La evolución homogénea del dogma católico

RESPONSE TO SOME HISTORICAL OBJECTIONS

**465. A HISTORICAL STUDY.—**In the preceding sections we have just seen what is the opinion of traditional theology on the homogeneous evolution of Catholic dogma by way of inclusive theological conclusion.

As a complement to the subject matter, we shall briefly concern ourselves in this section with certain historical objections that have been raised against us by an illustrious theologian. Our objector proposes to prove that traditional theology, in teaching the definability of theological conclusions, understood by conclusions those conclusions improperly so called. To that end, he divides his historical study into four periods: a) the great scholastics of the thirteenth century; b) from Scotus to the Council of Trent; c) from the Council of Trent to the Vatican; d) from the Vatican Council to our own day. That same shall be our division.

**466. THE GREAT SCHOLASTICS UP TO SCOTUS.—**As we have said, our objector proposes to prove that when St. Thomas and the great Scholastics of the thirteenth century affirm that the consequences of the articles of faith are definable by divine faith, they understand by consequences the improper consequences, that is, the truths formally revealed. To this end, he sets forth with great wealth of erudition a matter that we have already expounded several times, namely, that the great Scholastics consider the body of revealed truths as an organism, and divide it into articles and non-articles. By articles they understand those fundamental truths that offer "special difficulty." Everything that offers no special difficulty, although it be formally revealed, they have classified under the name of "non-articles," and they have frequently subdivided it into antecedents, concomitants, and consequences of the articles. From which it follows—says our objector—that when they speak of "consequences" of the articles, they understand by consequences the truths that, though not articles, are formally revealed, and, therefore, improper consequences. A proof of this also is that they place among the non-articles the Eucharist, and no one will say that the Eucharist is not a formally revealed truth. To this, and only this, is reduced whatever our objector says regarding this first period.

Our answer to all this is quite simple. In the great scholastics, and very particularly in Saint Thomas, there are two divisions of the revealed, which, since they are made from different points of view, are very different from each other. The first division is into articles and non-articles of the Creed. All the great scholastics treat this first division in connection with the Apostles' Creed in the third book of the Sentences. The second division is into revealed directly and revealed indirectly, which they also sometimes call the division into things "that are contained in revelation in an explicit or determinate manner," and into things "from whose denial or corruption the denial or corruption of what is explicitly or determinately revealed would follow." All the great scholastics, both of the thirteenth century and of the following centuries, treat this second division in the first book of the Sentences, especially in connection with the question "Whether it is lawful to hold contrary opinions about the divine notions"¹.

Pues bien: our objector has focused almost exclusively on the first division between articles and non-articles, when he ought to have focused mainly on the second division, between the directly and indirectly revealed. Because he has focused on the first division and has seen that in the second member of that division, that is, in the non-articles, Saint Thomas places the Eucharist, he has deduced that the division between articles and non-articles is a division within what is formally revealed. Let our objector note the second division and he will see that Saint Thomas never places the Eucharist, nor any other Sacrament, in the second member, that is, in what is indirectly revealed ²

To this division of the revealed into direct and indirect revelation, which is the one that now concerns us, Saint Thomas gives such sovereign importance that he devotes a separate article to it in four different places in his works, apart from other secondary places: a) in book 1 of the Sentences, d. 33, q. 1, a. 5, under the title Whether contrary opinions about the divine notions can exist without sin; b) in book 4 of the same Sentences, d. 13, q. 2, a. 1, under the title Whether heresy denotes perversity of faith; c) in the Summa Theologica, part 1, q. 32, a. 4, under the title Whether it is lawful to hold contrary opinions about the divine notions; d) in the same Summa, Secunda-Secundae, q. 11, a. 2, under the title Whether heresy is properly about those things which pertain to the faith. These four articles, perfectly parallel to one another, as well as the parallel articles found in Saint Bonaventure and Scotus, must be read and reread, analyzed and compared by anyone who wishes to ascertain the mind of the great Scholastics, and above all of Saint Thomas, regarding dogmatic progress by way of theological conclusion.

