) to be sought or avoided according to circumstances; — or are things always to be avoided, such as the passions which are evil, against reason: to follow passion or affection or pleasure is against morality. Virtue is wisdom: the truly wise man patiently endures all inconveniences, and abstains from various pleasures (sustine et abstine); he subjects all affects and passions to reason, indeed he extirpates them by a certain apathy or impassibility, so that he is raised above all and cannot be disturbed by any influence of pain or pleasure: thus he is freed from affection.

But against this: 1) The identity of virtue and full happiness or beatitude does not exist here on earth, in which there are numerous and excessive sorrows.

2. The fundamental error by which it teaches that virtue must be cultivated solely for its own sake, so that every consideration of one's own happiness is excluded, is common to it with Kant; and therefore the arguments brought against this point of Kantian doctrine also have force here (cf. n. seq., 2 and 3).

3. The nature to which one must live conformably, it calls reason; but it understands reason in a thoroughly exclusive sense. So that it is not merely the preponderance and domination of reason, but pure rationality, with all else excluded from morality.

4. Hence the affective life lacks all morality. The passions must be reduced to slavery and extirpated, rather than ruled and moderated, so that there may be perfect apathy (by which one is not affected by them), and one's very life becomes indifferent to oneself!

5. Moreover, many false things are also contained therein. Thus: no degree of morality is admitted, but goodness or malice is held equal in all acts, the passions are also held as evil in themselves.

6. Finally, in the application of principles many errors occurred, and indeed most pernicious ones, since falsehood, suicide, and many foul things against nature were in fact held as lawful.

133. Kantianism. Stoicism was followed to some extent by Kant (1724-1804), author of the critical philosophy. After he had attempted to show that by pure speculative reason we can know only phenomena, and not noumena, or what things are in themselves; but that about them we have a merely subjective knowledge without objective value, and therefore the existence of God, the freedom of man, and the immortality of the soul cannot be proved with certainty; — he decided to lay the foundations of ethics by another way, through pure practical reason.

From the testimony of the conscience of all men, nothing is simply good except the good will (ratio-will); and this alone is moral. But the will is good not from the object, but from the motive by which it is moved to act: this can be nothing other than the fulfilling of duty; which duty is nothing other than conformity with the universal moral law. Therefore the will, in order to be morally good, must do what is commanded and solely because it is commanded: « to act according to duty and for the sake of duty ». Whence morality is from the form alone (which alone is universal), independently of the matter²: for if it fulfils the law for some empirical or eudaemonistic end (such as the satisfaction of natural tendency, fear of power, avoiding evil), or for the sake of some happiness or utility to be obtained, then the will pursues the useful, and has an egoistic motive, destructive of morality, and therefore it is not good morality; but only when it is impelled from pure reverence for the law. Kant therefore not only formally distinguishes every eudaemonistic element from morality, but excludes it as something incompatible with it.

Whence Ethics a) must be pure from every empirical element of experience and proceed a priori; and therefore does not depend on concrete human nature and is without respect to psychology;

c) obligation does not depend on morality, but morality on obligation.

But the universal moral law presents itself to man as something commanding, not conditionally and hypothetically (if you wish to be happy, do this), but absolutely and categorically (do good): whence it is a categorical imperative of practical reason, which must be obeyed simply and without any respect to the object and to the consequences of the act or to obtaining a reward, and without further inquiry into its foundation or authority; hence it is called a formal imperative. For the moral law proceeds from reason or rational nature as such, which is an end in itself, so that man cannot be ordered as a means to another end. Morality is essentially autonomous, by which the will observes its own law; for reason, as it is the sole measure of morality, so also its unique foundation. For in heteronomy, if one is subjected to the law of another, even of God, we are always led by a utilitarian or eudaemonistic motive (of love, hope, fear), and the imperative will not be categorical but conditional: « if he commands, if you wish to obey, in order to obtain something material, do so ». Whence the ultimate end is the fulfilment of duty that is fully possible, or the pursuit of autonomy of duty, which is an end in itself and has absolute value in itself: in the domain of ends he is subject to the legislator. Autonomy is only the foundation of proper value, as the ultimate foundation of morality and obligation.

