Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

65. The involuntary is that which does not proceed from knowledge of the end, or, if knowledge of the end be present, nevertheless not from an intrinsic principle, that is: that which does not proceed from an intrinsic principle, or at least not with knowledge of the end. When knowledge of the end alone is lacking, in one who is capable of knowledge and of the voluntary, the involuntary is negative or non-voluntary, and it is that which the agent does not know and hence neither pursues nor shuns: thus a dishonest motion before the advertence of reason is properly non-voluntary; but when the inclination from an intrinsic principle is lacking, the involuntary can be positive or contrary and properly so-called, and it is that which the agent shuns by a positive act, and which is against his inclination: thus a shameful thought had unwillingly is properly involuntary.

66. The involuntary is distinguished as simply involuntary, which the agent in no way causes nor desires but rather shuns and strives to impede absolutely and efficaciously; — and the involuntary in a certain respect, which the agent would not will but which would displease him, considering certain circumstances, yet with all things weighed he wills it and it pleases him; in other words: what he shuns with a conditional will, he nonetheless embraces with an absolute and efficacious will, so that the involuntary in a certain respect is voluntary simply. This is not pure voluntary, but mixed with the involuntary. Thus the throwing of goods into the sea, by reason of the storm, is voluntary, but in a certain respect it is involuntary, for were the danger absent, the throwing would not occur¹.

67. Impediments to the voluntary. — The following impede the voluntary and thus the human act: 1° all those things by which a man is not master of himself, such as defect of reason, mental alienation, sleep, drunkenness, the state of somnambulism or perfect hypnotism, diabolical obsession, etc., from which, however, some things can be voluntary in their cause; 2° in a man who is master of himself there are four principal proximate causes (to which others are reduced) which impede the voluntary, i.e., take away or diminish it: violence and fear, which impede the inclination of the will; concupiscence and ignorance, which impede intellectual cognition, i.e., take it away or diminish it. Whence they are called enemies of the voluntary.

St. Thomas, First Part of the Second Part, Question 6, Articles 4 and 5.

68. Violence, which is called coercion when exercised upon a being that has knowledge, is properly motion that proceeds from an extrinsic principle, with the patient resisting, i.e., with the one suffering force opposing it. It is said: 1° from an extrinsic principle, and thus the violent differs from the natural and the voluntary, which are from an intrinsic principle: for nothing properly inflicts violence on itself, otherwise it would at the same time tend and not tend toward the same thing; 2° with the patient resisting, i.e., while the patient repels with every effort: for if something is naturally or voluntarily disposed, or is not indisposed but indifferent, to suffering what comes from an extrinsic principle, the passion will be natural or voluntary or permitted, not violent. Hence there is distinguished a) violence strictly so called, or absolute and perfect, when the patient resists as much as it can, e.g., death inflicted on one who defends his life; and b) violence broadly so called, imperfect and in a certain respect, when it resists but not as much as it can, e.g., death inflicted on a martyr. It differs a) from the necessary, to which it adds that it is from an extrinsic principle, while the necessary can also be from an intrinsic principle; b) from the involuntary, because the latter can be from an intrinsic principle, from knowledge of evil or from lack of knowledge of the end. Indeed, everything violent is necessary, and, if it concerns a knowing being, involuntary; but not conversely; c) from what is called moral violence: with properly so called physical violence (which by St. Thomas, II Sent. d. 25, q. 1, a. 2, is called sufficient and compelling) is not to be confused that which is improperly so called, namely moral (called insufficient and impelling), which is inflicted by threatening and rebuking, and which coincides with grave fear impressed, especially when something would not be hindered by resisting but would then be brought about by external force, e.g., the departure from a house made by someone who otherwise would be expelled by military force.