The difference between direct and indirect revelation does not lie, like that between articles and non-articles, in offering greater or lesser difficulty, but in something else very important, and to which many do not pay sufficient attention. For Saint Thomas, as for Saint Bonaventure and Scotus, that is called and is indirect revelation everything the denial or corruption of which necessarily entails the denial or corruption of what is directly revealed. And this indirect revelation, once defined by the Church, becomes a matter of true divine faith, and its denial true heresy. Let us cite some texts:

"Respondeo dicendum that something belongs to faith in two ways. In one way directly, as those things which are principally divinely handed down to us... indirectly indeed those things belong to faith from the denial of which something contrary to faith follows" ³.

I reply that we are now speaking of heresy insofar as it implies corruption of the Christian faith... To which something pertains in two ways: in one way directly and principally, such as the articles of faith; in another way indirectly and secondarily, such as those things from which the corruption of some article follows: and with regard to both there can be heresy, in the same way that faith can be ⁴.

“I reply that it must be said that... a contradiction regarding those things which pertain to the faith can be twofold: either because it concerns those things which are explicitly contained in the articles of faith...; or it concerns those things from which some inconvenience and something contrary to the faith follows” ⁵

Now then: according to St. Thomas, from the denial of every true and proper conclusion there follows the denial of the principle from which it is deduced and, therefore, from the denial of every true and proper theological conclusion there follows the denial of the directly revealed. "This is the relationship of conclusion to principle, that once the conclusion is destroyed, the principle is destroyed" ⁶ "Demonstrative conclusions have a necessary relationship to the principles from which they are demonstrated, so that if the conclusions are not true, it is necessary that the principles are not true" ⁷ "And because there are certain things which are contained implicitly in the faith of the Church, as conclusions are contained in principles, therefore in these matters diverse opinions are tolerated until it is determined by the Church that one of them is contrary to the faith of the Church, because from it something directly contrary to the faith follows" ⁸

Finally, when this indirect revelation is defined by the Church, "idem iudicium est de his (concerning what is indirectly revealed) et de illis (concerning what is directly revealed) quae determinata sunt in fide, quia ad unum sequitur alterum" ⁹ "In this matter one cannot err without heresy" ¹⁰ "If anyone were to resist such an ordinance, he would be deemed a heretic" ¹¹ "Thus, therefore, the obstinacy whereby someone despises submitting to the judgment of the Church in those things that pertain to faith, whether DIRECTLY or INDIRECTLY, makes a man a heretic" ¹²

467. THE INDIRECTLY REVEALED.—Thus, under this second member of the indirectly revealed, St. Thomas, like St. Bonaventure and Scotus (367-372), includes two things: a) everything purely ornamental or secondary in Sacred Scripture, such as whether Abraham had two sons, or whether Tobias’s dog wagged its tail; because although such things are not of any importance in themselves (per se), they are so by their necessary relation to something directly revealed, since from their denial would follow the denial of the dogma of the total inspiration of Sacred Scripture, which is directly revealed; b) all true theological conclusions; for the same reason, namely, by their necessary relation to the directly revealed, since from the denial or corruption of the theological conclusion follows the denial of the directly revealed dogma from which such a conclusion is deduced: “Because from it follows something contrary to the faith directly” ¹³.

Read and reread without prejudice, like any Thomist, those four most fundamental articles where the Holy Doctor speaks of indirect revelation; analyze them and compare them with one another, and you will see with evidence that under that definition of what is indirectly revealed, Saint Thomas includes every true theological conclusion.

Do not focus only on the example that Saint Thomas gives, for examples are always given of clear and obvious things in order to apply them afterward to what is more difficult or obscure, but rather focus on the definition that Saint Thomas gives of indirect revelation, and also on the application that he makes of it to the question of divine notions and theological conclusions.