But the categorical imperative is an unconditional and universal rule. Whence

a) the first and fundamental subjective rule (or « maxim », as it is called), which will be the criterion of morality, is this: « So act that the rule of your will can always become the principle of universal legislation », i. e. before you act carefully consider whether something absurd would follow from your action, if all were ordered to do the same, and so in fact acted. From which rule two others follow;

b) another which determines the end of morality: « So act that you hold humanity in yourself and in others as an end, not however as a means which you use »; for if you use yourself or others as a means, by that very fact you act for utility or pleasure, not for duty, and the imperative will already be conditional, not categorical;

c) a third which indicates the source of morality: « So act that you consider your will (as to matter) as a universal legislator »; autonomy is altogether necessary, otherwise we would no longer act for duty.

Now, in order that ethics be possible, there are three postulates of practical reason, which although theoretically indemonstrable, must be admitted and believed as truths. For

1. the moral law postulates freedom: if the will were forced to act, it could not be morally good; whence it is not phenomenal freedom, but there is given a numenal freedom which determines phenomenal operations³; 2) the necessary object and end of the created will is to bring about the supreme good, which consists in the intimate union of happiness and virtue. This, however, cannot be attained in the present life, for by that very fact the obligation would cease. Whence the will is destined to tend perpetually toward progress toward the supreme good; for which it is postulated that the soul is immortal;

2. man cannot think the supreme good unless joined with supreme happiness. But the moral order is opposed to the order of happiness. Therefore it is postulated that there be some cause which unites morality with beatitude, and this can be nothing other than God. Hence there will be retribution, because virtue is worthy of retribution, although it cannot be exercised for the sake of retribution. Retribution in this life is impossible. Therefore it is in the other life, and therefore there is a God.

Thus God is introduced as the end of ethics, without being the foundation of morality.

From which postulates results the primacy of practical reason and of the will over speculative reason.

Many have followed Kant as to substance; and several of his principles have had influence on modern philosophy as a whole. Many things, however, can be opposed to his system⁴.

1. It rests on three false foundations, namely it supposes a) the ideological and critical system of speculative reason; b) that the characters « universal » and « necessary » cannot be derived from what is known experimentally; c) that all « material » principles place the motive in the lower appetitive faculty and that men are moved by them only through pleasure; whence man cannot act honestly except « for the sake of the form » of the law, namely from pure reverence for the law. Where there is a twofold error, namely a) that the law does not move except through the lower faculty, since the good can be desired by a twofold faculty; b) that one acts from pure reverence for the law or from the motive of pleasure, for there are many other motives of the higher appetite, e. g. agreement with human nature or with the right order, love of God, excellence of virtue, etc.

2. It does not explain morality or the norm of morality, for a) it removes the real end, beatitude; whence it makes impossible the relation of acts to the end and consequently removes the rule of mores;

therefore b) if there is no moral rule, neither will there be a true law or obligatory rule. For obligation is the necessity of acting. But the will is not solicited except by a final cause or a good willed. Therefore the categorical imperative, which intends to exclude every real end, cannot found a real obligation, and therefore is not law;

indeed c) the rule given is psychologically impossible. For one must act solely from the motive of duty, without consideration of one's own good and affect of the appetitive faculty. But this is impossible. The will has the good as its proper object, and whatever it wills, it wills under the aspect of the good. Therefore it cannot act from pure reverence for the law, unless this be fitting and good for it; — otherwise the good would be something foreign to the will and could not move it. It is therefore impossible to exclude the affect of the appetitive faculty: that something be good for man and pertaining to happiness, if it is not always the principal motive, is nevertheless the sine qua non condition of appetition. Hence Kantian ethics maims human nature, and therefore is antinatural and unfruitful;

in fact d) it assumes as known from common persuasion that only that will is simply good which wills and what the law commands and because it commands. But such persuasion does not exist, for men often call honest actions which are commanded by no law, e. g. if someone freely devotes himself to the service of the poor and sick or to the obsequies of his country; moreover, they also hold prescribed acts as good if they are done from another motive (not forbidden by another law) such as mercy, love of neighbor, etc.: thus a good will is manifested.

3. The honesty of an action is not necessarily corrupted by a eudaemonological intention. For there is a twofold grade of perfection, namely a) to act for honesty or for a deontological end; b) to act for happiness, although not exclusively for it alone, but with due subordination to the deontological end, using the hope of reward or fear of punishment to pursue honesty more efficaciously⁵. Which remains good, because in this way man acts according to nature adequately considered. This nature, by an invincible appetite implanted by the Creator, tends toward its good or happiness. Whence by thus acting the honest good, man wills that to which he is led by nature by the Creator. On the other hand, the Kantian rule is not proportioned to nature: for it is impossible that a being who by the whole weight of nature is inclined toward his own happiness should continually neglect this in acting; as is confirmed, ceteris paribus, by the universal way of acting of even the most perfect men.

