Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

52. Elements of the human act. — In the human act we can distinguish the essential being, or the elements which constitute it, and the accidental being, which is added to it once it is already constituted; likewise, a subjective element, or the very activity of the agent, and an objective element, or the object (i.e., the end or good) viewed totally, with all that pertains to it.

1° The subjective element is wholly essential; for which three things are required: a) Deliberate reason, i.e. prior knowledge of the intellect proposing the good. For nothing is willed unless it is first known, and indeed deliberately, without which man would not be master of his own act; b) The tendency of the will toward the good proposed by reason; c) Freedom of this tendency, for otherwise the will would neither choose nor act in the manner proper to man.

Regarding deliberate cognition, nothing special needs to be said, because the will presupposes cognition, and freedom presupposes deliberation; hence it suffices to explain the other two elements; the essence, therefore, of the human act is that it be voluntary and free.

2° The objective element, however, is twofold: a) one essential, namely the object itself or the end or good toward which the agent tends; b) another accidental, namely the circumstances which are added to the object and affect it.

Of all which things, it must now be spoken specifically.

S. Th. I-II, q. 6, a. 1 et 2.

53. The voluntary, according to Aristotle, Ethic. III, c. 1, is that which proceeds from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end. It is said:

1. that i.e. whatsoever, whether an act, or its omission, or an effect proceeding from either;
2. which proceeds, namely, in whatever way, whether immediately or mediately, whether directly or indirectly: for he who places a cause, or, when he ought to place it, omits it, wills and causes the effect which he foresees will follow therefrom;
3. from an intrinsic principle i.e. from a power and inclination proper to that which operates;
4. with knowledge of the end or of the good: since the principle of acting is twofold, efficient and final, that properly proceeds from the intrinsic which has an intrinsic efficient and final principle, so that it is not only moved but moves itself toward the end; whence for the voluntary there is required not only that it be from its own efficient principle from natural inclination, but also from some prior knowledge of the end from intentional inclination, by which a being acts for the sake of a known good. Hence for something to be totally voluntary, it must be known according to all circumstances; but if one be ignored, according to that it will not be voluntary, as if someone kills a man, not knowing him to be a cleric, he is guilty of homicide, not of sacrilege.

Therefore the voluntary differs: a) from the natural, whose efficient principle is within, but not the final, as the movements of the heart and of vegetative life, which occur without knowledge of the end; b) from the violent, whose principle is from without, with the subject resisting, as if one were dragged by external force against one's will; c) from the simply willed: for this is an intentional object, but not a real effect of the will proceeding from it as from a cause, that toward which the will tends affectively, but which does not proceed from it effectively, that which it wills but does not cause; thus rain for the farmer is willed but not voluntary, likewise the natural death of an enemy over which someone rejoices: for every voluntary is in some way willed, but not conversely¹ ; d) from the permissive, which is neither voluntary, i.e., proceeding from the will, nor willed as its object, but only is not impeded by one who can but ought not: thus for just reasons and a greater good, God or a governor do not impede sins which nevertheless displease them and are not done by them.

54. Division of the voluntary according to the knowledge of the end. — Since the voluntary proceeds from knowledge of the end, hence according to the diverse knowledge of the end, the voluntary is diverse: 1° Knowledge of the end is material or improperly so called when that which is the end is known, but not as an end; knowledge, however, is formal or properly so called when the thing which is the end is known as an end, i.e. the very reason and dignity of the end and the proportion of that which is ordered to the end, or the proportion of means to the end: hence the voluntary is divided into properly so called or perfect, which proceeds from formal knowledge of the end and is found only in the higher appetite of man;— and improperly so called or imperfect, which proceeds from material knowledge of the end and is found also in the sensitive appetite alone, indeed even in brutes: this is also called spontaneous. 2° Formal knowledge can be deliberate and undeliberate; hence there is distinguished necessary voluntary, which proceeds from a judgment and will determined to one thing;— and free, which occurs from an indifferent judgment with a power of the will toward the opposite. The free is not always more voluntary, for greater is the intentional inclination of the will toward beatitude in others, and yet it is necessary. 3° Deliberate knowledge can be more or less perfect; hence there is distinguished the voluntary perfectly free, which occurs with full deliberation, such as prudent men are accustomed to employ in matters of some importance, and with full consent: this is required for mortal sin; — and imperfectly free, which occurs with some deliberation and some consent, as is found in the half-asleep, half-drunk, distracted, and those laboring under vehement passion: this suffices for venial sin. Hence by theologians there are usually distinguished: first-first motions, which precede all deliberation (nor are they properly voluntary or human acts), second-first, which occur after some deliberation and before perfect deliberation, and second or deliberate, which proceed from perfect deliberation.

55. Division of the voluntary according to the intention of the will. — The voluntary is from one's own intentional inclination of appetite, whence according to the diverse intention of the will from which it proceeds, the voluntary is diverse. For something can proceed: 1) From an actual intention had here and now, whether it be explicit, as when a priest baptizing says: I will to baptize, or whether it be implicit contained in another act, as when he wills to approach the baptistery and to perform all things in the customary manner; 2) From a virtual intention, previously had, but here and now still influencing and persisting in power, as when a distracted priest baptizes from an intention had at the beginning; 3) From a habitual intention, previously had and not revoked, but in no way persisting in power and influencing the present act: as when a catechumen desiring to be baptized, deprived of his senses, is voluntarily baptized². The first is willed actually, the second virtually, the third habitually only³. For a human act a habitual intention does not suffice (nor a fortiori an interpretative one): for this does not influence the act nor does it make it proceed from the deliberation of reason and the influx of freedom and be done in a human manner; but at least a virtual intention is necessary. For which three things are required: a) that the agent act in a human manner, otherwise he would not act from intention; b) that the first intention was not revoked; and c) that it remain active in some effect of itself, so that one effect flows from another and all from the first.