Also when St. Thomas treats, for instance, of life, he defines it as "everything that moves from within," and he gives as an example the animals. If some empirical reader were to focus only on the example, he would deduce from it that, according to St. Thomas, angels or God do not have life, since they are not animals. Such a way of interpreting St. Thomas would be laughable, for although the example that St. Thomas usually gives when treating of life does not apply to angels and to God, his definition does apply to them. In the same way, when treating of indirect revelation, St. Thomas gives as an example what is secondary in Scripture; but he gives as the definition: "everything the denial or corruption of which entails the denial or corruption of direct revelation." And it is evident that this definition fully applies to theological conclusions, for, as the same holy Doctor tells us, "once the conclusion is destroyed, the principle is destroyed."

Furthermore, in the first and fourth of those four cited articles, Saint Thomas expressly and radically distinguishes between truths that can in one way or another belong to the faith and truths that can in no way belong to it, and he subdivides the former into truths that belong to the faith directly and truths that belong indirectly. Thus, according to Saint Thomas, every truth, whatever it may be, must be classified into one of these three groups: a) truths that belong to the faith directly; b) truths that belong to the faith indirectly; c) truths that do not belong and cannot belong to the faith in any way (323).

Of the first ones, he says that they are of divine faith per se. Of the second ones, he says that they are of divine faith by their necessary relationship with the first ones, and that they must be believed with divine faith after being defined by the Church. Of the third ones, he says that they are absolutely indifferent for faith and that they may be freely affirmed or denied without any sin, unless, perhaps, the subjective sin of vanity or presumption, which can be present in every human act, even in dealing with the most profane matters indifferent to faith. "There is no sin, except perhaps accidentally, namely of presumption or vain glory or of many other things, because accidental causes are infinite" ¹⁴.

Now, let every Thomist speak frankly: In which of those three departments or groups does he place theological conclusions and even dogmatic facts? If he places them in the third group, such truths would be completely indifferent for the preservation of the faith, which is the Jansenist error. If he places them in the second or first, he must confess that, according to St. Thomas, such truths become truly of divine faith once defined by the Church. In this there is no possible escape for anyone who admits those two fundamental articles of St. Thomas.

Add to this that in the first and third of the four articles cited, Saint Thomas expressly applies that doctrine on the indirect revealed to the divine notions. A very clear proof that by indirect revealed Saint Thomas does not mean only what is secondary in Scripture, for the divine notions are not scriptural ¹⁵. The reason why the divine notions fall under the indirect revealed and, therefore, are definable as of divine faith, Saint Thomas expressly gives us, namely, because from the denial of the notions the denial of the persons would follow, and since the persons are direct revealed, for that reason the notions remain indirectly revealed and are definable as of divine faith. "The same judgment must be made of these and of those things which are determined in the faith, because one follows from the other... Because "from error concerning the notions error concerning the persons follows". From this the holy Doctor deduces that most fundamental corollary, which no theologian or historian of dogmas should ever forget: "And for this reason many things are now reputed heretical which previously were not reputed". To which doctrines does Saint Thomas refer there when he says that today they are held by the Church as heretical and previously they were not? He is certainly not referring to directly revealed doctrines, for he is speaking of the indirect revealed. Nor is he referring to what is secondary or ornamental in Scripture, for of that the Church has defined nothing as heretical. Saint Thomas therefore evidently refers to true theological conclusions, that is, to those truths that have not been directly revealed, but from whose denial the denial of a directly revealed principle follows, which suffices for them also to remain indirectly revealed and to be defined as of divine faith. The same holy Doctor indicates it very clearly: "And for this reason many things are now reputed heretical, which previously were not reputed, because now it is more manifest what follows from them".

Let every Thomist note that propter hoc. Many modern theologians calmly say that if the Church employs reasoning, it is solely to ascertain whether the conclusion was or was not from the beginning implicitly contained in revelation or in the intention of the revealing God. All that is very true, and the Church has no other end than that. But they do not notice that, according to Saint Thomas and according to Saint Bonaventure and Scotus, the means or human instrument (although always under divine assistance or authority) available to the Church to ascertain whether a conclusion was already from the beginning contained in revelation or in the intention of the revealing God, is to ascertain whether such a conclusion has an absolutely necessary connection with a directly revealed principle, and that, therefore, for Saint Thomas an absolutely necessary connection (and that is the theological conclusion properly so-called) with a directly revealed principle is the same thing as implicit containment in the intention of the revealing God or in divine revelation.