It is therefore false that reason forbids following the inclination toward happiness or pleasure: this appetite can be directed by right reason.

4. For it contradicts itself: a) asserting on the one hand that an action elicited for the hope of beatitude is not good, and on the other hand that the supreme good consists in the conjunction of virtue and beatitude. If this is true, why will it be forbidden to desire and seek it? For it is not evil to seek what is perfect; but it is perfect to cultivate virtue and at the same time to be happy;

therefore.

b) likewise asserting on the one hand that the only honest motive is the fulfilling of duty; and on the other hand that man is to be considered as an end, indeed that the rule of acting must be constituted by each one so that it can hold for all. But this is to introduce a material element distinct from duty, and therefore to make the imperative conditional.

5. Indeed, from the system several absurdities follow:

a) that human nature is an end to itself, and its perfection is absolute autonomy: for human nature is not autonomous, since dependence is essential to man;

b) that reason is at once superior and inferior, making the law and rebelling against itself: « it is at once rule and at the same time subject » and « not rarely rebellious »;

c) that practical judgments are synthetic a priori (by which, namely, a priori the idea of obligation is joined with action), which rest on a blind faith in the goodness and holiness of the law of reason; a priori it is supposed that human reason commands good things, whereas on the contrary in its judgments it ought to depend on objective truth. Thus obligation is built up without an ontological foundation;

d) that the matter of action in no way pertains to morality: for how is it discerned that a rule is apt to be made a universal principle, e. g. that an act (falsehood) is worthy to be prohibited by a universal law, except because the matter or object has in itself turpitude and is against reason?

e) that no act is good which is not prescribed by a categorical imperative; yet there is a distinction between the licit, the obligatory, and the heroic, between the prescribed good and the unprescribed good; indeed the obligatory is posterior to morality;

f) that goodness and malice are constituted by the categorical imperative: is an act evil solely because prohibited, good because prescribed, or on the contrary prohibited as in itself evil, and prescribed as in itself good?

6. Finally it leads to fatalism or pantheism. For one must obey reason, either blindly because reason dictates, not seeking any further foundation, and this is fatalism; or have human reason as absolute and God, which is pantheism.

134. Conclusion. — From these things it is already evident what must be thought of morality absolutely independent or laic. Besides the fact that it is incomplete, it seems under some aspect to include something utopian. For in general:

1. In logical order, it is impossible to justify ethics without an absolute end that subsists in itself, and which is none other than God, the supreme and infinite good; otherwise all our aspirations toward good would go into the void or nothing. Hence beyond contingent created goods there must be an absolute End, which is the end in itself.

2. In ontological order, all things are founded on this, that God loves himself with necessary love and cannot will anything except for his own sake; otherwise he could not communicate himself to other entities which participate in his perfection, nor give them an end, the communication of his goodness.

3. In practical order and execution, without recourse to God, the observance of morality will not be sufficiently obtained, for want of an efficacious sanction; namely, if man were not certain that God, infinitely just and omnipotent, will establish an eternal harmony and concord between virtue and happiness, vice and unhappiness.

In particular, those who uphold an independent morality, in place of theistic or Christian morality, propose either

1. The ethics of solidarity, by which we are bound toward others. The obligation would arise either from a contract, or from inheritance by which we obtain all things from preceding generations. Not from a contract, for a contract is valid only if freely entered into; but individuals are not bound, because they have not assumed the obligation, indeed they have not freely undertaken society. Not from inheritance, because the patrimony of earlier generations has no determined natural heirs, but pertains to all and each; whence if we use it, we contract no debt from this toward others⁶. — Or

2. Sociological ethics, which founds morality on the idea of society, which is a moral person distinct from and superior to individuals, which can command. But society is not a person or entity really distinct from individuals, nor is it an absolute end in itself: it is for the good of individuals and these are not simply for it. Since individuals must obey, it is not because society has an absolute right to command for commanding's sake, but because the commanded thing contributes to the good of individuals and so can be legitimated. — Or

3. The ethics of nature, which is founded on the subjection of man to his nature. The ultimate end is: to be ourselves, to conserve and perfect ourselves under individual respect and in relation to society. In a right sense this can be understood of rational nature as such, ordered to the ultimate end, God; but in fact those who do not recognize God and the author of the universe, what do they understand by the name of nature which is the norm? In various and opposite ways they interpret it. Moreover, the instincts which are to be reformed for the good ordering of nature proceed from nature itself as do those which are to be stimulated; therefore there must be another discriminating rule: human reason, an irradiation of the divine reason itself.