If contrary or incompossible intentions are present, the predominant one remains and influences or obtains its effect. Among simultaneous intentions, that one is predominant which, according to the present disposition, would be chosen if the incompossibility were known; but if they are equal, none persists because they destroy each other. Of two successive intentions, the later will prevail if one formed it mindful of the earlier, because then the earlier was knowingly revoked; and generally even if one was unmindful of the earlier, unless the earlier was so made that it wills to exclude the subsequent at least virtually.

56. Division of the voluntary by reason of its principle. — The voluntary is from an intrinsic principle, and therefore by reason of a different principle it is divided into the elicited, which proceeds immediately from the will itself and is consummated in it (to will, to consent, to choose), — and the commanded, which proceeds from the motion and command of the will immediately from another power, whether internal (e.g., voluntarily to think or to become angry), or external (e.g., voluntarily to walk).

By reason of its term, therefore, it isinternal orexternal, according as it is completed in an interior rational or sensitive power, or in the exterior senses, members, or effects.

Hence the elicited and internal voluntary act, and the commanded and external act, are not one and the same.

57. Division of the voluntary by reason of manifestation. — Both the voluntary and the willed are manifested in different ways, and thus it is divided into 1) express, which is manifested by words or signs; — 2) tacit, which is manifested by silence, or rather is surely discerned from the circumstances of silence according to Rule 43 of Law: He who is silent is seen to consent; — 3) presumed, which from certain reasons, such as from inclination or disposition of mind, is prudently inferred to be now present, or is conjecturally gathered from reasonable indications: for presumption is a probable conjecture of an uncertain thing. — Examples are: a religious who buys a book with consent received from a superior, — or with a superior present and silent, — or with a superior absent whom he cannot approach while he is altogether in need of the book.

Not everyone who is silent consents, for in rule 44 it is said: He who is silent does not confess, but neither does he seem to deny. Silence, therefore, does not by itself but only according to various circumstances prudently to be considered signifies consent or dissent. Hence a silent person is deemed to consent a) in favorable matters when it concerns advantage or favor, as with a donation or gratuitous promise, but not if it concerns a burden, disadvantage, prejudice; — b) also in prejudicial matters, if someone can without great inconvenience and at the same time ought to contradict, e.g. if he is questioned by a judge, or a superior if he notices a rule transgressed and is silent, or if several come together to deliberate on a common opinion: for then those who are silent are deemed by themselves to assent to those consenting; — c) by comparison: if several things being proposed someone denies all, but is silent about one, he is deemed to affirm; if he affirms all, but is silent about one, he is deemed to deny; — d) if it was so determined in law, which however holds only in the external forum, provided the contrary is not proven.

58. Observation. — From all the aforesaid is distinguished both the merely interpretative voluntary and the volitional act: so called from an intention in no way actually held but which would only be held. But this in no way is but only would be volitional or voluntary, namely, in fact it is not intended by the will nor does it proceed from it, but it would be intended or would proceed, if something were known, e.g. a priest would wish to celebrate Mass for his father if he knew he were dead, and a bishop, if it were asked of him, would grant jurisdiction. It differs from the presumed volitional, because the latter indicates that which according to prudent estimation exists or has existed, whereas the former, given a supposition, would exist.

It is called merely interpretative. For even the voluntary presumed is called by others and can also be called under some respect interpretative. And many Scholastics call the voluntary in cause interpretative: for he who wills the cause is deemed to will the effect; and others so call the voluntary from virtual intention (or habitual): he who begins voluntarily is deemed to will to persevere.

S. Th. I-II, q. 6, a. 3; q. 71, a. 5; q. 77, a. 7.

59. Notions. — Man is not only master of his willing and acting, but also of his not acting and not willing, insofar as "by willing and acting he can impede that which is not willing and not acting"¹. Hence:

1° According to the different things which proceed from the will, the voluntary is rightly called positive if the placement of the act proceeds, — negative if the omission of the act proceeds. For a voluntary omission is not to be confused with the will of omitting; for the omission of fornication or of Mass is not voluntary for him who is detained in prison, and yet he can have the will of omitting fornication or Mass, while he says within himself: I would not do it or I would not hear it, if I could; — on the contrary, an omission can be voluntary even if one does not say: I will not hear, provided that, at the time when he can hear Mass, he does something else voluntarily. In the 1st case there is the placement of the act, namely commission, i.e. of desire, which is positively voluntary (I will not act i.e. I will not to act); in the 2nd case omission of the act, and this is negatively voluntary (I do not will to act). Both, however, can exist at once, while from the will of omitting one omits the work.

The positive voluntary essentially includes an act, because it proceeds from the will through a real influx. The negative voluntary does not essentially include an act: for in its essence it is constituted not by an act but by a negation, because it is not an act but the omission of this; this, however, that it may proceed from the will, supposes a preceding or concomitant act of the will as its cause or occasion: for either a man intends the omission itself in itself, or at least he voluntarily places another act incompossible with the omitted act, such as playing, sleeping, staying home, when the celebration of Mass is imminent. Aptly St. Thomas, q. 71, a. 5: « If in the sin of omission there is understood only that which per se pertains to the notion of sin, thus sometimes the sin of omission is... without any act either interior or exterior... If, however, in the sin of omission there are also understood the causes or occasions of omitting, thus it is necessary that in the sin of omission there be some act »².