**468. SUMMARY.—**Thus, all our argumentation, which we have already set forth on other occasions and which we repeat anew with the most intimate persuasion, is condensed into the following four propositions of Saint Thomas:

1. Everything indirectly revealed can be defined as of divine faith.

2. By indirectly revealed is understood everything whose denial necessarily entails the denial of something directly revealed.

3. From the denial of every true theological conclusion, the denial of something directly revealed necessarily follows.

4. Then every true theological conclusion is definable as of divine faith.

469. FINAL CONFIRMATION.—For readers unfamiliar with these matters, there is a clear and decisive confirmation: the classical commentators of St. Thomas Aquinas. The whole question depends on what St. Thomas and the great thirteenth-century Scholastics understand by indirect revelation. Let us hear Báñez commenting on the classic article of St. Thomas¹⁶: “First conclusion: Concerning those things which pertain to the faith directly or indirectly, there can be heresy... These things being so established, regarding the first conclusion of the second article, the question arises: what does St. Thomas understand by pertaining to the faith directly or indirectly? For either it is understood... or it is understood... or finally by 'directly' it is understood that something falls immediately under the habit of faith, that is, without a process of reasoning: while it is said to pertain indirectly to the faith, what is gathered by necessary consequence from some proposition immediate according to faith. To this doubt it is replied that St. Thomas is to be understood in this last way... Thus if someone denies that Christ is capable of laughter, he errs in the catholic faith consequently and indirectly. For it follows well by a consequence known by the natural light, that Christ is not a perfect man”¹⁷. It could not be said more clearly. And elsewhere he adds: “For if someone were to confess that Christ is a perfect man, but were to deny that He is capable of laughter, because he opines that the capacity for laughter does not pertain to the perfection of man, this one would be a bad philosopher, but not yet a heretic. Since it has not so far been defined by the Church that Christ is capable of laughter. But if it were defined by the Church that the capacity for laughter pertains to the perfection of human nature, just as it has been defined that Christ has a twofold will, namely human and divine, then whoever would deny that Christ is capable of laughter would be a heretic”¹⁸.

We advise every Thomist to read in its entirety Báñez’s commentary on the cited article¹⁹; it is pure gold.

Nevertheless, one phrase seems to us inaccurate: “All things, indeed, which are in Sacred Scripture pertain directly to the faith.” Báñez does not seem to have observed that St. Thomas expressly affirms that what is secondary in Sacred Scripture pertains to the faith only indirectly.

But this has no importance as regards properly so-called theological conclusions, the only ones that concern us. On this point, all or almost all the commentators interpret St. Thomas as Báñez does; they affirm that these conclusions are included by St. Thomas among the truths that pertain to the faith indirectly. As we have said elsewhere (263), there is no theologian who, to prove that the infallibility of the Church extends to properly so-called theological conclusions, does not make use of St. Thomas’s texts on the indirect revealed. We have already cited the texts of Torres, Toledo, Silvio, Gravina, Serra, Philip of the Most Holy Trinity, de Marinis (390. 395, 405. 406, 410, 413, 243. 414). And we will even cite some others.

