Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. I-II, q. 10 et 13.

84. The free is that which is immune from a bond. But the bond is twofold:

1° an external bond, i.e., an extrinsic cause acting and determining, from which every voluntary act is immune, which therefore is called free from coercion and violence, or from extrinsic force compelling the act against the inclination of the will. Freedom from coercion, or of execution (spontaneity), thus is inseparable from the human will, because this cannot be compelled even by God; for no one can will unwillingly, since no one can will while not willing. It is freedom of acting rather than of willing.

2° an internal bond or intrinsic necessity and natural determination of the power to one thing; hence what is properly called free, as opposed to natural necessity, is that which proceeds from the choice of the will not naturally determined, or that to which the will determines itself through deliberation. Whence it is called free choice "which is the cause of itself," i.e., of its own motion, namely through its own judgment and its own determination (Q. D. de Ver. 24, a. 1; C. G. I, 72 et 88); and freedom properly so called, as opposed to necessity, is called of indifference (to opposites), of choice, and of exercise. It is true freedom of willing.

In human acts however, the voluntary is always free, and therefore these terms are often used interchangeably by moralists.

85. Liberty is an abstract quality which belongs to the will insofar as it is equipped with free choice; free choice, however, is a rational power (choice) with respect to opposites (free), as St. Thomas says in Q. D. de Ver. 24, a. 3; which is defined by him (I, q. 83, a. 4; and q. 62, a. 8, ad 3): The elective power of means with the order of the end preserved, i.e., the active faculty of acting at will, not acting, or doing something else. It is called: 1) power, i.e., a potency or active faculty, not, however, an act, because free choice is in man natural and permanent while he does not act.

2) Elective: It consists in taking one thing while the other is rejected. But election is an act of the will: namely, to desire something (that is, to will one thing over another) in order to attain something else; although it presupposes choice or practical judgment, and therefore counsel or deliberation of the intellect, by which the motives for acting are comparatively weighed (according to the different character of good and expedient, or of evil and inexpedient) and it is judged what ought to be preferred to the other.

Liberty, therefore, formally is in the will, which from the judgment of the intellect freely determines itself to this or that, while it can will or choose something else; radically and presuppositively in the intellect, which proposes objects with a certain indifference. For it is in the will as in its subject, because the adequate object of the will, by which its capacity is fulfilled, is not any particular good but universal good; hence it does not efficaciously and necessarily will whatever things are proposed to it as particular, participated, and qualified goods. Therefore, that from which liberty immediately arises is the excellence of the will above particular goods and its breadth and capacity for all goods: hence particular goods cannot satiate its capacity nor equal its breadth.

It is moreover originative from reason directing and regulating as from a cause: for from this the will can be freely borne to diverse things because reason can have diverse conceptions of the good (I-II, q. 17, a. 1, ad 2). For in various particular objects it sees advantage and defect at once; whence it can propose these as appetible and eligible under one respect, and as odious and avoidable under another respect. And therefore the will can choose them inasmuch as they are good, but it can also not choose them inasmuch as they have the character of inconvenience or defect. For the will is essentially a rational appetite, and therefore it is borne not freely but necessarily toward the object that is proposed by the intellect as simply good without defect (I, q. 82, a. 1 et 2; I-II, q. 13, a. 6).

3) of the means: Choice in things operable relates as the conclusion does in things speculative, and the end as the principle; therefore the end as end is not chosen because it relates as a principle in things operable, but only the means are chosen, just as the conclusion is not of the principles but of what follows from them. But if sometimes the end is chosen, then it is considered as a means to the ultimate end; but the ultimate end as such, or the complete good as such, is not chosen because it cannot be ordered to something else.

4. With the order of the end preserved: For means are for the sake of the end; hence if freedom turns aside from the end, a defect is present, which is not of the essence and perfection of free choice, just as a conclusion that falls short of its principles.

86. Division of freedom. — By reason of the object freedom:

1. one kind is of contradiction or of exercise (concerning the very act of the will) by which we can choose between two contradictories, namely to will to love and to will not to love, to will to act and to will not to act, to will to will and to will not to will, etc.;
2. another kind is of specification (concerning the objects of the act of the will) by which we can choose between two acts differing in species or between two diverse goods, e.g., to will to stand or to sit, to walk or to study, faith or hope, to do this or that;
3. another kind is of contrariety or moral^1 (concerning the order of the end) by which we can choose between two contrary acts with respect to the end, e.g., to love and to hate, to will good and evil. This is not a new species of freedom but the very freedom of specification in choosing between contraries (cf. St. Thomas, Q. D. de Ver. 22, a. 6; in Ioh. VIII, 34). The first pertains to the essence of freedom, without which it cannot exist; the second pertains to its perfection; the third is a defect proper to the state of the wayfarer, whence it is called an imperfection and a sign of freedom, just as sickness is a sign of life. For the way of means to the end is the more perfect the more securely it attains the end.