2º By the same name, recent authors call positive and negative voluntary acts, whether that which proceeds from the will as from a positive cause, namely from a voluntary act through a true and positive influx, or that which proceeds from it as from a negative cause, namely from a voluntary omission, or that which is deemed to proceed from the will not operating and omitting to act when it can and ought to act. These according to a different manner from the will proceed, and therefore by St. Thomas they are respectively called: voluntary direct, that which directly proceeds from it insofar as it is an agent (just as heating from heat) and toward which the will is borne; — and indirect³, that toward which it is not borne but which proceeds from it indirectly insofar as it could prohibit but does not prohibit, or does not act while it ought to act, just as the sinking of a ship is said to be from the helmsman to whom the steering is entrusted, insofar as he ceases from steering.

Voluntarium directum, therefore, is from a will that acts; indirectum is from a will that does not act when it ought to act.

60. Principles. I. That an omission be voluntary⁴, it is required and suffices that someone be able to place the act which is omitted and omit it advertently, nor is it required that he ought to place it: for he can as voluntarily omit Mass on a ferial day as on a feast day; — but that it be imputed to him, something more is required: for praise that he have intended the omission for a good end: for goodness is not contracted unless it be willed and intended as such; for fault, that he ought to have placed the omitted act: for fault is not present, unless someone transgress some precept.

II. For the effect of omission to be voluntary, it is required:

1° That the effect could and ought to have been morally foreseen, i.e., was foreseen in some way at least confusedly, obscurely, or indistinctly, insofar as someone at least doubted or suspected it would follow, or knew of the obligation to pay attention: for nothing is willed unless it is first known;

2° That it could have been avoided, and therefore that the omission freely took place: for the effect is not more voluntary than its cause;

3° As it ought to have been avoided, or as there was present an obligation not of omitting but of positing the omitted act, and indeed of positing it lest an effect follow: for a positive effect is not contained in an omission, and therefore an effect from a negative cause cannot be voluntary unless there is an obligation of impeding it. For, if the aforesaid obligation is lacking, since a simple omission can have no real influx into a positive effect, already every nexus, even moral, of causality between the omission and this effect is lacking, and consequently this effect is only permitted, not willed in the omission nor voluntary. On the contrary, if someone ought to avoid the effect, and does not avoid it, morally he is deemed and imputably is the cause of it, namely its privative cause. — But if the aforesaid conditions are present, even the effect is imputed to fault, because some precept is violated.

61. Observation. — The agent's intention cannot change the nature and causality of things, nor cause some effect to proceed from a certain action or omission as from a cause. Hence, if, given the absence of the third condition, the obligation to avoid the effect is lacking, that effect does not become voluntary even if one intends the omission precisely as a means for an evil effect, or even a good one: the effect will then be willed in itself, but it will not be voluntary, because the connection of causality between the effect and the omission is lacking, and this omission is not its true cause. Thus, if someone, precisely so that another may be immersed in water, refrains from bringing aid, while nevertheless he is not bound to bring aid, because, e.g., there is greater danger for himself. The intention, like the omission or the act placed with it, will be imputed to fault or praise, but not the effect itself; indeed, a good effect that follows the omission will never be imputed to praise, because, although it can occur with a good intention, it does not nevertheless arise from the good intention as from a cause by the omission.

S. Th. I-II, q. 77, a. 7; q. 20. a. 5; II-II, q. 43, a. 3; q. 46, a. 2, ad 2; q. 64, a. 7 et 8; q. 79. a. 3, ad 3; q. 150, a. 4.

62. Notions. — By reason of the mode in which the will is borne toward that object, the positive and direct voluntary is either 1° Voluntary in itself, when the will is borne directly toward that object, i.e., it immediately wills something in itself and simultaneously causes it by acting, whether as an end (for its own sake), e.g., when someone wills to kill an enemy, or as a means to an end (for the sake of another), e.g., when a thief wills to kill a traveler in order to take his money; — or 2° Voluntary in cause only, when the will is borne immediately toward the cause and not toward the effect, i.e., it does not will the effect in itself as an end or means, but nevertheless the effect itself proceeds from the will insofar as this wills and does something else with which it is joined as with a cause, e.g., when someone wills to get drunk, foreseeing that in drunkenness he will commit blasphemies, impurities, or homicide¹ The cause can be physical or moral, immediate or mediate, proximate or remote, a cause per se which is naturally suited to produce the effect, although by accident the effect can fail (thus excessive drink produces drunkenness), or a cause per accidens which not from its own nature but by the intervention of another can sometimes produce it (thus drunkenness, with a quarrel arising, produces homicide). More recent authors prefer to say direct and indirect voluntary; but they would better say immediate and mediate: for what proceeds through a positive cause, yet directly from the will².