A heretical proposition is one that directly and immediately contradicts a truth of faith immediately revealed by Sacred Scripture, or defined by the Church. This is the common definition handed down by Saint Thomas, 2-2, question eleven, article two, and by the commentators on that question... In the second degree is the erroneous proposition. And an erroneous proposition of this kind is one that contradicts a truth revealed by God mediately, that is, indirectly and secondarily, AS ST. THOMAS EXPRESSLY TEACHES, in the cited question eleven, article two ²⁰

On the formal reason under which theological conclusions are to be regarded as the object of infallibility. This formal reason is the reason of the connection between what is immediately revealed and those things which are required for safeguarding, proposing, explaining, and defending the truths thus revealed... "To this faith—says Saint Thomas. 2-2, q. 11, a. 2—something pertains in two ways... in one way directly and principally, like the articles of faith: in another way indirectly and secondarily, like those things from whose denial the corruption of some article follows; and concerning both there can be heresy, in the same way as there can be faith" ²¹

Neque theologi hac in re dissentium (namely, regarding the extension of the Church's infallibility to properly so-called theological conclusions), except as to the censure which the opposite opinion deserves. Something pertains to the doctrine of faith—says St. Thomas, In I ad Cor., ch. 11, lect. 4—in two ways: in one way directly, the articles of faith which are proposed for belief in themselves; in another way indirectly, insofar as from their denial something contrary to faith follows ²²

We could cite many theologians, ancient and modern, Thomist and non-Thomist, who interpret Saint Thomas in the same way. But we will limit ourselves to a text that will undoubtedly please our opponent, since it is from the Salmanticenses themselves. Here is what they say: “A proposition is erroneous when it immediately and evidently opposes a truth revealed mediately and secondarily, or when it immediately and evidently contradicts a theological conclusion; such as this proposition: “Christ is not capable of laughter.” THIS IS GATHERED FROM SAINT THOMAS, 2-2, q. 11, a. 2, and taught by Suárez, Báñez, Tapia, and commonly by modern Doctors” ²³

Our opponent can see here St. Thomas and the great Scholastics of the thirteenth century explained by Báñez and by the majority of theologians, in exactly the same sense in which we ourselves have explained them. St. Thomas, then, understands by indirectly revealed theological conclusions properly so called.

Here is our objector, Saint Thomas and the great Scholastics of the thirteenth century, explained by the distinguished Báñez in the very same sense in which we have explained them. There he has clearly and explicitly explained what Saint Thomas understands by indirect revelation or by conclusions or consequences of what is directly revealed: he understands the true, proper, and rigorous theological conclusions.

Now let our objector again read St. Thomas or any great Scholastic of the thirteenth century, and he will see that they place the Eucharist and other similar truths among the non-articles of the Creed, but they never place them among what is indirectly revealed. Our objector has amused himself by analyzing only those questions in which the Scholastics treat of "How all the truths of faith are contained in the Creed" or "How the Eucharist is contained in the Creed," which is where they treat of the accidental division between articles and non-articles; when he ought also to have devoted himself to analyzing those questions in which they treat of Whether it is lawful to hold contrary opinions about the notions or Whether heresy concerns those things which are of faith, which is where they treat of the most fundamental division of directly and indirectly revealed truth. Because he has confused or not sufficiently distinguished these two divisions of what is revealed, everything our objector has told us with such erudition about that first period of the great Scholastics of the thirteenth century is beside the point ²⁴.

470. FROM SCOTUS TO THE COUNCIL OF TRENT.—In this second period our objector cites Scotus, Ockham, Gerson, Aureolus and, among the Thomists, Cardinal Torquemada. Of all of them, even of Cardinal Torquemada, he is forced to confess that they expressly and clearly defend the definability by divine faith of the theological conclusion properly so called.

Our objector could equally have cited many others from that period, which we have noted, and which say exactly the same thing (372-398). Rather, he could have limited himself to simply saying that all, without exception, follow the same opinion, for we have not found, nor do we believe one will be found, a single theologian before Molina who has said the contrary. Since our objector frankly confesses this, we could with that alone leave this period and move on to the next.

