Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. I-II, q. 18, a. 1 and 8.

114. Morality is the attribution of human acts according to which they are called good or bad, i. e., fitting or unfitting. Good and bad are attended to in human acts in a special way. For good and bad are said by comparison to the end; therefore where there is specially the notion of an end, there is specially the notion of good. But it belongs to man in a special way to act for an end, insofar as he freely determines the end for himself. Therefore in a human act, besides the metaphysical goodness of the act, which is common to all entities as such, another goodness is given, which consists in this, that man rightly determines the end for himself. And this is moral good, to which moral evil is opposed¹.

115. Morality is the condition of every human act and is customarily defined as: the conformity or disformity of a human act with its rule, right reason.

It is proved: Good is that which suits an entity by comparison to the end, and evil is that which does not suit; hence good in a human act is that which suits a human act by comparison to the end. What suits a human act suits a man acting insofar as he is a man. What suits a man acting insofar as he is a man suits reason, which is the first principle of human acts and whose office it is to order suitably toward the end. Therefore good in a human act is that which suits reason, or that which is according to right reason, by comparison to the end; and evil is that which does not suit reason, or that which is against right reason.

Right reason, however, is nothing other than a participation in the eternal law of God, whose foundation is the absolutely ultimate end. Hence a kind of triple rule can be distinguished: the ultimate end, the eternal law, and right reason.

Whence S. Thomas, Q. D. De Malo, q. 2, a. 4: « Good and evil in acts are to be taken according to that which is proper to man insofar as he is a man. This, however, is reason. Whence good and evil in a human act are considered according as the act agrees with (and suits) reason informed by the divine law either naturally, or by teaching, or by infusion ».

116. Essence of morality. — Morality does not consist: a) In the free act or in its freedom (which is attributed to Scotus): for this is a mere moral aptitude, namely the matter or foundation and condition of morality, which adds something over and above it; whence there can be in the same act multiple moralities, but only one freedom; moreover, freedom pertains to the physical being of the act, for even if morality were not, the act would remain free.

b) Neither in imputability (Pufendorf): for this is a consequence of morality, since for an act to be imputed for praise or blame it is supposed to have been good or bad.

c) Nor is it a mere extrinsic denomination of the act (Suarez) or a relation of reason (Vasquez): the act by reason of itself is good or bad; and goodness or malice really and properly inheres in acts and exists even if reason does not consider or denominate them²; whence S. Thomas, a. 4, ad 2: « the due proportion to the end and the relation to it inheres in the action ».

d) Nor is it a real relation properly so called or predicamental relation: for this is to a terminus as a pure terminus, whereas the act is related to the rule as to its perfective; moreover it does not pertain to the essence of the human act, but is an accident that accrues to it, while morality is essential to it because it belongs to it by reason of its proper object from which it has its species.

e) But morality is an intrinsic respect or transcendental relation, i. e., an intrinsic habitudo of the act itself, by which it tends to the object precisely as conformed or disformed to the rules of mores. This is the opinion of the Thomists.

It is proved: 1) Morality is the order or disposition that deliberating reason makes in voluntary acts. But reason makes precisely in these acts that their intrinsic habitudo or physical tendency toward the object be a tendency toward the object as subject to rules. Therefore morality is an intrinsic respect or order which reason makes in human acts and by which they tend toward the object conformably or disconformably to their rules.

2. The essence of any act is the intrinsic order to the object. Therefore a moral act is essentially the intrinsic tendency to a moral object. Now the object is moral insofar as it is subjected to the rules of mores. Therefore morality also is essentially the intrinsic tendency of the act toward the object as subject to the rules of mores.

117. Divisions of morality. — Since morality is the habitudo of action to a rule, hence according to the various habitudines to various rules, morality is various:

1° The rule is remote and objective, namely law, either God's eternal law or the temporal human right reason prescribing; or proximate and subjective, namely the actual conscience of the law and of the conformity or disformity of the act to it. Hence morality is distinguished as material or objective, which is the conformity or disformity of the objective element, i. e., of the act taken according to itself

1. Modern authors of the Society of Jesus combine the first and third opinions, and say that morality is freedom together with a twofold extrinsic denomination. So for example Frins and Cathrein say that it is the dependence of the act on a free will operating and on reason attentive to the honesty or turpitude of the object. Where there are three: the intrinsic denomination of the voluntary, and the twofold extrinsic denomination: the relation of dependence on the free will, and the relation of dependence on attentive reason. Similarly Pesch says that it consists in this, that the free will is borne toward the object apprehended under the aspect of good or base (Zeitschrift für K. Th., 1887, p. 867).

with its objective rule, the law, no account being taken of the agent's relation to the rule, or independently of the practical judgment of the agent; — and as subjective or formal, which is the conformity or disformity of the subjective element, i. e., of the act insofar as it proceeds from the agent, and of the agent himself with the subjective rule or practical judgment of conscience. One can exist without the other, as when one through invincible ignorance places a bad act which he thinks good: the act will be materially bad but formally good; and vice versa. Thus blasphemy uttered by one who is out of his mind is materially bad, uttered by one in full possession of his faculties it is also formally bad.

2° The rule is imperative, or approbative and advisory, and therefore morality is distinguished as of precept when something is prescribed or forbidden; — and as free when something is only approved and advised. Evil is always forbidden; but good is not always prescribed, but only that which is judged necessary.

3° The rule is necessary and natural, or positive, and therefore morality is distinguished as intrinsic and necessary, arising from the nature of things: this belongs to those things which are by their nature good or bad, and necessarily commanded or forbidden; — and as extrinsic, arising from the positive free will of the one commanding: this belongs to those things which are good or bad only because they are commanded or forbidden.

118. Species of morality. — There is a twofold supreme and fundamental species of morality: goodness and malice. It is called supreme, because there can be many lowest species of morality, which are taken from specifically diverse objects, as will be explained below in q. 5.

It is proved: For a human act is either conformed to its rules or disformed from them. In the first case it is good: for good and being are convertible, whence something has just so much of goodness as it has of being; if therefore an act has the fullness of being that is due and fitting to it, it is good. But that which is conformed to its rules has all that it ought to have. Therefore an act conformed to them is good. — In the second case it is bad: for that which has something of the fullness of being is, according to this, being and good, but insofar as it does not have the whole being which it ought to have, it falls short of goodness and is called bad. But an act which is in some way disformed from its rules does not have the whole being which it ought to have. Therefore such an act is bad. Hence the axiom: Good depends on the whole cause, evil on any defect whatsoever.

Thus good is defined as that which suits the rule of reason and rational nature, evil as that which does not suit.

119. Remark. — In the terminology of moderns the moral act or morality is often taken in a quite different sense. The moral act is opposed to the immoral act, and is then the same as the honest act: thus Kant distinguishes moral, immoral, and amoral acts. In S. Thomas the moral act is never spoken of in this sense, nor is the word immoral ever used, but to the moral act is opposed the non-moral act. Similarly morality among moderns is often taken for honesty and is opposed to immorality. — But according to the proper meaning of the word, just as mores are good or depraved, so morality is twofold: goodness and malice³.

120. Object of the question. — Having supposed the distinction between moral good and moral evil, we must now inquire into the reason, criteria, and foundations of this discrimination, as well as its more fundamental principle. To which we shall say 1) about the intrinsic difference between moral good and moral evil; 2) about the subjective criterion or norm according to which morality can be determined; 3) about the objective criterion of morality and its ultimate foundation; 4) about the errors to be noted and refuted in this matter; 5) about the cognitive faculty of morality: for the question is connected with the foregoing.

S. Th. I-II, q. 18, a. 1 and 8 ; C. Gent. III, 129.

121. State of the question. — First there arises the question about the reason for the discrimination between good and evil, namely whether

there are given some human acts which are objectively good or bad from the intrinsic, or according to the nature of the thing, or on the contrary are only so from extrinsic determination and positive will. Around this there are several errors, which are comprehended under the common name of Moral Positivism¹.

They are reduced to a twofold class:

1. For some say that the positive determination of good and evil was made by men, either a) by civil laws (Hobbes) or by the social contract (Rousseau), or b) by education (Montaigne), or c) by public opinion and the custom of the people (St Lambert), or d) by the invention of sages and the powerful (Mandeville), or e) by the evolution of the moral sense or of the collective conscience or culture (Evolutionists, v. Hartmann, Levy-Bruhl, Durkheim).

2. Others derive the discrimination from the free will of God; so the Nominalists like Occam and Gerson, Descartes, Pufendorf, likewise the commentators on Grotius like Osiander, Gronovius, Cocceius².

Against these the Catholic doctrine holds that certain actions are by their nature good or bad, independently of any positive will.

122. Thesis. There are given some actions intrinsically good or bad, independently of any will even divine.

We admit indeed that there are many actions which are morally good because they are prescribed by some divine or human law, and similarly many bad because they are forbidden; but there are some which are commanded or forbidden as in themselves honest or dishonest.

