Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Thomas, I, q. 5; q. 44, a. 4; q. 103, a. 2; I-II, q. 1, a. 1, 2, 3; II-II, q. 145, a. 3; C. Gent. III, 1, 2, 3, 16, 17, 18, 19, 24.

9. The Notion of End. — End, etymologically, signifies any termination whatsoever, and thus death is called the end of life; in the strict sense, however, it designates that which finishes or terminates a tendency or action, upon the obtaining of which the agent ceases to act and rests from acting. But because a rational being directs itself to a terminus which it knows as good, therefore the end is also the cause which impels toward acting, insofar as it excites desire or appetite for itself and thus attracts the efficient cause to acting: “the end,” says St. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1, “although it is last (or terminus) in execution, is nevertheless first (or principle) in the intention of the agent, and in this way it has the nature of a cause,” indeed it is the first of all causes. Whence it is defined: that to which or for which, i.e., for the sake of which something is done.

It can be considered at the end: a) the thing which we desire to obtain (the end which or objective); b) its attainment or the action by which its possession is obtained (the end by which or formal); c) the person for whom the possession of the thing is desired (the end for whom or subjective); these three, however, are not distinct and separate ends in the concrete, but integrating elements of one total end: for we do not desire a thing except as to be possessed by someone.

10. Division of the End. — It is distinguished: 1) By reason of the subject, the end of the work or intrinsic, toward which the work by its own nature

is ordered, which is confused with the object: thus the alleviation of misery in respect of alms; — and the end of the agent, to which the agent orders the work or which he intends: this is sometimes the same as the end of the work, sometimes different, and then in relation to the object and the end of the work it is extrinsic and accidental, whether the former is intended first and is attached to the prior one (as if someone wills alms for the sake of mercy and the glory of God), or, with the former neglected, the latter alone is intended and directs the act (as alms given solely for fornication).

2) In terms of the term, the end is ultimate or intermediate: the former is that which is intended for its own sake and in which one rests, whether it be simply and absolutely ultimate i.e. in every kind of action and with respect to the whole of life, or whether it be ultimate in a certain respect i.e. in some series of actions, as health or victory in the operations of medicine or war; — but if it is referred to a further end, it becomes intermediate: this is intended for the sake of another end to which it is referred, as the relief of the poor is referred to the honor of God.

But the intermediate and the proximate end, the ultimate and the remote end, are not to be confused: proximate is that which is intended immediately, with no other end interposed; — remote is that which is intended by the will but through the mediation of another end; whence the ultimate end can be proximate or immediately intended, as happens in an act of charity.

3) By reason of causality or influx, the end (especially of the agent) is total or adequate if the agent acts for that alone, e.g., almsgiving out of mercy; — or partial or inadequate if he acts at the same time for another, e.g., out of mercy and vain glory. Partial* ends* either a) are equally principal if they exert equal collateral influx and move concomitantly to acting, so that each one suffices for positing the act (as going to the city for business and for an extraordinary spectacle); — or b) one is primary or motive and the other secondary or impulsive, according as the agent is moved to act by the former first and principally (as a priest about to celebrate Mass for the worship of God), or less principally, consecutively and subordinately with the other presupposed, even if he would not otherwise act (e.g., a priest celebrating at the same time for a stipend, who would not celebrate without the stipend).

4. In terms of effect, the end is called effect or product, or attained, insofar as it is made and produced by the operation of an agent, as health by the operation of a physician, or it is attained but not produced by the operation of an agent, since on the contrary it is brought about by another's intervention, as the prize of a contest. These ends do not differ according to final causality: for each moves insofar as it is in intention; but according to being, because one exists before the operation, although it is not yet attained, and is called antecedent, the other after the operation by which it is effected, and is called consequent.

II. The notion and division of the good.— That toward which a being tends as toward an end cannot be other than that which is suitable to it; likewise, nothing can move anyone to act unless it is known *as apt *to perfect him and appears suitable to him (whether it truly is suitable or merely in appearance); hence, end and good are the same in reality, although they are distinguished in concept¹.

By reason of perfection good is supreme or perfect, which fully perfects nature and is the absolutely ultimate end; and imperfect or participated, which in some respect perfects.

Now the division according to appetibility is threefold: a) the honorable or rational, which is in itself and for itself appetible to the rational nature and befits it: it is always the true good; b) the useful, which is appetible for the sake of another, insofar as it serves another, or helps toward attaining another, e.g., medicine for health; c) the delightful, which is appetible insofar as it quiets the appetite by its enjoyment; this can be an apparent and false good, if it is dishonorable: for even in dishonorable things we can take delight².

These three are diverse but not opposed, so that they can be found together: thus the exercise of virtue is in itself honorable, useful for salvation, and it procures delight.

12. What we suppose from dogmatic theology. — Besides the traditional notions, from real philosophy and dogmatic theology we suppose as known:

1° In producing the totality of things, God, as the end of the agent, necessarily intended His own intrinsic goodness—not to be increased, but to be communicated and manifested—and therefore God Himself is the first final cause, or the end for which, absolutely ultimate external end of the whole universe and of all creatures. Whence Prov. XVI, 4: The Lord hath made all things for Himself (Rom. XI, 36; Apoc. I, 8; XXI, 6; XXII, 13; Hebr. II, 10). This is of faith from the Council of Vatican, sess. 3, c. I³.

2° God also intended the end of the work, prefixed to the creatures themselves, and this to be His external glory, namely, the manifestation and glorification of His perfection through creatures. This is the primary end of all creatures (Ps. XVIII, 2; Is. VI, 3; XLIII, 7; Eccli. XVII, 7). It is de fide from the Council of Vatican, sess. 3, ch. I, can. 5.

3° All creatures procure this glory of God in their own proper manner, conformably to their own nature; specifically, irrational creatures procure only the objective glory, which consists in the representation and manifestation of the perfection of God which they share in, while rational creatures also procure the formal glory, by acknowledging, praising, and loving the divine perfection.

4° By positive will and gratuitous goodness, God has destined us for His supernatural glory, which is procured through habitual grace and infused virtues here on earth, and through the intuitive vision of God Himself in heaven (1 Cor 2:6-12 and 13:12; 1 John 3:2). This is de fide from the Council of Vienne, articles 4 and 5, and from Benedict XII, in the Constitution Ben. Deus, and from the Council of Vatican, session 3, chapter 2.

5° God moreover gave to each creature its own proper and internal end, proportioned to its nature, which is the very perfection or good of creatures, which when they attain, by that very fact as parts of the universe they concur toward the universal end of the whole created order and thus toward the glory of God. To the rational creature God gave as its proper end happiness. This is the end which is secondary, subordinated to the primary (Gen. I, 27 sq.; Wis. XI, 24-25, XII, 13; Ps. VIII, 5).

It is of faith from the Council of Vatican, session 3, chapter 2, and from the Fourth Lateran Council, chapter 1.

6° Man, unlike other beings that are moved and led to an end, properly and formally acts for an end, i.e., by knowing the end as such and by freely moving and leading himself to it by his will (S. Th. I-II, q. 1, a. 2).

13. The object of the treatise. — In the present treatise we do not inquire about the primary end of the universe, which man has in common with other creatures, but about the secondary end which is proper to man, namely, about his beatitude: for from the fact that he was created for the vision and glory of God, it is not yet affirmed that man's beatitude consists in this. And this end can be regarded in two ways: 1) externally and passively, insofar as it is fixed for man by the intention of the Creator, and this aspect is ontological and hence metaphysical and dogmatic; 2) internally and actively, insofar as man is inclined toward the end and ought to intend it by his own will and is morally obligated to this; and hence insofar as the end is the source and root and, as it were, the norm of human actions, and this aspect is psychological and moral. And in this sense we inquire about the end or beatitude of man. Moreover, it can be considered in two ways: a) formally and in the abstract, according to the very notion of the ultimate end (what it is); b) materially and in the concrete, according to the very thing which is the ultimate end (in what it consists). Now we do not inquire only about the end in the abstract, but especially about that in which it consists in the concrete.

14. Division of the treatise. — The treatise is divided into five questions: 1° on the ultimate end of man in general and beatitude in the abstract (what it is); 2° on objective beatitude (in what it consists); 3° on formal beatitude (what it is); 4° on the qualities or dowries of beatitude (what things are required for it); 5° on the manner of attaining beatitude (how it can be obtained).

