Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

98. A bodily constitution, which can depend greatly on heredity, and undergoes change through education, can be numbered first among the causes, which more remotely influence the child.

1. Bodily temperament (temperament) is the complex of those inclinations which belong to each one from his own organism and constitute his special character; since, however, such innate dispositions can in some way be changed by one's own efforts, education, and external circumstances, character is called the complex of innate inclinations insofar as they have been changed by one's own will and the instruction of others and have acquired some firmness. Whence St. Thomas (c. Gent. II, 63): "The soul rules the body and resists the passions which follow the temperament: for from the temperament some are more apt than others to lusts or anger; yet they abstain more from them, because of something restraining, as is evident in the continent." Temperament therefore diminishes the exercise of free will, but does not take it away; as has been said of the passions and habits of which it is the cause. This, moreover, is established by one's own and others' experience.

2. The complexion of the body depends greatly on heredity, by which tendencies are transmitted from parents to children, tendencies that depend more on the organism, and indeed not only physical defects or corporeal or sensory qualities, but also mental aptitudes, and even moral tendencies, such as inclinations to anger, drunkenness, vices of the flesh, suicide, so that in most regions examples are cited of families in which certain virtues or vices have been transmitted through many generations.

Indeed, although a certain kind of madness may sometimes be transmitted from vicious parents which entirely removes liberty, nevertheless the ordinary use of reason and liberty remains. Against modern determinists contending that by the law of heredity the liberty of children is destroyed, into whom propensities are transmitted without their consent, it must be held that hereditary propensities diminish free choice, insofar as reason is obscured by them and the force of the will is in some way weakened, as we have said concerning the passions and habits to which hereditary inclinations can give rise and therefore be assimilated. Nor does there exist only an influence of the body on the soul, but also, in turn, an influence of the soul on the body is given.

3) Natural propensities that arise from constitution or heredity, and are strengthened by character, are greatly increased and diminished by education. Education influences free choice in three ways: by inculcating principles, whether good or bad, which easily turn into prejudices, or by omitting to inculcate good principles; — by presenting examples through which the intellect is indirectly led little by little to approve what is done by many, or even the will is directly drawn to consent; — finally, by exciting passions and directing them toward good or evil (e.g., by counsels or the reading of books). Now as regards inculcated principles, what we have said about ignorance is to be applied, which does not always render an act simply involuntary, if that ignorance itself is consequent; as regards examples and excited passions, what has been handed down about passions holds, which generally do not remove but diminish liberty.

99. Another cause are pathological states or diseases of the mind, which are so called, not because the soul itself or the spiritual faculties can be diseased in themselves, but because, on account of badly affected organs, specifically the centers of the brain, and on account of the organic sensitive powers, they are hindered in their action transiently or permanently. Some are merely functional, without lesion of the organ, and are called psychic; others organic, with lesion of the organ, are called physio-psychological. They are distinguished¹:

A. Psychosae, which habitually disturb the use of reason, at least in determinate matter, so that the sick are not conscious of their own abnormal state. Thus:

1) Dementia, which is a growing weakness and dullness of the mind.

2) Phrenesis, of which various species are counted. In it, the sick put forth false judgments which are incurable at the root, because they are deceived by perpetual or temporary hallucinations or have disturbed associations of imagination, so that their psychic life can be equated with the life of those dreaming.

Hence in delirium, even if it be monomania or hallucination confined to a single subject, they are not free; through the intervals of delirium nothing of itself impedes freedom.

B. Psychasthenia, which hinders practical judgment and the will, but in such a way that the weak are conscious of their abnormal state and psychic debility. And indeed:

1) Obsession so occupies the mind that the obsessed person is bound to think or do certain things. It sufficiently disturbs practical judgment, so that, if it is vehement, room is often left only for slight guilt, and scarcely can grave sin occur in such cases. But besides perpetual obsessions, there are others which arise only in certain circumstances; hence outside the state of obsession the infirm are held by the precept 98 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE MORALIS

On fleeing the occasions of morbid excitation to committing dishonorable acts, and if they freely do violence to these, they are guilty. Reduced to obsession are phobias, fixed ideas, more intense scruples².

2. Impulses of the blind or invincible propensities can be in a morbid state, whether they immediately obtain a non-deliberated act, or they overcome futile resistance so that the act is nonetheless elicited. Hence some are merely mechanical or motivative, which often are without affect, as for example in an idiot; — others are psycho-mechanical or even merely psychic, which occur with a more distinct perception and stronger affect, and often leave partial freedom.

All suppose the suggestible person, for his passive docility depends on the intensity of a certain phantasm which quite easily produces an insuperable impulse. Thus some are known to be prone to lies, others to internal blasphemies, others to suicide or homicide, others to thefts, drunkennesses, or fires, according as they suffer from cleptomania, dipsomania, pyromania; with whom, however, are not to be confounded those who are thieves, drunkards, liars, etc. from habit: for these indeed are not abnormal, but sinners from malice.