69. Can violence be inflicted on the will? — The act of the will is twofold: one is elicited immediately by it, elicited, namely, to will; the other is commanded by it,commanded, exercised through another power, e.g., voluntarily thinking, walking, speaking. As to the former, violence cannot be inflicted on the will: for an elicited act is the very inclination of the will toward something, proceeding from an intrinsic knowing principle; but a violent act proceeds from an extrinsic principle; therefore it is impossible for an act of the will to be violent. And indeed, the violent is against the inclination of the thing suffering it; but an elicited act of the will, since it is the inclination of the will itself, cannot be against its own inclination; whence Anselm says, On Free Will, ch. 6: "No one can will something unwillingly, because one cannot will while not willing to will." — As to commanded acts, however, it can suffer violence, insofar as by violence our external or internal powers are moved against the command of the will, or are hindered from executing it, e.g., the foot so that it does not take a step, the eye, by closing it, so that it does not see, etc. Hence:

a) No one can compel the will itself, not even God. b) God alone, as the cause both of the will and of the act itself, can change it, i.e., transfer it from one thing to another and make of the unwilling one willing, of one willing this one willing that; yet then He does not do violence, nor does He compel the will against its inclination, but He causes one inclination of the will to be succeeded by another. c) God, angels, and the devil, against the will, can move the intellect, imagination, and sensitive appetite toward some object; in which case that motion with respect to these faculties is not violent, but with respect to the will. d) All these, and men too, can move the external members and external senses against the will.

70. Principles. The violent is directly opposed to the voluntary, and accordingly makes something involuntary: for the violent (when it is inflicted upon a knowing being) is from an extrinsic principle against the inclination of the willing subject; but the voluntary is from the intrinsic, i.e., from the will's own inclination (cf. can. 2205, § I).

« It is common to the voluntary and the natural, says St. Thomas, a. 5, that both are from an intrinsic principle (i.e., from the agent's own inclination); but the violent is from an extrinsic principle (against the inclination of the subject). And for this reason, just as in things that lack cognition, violence makes something be against nature (unnatural), so in knowing things it makes something be against the will... which is called involuntary ».

Hence, that which is made from an extrinsic principle:

1) If the subject resists externally and internally as much as it can, it is absolutely violent and entirely involuntary, 2) If it resists externally but consents internally, it is neither voluntary nor involuntary but willed; 3) If it neither consents nor resists, or does not resist as much as it can, but conducts itself passively, while it ought not to resist or resist more, it is not voluntary but permitted; 4) If it does not consent, but also does not resist as much as it ought, it is indirectly voluntary (n. 60, II); 5) If it does not resist as much as it can but consents, it is violent in a certain respect but simply voluntary, yet the less so the greater the violence was or the more it resisted: for the voluntary is "in one way according to action when someone wills to do something, in another way according to passion when someone wills to suffer from another; hence when an action is inflicted by some external agent, while the will of suffering remains in the one who suffers, it is not simply violent because, although the one who suffers does not contribute by acting, he nevertheless contributes by willing to suffer; hence it cannot be called involuntary" (a. 5, ad 2).

A girl, overpowered by force, if she resists as much as she is able, is overpowered involuntarily; if she does not resist as much as she ought, or if she consents, she is overpowered voluntarily and culpably; if she does not resist as much as she is able but as much as she ought, she is overpowered not involuntarily but permissively. Setting aside the danger of consent, she is not bound to resist useless means, or extraordinary ones (the killing of the aggressor), or even crying out, if there is a danger of notable harm, e.g., death, excessive shame: in these cases the overpowering is not voluntary. But if she consents internally, [while] resisting externally as much as she ought, the external overpowering is not on that account truly voluntary, but merely willed.

S. Th. I-II, q. 6, a. 6.

71. Fear or dread is a passion of the sensitive appetitive power, the irascible, by which we flee from a future sensible evil that is difficult to avoid. It is taken here for every movement by which we flee from an evil, whether it be a movement of passion or of will; and it is customarily defined: A trembling of the mind (i.e., disquiet and disturbance) from the cause of an impending or future evil or danger. It differs from coercion, because this physically acts upon a man's powers, and is from an extrinsic principle; but the cause which provokes fear is a moral cause which influences by way of a known object, namely, by proposing danger, whence fear is from an intrinsic principle with cognition.