63. Principles. That an effect be voluntary in its cause, it is required: 1° That the effect have been foreseen in some way, at least confusedly, as was said in no. 60, II: for nothing is willed unless it is foreknown;

2° That it could have been avoided, and therefore that the cause was freely posited or could have not been posited: for the effect is not more voluntary than its own cause;

3° That there be a nexus of causality between this freely placed cause and this effect; which a) is always verified of the cause per se if the two prior conditions are present: for he who wills the cause is deemed to will the effect which follows from it naturally and necessarily; b) is verified also of the cause per accidens provided that in addition the third condition be present, namely that the effect ought to have been avoided, or that there was present the obligation of not placing the cause, and indeed of not placing it lest the effect follow: for since the effect is not sufficiently contained in such a cause (unless through another cause) and hence no physical nexus is present with the effect, if the said obligation is lacking, every nexus of causality, even moral, between cause and effect is lacking, and hence the effect will not be willed nor voluntary in the cause, but only permitted. On the contrary, if one is bound not to place the cause lest the effect follow, and nonetheless places it, he is deemed morally and imputably to be the cause of this effect.

But if the aforesaid conditions are present, the axiom is verified: An evil effect foreseen in the cause communicates its malice to the cause, namely, if it can and ought to be avoided. For the effect, indeed, is only voluntary in the cause and is not imputed to praise, because it is not intended; but in order that it be imputed to blame, it is required that there be an obligation to avoid the cause lest the effect follow, for otherwise no precept regarding the effect would be violated.

64. Corollaries. — From the foregoing it follows: 1° That an effect that is voluntary can be in its cause non-voluntary in itself, if it is not intended; indeed, in itself involuntary, if it displeases, as if someone posits the cause of a killing (e.g., releasing an arrow with some foresight of the killing) and this is not intended or displeases, e.g., if he does not wish to kill but wishes to release the arrow without applying sufficient care lest he kill a man.

2° On the contrary, an effect can be willed in itself, if it pleases, desired or even intended, and yet not be voluntary, if it follows from a cause per accidens and the obligation to avoid it is lacking, because, e.g., a greater good effect which follows from the cause is also intended: for then the evil effect willed in itself is not voluntary, but is only permitted in the cause (Cf. n. 173).

Thus if someone digs a pit on his own land, far from the road, foreseeing and desiring that an enemy might fall into it; if it so happens, the accident is not voluntary for him, because his is only an accidental cause.

3° An effect, e.g., the sin of a neighbor, of which we in no way posit the cause in itself but only a bare occasion or condition, or an accidental cause, is not voluntary in its cause nor imputable, even if it be in itself willed and intended; unless, however, there be an obligation to avoid the effect: for our intention does not change an occasion into a cause, nor an accidental cause into a cause in itself.

Thus if someone takes from a miser a thing of small value, foreseeing or even intending that he, from grief, may grow weak or die, and it so happens, the weakness and death are not voluntary because he was merely the occasion or accidental cause of them, and in no way the per se cause.

65. The involuntary is that which does not proceed from knowledge of the end, or, if knowledge of the end be present, nevertheless not from an intrinsic principle, that is: that which does not proceed from an intrinsic principle, or at least not with knowledge of the end. When knowledge of the end alone is lacking, in one who is capable of knowledge and of the voluntary, the involuntary is negative or non-voluntary, and it is that which the agent does not know and hence neither pursues nor shuns: thus a dishonest motion before the advertence of reason is properly non-voluntary; but when the inclination from an intrinsic principle is lacking, the involuntary can be positive or contrary and properly so-called, and it is that which the agent shuns by a positive act, and which is against his inclination: thus a shameful thought had unwillingly is properly involuntary.

66. The involuntary is distinguished as simply involuntary, which the agent in no way causes nor desires but rather shuns and strives to impede absolutely and efficaciously; — and the involuntary in a certain respect, which the agent would not will but which would displease him, considering certain circumstances, yet with all things weighed he wills it and it pleases him; in other words: what he shuns with a conditional will, he nonetheless embraces with an absolute and efficacious will, so that the involuntary in a certain respect is voluntary simply. This is not pure voluntary, but mixed with the involuntary. Thus the throwing of goods into the sea, by reason of the storm, is voluntary, but in a certain respect it is involuntary, for were the danger absent, the throwing would not occur¹.

67. Impediments to the voluntary. — The following impede the voluntary and thus the human act: 1° all those things by which a man is not master of himself, such as defect of reason, mental alienation, sleep, drunkenness, the state of somnambulism or perfect hypnotism, diabolical obsession, etc., from which, however, some things can be voluntary in their cause; 2° in a man who is master of himself there are four principal proximate causes (to which others are reduced) which impede the voluntary, i.e., take away or diminish it: violence and fear, which impede the inclination of the will; concupiscence and ignorance, which impede intellectual cognition, i.e., take it away or diminish it. Whence they are called enemies of the voluntary.

St. Thomas, First Part of the Second Part, Question 6, Articles 4 and 5.

68. Violence, which is called coercion when exercised upon a being that has knowledge, is properly motion that proceeds from an extrinsic principle, with the patient resisting, i.e., with the one suffering force opposing it. It is said: 1° from an extrinsic principle, and thus the violent differs from the natural and the voluntary, which are from an intrinsic principle: for nothing properly inflicts violence on itself, otherwise it would at the same time tend and not tend toward the same thing; 2° with the patient resisting, i.e., while the patient repels with every effort: for if something is naturally or voluntarily disposed, or is not indisposed but indifferent, to suffering what comes from an extrinsic principle, the passion will be natural or voluntary or permitted, not violent. Hence there is distinguished a) violence strictly so called, or absolute and perfect, when the patient resists as much as it can, e.g., death inflicted on one who defends his life; and b) violence broadly so called, imperfect and in a certain respect, when it resists but not as much as it can, e.g., death inflicted on a martyr. It differs a) from the necessary, to which it adds that it is from an extrinsic principle, while the necessary can also be from an intrinsic principle; b) from the involuntary, because the latter can be from an intrinsic principle, from knowledge of evil or from lack of knowledge of the end. Indeed, everything violent is necessary, and, if it concerns a knowing being, involuntary; but not conversely; c) from what is called moral violence: with properly so called physical violence (which by St. Thomas, II Sent. d. 25, q. 1, a. 2, is called sufficient and compelling) is not to be confused that which is improperly so called, namely moral (called insufficient and impelling), which is inflicted by threatening and rebuking, and which coincides with grave fear impressed, especially when something would not be hindered by resisting but would then be brought about by external force, e.g., the departure from a house made by someone who otherwise would be expelled by military force.

