Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. I-II, q. 3; C. Gent. III, 25, 26, 37, 40, 44.

30. State of the question. — Beatitude formal (Εὐδαιμονία) is the possession or enjoyment of the Highest Good. The Highest Good is God. Since, however, God is a good distinct from us and external, we will not be blessed unless we are in some way joined to Him Himself. Hence, although as to cause or object it is something uncreated, beatitude itself nonetheless according to essence or form is something created existing in man himself. Whence it is now asked in what created manner that attainment is brought about, or what that union with God may be by which subjective beatitude is constituted (q., 3.a. 2).

31. Thesis I. Formal beatitude consists in the most perfect knowledge of God and the consequent love that a man can acquire according to his capacity. — It is proved:

1° Formal beatitude consists in the conscious union of ourselves with the beatifying object, God. But God, being immaterial, cannot be attained directly and formally by sense but only by mind, i.e., by the immaterial faculties, intellect and will: for He is an intelligible good, not a sensible one. Therefore formal beatitude cannot consist except in an act of intellect and will, that is, in knowledge and love. Moreover, this knowledge is relatively most perfect according to each one's capacity, so that nothing remains for him to desire; otherwise it would not be our ultimate perfection or true beatitude.

2° From St. Thomas after Aristotle: Formal beatitude consists in an act, not of the lower and sensitive part, but of the intellective part, and indeed in the contemplation of God and the ensuing love. For a) it is not in potency or in habit, but in act, because the ultimate perfection of man is in act and in operation which is the ultimate act of the operator: since potency is ordered to act, nothing is perfect unless it is in second act. Hence a thing is said to exist for the sake of operation (a. 2); b) it is in an operation, not of the sensitive part which man has in common with brutes and by which he cannot be united to God; — but in the operation of the most excellent part which is most proper to man, namely the intellective part (a. 3);

c) It consists in the best operation of the intellectual part, namely, with respect to the best object: spiritual faculties are only fully perfected and satisfied when they fully attain this object, through contemplation of the Highest Truth and enjoyment of the Highest Good. Therefore, happiness consists in knowledge and love of God; and indeed in the highest degree possible (a. 5).

3° "Everything tends toward divine likeness as toward its own end (or its own good. For every being is perfect insofar as it participates, as far as it can, in the goodness of the highest good). Therefore that by which each thing is most assimilated to God is its ultimate end. But the intellectual creature is most assimilated to God by the very fact that it is intellectual: for it has this likeness above all other creatures, and this includes all others. In the genus of this likeness, moreover, it is more assimilated to God insofar as it actually understands... God Himself, for God, by understanding Himself, understands all other things. Therefore, to understand God is the ultimate end of every intellectual substance" (C. Gent. III, 25).

4° Hence Scripture and the Fathers call the end of man eternal life. But life is the movement of the living thing proceeding from itself, and it is not in a habit but in an operation: namely, the vital operation by which one lives in second act. This life is the knowledge of God, according to John XVII, 3; it is the love of charity (I Cor. XIII, 8-13) and intimate friendship (Rev. XIX, 7; XXI); and in this consists our beatitude (Mt. V, 8; XXV, 21, 34, 46).

32. Thesis II. In the present order of Providence, beatitude is not natural, consisting in the mere abstract, mediate, and analogical knowledge of God, however perfect it may be, but supernatural, consisting in the immediate, intuitive, and proper vision of the divine essence.

The natural end is that to which we would have been destined, if God had not by His gratuitous goodness elevated us to a supernatural end, the vision of Himself in Himself. Moreover, the natural end is the attainment of God known by reason alone, or the abstractive contemplation of God through creatures, but in the most perfect manner possible by our powers, namely, through a knowledge of the whole universe so perfect that nothing would remain naturally knowable: for if nature possesses all things to which it can attain by its own powers, then all its absolute desires are already fulfilled and nothing remains to be desired. This is our natural happiness, owed to nature.

Now, however, we are destined for a supernatural end beyond the exigencies and powers of our nature, namely, to see God in an intuitive manner, face to face, without intermediary, i.e., to see and love God and enjoy Him in the same way (although not to the same degree) as God sees and loves Himself and enjoys Himself, so that we participate in the very divine life (S. Th. I, q. 62, a. 1; Q. D. de Ver. 27, a. 2).

Thus we shall have happiness not only natural, but we shall be partakers of the very divine happiness itself.

It is proved: 1° From the Scriptures. a) St. Paul, describing the state of final perfection, teaches that it consists in the vision of God, face to face (I Cor. XIII, 12). The phrase: face to face, from Hebrew usage, always indicates the presence of person to person, and to see face to face signifies intuitive vision in itself, especially since it is opposed to mediate knowledge (through a mirror), and to imperfect and obscure knowledge (in a riddle), and to analogical knowledge (in part). Whence the Apostle adds: then I shall know even as I am known i.e. by God; but God sees us intuitively; therefore we too shall see God intuitively.

b) St. John, who said that eternal life is the knowledge of God (XVII, 3), adds that we will see God as He is, because we will be like God (1 John III, 2), who sees Himself; but God sees Himself intuitively; therefore we too, being like Him, will see Him in that way.