S. Th. I-II, q. 1; C. Gent. III, 1, 2, 3.

Assuming that man is not only, like irrational beings, moved and led toward an end, but properly and formally acts for the sake of an end, knowing it as an end and intending it voluntarily and freely, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas we establish the following theses¹ :

15. Thesis I. Man, in all deliberate and voluntary, that is, human actions, acts in his own manner for the sake of some end or good. — It is proved:

a) From the notion of the good: All actions which proceed from some power are caused by it according to the ratio of its object. But the object of the will is the good and the end. Hence it is necessary that voluntary or human acts be for the sake of an end (q. 1, a. 1).

b) From the notion of the end: In causes that are subordinated per se, of which one does not move unless it is moved by another, there is no infinite regress; rather, with the first removed, it is necessary that the others be removed. But the end is the first among causes, because nothing acts except from a determinate intention of the end: for if an agent were not determined to some effect, it would no more will or do this than that. Therefore all human acts depend on and are derived from the intention of the end, and so are done for the sake of the end (a. 2 and 4).

c) From induction Billuart brings forward the argument²: All human acts are elicited or commanded by the will. Elicited acts are concerned either with the end, and then they are for the sake of the end, which by its goodness allures the will to love it; or with means, and then they are also for the sake of the end, since the will does not will them except for the end. Likewise commanded acts, because the will commands them out of love of the end,

so that through them, as through means, it may attain the end. Therefore³

16. Corollary. — From this it follows that all human acts receive their species (at least physical) from the end, whether a) they are considered actively, as an action proceeding from the agent or a motion by which a man moves himself, and then they have their species from the formal principle; but the principle of the act of the will is its object, which is the good and the end (in intention); — or b) they are considered passively as a passion tending to something, and a motion by which a man is moved by himself to a terminus, and then they are specified by the terminus; but that to which a human act is terminated is what the will intends as the end (in execution) (a. 3).

17. Thesis II. Man in all deliberate acts, at least implicitly, acts for the ultimate end of the whole of life, at least abstractly and as conceived in common, or for the perfect good. — It is proved:

a) From the notion of the good: Everything that man desires, he desires under the aspect of the good; but the good is desired either as the perfect good that satisfies and is the ultimate end, or as a beginning and part of the perfect good, and therefore as tending toward the perfect good and the ultimate end, because a beginning is always ordered to its completion, just as every part is ordered to the whole (a. 6).

b) From the notion of the ultimate end: The ultimate end holds itself in moving the will as the first mover does in motions, because it is first in intention. But in movers, no infinite regress is given, because secondary movers do not move except insofar as they are moved by the first mover. Therefore, secondary goods or intermediate and subordinate ends do not move the appetite except in order to the perfect good, which

is the ultimate end (a. 6). — And indeed, if in ends there were granted an infinite process, and if all ends were intermediate and subordinate, there would be no end which the will would intend for its own sake and in which it would finally rest, no end from which the will would first begin to be moved, and consequently it would never will anything, never begin to operate anything; just as neither would an action once begun ever be terminated. And thus there would be no human act; and even if there were some act, it would be entirely vain (a. 6 and 4).

18. Thesis III. Man cannot simultaneously choose two ultimate ends, but only one.

This must be understood not only of the ultimate end formally taken and in the abstract, or of beatitude in general and the very notion of the highest good, which is evidently one; but also of the ultimate end materially taken in the concrete, i.e., of the thing in which man places his supreme good. Not indeed if the end is considered partially, because to it as parts there can concur several things collectively taken which together constitute one perfect and complete good; but if it were considered totally, because the notion of the highest good cannot be attributed to several things divisively and separately, so that man tends toward several disparate things as toward ultimate ends that are total and adequate, not subordinate to one another, as if each one alone without the others were the whole ultimate end. And therefore Christ says (Mt. VI, 24): No one can serve two masters, namely, ones not subordinate to each other.

It is proved: a) From the fact that the ultimate end has the character of the perfect: A person desires something as an ultimate end which he desires as a good perfect and completive of himself and fully satisfying (from the intention of the one desiring); otherwise he would not rest in it and it would not be the ultimate end; therefore the ultimate end so fills and satisfies the whole appetite of man that nothing outside itself is left to be desired.

And yet it would not fulfill nor fully satisfy if something beyond itself, namely another end, could be desired and required for its perfection.

Hence it cannot be that the will tends toward two things in such a way as if each were its perfect good and ultimate end.

It is confirmed: If there were two ultimate ends, neither would be the highest and full good of the one desiring, neither would perfectly satisfy the appetite, since, with one obtained, the other would still be desirable. Hence they would be simultaneously fully satisfied in power, because they are ultimate ends; and they would not be, because outside each one there would remain something to be desired that would not be subordinated to it, namely, the other end.

b) From the fact that the ultimate end has the nature of the first natural good: What is naturally desired cannot be but one, because nature is determined to one thing and tends only to one; hence, just as one thing has only one form and one species, so too there is only one natural inclination. But the ultimate end, or the supreme good, is naturally desired. Therefore, the ultimate end is one. The minor premise is established by internal experience, and it is also understood: just as in reason the principle is what is known as naturally implanted, so in the will the principle is what is desired by natural tendency; hence, the love of the end, or of the supreme good, is implanted in the will, because it is the principle among things desirable.

c) From the fact that the ultimate end has the character of the first specifying principle: In every genus of causing and operating, there is one principle from which all things are derived; otherwise, the genus would not be one. But all human acts constitute one genus of operating and causing, because all things appetible by the will are of one genus, namely, the good suitable to man; moreover, the ultimate end is the first principle in this genus because it is appetible for its own sake. Therefore, the ultimate end is one. — “Since voluntary actions receive their species from the end,” says St. Thomas, “it is necessary that they receive the character of genus from the ultimate end, which is common” (a. 5)

19. Thesis IV. The ultimate end of man is in reality happiness or beatitude. — It is proved: The ultimate end is the highest and perfect good of man. But beatitude or happiness is nothing other than the possession of this highest good, sufficient and complete, which ultimately perfects and terminates every tendency and fully satisfies and entirely stills all the appetite of the intellectual nature, which knowingly recognizes this its full sufficiency in the good and rejoices in it (I, q. 26, a. 1). Therefore the ultimate end of man is beatitude. Hence beatitude can be defined both objectively: the perfect good entirely stilling and satisfying the appetite (q. 2, a. 8), or the most complete good which completes the whole appetite of the rational agent, so that nothing remains to be desired, or the perfect and sufficient good, excluding every evil and fulfilling every desire (q. 5, a. 3), the ultimate perfection of the rational or intellectual nature (I, q. 62, a. 1); — and formally: the stable possession and rest in ultimate perfection, the possession of the perfect good which entirely stills our desire, or the state made perfect by the aggregation of all goods (Boethius).

That this beatitude truly exists and is possible for us is proved: Man by innate appetite and instinctive necessity tends toward perfect beatitude, so that it is impossible not to think of it frequently and not to desire it, or sincerely to will the opposite. But an innate appetite cannot be empty, otherwise our nature would be ill-constituted; moreover, it is repugnant to God's wisdom, truth, and goodness that He should have implanted in us an inclination and appetite toward something that does not exist or that we cannot attain. Therefore.

20. Corollaries. — 1. The end is the cause, origin, and root of all affections. This "can be declared more fully not only by the example of light, which, because it is the first and highest visible object, is the reason for seeing all distinctions of colors; or by the example of the motion of the heart, which, because it is the first motion of life, is the cause from which all vital motions flow; but still far more clearly by the comparison, very frequent in St. Thomas, of the intellect with the will. For thus the love of the ultimate end stands among appetible things, as the cognition of principles stands among intelligible things; whence just as first principles are the first things known, so beatitude or the ultimate end is the first thing willed. And just as we do not assent to particular conclusions except insofar as they cohere with first principles, so neither do we will particular goods except insofar as they are connected with the ultimate end, namely, beatitude. And finally, just as cognition of principles moves to all other cognitions, insofar as, illumined through it, we understand the rest, and therefore it is the root of all cognitions—indeed, the other cognitions are nothing but certain propagations and diffusions of that first light—so that first love of beatitude moves to other loves, insofar as, excited through it, we seek those things which lead to it, and it is the first root of all affections; indeed, the other affections are nothing but certain branches, offshoots, and diffusions of that first love; or lines born from this circumference, and terminated in its center, namely, beatitude. Whence Boethius, 3 de Cons., Prose 2, says splendidly: All the care of mortals, which the labor of manifold pursuits exercises, proceeds indeed by a different path, but still strives to arrive at one end of beatitude. And St. Augustine, l. 13 de Trin., c. 5: All men wish to be happy, and this they desire most ardently, and on account of this they desire other things. Thus Goudin, Phil. p. 3, q. 1, a. 1, § 1, concl. 2.

2. Beatitude can be considered: a) In the abstract, and thus it is the universal and complete good that man necessarily wills and cannot not will, and therefore in this all agree. b) In the concrete, for the thing whose possession should make us blessed and perfectly good, and thus man who does not possess it, freely tends toward it, because he does not necessarily see the necessary connection of this or that good with beatitude; whence under this respect men do not agree on the ultimate end (q. 5, a. 8; q. 1, a. 7).

S. Th. I-II, q. 2; C. Gent. III, 27-33, 48; Comp. theol. II, 9.

21. Thesis I. The beatitude of man, according to Catholic doctrine, does not consist in created goods, whether external or internal, of body or soul, whether all these are taken distributively or collectively.