69. Can violence be inflicted on the will? — The act of the will is twofold: one is elicited immediately by it, elicited, namely, to will; the other is commanded by it,commanded, exercised through another power, e.g., voluntarily thinking, walking, speaking. As to the former, violence cannot be inflicted on the will: for an elicited act is the very inclination of the will toward something, proceeding from an intrinsic knowing principle; but a violent act proceeds from an extrinsic principle; therefore it is impossible for an act of the will to be violent. And indeed, the violent is against the inclination of the thing suffering it; but an elicited act of the will, since it is the inclination of the will itself, cannot be against its own inclination; whence Anselm says, On Free Will, ch. 6: "No one can will something unwillingly, because one cannot will while not willing to will." — As to commanded acts, however, it can suffer violence, insofar as by violence our external or internal powers are moved against the command of the will, or are hindered from executing it, e.g., the foot so that it does not take a step, the eye, by closing it, so that it does not see, etc. Hence:

a) No one can compel the will itself, not even God. b) God alone, as the cause both of the will and of the act itself, can change it, i.e., transfer it from one thing to another and make of the unwilling one willing, of one willing this one willing that; yet then He does not do violence, nor does He compel the will against its inclination, but He causes one inclination of the will to be succeeded by another. c) God, angels, and the devil, against the will, can move the intellect, imagination, and sensitive appetite toward some object; in which case that motion with respect to these faculties is not violent, but with respect to the will. d) All these, and men too, can move the external members and external senses against the will.

70. Principles. The violent is directly opposed to the voluntary, and accordingly makes something involuntary: for the violent (when it is inflicted upon a knowing being) is from an extrinsic principle against the inclination of the willing subject; but the voluntary is from the intrinsic, i.e., from the will's own inclination (cf. can. 2205, § I).

« It is common to the voluntary and the natural, says St. Thomas, a. 5, that both are from an intrinsic principle (i.e., from the agent's own inclination); but the violent is from an extrinsic principle (against the inclination of the subject). And for this reason, just as in things that lack cognition, violence makes something be against nature (unnatural), so in knowing things it makes something be against the will... which is called involuntary ».

Hence, that which is made from an extrinsic principle:

1) If the subject resists externally and internally as much as it can, it is absolutely violent and entirely involuntary, 2) If it resists externally but consents internally, it is neither voluntary nor involuntary but willed; 3) If it neither consents nor resists, or does not resist as much as it can, but conducts itself passively, while it ought not to resist or resist more, it is not voluntary but permitted; 4) If it does not consent, but also does not resist as much as it ought, it is indirectly voluntary (n. 60, II); 5) If it does not resist as much as it can but consents, it is violent in a certain respect but simply voluntary, yet the less so the greater the violence was or the more it resisted: for the voluntary is "in one way according to action when someone wills to do something, in another way according to passion when someone wills to suffer from another; hence when an action is inflicted by some external agent, while the will of suffering remains in the one who suffers, it is not simply violent because, although the one who suffers does not contribute by acting, he nevertheless contributes by willing to suffer; hence it cannot be called involuntary" (a. 5, ad 2).

A girl, overpowered by force, if she resists as much as she is able, is overpowered involuntarily; if she does not resist as much as she ought, or if she consents, she is overpowered voluntarily and culpably; if she does not resist as much as she is able but as much as she ought, she is overpowered not involuntarily but permissively. Setting aside the danger of consent, she is not bound to resist useless means, or extraordinary ones (the killing of the aggressor), or even crying out, if there is a danger of notable harm, e.g., death, excessive shame: in these cases the overpowering is not voluntary. But if she consents internally, [while] resisting externally as much as she ought, the external overpowering is not on that account truly voluntary, but merely willed.

S. Th. I-II, q. 6, a. 6.

71. Fear or dread is a passion of the sensitive appetitive power, the irascible, by which we flee from a future sensible evil that is difficult to avoid. It is taken here for every movement by which we flee from an evil, whether it be a movement of passion or of will; and it is customarily defined: A trembling of the mind (i.e., disquiet and disturbance) from the cause of an impending or future evil or danger. It differs from coercion, because this physically acts upon a man's powers, and is from an extrinsic principle; but the cause which provokes fear is a moral cause which influences by way of a known object, namely, by proposing danger, whence fear is from an intrinsic principle with cognition.

72. Fear is divided: 1° By reason of cause it is either taken up if it arises from a natural cause, whether intrinsic like disease, weakness of mind, or extrinsic like shipwreck, fire, encounter with wild beasts; — or struck in if from a free external cause, God, devil, man: this latter by reason of manner is just when the one striking has the right to cause fear and causes it in a lawful manner, e.g. a father, a judge with due punishments; or unjust when he does not have the right to cause fear or causes it in an unlawful manner, whether it is done to extort something e.g. a contract or a vow, or for another end e.g. for the sake of revenge.