However, since Capreolus carries great weight in the Thomistic tradition and belongs to this second period, our opponent could not pass him over in silence, nor should we. After conceding that all the theologians cited from this period agree with us, and being unable to find any clear text in Capreolus to the contrary, our opponent has contented himself with saying that "Capreolus seems to disagree" (contradicere videtur Capreolus). But whence does our opponent derive this hesitant seems (videtur)? Did Capreolus, who never lets a single deviation from Thomistic doctrine by Scotus, Aureolus, or others pass without correction, make the slightest correction of these theologians' teaching concerning the definability (definibilitas) of the theological conclusion? No. Our opponent has not been able to find a single word in Capreolus on this matter. He has found only that Capreolus, when discussing whether theology is a science (scientia), not with respect to the articles of faith but to theological conclusions, and whether it is a habit distinct (habitus distinctus) from faith, answers both questions in the affirmative. We fail to see on what grounds our opponent reproduces these passages from Capreolus, for this is precisely the answer that all Thomists, following St. Thomas, have always given, still give, and always will give to these two questions. These questions bear upon whether theological conclusions are objects of faith through themselves (per se), that is, prior to a definition of the Church, something that Thomists have always denied. But they bear not the slightest relation to the question whether such conclusions become objects of faith by virtue of their relation to what has been directly revealed, once that relation has been defined by the Church, something that Thomists have always affirmed.

On the other hand, after having previously affirmed that Saint Thomas, when he speaks of conclusions, means improper conclusions, and having cited in confirmation of this that text of Saint Thomas In Boetium: "Those things which we hold by faith are, as it were, the principles in this science, and other things are, as it were, the conclusions", now our objector says, and rightly, that when Capreolus speaks of conclusions, he means proper conclusions. And he has not noticed that Capreolus (in the very place to which our objector alludes), in order to prove this point about proper conclusions, adduces precisely that text of Saint Thomas which our objector wishes to understand as referring to improper conclusions ²⁵.

Stranger still is that a text from Capreolus which was the only one relevant to the case has escaped our objector, and it reads as follows: "To the fourth it is said that although Sacred Scripture does not proceed in the manner of demonstrative science, nevertheless from the contents of Sacred Scripture, which are related as principles of science, the saints demonstratively inferred conclusions about which theology is concerned, arguing against heretics from the principles of theology. And therefore, although theology is not handed down in the sacred canon in syllogistic style explicitly, nevertheless in the books of the subsequent theologians it is handed down in a scientific manner and in the manner of an art explicitly. ALL THINGS, HOWEVER, ARE CONTAINED IMPLICITLY IN SACRED SCRIPTURE"²⁶. There our objector has it how for Capreolus, just as for Saint Thomas, the true and proper theological conclusions, since it is of these that our objector rightly confesses Capreolus speaks, are implicit in Sacred Scripture, which is all that is required for them to be definable as of divine faith.

With Capreolus our objector comes to an end, and we too will bring the second period to a close.

**471. TRANSCENDENTAL CONFESSION: FROM TRENT TO VATICAN.—**Upon entering this third period, our objector begins by making frankly and nobly the following most important confession: "By the common consensus of theologians, the doctrine that considered conclusions as de fide (that is, as definable as de fide) remained common even after Trent. Thus in the sixteenth century it is held by Peter Soto, Bellarmine, Cardinal Toletus (he could have added Cajetan, Cano, Dominic Soto, Báñez, Medina, etc., etc.). Indeed, even John of St. Thomas, together with Navarrete and Master González, declares that opinion common among the Thomists, at least as regards the definability of conclusions".

Let the reader note well that momentous confession. That is precisely what we have repeated so many times in this work against certain manuals that present the definability of the theological conclusion as a particular opinion of Cano, Vázquez, and Vega, when it was the common opinion of all theologians before Molina and of almost all those after him. Where Vázquez and Vega exceeded themselves was in making them de fide per se or without a definition of the Church, not in making them definable as de fide, for that was the common opinion, as our objector confesses and as Suárez had already acknowledged before. We congratulate ourselves that a historian of the stature of our objector has come to rest at that most important conclusion.

But despite that frank confession, our objector opines that later theologians have restricted that common doctrine, and that one must adhere to that restriction. He says thus: "However, in this period the nominalistic formula is no longer simply admitted, but only with restriction and distinction, in such a way that it is reduced to the path of truth."