It is proved: 1) By the argument of conscience and historical induction. Psychologically and historically it is established that there are certain actions which, according to the common conscience and the perpetual and invincible persuasion of men, have always been held as naturally in themselves honest or dishonest: thus for example to love parents, to do good to one's neighbor, to speak the truth, to keep covenants, etc.; on the contrary to pursue parents with hatred, to kill the innocent without legitimate reason, to betray friends unjustly, to break promises, to utter a falsehood harmful to one's neighbor, and other things of the same kind, are held as something base and dishonest. This persuasion indeed prevails among all nations, even barbarian ones; nor is it diminished or lost by anyone, except as the moral sense is diminished or destroyed. But a persuasion so constant and universal, deeply rooted in minds so diverse and dissenting in nearly all other things, does not arise from civil law or custom, which is different among various nations, and moreover laws and customs are themselves called good and bad, for which reason they are not the primary criterion; — nor from education, the social contract, or public opinion, which likewise are not the same among different peoples; but it is derived from nature itself.

Neither can it be said that the morality of these acts depends on a free institution by God: for this institution is not known to many peoples who do not have revelation, and therefore does not explain the universality of the fact. Moreover, certain actions appear in themselves and essentially so honest or dishonest that not even a divine positive will could change their morality (e.g. God cannot make blasphemy a praiseworthy act, nor make piety a sin) : the essence of things therefore does not depend on the free will of God, nor therefore the essential relations between them. Whence S. Thomas, Q. D. de Ver. 23, a. 6 : "The will does not have the character of a first rule... ; for it is directed by reason and intellect, not only in us, but also in God... ; to say that justice depends on simple will is to say that the divine will does not proceed according to the order of wisdom, which is blasphemy".

2. From philosophical reason: The good of an entity is that which suits its nature, evil that which does not suit. And there are several actions which in themselves and naturally suit or do not suit rational human nature. Therefore there are several actions which from their very nature in themselves and naturally are good or bad.

The minor premise is proved from S. Thomas, III c. Gent. 129: « Of whatever there is a determined nature, there must needs be determined operations which suit that nature (or on the contrary do not suit it): for the proper operation of anything follows its own nature. Now it is evident that the nature of men is determined. Therefore there must needs be some operations in themselves fitting to man » (or on the contrary unfitting).

The conclusion is inductively proved from three principal matters about which human action is concerned, i. e., about a) social relations with others, insofar as man is a social being; — b) the use of external things and the governance of the body and lower powers, insofar as he is a rational being; — c) relations with God as ultimate end, insofar as man is a created being. And in these three matters actions are by their nature fitting or unfitting:

a) about social relations with other men: « Whatever something is natural, that without which it cannot be had must needs be natural: for nature does not fail in what is necessary. Now it is natural to man that he be a social animal; which is shown from this, that one man alone is not sufficient for providing all that is necessary for human life. Therefore those things without which human society cannot be preserved are naturally fitting to man: such things are that each one preserve what is his, and abstain from injuries. Therefore there are some human acts naturally right ».

b) about the use of external things and the governance of the body and lower powers: « Man naturally has this, that he use inferior things for his life's necessity. Now there is a determined measure (naturally) according to which the use of the aforesaid things is fitting for human life, which measure, if it is passed over, becomes harmful to man, as appears in the immoderate taking of foods. Therefore there are some acts naturally unfitting to man.

Likewise according to the natural order the body of man is for the sake of the soul and the lower powers of the soul for the sake of reason; just as in other things matter is for the sake of form and instruments for the sake of the principal agent. From the fact, however, that something is ordered to another, it ought to receive help from it, not indeed an impediment. Therefore it is naturally right that man so provide for the body and the lower powers of the soul that from this the act of reason and its good is not hindered, but rather helped. If however the contrary happens, it will be naturally a sin. Drunkenness therefore and revelling and the disordered use of venereal pleasures, by which the act of reason is hindered and the soul subjected to passions which do not allow the free judgment of reason, are naturally evil ».

c) about relations with God: « To each one those things naturally suit by which he tends toward his natural end; those however which are to the contrary are naturally unsuited to him... Man is naturally ordered to God as to an end. Therefore those things by which man is led to the knowledge and love of God are naturally right; whatever indeed is to the contrary is naturally evil to man ».

« Therefore it is evident, as S. Thomas concludes, that good and evil in human acts are not only according to the position of law, but also according to the natural order ».

3. From the consequences of the adverse opinion: If there is no essential and objective discrimination between good and evil, a wide road is opened to moral scepticism. For a) what today is held as bad, tomorrow, with changed legislation, or tradition or education, can be held as lawful; and therefore the true notion of moral obligation perishes: for this is conceived as something permanent and universal, not hypothetically but categorically prescribing certain actions, whereas civil laws and traditions of peoples are something unstable and particular, and can only create a hypothetical obligation. With this discrimination removed, therefore, the moral order itself collapses; — b) there have existed some most wicked customs, the attack on which by heroic and saintly persons is generally praised as progress. Yet according to positivism all customs are good; nor is there an ideal and permanent rule by which to measure progress; — c) the adversaries must assume as foundation the principle: To a God who commands (or to men who command) obedience is good and resistance is evil. Therefore something is to be admitted as good or bad before the positive precept of God (or of men). And if nothing is admitted, the foundation of the whole moral order collapses.

123. They object, the positivists and evolutionists, certain examples of polygamy, of human sacrifices, of the killing of parents out of piety, namely to avoid the burdens of old age or captivity, which are sometimes reputed honest and just; whence they conclude that the public conscience is not offended by wrongdoing, because

R. The error exists not with respect to all intrinsically honest and dishonest things, but with respect to some: for nature can fail not in all things but in some, and so some have a depraved reason from passion, or from bad custom, or from a bad disposition of nature, and they could have erred with respect to some, as in the case of polygamy, or human sacrifice, or brigandage which among some was not held unjust, or the killing of parents done to remove misery. But they erred rather about the manner of practising piety than about the very obligation of loving parents; as about the manner of worshipping God, of keeping justice, or of ordering matrimony, not about the principles themselves, that it is good to love God, to live justly, and to protect the education of the human race through matrimony. Whence already S. Thomas, in Eth., b. 3: « Some things (not all), which by some are held just and honest, by others unjust and dishonest according to the difference of times and places and persons. For something is held vicious at one time or in one region which at another time or in another region is not held vicious. And from this difference it comes about that some think that nothing is naturally just or honest, but only according to the position of law ».

S. Th. I-II, q. 19, a. 3 and 4 ; 21, a. 1 ; 71, a. 6 ; 72, a. 4 and 8 ; 74, a. 7 ; 86, a. 1 and 2 ; 63, a. 2 ; De Malo, q. 2, a. 4 ; q 16, a. 2.

Having supposed an intrinsic discrimination of moral good and evil, we must now inquire into the foundations of this discrimination, and first into its subjective criterion or norm of morality; then into the objective criterion and ultimate foundation. About the first, two theses are laid down.

124. Thesis I. The nearer and intrinsic norm of morality is right human practical reason.

Explanation: It is called: 1) reason, and not only conscience, which is the rule of subjective morality of human acts, since here we are primarily concerned with the norm of objective morality: for conscience is particular reason, by which a definite person judges about the morality of such an act in particular and applies the law to a definite concrete case, whereas here we are more concerned with universal reason which judges about the morality of acts in general and enunciates the law, and is by essence common to all men; 2) right, i. e., judging conformably to the eternal law, from which it flows as from a fountain and rule of all good; for, as S. Thomas says, II Sent. d. 24, q. 3, a. 3, ad 3: « A corrupted reason is not reason, just as a false syllogism is not properly a syllogism, and therefore the rule of human acts is not any reason whatever, but right reason », which alone is able to order suitably toward the end and as is fitting;

3. is a nearer norm, rather than a proximate norm: for the latter is conscience, which applies the law to the concrete act, and so is the altogether proximate and immediate rule of acting, and with respect to it universal reason or law is already a remoter rule; and nevertheless this is the near rule with respect to the supreme and ultimate rule which is the eternal law of God himself;

4. and intrinsic: for reason is intrinsic to man, while the eternal law of God is extrinsic to him.

The thesis is proved 1° By facts: A moral action is to be called good, like any entity, when it reaches its end, or at least rightly and orderly tends toward its proper end. But it belongs to practical reason of man to discover what our ultimate end is, what means are necessary

The minor is proved:

a) Generally by experience;

b) Specially from the difference between rational and irrational nature (I-II, q. 91, a. 2): for it is evident that man rules himself and orders his acts toward an end; since therefore order is according to a rule, man must needs have implanted in him a rule by which he could rule himself and order his acts: which is nothing other than reason.

c) For just as speculative reason is by nature able to know the true, so practical reason is able to perceive the good (under the aspect of the true), i. e., the ordered relation of acts to the ultimate end, e. g., it dictates that blasphemy is evil as contrary to God the ultimate end, that intemperance is a sin because men thereby abuse

Briefly: The judgment of practical reason has as its object the fittingness and unfittingness of an act with an end. But the goodness of action resides in the relation of fittingness and subordination to the ultimate end of rational nature; malice in the relation of unfittingness. Therefore the judgment of practical reason

2° By reason drawn from S. Thomas, I-II, q. 90, a. 1: In each kind, that which is the principle is the measure and rule of that kind. Reason is the first principle of human acts, because it is its office to order toward the end, which is the first principle in matters of action. Therefore the rule and measure of human acts

125. Thesis II. The supreme and extrinsic norm and ultimate rule of morality is the reason of God, or the eternal law itself.

