Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 8 and 11-16.

106. There are six elicited acts of the will: three concerning the end: simple volition, intention and enjoyment, three concerning the means: consent, choice and active use. But every act of the will depends on prior knowledge: for although the will, as an efficient cause, moves the other faculties to exercise (i.e., to act or not to act), nevertheless it is moved by the intellect as by a final cause with respect to specification (or determination of the act), insofar as the latter proposes to it goods or actions diverse in kind and moves the will to operate rather in this kind of action than in another. Therefore there are also given six acts of the intellect which precede the elicited acts of the will.

107. By these twelve acts the moral work is completed both in intention and in execution. In intention

A. toward the end, there is 1) simple apprehension of the intellect by which it knows something, e.g., health, as good (or evil); 2) there follows simple volition, i.e., bare complacency and an inefficacious desire for the proposed good (or an inefficacious dislike of evil); 3) if the volition is strong, the intellect is moved to examine whether the good is suitable and can be acquired (or whether the evil is not suitable and can be avoided): this is the judgment so proposing the good, namely, as suitable and possible; 4) there follows the intention of the will, which is an efficacious desire for the good (or an efficacious flight from evil), or the end to be acquired through means.

B. about the means, 5) by the force of intention the intellect is moved to seek out suitable means for obtaining the good, and this is counsel, i.e., inquiry and deliberation about the means, such as, for example, walking, medicine, good eating, bodily exercises; 6) there follows consent of the will approving the useful means; 7) by the force of consent the intellect is moved to discern the more suitable means, and this is discerning judgment or practical judgment; 8) there follows choice of the will which accepts one means over another, e.g., walking, and thus the order of intention is completed. —

Here follows the execution of the aforementioned things, in reverse order, which begins

A. circa media, 9) through command: for by the force of election the intellect commands the execution of the means, e.g., of walking; 10) there follows on the part of the will active use, i.e., the application of the executive powers, in this case the locomotive power, to acting; to which corresponds in these powers passive use, i.e., the execution of the means, here the walking itself.

B. From these 11) it follows the acquisition of the end and the cognition of the acquisition; from which is had 12) enjoyment or delight and joy of the will and pleasant rest in the good or possessed end.

108. Observations. — 1. All the aforesaid acts concur to the moral work when it is performed not rashly, or from imagination or passion, but prudently and maturely, even if they succeed one another so suddenly that they cannot be distinguished by the agent. 2. All acts are for the sake of an end, except the ultimate one: fruition.