Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. I-II, q. 6, a. 1 et 2.

53. The voluntary, according to Aristotle, Ethic. III, c. 1, is that which proceeds from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end. It is said:

1. that i.e. whatsoever, whether an act, or its omission, or an effect proceeding from either;
2. which proceeds, namely, in whatever way, whether immediately or mediately, whether directly or indirectly: for he who places a cause, or, when he ought to place it, omits it, wills and causes the effect which he foresees will follow therefrom;
3. from an intrinsic principle i.e. from a power and inclination proper to that which operates;
4. with knowledge of the end or of the good: since the principle of acting is twofold, efficient and final, that properly proceeds from the intrinsic which has an intrinsic efficient and final principle, so that it is not only moved but moves itself toward the end; whence for the voluntary there is required not only that it be from its own efficient principle from natural inclination, but also from some prior knowledge of the end from intentional inclination, by which a being acts for the sake of a known good. Hence for something to be totally voluntary, it must be known according to all circumstances; but if one be ignored, according to that it will not be voluntary, as if someone kills a man, not knowing him to be a cleric, he is guilty of homicide, not of sacrilege.

Therefore the voluntary differs: a) from the natural, whose efficient principle is within, but not the final, as the movements of the heart and of vegetative life, which occur without knowledge of the end; b) from the violent, whose principle is from without, with the subject resisting, as if one were dragged by external force against one's will; c) from the simply willed: for this is an intentional object, but not a real effect of the will proceeding from it as from a cause, that toward which the will tends affectively, but which does not proceed from it effectively, that which it wills but does not cause; thus rain for the farmer is willed but not voluntary, likewise the natural death of an enemy over which someone rejoices: for every voluntary is in some way willed, but not conversely¹ ; d) from the permissive, which is neither voluntary, i.e., proceeding from the will, nor willed as its object, but only is not impeded by one who can but ought not: thus for just reasons and a greater good, God or a governor do not impede sins which nevertheless displease them and are not done by them.

54. Division of the voluntary according to the knowledge of the end. — Since the voluntary proceeds from knowledge of the end, hence according to the diverse knowledge of the end, the voluntary is diverse: 1° Knowledge of the end is material or improperly so called when that which is the end is known, but not as an end; knowledge, however, is formal or properly so called when the thing which is the end is known as an end, i.e. the very reason and dignity of the end and the proportion of that which is ordered to the end, or the proportion of means to the end: hence the voluntary is divided into properly so called or perfect, which proceeds from formal knowledge of the end and is found only in the higher appetite of man;— and improperly so called or imperfect, which proceeds from material knowledge of the end and is found also in the sensitive appetite alone, indeed even in brutes: this is also called spontaneous. 2° Formal knowledge can be deliberate and undeliberate; hence there is distinguished necessary voluntary, which proceeds from a judgment and will determined to one thing;— and free, which occurs from an indifferent judgment with a power of the will toward the opposite. The free is not always more voluntary, for greater is the intentional inclination of the will toward beatitude in others, and yet it is necessary. 3° Deliberate knowledge can be more or less perfect; hence there is distinguished the voluntary perfectly free, which occurs with full deliberation, such as prudent men are accustomed to employ in matters of some importance, and with full consent: this is required for mortal sin; — and imperfectly free, which occurs with some deliberation and some consent, as is found in the half-asleep, half-drunk, distracted, and those laboring under vehement passion: this suffices for venial sin. Hence by theologians there are usually distinguished: first-first motions, which precede all deliberation (nor are they properly voluntary or human acts), second-first, which occur after some deliberation and before perfect deliberation, and second or deliberate, which proceed from perfect deliberation.

