Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. I-II, q. 6, a. 6.

71. Fear or dread is a passion of the sensitive appetitive power, the irascible, by which we flee from a future sensible evil that is difficult to avoid. It is taken here for every movement by which we flee from an evil, whether it be a movement of passion or of will; and it is customarily defined: A trembling of the mind (i.e., disquiet and disturbance) from the cause of an impending or future evil or danger. It differs from coercion, because this physically acts upon a man's powers, and is from an extrinsic principle; but the cause which provokes fear is a moral cause which influences by way of a known object, namely, by proposing danger, whence fear is from an intrinsic principle with cognition.

72. Fear is divided: 1° By reason of cause it is either taken up if it arises from a natural cause, whether intrinsic like disease, weakness of mind, or extrinsic like shipwreck, fire, encounter with wild beasts; — or struck in if from a free external cause, God, devil, man: this latter by reason of manner is just when the one striking has the right to cause fear and causes it in a lawful manner, e.g. a father, a judge with due punishments; or unjust when he does not have the right to cause fear or causes it in an unlawful manner, whether it is done to extort something e.g. a contract or a vow, or for another end e.g. for the sake of revenge.

2° By reason of intensity, fear is grave when the evil that is feared is great and certainly or probably imminent; — and light when a light evil is feared, or a grave one but not probably imminent.

Prior is absolutely grave, when the evil, considered in itself, is great from its very nature, e.g., death, serious injury or mutilation, harsh imprisonment, exile, rape, notable disgrace, loss of status or of a great part of one’s goods: this usually falls upon a steadfast man and a person of brave spirit; — or relatively grave, when the evil is grave only with respect to the fearing person, considering his age, sex, condition, temperament, etc.: this does not fall upon a steadfast man, but upon a faint-hearted one who easily fears; thus a timid person, a child, a woman, an old man greatly fear what a man does not dread.

Reverential fear toward superiors, e.g., of children toward parents, of a wife toward her husband, of a ward toward his guardian, of a religious toward his prelate, of a cleric toward his bishop, is by itself regarded and generally is light, unless grave threats, beatings, or most urgent entreaties are added, because then it can be reckoned a harsh and grave vexation or a lasting indignation is to be feared.

3° By reason of its operation, fear is antecedent or impelling, when someone acts from fear, when it is the motive of acting, e.g., if a traveler gives money to a robber from fear of death; — and concomitant or repelling or retracting, when someone acts not from but with fear, when it is not the motive of the deed, although it accompanies it, nay rather it would be the motive for not acting, e.g., if a robber steals with fear of prison, or a merchant with fear boards the high sea.

73. Principles. I. What is done from fear is perfectly voluntary and free: for then there is present a strong and deliberate will which overcomes and conquers the fear.

II. What is done out of fear is, as a rule, a mixture of the voluntary and the involuntary, because it comes partly from inclination and partly against the inclination of the will: it is voluntary simply speaking, because the will, all things considered, wills and chooses it; but it is involuntary in a qualified sense, because it wills and chooses it with some reluctance, for it would not will that thing considered in itself and setting aside certain circumstances.

It is evident from the example of a merchant who, from fear of shipwreck, throws his goods into the sea. In which case four things concur: 1° love of the lesser good, namely, the goods; 2° love of the greater good, namely, of life, whose loss is feared; 3° effective consent to the lack of the lesser good (the goods) in order to preserve the greater (namely, life); 4° nonetheless, ineffective love persists toward the lesser good, from which arises an ineffective displeasure at its lack. Now the consent is conformed to the second inclination and therefore is simply voluntary, but it is against the first, which persists in some measure, and according to this it is in some measure involuntary; whence it is mixed from the voluntary and the involuntary.

We have said: regularly, because a) sometimes it is not involuntary in a qualified sense, if fear also excludes the affection for the lesser opposed good, and then what is done from fear becomes purely voluntary, not mixed with the involuntary. For other reasons besides the fear of avoiding evil can arise on account of which the action becomes lovable in itself, and the very fear can be a motive which demands that the ineffective affection for the opposite be excluded. As is clear regarding the sinner who grieves over sins out of fear of hell, but nevertheless does not retain an affection for the sins (Council of Trent, sess. 14, ch. 4), and similarly a nobleman fleeing theft out of fear of infamy does not necessarily say: if there were no infamy, I would steal; — b) by accident it is not voluntary simply, if the fear is so vehement and so disturbs the reason that it entirely removes its deliberation and use, and then it takes away the voluntary properly so called and the free.

74. Corollaries. — From the aforesaid it is easily understood: 1° Fear of itself and regularly does not excuse from the whole sin, because it leaves the voluntary simply, which suffices for sin; yet it diminishes insofar as the act is involuntary in a certain respect and therefore less voluntary and free (fear excuses from so much but not from the whole, cf. can. 2205, § 3), yet it does not so diminish as to make a mortal sin venial, because generally it leaves sufficient deliberation for a mortal sin.

2° Fear accidentally excuses from mortal sin if it removes perfect deliberation, indeed from all sin, if it removes all deliberation. 3° Grave fear, because it does not remove free voluntariness, per se does not by the nature of things invalidate human acts (can. 103, § 2), unless perhaps sometimes for those which by their nature require more perfect freedom (vow, gratuitous donation, marriage).

75. Observations. — 1st Light fear in the external forum is never considered a sufficiently causative reason for an action. 2nd Grave fear never excuses from an intrinsically evil work which is prohibited by natural law as evil in itself; often it excuses from the observance of positive law, or from those things which are only evil because prohibited (can. 2205, § 2 and 3).