2° By reason of intensity, fear is grave when the evil that is feared is great and certainly or probably imminent; — and light when a light evil is feared, or a grave one but not probably imminent.

Prior is absolutely grave, when the evil, considered in itself, is great from its very nature, e.g., death, serious injury or mutilation, harsh imprisonment, exile, rape, notable disgrace, loss of status or of a great part of one’s goods: this usually falls upon a steadfast man and a person of brave spirit; — or relatively grave, when the evil is grave only with respect to the fearing person, considering his age, sex, condition, temperament, etc.: this does not fall upon a steadfast man, but upon a faint-hearted one who easily fears; thus a timid person, a child, a woman, an old man greatly fear what a man does not dread.

Reverential fear toward superiors, e.g., of children toward parents, of a wife toward her husband, of a ward toward his guardian, of a religious toward his prelate, of a cleric toward his bishop, is by itself regarded and generally is light, unless grave threats, beatings, or most urgent entreaties are added, because then it can be reckoned a harsh and grave vexation or a lasting indignation is to be feared.

3° By reason of its operation, fear is antecedent or impelling, when someone acts from fear, when it is the motive of acting, e.g., if a traveler gives money to a robber from fear of death; — and concomitant or repelling or retracting, when someone acts not from but with fear, when it is not the motive of the deed, although it accompanies it, nay rather it would be the motive for not acting, e.g., if a robber steals with fear of prison, or a merchant with fear boards the high sea.

73. Principles. I. What is done from fear is perfectly voluntary and free: for then there is present a strong and deliberate will which overcomes and conquers the fear.

II. What is done out of fear is, as a rule, a mixture of the voluntary and the involuntary, because it comes partly from inclination and partly against the inclination of the will: it is voluntary simply speaking, because the will, all things considered, wills and chooses it; but it is involuntary in a qualified sense, because it wills and chooses it with some reluctance, for it would not will that thing considered in itself and setting aside certain circumstances.

It is evident from the example of a merchant who, from fear of shipwreck, throws his goods into the sea. In which case four things concur: 1° love of the lesser good, namely, the goods; 2° love of the greater good, namely, of life, whose loss is feared; 3° effective consent to the lack of the lesser good (the goods) in order to preserve the greater (namely, life); 4° nonetheless, ineffective love persists toward the lesser good, from which arises an ineffective displeasure at its lack. Now the consent is conformed to the second inclination and therefore is simply voluntary, but it is against the first, which persists in some measure, and according to this it is in some measure involuntary; whence it is mixed from the voluntary and the involuntary.

We have said: regularly, because a) sometimes it is not involuntary in a qualified sense, if fear also excludes the affection for the lesser opposed good, and then what is done from fear becomes purely voluntary, not mixed with the involuntary. For other reasons besides the fear of avoiding evil can arise on account of which the action becomes lovable in itself, and the very fear can be a motive which demands that the ineffective affection for the opposite be excluded. As is clear regarding the sinner who grieves over sins out of fear of hell, but nevertheless does not retain an affection for the sins (Council of Trent, sess. 14, ch. 4), and similarly a nobleman fleeing theft out of fear of infamy does not necessarily say: if there were no infamy, I would steal; — b) by accident it is not voluntary simply, if the fear is so vehement and so disturbs the reason that it entirely removes its deliberation and use, and then it takes away the voluntary properly so called and the free.

74. Corollaries. — From the aforesaid it is easily understood: 1° Fear of itself and regularly does not excuse from the whole sin, because it leaves the voluntary simply, which suffices for sin; yet it diminishes insofar as the act is involuntary in a certain respect and therefore less voluntary and free (fear excuses from so much but not from the whole, cf. can. 2205, § 3), yet it does not so diminish as to make a mortal sin venial, because generally it leaves sufficient deliberation for a mortal sin.

2° Fear accidentally excuses from mortal sin if it removes perfect deliberation, indeed from all sin, if it removes all deliberation. 3° Grave fear, because it does not remove free voluntariness, per se does not by the nature of things invalidate human acts (can. 103, § 2), unless perhaps sometimes for those which by their nature require more perfect freedom (vow, gratuitous donation, marriage).

75. Observations. — 1st Light fear in the external forum is never considered a sufficiently causative reason for an action. 2nd Grave fear never excuses from an intrinsically evil work which is prohibited by natural law as evil in itself; often it excuses from the observance of positive law, or from those things which are only evil because prohibited (can. 2205, § 2 and 3).

S. Th. I-II, q. 6, a. 7; q. 73, a. 6; q. 77, a. 5 et 7; q. 78, a. 2 et 4

76. Concupiscence: 1° in the broadest sense it is either a) habitual disorder, i.e., the privation of rightness left by original sin in the sensitive appetite, especially when it tends toward a sensible good, and consequently in reason and will; or b) any passion or movement of the appetite that is disordered, preceding deliberation, especially when it tends toward evil or rises against reason (the first-first movement); 2° in the strictest sense it is a special passion whereby the concupiscible appetite tends toward an absent, delightful sensible good, and is opposed to fear, which is the movement of the appetite fleeing evil; 3° in a less strict sense, here it is taken not indeed for every passion, but for any affection or movement of the sensitive appetite or will tending toward a delightful good to pursue it¹.