It is called: 1) the supreme norm, because morality depends more on this than on the near rule. For an effect depends more on the first cause than on the second cause, since the second cause does not act except by virtue of the first cause; whence that human reason is the rule of morality, this it has from the eternal law. Therefore moral good d

2. ultimate: the nearer norm is founded ultimately in the remote and fundamental norm or eternal law. Whence human reason is called the near, subordinate and regulated norm of morality; the eternal law the ultimate and supreme and regulating norm (q. 71, a. 6 ; q. 21, a. 1);

3. is the eternal law, i. e., the divine reason inasmuch as it conceives the ordering of all actions and orders them to the ultimate end, the will of God inasmuch as it necessarily wills this ordering to be observed by man, and the reason of God inasmuch as it commands this ordering and imposes it upon us.

It is proved: 1) Human reason is true or false according as it is conformed to truth or not: for it is cognitive, not productive, of truth.

But the measure of all truth is the reason of God, which is the first truth and productive of every other truth.

Therefore human reason is a true rule according as it is conformed to the reason of God (q. 19, a. 4).

2. In human acts good and evil are said according to the order to the ultimate end. But the ultimate end is constituted and intended by the author of nature. Therefore the supreme ordering of human acts is from God; and acts are good or bad according to the ordering of God.

3. Hence was condemned the proposition of the Syllabus, 3°: « Human reason, without any respect at all for God, is the sole arbiter of true and false, good and evil ».

They object: We do not know the eternal law; therefore it is not a rule. — R. It is made known through creatures and especially through the knowledge of human nature, for all things have from the eternal law that they are ordered and moved toward their end and toward the end of the whole universe: « Although the eternal law is unknown to us according as it

126. Corollary. — Human reason is the secondary and nearer proper or homogeneous and immanent rule; the eternal law the primary and supreme, heterogeneous, and transcendent rule (q. 19, a. 4, ad 2 ; q. 21, a. 1 ; q. 71, a. 6).

Not only must we inquire into the subjective criterion of morality, or the norm by which it is discerned, but also into the objective criterion and the foundation of the intrinsic discrimination between good and evil, or the ontological principle from which the rule of morality has its origin and force, and on which right reason relies for judging what is good or evil.

127. Thesis. The objective foundation of morality, the proximate of the rule of reason, is human nature with its end and essential relations; the ultimate, of the eternal law, is the divine essence itself.

Many recent authors say that human rational nature as such in itself is the proximate norm of morality; — or even human nature completely considered with all its essential relations, namely as rational (and not merely sentient), as social, and as created¹; — some even add that the fundamental norm or the foundation of the eternal law and the will of God itself². But all these confuse the norm with its objective foundation. — On the contrary, some deny that morality depends on the ultimate end to which human nature is nevertheless ordered³, or even on the essential order of things⁴. But we must say:

1° Human rational nature as such, or even completely considered with its relations, is not the formal rule and measure or criterion by which morality is distinguished (and even if one wished to call it a rule, it would at least not be the proximate rule), but the objective foundation according to which reason discerns what is good or bad: for from this the object or act is discerned to be good or bad because it has a relation of fittingness or unfittingness with rational nature. Whence the near norm and subjective criterion of morality is only the practical judgment of reason. And therefore S. Thomas distinguishes between physical good and moral good, between works of nature and works of will, and says that nature is the rule of natural works, reason the rule of acts of will⁵.

For reason is right from its conformity to the eternal law. The eternal law is made known through creatures, and especially through human nature. Therefore human nature stands as a medium between the eternal law and reason, and in this sense it is said to be so, but it is not a rule, except fundamentally, i. e., as the foundation of the rule of reason.

2° Consequently, even the ultimate end of man to which rational nature is itself naturally ordered, and the very essential order of things or the objective order arising from the necessary relations of the human agent to various entities, for the same reason, can be called the objective foundation of morality. They are a rule fundamentally, or the foundation of the rule of reason⁶.

3° Human nature, however, and the essential order of things, are not the fundamental rule nor the foundation of the supreme rule and the eternal law, because before the idea of God and independently of it, created essences and the order among them are nothing at all and have no being either real or ideal; whence the foundation of the eternal law, as of all things, is the divine essence alone, which is the absolutely ultimate end.

128. Remark. — Lest a difficulty arise from the fact that we define good and evil according to conformity or disformity, whether to rational nature, or to reason, or to the ultimate end; for these all come down to the same thing. For good is that which suits some nature; rational nature is constituted by reason; nature is also the principle of operation tending toward its proper end. Therefore it is the same to say: moral good suits rational nature, or reason, or the ultimate end of human nature.

129. False systems are opposed to the Catholic doctrine on the nature, rule, and foundation of morality, which places moral goodness in the honest good alone and grounds it in rational human nature, the eternal law of God, and the tendency toward perfect happiness to be obtained in the other life; — whether by defect or by excess. It is itself conformed to Aristotelian philosophy, and can be called rational eudaemonism, because it intends rational perfection, the supreme good of man. To it

a) by defect is opposed pure eudaemonism (εὐδαιμονία = happiness, bien-être, welzijn, lust) or ethical voluntarism (gemoeds-, begeerte- of strevingsmoraal, geluksmoraal, gelukstrevingsmoraal, geluksdrang), which tends toward earthly happiness and places it either in the delectable good: Hedonism or sensualism, or in the useful good for temporal happiness: Utilitarianism, which subsists under various forms, e. g. individual, or social, or evolutionist utilitarianism, sociological ethics, progressivism, pragmatism, etc.

b) on the contrary, by excess is opposed pure rationalism or formalism: namely autonomistic and ethical rationalism, which proposes the honest good exaggeratedly and indeed of autonomous reason, without respect for human nature considered in its totality, for the eternal law of God, or for happiness, or for reward even of the other life. It exists under various forms of which the chief are Stoicism and Kantianism¹.

130. Hedonism (ἡδονή = pleasure) or moral sensualism (genietingsmoraal) says: Happiness is the sum of pleasures. Good is in sensual pleasure, evil in pain. The supreme good is the greatest present pleasure of the body, and every pleasure is good, even if obtained by the most shameful action. Whence the supreme norm is: pleasure is to be sought, pain to be fled; to which nature impels. Hence actions are good which bring more pleasure than pain; and therefore virtue is good only as a means to pleasure.

Against this system can be opposed:

1. Hedonism is founded on the system of moral positivism: for pleasure varies and depends much on circumstances, custom, the laws of times and places, and the character of individuals, and corresponds to particular tendencies: each one is drawn by his own pleasure!

2. It falsely supposes the ultimate end to be in the supreme pleasure of this life.

3. The delectable good is not the first object of appetite, for pleasure follows from appetition and operation which naturally precedes it and produces it. Whence pleasure will be good (or evil) according to the very nature of the operation. Therefore it is not the principle or norm of morality.

4. Hedonism denies the classic distinction between the honest, the useful, and the delectable good: yet historically and really there is a difference between what is delectable to sense and what is fitting for man; whence the system is opposed to the natural conscience of man; and reduced to the state of the present life, it justifies all crimes.

5. It considers only one element of man: but man is spirit and heart, not only heart.

6. The delectable good is relative to the individual, and therefore subjective and variable; therefore it does not constitute a criterion of objective and intrinsic discrimination between good and evil.

7. Pleasure sought without restriction and discretion destroys itself: experience shows that it brings pain and is transformed into pain. If however pleasure as such is good, it will never be excessive; and nevertheless pleasure can be excessive: for its quantity displeases, so that it is no longer pleasure.

They object: 1) Natural inclinations are true; therefore the pleasure to which nature inclines is the true end and the true good. — R. Those inclinations are true, not because they tend toward pleasure, but because they show the internal nature of man. Whence it is not absolutely good to follow them, but insofar as they suit human nature as such, and reason itself, to which all other inclinations must be subordinated, as the lower to the higher.

2. Not every pleasure is good or an end, but pleasure of a certain kind or quality, which is discerned by reason. — R. Then pleasure as such is no longer the ultimate norm; but a determined quality or condition of pleasure. Which is already a denial of the system.

There is nevertheless in it something true: namely the connection between virtue and happiness and pleasure, not indeed the baser one of sense, but the nobler one of mind. The exercise of virtue alone can procure true happiness: it can cause an imperfect one in the present life, and merit a perfect one in the other life. But an act will not be good because it makes us happy; it makes us happy because it is good.

131. Utilitarianism (nuttigheidsmoraal; Nützlichkeitsmoral; Erfolgsmoral) in general does not place the end precisely in pleasure alone but in the sum of goods; — and moral good in whatever good is useful for earthly happiness either of the individual or of society, even in pleasure which reason approves as truly useful. Thus pleasure remains the secondary criterion of morality.

Now the aforesaid norm, besides falsely supposing that created good is the end of man:

1. Is not sufficient, as not being universal: for there are many honest or dishonest acts without respect to private or social good, e. g. contrary to utility, faith given is preserved. Social utilitarianism in fact denies the duties of man toward God and toward himself, except as they are ordered to the social good; individual utilitarianism does not prove duties toward God or toward others. If they say that individual good is joined to the social, R.: perhaps so in the abstract, let it pass; in the concrete, I deny, for in fact they are often opposed and at war.