87. Thesis. Man is of free will, even in the present state of fallen nature. — It is of faith from the Council of Trent, session 6, ch. 1 and canons 4, 5, and 6; and from the Vatican Council, session 3, ch. 3, canon 5 (cf. the condemned propositions of Baius 39, 66, 67; of Jansenius the 3rd; and the 1st condemned by Alexander VIII). 1st Part is proved: The will is a power by which man can desire every good. If, therefore, a particular good is shown to him, he can desire it because it is good, and not desire it because a defect is joined with it, or because it is not the complete good nor perfectly satisfying. Cf. St. Thomas I, q. 82, a. 2; q. 83, a. 1; I-II, q. 10, a. 2; q. 13, a. 6; Q. D. de Malo VI, a. 1. 2nd Part is proved: 1° from the Scriptures in which the faculty of choosing is asserted formally and directly (Eccli. XV, 14;

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XXXI, 10; Gen. IV, 7; Deut. XXX, 15, 19; I Cor. VII, 36-37), and also virtually and indirectly, namely by precepts and counsels, exhortations, probations, rewards and punishments;

2° from the testimony of conscience and the common sense of men;

3. By the perpetual tradition of the Church: a) It is set forth by the apostolic Fathers, especially by the Apologists. Cf. Justin, Apol. I, 43; Dial. 102; Tatian, Adv. Graec. or. 7; Theophilus of Antioch, Ad Autol. II, 27; Irenaeus, Adv. haer. IV, 37. b) It is defended and vindicated among the Fathers: Against the Gnostics: thus Tertullian, De anima; Methodius, De lib. arb.; Origen, De Princ.; Ephraem, etc. Against the Manichaeans: thus Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine². Against the Praedestinatians of the 8th-9th century: thus Adrian I, ep. Instit. universal., the Council of Quierzy, the Council of Valence. Cf. Leo IX, symb. fidei. c) In the Middle Ages the Scholastics also prove liberty by philosophical arguments. d) Afterwards Luther, Baius, and Jansenius were condemned, denying the liberty of fallen man.

4° by reason: Fallen man does not cease to be of an intellectual nature. But free choice inseparably follows an intellectual nature.

88. Observation. — The will a) as regards specification is naturally and necessarily moved by some object, as St. Thomas says, q. 10, a. 1: Things that do not belong to something per se but can belong and not belong are reduced to something that belongs per se and necessarily, as to a first principle; otherwise one would proceed to infinity. And therefore it is necessary that the principle in those things that pertain to a thing always be natural. Hence the principle of the will's movements must be something naturally willed. This, however, is

1. good in common or indeterminate universal good (whatever good, so that it is nothing but good), toward which the will naturally tends as any power tends toward its object;
2. the ultimate end itself or beatitude in the abstract, as our highest and complete good, because it is the first principle in things to be done;
3. those things that are necessary for the one willing according to his nature, such as to be and to live and to know the true, insofar as they are thus considered in themselves and by reason of themselves as fitting to nature (on the part of the object), because thus they appear only as good; accidentally, however, and by reason of circumstances, they can appear as evil, and then they are not naturally desired (e.g., in suicide).

b) As regards the exercise, at least in the present state, it is not moved necessarily by any object, nor by a good or by happiness in general, because man can always not think of that object and thus not actually will it (a. 2). It is not so in the state of the end, in which the intellect is always in act and necessarily understands God to be its happiness (I, q. 82, a. 2).

From this it is understood: 1) the will necessarily wills that which is thought by the intellect as good absolutely and in every respect; 2) if something evidently appears so necessarily connected with the end and beatitude that without it the end cannot be had, then the will cannot not will it; 3) because, however, all particular goods, even those in which the ultimate end is constituted, do not necessarily and always appear as good and necessary in every part, but can appear as connected with evils (e.g., on account of difficulties), therefore they are freely desired as to specification, and because man can not consider them, they are freely desired as to exercise.