72. Fear is divided: 1° By reason of cause it is either taken up if it arises from a natural cause, whether intrinsic like disease, weakness of mind, or extrinsic like shipwreck, fire, encounter with wild beasts; — or struck in if from a free external cause, God, devil, man: this latter by reason of manner is just when the one striking has the right to cause fear and causes it in a lawful manner, e.g. a father, a judge with due punishments; or unjust when he does not have the right to cause fear or causes it in an unlawful manner, whether it is done to extort something e.g. a contract or a vow, or for another end e.g. for the sake of revenge.

2° By reason of intensity, fear is grave when the evil that is feared is great and certainly or probably imminent; — and light when a light evil is feared, or a grave one but not probably imminent.

Prior is absolutely grave, when the evil, considered in itself, is great from its very nature, e.g., death, serious injury or mutilation, harsh imprisonment, exile, rape, notable disgrace, loss of status or of a great part of one’s goods: this usually falls upon a steadfast man and a person of brave spirit; — or relatively grave, when the evil is grave only with respect to the fearing person, considering his age, sex, condition, temperament, etc.: this does not fall upon a steadfast man, but upon a faint-hearted one who easily fears; thus a timid person, a child, a woman, an old man greatly fear what a man does not dread.

Reverential fear toward superiors, e.g., of children toward parents, of a wife toward her husband, of a ward toward his guardian, of a religious toward his prelate, of a cleric toward his bishop, is by itself regarded and generally is light, unless grave threats, beatings, or most urgent entreaties are added, because then it can be reckoned a harsh and grave vexation or a lasting indignation is to be feared.

3° By reason of its operation, fear is antecedent or impelling, when someone acts from fear, when it is the motive of acting, e.g., if a traveler gives money to a robber from fear of death; — and concomitant or repelling or retracting, when someone acts not from but with fear, when it is not the motive of the deed, although it accompanies it, nay rather it would be the motive for not acting, e.g., if a robber steals with fear of prison, or a merchant with fear boards the high sea.

73. Principles. I. What is done from fear is perfectly voluntary and free: for then there is present a strong and deliberate will which overcomes and conquers the fear.

II. What is done out of fear is, as a rule, a mixture of the voluntary and the involuntary, because it comes partly from inclination and partly against the inclination of the will: it is voluntary simply speaking, because the will, all things considered, wills and chooses it; but it is involuntary in a qualified sense, because it wills and chooses it with some reluctance, for it would not will that thing considered in itself and setting aside certain circumstances.

It is evident from the example of a merchant who, from fear of shipwreck, throws his goods into the sea. In which case four things concur: 1° love of the lesser good, namely, the goods; 2° love of the greater good, namely, of life, whose loss is feared; 3° effective consent to the lack of the lesser good (the goods) in order to preserve the greater (namely, life); 4° nonetheless, ineffective love persists toward the lesser good, from which arises an ineffective displeasure at its lack. Now the consent is conformed to the second inclination and therefore is simply voluntary, but it is against the first, which persists in some measure, and according to this it is in some measure involuntary; whence it is mixed from the voluntary and the involuntary.

We have said: regularly, because a) sometimes it is not involuntary in a qualified sense, if fear also excludes the affection for the lesser opposed good, and then what is done from fear becomes purely voluntary, not mixed with the involuntary. For other reasons besides the fear of avoiding evil can arise on account of which the action becomes lovable in itself, and the very fear can be a motive which demands that the ineffective affection for the opposite be excluded. As is clear regarding the sinner who grieves over sins out of fear of hell, but nevertheless does not retain an affection for the sins (Council of Trent, sess. 14, ch. 4), and similarly a nobleman fleeing theft out of fear of infamy does not necessarily say: if there were no infamy, I would steal; — b) by accident it is not voluntary simply, if the fear is so vehement and so disturbs the reason that it entirely removes its deliberation and use, and then it takes away the voluntary properly so called and the free.

74. Corollaries. — From the aforesaid it is easily understood: 1° Fear of itself and regularly does not excuse from the whole sin, because it leaves the voluntary simply, which suffices for sin; yet it diminishes insofar as the act is involuntary in a certain respect and therefore less voluntary and free (fear excuses from so much but not from the whole, cf. can. 2205, § 3), yet it does not so diminish as to make a mortal sin venial, because generally it leaves sufficient deliberation for a mortal sin.

