Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. I-II, q. 6, a. 1 et 2.

53. The voluntary, according to Aristotle, Ethic. III, c. 1, is that which proceeds from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end. It is said:

1. that i.e. whatsoever, whether an act, or its omission, or an effect proceeding from either;
2. which proceeds, namely, in whatever way, whether immediately or mediately, whether directly or indirectly: for he who places a cause, or, when he ought to place it, omits it, wills and causes the effect which he foresees will follow therefrom;
3. from an intrinsic principle i.e. from a power and inclination proper to that which operates;
4. with knowledge of the end or of the good: since the principle of acting is twofold, efficient and final, that properly proceeds from the intrinsic which has an intrinsic efficient and final principle, so that it is not only moved but moves itself toward the end; whence for the voluntary there is required not only that it be from its own efficient principle from natural inclination, but also from some prior knowledge of the end from intentional inclination, by which a being acts for the sake of a known good. Hence for something to be totally voluntary, it must be known according to all circumstances; but if one be ignored, according to that it will not be voluntary, as if someone kills a man, not knowing him to be a cleric, he is guilty of homicide, not of sacrilege.

Therefore the voluntary differs: a) from the natural, whose efficient principle is within, but not the final, as the movements of the heart and of vegetative life, which occur without knowledge of the end; b) from the violent, whose principle is from without, with the subject resisting, as if one were dragged by external force against one's will; c) from the simply willed: for this is an intentional object, but not a real effect of the will proceeding from it as from a cause, that toward which the will tends affectively, but which does not proceed from it effectively, that which it wills but does not cause; thus rain for the farmer is willed but not voluntary, likewise the natural death of an enemy over which someone rejoices: for every voluntary is in some way willed, but not conversely¹ ; d) from the permissive, which is neither voluntary, i.e., proceeding from the will, nor willed as its object, but only is not impeded by one who can but ought not: thus for just reasons and a greater good, God or a governor do not impede sins which nevertheless displease them and are not done by them.

54. Division of the voluntary according to the knowledge of the end. — Since the voluntary proceeds from knowledge of the end, hence according to the diverse knowledge of the end, the voluntary is diverse: 1° Knowledge of the end is material or improperly so called when that which is the end is known, but not as an end; knowledge, however, is formal or properly so called when the thing which is the end is known as an end, i.e. the very reason and dignity of the end and the proportion of that which is ordered to the end, or the proportion of means to the end: hence the voluntary is divided into properly so called or perfect, which proceeds from formal knowledge of the end and is found only in the higher appetite of man;— and improperly so called or imperfect, which proceeds from material knowledge of the end and is found also in the sensitive appetite alone, indeed even in brutes: this is also called spontaneous. 2° Formal knowledge can be deliberate and undeliberate; hence there is distinguished necessary voluntary, which proceeds from a judgment and will determined to one thing;— and free, which occurs from an indifferent judgment with a power of the will toward the opposite. The free is not always more voluntary, for greater is the intentional inclination of the will toward beatitude in others, and yet it is necessary. 3° Deliberate knowledge can be more or less perfect; hence there is distinguished the voluntary perfectly free, which occurs with full deliberation, such as prudent men are accustomed to employ in matters of some importance, and with full consent: this is required for mortal sin; — and imperfectly free, which occurs with some deliberation and some consent, as is found in the half-asleep, half-drunk, distracted, and those laboring under vehement passion: this suffices for venial sin. Hence by theologians there are usually distinguished: first-first motions, which precede all deliberation (nor are they properly voluntary or human acts), second-first, which occur after some deliberation and before perfect deliberation, and second or deliberate, which proceed from perfect deliberation.

55. Division of the voluntary according to the intention of the will. — The voluntary is from one's own intentional inclination of appetite, whence according to the diverse intention of the will from which it proceeds, the voluntary is diverse. For something can proceed: 1) From an actual intention had here and now, whether it be explicit, as when a priest baptizing says: I will to baptize, or whether it be implicit contained in another act, as when he wills to approach the baptistery and to perform all things in the customary manner; 2) From a virtual intention, previously had, but here and now still influencing and persisting in power, as when a distracted priest baptizes from an intention had at the beginning; 3) From a habitual intention, previously had and not revoked, but in no way persisting in power and influencing the present act: as when a catechumen desiring to be baptized, deprived of his senses, is voluntarily baptized². The first is willed actually, the second virtually, the third habitually only³. For a human act a habitual intention does not suffice (nor a fortiori an interpretative one): for this does not influence the act nor does it make it proceed from the deliberation of reason and the influx of freedom and be done in a human manner; but at least a virtual intention is necessary. For which three things are required: a) that the agent act in a human manner, otherwise he would not act from intention; b) that the first intention was not revoked; and c) that it remain active in some effect of itself, so that one effect flows from another and all from the first.

