Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. I-II, q. 2; C. Gent. III, 27-33, 48; Comp. theol. II, 9.

21. Thesis I. The beatitude of man, according to Catholic doctrine, does not consist in created goods, whether external or internal, of body or soul, whether all these are taken distributively or collectively.

That which is to be proved part by part. For the proof, one must consider the conditions required for beatitude, which are not found in the aforesaid goods. For beatitude is a state made perfect by the aggregation of all goods, or the stable possession of a perfect good which entirely quiets the soul. Hence, for some good to be able to bless a man, perfectly complete and satisfy him, it must be a) perfect in itself, that is, ultimately desirable for its own sake and not for the sake of something else, b) sufficient and supreme, that is, fulfilling all the legitimate aspirations of the intellect and will, c) stable and unfailing. These things being posited, it must be said that man cannot attain his beatitude in created goods: whether external goods of fortune, — or of the body, — or of the soul, which although they are desirable in many respects, lack the three aforesaid conditions (q. 2, a. 4).

**22. The first part A is proved: ** Happiness does not consist in external goods, such as riches, dignities, honors, fame, glory, power, etc. For these: a) Are not desirable in themselves, but only for the sake of something else, namely, for man, insofar as they either help in acquiring goods of the soul or of the body: thus riches are sought to sustain life or to enjoy pleasures, power is given for the sake of the commonwealth and serves happiness as a means; or rather they presuppose and follow upon perfection: thus honors, fame, and glory do not make excellence but presuppose some excellence to be in man, of which they are a sign and testimony. b) Are not sufficient because they do not exclude every evil, since they are common to the good and the bad, nay, from them evil can arise: for often the more riches abound and

honors all the more inflame desire; not rarely, too, after some time, they bring on nausea and weariness, and moreover they are indifferent to good and evil so that one can use them badly, whence perfection is more in their good use than in themselves; — besides, those who have all these things can lack many other things necessary for happiness, such as bodily health, wisdom, tranquility of mind, etc. Therefore they do not fulfill all legitimate human aspirations. c) Nor are they stable: for they are easily lost through some misfortune; hence they are acquired with labor, retained with anxiety and the worry of fear, lost with sorrow, and at length at the time of death they pass away. d) Happiness is acquired by inner principles, i.e., by our studious acts of intellect and will, and perfects man intrinsically, since man is naturally ordered to it; but these are more from external causes, indeed often from fortune.

That the Scriptures teach: concerning riches, Mt. V, 3; Eccli. XXXI, 8; Eccl. V, 9; Ps. LXI, 11; concerning honor, III Reg. X, 24 and XI, 4; concerning fame and glory, Is. XL, 6 sq.; concerning power, Sap. VI, 1 sq.

23. The 1st part B is proved: Beatitude does not consist in goods of the body, which consist in health, strength, vigor, beauty, sensual pleasure, and delight of the senses: a) By their nature they are subordinated to goods of the soul, whence they are not to be sought for their own sake; nor are they truly useful except insofar as they serve the operations and perfection of the soul. The very being of the body is not the end, because it is not the highest good: for the being of the soul is principal, because the being of the body depends on the soul and not vice versa. Whence goods of the body are ordered to the soul. b) They do not fulfill all of a man's legitimate desires, for they are common to brutes and men, nor do they accordingly satisfy the nobler appetites of the soul, nor do they constitute the proper end of man, nor do they exclude all evils but are common to goods and evils. Nay, when someone immoderately indulges in bodily delights, the powers of the mind are depressed, and man becomes like a brute, since he delights in the same pleasures and rests in them, against the right order of reason. Besides, delight by itself is not principally beatitude, but

accident of it, which follows total or partial beatitude; a fortiori bodily delight, which follows a sensible good pertaining to the body, and therefore is not man's perfect good.

c) Moreover, there is no one who has not experienced how uncertain and unstable these things are (cfr. Gen. III, 19; Sap. II, 1-9).