55. Division of the voluntary according to the intention of the will. — The voluntary is from one's own intentional inclination of appetite, whence according to the diverse intention of the will from which it proceeds, the voluntary is diverse. For something can proceed: 1) From an actual intention had here and now, whether it be explicit, as when a priest baptizing says: I will to baptize, or whether it be implicit contained in another act, as when he wills to approach the baptistery and to perform all things in the customary manner; 2) From a virtual intention, previously had, but here and now still influencing and persisting in power, as when a distracted priest baptizes from an intention had at the beginning; 3) From a habitual intention, previously had and not revoked, but in no way persisting in power and influencing the present act: as when a catechumen desiring to be baptized, deprived of his senses, is voluntarily baptized². The first is willed actually, the second virtually, the third habitually only³. For a human act a habitual intention does not suffice (nor a fortiori an interpretative one): for this does not influence the act nor does it make it proceed from the deliberation of reason and the influx of freedom and be done in a human manner; but at least a virtual intention is necessary. For which three things are required: a) that the agent act in a human manner, otherwise he would not act from intention; b) that the first intention was not revoked; and c) that it remain active in some effect of itself, so that one effect flows from another and all from the first.

If contrary or incompossible intentions are present, the predominant one remains and influences or obtains its effect. Among simultaneous intentions, that one is predominant which, according to the present disposition, would be chosen if the incompossibility were known; but if they are equal, none persists because they destroy each other. Of two successive intentions, the later will prevail if one formed it mindful of the earlier, because then the earlier was knowingly revoked; and generally even if one was unmindful of the earlier, unless the earlier was so made that it wills to exclude the subsequent at least virtually.

56. Division of the voluntary by reason of its principle. — The voluntary is from an intrinsic principle, and therefore by reason of a different principle it is divided into the elicited, which proceeds immediately from the will itself and is consummated in it (to will, to consent, to choose), — and the commanded, which proceeds from the motion and command of the will immediately from another power, whether internal (e.g., voluntarily to think or to become angry), or external (e.g., voluntarily to walk).

By reason of its term, therefore, it isinternal orexternal, according as it is completed in an interior rational or sensitive power, or in the exterior senses, members, or effects.

Hence the elicited and internal voluntary act, and the commanded and external act, are not one and the same.

57. Division of the voluntary by reason of manifestation. — Both the voluntary and the willed are manifested in different ways, and thus it is divided into 1) express, which is manifested by words or signs; — 2) tacit, which is manifested by silence, or rather is surely discerned from the circumstances of silence according to Rule 43 of Law: He who is silent is seen to consent; — 3) presumed, which from certain reasons, such as from inclination or disposition of mind, is prudently inferred to be now present, or is conjecturally gathered from reasonable indications: for presumption is a probable conjecture of an uncertain thing. — Examples are: a religious who buys a book with consent received from a superior, — or with a superior present and silent, — or with a superior absent whom he cannot approach while he is altogether in need of the book.

Not everyone who is silent consents, for in rule 44 it is said: He who is silent does not confess, but neither does he seem to deny. Silence, therefore, does not by itself but only according to various circumstances prudently to be considered signifies consent or dissent. Hence a silent person is deemed to consent a) in favorable matters when it concerns advantage or favor, as with a donation or gratuitous promise, but not if it concerns a burden, disadvantage, prejudice; — b) also in prejudicial matters, if someone can without great inconvenience and at the same time ought to contradict, e.g. if he is questioned by a judge, or a superior if he notices a rule transgressed and is silent, or if several come together to deliberate on a common opinion: for then those who are silent are deemed by themselves to assent to those consenting; — c) by comparison: if several things being proposed someone denies all, but is silent about one, he is deemed to affirm; if he affirms all, but is silent about one, he is deemed to deny; — d) if it was so determined in law, which however holds only in the external forum, provided the contrary is not proven.

58. Observation. — From all the aforesaid is distinguished both the merely interpretative voluntary and the volitional act: so called from an intention in no way actually held but which would only be held. But this in no way is but only would be volitional or voluntary, namely, in fact it is not intended by the will nor does it proceed from it, but it would be intended or would proceed, if something were known, e.g. a priest would wish to celebrate Mass for his father if he knew he were dead, and a bishop, if it were asked of him, would grant jurisdiction. It differs from the presumed volitional, because the latter indicates that which according to prudent estimation exists or has existed, whereas the former, given a supposition, would exist.

It is called merely interpretative. For even the voluntary presumed is called by others and can also be called under some respect interpretative. And many Scholastics call the voluntary in cause interpretative: for he who wills the cause is deemed to will the effect; and others so call the voluntary from virtual intention (or habitual): he who begins voluntarily is deemed to will to persevere.