2° Fear accidentally excuses from mortal sin if it removes perfect deliberation, indeed from all sin, if it removes all deliberation. 3° Grave fear, because it does not remove free voluntariness, per se does not by the nature of things invalidate human acts (can. 103, § 2), unless perhaps sometimes for those which by their nature require more perfect freedom (vow, gratuitous donation, marriage).

75. Observations. — 1st Light fear in the external forum is never considered a sufficiently causative reason for an action. 2nd Grave fear never excuses from an intrinsically evil work which is prohibited by natural law as evil in itself; often it excuses from the observance of positive law, or from those things which are only evil because prohibited (can. 2205, § 2 and 3).

S. Th. I-II, q. 6, a. 7; q. 73, a. 6; q. 77, a. 5 et 7; q. 78, a. 2 et 4

76. Concupiscence: 1° in the broadest sense it is either a) habitual disorder, i.e., the privation of rightness left by original sin in the sensitive appetite, especially when it tends toward a sensible good, and consequently in reason and will; or b) any passion or movement of the appetite that is disordered, preceding deliberation, especially when it tends toward evil or rises against reason (the first-first movement); 2° in the strictest sense it is a special passion whereby the concupiscible appetite tends toward an absent, delightful sensible good, and is opposed to fear, which is the movement of the appetite fleeing evil; 3° in a less strict sense, here it is taken not indeed for every passion, but for any affection or movement of the sensitive appetite or will tending toward a delightful good to pursue it¹.

In terms of the act of deliberate will, concupiscence is antecedent, which (in the order of causality) precedes the free consent of the will and causes it: then something is done from concupiscence, as when, upon seeing a beautiful woman, lust draws the will to take delight in her;— and consequent, which (in the order of causality) follows the free consent of the will and proceeds from it, as if, willing to sin with a woman, one excites concupiscence to perpetrate the sin: then something is done with concupiscence. It is evident that consequent concupiscence, since it follows upon the voluntary, in no way impedes it nor causes the involuntary, but is only a sign and effect of the voluntary. The question, therefore, concerns only antecedent concupiscence, namely how it stands with respect to the voluntary and the involuntary.

77. Principle I. Antecedent concupiscence causes the voluntary rather than the involuntary. — For something is called voluntary from the fact that the will is borne toward it. But through concupiscence the will is inclined to will that which it desires. Therefore concupiscence does more to make something voluntary than involuntary.

Therefore, to distinguish it from fear, concupiscence of itself never renders an act involuntary, either simply or in a qualified sense, because in one who acts from fear there remains a prior contrary will regarding what he does, but in one who acts from concupiscence there does not remain a prior will that repudiated what he desires, and therefore the one desiring acts against what he willed, while the one fearing acts against what he even now wills in itself. Concupiscence, however, does render an act involuntary accidentally when some evil is joined to the object that is desired, e.g., when a lustful man is at the same time avaricious and wills fornication, for the sake of procuring which he must pay out money.

78. Principle II. Antecedent concupiscence increases the voluntary, diminishes the free voluntary; whence what is done from concupiscence is more voluntary, less free². — For such concupiscence: 1° Always increases the voluntary improperly so called, because it itself, as an indeliberate movement of appetite, is in this way voluntary by its very nature.

2° Generally it increases the voluntary act properly so called as to the inclination or propensity, because our will is borne more toward the object we covet when the intellect proposes it as more covetable and to be pursued with greater efficacy; — yet it diminishes it as to the indifference of judgment and consequently as to deliberation. For it causes the intellect to perceive less the aspect of evil in the object and to propose it as more lovable; whence it also diminishes the free act, and consequently the goodness of the act and the sin.

3° Sometimes, if it is very vehement, it removes knowledge and deliberation and the use of reason, and hence the voluntary properly so called and the free; yet it does not make it involuntary: for in one who does not use reason, neither is it voluntary properly nor involuntary.

79. Observation.—Consequent concupiscence in no way diminishes the voluntary act properly so called, nor the free act, nor consequently goodness or sin, because it is itself an effect of the free will. Hence what is done with concupiscence is neither less voluntary nor less free. It can, however, diminish deliberation and freedom with respect to the act following from it; but with respect to that act, it is antecedent.