2° From Tradition, whose witnesses are Benedict XII in the Const. Ben. Deus (1336), and the Council of Florence (for the Greeks) after the Council of Vienne (a. 5), which define as a dogma of faith that beatitude is the vision of God. This, moreover, is supernatural, as we know from the Vatican Council, sess. 3, c. 2 and can. 3.

3° With these things established, from reason St. Thomas proves that the natural end can no longer satisfy man, nor therefore be perfect happiness: Man is not perfectly blessed as long as there remains to him something to be desired and sought. But the intellect seeks perfect knowledge of the very essence of things: thus, seeing an effect, it naturally desires to know perfectly the very essence of the cause, insofar as is possible for it. But the human intellect knows the effects of God and so knows that God exists. Hence there remains to it a natural desire to know perfectly the very essence of God (which we know to be possible from revelation), and so it is not yet perfectly blessed unless it sees Him¹ (a. 8).

It follows, then, that natural beatitude is not happiness simply and absolutely perfect, as not being the whole happiness possible in itself which can befall man, but is only perfect in a certain respect and relatively, for the natural state alone; — in the supernatural order, however, of elevation to the intuitive vision of God, it can no longer in any sense be called perfect. Whence the Scholastics are not wont to call the natural ultimate end perfect happiness, but they reserve that name for the supernatural ultimate end of the vision of God.

33. Thesis III. Beatitude, although according to its physical essence it embraces, as it were, three acts of vision, love, and fruition, nevertheless according to its logical or metaphysical essence consists solely in the knowledge of God.

The opinion of St. Thomas is that, while Scotus places beatitude solely in the act of love, St. Albert the Great, however, St. Bonaventure, and Suarez require both acts of intellect and will. In beings, essence can be considered in two ways: a) completely and concretely, as the complex of all the elements which constitute a thing in its species and distinguish it from others, and this is the physical essence; b) abstractly and in its fundamental element, as the perfection which first and of itself constitutes a thing and distinguishes it from others and is the root of all that pertains to a thing, and this is the metaphysical or logical essence. These notions can be applied to beatitude, but analogically, because it is not a being of itself but only an action and hence an accident. Now we say that beatitude, if considered completely according to all essential and necessary elements, comprises an act not only of intellect but also of will; but if it is considered according to its fundamental element, as the very attainment of the supreme good from which other goods flow, or as the action by which man primarily attains and possesses the supreme good, we say that it is only an act of intellect.

It is proved 1° Negatively: Beatitude does not consist in an act of the will, namely of love or joy, because this cannot be the attainment of the highest good. For the will is inclined toward something and terminates at the thing by affection alone, touching it, however, not effectively and really. But even if one says that the will in love and joy terminates at God in a certain manner, still it does not do so except through something previously known by the intellect; hence joy does indeed presuppose the possession of the good, but it does not constitute that possession as such, and consequently it does not constitute beatitude. What is more, the very object of joy, namely the good possessed, is presupposed as attained, and attainment is the very essence of beatitude; therefore joy and love lie outside the essence of beatitude, as consequences of it. Yet in the attainment of the highest good there is included the very vision of God, for it is impossible that the end be attained by an act of the will alone, when the end itself is not present to the one attaining it; for one cannot love what is not known in some way. But since the will, even after the vision, loves God, and this love is ordained to the vision as its foundation, the attainment must be attributed to the vision itself, which presents the object to be loved, and not to the love, which presupposes the presentation. Thus the opinion of Scotus is refuted, who placed beatitude in an act of the will. — Nor does the objection hold that the will by its own nature tends toward a universal good, and hence can attain the highest good. For this inclination is toward the good in general, and it is satisfied not by any particular good, but only by that which is universally good, namely God Himself; yet the will does not attain God as He is in Himself, but only as He is proposed by the intellect; and hence, if the intellect does not see Him as He is in Himself, the will is not satisfied, but remains with a desire — not, indeed, a desire that is efficacious and unqualified, but merely inefficacious and conditioned, of seeing « if it were possible », which desire does not impede beatitude and ought not to be fulfilled, since that is naturally impossible. — But if you were to say that such a restriction is not added by St. Thomas, and hence is not to be supplied in his argumentation, then the argument would have to be regarded either as one of mere fittingness, not as apodictic, or as showing that special obediential potency which is naturally in man and by which he can be elevated to the vision of the divine essence.

Inclination, however, is not the attainment of the good; otherwise, intensely willing something would suffice for possessing it (a. 4).

And indeed every act of the will toward the good is either an inclination toward an absent good, and then it is not an attainment of the thing; or a resting in a present good, and then it presupposes already possession and attainment. Thus in particular: enjoyment or rest in a possessed good does not produce possession of the good but follows upon it; desire is a tendency toward an absent good; and love abstracts from the presence and absence of the good, and by it, accordingly, no present good comes to be. Therefore no act of the will makes us possess God, nor is it the essence of beatitude.

