Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

105. Elicited and commanded acts. — By reason of the principle from which they proceed, human acts are either elicited from the will or merely commanded.

Acts elicited are acts of the will itself, namely, those which proceed from the will as from a proper cause, are produced immediately by it, and are received and perfected in it (whether they are commanded by no other act of the will, or depend on another preceding one): they are diverse acts or modes of willing. Acts merely commanded are those which do not proceed immediately from the will, but from another internal or external power subject to the will and moved by it.

By reason of the term an act can be internal or external; hence internal and elicited acts differ from external and commanded acts: every elicited act is internal, but not every commanded act is external; an internal act, e.g., of the intellect or of the sensitive appetite or of the internal senses, can be commanded.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 8 and 11-16.

106. There are six elicited acts of the will: three concerning the end: simple volition, intention and enjoyment, three concerning the means: consent, choice and active use. But every act of the will depends on prior knowledge: for although the will, as an efficient cause, moves the other faculties to exercise (i.e., to act or not to act), nevertheless it is moved by the intellect as by a final cause with respect to specification (or determination of the act), insofar as the latter proposes to it goods or actions diverse in kind and moves the will to operate rather in this kind of action than in another. Therefore there are also given six acts of the intellect which precede the elicited acts of the will.

107. By these twelve acts the moral work is completed both in intention and in execution. In intention

A. toward the end, there is 1) simple apprehension of the intellect by which it knows something, e.g., health, as good (or evil); 2) there follows simple volition, i.e., bare complacency and an inefficacious desire for the proposed good (or an inefficacious dislike of evil); 3) if the volition is strong, the intellect is moved to examine whether the good is suitable and can be acquired (or whether the evil is not suitable and can be avoided): this is the judgment so proposing the good, namely, as suitable and possible; 4) there follows the intention of the will, which is an efficacious desire for the good (or an efficacious flight from evil), or the end to be acquired through means.

B. about the means, 5) by the force of intention the intellect is moved to seek out suitable means for obtaining the good, and this is counsel, i.e., inquiry and deliberation about the means, such as, for example, walking, medicine, good eating, bodily exercises; 6) there follows consent of the will approving the useful means; 7) by the force of consent the intellect is moved to discern the more suitable means, and this is discerning judgment or practical judgment; 8) there follows choice of the will which accepts one means over another, e.g., walking, and thus the order of intention is completed. —

Here follows the execution of the aforementioned things, in reverse order, which begins

A. circa media, 9) through command: for by the force of election the intellect commands the execution of the means, e.g., of walking; 10) there follows on the part of the will active use, i.e., the application of the executive powers, in this case the locomotive power, to acting; to which corresponds in these powers passive use, i.e., the execution of the means, here the walking itself.

B. From these 11) it follows the acquisition of the end and the cognition of the acquisition; from which is had 12) enjoyment or delight and joy of the will and pleasant rest in the good or possessed end.

108. Observations. — 1. All the aforesaid acts concur to the moral work when it is performed not rashly, or from imagination or passion, but prudently and maturely, even if they succeed one another so suddenly that they cannot be distinguished by the agent. 2. All acts are for the sake of an end, except the ultimate one: fruition.

S. Th. I-II, q. 17; q. 9, a. 2, ad 3.

109. Command properly is an act of practical reason: for it is an expression of the will by which the work to be done is intimated to someone (do this), and a ordering necessitating the one commanded to do the work; but to express and to order belong to reason, not to the will. — Nevertheless, the will is said to command the other powers whose acts are called commanded: a) by taking to command improperly for to move, because the will moves the other faculties to exercise and to the end; b) also properly: because, since the choice of the will moves reason to command, therefore command has from the will its force and efficacy of moving the other powers; but the act is rather to be attributed to the moving power than to the moved power (e.g., killing is more attributed to the will than to the hand); whence command is rather attributed to the will than to the intellect.

110. Command and the commanded act are one human act. — For command and the act commanded by it itself are said to have order to one another; and therefore, although physically they are several, morally, however, they are simply one and the same human act, like a certain one whole: in which the commanding mover holds itself as the formal element, the commanded act is had materially; — yet they are several according to parts.

111. Those acts can be commanded which are in our domain or power, and toward which a persuasive reason can move us; namely: 1° acts of the will, which are maximally in our power and over which the intellect, just as it can judge, so too can command: for by one act the will can move itself to another, insofar as it moves reason to propose or command this; in which case that act will be at once elicited by the will and commanded by it. The first act of the will is excepted, to which a man does not move himself by another act, but is moved by God alone; 2° acts of reason, not as regards the perception of the object, nor as regards assent or adherence to such or such an object, unless the matter concerns non-evident things; — but as regards the exercise or application: for the will moves reason to act, and reason reflects upon its own acts and so can dispose of its acts, — except the first act of reason, which precedes every act of the will and does not depend on it, except as regards its continuation; 3° acts of the sensitive life, as regards exercise and application, not indeed as dependent on the disposition of the body, but insofar as they depend on the sensitive power and on imagination, and do not anticipate reason and will but follow them; 4° acts of the external senses and members which are moved by the sensitive powers, such as the eye, hand, foot, tongue. On the contrary cannot be commanded: a) the first act of reason and of the will; b) acts of the sensitive powers anticipating reason; c) acts of the vegetative life which follow natural appetite; d) acts of the external members which are moved by a natural power, such as the movement of the heart and of the genital member; unless sometimes indirectly, insofar as by the influence of the nervous system and the sensitive part an acceleration can occur in the circulation of the blood and thus a commotion of the heart or of the genital organ. 112. The dominion of the will over the other powers can be perfect or despotic (such as is the dominion of a master over a slave) when it is not resisted: in such a way it moves itself, and through itself the locomotive power, the external senses, and the other exterior members; — but, after original sin, it is often imperfect or political (such as is the dominion of a king over free men), which is sometimes resisted or not obeyed: in such a way it moves the intellect, the internal senses, and the sensitive appetite: for thoughts or passions rise up against the will, nor do they always follow if they are chosen and excited by the will.