First of all, it is amusing to qualify as "nominalist" a formula that has just been confessed to be admitted without restriction or distinction of any kind by all theologians, before and after the Council of Trent, up to Molina. Are, perhaps, all those classical sixteenth-century theologians nominalists, who admit without distinctions or restrictions the definability of faith of the true theological conclusion? All the more so since that doctrine does not come at all from the nominalist period, but rather, both the common opinion and the formula that our objector is pleased to call nominalist, are derived from the notion that the great Scholastics had given of the indirect revealed, and very especially St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure (361-370).

Secondly, when a doctrine has been common doctrine before and after Trent, and above all among all the classical theologians of the sixteenth century, it matters little that later some theologians have restricted it, even if those theologians are called John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses, and Billuart. These are the three theologians who, after Suárez, have sown confusion in the Thomist school on this question. The first, by confusion of nomenclature, sometimes using the names of immediate and virtual promiscuously. The other two, using Suárez's new nomenclature of confused formal or equivalent and pure virtual (virtuale tantum), and giving occasion for dispute as to whether they take these terms in the same or a different sense than that which they had and have since Suárez, who invented them.

But let us leave this aside and see who those theologians are who, in our objector's judgment, have made that restriction or cooperated in it. He says the following: “The first impulse seems to have been given by Cajetan: M. Canus first raised the question: Suárez was the first to pose the question of definability: John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses, and Billuart sufficiently solved the question.” Let us examine one by one, but briefly, those six theologians, who are the only ones our objector cites in what he calls the restriction of the common doctrine.

472. CARDINAL CAJETAN.—Of Cajetan, our objector tells us the following: “Cajetan, following in the footsteps of Capreolus, established the conclusions as the proper object of theology. To this end, he distinguishes two kinds of revealed truth: ‘formally revealed, that is, in itself; and virtually revealed, that is, in its principles’.” That is all our objector has found in Cajetan.

Frankly, we do not see what that text of Cajetan, which we all admit and which we ourselves had already cited several times, has to do with the restriction we are now discussing. We suspect, however, that with the phrase “by clinging to the footprints of Capreolus,” and with what he had previously said about Capreolus, our objector wishes to imply—without daring to say it plainly—that Capreolus first and Cajetan later, in pointing out as the object of theology the proper conclusions, have modified or restricted the doctrine of St. Thomas, who, according to our objector, had understood by conclusions the improper ones. Is that not so?

Now, let anyone read the third article of the first question of the Summa Theologica, “Utrum sacra doctrina sit una scientia,” and he will see that St. Thomas makes therein the division of revealed and revealable, pointing out the revealed as the proper object of divine faith and the revealable as the proper object of Theology. “Since therefore sacred doctrine considers certain things insofar as they are revealed by God, all things whatsoever that are revealable by God share in the one formal reason of this science” ²⁷.

It is strange that our objector should have missed that most fundamental division of “revealed” and “revealable” made by St. Thomas, when that “revealable” is precisely the theological conclusion properly so called, and the root and seed of all dogmatic progress by way of rigorous theological conclusion. The division which Capreolus later made into “principles” and “conclusions” properly so called, as well as that which Cajetan made into the “formal” and “virtual” revealed, are not restrictions or amplifications, but an exact translation of the division of the “revealed” and the “revealable” of the Holy Doctor. Although this is evident, we will cite the words of the commentator, who in this question seems to be the favorite of our objector. Thus says John of St. Thomas, commenting on the article and text of the Holy Doctor which we have just cited: “Where St. Thomas, for Scripture, posits immediately revealed things, because those things which Scripture hands down are believable by faith: but for the science of theology he posits revealable things, which are virtually or in potency revealed” ²⁸.

Here the reader has clearly expressed not only that the division of Cajetan and of Capreolus is the same as that of St. Thomas, but also that St. Thomas and the great Scholastics, when they spoke of conclusions, understood the proper conclusions (virtually or in revealed potency), as our objector confesses that Capreolus and Cajetan understand them.