24. The first part is proved C: Happiness does not consist in goods of the soul.

a) It is not the very substance of the soul, because this is to be completed from without, as being in potency to act and to further perfection, e.g., wisdom and virtue, whence it is not the ultimate end of itself.

b) Not faculties or habits, because they are also in potency to act.

c) Not the acts themselves actus, because they are something finite. But human appetite tends to the universal and complete good; moreover, any good inherent to the soul itself, even an act, is a participated good and consequently a particularized one. Hence it is impossible that any of these be the ultimate end of man. — Furthermore, acts depend on their object, and therefore they are perfect and can satisfy human appetite only if they attain the universal true and the highest good, which cannot be found in finite things intrinsic to the soul. And therefore the very thing that makes us blessed is not a created good intrinsic to the soul, but exists outside the soul, although the very attainment and possession of it is an act of the soul.

Hence specifically beatitude is not wisdom and virtue, which otherwise in this life do not place us in possession of complete good. For virtue does not satisfy but makes the appetite right and can be lost; it is the way to beatitude, and happiness itself is the reward of virtue. Wisdom is the means of acquiring truth, tending toward total and perfect truth. But these are not able to perfectly quiet the appetite.

25. — The 2nd part is proved: Beatitude does not consist in created goods taken collectively.

Their inability to attain beatitude arises not from their quantity, but from their nature, intrinsic imperfection, and limitation, and therefore solely by accumulation.

Summa Theologiae Moralis I. — 3

cannot be removed. And no one has possessed or will be able to possess all these things at once. Cf. Eccli. I, 2; XII, 8; 13-14; Ps. LXXII; Eccl. II, 11; Sap. II; Mt. XVI, 21-26.

26. They object that there are many who care little about God and place happiness only in created things. — R. This moral perversion is a fact of humanity corrupted by sin. It is explained by a twofold cause: 1) from the fact that eternal goods, as invisible and future, seem more remote to us, and therefore affect the mind less; while, on the contrary, created goods, visible and present, appear nearer and procure actual delight. Nevertheless, right reason teaches that eternal and future goods are to be preferred to these transient and imperfect ones, and faith does so as well, as the Apostle warns, II Cor. IV, 17: "For that which is at present momentary and light of our tribulation, worketh for us above measure exceedingly an eternal weight of glory"; — 2) from the fact that men, by indulging in earthly pleasures against conscience, have become animal-like, pursuing sensual delights more than spiritual things; "but the animal man," says the Apostle, I Cor. II, 14, "perceiveth not the things that are of the Spirit of God." Yet reason shows that intellectual goods, as higher, are to be preferred to sensible ones, and that all sensible and earthly things will have an end; with these considerations, a man who intends to act rightly desires eternal happiness that will last forever¹

27. Thesis II. God alone is the true and complete beatitude of man. — It is proved:

1° Indirectly from the fact that happiness does not consist in any created good; therefore, in the uncreated good, God.

2° Directly: “For beatitude is the perfect good, which wholly quiets the appetite; otherwise it would not be the ultimate end, if something further remained to be desired. But the object of the will, which is the human appetite, is universal good, just as the object of the intellect is universal truth. From which it is clear that nothing can quiet man’s will except universal good; which is found in no created thing, but only in God, because every creature has participated goodness. Hence God alone can fill man’s will... Therefore in God alone does man’s beatitude consist” 1a 2ae q. 2, a. 8. Hence St. Augustine, Conf. Bk. I, n. 1: God, “You have made us for Yourself, and restless

our heart is restless until it rests in you.” Cf. Ps. 15, 2, 5, 10; 72, 25-26; 102, 5.