S. Th. I-II, q. 6, a. 8; q. 19, a. 6; q. 76.

80. Ignorance properly is a lack of knowledge in a subject capable of it, e.g., astronomy in a priest. It differs 1° from nescience, which is a simple negation of knowledge in an incapable subject, e.g., in a child or a madman;

antecedent concupiscence simply diminishes the voluntary, and not only under the aspect of freedom. Yet they do not speak correctly in this way. Hence Schmitt, in the more recent editions of Noldin’s work, I, n. 53, corrected this somewhat, writing: antecedent concupiscence diminishes freedom. And Salsmans, in the most recent edition of Génicot’s work, changed one word, and in place of concupiscence put passion; but for that reason the doctrine is neither more adequate nor less ambiguous.

2° from error, which is not a mere lack but a positive act of the intellect judging a thing to be otherwise than it is: it arises from ignorance or rashness; 3° from inadvertence, which is a lack not indeed of habitual knowledge but of actual consideration; 4° from forgetfulness, which is the privation of knowledge previously had. Since moralists deal only with duties owed and with sins not owed, they often more strictly take ignorance, not indeed as negation, but as privation of knowledge which ought to be in someone, such as theology for a confessor. Hence some distinguish ignorance negative, and privative, nay even positive or of false disposition, if it includes error.

81. Ignorance is divided: 1) By reason of the object that is ignored, there is ignorance of law, whether natural or positive, whether divine or human, whether of the law itself or of the penalty attached to it: by which, namely, the existence or extension or meaning of the law itself is ignored;— and ignorance of fact: by which a fact or a concrete circumstance of the fact determining the present application of the law is ignored.

Thus, one who does not know that fasting is to be observed on the vigil of Pentecost, or that heretical books are forbidden, is in ignorance of the law; one who does not notice that this day is the vigil of Pentecost, or that this book is heretical, is in ignorance of fact.

2. By reason of the subject, or the person who is ignorant, ignorance is invincible or vincible. Invincible, or involuntary, is that which could not be removed by moral diligence; — vincible, truly, or voluntary, is that which could be so removed.

Moral diligence, however, is that which prudent persons are accustomed to employ, and which varies according to the various circumstances or the quality of the business, person, place, etc., e.g., it will be greater in a priest for duly carrying out his office than in a rustic, greater where the goods of life are at stake than those of fortune, where there is notable harm to a third party than where there is small harm.

Vincible ignorance is blameless if it ought not to be removed;— blameworthy indeed if it ought to be. Moralists, however, attending only to what is owed and not owed, promiscuously use the terms blameworthy and vincible, and often call vincible ignorance that which is blameworthy, and call invincible that which is blameless¹.

Invincibilis can arise from two sources: either because one has not thought at all about the truth to be sought or about the danger of erring (for the first idea is not within a person’s power), or because, if one has thought and applied diligence, one still has not arrived at the truth. Hence it is not voluntary.

On the other hand, vincible ignorance is voluntary either directly and in itself, as when someone wishes to be ignorant; or only indirectly, from negligence, as when one omits to inquire while one ought to inquire; or only in its cause, if one wills something to which ignorance follows (e.g., drunkenness). There are, moreover, many degrees of it, which are commonly reduced to three: a) ignorance strictly or simply vincible when diligence is employed to overcome it but not sufficient or not all that is morally possible, or not all that the quality of the affair and of the person demands: it is indirectly voluntary; b) crass when no or scarcely any diligence was employed to acquire knowledge, and supine if it was so [employed] to drive away ignorance: it is voluntary, either indirectly, or in its cause; c) affected, malicious, or directly willed, when someone expressly and deliberately wishes to be ignorant for whatever end: whether to act at will and not be drawn back from a purpose, or to have an excuse in sins committed or to be committed, or out of weariness, etc., especially if he studiously wishes not to know so that he may not be drawn back from sinning but may sin more freely.