135. Thesis. The cognitive faculty of morality is none other than the intellect, which under this aspect is called practical.

It is proved: A. indirectly, by the exclusion of other opinions. The cognitive faculty of morality is not experience, nor sense, nor instinct, nor subjective affection. Therefore (cf. nn. 136-137).

B. directly: 1° Morality is conformity or fittingness with the rule of reason and the ultimate end, or disformity or unfittingness. But that pertains to the object of reason or the intellect. Therefore morality is known by the intellect.

2° Judgment about moral things is a kind of truth. But truth is the proper object of the intellect. Therefore judgment about moral things pertains to the intellect.

It is called practical because it has as its object the proportion of means to the end, and so is ordered to directing the acts of the will toward the end. The practical intellect, however, is not different from the speculative intellect. A faculty is not diversified by an accidental difference of object. But the object of the speculative intellect and the object of the practical intellect differ merely accidentally: for it is accidental to something apprehended by the intellect that it is ordered to work or is not ordered. Therefore the practical intellect does not differ really from the speculative intellect (I, q. 79, a. 11).

136. To the foregoing doctrine is opposed Moral Empiricism, which derives the knowledge of morality solely from experimental observation of utility. All things are mutable; the absolute is a metaphysical illusion; and therefore morality is essentially mutable according to circumstances. Whence the system in fact is reduced to evolutionism, which rests on impulses from repeated sensible experiences through all generations, had and transmitted. In which reason has only secondary parts: for it follows inclinations, and experiences what is, but does not dictate what ought to be. And so ethics is a descriptive and explanatory science, not normative.

Now organic ethics, as it is usually called:

A. As to its foundation, it supposes materialism or positivism, and therefore acknowledges only the ethics of utilitarianism or sensualism.

B. As to its method, 1) it is incomplete: for determining the rule of morals it is certainly useful, but the historical and psychological observation of factors and actions is not sufficient, because not only is it asked what men have done or do, but also and chiefly what it is fitting or necessary to do. For the determination of this, experience is not sufficient, but the exercise of reason itself is required, by which we know the cause and origin of this fittingness or moral obligation;

2. it is defective: it asserts indeed that there is no man who ultimately acts except for his own advantage. And yet experience also teaches that there are men who, for God or for their neighbor, spend themselves and all that is theirs; and that the notion of the honest and the just (with many at least) is distinct from the notion of happiness: for there are certain acts held as good, indeed most good or heroic, which not only do not bring pleasure, but cause sadness and detriment; others on the contrary, although wicked, procure advantage, as if someone, by fraud used in playing, should obtain for himself the victory and a large sum of money.

C. As to the matter: 1) it is insufficient. The value of a necessary principle is not from experience, and instinctive impulses do not constitute a principle of morality. For it must be asked whether the instinctive or organic impulses are a true manifestation of the good, or rather hallucinations. If the former, this will be only because of conformity with reason, and thus we return to our criterion. If the latter, it would be necessary to explain the universality and persistence of those hallucinations;

2. it is illogical, as opposed to experience: for if moral ideas and inclinations come from heredity, how does ethics give us the faculty and sometimes the duty of acting against instinct?

3. it is erroneous: it falsely asserts that duty is by natural or intellectual instinctive necessity; that obligation, however, arises from intrinsic sanction (e. g. harmful effects) and extrinsic (or fear of punishments), which is threefold: social, which the stronger impose on the will; civil, by which the prince necessary for social order is feared; religious, by which the souls of the dead (especially of princes) are feared. Now

a) this is not the notion we have of duty or obligation;

b) many do not perceive these moral sanctions; those, however, who know them could say that they yield to force, but do not recognize obligation;

c) such obligation has no force and efficacy in conscience, but is rather the destruction than the explanation of moral obligation: for it would be only an action extorted by fear alone.

4. Whence the system is not founded in positive experience, but is rather constituted from a series of hypotheses.

137. Moral Intuitionism is also opposed, by which generic name are designated all who agree in this, that good and evil are affirmed immediately by some intuition of a faculty (as Nativists and Innatists for psychology), or who assert that morality is known by instinct or a special sense, by which spontaneously man affirms good and evil without induction of experience and without deduction of reason. Which

A. others say is known by a physical or bodily sense, like Sensists and Phrenologists, who admit only sensitive knowledge. Against:

1. The assertion rests on a false foundation; it supposes materialism and a false system of the criterion of truth.

2. In the Sensist system, no freedom remains, which supposes indifference of judgment, which cannot exist without intelligence. Whence it destroys morality in its principle.