They object that the aforesaid argument does not hold. For the universal good is either abstract (universal in predicating), and then the conclusion does not follow, because such a good is found in any created good; — or it is a concrete or complete universal good (universal in being), and then there is a petitio principii, for the concrete universal good is nothing other than God. — Reply:

1) In the argument of St. Thomas, the universal good is taken abstractly, but not formally as abstract from concrete existence or as good in general, which can be some any good whatsoever; but most broadly as unlimited, and absolutely as every good, prescinding from the finite and the infinite and not contracted to this or that good². But the limited exists in individual created beings. Therefore these are not the universal good, which is the beatitude of man. The power of the intellect, namely, extends itself to every true thing, and therefore the power of the will to every good; whence it is not satisfied if it possesses one good, since it can still extend itself to another. Some participated and finite good does not exhaust the extension of the object; only the infinite good does that.

2) Even if the universal concrete good were understood, the argument could hold, by understanding the good not absolutely, but the complete good of man. But man is able to know not only the created and finite true but also the uncreated and infinite, and therefore he can also desire the uncreated or infinite good. Thus the complete good of man is not a finite but an infinite good.

28. Corollary. — From all these things it follows that the supreme happiness of man truly coincides with the ultimate end of the universe, and consists essentially in the attainment of this end; and not only in the same object but also in the same act of cognition and love, namely, in knowing, loving, and thereby glorifying God. Thus, while man pursues the glory of God, the primary end, by that very fact he promotes his own happiness, which is the secondary end, because the good of the creature ought to be subordinated to the good of the Creator as the ultimate end; — and by attaining his own good, he also glorifies God, and by tending toward his own good, by that very fact he tends toward the good of the universe. Hence the two ends are really conflated, but they differ in reason. The highest glory of God is our happiness, and our highest good cannot be anything other than His highest glory. Thus through happiness man fulfills the ultimate end of the universe, because

objective beatitude proximately seeks as its own good, but simultaneously ultimately as a divine good.

29. Observations. — 1st That God can be the object of human beatitude does not require a proportion of entity (i.e., of quantitative commensuration or equality) between human nature and God, but rather a proportion of objective relation and final ordering (of proportionality) suffices, i.e., the capacity and ordination of appetite to attaining Him. Suppl. III p. q. 92, a. 1, ad 6.

2nd In this sense, human appetite can in a certain way be called infinite according to object and appetition and relation and capacity, although subjectively, as regards existence, it is finite. Thus also subjective beatitude is a good of which man is capable as an intrinsic and inherent thing, and hence finite; objective beatitude is a good of which he is capable as an object, which is infinite. I-II, q. 2, a. 8, ad 3.

3rd Nevertheless, man does not desire God as something to be possessed in an infinite manner (which is impossible for a creature), but he tends toward possessing Him insofar as it is possible according to his own powers, namely, in varying degree according to each one’s own capacity, disposition, and preparation. Ibid., q. 3, a. 8, ad 2.

4th Man does not desire God as a mere means which he uses to make himself happy, as if God were a useful good that is loved only for the sake of something else, but as the highest good, the cause of happiness and the fountain of all perfection and the ultimate end, who is loved for his own sake and to whom man himself ultimately subordinates himself. A. v. does not so much seek God for the sake of happiness, but rather happiness for the sake of God.

5th On the part of the object, for man's beatitude no created goods essentially are required besides God, because He Himself is the infinite good capable of satisfying all appetitions. Yet there are several created goods, sensible and corporeal, which pertain to beatitude consequently, but as it were spontaneously follow from essential beatitude. For by virtue of divine possession, the blessed one will certainly have what he reasonably desires.

6th The beatitude of the soul is also the beatitude of all the sensitive and corporeal faculties. For man is truly one substantial being, one nature tending toward one end. And therefore the sensitive and vegetative parts do not have a diverse end exclusively proper to themselves, but are subordinated to the intellective part and attain their perfection and their true end when, in the attainment of the rational good, they perfectly serve and aid the higher part. Whence, when the rational part obtains its ultimate perfection in the possession of God, it reaches the end of the whole nature, and by that very fact the other parts are completed immediately or mediately in a manner proportioned to their nature. This will be perfectly accomplished in the other life after the resurrection, because there will no longer be any struggle between the human faculties but a perfect mutual subordination.