Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

St. Thomas, First Part of the Second Part, Question 6, Articles 4 and 5.

68. Violence, which is called coercion when exercised upon a being that has knowledge, is properly motion that proceeds from an extrinsic principle, with the patient resisting, i.e., with the one suffering force opposing it. It is said: 1° from an extrinsic principle, and thus the violent differs from the natural and the voluntary, which are from an intrinsic principle: for nothing properly inflicts violence on itself, otherwise it would at the same time tend and not tend toward the same thing; 2° with the patient resisting, i.e., while the patient repels with every effort: for if something is naturally or voluntarily disposed, or is not indisposed but indifferent, to suffering what comes from an extrinsic principle, the passion will be natural or voluntary or permitted, not violent. Hence there is distinguished a) violence strictly so called, or absolute and perfect, when the patient resists as much as it can, e.g., death inflicted on one who defends his life; and b) violence broadly so called, imperfect and in a certain respect, when it resists but not as much as it can, e.g., death inflicted on a martyr. It differs a) from the necessary, to which it adds that it is from an extrinsic principle, while the necessary can also be from an intrinsic principle; b) from the involuntary, because the latter can be from an intrinsic principle, from knowledge of evil or from lack of knowledge of the end. Indeed, everything violent is necessary, and, if it concerns a knowing being, involuntary; but not conversely; c) from what is called moral violence: with properly so called physical violence (which by St. Thomas, II Sent. d. 25, q. 1, a. 2, is called sufficient and compelling) is not to be confused that which is improperly so called, namely moral (called insufficient and impelling), which is inflicted by threatening and rebuking, and which coincides with grave fear impressed, especially when something would not be hindered by resisting but would then be brought about by external force, e.g., the departure from a house made by someone who otherwise would be expelled by military force.

69. Can violence be inflicted on the will? — The act of the will is twofold: one is elicited immediately by it, elicited, namely, to will; the other is commanded by it,commanded, exercised through another power, e.g., voluntarily thinking, walking, speaking. As to the former, violence cannot be inflicted on the will: for an elicited act is the very inclination of the will toward something, proceeding from an intrinsic knowing principle; but a violent act proceeds from an extrinsic principle; therefore it is impossible for an act of the will to be violent. And indeed, the violent is against the inclination of the thing suffering it; but an elicited act of the will, since it is the inclination of the will itself, cannot be against its own inclination; whence Anselm says, On Free Will, ch. 6: "No one can will something unwillingly, because one cannot will while not willing to will." — As to commanded acts, however, it can suffer violence, insofar as by violence our external or internal powers are moved against the command of the will, or are hindered from executing it, e.g., the foot so that it does not take a step, the eye, by closing it, so that it does not see, etc. Hence:

a) No one can compel the will itself, not even God. b) God alone, as the cause both of the will and of the act itself, can change it, i.e., transfer it from one thing to another and make of the unwilling one willing, of one willing this one willing that; yet then He does not do violence, nor does He compel the will against its inclination, but He causes one inclination of the will to be succeeded by another. c) God, angels, and the devil, against the will, can move the intellect, imagination, and sensitive appetite toward some object; in which case that motion with respect to these faculties is not violent, but with respect to the will. d) All these, and men too, can move the external members and external senses against the will.

70. Principles. The violent is directly opposed to the voluntary, and accordingly makes something involuntary: for the violent (when it is inflicted upon a knowing being) is from an extrinsic principle against the inclination of the willing subject; but the voluntary is from the intrinsic, i.e., from the will's own inclination (cf. can. 2205, § I).

« It is common to the voluntary and the natural, says St. Thomas, a. 5, that both are from an intrinsic principle (i.e., from the agent's own inclination); but the violent is from an extrinsic principle (against the inclination of the subject). And for this reason, just as in things that lack cognition, violence makes something be against nature (unnatural), so in knowing things it makes something be against the will... which is called involuntary ».

Hence, that which is made from an extrinsic principle:

1) If the subject resists externally and internally as much as it can, it is absolutely violent and entirely involuntary, 2) If it resists externally but consents internally, it is neither voluntary nor involuntary but willed; 3) If it neither consents nor resists, or does not resist as much as it can, but conducts itself passively, while it ought not to resist or resist more, it is not voluntary but permitted; 4) If it does not consent, but also does not resist as much as it ought, it is indirectly voluntary (n. 60, II); 5) If it does not resist as much as it can but consents, it is violent in a certain respect but simply voluntary, yet the less so the greater the violence was or the more it resisted: for the voluntary is "in one way according to action when someone wills to do something, in another way according to passion when someone wills to suffer from another; hence when an action is inflicted by some external agent, while the will of suffering remains in the one who suffers, it is not simply violent because, although the one who suffers does not contribute by acting, he nevertheless contributes by willing to suffer; hence it cannot be called involuntary" (a. 5, ad 2).

A girl, overpowered by force, if she resists as much as she is able, is overpowered involuntarily; if she does not resist as much as she ought, or if she consents, she is overpowered voluntarily and culpably; if she does not resist as much as she is able but as much as she ought, she is overpowered not involuntarily but permissively. Setting aside the danger of consent, she is not bound to resist useless means, or extraordinary ones (the killing of the aggressor), or even crying out, if there is a danger of notable harm, e.g., death, excessive shame: in these cases the overpowering is not voluntary. But if she consents internally, [while] resisting externally as much as she ought, the external overpowering is not on that account truly voluntary, but merely willed.