If contrary or incompossible intentions are present, the predominant one remains and influences or obtains its effect. Among simultaneous intentions, that one is predominant which, according to the present disposition, would be chosen if the incompossibility were known; but if they are equal, none persists because they destroy each other. Of two successive intentions, the later will prevail if one formed it mindful of the earlier, because then the earlier was knowingly revoked; and generally even if one was unmindful of the earlier, unless the earlier was so made that it wills to exclude the subsequent at least virtually.

56. Division of the voluntary by reason of its principle. — The voluntary is from an intrinsic principle, and therefore by reason of a different principle it is divided into the elicited, which proceeds immediately from the will itself and is consummated in it (to will, to consent, to choose), — and the commanded, which proceeds from the motion and command of the will immediately from another power, whether internal (e.g., voluntarily to think or to become angry), or external (e.g., voluntarily to walk).

By reason of its term, therefore, it isinternal orexternal, according as it is completed in an interior rational or sensitive power, or in the exterior senses, members, or effects.

Hence the elicited and internal voluntary act, and the commanded and external act, are not one and the same.

57. Division of the voluntary by reason of manifestation. — Both the voluntary and the willed are manifested in different ways, and thus it is divided into 1) express, which is manifested by words or signs; — 2) tacit, which is manifested by silence, or rather is surely discerned from the circumstances of silence according to Rule 43 of Law: He who is silent is seen to consent; — 3) presumed, which from certain reasons, such as from inclination or disposition of mind, is prudently inferred to be now present, or is conjecturally gathered from reasonable indications: for presumption is a probable conjecture of an uncertain thing. — Examples are: a religious who buys a book with consent received from a superior, — or with a superior present and silent, — or with a superior absent whom he cannot approach while he is altogether in need of the book.

Not everyone who is silent consents, for in rule 44 it is said: He who is silent does not confess, but neither does he seem to deny. Silence, therefore, does not by itself but only according to various circumstances prudently to be considered signifies consent or dissent. Hence a silent person is deemed to consent a) in favorable matters when it concerns advantage or favor, as with a donation or gratuitous promise, but not if it concerns a burden, disadvantage, prejudice; — b) also in prejudicial matters, if someone can without great inconvenience and at the same time ought to contradict, e.g. if he is questioned by a judge, or a superior if he notices a rule transgressed and is silent, or if several come together to deliberate on a common opinion: for then those who are silent are deemed by themselves to assent to those consenting; — c) by comparison: if several things being proposed someone denies all, but is silent about one, he is deemed to affirm; if he affirms all, but is silent about one, he is deemed to deny; — d) if it was so determined in law, which however holds only in the external forum, provided the contrary is not proven.

58. Observation. — From all the aforesaid is distinguished both the merely interpretative voluntary and the volitional act: so called from an intention in no way actually held but which would only be held. But this in no way is but only would be volitional or voluntary, namely, in fact it is not intended by the will nor does it proceed from it, but it would be intended or would proceed, if something were known, e.g. a priest would wish to celebrate Mass for his father if he knew he were dead, and a bishop, if it were asked of him, would grant jurisdiction. It differs from the presumed volitional, because the latter indicates that which according to prudent estimation exists or has existed, whereas the former, given a supposition, would exist.

It is called merely interpretative. For even the voluntary presumed is called by others and can also be called under some respect interpretative. And many Scholastics call the voluntary in cause interpretative: for he who wills the cause is deemed to will the effect; and others so call the voluntary from virtual intention (or habitual): he who begins voluntarily is deemed to will to persevere.

S. Th. I-II, q. 6, a. 3; q. 71, a. 5; q. 77, a. 7.

59. Notions. — Man is not only master of his willing and acting, but also of his not acting and not willing, insofar as "by willing and acting he can impede that which is not willing and not acting"¹. Hence:

1° According to the different things which proceed from the will, the voluntary is rightly called positive if the placement of the act proceeds, — negative if the omission of the act proceeds. For a voluntary omission is not to be confused with the will of omitting; for the omission of fornication or of Mass is not voluntary for him who is detained in prison, and yet he can have the will of omitting fornication or Mass, while he says within himself: I would not do it or I would not hear it, if I could; — on the contrary, an omission can be voluntary even if one does not say: I will not hear, provided that, at the time when he can hear Mass, he does something else voluntarily. In the 1st case there is the placement of the act, namely commission, i.e. of desire, which is positively voluntary (I will not act i.e. I will not to act); in the 2nd case omission of the act, and this is negatively voluntary (I do not will to act). Both, however, can exist at once, while from the will of omitting one omits the work.