2. It is practically impossible: for all the consequences (of advantage or disadvantage) present and future would have to be adequately perceived and mutually compared, in order that it could be established what is truly useful.

3. It is not immutable: for earthly happiness appears subjective and relative, and is therefore not conceived in the same way by all, but for various times and regions and individuals is understood in different ways, so that nothing is more mutable than such a rule; whence it would render morality subjective and changeable.

4. It is false: for acts held by all as dishonest can be useful to man, e. g. theft and homicide, or can be ordered to the social good, e. g. perjury, homicide, falsehood; and vice versa, acts certainly honest can be useless. Whence the norm of the happiness of life is vague and indeterminate because it can legitimize everything; and at the same time so restricted that it cannot legitimize many duties, as already said under 1°).

5. It is incomplete and defective: it considers more the empirical and affective aspect (egoism or altruism) than the rational aspect, to which it assigns the second place and which it subordinates to inclination and tendency; whereas reason had the first place in morality, as directing and regulating.

In particular A. Individual, private or egoistic utilitarianism (welbegrepen eigenbelang) places morality in whatever good which each one, for his pursuit of happiness, has proposed to obtain for himself. Whence it is not pleasure alone, but that which of itself and by its effects and circumstances offers greater utility also future for the whole life.

Against individual utilitarianism many things can be brought which are opposed to hedonism, namely: 1) It is founded on moral positivism: utility depends on many circumstances, laws, custom, and personal character.

2. It falsely supposes the ultimate end to be in the happiness of this life.

3. It denies the classic distinction between the honest, the useful, and the delectable good. And yet the useful as such is not an end but a means. Whence the end must be either the delectable good (hedonism), or the good considered in relation to the end of nature (rational ethics). Utility therefore is not the primary criterion. Whence the system is opposed to the moral conscience of all times, which refuses to admit as moral perfection the question of profit, just as of pleasure.

4. It considers only one aspect of man; but man of himself is individual and of himself by his nature is social. Whence not individual utility alone is the end of the moral order.

5. The useful good is not a universal criterion: for it is relative and variable, whence it is not a criterion of objective and intrinsic discrimination; indeed it can lead to the greatest crimes; — on the contrary, the best acts, such as shedding blood for God, virtue, the defense of country, can be useless.

6. Hence individual utility is denied to have to do with education and legislation.

7. Whence is condemned prop. 58 of the Syllabus: « All moral discipline and honesty must be placed in accumulating and increasing riches in every way and in satisfying pleasures ».

B. Social utilitarianism or altruism establishes that the common happiness is the norm of morality. Actions therefore are good or bad according as they promote or hinder the common happiness, and the more an action contributes to the common good, the better it is; the more it hinders it, the worse.

Against this form in particular can be opposed:

1. In order that the happiness of others be the end, one must know in what that happiness consists. Whence the system does not give an ultimate answer, nor definitively solves the question, but pushes it back. The useful is not a measure, because it is a means, not an end. Therefore it is not the supreme criterion.

2. It is not a universal criterion. Ethics precedes the organization of society. Conscience testifies that, besides social good, there are good and bad actions, such as intemperance, blasphemy, parricide, which are evil even in individual or family life. Moreover, the individual and society remain distinct, although they are not disjoint or separate. — Besides, man is referred directly to society only through external acts; and yet internal acts are moral, indeed moral in the first place and essentially.

3. It is not the first criterion. For the end of society is the end of individuals. Whence the distinction between social good and evil is subordinated to the distinction between individual good and evil; and if the good of one is not moral, neither is the good of many. It is natural for man to enter society, because the good is what is conformed to reason. There properly is the end, where there properly is the operation. Society is not one per se, but has only a unity of order; and therefore as such it is not apt to attain happiness.

4. It places the end in the present life and legitimizes all crimes, e. g. of powerful nations against the weaker.

5. According to the very principles of empiricism and utilitarianism, egoism prevails over altruism; and in the case of conflict between social good and individual happiness, according to the principles of utilitarianism the conflict cannot be solved.

132. Pure Rationalism or Formalism. In general, followers of autonomistic rationalism, having rejected the eternal law and excluded every relation to the person of God, to his reason and will, deduce morality and moral obligation solely from the conformity of the act with reason itself or nature as rational, without respect for utility, or pleasure, or happiness, or sanction. Whence they preach a purely rational morality, and moral good is only in the rational part of man; and therefore it consists in rational fittingness, and must be sought solely from the motive of fittingness, i. e., of virtue or duty, for its own sake (formalism).

It arose first in Greece, in the Cynic school, but there it flourished especially in the Stoic school.

The foundation of morality is: « to live conformably to nature », and since human nature is rational, virtue is in a life instituted according to reason. The supreme and unique good is a life according to virtue; whence virtue is an end in itself: for the good is to be loved and sought for its own sake, not for the sake of something else. Virtue and happiness are really the same: « it is the same to live happily as to live according to nature », says Seneca; besides virtue nothing else is needed for happiness. Nevertheless virtue is not to be sought for the sake of happiness; happiness is never to be sought as an end.

All else either are indifferent things (such as health, riches, sickness, poverty) to be sought or avoided according to circumstances; — or are things always to be avoided, such as the passions which are evil, against reason: to follow passion or affection or pleasure is against morality. Virtue is wisdom: the truly wise man patiently endures all inconveniences, and abstains from various pleasures (sustine et abstine); he subjects all affects and passions to reason, indeed he extirpates them by a certain apathy or impassibility, so that he is raised above all and cannot be disturbed by any influence of pain or pleasure: thus he is freed from affection.

But against this: 1) The identity of virtue and full happiness or beatitude does not exist here on earth, in which there are numerous and excessive sorrows.

2. The fundamental error by which it teaches that virtue must be cultivated solely for its own sake, so that every consideration of one's own happiness is excluded, is common to it with Kant; and therefore the arguments brought against this point of Kantian doctrine also have force here (cf. n. seq., 2 and 3).

3. The nature to which one must live conformably, it calls reason; but it understands reason in a thoroughly exclusive sense. So that it is not merely the preponderance and domination of reason, but pure rationality, with all else excluded from morality.

4. Hence the affective life lacks all morality. The passions must be reduced to slavery and extirpated, rather than ruled and moderated, so that there may be perfect apathy (by which one is not affected by them), and one's very life becomes indifferent to oneself!

5. Moreover, many false things are also contained therein. Thus: no degree of morality is admitted, but goodness or malice is held equal in all acts, the passions are also held as evil in themselves.

6. Finally, in the application of principles many errors occurred, and indeed most pernicious ones, since falsehood, suicide, and many foul things against nature were in fact held as lawful.

133. Kantianism. Stoicism was followed to some extent by Kant (1724-1804), author of the critical philosophy. After he had attempted to show that by pure speculative reason we can know only phenomena, and not noumena, or what things are in themselves; but that about them we have a merely subjective knowledge without objective value, and therefore the existence of God, the freedom of man, and the immortality of the soul cannot be proved with certainty; — he decided to lay the foundations of ethics by another way, through pure practical reason.

From the testimony of the conscience of all men, nothing is simply good except the good will (ratio-will); and this alone is moral. But the will is good not from the object, but from the motive by which it is moved to act: this can be nothing other than the fulfilling of duty; which duty is nothing other than conformity with the universal moral law. Therefore the will, in order to be morally good, must do what is commanded and solely because it is commanded: « to act according to duty and for the sake of duty ». Whence morality is from the form alone (which alone is universal), independently of the matter²: for if it fulfils the law for some empirical or eudaemonistic end (such as the satisfaction of natural tendency, fear of power, avoiding evil), or for the sake of some happiness or utility to be obtained, then the will pursues the useful, and has an egoistic motive, destructive of morality, and therefore it is not good morality; but only when it is impelled from pure reverence for the law. Kant therefore not only formally distinguishes every eudaemonistic element from morality, but excludes it as something incompatible with it.

Whence Ethics a) must be pure from every empirical element of experience and proceed a priori; and therefore does not depend on concrete human nature and is without respect to psychology;

c) obligation does not depend on morality, but morality on obligation.

But the universal moral law presents itself to man as something commanding, not conditionally and hypothetically (if you wish to be happy, do this), but absolutely and categorically (do good): whence it is a categorical imperative of practical reason, which must be obeyed simply and without any respect to the object and to the consequences of the act or to obtaining a reward, and without further inquiry into its foundation or authority; hence it is called a formal imperative. For the moral law proceeds from reason or rational nature as such, which is an end in itself, so that man cannot be ordered as a means to another end. Morality is essentially autonomous, by which the will observes its own law; for reason, as it is the sole measure of morality, so also its unique foundation. For in heteronomy, if one is subjected to the law of another, even of God, we are always led by a utilitarian or eudaemonistic motive (of love, hope, fear), and the imperative will not be categorical but conditional: « if he commands, if you wish to obey, in order to obtain something material, do so ». Whence the ultimate end is the fulfilment of duty that is fully possible, or the pursuit of autonomy of duty, which is an end in itself and has absolute value in itself: in the domain of ends he is subject to the legislator. Autonomy is only the foundation of proper value, as the ultimate foundation of morality and obligation.