That which is to be proved part by part. For the proof, one must consider the conditions required for beatitude, which are not found in the aforesaid goods. For beatitude is a state made perfect by the aggregation of all goods, or the stable possession of a perfect good which entirely quiets the soul. Hence, for some good to be able to bless a man, perfectly complete and satisfy him, it must be a) perfect in itself, that is, ultimately desirable for its own sake and not for the sake of something else, b) sufficient and supreme, that is, fulfilling all the legitimate aspirations of the intellect and will, c) stable and unfailing. These things being posited, it must be said that man cannot attain his beatitude in created goods: whether external goods of fortune, — or of the body, — or of the soul, which although they are desirable in many respects, lack the three aforesaid conditions (q. 2, a. 4).

**22. The first part A is proved: ** Happiness does not consist in external goods, such as riches, dignities, honors, fame, glory, power, etc. For these: a) Are not desirable in themselves, but only for the sake of something else, namely, for man, insofar as they either help in acquiring goods of the soul or of the body: thus riches are sought to sustain life or to enjoy pleasures, power is given for the sake of the commonwealth and serves happiness as a means; or rather they presuppose and follow upon perfection: thus honors, fame, and glory do not make excellence but presuppose some excellence to be in man, of which they are a sign and testimony. b) Are not sufficient because they do not exclude every evil, since they are common to the good and the bad, nay, from them evil can arise: for often the more riches abound and

honors all the more inflame desire; not rarely, too, after some time, they bring on nausea and weariness, and moreover they are indifferent to good and evil so that one can use them badly, whence perfection is more in their good use than in themselves; — besides, those who have all these things can lack many other things necessary for happiness, such as bodily health, wisdom, tranquility of mind, etc. Therefore they do not fulfill all legitimate human aspirations. c) Nor are they stable: for they are easily lost through some misfortune; hence they are acquired with labor, retained with anxiety and the worry of fear, lost with sorrow, and at length at the time of death they pass away. d) Happiness is acquired by inner principles, i.e., by our studious acts of intellect and will, and perfects man intrinsically, since man is naturally ordered to it; but these are more from external causes, indeed often from fortune.

That the Scriptures teach: concerning riches, Mt. V, 3; Eccli. XXXI, 8; Eccl. V, 9; Ps. LXI, 11; concerning honor, III Reg. X, 24 and XI, 4; concerning fame and glory, Is. XL, 6 sq.; concerning power, Sap. VI, 1 sq.

23. The 1st part B is proved: Beatitude does not consist in goods of the body, which consist in health, strength, vigor, beauty, sensual pleasure, and delight of the senses: a) By their nature they are subordinated to goods of the soul, whence they are not to be sought for their own sake; nor are they truly useful except insofar as they serve the operations and perfection of the soul. The very being of the body is not the end, because it is not the highest good: for the being of the soul is principal, because the being of the body depends on the soul and not vice versa. Whence goods of the body are ordered to the soul. b) They do not fulfill all of a man's legitimate desires, for they are common to brutes and men, nor do they accordingly satisfy the nobler appetites of the soul, nor do they constitute the proper end of man, nor do they exclude all evils but are common to goods and evils. Nay, when someone immoderately indulges in bodily delights, the powers of the mind are depressed, and man becomes like a brute, since he delights in the same pleasures and rests in them, against the right order of reason. Besides, delight by itself is not principally beatitude, but

accident of it, which follows total or partial beatitude; a fortiori bodily delight, which follows a sensible good pertaining to the body, and therefore is not man's perfect good.

c) Moreover, there is no one who has not experienced how uncertain and unstable these things are (cfr. Gen. III, 19; Sap. II, 1-9).

24. The first part is proved C: Happiness does not consist in goods of the soul.

a) It is not the very substance of the soul, because this is to be completed from without, as being in potency to act and to further perfection, e.g., wisdom and virtue, whence it is not the ultimate end of itself.

b) Not faculties or habits, because they are also in potency to act.

c) Not the acts themselves actus, because they are something finite. But human appetite tends to the universal and complete good; moreover, any good inherent to the soul itself, even an act, is a participated good and consequently a particularized one. Hence it is impossible that any of these be the ultimate end of man. — Furthermore, acts depend on their object, and therefore they are perfect and can satisfy human appetite only if they attain the universal true and the highest good, which cannot be found in finite things intrinsic to the soul. And therefore the very thing that makes us blessed is not a created good intrinsic to the soul, but exists outside the soul, although the very attainment and possession of it is an act of the soul.

Hence specifically beatitude is not wisdom and virtue, which otherwise in this life do not place us in possession of complete good. For virtue does not satisfy but makes the appetite right and can be lost; it is the way to beatitude, and happiness itself is the reward of virtue. Wisdom is the means of acquiring truth, tending toward total and perfect truth. But these are not able to perfectly quiet the appetite.

25. — The 2nd part is proved: Beatitude does not consist in created goods taken collectively.

Their inability to attain beatitude arises not from their quantity, but from their nature, intrinsic imperfection, and limitation, and therefore solely by accumulation.

Summa Theologiae Moralis I. — 3

cannot be removed. And no one has possessed or will be able to possess all these things at once. Cf. Eccli. I, 2; XII, 8; 13-14; Ps. LXXII; Eccl. II, 11; Sap. II; Mt. XVI, 21-26.

26. They object that there are many who care little about God and place happiness only in created things. — R. This moral perversion is a fact of humanity corrupted by sin. It is explained by a twofold cause: 1) from the fact that eternal goods, as invisible and future, seem more remote to us, and therefore affect the mind less; while, on the contrary, created goods, visible and present, appear nearer and procure actual delight. Nevertheless, right reason teaches that eternal and future goods are to be preferred to these transient and imperfect ones, and faith does so as well, as the Apostle warns, II Cor. IV, 17: "For that which is at present momentary and light of our tribulation, worketh for us above measure exceedingly an eternal weight of glory"; — 2) from the fact that men, by indulging in earthly pleasures against conscience, have become animal-like, pursuing sensual delights more than spiritual things; "but the animal man," says the Apostle, I Cor. II, 14, "perceiveth not the things that are of the Spirit of God." Yet reason shows that intellectual goods, as higher, are to be preferred to sensible ones, and that all sensible and earthly things will have an end; with these considerations, a man who intends to act rightly desires eternal happiness that will last forever¹

27. Thesis II. God alone is the true and complete beatitude of man. — It is proved:

1° Indirectly from the fact that happiness does not consist in any created good; therefore, in the uncreated good, God.

2° Directly: “For beatitude is the perfect good, which wholly quiets the appetite; otherwise it would not be the ultimate end, if something further remained to be desired. But the object of the will, which is the human appetite, is universal good, just as the object of the intellect is universal truth. From which it is clear that nothing can quiet man’s will except universal good; which is found in no created thing, but only in God, because every creature has participated goodness. Hence God alone can fill man’s will... Therefore in God alone does man’s beatitude consist” 1a 2ae q. 2, a. 8. Hence St. Augustine, Conf. Bk. I, n. 1: God, “You have made us for Yourself, and restless

our heart is restless until it rests in you.” Cf. Ps. 15, 2, 5, 10; 72, 25-26; 102, 5.

They object that the aforesaid argument does not hold. For the universal good is either abstract (universal in predicating), and then the conclusion does not follow, because such a good is found in any created good; — or it is a concrete or complete universal good (universal in being), and then there is a petitio principii, for the concrete universal good is nothing other than God. — Reply:

1) In the argument of St. Thomas, the universal good is taken abstractly, but not formally as abstract from concrete existence or as good in general, which can be some any good whatsoever; but most broadly as unlimited, and absolutely as every good, prescinding from the finite and the infinite and not contracted to this or that good². But the limited exists in individual created beings. Therefore these are not the universal good, which is the beatitude of man. The power of the intellect, namely, extends itself to every true thing, and therefore the power of the will to every good; whence it is not satisfied if it possesses one good, since it can still extend itself to another. Some participated and finite good does not exhaust the extension of the object; only the infinite good does that.

2) Even if the universal concrete good were understood, the argument could hold, by understanding the good not absolutely, but the complete good of man. But man is able to know not only the created and finite true but also the uncreated and infinite, and therefore he can also desire the uncreated or infinite good. Thus the complete good of man is not a finite but an infinite good.

28. Corollary. — From all these things it follows that the supreme happiness of man truly coincides with the ultimate end of the universe, and consists essentially in the attainment of this end; and not only in the same object but also in the same act of cognition and love, namely, in knowing, loving, and thereby glorifying God. Thus, while man pursues the glory of God, the primary end, by that very fact he promotes his own happiness, which is the secondary end, because the good of the creature ought to be subordinated to the good of the Creator as the ultimate end; — and by attaining his own good, he also glorifies God, and by tending toward his own good, by that very fact he tends toward the good of the universe. Hence the two ends are really conflated, but they differ in reason. The highest glory of God is our happiness, and our highest good cannot be anything other than His highest glory. Thus through happiness man fulfills the ultimate end of the universe, because

objective beatitude proximately seeks as its own good, but simultaneously ultimately as a divine good.