The positive voluntary essentially includes an act, because it proceeds from the will through a real influx. The negative voluntary does not essentially include an act: for in its essence it is constituted not by an act but by a negation, because it is not an act but the omission of this; this, however, that it may proceed from the will, supposes a preceding or concomitant act of the will as its cause or occasion: for either a man intends the omission itself in itself, or at least he voluntarily places another act incompossible with the omitted act, such as playing, sleeping, staying home, when the celebration of Mass is imminent. Aptly St. Thomas, q. 71, a. 5: « If in the sin of omission there is understood only that which per se pertains to the notion of sin, thus sometimes the sin of omission is... without any act either interior or exterior... If, however, in the sin of omission there are also understood the causes or occasions of omitting, thus it is necessary that in the sin of omission there be some act »².

2º By the same name, recent authors call positive and negative voluntary acts, whether that which proceeds from the will as from a positive cause, namely from a voluntary act through a true and positive influx, or that which proceeds from it as from a negative cause, namely from a voluntary omission, or that which is deemed to proceed from the will not operating and omitting to act when it can and ought to act. These according to a different manner from the will proceed, and therefore by St. Thomas they are respectively called: voluntary direct, that which directly proceeds from it insofar as it is an agent (just as heating from heat) and toward which the will is borne; — and indirect³, that toward which it is not borne but which proceeds from it indirectly insofar as it could prohibit but does not prohibit, or does not act while it ought to act, just as the sinking of a ship is said to be from the helmsman to whom the steering is entrusted, insofar as he ceases from steering.

Voluntarium directum, therefore, is from a will that acts; indirectum is from a will that does not act when it ought to act.

60. Principles. I. That an omission be voluntary⁴, it is required and suffices that someone be able to place the act which is omitted and omit it advertently, nor is it required that he ought to place it: for he can as voluntarily omit Mass on a ferial day as on a feast day; — but that it be imputed to him, something more is required: for praise that he have intended the omission for a good end: for goodness is not contracted unless it be willed and intended as such; for fault, that he ought to have placed the omitted act: for fault is not present, unless someone transgress some precept.

II. For the effect of omission to be voluntary, it is required:

1° That the effect could and ought to have been morally foreseen, i.e., was foreseen in some way at least confusedly, obscurely, or indistinctly, insofar as someone at least doubted or suspected it would follow, or knew of the obligation to pay attention: for nothing is willed unless it is first known;

2° That it could have been avoided, and therefore that the omission freely took place: for the effect is not more voluntary than its cause;

3° As it ought to have been avoided, or as there was present an obligation not of omitting but of positing the omitted act, and indeed of positing it lest an effect follow: for a positive effect is not contained in an omission, and therefore an effect from a negative cause cannot be voluntary unless there is an obligation of impeding it. For, if the aforesaid obligation is lacking, since a simple omission can have no real influx into a positive effect, already every nexus, even moral, of causality between the omission and this effect is lacking, and consequently this effect is only permitted, not willed in the omission nor voluntary. On the contrary, if someone ought to avoid the effect, and does not avoid it, morally he is deemed and imputably is the cause of it, namely its privative cause. — But if the aforesaid conditions are present, even the effect is imputed to fault, because some precept is violated.

61. Observation. — The agent's intention cannot change the nature and causality of things, nor cause some effect to proceed from a certain action or omission as from a cause. Hence, if, given the absence of the third condition, the obligation to avoid the effect is lacking, that effect does not become voluntary even if one intends the omission precisely as a means for an evil effect, or even a good one: the effect will then be willed in itself, but it will not be voluntary, because the connection of causality between the effect and the omission is lacking, and this omission is not its true cause. Thus, if someone, precisely so that another may be immersed in water, refrains from bringing aid, while nevertheless he is not bound to bring aid, because, e.g., there is greater danger for himself. The intention, like the omission or the act placed with it, will be imputed to fault or praise, but not the effect itself; indeed, a good effect that follows the omission will never be imputed to praise, because, although it can occur with a good intention, it does not nevertheless arise from the good intention as from a cause by the omission.