But the categorical imperative is an unconditional and universal rule. Whence

a) the first and fundamental subjective rule (or « maxim », as it is called), which will be the criterion of morality, is this: « So act that the rule of your will can always become the principle of universal legislation », i. e. before you act carefully consider whether something absurd would follow from your action, if all were ordered to do the same, and so in fact acted. From which rule two others follow;

b) another which determines the end of morality: « So act that you hold humanity in yourself and in others as an end, not however as a means which you use »; for if you use yourself or others as a means, by that very fact you act for utility or pleasure, not for duty, and the imperative will already be conditional, not categorical;

c) a third which indicates the source of morality: « So act that you consider your will (as to matter) as a universal legislator »; autonomy is altogether necessary, otherwise we would no longer act for duty.

Now, in order that ethics be possible, there are three postulates of practical reason, which although theoretically indemonstrable, must be admitted and believed as truths. For

1. the moral law postulates freedom: if the will were forced to act, it could not be morally good; whence it is not phenomenal freedom, but there is given a numenal freedom which determines phenomenal operations³; 2) the necessary object and end of the created will is to bring about the supreme good, which consists in the intimate union of happiness and virtue. This, however, cannot be attained in the present life, for by that very fact the obligation would cease. Whence the will is destined to tend perpetually toward progress toward the supreme good; for which it is postulated that the soul is immortal;

2. man cannot think the supreme good unless joined with supreme happiness. But the moral order is opposed to the order of happiness. Therefore it is postulated that there be some cause which unites morality with beatitude, and this can be nothing other than God. Hence there will be retribution, because virtue is worthy of retribution, although it cannot be exercised for the sake of retribution. Retribution in this life is impossible. Therefore it is in the other life, and therefore there is a God.

Thus God is introduced as the end of ethics, without being the foundation of morality.

From which postulates results the primacy of practical reason and of the will over speculative reason.

Many have followed Kant as to substance; and several of his principles have had influence on modern philosophy as a whole. Many things, however, can be opposed to his system⁴.

1. It rests on three false foundations, namely it supposes a) the ideological and critical system of speculative reason; b) that the characters « universal » and « necessary » cannot be derived from what is known experimentally; c) that all « material » principles place the motive in the lower appetitive faculty and that men are moved by them only through pleasure; whence man cannot act honestly except « for the sake of the form » of the law, namely from pure reverence for the law. Where there is a twofold error, namely a) that the law does not move except through the lower faculty, since the good can be desired by a twofold faculty; b) that one acts from pure reverence for the law or from the motive of pleasure, for there are many other motives of the higher appetite, e. g. agreement with human nature or with the right order, love of God, excellence of virtue, etc.

2. It does not explain morality or the norm of morality, for a) it removes the real end, beatitude; whence it makes impossible the relation of acts to the end and consequently removes the rule of mores;

therefore b) if there is no moral rule, neither will there be a true law or obligatory rule. For obligation is the necessity of acting. But the will is not solicited except by a final cause or a good willed. Therefore the categorical imperative, which intends to exclude every real end, cannot found a real obligation, and therefore is not law;

indeed c) the rule given is psychologically impossible. For one must act solely from the motive of duty, without consideration of one's own good and affect of the appetitive faculty. But this is impossible. The will has the good as its proper object, and whatever it wills, it wills under the aspect of the good. Therefore it cannot act from pure reverence for the law, unless this be fitting and good for it; — otherwise the good would be something foreign to the will and could not move it. It is therefore impossible to exclude the affect of the appetitive faculty: that something be good for man and pertaining to happiness, if it is not always the principal motive, is nevertheless the sine qua non condition of appetition. Hence Kantian ethics maims human nature, and therefore is antinatural and unfruitful;

in fact d) it assumes as known from common persuasion that only that will is simply good which wills and what the law commands and because it commands. But such persuasion does not exist, for men often call honest actions which are commanded by no law, e. g. if someone freely devotes himself to the service of the poor and sick or to the obsequies of his country; moreover, they also hold prescribed acts as good if they are done from another motive (not forbidden by another law) such as mercy, love of neighbor, etc.: thus a good will is manifested.

3. The honesty of an action is not necessarily corrupted by a eudaemonological intention. For there is a twofold grade of perfection, namely a) to act for honesty or for a deontological end; b) to act for happiness, although not exclusively for it alone, but with due subordination to the deontological end, using the hope of reward or fear of punishment to pursue honesty more efficaciously⁵. Which remains good, because in this way man acts according to nature adequately considered. This nature, by an invincible appetite implanted by the Creator, tends toward its good or happiness. Whence by thus acting the honest good, man wills that to which he is led by nature by the Creator. On the other hand, the Kantian rule is not proportioned to nature: for it is impossible that a being who by the whole weight of nature is inclined toward his own happiness should continually neglect this in acting; as is confirmed, ceteris paribus, by the universal way of acting of even the most perfect men.

It is therefore false that reason forbids following the inclination toward happiness or pleasure: this appetite can be directed by right reason.

4. For it contradicts itself: a) asserting on the one hand that an action elicited for the hope of beatitude is not good, and on the other hand that the supreme good consists in the conjunction of virtue and beatitude. If this is true, why will it be forbidden to desire and seek it? For it is not evil to seek what is perfect; but it is perfect to cultivate virtue and at the same time to be happy;

therefore.

b) likewise asserting on the one hand that the only honest motive is the fulfilling of duty; and on the other hand that man is to be considered as an end, indeed that the rule of acting must be constituted by each one so that it can hold for all. But this is to introduce a material element distinct from duty, and therefore to make the imperative conditional.

5. Indeed, from the system several absurdities follow:

a) that human nature is an end to itself, and its perfection is absolute autonomy: for human nature is not autonomous, since dependence is essential to man;

b) that reason is at once superior and inferior, making the law and rebelling against itself: « it is at once rule and at the same time subject » and « not rarely rebellious »;

c) that practical judgments are synthetic a priori (by which, namely, a priori the idea of obligation is joined with action), which rest on a blind faith in the goodness and holiness of the law of reason; a priori it is supposed that human reason commands good things, whereas on the contrary in its judgments it ought to depend on objective truth. Thus obligation is built up without an ontological foundation;

d) that the matter of action in no way pertains to morality: for how is it discerned that a rule is apt to be made a universal principle, e. g. that an act (falsehood) is worthy to be prohibited by a universal law, except because the matter or object has in itself turpitude and is against reason?

e) that no act is good which is not prescribed by a categorical imperative; yet there is a distinction between the licit, the obligatory, and the heroic, between the prescribed good and the unprescribed good; indeed the obligatory is posterior to morality;

f) that goodness and malice are constituted by the categorical imperative: is an act evil solely because prohibited, good because prescribed, or on the contrary prohibited as in itself evil, and prescribed as in itself good?

6. Finally it leads to fatalism or pantheism. For one must obey reason, either blindly because reason dictates, not seeking any further foundation, and this is fatalism; or have human reason as absolute and God, which is pantheism.

134. Conclusion. — From these things it is already evident what must be thought of morality absolutely independent or laic. Besides the fact that it is incomplete, it seems under some aspect to include something utopian. For in general:

1. In logical order, it is impossible to justify ethics without an absolute end that subsists in itself, and which is none other than God, the supreme and infinite good; otherwise all our aspirations toward good would go into the void or nothing. Hence beyond contingent created goods there must be an absolute End, which is the end in itself.

2. In ontological order, all things are founded on this, that God loves himself with necessary love and cannot will anything except for his own sake; otherwise he could not communicate himself to other entities which participate in his perfection, nor give them an end, the communication of his goodness.

3. In practical order and execution, without recourse to God, the observance of morality will not be sufficiently obtained, for want of an efficacious sanction; namely, if man were not certain that God, infinitely just and omnipotent, will establish an eternal harmony and concord between virtue and happiness, vice and unhappiness.

In particular, those who uphold an independent morality, in place of theistic or Christian morality, propose either

1. The ethics of solidarity, by which we are bound toward others. The obligation would arise either from a contract, or from inheritance by which we obtain all things from preceding generations. Not from a contract, for a contract is valid only if freely entered into; but individuals are not bound, because they have not assumed the obligation, indeed they have not freely undertaken society. Not from inheritance, because the patrimony of earlier generations has no determined natural heirs, but pertains to all and each; whence if we use it, we contract no debt from this toward others⁶. — Or

2. Sociological ethics, which founds morality on the idea of society, which is a moral person distinct from and superior to individuals, which can command. But society is not a person or entity really distinct from individuals, nor is it an absolute end in itself: it is for the good of individuals and these are not simply for it. Since individuals must obey, it is not because society has an absolute right to command for commanding's sake, but because the commanded thing contributes to the good of individuals and so can be legitimated. — Or

3. The ethics of nature, which is founded on the subjection of man to his nature. The ultimate end is: to be ourselves, to conserve and perfect ourselves under individual respect and in relation to society. In a right sense this can be understood of rational nature as such, ordered to the ultimate end, God; but in fact those who do not recognize God and the author of the universe, what do they understand by the name of nature which is the norm? In various and opposite ways they interpret it. Moreover, the instincts which are to be reformed for the good ordering of nature proceed from nature itself as do those which are to be stimulated; therefore there must be another discriminating rule: human reason, an irradiation of the divine reason itself.