29. Observations. — 1st That God can be the object of human beatitude does not require a proportion of entity (i.e., of quantitative commensuration or equality) between human nature and God, but rather a proportion of objective relation and final ordering (of proportionality) suffices, i.e., the capacity and ordination of appetite to attaining Him. Suppl. III p. q. 92, a. 1, ad 6.

2nd In this sense, human appetite can in a certain way be called infinite according to object and appetition and relation and capacity, although subjectively, as regards existence, it is finite. Thus also subjective beatitude is a good of which man is capable as an intrinsic and inherent thing, and hence finite; objective beatitude is a good of which he is capable as an object, which is infinite. I-II, q. 2, a. 8, ad 3.

3rd Nevertheless, man does not desire God as something to be possessed in an infinite manner (which is impossible for a creature), but he tends toward possessing Him insofar as it is possible according to his own powers, namely, in varying degree according to each one’s own capacity, disposition, and preparation. Ibid., q. 3, a. 8, ad 2.

4th Man does not desire God as a mere means which he uses to make himself happy, as if God were a useful good that is loved only for the sake of something else, but as the highest good, the cause of happiness and the fountain of all perfection and the ultimate end, who is loved for his own sake and to whom man himself ultimately subordinates himself. A. v. does not so much seek God for the sake of happiness, but rather happiness for the sake of God.

5th On the part of the object, for man's beatitude no created goods essentially are required besides God, because He Himself is the infinite good capable of satisfying all appetitions. Yet there are several created goods, sensible and corporeal, which pertain to beatitude consequently, but as it were spontaneously follow from essential beatitude. For by virtue of divine possession, the blessed one will certainly have what he reasonably desires.

6th The beatitude of the soul is also the beatitude of all the sensitive and corporeal faculties. For man is truly one substantial being, one nature tending toward one end. And therefore the sensitive and vegetative parts do not have a diverse end exclusively proper to themselves, but are subordinated to the intellective part and attain their perfection and their true end when, in the attainment of the rational good, they perfectly serve and aid the higher part. Whence, when the rational part obtains its ultimate perfection in the possession of God, it reaches the end of the whole nature, and by that very fact the other parts are completed immediately or mediately in a manner proportioned to their nature. This will be perfectly accomplished in the other life after the resurrection, because there will no longer be any struggle between the human faculties but a perfect mutual subordination.

S. Th. I-II, q. 3; C. Gent. III, 25, 26, 37, 40, 44.

30. State of the question. — Beatitude formal (Εὐδαιμονία) is the possession or enjoyment of the Highest Good. The Highest Good is God. Since, however, God is a good distinct from us and external, we will not be blessed unless we are in some way joined to Him Himself. Hence, although as to cause or object it is something uncreated, beatitude itself nonetheless according to essence or form is something created existing in man himself. Whence it is now asked in what created manner that attainment is brought about, or what that union with God may be by which subjective beatitude is constituted (q., 3.a. 2).

31. Thesis I. Formal beatitude consists in the most perfect knowledge of God and the consequent love that a man can acquire according to his capacity. — It is proved:

1° Formal beatitude consists in the conscious union of ourselves with the beatifying object, God. But God, being immaterial, cannot be attained directly and formally by sense but only by mind, i.e., by the immaterial faculties, intellect and will: for He is an intelligible good, not a sensible one. Therefore formal beatitude cannot consist except in an act of intellect and will, that is, in knowledge and love. Moreover, this knowledge is relatively most perfect according to each one's capacity, so that nothing remains for him to desire; otherwise it would not be our ultimate perfection or true beatitude.

2° From St. Thomas after Aristotle: Formal beatitude consists in an act, not of the lower and sensitive part, but of the intellective part, and indeed in the contemplation of God and the ensuing love. For a) it is not in potency or in habit, but in act, because the ultimate perfection of man is in act and in operation which is the ultimate act of the operator: since potency is ordered to act, nothing is perfect unless it is in second act. Hence a thing is said to exist for the sake of operation (a. 2); b) it is in an operation, not of the sensitive part which man has in common with brutes and by which he cannot be united to God; — but in the operation of the most excellent part which is most proper to man, namely the intellective part (a. 3);

c) It consists in the best operation of the intellectual part, namely, with respect to the best object: spiritual faculties are only fully perfected and satisfied when they fully attain this object, through contemplation of the Highest Truth and enjoyment of the Highest Good. Therefore, happiness consists in knowledge and love of God; and indeed in the highest degree possible (a. 5).

3° "Everything tends toward divine likeness as toward its own end (or its own good. For every being is perfect insofar as it participates, as far as it can, in the goodness of the highest good). Therefore that by which each thing is most assimilated to God is its ultimate end. But the intellectual creature is most assimilated to God by the very fact that it is intellectual: for it has this likeness above all other creatures, and this includes all others. In the genus of this likeness, moreover, it is more assimilated to God insofar as it actually understands... God Himself, for God, by understanding Himself, understands all other things. Therefore, to understand God is the ultimate end of every intellectual substance" (C. Gent. III, 25).

4° Hence Scripture and the Fathers call the end of man eternal life. But life is the movement of the living thing proceeding from itself, and it is not in a habit but in an operation: namely, the vital operation by which one lives in second act. This life is the knowledge of God, according to John XVII, 3; it is the love of charity (I Cor. XIII, 8-13) and intimate friendship (Rev. XIX, 7; XXI); and in this consists our beatitude (Mt. V, 8; XXV, 21, 34, 46).

32. Thesis II. In the present order of Providence, beatitude is not natural, consisting in the mere abstract, mediate, and analogical knowledge of God, however perfect it may be, but supernatural, consisting in the immediate, intuitive, and proper vision of the divine essence.

The natural end is that to which we would have been destined, if God had not by His gratuitous goodness elevated us to a supernatural end, the vision of Himself in Himself. Moreover, the natural end is the attainment of God known by reason alone, or the abstractive contemplation of God through creatures, but in the most perfect manner possible by our powers, namely, through a knowledge of the whole universe so perfect that nothing would remain naturally knowable: for if nature possesses all things to which it can attain by its own powers, then all its absolute desires are already fulfilled and nothing remains to be desired. This is our natural happiness, owed to nature.

Now, however, we are destined for a supernatural end beyond the exigencies and powers of our nature, namely, to see God in an intuitive manner, face to face, without intermediary, i.e., to see and love God and enjoy Him in the same way (although not to the same degree) as God sees and loves Himself and enjoys Himself, so that we participate in the very divine life (S. Th. I, q. 62, a. 1; Q. D. de Ver. 27, a. 2).

Thus we shall have happiness not only natural, but we shall be partakers of the very divine happiness itself.

It is proved: 1° From the Scriptures. a) St. Paul, describing the state of final perfection, teaches that it consists in the vision of God, face to face (I Cor. XIII, 12). The phrase: face to face, from Hebrew usage, always indicates the presence of person to person, and to see face to face signifies intuitive vision in itself, especially since it is opposed to mediate knowledge (through a mirror), and to imperfect and obscure knowledge (in a riddle), and to analogical knowledge (in part). Whence the Apostle adds: then I shall know even as I am known i.e. by God; but God sees us intuitively; therefore we too shall see God intuitively.

b) St. John, who said that eternal life is the knowledge of God (XVII, 3), adds that we will see God as He is, because we will be like God (1 John III, 2), who sees Himself; but God sees Himself intuitively; therefore we too, being like Him, will see Him in that way.

2° From Tradition, whose witnesses are Benedict XII in the Const. Ben. Deus (1336), and the Council of Florence (for the Greeks) after the Council of Vienne (a. 5), which define as a dogma of faith that beatitude is the vision of God. This, moreover, is supernatural, as we know from the Vatican Council, sess. 3, c. 2 and can. 3.

3° With these things established, from reason St. Thomas proves that the natural end can no longer satisfy man, nor therefore be perfect happiness: Man is not perfectly blessed as long as there remains to him something to be desired and sought. But the intellect seeks perfect knowledge of the very essence of things: thus, seeing an effect, it naturally desires to know perfectly the very essence of the cause, insofar as is possible for it. But the human intellect knows the effects of God and so knows that God exists. Hence there remains to it a natural desire to know perfectly the very essence of God (which we know to be possible from revelation), and so it is not yet perfectly blessed unless it sees Him¹ (a. 8).

It follows, then, that natural beatitude is not happiness simply and absolutely perfect, as not being the whole happiness possible in itself which can befall man, but is only perfect in a certain respect and relatively, for the natural state alone; — in the supernatural order, however, of elevation to the intuitive vision of God, it can no longer in any sense be called perfect. Whence the Scholastics are not wont to call the natural ultimate end perfect happiness, but they reserve that name for the supernatural ultimate end of the vision of God.

