Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. I-II, q. 5.

43. Thesis I. Man is capable of attaining even supernatural beatitude; — yet he cannot achieve this by natural powers, but by the aid of divine grace he is able to obtain it, and indeed in varying degree. — It is proved:

1° Man is capable of attaining even supernatural beatitude, because he is capable of perfect good, since his intellect can know universal and perfect good and his will can desire it (a. 1). This is of faith, explicitly defined in the Council of Vatican, session 3, ch. 2, can. 3; and it is included in the fact that the vision of God is the ultimate end of man, which is of faith from the Council of Florence, from Benedict XII, and from the Council of Trent, session 25.

2° Yet it cannot attain supernatural beatitude by natural powers. It is de fide from Council of Vienne, year 5, and from Council of Orange II, canons 7, 10, 18, 19, 20 (Cf. Vatican I, session 3, canon 3; and proposition 11 of Baius condemned). To see God through His essence is above the nature not only of man but of every creature. For natural knowledge is proportioned to the nature of the knower and therefore occurs according to the mode of the knower. Every knowledge that occurs according to the mode of a created substance cannot know God as He is in Himself but falls short of the vision of the divine essence, which infinitely exceeds every created substance. Hence neither man nor any creature can attain supernatural beatitude by natural powers, but needs the help of divine grace (John 1:18; 6:46; Matt. 11:27; 1 Cor. 2:11; 1 John 4:12). — From this it also follows that we cannot attain beatitude immediately by the action of creatures but only of God alone, although we can be helped by them ministerially so that we are disposed toward its attainment (a. 5 and 6; I, q. 12, a. 4).

3° A man can obtain beatitude in varying degree so that one is more blessed than another, not indeed according to objective beatitude, because there is only one Supreme Good, God, by the enjoyment of whom all are blessed, but as regards possession and enjoyment, because insofar as someone enjoys God more, he is more blessed. Moreover, it happens that one person enjoys God more perfectly than another, from the fact that he is better disposed or ordered to His enjoyment according to the diversity of grace and charity and merits (a. 2). This also is of faith from the Council of Florence (decree of union) and from the Council of Trent, session 6, ch. 16, can. 32 (Cf. John XIV, 2: 1 Cor. XV, 41-42).

44. Thesis II. Perfect beatitude is not possible in the present life but only in the next life. This is of faith from the Council of Vienne, article 4 (cf. Benedict XII, and the Second Council of Orange). — It is proved:

1. From the notion of beatitude in the abstract: Beatitude, since it is a perfect and sufficient good, excludes every evil and fulfills every desire. But in this life a) not every evil is excluded, such as ignorance on the part of the intellect, disordered affection and concupiscence on the part of the appetite, infirmity and afflictive toil on the part of the body; — b) not every desire is fulfilled, since goods are essentially unstable, even spiritual ones, such as virtue which is liable to vice because of the mutability of freedom, and knowledge which is lost through forgetfulness, indeed even earthly life itself, while yet we would wish to remain perpetually and naturally flee death (art. 3).
2. From the notion of beatitude in the concrete: a) The vision of God in Himself is now impossible (I Tim. VI, 16; I Cor. XIII, 12; I John III, 2); indeed even the perfect natural knowledge of the highest truth and of God is impossible, because it is subject to many impediments and difficulties, is often obscured and mingled with doubts and errors, nor does it give the certainty of permanence without which happiness is not had. b) The will on earth is not so firmly established in goods that it never turns aside from the true object of beatitude and sins, but it is hindered by the desires and necessities of the present life from being borne ceaselessly toward God with the highest love.

Nonetheless, in this life there can be an inchoate or imperfect happiness, and a state of inchoate perfection and imperfect blessedness, which approaches more or less to perfect blessedness and consists in knowledge, love, and imitation of God, or in rectitude of will and operation of virtue, for which the goods of the body and the help of other men are required, as it were, instrumentally (q. 4, a. 7): these afford man the friendship of God and the joy flowing therefrom, peace of conscience and tranquility of heart, and hope of future blessedness, which surpass all earthly delights. It is therefore a way and a tending toward perfect blessedness or God; just as an intermediate end naturally and necessarily tends to the ultimate end whose goodness it participates in.

45. Thesis III. Beatitude can be obtained from God by good works of the present life that precede it. It is of faith from the Second Council of Orange, ch. 18; the Fourth Lateran Council, ch. 1, and the Council of Trent, session 6, ch. 16, canon 32.

Thus it does not happen necessarily: for absolutely, God could have immediately given beatitude and at the same time disposed man toward it, i.e., in the same moment could have made the will rightly tending toward the ultimate end and obtaining it, just as in an instant He can simultaneously dispose matter and infuse form (e.g., in the resurrection of the dead). But He did not do so, as is evident from the fact that we do not attain beatitude in the present life. And moreover, the order of divine wisdom requires that it not be done so.

It is proved: For to have perfect good without motion and a preceding disposition belongs to one who naturally possesses it. Only God naturally possesses beatitude. Therefore it is proper to God that He is not moved and disposed toward beatitude through a preceding operation. And so, since beatitude exceeds every created nature, no pure creature fittingly obtains beatitude without the motion of a preceding operation through which it tends toward it; and thus beatitude becomes the reward of virtuous operation (a. 7).

Hence in the Scriptures they are consistently exhibited, both good works as reason and title on account of which eternal glory is granted (Mt. XXV, 21; 34-36; II Cor. IV, 17) in the same way as punishment is given for evils (Rom. III, 7, 8), and eternal glory as reward for the works of the just (Mt. V, 12; XIX, 29) and recompense of the heavenly inheritance (Col. III, 24; Hebr. X, 35; XI, 16), as prize (I Cor. IX, 24; Phil. III, 14), crown (Iac. I, 12; Apoc. II, 10), indeed crown of justice (II Tim. IV, 8) which is proportioned to works, greater or lesser (Mt. XXV, 14 sq.; Luc. XIX, 11. sq.; II Cor. IX, 6; Gal. VI, 8; Apoc. XXII, 12). Hence the Apostle, I Cor. XV, 58, says: Labor in the Lord is not in vain.

46. Corollary: Earthly life is a way to an end and beatitude. — Earthly life, therefore, since it is to be ended, is not a state of ultimate perfection and happiness, but a way by which we ought to tend to that through our acts. For exercising those acts:

1) For attaining the natural end man would have

a) internal means namely, human nature itself with its powers, especially reason and free will, and moral virtues, acquired by their aid, for working good more easily under God's ordinary motion;

b) the external means: society whose purpose is to promote man toward good both spiritual and temporal.

2. In the present order, however, God has granted us, for the supernatural end,

a) The means internal proportioned to this end, namely, grace both habitual with the virtues theological and moral infused and connected with the gifts of the Holy Spirit, gifts connected, and both actual of the intellect as well as the will and special motion of the Holy Spirit;

b) the external means externum: the supernatural society, the Church, whose institutor and head is Christ, and which leads men to the supernatural end by the proposal of faith, laws, and sacraments.