135. Thesis. The cognitive faculty of morality is none other than the intellect, which under this aspect is called practical.

It is proved: A. indirectly, by the exclusion of other opinions. The cognitive faculty of morality is not experience, nor sense, nor instinct, nor subjective affection. Therefore (cf. nn. 136-137).

B. directly: 1° Morality is conformity or fittingness with the rule of reason and the ultimate end, or disformity or unfittingness. But that pertains to the object of reason or the intellect. Therefore morality is known by the intellect.

2° Judgment about moral things is a kind of truth. But truth is the proper object of the intellect. Therefore judgment about moral things pertains to the intellect.

It is called practical because it has as its object the proportion of means to the end, and so is ordered to directing the acts of the will toward the end. The practical intellect, however, is not different from the speculative intellect. A faculty is not diversified by an accidental difference of object. But the object of the speculative intellect and the object of the practical intellect differ merely accidentally: for it is accidental to something apprehended by the intellect that it is ordered to work or is not ordered. Therefore the practical intellect does not differ really from the speculative intellect (I, q. 79, a. 11).

136. To the foregoing doctrine is opposed Moral Empiricism, which derives the knowledge of morality solely from experimental observation of utility. All things are mutable; the absolute is a metaphysical illusion; and therefore morality is essentially mutable according to circumstances. Whence the system in fact is reduced to evolutionism, which rests on impulses from repeated sensible experiences through all generations, had and transmitted. In which reason has only secondary parts: for it follows inclinations, and experiences what is, but does not dictate what ought to be. And so ethics is a descriptive and explanatory science, not normative.

Now organic ethics, as it is usually called:

A. As to its foundation, it supposes materialism or positivism, and therefore acknowledges only the ethics of utilitarianism or sensualism.

B. As to its method, 1) it is incomplete: for determining the rule of morals it is certainly useful, but the historical and psychological observation of factors and actions is not sufficient, because not only is it asked what men have done or do, but also and chiefly what it is fitting or necessary to do. For the determination of this, experience is not sufficient, but the exercise of reason itself is required, by which we know the cause and origin of this fittingness or moral obligation;

2. it is defective: it asserts indeed that there is no man who ultimately acts except for his own advantage. And yet experience also teaches that there are men who, for God or for their neighbor, spend themselves and all that is theirs; and that the notion of the honest and the just (with many at least) is distinct from the notion of happiness: for there are certain acts held as good, indeed most good or heroic, which not only do not bring pleasure, but cause sadness and detriment; others on the contrary, although wicked, procure advantage, as if someone, by fraud used in playing, should obtain for himself the victory and a large sum of money.

C. As to the matter: 1) it is insufficient. The value of a necessary principle is not from experience, and instinctive impulses do not constitute a principle of morality. For it must be asked whether the instinctive or organic impulses are a true manifestation of the good, or rather hallucinations. If the former, this will be only because of conformity with reason, and thus we return to our criterion. If the latter, it would be necessary to explain the universality and persistence of those hallucinations;

2. it is illogical, as opposed to experience: for if moral ideas and inclinations come from heredity, how does ethics give us the faculty and sometimes the duty of acting against instinct?

3. it is erroneous: it falsely asserts that duty is by natural or intellectual instinctive necessity; that obligation, however, arises from intrinsic sanction (e. g. harmful effects) and extrinsic (or fear of punishments), which is threefold: social, which the stronger impose on the will; civil, by which the prince necessary for social order is feared; religious, by which the souls of the dead (especially of princes) are feared. Now

a) this is not the notion we have of duty or obligation;

b) many do not perceive these moral sanctions; those, however, who know them could say that they yield to force, but do not recognize obligation;

c) such obligation has no force and efficacy in conscience, but is rather the destruction than the explanation of moral obligation: for it would be only an action extorted by fear alone.

4. Whence the system is not founded in positive experience, but is rather constituted from a series of hypotheses.

137. Moral Intuitionism is also opposed, by which generic name are designated all who agree in this, that good and evil are affirmed immediately by some intuition of a faculty (as Nativists and Innatists for psychology), or who assert that morality is known by instinct or a special sense, by which spontaneously man affirms good and evil without induction of experience and without deduction of reason. Which

A. others say is known by a physical or bodily sense, like Sensists and Phrenologists, who admit only sensitive knowledge. Against:

1. The assertion rests on a false foundation; it supposes materialism and a false system of the criterion of truth.

2. In the Sensist system, no freedom remains, which supposes indifference of judgment, which cannot exist without intelligence. Whence it destroys morality in its principle.

3. Universals, abstracts, and immutables (such as the moral norm) are not known by sense, which is essentially mutable, and varies according to circumstances and subjective dispositions. Therefore it destroys morality in its essence.

4. The moral rule orders human acts. To order pertains to the intellect. Therefore to the intellect pertains the knowledge of morality.

5. Sense experiences from objects only pleasure and pain; therefore logically Sensism must lead to hedonism or sensualism¹.

B. Others say it is known by a certain spiritual sense of intuition or instinct, which differs from the intellect and corresponds to a blind instinct by which we immediately know first principles, both speculative and practical. Which sense is of the affective order, and consists in a certain internal affection or sympathy or taste. So the Scotist school, Sentimentalists, and many recent authors; who all in fact are altruists. This system:

1. Is for the most part founded on a false system of the criterion.

2. Is inadequate. It denies the rational element, and assigns the first parts to the affective element, which is only secondary. For reason, according to them, only observes, does not dictate; and social utility is to be embraced not because it is conformed to reason, but because affection and instinct incline to it! On the contrary, affection is only a prejudgment or resonance of the judgment of reason, which is the norm of morality.

3. It does not provide a certain but a fallacious criterion. For one is not always affected with sympathy toward the moral good, nor always with antipathy toward evil; for other non-moral causes also, such as talents, qualities, happy outcome, enjoyment, joy, can excite the same affects.

4. It does not provide a universal criterion: for the multitude and society toward which we are held by the affect of sympathy are subject to changes; but what if we are inclined toward different men, toward whom we are held to be affected by sympathies?

5. It does not provide an objective but a subjective criterion: sympathy and antipathy change according to circumstances and persons.

6. It does not provide an ultimate criterion: for sympathies and antipathies themselves are good or bad. Why, except because they are conformed or disformed to reason?

7. As human reason reasons about speculative truth, so also about practical truth. But it is absolutely repugnant that the first principles of speculative reason be admitted by a blind instinct and without evidence. Therefore the same is repugnant for the first principles of practical reason, in practical or moral matters.

8. There are other instincts and intuitions, namely egoistical ones. Why, however, should we follow the inclinations of sympathies, and not the egoistical ones? Either because they are conformed to reason; — or because they have been made by evolution: in this latter case it does not follow that they are legitimate and good. And besides, persons of egoistical character can provoke antipathy.

The moral sense cannot be distinguished from other experiences unless a certain notion of morality is present beforehand; i. e. unless reason has investigated the idea and value of morality, and distinguished it from impressions merely sensitive, aesthetic, or social.

They object the spontaneity and universality and persistence of the moral conscience in all men and through all times; which cannot be explained except by instinct and a special sense; — and this is the only argument they bring. — R.: this proves a constant and innate disposition toward knowing the first moral principles, namely synderesis or the habit of the first practical principles (as there is the habit of the intellect for the first speculative principles), but does not prove a blind instinct or a special sense. For it is useless to have recourse to a distinct special faculty; because practical reason informed by synderesis is able to explain this, and it is not a faculty distinct from speculative reason.

C. Others who profess transcendental objectivism, or the transcendental or absolute idealism originating from it, have recourse to a blind instinct of the intellect itself, by which abstract and universal truths are admitted in such a way that their value is not demonstrated, because it cannot be demonstrated that they correspond to reality. So Kant and after him those who, resting on his principles, have fallen into Pantheism, like Fichte, Schelling, Hegel. — Against this:

a) As to the foundation, this is a false criteriological system, or even pantheistic monism, in which case morality will be impersonal and supra-individual.

b) As to the method, 1) this is incomplete: for although reason is chiefly necessary for defining what we ought to do, historical and psychological observation of human nature, to which the rules of morality must be adapted, must nevertheless be added;

2. therefore it is not accommodated to human nature: for if an act elicited with the hope of reward or the fear of punishment is said not to be good, when historically and psychologically it is established that men do not act well without respect for beatitude or fear of punishment, it follows that such a method and norm is not proportioned to human powers;

3. it introduces blind faith: for if speculative reason is incapable of knowing speculative truths with certainty, why will practical reason be more certain about the existence of obligation?

c) As to the matter, with regard to the Kantian system enough has been said, n. 133. With regard to the pantheistic systems:

1. in fact, the moral conscience attributes value to acts that uniquely tend toward the perfection of the individual; in the individual man there is also an exigency of morality;

2. indeed if it does not exist there, there will be no longer any exigency of morality: for obligation toward others is, in order that they may be perfected.

