Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Thomas, I, q. 5; q. 44, a. 4; q. 103, a. 2; I-II, q. 1, a. 1, 2, 3; II-II, q. 145, a. 3; C. Gent. III, 1, 2, 3, 16, 17, 18, 19, 24.

9. The Notion of End. — End, etymologically, signifies any termination whatsoever, and thus death is called the end of life; in the strict sense, however, it designates that which finishes or terminates a tendency or action, upon the obtaining of which the agent ceases to act and rests from acting. But because a rational being directs itself to a terminus which it knows as good, therefore the end is also the cause which impels toward acting, insofar as it excites desire or appetite for itself and thus attracts the efficient cause to acting: “the end,” says St. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1, “although it is last (or terminus) in execution, is nevertheless first (or principle) in the intention of the agent, and in this way it has the nature of a cause,” indeed it is the first of all causes. Whence it is defined: that to which or for which, i.e., for the sake of which something is done.

It can be considered at the end: a) the thing which we desire to obtain (the end which or objective); b) its attainment or the action by which its possession is obtained (the end by which or formal); c) the person for whom the possession of the thing is desired (the end for whom or subjective); these three, however, are not distinct and separate ends in the concrete, but integrating elements of one total end: for we do not desire a thing except as to be possessed by someone.

10. Division of the End. — It is distinguished: 1) By reason of the subject, the end of the work or intrinsic, toward which the work by its own nature

is ordered, which is confused with the object: thus the alleviation of misery in respect of alms; — and the end of the agent, to which the agent orders the work or which he intends: this is sometimes the same as the end of the work, sometimes different, and then in relation to the object and the end of the work it is extrinsic and accidental, whether the former is intended first and is attached to the prior one (as if someone wills alms for the sake of mercy and the glory of God), or, with the former neglected, the latter alone is intended and directs the act (as alms given solely for fornication).

2) In terms of the term, the end is ultimate or intermediate: the former is that which is intended for its own sake and in which one rests, whether it be simply and absolutely ultimate i.e. in every kind of action and with respect to the whole of life, or whether it be ultimate in a certain respect i.e. in some series of actions, as health or victory in the operations of medicine or war; — but if it is referred to a further end, it becomes intermediate: this is intended for the sake of another end to which it is referred, as the relief of the poor is referred to the honor of God.

But the intermediate and the proximate end, the ultimate and the remote end, are not to be confused: proximate is that which is intended immediately, with no other end interposed; — remote is that which is intended by the will but through the mediation of another end; whence the ultimate end can be proximate or immediately intended, as happens in an act of charity.

3) By reason of causality or influx, the end (especially of the agent) is total or adequate if the agent acts for that alone, e.g., almsgiving out of mercy; — or partial or inadequate if he acts at the same time for another, e.g., out of mercy and vain glory. Partial* ends* either a) are equally principal if they exert equal collateral influx and move concomitantly to acting, so that each one suffices for positing the act (as going to the city for business and for an extraordinary spectacle); — or b) one is primary or motive and the other secondary or impulsive, according as the agent is moved to act by the former first and principally (as a priest about to celebrate Mass for the worship of God), or less principally, consecutively and subordinately with the other presupposed, even if he would not otherwise act (e.g., a priest celebrating at the same time for a stipend, who would not celebrate without the stipend).

4. In terms of effect, the end is called effect or product, or attained, insofar as it is made and produced by the operation of an agent, as health by the operation of a physician, or it is attained but not produced by the operation of an agent, since on the contrary it is brought about by another's intervention, as the prize of a contest. These ends do not differ according to final causality: for each moves insofar as it is in intention; but according to being, because one exists before the operation, although it is not yet attained, and is called antecedent, the other after the operation by which it is effected, and is called consequent.

II. The notion and division of the good.— That toward which a being tends as toward an end cannot be other than that which is suitable to it; likewise, nothing can move anyone to act unless it is known *as apt *to perfect him and appears suitable to him (whether it truly is suitable or merely in appearance); hence, end and good are the same in reality, although they are distinguished in concept¹.

By reason of perfection good is supreme or perfect, which fully perfects nature and is the absolutely ultimate end; and imperfect or participated, which in some respect perfects.

