Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. I-II, q. 18, a. 1 and 8.

114. Morality is the attribution of human acts according to which they are called good or bad, i. e., fitting or unfitting. Good and bad are attended to in human acts in a special way. For good and bad are said by comparison to the end; therefore where there is specially the notion of an end, there is specially the notion of good. But it belongs to man in a special way to act for an end, insofar as he freely determines the end for himself. Therefore in a human act, besides the metaphysical goodness of the act, which is common to all entities as such, another goodness is given, which consists in this, that man rightly determines the end for himself. And this is moral good, to which moral evil is opposed¹.

115. Morality is the condition of every human act and is customarily defined as: the conformity or disformity of a human act with its rule, right reason.

It is proved: Good is that which suits an entity by comparison to the end, and evil is that which does not suit; hence good in a human act is that which suits a human act by comparison to the end. What suits a human act suits a man acting insofar as he is a man. What suits a man acting insofar as he is a man suits reason, which is the first principle of human acts and whose office it is to order suitably toward the end. Therefore good in a human act is that which suits reason, or that which is according to right reason, by comparison to the end; and evil is that which does not suit reason, or that which is against right reason.

Right reason, however, is nothing other than a participation in the eternal law of God, whose foundation is the absolutely ultimate end. Hence a kind of triple rule can be distinguished: the ultimate end, the eternal law, and right reason.

Whence S. Thomas, Q. D. De Malo, q. 2, a. 4: « Good and evil in acts are to be taken according to that which is proper to man insofar as he is a man. This, however, is reason. Whence good and evil in a human act are considered according as the act agrees with (and suits) reason informed by the divine law either naturally, or by teaching, or by infusion ».

116. Essence of morality. — Morality does not consist: a) In the free act or in its freedom (which is attributed to Scotus): for this is a mere moral aptitude, namely the matter or foundation and condition of morality, which adds something over and above it; whence there can be in the same act multiple moralities, but only one freedom; moreover, freedom pertains to the physical being of the act, for even if morality were not, the act would remain free.

b) Neither in imputability (Pufendorf): for this is a consequence of morality, since for an act to be imputed for praise or blame it is supposed to have been good or bad.

c) Nor is it a mere extrinsic denomination of the act (Suarez) or a relation of reason (Vasquez): the act by reason of itself is good or bad; and goodness or malice really and properly inheres in acts and exists even if reason does not consider or denominate them²; whence S. Thomas, a. 4, ad 2: « the due proportion to the end and the relation to it inheres in the action ».

d) Nor is it a real relation properly so called or predicamental relation: for this is to a terminus as a pure terminus, whereas the act is related to the rule as to its perfective; moreover it does not pertain to the essence of the human act, but is an accident that accrues to it, while morality is essential to it because it belongs to it by reason of its proper object from which it has its species.

e) But morality is an intrinsic respect or transcendental relation, i. e., an intrinsic habitudo of the act itself, by which it tends to the object precisely as conformed or disformed to the rules of mores. This is the opinion of the Thomists.

It is proved: 1) Morality is the order or disposition that deliberating reason makes in voluntary acts. But reason makes precisely in these acts that their intrinsic habitudo or physical tendency toward the object be a tendency toward the object as subject to rules. Therefore morality is an intrinsic respect or order which reason makes in human acts and by which they tend toward the object conformably or disconformably to their rules.

2. The essence of any act is the intrinsic order to the object. Therefore a moral act is essentially the intrinsic tendency to a moral object. Now the object is moral insofar as it is subjected to the rules of mores. Therefore morality also is essentially the intrinsic tendency of the act toward the object as subject to the rules of mores.

117. Divisions of morality. — Since morality is the habitudo of action to a rule, hence according to the various habitudines to various rules, morality is various:

1° The rule is remote and objective, namely law, either God's eternal law or the temporal human right reason prescribing; or proximate and subjective, namely the actual conscience of the law and of the conformity or disformity of the act to it. Hence morality is distinguished as material or objective, which is the conformity or disformity of the objective element, i. e., of the act taken according to itself

1. Modern authors of the Society of Jesus combine the first and third opinions, and say that morality is freedom together with a twofold extrinsic denomination. So for example Frins and Cathrein say that it is the dependence of the act on a free will operating and on reason attentive to the honesty or turpitude of the object. Where there are three: the intrinsic denomination of the voluntary, and the twofold extrinsic denomination: the relation of dependence on the free will, and the relation of dependence on attentive reason. Similarly Pesch says that it consists in this, that the free will is borne toward the object apprehended under the aspect of good or base (Zeitschrift für K. Th., 1887, p. 867).

with its objective rule, the law, no account being taken of the agent's relation to the rule, or independently of the practical judgment of the agent; — and as subjective or formal, which is the conformity or disformity of the subjective element, i. e., of the act insofar as it proceeds from the agent, and of the agent himself with the subjective rule or practical judgment of conscience. One can exist without the other, as when one through invincible ignorance places a bad act which he thinks good: the act will be materially bad but formally good; and vice versa. Thus blasphemy uttered by one who is out of his mind is materially bad, uttered by one in full possession of his faculties it is also formally bad.

2° The rule is imperative, or approbative and advisory, and therefore morality is distinguished as of precept when something is prescribed or forbidden; — and as free when something is only approved and advised. Evil is always forbidden; but good is not always prescribed, but only that which is judged necessary.

3° The rule is necessary and natural, or positive, and therefore morality is distinguished as intrinsic and necessary, arising from the nature of things: this belongs to those things which are by their nature good or bad, and necessarily commanded or forbidden; — and as extrinsic, arising from the positive free will of the one commanding: this belongs to those things which are good or bad only because they are commanded or forbidden.

118. Species of morality. — There is a twofold supreme and fundamental species of morality: goodness and malice. It is called supreme, because there can be many lowest species of morality, which are taken from specifically diverse objects, as will be explained below in q. 5.

It is proved: For a human act is either conformed to its rules or disformed from them. In the first case it is good: for good and being are convertible, whence something has just so much of goodness as it has of being; if therefore an act has the fullness of being that is due and fitting to it, it is good. But that which is conformed to its rules has all that it ought to have. Therefore an act conformed to them is good. — In the second case it is bad: for that which has something of the fullness of being is, according to this, being and good, but insofar as it does not have the whole being which it ought to have, it falls short of goodness and is called bad. But an act which is in some way disformed from its rules does not have the whole being which it ought to have. Therefore such an act is bad. Hence the axiom: Good depends on the whole cause, evil on any defect whatsoever.

Thus good is defined as that which suits the rule of reason and rational nature, evil as that which does not suit.

119. Remark. — In the terminology of moderns the moral act or morality is often taken in a quite different sense. The moral act is opposed to the immoral act, and is then the same as the honest act: thus Kant distinguishes moral, immoral, and amoral acts. In S. Thomas the moral act is never spoken of in this sense, nor is the word immoral ever used, but to the moral act is opposed the non-moral act. Similarly morality among moderns is often taken for honesty and is opposed to immorality. — But according to the proper meaning of the word, just as mores are good or depraved, so morality is twofold: goodness and malice³.