3) By reason of the act of the will, at once in regard to the ignorance and in regard to the deed.², ignorance is:

a) Antecedent [ignorance] which does not follow from the will but precedes its act, and yet is for it the cause of willing and acting what (according to the present disposition) it would not will or do if knowledge were present. Hence ignorance is a cause of the deed because it removes the knowledge which would impede the deed, e.g., if someone, thinking he is killing a wild beast, kills a friend whom he would not have killed had he known: such a one acts from involuntary ignorance. For every antecedent ignorance is invincible, but not conversely, because the invincible is not always a reason for doing what otherwise would not be done.

b) Concomitant [ignorance] which precedes the act of the will and is joined to it, yet not as a cause of willing and doing what is done, because even if it were not present, the deed would nonetheless be done (according to the present disposition), e.g., if someone, thinking he is killing a wild beast, kills an enemy whom he would also have killed had he known: such a person acts with involuntary ignorance. It is also invincible.

c) Consequent is that which in some way follows from an act of the will directly unwilling or indirectly negligent, and it is directly or indirectly voluntary and at the same time precedes the work so that it can be a cause of willing and doing it, e.g., if someone voluntarily neglects to inquire about the danger of killing a man whom, if he knew, he would not kill, or about the day of abstinence when, if he knew abstinence was required, he would abstain: such a one acts from voluntary ignorance. Consequent is vincible, as being voluntary; whether it be vincible at the moment the work is done, or was once vincible, provided the work was foreseen and on account of it the ignorance ought to have been guarded against — otherwise it would be invincible with respect to the work although in itself vincible, and therefore antecedent or concomitant with respect to the work that is done.

82. Principles. 1. Antecedent ignorance removes the voluntary with respect to that which is ignored, because it is invincible; indeed it renders the act positively involuntary simply, because it makes something against the habitual inclination of the will: for the act would not be done if the ignorance were absent. Whence: what is done from antecedent involuntary ignorance is positively and simply involuntary; therefore such ignorance excuses.

We have said: according to that which is unknown, for under another respect it can be voluntary: thus he who kills a man or a friend, thinking it to be a beast or an enemy, voluntarily shoots the arrow, but does not shoot it at the man or the friend, and he who sins with a woman, not knowing that she is joined in marriage, although not of adultery, is nevertheless guilty of fornication.

II. Concomitant ignorance removes the voluntary because it is invincible, but it does not render the act positively involuntary, because it is not against the inclination of the will, and the act would occur even if the ignorance were absent; it therefore makes the act non-voluntary. Hence: what is done with concomitant involuntary ignorance is non-voluntary, and of this ignorance it is said: it does not accuse, nor does it wholly excuse, namely, from the habitual disposition of the will.

III. Consequent ignorance does not make an act simply involuntary, but renders the work simply voluntary, because it itself is vincible and voluntary. It does, however, make in general (even if it be affected) something involuntary in a qualified sense, because it is against some inclination of the will, insofar as it is the cause of doing that which would not be done with knowledge present; hence it diminishes the voluntary and sin according to the degree of vincibility, so that even sometimes it makes a mortal sin venial.

But it should be well noted: ignorance that is exceptional in being voluntary in no way diminishes, if indeed it be so affected as that one precisely chooses it in order to sin more freely or so as not to be held back from sin: this, namely, in no way makes something involuntary, nor accordingly diminishes the voluntary and the sin, but rather increases it, not by reason of itself but by reason of the cause, because a greater disposition toward evil is present. For then, from the greater intensity or more intense inclination of the will toward sinning, it comes about that someone wishes to undergo ignorance.

Hence: what is done from voluntary or consequent ignorance is simply voluntary, but ordinarily involuntary in a certain respect, and then less voluntary. That ignorance does not excuse, but accuses.

83. Observations. — 1. The general doctrine on ignorance is briefly expressed in canon 2202, § 1: “A violation of an unknown law is in no way imputed if the ignorance was inculpable; otherwise, culpability is diminished more or less according to the culpability of the ignorance itself.”

2. What we have said about ignorance can be applied to inadvertence and forgetfulness, and to error. Error includes ignorance; full inadvertence and perfect forgetfulness are equated with invincible ignorance; but if they are not perfect but arise from negligence, they are equated with vincible ignorance. Hence canon 2202, § 3: "What is established about ignorance also holds for inadvertence and error."