33. Thesis III. Beatitude, although according to its physical essence it embraces, as it were, three acts of vision, love, and fruition, nevertheless according to its logical or metaphysical essence consists solely in the knowledge of God.

The opinion of St. Thomas is that, while Scotus places beatitude solely in the act of love, St. Albert the Great, however, St. Bonaventure, and Suarez require both acts of intellect and will. In beings, essence can be considered in two ways: a) completely and concretely, as the complex of all the elements which constitute a thing in its species and distinguish it from others, and this is the physical essence; b) abstractly and in its fundamental element, as the perfection which first and of itself constitutes a thing and distinguishes it from others and is the root of all that pertains to a thing, and this is the metaphysical or logical essence. These notions can be applied to beatitude, but analogically, because it is not a being of itself but only an action and hence an accident. Now we say that beatitude, if considered completely according to all essential and necessary elements, comprises an act not only of intellect but also of will; but if it is considered according to its fundamental element, as the very attainment of the supreme good from which other goods flow, or as the action by which man primarily attains and possesses the supreme good, we say that it is only an act of intellect.

It is proved 1° Negatively: Beatitude does not consist in an act of the will, namely of love or joy, because this cannot be the attainment of the highest good. For the will is inclined toward something and terminates at the thing by affection alone, touching it, however, not effectively and really. But even if one says that the will in love and joy terminates at God in a certain manner, still it does not do so except through something previously known by the intellect; hence joy does indeed presuppose the possession of the good, but it does not constitute that possession as such, and consequently it does not constitute beatitude. What is more, the very object of joy, namely the good possessed, is presupposed as attained, and attainment is the very essence of beatitude; therefore joy and love lie outside the essence of beatitude, as consequences of it. Yet in the attainment of the highest good there is included the very vision of God, for it is impossible that the end be attained by an act of the will alone, when the end itself is not present to the one attaining it; for one cannot love what is not known in some way. But since the will, even after the vision, loves God, and this love is ordained to the vision as its foundation, the attainment must be attributed to the vision itself, which presents the object to be loved, and not to the love, which presupposes the presentation. Thus the opinion of Scotus is refuted, who placed beatitude in an act of the will. — Nor does the objection hold that the will by its own nature tends toward a universal good, and hence can attain the highest good. For this inclination is toward the good in general, and it is satisfied not by any particular good, but only by that which is universally good, namely God Himself; yet the will does not attain God as He is in Himself, but only as He is proposed by the intellect; and hence, if the intellect does not see Him as He is in Himself, the will is not satisfied, but remains with a desire — not, indeed, a desire that is efficacious and unqualified, but merely inefficacious and conditioned, of seeing « if it were possible », which desire does not impede beatitude and ought not to be fulfilled, since that is naturally impossible. — But if you were to say that such a restriction is not added by St. Thomas, and hence is not to be supplied in his argumentation, then the argument would have to be regarded either as one of mere fittingness, not as apodictic, or as showing that special obediential potency which is naturally in man and by which he can be elevated to the vision of the divine essence.

Inclination, however, is not the attainment of the good; otherwise, intensely willing something would suffice for possessing it (a. 4).

And indeed every act of the will toward the good is either an inclination toward an absent good, and then it is not an attainment of the thing; or a resting in a present good, and then it presupposes already possession and attainment. Thus in particular: enjoyment or rest in a possessed good does not produce possession of the good but follows upon it; desire is a tendency toward an absent good; and love abstracts from the presence and absence of the good, and by it, accordingly, no present good comes to be. Therefore no act of the will makes us possess God, nor is it the essence of beatitude.

2° Positively and assertively: Beatitude consists, at least partially, in an act of the intellect.

For the essence of beatitude is the act of the power most proper to man and most noble. This, however, is the intellect, both because its object is more universal, simpler, more immaterial, and more abstract, and because it is the power closer to the soul and from which the will itself arises. Therefore (a. 5).

Nor should you say that the will is nobler, which itself moves the intellect. For, on the contrary, "first and per se the intellect moves the will: a) For the will, insofar as it is of this sort, is moved by its object, which is the apprehended good; but the will moves the intellect as it were accidentally, insofar as the very act of understanding is apprehended as good and thus is desired by the will. From which it follows that the intellect actually understands, and in this very fact precedes the will: for the will would never desire to understand, unless the intellect first apprehended the very act of understanding as good. b) And again, the will moves the intellect to operate in act in the manner in which the end moves, for the understood good is the end of the will. But the agent is posterior in moving than the end, for the agent does not move except for the sake of the end. Whence it appears that the intellect is simply higher than the will, but the will is higher than the intellect accidentally and in a certain respect" (C. Gent. III, 26).

3° Positively and exclusively: Beatitude consists solely in an act of the intellect. — For:

a) The essence of happiness is the attainment of the highest good, which is an intelligible good. But the highest intelligible good cannot be possessed except by the act of the intellect alone: for the will is borne toward an object outside itself, and is only an inclination toward it, while the intellect apprehends the object and draws it to itself and thus makes it present to itself and is joined to it really and effectively, and so truly possesses it. Therefore the essence of happiness is obtained not by the will but by the intellect alone.

b) The essence of beatitude is the first act which truly attains God Himself and the root of all other things which are required for beatitude. But this is only the act of the intellect, because it first attains God and is the root from which love and joy necessarily arise. Therefore the essence of beatitude is only the act of the intellect, not of the will (a. 4).

34. Corollaries. — From the foregoing, it can be concluded with St. Thomas:

a) Beatitude consists more in the speculative intellect than in the practical (a. 5), which is evident from three points: 1° because the best object of the intellective power is the divine good, which is not the object of the practical intellect but of the speculative; hence beatitude consists chiefly in the contemplation of divine things; — 2° because contemplation is sought most for its own sake, while the act of the practical intellect is not sought for its own sake but for the sake of action; and actions themselves are ordered to some end. Hence it is clear that the ultimate end cannot consist in the active life but in the contemplative; — 3° because in the contemplative life man shares with higher beings, namely with God and the angels, to whom he is made like through beatitude; but in those things which pertain to the active life, even animals share in some way with man. And therefore the ultimate and perfect beatitude consists wholly and principally in contemplation.

b) Yet beatitude does not consist in human speculative sciences (a. 6).

c) Nor does it consist in the knowledge of spirits (a. 7).

35. Observations. — 1° Love joins to God in a new and thus more perfect way, but only affectively, not however really. And although the will tends toward the possession of God, it tends to this mediately, through the act by which God can be possessed, namely, through the act of cognition.

2° Beatitude is the object of the will, as something appetible, not, however, as something attainable. Likewise, beatitude is the attainment of the ultimate end, not as a good appetible that attracts the will, but as really possessed by the intellect.

3° The act of the intellect is ordered to love and delight, not as a means to an end, but as a cause to an effect and as an essence to its consequent property.

4° Beatitude is the ultimate perfection by way of attainment of the good, not however by way of a property and complement.

5° The metaphysical essence ought not to be the highest good, nor fulfill all desires, nor render [men] perfectly blessed formally, but only radically and fundamentally: in the same way, rationality alone does not render man perfect formally but fundamentally.

6th The act of the will is more perfect than the act of the intellect in moral perfection, but not in physical and natural perfection, except in some way accidentally; and it is never more perfect in the order of attainment and possession.

7th For the beatific vision, there is required on the part of our intellect the divine light of glory, which elevates and strengthens the intellect and renders it capable of beholding God (Council of Vienne, art. 5); on the part of the object no intelligible species is required. These matters are explained in dogmatic theology.

8th The beatific vision is not due to nature, because no innate appetite is given for obtaining it, but only a elicited natural appetite, not efficacious, however, but inefficacious and conditioned, i.e., insofar as that vision is possible; for the rational creature alone is innate an immediate obediential potency, which by positive ordination does not demand the vision of God nor incline toward it, but which is apt to be elevated to seeing God. As is explained in the same dogmatics.

9th Beatitude does not consist in God’s inflow into the essence of the soul (as Henry of Ghent and John of Ripa held), because only operation renders us perfect and conscious of the possession of God; — nor in the uncreated vision of God communicated to a creature (as the Master of Good Hope willed): for an act ought to be from what is intrinsic and proceed from the one operating; the action of God is not intrinsic to us and does not proceed from us; therefore it does not render us blessed nor seeing God.

S. Th. I-II, q. 4, et q. 5, a. 4.

The qualities of beatitude, which necessarily follow from its very essence, are distinguished as three in the soul, namely: the highest delight or joy — impeccability — and inamissibility; moreover, a perfect body, adapted to the perfect state of the soul, seems required, which therefore must be raised up by God.