In terms of the act of deliberate will, concupiscence is antecedent, which (in the order of causality) precedes the free consent of the will and causes it: then something is done from concupiscence, as when, upon seeing a beautiful woman, lust draws the will to take delight in her;— and consequent, which (in the order of causality) follows the free consent of the will and proceeds from it, as if, willing to sin with a woman, one excites concupiscence to perpetrate the sin: then something is done with concupiscence. It is evident that consequent concupiscence, since it follows upon the voluntary, in no way impedes it nor causes the involuntary, but is only a sign and effect of the voluntary. The question, therefore, concerns only antecedent concupiscence, namely how it stands with respect to the voluntary and the involuntary.

77. Principle I. Antecedent concupiscence causes the voluntary rather than the involuntary. — For something is called voluntary from the fact that the will is borne toward it. But through concupiscence the will is inclined to will that which it desires. Therefore concupiscence does more to make something voluntary than involuntary.

Therefore, to distinguish it from fear, concupiscence of itself never renders an act involuntary, either simply or in a qualified sense, because in one who acts from fear there remains a prior contrary will regarding what he does, but in one who acts from concupiscence there does not remain a prior will that repudiated what he desires, and therefore the one desiring acts against what he willed, while the one fearing acts against what he even now wills in itself. Concupiscence, however, does render an act involuntary accidentally when some evil is joined to the object that is desired, e.g., when a lustful man is at the same time avaricious and wills fornication, for the sake of procuring which he must pay out money.

78. Principle II. Antecedent concupiscence increases the voluntary, diminishes the free voluntary; whence what is done from concupiscence is more voluntary, less free². — For such concupiscence: 1° Always increases the voluntary improperly so called, because it itself, as an indeliberate movement of appetite, is in this way voluntary by its very nature.

2° Generally it increases the voluntary act properly so called as to the inclination or propensity, because our will is borne more toward the object we covet when the intellect proposes it as more covetable and to be pursued with greater efficacy; — yet it diminishes it as to the indifference of judgment and consequently as to deliberation. For it causes the intellect to perceive less the aspect of evil in the object and to propose it as more lovable; whence it also diminishes the free act, and consequently the goodness of the act and the sin.

3° Sometimes, if it is very vehement, it removes knowledge and deliberation and the use of reason, and hence the voluntary properly so called and the free; yet it does not make it involuntary: for in one who does not use reason, neither is it voluntary properly nor involuntary.

79. Observation.—Consequent concupiscence in no way diminishes the voluntary act properly so called, nor the free act, nor consequently goodness or sin, because it is itself an effect of the free will. Hence what is done with concupiscence is neither less voluntary nor less free. It can, however, diminish deliberation and freedom with respect to the act following from it; but with respect to that act, it is antecedent.

S. Th. I-II, q. 6, a. 8; q. 19, a. 6; q. 76.

80. Ignorance properly is a lack of knowledge in a subject capable of it, e.g., astronomy in a priest. It differs 1° from nescience, which is a simple negation of knowledge in an incapable subject, e.g., in a child or a madman;

antecedent concupiscence simply diminishes the voluntary, and not only under the aspect of freedom. Yet they do not speak correctly in this way. Hence Schmitt, in the more recent editions of Noldin’s work, I, n. 53, corrected this somewhat, writing: antecedent concupiscence diminishes freedom. And Salsmans, in the most recent edition of Génicot’s work, changed one word, and in place of concupiscence put passion; but for that reason the doctrine is neither more adequate nor less ambiguous.

2° from error, which is not a mere lack but a positive act of the intellect judging a thing to be otherwise than it is: it arises from ignorance or rashness; 3° from inadvertence, which is a lack not indeed of habitual knowledge but of actual consideration; 4° from forgetfulness, which is the privation of knowledge previously had. Since moralists deal only with duties owed and with sins not owed, they often more strictly take ignorance, not indeed as negation, but as privation of knowledge which ought to be in someone, such as theology for a confessor. Hence some distinguish ignorance negative, and privative, nay even positive or of false disposition, if it includes error.

81. Ignorance is divided: 1) By reason of the object that is ignored, there is ignorance of law, whether natural or positive, whether divine or human, whether of the law itself or of the penalty attached to it: by which, namely, the existence or extension or meaning of the law itself is ignored;— and ignorance of fact: by which a fact or a concrete circumstance of the fact determining the present application of the law is ignored.

Thus, one who does not know that fasting is to be observed on the vigil of Pentecost, or that heretical books are forbidden, is in ignorance of the law; one who does not notice that this day is the vigil of Pentecost, or that this book is heretical, is in ignorance of fact.

2. By reason of the subject, or the person who is ignorant, ignorance is invincible or vincible. Invincible, or involuntary, is that which could not be removed by moral diligence; — vincible, truly, or voluntary, is that which could be so removed.

Moral diligence, however, is that which prudent persons are accustomed to employ, and which varies according to the various circumstances or the quality of the business, person, place, etc., e.g., it will be greater in a priest for duly carrying out his office than in a rustic, greater where the goods of life are at stake than those of fortune, where there is notable harm to a third party than where there is small harm.

Vincible ignorance is blameless if it ought not to be removed;— blameworthy indeed if it ought to be. Moralists, however, attending only to what is owed and not owed, promiscuously use the terms blameworthy and vincible, and often call vincible ignorance that which is blameworthy, and call invincible that which is blameless¹.