It is not easy to discern whether impulses are truly irresistible, but from all the circumstances it must be judged whether freedom is only diminished or taken away. The latter can easily be supposed a) if the action cannot be explained by natural concupiscence, b) if after the evil action the mind has remained calm and content, c) if something is done which one would otherwise altogether abhor; — yet freedom is not always taken away. Hence what we said above about violence, about fear, and about concupiscence can be applied.

3. Abulia renders the will impotent for willing and for effectively commanding what is desired, whether it remains idle, or as if unwilling, is compelled to do or leave certain things against its own practical judgments. In the 1° case, the sick person is often excused from certain positive duties, because freedom is at least sufficiently diminished; in the 2° case, what was said about impulses holds.

Abulia, however, is sometimes not universal, but is limited to certain acts or particular times. Moreover, it can be voluntary and free in its cause, when someone knowingly and freely induced this state, e.g., by constantly abdicating the will without sufficient reason.

C. Psychoneuroses or disorders of the nervous system itself:

1. Neurasthenia is a pathological state consisting in habitual fatigue of the nervous system from an organic or psychic cause; in which the nerves appear weakened and exhausted, so that the agent, although self-possessed, labors under the greatest inconstancy, and is much depressed physically and morally. Hence liberty is diminished, though not taken away. Therefore the infirm can quite easily be excused when, yielding to weariness, they neglect certain positive precepts, especially merely ecclesiastical ones, as too great a burden. If, however, out of sadness, they seek base pleasures to which the disease itself does not impel them, of themselves they are to be judged to sin.

2. Hysteria, although there is dispute about its cause, also carries with it a disordering and disturbance of the nervous system, but much more serious than neurasthenia, which consists in a great morbid suggestibility, from which sensibility is diminished or temporarily extinguished in certain parts of the body (anesthesia), while in others it is rendered much more intense (hyperesthesia); there also arise bodily movements more or less disordered, as well as vivid hallucinations or vehement passions which are highly unstable, and greatly impede the free exercise of the will, as well as right judgment and the moral sense. Wherefore hysterics easily deceive themselves and others. Hence in practice, only from the circumstances, and from the declaration of the hysterics themselves, can it be known how much freedom remains in them. Nevertheless, hysterical agitation (crise, accès de grande hystérie) cannot be reconciled with full responsibility and grave guilt.

3. Epilepsy is still more serious, that hidden or concealed form which drives one to commit various strange, shameful, and atrocious deeds: to inflicting injury, blasphemies, shameful conversations, striking, homicide, etc.; not indeed constantly, but with longer intervals interposed, so that the sick person retains no memory of all these things. The agitation or epileptic crisis cannot certainly be reconciled with full responsibility and grave guilt. But outside the times of frenzy the mind is sound and perfectly free; unless at times a transient psychic disturbance should supervene.

All the aforesaid disturbances, even if they affect the affection or the will, seem to draw their origin from the clouding or diminution of intellectual cognition³.

In general overview, therefore, as far as pathological states are concerned, "cases in which imputability remains whole, or in which it is entirely removed, are to be considered as exceptions. For generally imputability neither remains untouched, nor is entirely removed, but is diminished.

This proposition concerns acts that proceed from abnormality, and does not concern acts that are placed outside the influence of the abnormality — e.g., concerning other matters or in lucid intervals —; ... moreover, it concerns actual imputability, and it intends to prejudge nothing about indirect imputability or imputability in cause, both with respect to the abnormality itself and with respect to the effects of the abnormality. This imputability, however, cannot be neglected.

Even in practice — e.g., in direction — although one must proceed gently, this imputability is not to be too much diminished by excuses...

With regard to care, after examining the condition of those suffering from abnormalities, the role of the priest, the physician, friends and family, and the collaboration of all of them must be determined. With regard to this collaboration, care must be taken lest the trust of the sick person in one of the named persons harm the trust which the infirm ought to have especially toward the priest and the physician. On the contrary, it is to be desired that, e.g., friends in whom the sick person confides should work, insofar as it can be done, so that trust in the physician and the priest always increases.

Care must also be taken that there be no contrary « remedies » (counsels, suggestions, etc.), so that their action would mutually weaken one another or in practice have no efficacy. Therefore, by questioning the physician or the family or prudently the sick person himself, the priest should learn, insofar as it is possible, what the physician has thought and decided. Also, friends and family may have suitable indications. Thus all, in a positive and optimal manner, can work together for healing⁴. ».

100. The third cause is hypnotic sleep. This a) in the perfect or deep state greatly diminishes the exercise of liberty, indeed, so long as it lasts, almost removes it, unless perhaps as regards matters to which the person is wholly opposed; — b) in the imperfect state of lighter sleep, liberty is diminished; — c) as regards suggestions, however, to be fulfilled afterward in the waking state, the matter is debated: for the Nancy school contends that the hypnotized person, even in this case, cannot morally resist the suggestion, while the Paris school asserts that liberty is not entirely removed but only diminished.

In practice, therefore, the hypnotized person must be diligently and cautiously questioned, so that, from his own testimony, it may be discerned whether and to what extent he was in some degree free in performing the action. Nevertheless, actions perpetrated in hypnosis can be free in their cause, when he freely abdicated his will and consented to the hypnotic sleep, foreseeing that such actions would be suggested, or exposing himself to this danger.