S. Th. I-II, q. 18, a. 2, 3, 4, 10.

138. Notions. — After we have spoken of the ultimate foundation, and of the first objective principle of morality, there must now be considered the immediate principles which are called the sources of morality; namely, the elements of a human act from which it immediately comes about that it is conformed to the rule and good, or disformed from it and bad, and that more or less. They are the object (the primary source), and the circumstances (the secondary source) of which the chief is the end, because it most influences the act.

A. The object is here considered 1) not as the whole objective element, or the complex of all circumstances, but in the proper sense as distinct from the circumstances: it is that which is first and of itself attained by the act, or the matter (thing or person) about which it is concerned, that into which it primarily and of itself by its nature tends; whence it is the same as the intrinsic end¹;

2. not according to physical being, but according to moral being, i. e., insofar as it is conformed or disformed to the rule of reason.

B. Circumstances are secondarily attained by the act as accidents that affect and determine the human act in its being to be constituted. Some affect the human act according to physical being, and these are indifferent (e. g., that one steal in the morning or in the evening); others according to moral being, which increase or diminish (e. g., that one steal much or little): these are called moral, to which alone we attend here.

C. End is here understood not the end of the work or intrinsic end, which is the same as the object, but the extrinsic end of the agent and added « by which the agent is moved to the work ».

Since reason, however, is not determined to one thing, but can primarily and of itself tend to all things, hence the same thing can be the object with respect to one act and only a circumstance with respect to another, and indeed: a) moral being can be the circumstance of an act considered according to physical being, e. g., that a thing is another's or deposited in a sacred place is a circumstance with respect to the act of taking, but is the substance of theft or sacrilege; b) indeed the circumstance of one act can be the object and substance of another act: thus it is not a circumstance with respect to theft that it be another's property, but that it be sacred, although this is not a circumstance with respect to sacrilege.

139. Remark. — The object (similarly the end and the circumstance) can be considered in a twofold way: physically and materially in the being of an entity, insofar as it is something in the nature of things, and so it is always good (by the goodness of nature or of entity); — or morally and in the being of mores, insofar as it is the object of such an act and insofar as it is attained by the agent, and so it can be morally good or bad. It is said:

1. With respect to the objective element: insofar as it is the object of such a human act or has due proportion to such an act or not, i. e., insofar as it is subject to the rule of reason and conformed to it and morally good, or disformed and evil, that such a thing or person is attained by such an act. Thus the object of theft is not the property of another in itself and physically considered, but insofar as the rule forbids that it be taken from its owner; the object of temperance is not food in itself considered, but insofar as it is conformed to reason that it be taken in the necessary quantity. Hence:

a) A physically good object can be morally bad and vice versa. Thus, although God and sin in themselves are a good or bad object, nevertheless God as to be hated is a bad object, sin to be destroyed is a good object conformed to reason.

b) An object that is physically one and the same can be morally good or bad, such as to seize and to restore another's property, to love and to hate a man.

c) The same act according to physical being can be of diverse species according to moral being: thus to give money is a donation if done as a favor, an almsgiving if for relieving misery, a payment if for the extinction of a debt, a restitution if for the recompense of an injury, a compensation if for merit;

d) An act physically the same can be morally good or bad according as it is done by different subjects, or by the same but at different times, e. g., the act of fornication and the conjugal act, the eating of meat on feria 5 and feria 6, the killing of a man by a robber or by a soldier.

e) Acts of the same physical species can be of different moral species, e. g., to know one's own woman or another's, love of God and of wine, of virtue and of vice; on the contrary, acts of the same moral species can be of different physical species, e. g., the love and desire of the same object.

2. With respect to the subjective element: insofar as it is attained by the agent, i. e., is known as conformed or disformed to the rules, or insofar as the object and its morality is known by the conscience of the agent as conformed or disformed to reason. For it can happen that the object is in itself bad and nevertheless through invincible ignorance is thought good: thus if one takes another's property which he thinks is his own, the act will be formally good; and vice versa, if one thinks that today is a fasting day and does not fast, the act will be formally bad.

All of the foregoing things also hold for circumstances and for the end.

140. Principle I. The morally considered object gives the act its morality, i.e. goodness or badness, and that fundamental, principal, and primary.

It is said: 1) fundamental, because it intrinsically and essentially belongs to the action, as the object without which the act cannot be;

2. principal, because it gives the act its moral species by which it is distinguished from others;

3. primary, because it is conceived before every other which arises from circumstances and even persists when these are changed. Thus in the theft of a sacred thing for vain glory, the malice from the object, i. e., the injustice, is the first and fundamental; the malice from the circumstances of the sacred and the end is called secondary and accidental.

It is proved 1) by reason: That is good which has the fullness of being due to it, evil if it does not have the whole being which it ought to have. Now something has being, and therefore goodness, first from that which gives it its species, namely from its form, e. g., a man generated from this, that he is a rational animal; on the contrary, principal and fundamental malice if it does not have the being of the species which it ought to have, e. g., if instead of a man a monster is generated. But a human act has its species from the morally considered object, as from a form. Therefore from a fitting object it has goodness, and that primary and fundamental; likewise malice if it does not have the fitting object which it ought to have.

Prob. minor: A human act is a motion or tendency to the morally considered object, as to a terminus. But every motion has its species from the terminus as from its form, because it is to the terminus as potency to act. Therefore a human act has its species from the morally considered object, as from a form.

This can be briefly stated as follows: Every thing has its being and goodness (and therefore its malice) fundamentally from its species. But a human act has its species from the object, because it is a motion to it as to a terminus. Therefore a human act, just as in the physical order so in the moral order, has its species from the object by which it is terminated.

Hence 2) in the Scriptures and in the doctrine of Tradition it is often affirmed that good things are to be done, whatever evil things are to be avoided; which is to be understood at least of those things which are good or bad by reason of their matter. Thus e. g. Ps. XXXIII, 14: Depart from evil and do good; Prov. III, 7: Fear (i. e., worship) God and depart from evil; Is. I, 16, 17: Cease to do perversely, learn to do well. Alluding to which the prince of the apostles says, I Pet. III, 10-12: He who will love life and see good days, let him refrain his tongue from evil and his lips that they speak no guile; let him depart from evil and do good; let him seek peace and follow it; for the eyes of the Lord are upon the just and his ears unto their prayers; but the countenance of the Lord is against them that do evil things.

Whence Christ, to the young man asking: « What good shall I do that I may have eternal life? » (Mt. XIX, 16), answers (v. 17-19): « If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments; .... Thou shalt do no murder, thou shalt not commit adultery, thou shalt not steal, thou shalt not bear false witness. Honor thy father and thy mother, and thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself »; which precisely are evil or good from the object.

141. Principle II. Moral circumstances as such give human acts goodness and malice, but secondary and accidental.

It is said: a) moral circumstances, because they are not considered in themselves and physically, but morally i. e. 1) as to this act, insofar as it is conformed or disformed to the rule of reason that the act be placed with these circumstances; and 2) insofar as this is known by the agent.

b) as such, because they sometimes give even the first and essential goodness or malice, as if a work indifferent from its object becomes good by reason of a circumstance, e. g., to drink moderately; but then the circumstance first and of itself is intended and becomes the object, or that which is first attained.

c) secondary and accidental morality, because circumstances as such supervene upon the act in its constituted moral being and species.

It is proved 1) by reason: The fullness of being and goodness in things is not only had from that which gives them their species, but also secondarily from supervening accidents, e. g., in a man from figure, virtue, color, etc., of which if anything that ought to be is missing, or if something that ought not to be is present, according to this the thing will be bad. Therefore also in human acts the fullness of being and goodness does not wholly consist in the species which comes from the object, but is added secondarily from fitting accidents which are the circumstances; which if something due is missing or something undue is present, according to this the action will be bad.

Confirmed: Circumstances can import a relation of fittingness or unfittingness to the rule of reason just as the object itself, e. g., not only is it unfitting to steal, but also to steal in a sacred place; not only is it fitting to pray, but also to pray on bended knees. Therefore.

Hence 2) in the Scriptures, Christ himself (Mc. XII, 41-44) declared that the poor widow who gave two mites gave more than the rich who gave much, because she gave of her want.

And 3) from Tradition we know that in confession the circumstances changing the species of sin are to be declared, or so aggravating or diminishing it as to make it mortal from venial or vice versa (which the Council of Trent defined, sess. 14, c. 5, can. 7). There would be no reason for this if they did not increase or diminish malice.

142. Principle III. The extrinsic and added end as such and morally considered gives human acts goodness or malice, but secondary and accidental.

It is said: 1) extrinsic end: for the end of the work or intrinsic end is the same as the object; wherefore we speak of the extrinsic and accidental end which is added by the agent to the object².

2. as such: for the end sometimes takes on the notion of a moral object and gives the first morality, as if one does an indifferent act for a good or bad end, or an act good from its object solely for the sake of the extrinsic end;

3. morally considered, i. e., insofar as it is conformed or disformed to reason that such a thing be intended as an end and such an act be chosen as a means to obtain it.

It is proved 1) by reason: A thing which depends on another has not only the fullness of being and goodness from its species and accidents, but also from its relation to the cause on which it depends; but as being depends on an efficient cause and species, so goodness depends especially on a final cause. But a human act depends on an efficient and a final cause. Therefore besides the absolute goodness which it has from being and species, it has relative goodness from the end if it has the due end, and malice if it does not have it.