36. Thesis I. The highest delight, or ineffable joy, which presupposes and includes love, necessarily follows from the essence of beatitude.

It is established by the Council of Vienne (year 5) and by Benedict XII: they declare that in beatitude there is the vision of God and enjoyment.

Blessed indeed is the man who attains perfect knowledge of the highest truth and possession of the highest goodness, and understands that nothing is better for himself. Hence the will is borne with all its strength toward this highest good, and accordingly, by loving, it rejoices in that highest good and rests in it.

And indeed necessarily he loves and rejoices so that he cannot not love nor rejoice. Thus we say against the Scotists. For the intellect, with the highest evidence, proposes God as the highest good supremely lovable, and His love as the embrace and enjoyment of infinite good, nor can it represent otherwise because it is free from error, so that there cannot appear even a shadow of evil or of the unsuitable or of that which impedes a greater good in God and in the enjoyment of God; indeed, the intellect cannot but think of this. But the will is essentially an appetite following the intellect. Hence necessarily and at every moment it necessarily loves the highest good and rejoices in its possession. — In other words, the blessed one sees his own beatitude to consist in God necessarily and without interruption, namely, the necessary connection of this object, God, with his beatitude. But no one can will not to be blessed. Therefore the blessed one necessarily wills God and loves and rejoices.

What the Scriptures declare (John 16:22; Matt. 5:12; Rom. 8:18), and set forth by various metaphors of satiety, inebriation, and a torrent of delights (Ps. 35:9; 16:15), so that all evil, sorrow, and sadness are taken away from the blessed (Rev. 7:16-17; 21:4), and they possess the kingdom (Rev. 22:5; Matt. 5:3, 10).

Therefore, the contemplation of the highest truth, God, is the root of all things required for happiness (Boethius, l. 3 de Consol.; St. Thomas, c. Gent. III, 63; Goudin, Phil. p. 3, q. 1, a. 3, c. 3): for it excellently bestows a) sufficiency which riches promise, for God is possessed who alone suffices, and truth is perfectly known as the intellectual nature desires; — b) delight which pleasures promise, because the contemplation of truth is the sole delight of the mind, and it is greater than all pleasures to the extent that it is more spiritual and purer (without the admixture of sadness and anxiety); — c) renown which fame promises, because it makes a man glorious before God and intellectual creatures; — d) reverence which wisdom promises, for he is supremely wise who perfectly contemplates the highest truth and is united to God; — e) security from evils and in goods, which power promises, because that highest contemplation is eternal and cannot be lost, and it most closely unites to God in whom is every good and to whom no evil can approach.

37. Observation. — The delight that accompanies beatitude is caused by the fact that the appetite rests in a good that is possessed; nevertheless, it is not the principal element in beatitude, but vision is stronger than delight, both because the cause is stronger than the effect, and because delight is on account of the operation and not the reverse: for delight consists in a certain quieting of the will; but that the will is quieted in something is only on account of the goodness of that in which it is quieted; therefore, if the will is quieted in an operation, it does this on account of the goodness of the operation and seeks delight in the operation because the operation is its good. And thus the principal good is the operation itself in which the will is quieted, rather than the quieting of the will in it.

38. Thesis II. From beatitude there also follows impeccability, or the rectitude of the will. This is of faith from Benedict XII, and is indicated by the Apostle saying that charity never falls away in the other life (I Cor. XIII, 8); whence this is called the undefiled inheritance (I Pet. I, 4). — It is proved:

1° Sin is the greatest evil; but with this standing, the possession of the highest good is excluded.

2° Sin presupposes error or lack of consideration: for the will wills nothing except under the aspect of good; therefore, for sin it is required that the intellect represent some evil under the appearance of good, or that it not attend to something to which it ought to attend; whence it comes about that it proposes to the will something to be willed here and now, or to be willed in this way, which was not to be willed. But error or lack of consideration, as an intellectual evil, cannot be admitted in the state of the highest good. Therefore ¹

3rd If the blessed could sin, they could lose glory and beatitude, since nevertheless it cannot be taken away from them, as will be said in the next thesis.

This impeccability arises from what is intrinsic, as the Thomists explain against Scotus:

a) From the contemplation of God. Man necessarily wills the ultimate end or beatitude in the abstract, and cannot will anything except in order to the ultimate end or happiness. But the blessed one incessantly and necessarily and always sees that God is the supreme good and perfect beatitude. Therefore he cannot will anything except what is in order to God. Sin, however, is something not ordered to God. Therefore the blessed one cannot sin (I, q. 62, a. 8 et ad 3; I-II, q. 4, a. 4).

Or even: The intellect, contemplating God, clearly sees that God and His will are the highest and every good necessarily to be loved; and hence nothing outside God is good, if it is against Him or not ordered to Him. Whence sin, which is against the will of God, cannot appear good to it. But man cannot will anything except under the aspect of good. Therefore the blessed cannot will sin².

b) From the love of the blessed. By beatific love man is turned by a continuous act and without interruption to God as the ultimate end. But through sin man is turned away from God the ultimate end, or at least deflects from Him. Yet actual aversion and deflection cannot stand at the same time with actual conversion and adherence, which it excludes. Therefore beatific love by a continuous act excludes sin (C. Gent. IV, 92)³.

39. Thesis III. Beatitude is unlosable and eternal (q. 5, a. 4; C. Gent. III, 62).

What faith teaches, as is evident from the Creeds, and from the Fourth Lateran Council, c. 1, and from Benedict XII, and as the Scriptures clearly indicate in many places (Mt. XXV, 46; VI, 20; John X, 28; I Thess. IV, 17; II Cor. IV, 17; Apoc. III, 12); whence beatitude is called an unfading and incorruptible inheritance (I Peter I, 4); a crown incorruptible (I Cor. IX, 25). And indeed:

Beatitudo ought to exclude every evil, which it will not do unless it is perpetual. For the blessed person either would know that his state is not perpetual, and then he would be afflicted with the greatest evil of sadness and sorrow; — or he would not know, and then either he would err by persuading himself that it is perpetual, and this would be the very grave evil of error; or he would doubt and greatly fear lest he be deprived of so great a good, which fear of losing is also an evil. Therefore beatitudo must necessarily be perpetual.

It is so, however, from within, as the Thomists hold against Scotus: 1° From the nature of beatitude in general. Perfect beatitude, from its own nature (and therefore from within), answers the natural desire of man which it ought to quiet. But man, because he will always exist and naturally desires to retain the good and to obtain security of retaining it, desires beatitude not limited in time but circumscribed by no limits. Therefore beatitude, in order to answer that desire, from its own nature ought to be perpetual. 2° From the nature of supernatural beatitude. No cause is given by which the beatific vision could be lost. Therefore from itself it is incapable of being lost. For it cannot cease a) on the part of the seeing subject; because one clearly seeing God to be the highest good cannot, on account of that reason, will to cease from that vision, since he perceives no evil or inconvenience in it; just as neither can he will not to be blessed; b) on the part of the created cause; because the immediate vision of God is above every created cause, which consequently cannot act upon it nor take it away or impede it; c) on the part of the object, God; because God always behaves in the same way and is not distanced from us except insofar as we are distanced from him. For the subtraction of beatitude is a punishment, whence it cannot be inflicted by God the just judge except on account of fault; but fault cannot be in the blessed one, since he is impeccable.

Specifically the light of glory, as a habit that is in itself permanent and permanently given by God, cannot cease: a) nor through its own corruption, since it is a simple quality; b) nor through the corruption of the subject, since that subject is wholly immaterial, wherefore the light is received incorruptibly according to the condition of the receiver and the giver; c) nor through a contrary disposition, which would be nothing other than sin, by which one would voluntarily turn oneself away from God; but sin is impossible, because he who sees God necessarily loves Him.

40. Thesis IV. The body is in no way required for the very essence of beatitude, even physical beatitude; nevertheless, it is required for its integrity and perfection, or for its well-being.

1st Part is on faith from Benedict XII and from the Council of Florence, and it is established from the Apostle, II Cor. V, 6-8: While we are in the body we are absent from the Lord: for we walk by faith, and not by sight. But we are bold, and have a will to be absent from the body, and to be present with the Lord. — It is proved: a) For supernatural beatitude: The intellect for its operation does not need the body except on account of sensible images in which it beholds intelligible truth. But God cannot be seen through sensible images.

Whence perfect beatitude, which is in the vision of God, does not depend on the body. And therefore, without the body, the soul can simply be blessed as to its substance.

b) For beatitude in general: The blessed soul is not blessed insofar as it is the form of the body, but insofar as it is intellectual it transcends all bodily organs and exercises spiritual operations which by their nature are independent of the body. Therefore, for beatitude, as regards its essence, it does not need the body (a. 5, ad 1um).

2ª Part: the body is required for the complete perfection or well-being of beatitude, in the same way as the beauty of the body or the quickness of the mind pertains to the perfection of man, although not to his essence, holds St. Thomas after St. Augustine; to this Scotus, Suarez, and many recent authors object ⁴.