2° Positively and assertively: Beatitude consists, at least partially, in an act of the intellect.

For the essence of beatitude is the act of the power most proper to man and most noble. This, however, is the intellect, both because its object is more universal, simpler, more immaterial, and more abstract, and because it is the power closer to the soul and from which the will itself arises. Therefore (a. 5).

Nor should you say that the will is nobler, which itself moves the intellect. For, on the contrary, "first and per se the intellect moves the will: a) For the will, insofar as it is of this sort, is moved by its object, which is the apprehended good; but the will moves the intellect as it were accidentally, insofar as the very act of understanding is apprehended as good and thus is desired by the will. From which it follows that the intellect actually understands, and in this very fact precedes the will: for the will would never desire to understand, unless the intellect first apprehended the very act of understanding as good. b) And again, the will moves the intellect to operate in act in the manner in which the end moves, for the understood good is the end of the will. But the agent is posterior in moving than the end, for the agent does not move except for the sake of the end. Whence it appears that the intellect is simply higher than the will, but the will is higher than the intellect accidentally and in a certain respect" (C. Gent. III, 26).

3° Positively and exclusively: Beatitude consists solely in an act of the intellect. — For:

a) The essence of happiness is the attainment of the highest good, which is an intelligible good. But the highest intelligible good cannot be possessed except by the act of the intellect alone: for the will is borne toward an object outside itself, and is only an inclination toward it, while the intellect apprehends the object and draws it to itself and thus makes it present to itself and is joined to it really and effectively, and so truly possesses it. Therefore the essence of happiness is obtained not by the will but by the intellect alone.

b) The essence of beatitude is the first act which truly attains God Himself and the root of all other things which are required for beatitude. But this is only the act of the intellect, because it first attains God and is the root from which love and joy necessarily arise. Therefore the essence of beatitude is only the act of the intellect, not of the will (a. 4).

34. Corollaries. — From the foregoing, it can be concluded with St. Thomas:

a) Beatitude consists more in the speculative intellect than in the practical (a. 5), which is evident from three points: 1° because the best object of the intellective power is the divine good, which is not the object of the practical intellect but of the speculative; hence beatitude consists chiefly in the contemplation of divine things; — 2° because contemplation is sought most for its own sake, while the act of the practical intellect is not sought for its own sake but for the sake of action; and actions themselves are ordered to some end. Hence it is clear that the ultimate end cannot consist in the active life but in the contemplative; — 3° because in the contemplative life man shares with higher beings, namely with God and the angels, to whom he is made like through beatitude; but in those things which pertain to the active life, even animals share in some way with man. And therefore the ultimate and perfect beatitude consists wholly and principally in contemplation.

b) Yet beatitude does not consist in human speculative sciences (a. 6).

c) Nor does it consist in the knowledge of spirits (a. 7).

35. Observations. — 1° Love joins to God in a new and thus more perfect way, but only affectively, not however really. And although the will tends toward the possession of God, it tends to this mediately, through the act by which God can be possessed, namely, through the act of cognition.

2° Beatitude is the object of the will, as something appetible, not, however, as something attainable. Likewise, beatitude is the attainment of the ultimate end, not as a good appetible that attracts the will, but as really possessed by the intellect.

3° The act of the intellect is ordered to love and delight, not as a means to an end, but as a cause to an effect and as an essence to its consequent property.

4° Beatitude is the ultimate perfection by way of attainment of the good, not however by way of a property and complement.

5° The metaphysical essence ought not to be the highest good, nor fulfill all desires, nor render [men] perfectly blessed formally, but only radically and fundamentally: in the same way, rationality alone does not render man perfect formally but fundamentally.

6th The act of the will is more perfect than the act of the intellect in moral perfection, but not in physical and natural perfection, except in some way accidentally; and it is never more perfect in the order of attainment and possession.

7th For the beatific vision, there is required on the part of our intellect the divine light of glory, which elevates and strengthens the intellect and renders it capable of beholding God (Council of Vienne, art. 5); on the part of the object no intelligible species is required. These matters are explained in dogmatic theology.

8th The beatific vision is not due to nature, because no innate appetite is given for obtaining it, but only a elicited natural appetite, not efficacious, however, but inefficacious and conditioned, i.e., insofar as that vision is possible; for the rational creature alone is innate an immediate obediential potency, which by positive ordination does not demand the vision of God nor incline toward it, but which is apt to be elevated to seeing God. As is explained in the same dogmatics.

9th Beatitude does not consist in God’s inflow into the essence of the soul (as Henry of Ghent and John of Ripa held), because only operation renders us perfect and conscious of the possession of God; — nor in the uncreated vision of God communicated to a creature (as the Master of Good Hope willed): for an act ought to be from what is intrinsic and proceed from the one operating; the action of God is not intrinsic to us and does not proceed from us; therefore it does not render us blessed nor seeing God.