Invincibilis can arise from two sources: either because one has not thought at all about the truth to be sought or about the danger of erring (for the first idea is not within a person’s power), or because, if one has thought and applied diligence, one still has not arrived at the truth. Hence it is not voluntary.

On the other hand, vincible ignorance is voluntary either directly and in itself, as when someone wishes to be ignorant; or only indirectly, from negligence, as when one omits to inquire while one ought to inquire; or only in its cause, if one wills something to which ignorance follows (e.g., drunkenness). There are, moreover, many degrees of it, which are commonly reduced to three: a) ignorance strictly or simply vincible when diligence is employed to overcome it but not sufficient or not all that is morally possible, or not all that the quality of the affair and of the person demands: it is indirectly voluntary; b) crass when no or scarcely any diligence was employed to acquire knowledge, and supine if it was so [employed] to drive away ignorance: it is voluntary, either indirectly, or in its cause; c) affected, malicious, or directly willed, when someone expressly and deliberately wishes to be ignorant for whatever end: whether to act at will and not be drawn back from a purpose, or to have an excuse in sins committed or to be committed, or out of weariness, etc., especially if he studiously wishes not to know so that he may not be drawn back from sinning but may sin more freely.

3) By reason of the act of the will, at once in regard to the ignorance and in regard to the deed.², ignorance is:

a) Antecedent [ignorance] which does not follow from the will but precedes its act, and yet is for it the cause of willing and acting what (according to the present disposition) it would not will or do if knowledge were present. Hence ignorance is a cause of the deed because it removes the knowledge which would impede the deed, e.g., if someone, thinking he is killing a wild beast, kills a friend whom he would not have killed had he known: such a one acts from involuntary ignorance. For every antecedent ignorance is invincible, but not conversely, because the invincible is not always a reason for doing what otherwise would not be done.

b) Concomitant [ignorance] which precedes the act of the will and is joined to it, yet not as a cause of willing and doing what is done, because even if it were not present, the deed would nonetheless be done (according to the present disposition), e.g., if someone, thinking he is killing a wild beast, kills an enemy whom he would also have killed had he known: such a person acts with involuntary ignorance. It is also invincible.

c) Consequent is that which in some way follows from an act of the will directly unwilling or indirectly negligent, and it is directly or indirectly voluntary and at the same time precedes the work so that it can be a cause of willing and doing it, e.g., if someone voluntarily neglects to inquire about the danger of killing a man whom, if he knew, he would not kill, or about the day of abstinence when, if he knew abstinence was required, he would abstain: such a one acts from voluntary ignorance. Consequent is vincible, as being voluntary; whether it be vincible at the moment the work is done, or was once vincible, provided the work was foreseen and on account of it the ignorance ought to have been guarded against — otherwise it would be invincible with respect to the work although in itself vincible, and therefore antecedent or concomitant with respect to the work that is done.

82. Principles. 1. Antecedent ignorance removes the voluntary with respect to that which is ignored, because it is invincible; indeed it renders the act positively involuntary simply, because it makes something against the habitual inclination of the will: for the act would not be done if the ignorance were absent. Whence: what is done from antecedent involuntary ignorance is positively and simply involuntary; therefore such ignorance excuses.

We have said: according to that which is unknown, for under another respect it can be voluntary: thus he who kills a man or a friend, thinking it to be a beast or an enemy, voluntarily shoots the arrow, but does not shoot it at the man or the friend, and he who sins with a woman, not knowing that she is joined in marriage, although not of adultery, is nevertheless guilty of fornication.

II. Concomitant ignorance removes the voluntary because it is invincible, but it does not render the act positively involuntary, because it is not against the inclination of the will, and the act would occur even if the ignorance were absent; it therefore makes the act non-voluntary. Hence: what is done with concomitant involuntary ignorance is non-voluntary, and of this ignorance it is said: it does not accuse, nor does it wholly excuse, namely, from the habitual disposition of the will.

III. Consequent ignorance does not make an act simply involuntary, but renders the work simply voluntary, because it itself is vincible and voluntary. It does, however, make in general (even if it be affected) something involuntary in a qualified sense, because it is against some inclination of the will, insofar as it is the cause of doing that which would not be done with knowledge present; hence it diminishes the voluntary and sin according to the degree of vincibility, so that even sometimes it makes a mortal sin venial.

But it should be well noted: ignorance that is exceptional in being voluntary in no way diminishes, if indeed it be so affected as that one precisely chooses it in order to sin more freely or so as not to be held back from sin: this, namely, in no way makes something involuntary, nor accordingly diminishes the voluntary and the sin, but rather increases it, not by reason of itself but by reason of the cause, because a greater disposition toward evil is present. For then, from the greater intensity or more intense inclination of the will toward sinning, it comes about that someone wishes to undergo ignorance.

Hence: what is done from voluntary or consequent ignorance is simply voluntary, but ordinarily involuntary in a certain respect, and then less voluntary. That ignorance does not excuse, but accuses.

83. Observations. — 1. The general doctrine on ignorance is briefly expressed in canon 2202, § 1: “A violation of an unknown law is in no way imputed if the ignorance was inculpable; otherwise, culpability is diminished more or less according to the culpability of the ignorance itself.”

2. What we have said about ignorance can be applied to inadvertence and forgetfulness, and to error. Error includes ignorance; full inadvertence and perfect forgetfulness are equated with invincible ignorance; but if they are not perfect but arise from negligence, they are equated with vincible ignorance. Hence canon 2202, § 3: "What is established about ignorance also holds for inadvertence and error."