« For, says the holy Doctor, a. 5, since operation depends on the nature of a thing, the more perfect the soul is in its nature, the more perfectly it will have its own operation in which happiness consists ». But the soul with the body is more perfect in its nature than when it has it complete. Therefore it is more perfect in its operation and beatitude than when it has it complete, insofar as it also extends itself to the body so that the body may, in its own way, share in it.

« The soul desires to enjoy God in such a way that this enjoyment itself flows over into the body, as far as is possible; and therefore, as long as it enjoys God without the body, its appetite rests in Him in such a way that it would still wish its body to attain to participation in Him (ad 4)...The desire of the separated soul rests wholly on the part of the appetible object, because it possesses what suffices for its appetite (God); but it does not rest wholly on the part of the one desiring, because it does not possess that good according to every mode in which it would wish to possess it. And therefore, when the body is taken up again, beatitude increases, not intensively but extensively » (ad 5) ⁵

But the body must be perfect: "For since it is natural for the soul to be united to the body, it cannot be that the perfection of the soul excludes its natural perfection; and therefore ... for beatitude in every way perfect, a perfect disposition of the body is required," both "antecedently," lest the body weigh down the soul and so in some way turn it away from the beatific vision, and "consequently, because from the beatitude of the soul there flows a redundancy to the body so that it too may obtain its own perfection" (a. 6).

41. The resurrection of the body is necessary and is demanded by nature itself, whence, says St. Thomas, an evident reason supports it⁶ (C. Gent. IV, 79). — It is proved:

1) From the very nature and immortality of the soul. The immortal soul is naturally united to the body because according to its essence it is the form of the body (Council of Vienne), and therefore it naturally knows nothing except with the concurrence of the imagination, and indeed not pure intelligibles but intelligibles in sense. It is therefore against the nature of the soul to be without a body, as is evident from the fact that our soul vehemently recoils from death. But nothing that is against nature can be perpetual, at least in those who attain their end. Therefore the soul will not be perpetually without a body. But it remains perpetually because it is immortal. Therefore it must be united to the body again⁷.

2) From the end of man, or from the natural desire for happiness. There is naturally in us a desire for complete happiness. But happiness is the ultimate perfection not of the soul alone but of the whole man. But the soul separated from the body is in some way imperfect, just as every part existing outside its whole: for the soul is naturally a part of human nature. Moreover, it cannot have the complete beatitude of man. Therefore, man cannot attain complete happiness unless the soul is again united to the body⁸.

3) From fitting retribution. “From divine Providence, punishment is owed to sinners and reward to those who act well. In this life, men composed of soul and body sin or act rightly. Therefore, reward or punishment was owed to men according to both soul and body. But it is manifest that in this life they cannot attain the reward of final happiness..., and often sins are not even punished in this life. Therefore, it is necessary to posit a renewed union of the soul with the body, so that man can be rewarded and punished in body and soul.”

The body, of course, is the soul's companion and instrument; not merely passive and external, not participating in morality, since it is part of the human composite, but truly animated and a sharer in its works, whether good or evil. For operation belongs not to the soul alone but to the whole composite; not the soul acts or the body, but man himself as such, according to the soul and according to the body, does good and evil. But to the one acting, the reward of the work is due. Reward, therefore, was owed to human beings, both according to the soul and according to the body, whether prize or punishment. And so the soul's union with the body will be repeated, so that man may receive reward and be punished in body and in soul.

The last argument holds also for sinners, but it is only of fittingness, because bodily works are not in themselves good or evil, but only from the communication of the will. The two former ones, however, seem to us compelling, at least for the resurrection of the just; for in the case of the wicked perhaps it could be said that God punishes them by deprivation of their body. And although they hold in themselves for natural happiness, they also prove for supernatural happiness or the beatific vision, because the supernatural order does not destroy the natural order but perfects it.

But the opponents object that the soul has a twofold mode of being, equally perfect, and a twofold mode of operating; nay, that it has a more perfect natural knowledge of God when it is separated from the body; whence it prefers separation. — We deny this: for then it is not understood why the soul so vehemently desires to be with the body and shrinks from separation; nor is it understood why the soul, even in this life, cannot know without dependence on the body. For if the body contributed nothing to the perfection of the human intellect, union with it would be against the nature of the soul. Likewise, the mode of understanding of the separated soul, although it is absolutely and in itself more perfect, is not however relatively to the soul, but is less perfect for it, because it is not proportioned to its imperfection. Cf. I q. 84, a. 7; q. 89, a. 1. 42. Observations. — 1ª The fact of the resurrection is not a mystery properly so called, since reason sees its possibility, nay even its necessity, but the mode by which the resurrection takes place, in a glorious body, is a mystery which reason can neither discover nor understand. On this cf. Th. dogm. in tr. de Novissimis. 2ª St. Thomas notes, in arts. 7 and 8, that for beatitude external goods, which serve for the sustenance and propagation of animal life, are in no way required. For the beatific vision will either be in the soul without the body, or it will be in the soul united to a body not animal and corruptible, but incorruptible and spiritualized, as befits heavenly life. However, the society of friends is required, not of necessity for the essence of beatitude, because man has the whole fullness of his perfection in God, but for the all-round perfection or well-being of beatitude, because man is a social being, and therefore it is fitting that the blessed see one another mutually, and rejoice in their society.

S. Th. I-II, q. 5.

43. Thesis I. Man is capable of attaining even supernatural beatitude; — yet he cannot achieve this by natural powers, but by the aid of divine grace he is able to obtain it, and indeed in varying degree. — It is proved:

1° Man is capable of attaining even supernatural beatitude, because he is capable of perfect good, since his intellect can know universal and perfect good and his will can desire it (a. 1). This is of faith, explicitly defined in the Council of Vatican, session 3, ch. 2, can. 3; and it is included in the fact that the vision of God is the ultimate end of man, which is of faith from the Council of Florence, from Benedict XII, and from the Council of Trent, session 25.

2° Yet it cannot attain supernatural beatitude by natural powers. It is de fide from Council of Vienne, year 5, and from Council of Orange II, canons 7, 10, 18, 19, 20 (Cf. Vatican I, session 3, canon 3; and proposition 11 of Baius condemned). To see God through His essence is above the nature not only of man but of every creature. For natural knowledge is proportioned to the nature of the knower and therefore occurs according to the mode of the knower. Every knowledge that occurs according to the mode of a created substance cannot know God as He is in Himself but falls short of the vision of the divine essence, which infinitely exceeds every created substance. Hence neither man nor any creature can attain supernatural beatitude by natural powers, but needs the help of divine grace (John 1:18; 6:46; Matt. 11:27; 1 Cor. 2:11; 1 John 4:12). — From this it also follows that we cannot attain beatitude immediately by the action of creatures but only of God alone, although we can be helped by them ministerially so that we are disposed toward its attainment (a. 5 and 6; I, q. 12, a. 4).

3° A man can obtain beatitude in varying degree so that one is more blessed than another, not indeed according to objective beatitude, because there is only one Supreme Good, God, by the enjoyment of whom all are blessed, but as regards possession and enjoyment, because insofar as someone enjoys God more, he is more blessed. Moreover, it happens that one person enjoys God more perfectly than another, from the fact that he is better disposed or ordered to His enjoyment according to the diversity of grace and charity and merits (a. 2). This also is of faith from the Council of Florence (decree of union) and from the Council of Trent, session 6, ch. 16, can. 32 (Cf. John XIV, 2: 1 Cor. XV, 41-42).

44. Thesis II. Perfect beatitude is not possible in the present life but only in the next life. This is of faith from the Council of Vienne, article 4 (cf. Benedict XII, and the Second Council of Orange). — It is proved:

1. From the notion of beatitude in the abstract: Beatitude, since it is a perfect and sufficient good, excludes every evil and fulfills every desire. But in this life a) not every evil is excluded, such as ignorance on the part of the intellect, disordered affection and concupiscence on the part of the appetite, infirmity and afflictive toil on the part of the body; — b) not every desire is fulfilled, since goods are essentially unstable, even spiritual ones, such as virtue which is liable to vice because of the mutability of freedom, and knowledge which is lost through forgetfulness, indeed even earthly life itself, while yet we would wish to remain perpetually and naturally flee death (art. 3).
2. From the notion of beatitude in the concrete: a) The vision of God in Himself is now impossible (I Tim. VI, 16; I Cor. XIII, 12; I John III, 2); indeed even the perfect natural knowledge of the highest truth and of God is impossible, because it is subject to many impediments and difficulties, is often obscured and mingled with doubts and errors, nor does it give the certainty of permanence without which happiness is not had. b) The will on earth is not so firmly established in goods that it never turns aside from the true object of beatitude and sins, but it is hindered by the desires and necessities of the present life from being borne ceaselessly toward God with the highest love.