Confirmed: The end expresses conformity or disformity to reason, e. g., not only is it conformed to reason to give alms, but also to give in satisfaction for sins; just as it is repugnant to reason not only to steal, but also to steal in order to get drunk. Therefore it cannot but be that the end, if good, influences goodness, and if bad, malice.

Hence 2) in the Scriptures Christ says: « Take heed that you do not your justice before men to be seen by them... The lamp of thy body is thy eye. If thy eye be single, thy whole body shall be lightsome. But if thy eye be evil, thy whole body shall be darksome » (Mt. VI, 1, 22-23). Which is to be understood of the perverse intention which blinds the mind and takes away the pleasure of God in works; while the right intention which directs all things pleases God and is rewarded by him. Whence v. 33 says: « Seek ye therefore first the kingdom of God and his justice; and all these things shall be added unto you ». And the Apostle admonishes, I Cor. X, 31, that all things be done to the glory of God.

143. Corollary. — In a human act, therefore, a fourfold goodness can be found: one according to genus insofar as it is an action, because insofar as it has act and entity, so much has it of (physical) goodness; another is according to species, i. e., according to a fitting object; a third is according to circumstances, as according to certain accidents; a fourth according to end, as according to a relation to the cause of goodness (a. 4).

S. Th. I-II, q. 18, a. 5 and 8 ; I, q. 48, a. 1, ad 2 ; C. G. III, 9 ; De Malo q. 2, a. 4 and ad 10 ; II Sent., d. 40, a. 1.

That good and evil in the physical order do not constitute a specific difference is manifest: thus a good and a bad garment, a healthy and a sick man, are not species of garment or of man. Hence it is asked whether in human acts goodness and malice are also a merely accidental difference, or on the contrary differ of themselves and essentially, and therefore according to species. About which we must hold what S. Thomas first of all taught.

144. Thesis. Human acts according to a good or bad object differ in moral species. — It is proved:

a) From the fact that the human act is rational. An act has its species from the object. But an act is human and moral insofar as it proceeds from deliberating reason. Therefore it has its species from the object considered as it is set against reason, or by comparison to reason. But good and bad in the object precisely and of themselves differ insofar as they are compared to reason, inasmuch as the object suits it or is repugnant to it¹. Therefore a good and a bad object make human acts differ in species (a. 5).

b) From the fact that the human act is voluntary. An act has its species from the object. But an act is human and moral insofar as it is voluntary. Therefore it has its species from the object by comparison to the will. But the object of the will is the good or end. Therefore a human act has its species from the comparison to the end. But good and bad are said of themselves according to the relation to the end: good inasmuch as it says order to the end, evil inasmuch as it lacks this order. Therefore in human acts good and bad differ in species (II Sent., d. 40, a. 1, ad 2 ; De Malo, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4 ; q. 2, a. 4, ad 10).

145. Is indifference a third species of morality? — I answer: 1) It is certain that not all human acts are of themselves according to species good or bad, but some are indifferent. For an act has its species from the object, and a human act from the object compared to reason from which the act proceeds. Therefore if the object of itself suits the order of reason, the act will be good according to species, e. g., to give alms; if it includes repugnance to reason, it will be bad according to species, e. g., to steal. But there are objects which say nothing that pertains to the order of reason, e. g., to walk, to lift a straw from the ground, to give money, etc., and then the act will be indifferent according to species.

2. Acts by their nature indifferent do not seem to be moral. For indifference, which is between goodness and malice, because it is neither conformity nor disformity to the rule, is not a species of morality but a negation of it. For morality says relation to the rule; but the indifferent says no relation to the rule: for it is that about which the rule does not care, and it is the same as if the rule were not. For morality is spoken of in relation to reason, to which it has conformity or repugnance; but the indifferent says nothing that pertains to the order of reason; therefore indifference exists outside morality (a. 8).

There are nevertheless some who say it is an incomplete species of morality.

3. Among indifferent acts some are called good-sounding or bad-sounding, whose object, — although it is neither good nor bad, — nevertheless inclines more either toward goodness, and these acts for the most part have formal goodness, such as to go to church, to visit the poor, to give money, etc.; — or on the contrary toward malice, and then it more often has injustice attached, such as to take another's property, to set up a cause from which even the death of someone can follow, to use amphibological speech or restriction, etc., and therefore the act cannot be placed unless there be a reason justifying, e. g., in case of necessity.

146. Remark. — In order that goodness (of object or circumstance) be contracted, it is required that it be intended in itself and for its own sake; but in order that malice be contracted, it is sufficient that it be foreseen and indirectly voluntary. For right reason dictates that the good is to be sought and to be loved in itself because it is worthy to be desired for its own sake, and therefore he who does not intend the good in itself does not will it well and rightly, and laudably, and in such a way that it deserves to be intended. It is therefore required that the good be the end intended by the agent or the motive by which he is moved to place the act, or, as S. Thomas says, q. 19, a. 7, ad 3: « for the will to be good, it is required that it be of good under the aspect of good, i. e., that it will good and for good ». Wherefore no one is praised because he visited the sick only for the sake of chatting, or fasted to save money; because formal honest mercy or fasting is not intended.

Yet one should not explicitly intend this honesty or conformity with the rule as such, but it is sufficient implicitly, by willing the act under some honest aspect, e. g., alms because it relieves the poor. — On the contrary, evil must not only not be loved but also be foreseen and avoided, even if not intended; which is not done by him who foresees and will not prevent it.

Hence, in order that an act be good, it must be good from an integral cause and from every part, i. e., both of object, and of end, and of circumstances; in order that an act be evil, a defect is sufficient either on the part of the object, or on the part of the circumstances or the end.

147. State of the question. — We have seen the supreme species in morality, namely goodness and malice, arise from the object, circumstances, and end; but the lowest species of moral acts must also be considered, according to which they have such special goodness or such special malice. Whence it is asked

a) whether this distinction arises from the same three sources; indeed

b) since a natural entity is placed in only one species, it is doubted whether several moral species can be found in one moral act.

To which we shall give the answer, with the object, circumstances, and end considered separately.

S. Th. I-II, q. 18, a. 2 ; a. 4, ad 3 ; a. 6 ; a. 7, ad 1 ; a. 10 ; q. 1, a. 3, ad 3 ; De Malo, q. 2, a. 6, ad 3.

148. Principle I. The morally considered object gives human acts not only generic but also specific morality.

Declaration. The sense is: The object not only makes the essential distinction between good and bad, and constitutes the supreme species of goodness and malice in human acts, but also the lowest species by which various good or bad acts are distinguished from one another.

It is proved: A moral act is essentially a motion to the morally considered object, as to a terminus. But every motion essentially has its lowest species from the terminus. Therefore every human act has its lowest moral species from the morally considered object. — And therefore according as objects say diverse fittingness with reason or opposition, various species of good acts are distinguished (e. g., love of God and of neighbor, faith and charity, fortitude and temperance), or of bad acts (e. g., homicide and theft, blasphemy and detraction, lust and anger).

Against this doctrine there is no obstacle from 1) the circumstance's being able to constitute the lowest moral species in a human act, because then it enters into the object, and becomes the principal condition of it and, as it were, the specific difference of the human act, as will be explained below, art. 2;

2. the human act's receiving its species from the end, because a) the end is the object of the will; b) with respect to the external commanded act, the end of the work is the same as the object, the end of the agent added is a circumstance adding species, which is considered by the agent as the accessory condition of the object coming extrinsically, insofar as the act is done under the influence of the will whose object is the end of the agent (cf. art. 3).

149. Principle II. One and the same moral act can have multiple species of morality.

It is proved: 1) This is not verified of a human act according to physical being, because a physical entity is specified by a natural form which is determined to one thing, and therefore is of one species; but according to moral being, an act is specified by the object apprehended by reason, which is not determined to one thing, but under different consideration can be referred to different species according to the moral conditions supervening, whether the species are of themselves subordinated to one another, or are disparate, as if theft is ordered to drunkenness (a. 7, ad 1). Thus to take another's property from a sacred place includes a different specific repugnance to the order of reason, which dictates that an injury not be done to a sacred place; and yet the object remains one, but composed of several.

2. Moral being accrues as a quality to the physical being itself, and therefore just as one physical thing can be of different species

Summa Theologiae Moralis I — 10 of perfection or defect according to accidents, e. g., the same man white and musical, blind and deaf, so one physical act can pertain to several moral species. Whence nothing prevents the same act from being in different species of virtue or sin.

150. Principle III. One and the same moral act cannot, however, be at one and the same time good and bad.

It is proved: For an act to be simply good, goodness is required from every part; for it to be simply bad, malice from any part is sufficient. Therefore.

And nevertheless, an act evil from one part is not thereby deprived of every goodness coming from other sources: thus an act good according to species can be bad by reason of a circumstance, or an act good according to species and circumstances can be ordered to a bad end, because, as S. Thomas says, « the posterior being removed, the prior nevertheless remains » (I Sent., d. 41, q. 1, a. 2 (Cf. I-II, q. 18, a. 4, ad 3).— It is excepted if the act is done from the sole or total cause of evil, because then no goodness is intended nor contracted, but the act is considered as a mere means of evil, insofar as the object is considered as altogether evil.