3. Universals, abstracts, and immutables (such as the moral norm) are not known by sense, which is essentially mutable, and varies according to circumstances and subjective dispositions. Therefore it destroys morality in its essence.

4. The moral rule orders human acts. To order pertains to the intellect. Therefore to the intellect pertains the knowledge of morality.

5. Sense experiences from objects only pleasure and pain; therefore logically Sensism must lead to hedonism or sensualism¹.

B. Others say it is known by a certain spiritual sense of intuition or instinct, which differs from the intellect and corresponds to a blind instinct by which we immediately know first principles, both speculative and practical. Which sense is of the affective order, and consists in a certain internal affection or sympathy or taste. So the Scotist school, Sentimentalists, and many recent authors; who all in fact are altruists. This system:

1. Is for the most part founded on a false system of the criterion.

2. Is inadequate. It denies the rational element, and assigns the first parts to the affective element, which is only secondary. For reason, according to them, only observes, does not dictate; and social utility is to be embraced not because it is conformed to reason, but because affection and instinct incline to it! On the contrary, affection is only a prejudgment or resonance of the judgment of reason, which is the norm of morality.

3. It does not provide a certain but a fallacious criterion. For one is not always affected with sympathy toward the moral good, nor always with antipathy toward evil; for other non-moral causes also, such as talents, qualities, happy outcome, enjoyment, joy, can excite the same affects.

4. It does not provide a universal criterion: for the multitude and society toward which we are held by the affect of sympathy are subject to changes; but what if we are inclined toward different men, toward whom we are held to be affected by sympathies?

5. It does not provide an objective but a subjective criterion: sympathy and antipathy change according to circumstances and persons.

6. It does not provide an ultimate criterion: for sympathies and antipathies themselves are good or bad. Why, except because they are conformed or disformed to reason?

7. As human reason reasons about speculative truth, so also about practical truth. But it is absolutely repugnant that the first principles of speculative reason be admitted by a blind instinct and without evidence. Therefore the same is repugnant for the first principles of practical reason, in practical or moral matters.

8. There are other instincts and intuitions, namely egoistical ones. Why, however, should we follow the inclinations of sympathies, and not the egoistical ones? Either because they are conformed to reason; — or because they have been made by evolution: in this latter case it does not follow that they are legitimate and good. And besides, persons of egoistical character can provoke antipathy.

The moral sense cannot be distinguished from other experiences unless a certain notion of morality is present beforehand; i. e. unless reason has investigated the idea and value of morality, and distinguished it from impressions merely sensitive, aesthetic, or social.

They object the spontaneity and universality and persistence of the moral conscience in all men and through all times; which cannot be explained except by instinct and a special sense; — and this is the only argument they bring. — R.: this proves a constant and innate disposition toward knowing the first moral principles, namely synderesis or the habit of the first practical principles (as there is the habit of the intellect for the first speculative principles), but does not prove a blind instinct or a special sense. For it is useless to have recourse to a distinct special faculty; because practical reason informed by synderesis is able to explain this, and it is not a faculty distinct from speculative reason.

C. Others who profess transcendental objectivism, or the transcendental or absolute idealism originating from it, have recourse to a blind instinct of the intellect itself, by which abstract and universal truths are admitted in such a way that their value is not demonstrated, because it cannot be demonstrated that they correspond to reality. So Kant and after him those who, resting on his principles, have fallen into Pantheism, like Fichte, Schelling, Hegel. — Against this:

a) As to the foundation, this is a false criteriological system, or even pantheistic monism, in which case morality will be impersonal and supra-individual.

b) As to the method, 1) this is incomplete: for although reason is chiefly necessary for defining what we ought to do, historical and psychological observation of human nature, to which the rules of morality must be adapted, must nevertheless be added;

2. therefore it is not accommodated to human nature: for if an act elicited with the hope of reward or the fear of punishment is said not to be good, when historically and psychologically it is established that men do not act well without respect for beatitude or fear of punishment, it follows that such a method and norm is not proportioned to human powers;

3. it introduces blind faith: for if speculative reason is incapable of knowing speculative truths with certainty, why will practical reason be more certain about the existence of obligation?

c) As to the matter, with regard to the Kantian system enough has been said, n. 133. With regard to the pantheistic systems:

1. in fact, the moral conscience attributes value to acts that uniquely tend toward the perfection of the individual; in the individual man there is also an exigency of morality;

2. indeed if it does not exist there, there will be no longer any exigency of morality: for obligation toward others is, in order that they may be perfected.