Nonetheless, in this life there can be an inchoate or imperfect happiness, and a state of inchoate perfection and imperfect blessedness, which approaches more or less to perfect blessedness and consists in knowledge, love, and imitation of God, or in rectitude of will and operation of virtue, for which the goods of the body and the help of other men are required, as it were, instrumentally (q. 4, a. 7): these afford man the friendship of God and the joy flowing therefrom, peace of conscience and tranquility of heart, and hope of future blessedness, which surpass all earthly delights. It is therefore a way and a tending toward perfect blessedness or God; just as an intermediate end naturally and necessarily tends to the ultimate end whose goodness it participates in.

45. Thesis III. Beatitude can be obtained from God by good works of the present life that precede it. It is of faith from the Second Council of Orange, ch. 18; the Fourth Lateran Council, ch. 1, and the Council of Trent, session 6, ch. 16, canon 32.

Thus it does not happen necessarily: for absolutely, God could have immediately given beatitude and at the same time disposed man toward it, i.e., in the same moment could have made the will rightly tending toward the ultimate end and obtaining it, just as in an instant He can simultaneously dispose matter and infuse form (e.g., in the resurrection of the dead). But He did not do so, as is evident from the fact that we do not attain beatitude in the present life. And moreover, the order of divine wisdom requires that it not be done so.

It is proved: For to have perfect good without motion and a preceding disposition belongs to one who naturally possesses it. Only God naturally possesses beatitude. Therefore it is proper to God that He is not moved and disposed toward beatitude through a preceding operation. And so, since beatitude exceeds every created nature, no pure creature fittingly obtains beatitude without the motion of a preceding operation through which it tends toward it; and thus beatitude becomes the reward of virtuous operation (a. 7).

Hence in the Scriptures they are consistently exhibited, both good works as reason and title on account of which eternal glory is granted (Mt. XXV, 21; 34-36; II Cor. IV, 17) in the same way as punishment is given for evils (Rom. III, 7, 8), and eternal glory as reward for the works of the just (Mt. V, 12; XIX, 29) and recompense of the heavenly inheritance (Col. III, 24; Hebr. X, 35; XI, 16), as prize (I Cor. IX, 24; Phil. III, 14), crown (Iac. I, 12; Apoc. II, 10), indeed crown of justice (II Tim. IV, 8) which is proportioned to works, greater or lesser (Mt. XXV, 14 sq.; Luc. XIX, 11. sq.; II Cor. IX, 6; Gal. VI, 8; Apoc. XXII, 12). Hence the Apostle, I Cor. XV, 58, says: Labor in the Lord is not in vain.

46. Corollary: Earthly life is a way to an end and beatitude. — Earthly life, therefore, since it is to be ended, is not a state of ultimate perfection and happiness, but a way by which we ought to tend to that through our acts. For exercising those acts:

1) For attaining the natural end man would have

a) internal means namely, human nature itself with its powers, especially reason and free will, and moral virtues, acquired by their aid, for working good more easily under God's ordinary motion;

b) the external means: society whose purpose is to promote man toward good both spiritual and temporal.

2. In the present order, however, God has granted us, for the supernatural end,

a) The means internal proportioned to this end, namely, grace both habitual with the virtues theological and moral infused and connected with the gifts of the Holy Spirit, gifts connected, and both actual of the intellect as well as the will and special motion of the Holy Spirit;

b) the external means externum: the supernatural society, the Church, whose institutor and head is Christ, and which leads men to the supernatural end by the proposal of faith, laws, and sacraments.

S. Th. I-II, q. 1 and q. 21.

47. The notion of a human act. — After the treatise on the ultimate end, we must consider human acts by which we ought to attain it.

According to St. Thomas, who first among all wrote a distinct treatise on human acts¹:

1) Those actions alone are properly called human, which are proper to man insofar as he is man, or which proceed from man acting insofar as he differs from irrational creatures, not only as to substance but also as to the mode of operating.

But it differs in its mode of operating from irrational creatures inasmuch as it acts freely, and so it is the master of its own acts.

2) Whence those actions alone are called properly human of which man is the master.

He is master of his own acts through the deliberation of reason and the choice of the will.

3) Those actions, therefore, are properly called human which proceed from deliberate will. But other actions which are done by a man are called acts of man; and although some are human as to substance, e.g., the necessary actions of the intellect and will, they are not, however, such as to the mode of operating, nor are they properly human since they are not of a man acting as a man (q. 1, a. 1).

An act of man can therefore be defined as an act which proceeds from the deliberate will of man (q. 1, a. 1), or an act which is voluntary, proceeding from reason (Q. D. de Malo 2, a. 6)^1.

Hinc: 1) They are not human a) acts (of vegetative or sensitive life) which man has in common with brutes, both as to substance and as to mode of operating, such as eating, seeing, walking, feeling without deliberation; b) acts of one who is incapable of deliberating: an infant, one fully sleeping, one delirious, the drunk, or the insane, one perfectly dependent on the influence of hypnotism; c) acts of one who can deliberate but acts without any deliberation, e.g., by a man fully distracted: they are called first-first movements. 2) Acts which are proper to man as to substance, such as understanding, willing, laughing, weeping, wondering, speaking, are nevertheless not human unless they are done from deliberation; on the contrary, acts common with brutes, such as eating, drinking, stroking one’s beard, walking, are human if they are done from deliberation. 3) Beatific love, although it is an act proper to man as to substance, is nevertheless not so as to mode of operating, because it is not free; hence it is not a human act^2.

48. Properties of the human act. — Human acts are so called insofar as they are performed in the manner proper to humans; they are also called free insofar as they proceed from free will, — moral insofar as they are conformable or nonconformable with the rules of morals: the inclination toward the ultimate end, right reason, law, and accordingly they have the character of rightness or of sin; — imputable insofar as they can be attributed to a human being as author and master, who must render an account of them, and thus they are worthy of praise or blame, praiseworthy or culpable^3; — meritorious insofar as they are referred

^{2 3 4}

to another in whose benefit or harm they redound, whether of a singular person, or of a community, or of God the ruler of the universe and ultimate end. All those acts are really the same, although they are distinguished in reason insofar as they are considered under a different respect⁵ (q. 21).

49. Division of the treatise.— The treatise is divided into 3 parts:

1st treats of human acts according to their material or physical and psychological being: A. on the condition of human acts: 1º on the subjective element of a human act: a) on the voluntary, both in itself, — both positive and negative, direct and indirect, — both in itself and in its cause; b) on the impediments of the voluntary, i.e., on violence, on fear, on concupiscence, on ignorance; c) on the free; d) on the impediments of the free, namely, on passion, on habit, on more remote impediments; — 2º on the objective element of a human act: a) on the object, b) on the circumstances. B. on the division of human acts: a) on elicited acts; b) on commanded acts.

2nd Part treats of human acts according to their formal or moral being: A. on the morality of human acts in general; 1º on the essence of morality and its species; 2º on the foundations of morality: a) on the intrinsic distinction between good and evil; b) on the subjective criterion or norm of morality; c) on the objective criterion and ultimate foundation of morality.

d) on the errors to be noted in this matter; e) on the cognitive faculty of morality; 3° on the principles or sources of morality in general; 4° on the specific distinction between a good and an evil act; 5° on the specific distinction among various good or evil acts a) from the object, b) from the circumstances, c) from the end.

B. on the morality of human acts in particular: 1° on the goodness and malice of the interior act; 2° on the goodness and malice of the exterior act; 3° on the goodness and malice of the external effect; 4° on the goodness and malice of the passions; 5° on the goodness and malice of the other circumstances.

3rd Part treats of human acts according to their supernatural and meritorious being: 1) on supernatural merit; 2) on the conditions of merit.

50. The treatise is theological and philosophical at once. — In the customary division, the first part is rather philosophical, providing the notions necessary for understanding the rest; the third is wholly theological, as dealing with the supernatural element; the second is at once theological and philosophical, because it is drawn not from reason alone but also from revelation: for this, by divine oral tradition and partly by the sacred Scriptures, teaches us even more certainly the most universal moral principles and their immediate and more general conclusions, from which the whole moral science is deduced. Whence to declare, confirm, explain, and apply these belongs to theology as much as to philosophy.

51. Importance of the treatise. — The treatise is the most principal of all, because it is;

1. more universal, since it hands down the most general notions and principles of the whole moral science to be applied in all its parts; and therefore
2. more fundamental, because on it is built up the edifice of the whole moral science: for this latter treats only of human acts, and all other things—whether ends, or means, or rules or counsels, or virtues or vices—it considers only insofar as they pertain to human acts; whence the treatise is entitled on the acts themselves human according to themselves. Hence
3. it is more necessary: for it is impossible to acquire for oneself a knowledge—not a common or merely historical one of moral matters, but a scientific one, founded on reasoning—unless the doctrine on human acts be well understood and rightly applied.