Now the division according to appetibility is threefold: a) the honorable or rational, which is in itself and for itself appetible to the rational nature and befits it: it is always the true good; b) the useful, which is appetible for the sake of another, insofar as it serves another, or helps toward attaining another, e.g., medicine for health; c) the delightful, which is appetible insofar as it quiets the appetite by its enjoyment; this can be an apparent and false good, if it is dishonorable: for even in dishonorable things we can take delight².

These three are diverse but not opposed, so that they can be found together: thus the exercise of virtue is in itself honorable, useful for salvation, and it procures delight.

12. What we suppose from dogmatic theology. — Besides the traditional notions, from real philosophy and dogmatic theology we suppose as known:

1° In producing the totality of things, God, as the end of the agent, necessarily intended His own intrinsic goodness—not to be increased, but to be communicated and manifested—and therefore God Himself is the first final cause, or the end for which, absolutely ultimate external end of the whole universe and of all creatures. Whence Prov. XVI, 4: The Lord hath made all things for Himself (Rom. XI, 36; Apoc. I, 8; XXI, 6; XXII, 13; Hebr. II, 10). This is of faith from the Council of Vatican, sess. 3, c. I³.

2° God also intended the end of the work, prefixed to the creatures themselves, and this to be His external glory, namely, the manifestation and glorification of His perfection through creatures. This is the primary end of all creatures (Ps. XVIII, 2; Is. VI, 3; XLIII, 7; Eccli. XVII, 7). It is de fide from the Council of Vatican, sess. 3, ch. I, can. 5.

3° All creatures procure this glory of God in their own proper manner, conformably to their own nature; specifically, irrational creatures procure only the objective glory, which consists in the representation and manifestation of the perfection of God which they share in, while rational creatures also procure the formal glory, by acknowledging, praising, and loving the divine perfection.

4° By positive will and gratuitous goodness, God has destined us for His supernatural glory, which is procured through habitual grace and infused virtues here on earth, and through the intuitive vision of God Himself in heaven (1 Cor 2:6-12 and 13:12; 1 John 3:2). This is de fide from the Council of Vienne, articles 4 and 5, and from Benedict XII, in the Constitution Ben. Deus, and from the Council of Vatican, session 3, chapter 2.

5° God moreover gave to each creature its own proper and internal end, proportioned to its nature, which is the very perfection or good of creatures, which when they attain, by that very fact as parts of the universe they concur toward the universal end of the whole created order and thus toward the glory of God. To the rational creature God gave as its proper end happiness. This is the end which is secondary, subordinated to the primary (Gen. I, 27 sq.; Wis. XI, 24-25, XII, 13; Ps. VIII, 5).

It is of faith from the Council of Vatican, session 3, chapter 2, and from the Fourth Lateran Council, chapter 1.

6° Man, unlike other beings that are moved and led to an end, properly and formally acts for an end, i.e., by knowing the end as such and by freely moving and leading himself to it by his will (S. Th. I-II, q. 1, a. 2).

13. The object of the treatise. — In the present treatise we do not inquire about the primary end of the universe, which man has in common with other creatures, but about the secondary end which is proper to man, namely, about his beatitude: for from the fact that he was created for the vision and glory of God, it is not yet affirmed that man's beatitude consists in this. And this end can be regarded in two ways: 1) externally and passively, insofar as it is fixed for man by the intention of the Creator, and this aspect is ontological and hence metaphysical and dogmatic; 2) internally and actively, insofar as man is inclined toward the end and ought to intend it by his own will and is morally obligated to this; and hence insofar as the end is the source and root and, as it were, the norm of human actions, and this aspect is psychological and moral. And in this sense we inquire about the end or beatitude of man. Moreover, it can be considered in two ways: a) formally and in the abstract, according to the very notion of the ultimate end (what it is); b) materially and in the concrete, according to the very thing which is the ultimate end (in what it consists). Now we do not inquire only about the end in the abstract, but especially about that in which it consists in the concrete.

14. Division of the treatise. — The treatise is divided into five questions: 1° on the ultimate end of man in general and beatitude in the abstract (what it is); 2° on objective beatitude (in what it consists); 3° on formal beatitude (what it is); 4° on the qualities or dowries of beatitude (what things are required for it); 5° on the manner of attaining beatitude (how it can be obtained).