Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis
Benedictus Henricus Merkelbach (1871–1942)
Summa Theologiae Moralis ad mentem D. Thomae et ad normam iuris novi
First published 1935
Volume I (De principiis) of Benedictus Henricus Merkelbach's Summa theologiae moralis sets out the foundations of Catholic moral theology within a Thomistic framework. It treats human acts, conscience, law, sin, and merit in relation to the canon law of its period. The present edition follows the Paris text published by Desclée de Brouwer in 1935 and includes the Latin text with an English translation. It comprises the first volume of the three-volume Summa.
Prologus
Introductio I: Theologia Moralis Generalis: Introductio
Tractatus I: Tractatus de ultimo actu humanorum fine seu de beatitudine
Introductio
Quaestio I: DE FINE ULTIMO IN COMMUNI
Quaestio II: DE BEATITUDINE OBIECTIVA
Quaestio III: DE BEATITUDINE FORMALI
Quaestio IV: DE QUALITATIBUS BEATITUDINIS
Quaestio V: DE MODO OBTINENDI BEATITUDINEM
Tractatus II: De actibus humanis in se
Introductio
Pars I: De actibus humanis secundum esse materiale et psychologicum
§ I: De conditione actuum humanorum
Caput I: De elemento subiectivo actus humani
Quaestio I: De voluntario
Articulus I: De voluntario in se
Articulus II: De voluntario tum positivo et directo, tum negativo et indirecto
Articulus III: De voluntario in se et in causa
Quaestio II: De impedimentis voluntarii seu de involuntario
Articulus I: De violentia
Articulus II: De metu
Articulus III: De concupiscentia
Articulus IV: De ignorantia
Quaestio III: De libero
Quaestio IV: De impedimentis liberi
Articulus I: De passionibus
Articulus II: De habitu et consuetudine
Articulus III: De impedimentis liberi remotioribus
Caput II: De elemento obiectivo actus humani
Quaestio I: De elemento essentiali seu obiecto
S. Th. I-II, q. 18, a. 2.
101. Etymologically, the object is that which is set before something else; whence the object of a human act is everything that is set before the deliberation of reason and the choice of the will, and thus it also includes the circumstances. In the present context, however, it is taken in a stricter sense and designates that, whether it be a thing or a person, which is attained first and per se by the act, and thus it is distinguished from the circumstances, which are attained only secondarily and per accidens and by reason of another: taking another's property is the object of theft; little or much is a circumstance.
Nothing general can be said about the essential objective element, because, since all objects are singular, it varies with different objects.
Quaestio II: De elemento accidentali seu de circumstantiis
S. Th. I-II, q. 7.
102. Circumstance by force of the word signifies that which stands around something; hence it designates something extrinsic to a thing which nevertheless touches it or approaches it according to place. Thus what is outside the substance of an act and yet in some way touches it, as its accident, is called a circumstance of the act, which is accordingly defined: an accident of a human act affecting it as constituted in being. Of the substance of theft are the man seizing, the thing belonging to another, and its appropriation against the owner's will — that the man be a priest or a layman, rich or poor, that he steal a sacred or profane thing, precious or cheap, where he steals: in a church or in a square, are circumstances.
103. Seven circumstances are customarily enumerated: Who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, when, to which Aristotle adds: about what, which is comprehended by others under “what.” For circumstances can touch either the human act itself, or its cause, or its effect. The act itself is affected both by two measures, namely, place or where and time or when, and by the quality or mode of acting: how; on the part of the final cause there is had the circumstance: why or on account of what; on the part of the principal agent: who; on the part of the instrument: by what aids; finally on the part of the material cause: about what, and on the part of the effect: what. Let it be noted that circumstances designate not essential but accidental conditions of place, time, mode, effect, agent, etc., and likewise an accidental end.
104. Observations. — 1ª) The circumstances are to be considered by the theologian: for he considers acts 1) in order to the ultimate end, 2) according as in them is found goodness or malice, and indeed greater or lesser, 3) according as they are meritorious and demeritorious. But a) human acts are proportioned to the end according as they are done with the due circumstances; b) according to these they are good or evil, better and worse; nay c) meritorious and demeritorious: for acts are voluntary and consequently meritorious, or involuntary according to the knowledge or ignorance of the circumstances. Therefore. These will be more apparent from what is to be said below. 2ª) The principal of all circumstances is for the sake of which, i.e., the end, because it is the motive and object of the will; there follows the circumstance what, which indicates the effect of the acts and at the same time the quantity and quality of the object, and thus touches the very substance of the act. 3ª) There is not given a circumstance how often, because it does not affect the same act but multiplies acts.