S. Th. I-II, q. 77, a. 7; q. 20. a. 5; II-II, q. 43, a. 3; q. 46, a. 2, ad 2; q. 64, a. 7 et 8; q. 79. a. 3, ad 3; q. 150, a. 4.

62. Notions. — By reason of the mode in which the will is borne toward that object, the positive and direct voluntary is either 1° Voluntary in itself, when the will is borne directly toward that object, i.e., it immediately wills something in itself and simultaneously causes it by acting, whether as an end (for its own sake), e.g., when someone wills to kill an enemy, or as a means to an end (for the sake of another), e.g., when a thief wills to kill a traveler in order to take his money; — or 2° Voluntary in cause only, when the will is borne immediately toward the cause and not toward the effect, i.e., it does not will the effect in itself as an end or means, but nevertheless the effect itself proceeds from the will insofar as this wills and does something else with which it is joined as with a cause, e.g., when someone wills to get drunk, foreseeing that in drunkenness he will commit blasphemies, impurities, or homicide¹ The cause can be physical or moral, immediate or mediate, proximate or remote, a cause per se which is naturally suited to produce the effect, although by accident the effect can fail (thus excessive drink produces drunkenness), or a cause per accidens which not from its own nature but by the intervention of another can sometimes produce it (thus drunkenness, with a quarrel arising, produces homicide). More recent authors prefer to say direct and indirect voluntary; but they would better say immediate and mediate: for what proceeds through a positive cause, yet directly from the will².

63. Principles. That an effect be voluntary in its cause, it is required: 1° That the effect have been foreseen in some way, at least confusedly, as was said in no. 60, II: for nothing is willed unless it is foreknown;

2° That it could have been avoided, and therefore that the cause was freely posited or could have not been posited: for the effect is not more voluntary than its own cause;

3° That there be a nexus of causality between this freely placed cause and this effect; which a) is always verified of the cause per se if the two prior conditions are present: for he who wills the cause is deemed to will the effect which follows from it naturally and necessarily; b) is verified also of the cause per accidens provided that in addition the third condition be present, namely that the effect ought to have been avoided, or that there was present the obligation of not placing the cause, and indeed of not placing it lest the effect follow: for since the effect is not sufficiently contained in such a cause (unless through another cause) and hence no physical nexus is present with the effect, if the said obligation is lacking, every nexus of causality, even moral, between cause and effect is lacking, and hence the effect will not be willed nor voluntary in the cause, but only permitted. On the contrary, if one is bound not to place the cause lest the effect follow, and nonetheless places it, he is deemed morally and imputably to be the cause of this effect.

But if the aforesaid conditions are present, the axiom is verified: An evil effect foreseen in the cause communicates its malice to the cause, namely, if it can and ought to be avoided. For the effect, indeed, is only voluntary in the cause and is not imputed to praise, because it is not intended; but in order that it be imputed to blame, it is required that there be an obligation to avoid the cause lest the effect follow, for otherwise no precept regarding the effect would be violated.

64. Corollaries. — From the foregoing it follows: 1° That an effect that is voluntary can be in its cause non-voluntary in itself, if it is not intended; indeed, in itself involuntary, if it displeases, as if someone posits the cause of a killing (e.g., releasing an arrow with some foresight of the killing) and this is not intended or displeases, e.g., if he does not wish to kill but wishes to release the arrow without applying sufficient care lest he kill a man.

2° On the contrary, an effect can be willed in itself, if it pleases, desired or even intended, and yet not be voluntary, if it follows from a cause per accidens and the obligation to avoid it is lacking, because, e.g., a greater good effect which follows from the cause is also intended: for then the evil effect willed in itself is not voluntary, but is only permitted in the cause (Cf. n. 173).

Thus if someone digs a pit on his own land, far from the road, foreseeing and desiring that an enemy might fall into it; if it so happens, the accident is not voluntary for him, because his is only an accidental cause.

3° An effect, e.g., the sin of a neighbor, of which we in no way posit the cause in itself but only a bare occasion or condition, or an accidental cause, is not voluntary in its cause nor imputable, even if it be in itself willed and intended; unless, however, there be an obligation to avoid the effect: for our intention does not change an occasion into a cause, nor an accidental cause into a cause in itself.

Thus if someone takes from a miser a thing of small value, foreseeing or even intending that he, from grief, may grow weak or die, and it so happens, the weakness and death are not voluntary because he was merely the occasion or accidental cause of them, and in no way the per se cause.