In contrast, our objector has forgotten to cite a very important text where Cardinal Cajetan treats and resolves ex professo the question of the definability as a matter of faith of everything necessarily connected with the revealed principles, which is precisely what we are dealing with. He says the following: “There are two ways by which it can be decided for the Christian religion what is to be believed... Nor does it matter whether something is revealed in Sacred Scripture and elsewhere explicitly (such as the creation of the world, the incarnation of the Word of God, and other things of this kind) or implicitly, as are all those things whose opposites cannot be maintained together with the truth of Sacred Scripture and of the other things that we know with certain faith, except that it takes ingenuity, effort, reason, and intellect to make manifest that these things which are said to be contained implicitly are NECESSARILY CONNECTED to those things in which they are said to be contained ²⁹

Here we have explicitly affirmed by Cardinal Cajetan the same thing that we already knew from Capreolus and Saint Thomas: that everything necessarily connected, with true theological connection, is implicit and definable as of divine faith. Are Báñez, Capreolus, and Cardinal Cajetan also nominalists?

473. MELCHOR CANO.—Concerning the distinguished founder of the discipline of Loci Theologici, our objector makes three assertions, and we regret to have to say that all three are inaccurate.

He says first that Cano began by affirming in chapter 8 of the sixth book the common doctrine that theological conclusions are of faith; but that later, in the twelfth book, he expressly added that they were only of faith mediately. That is not accurate. That doctrine that they are of faith mediately had already been pointed out by Cano from the fifth book, chapter 5, in the paragraph beginning "But the final argument" (463).

Secondly, he says that by making that affirmation that the conclusions are matters of faith mediately, Cano modified the common opinion that he himself had previously expressed. This is even more inaccurate. That the theological conclusion is not a matter of faith except mediately is what Cano says when dealing with the theological conclusion per se or without a definition by the Church. But when dealing with conclusions defined by the Church, Cano affirms expressly and categorically that they are as immediate and as formally matters of faith as the articles of faith or the Gospel itself, and this Cano affirms not as a probable opinion, but as one of the fundamental rules or "praeceptiones" of the theological loci. Let us hear Cano: "Seventh rule: If either the Church, or a Council, or the Apostolic See, or even the Saints with one mind and the same voice, have both established some theological conclusion and also prescribed it to the faithful, this truth will be regarded as Catholic as if it had been revealed by Christ Himself per se; and whoever opposes it will be just as much a heretic as if he contradicted the Sacred Scriptures and the traditions of the Apostles." ³⁰ It could not have been said more clearly (456).

Our objector states, thirdly, that Cano calls theological conclusions "appendices of the faith," and that Cano asserts that with the denial of a theological conclusion "faith grows weak, it does not perish." Evidently our objector has read Cano hastily. This matter of "appendices of the faith" and of "faith grows weak, it does not perish," which Cano brings up at the beginning of chapter 5, Cano says not about theological conclusions, but about other truths that do not attain the category of conclusions because they have no necessary but vehement relation, and about which Cano had just spoken at the end of the previous chapter ³¹. Let our objector read them again and he will confess that this is so. So far is Cano from believing that with the denial of conclusions "faith grows weak, it does not perish," that he expressly says shortly after the words cited by our objector: "But when from adverse errors of this kind (that is, the denial of conclusions) not only a weakening of faith, but also its corruption follows, etc." ³²

The doctrine, then, of Melchor Cano is represented by these two propositions: a) true theological conclusions (and that is not a true and rigorous theological conclusion which does not have an absolute or metaphysically certain connection with the revealed principle from which it is deduced) are purely theological or mediately of faith per se or without definition of the Church; b) but they are formally or immediately of faith after the definition. From the first proposition Vázquez departed; from the second Molina departed. Both propositions united represent exactly the doctrine which, as we have seen, St. Thomas teaches concerning the indirectly revealed or theological conclusion. This is the doctrine which all the classical Thomists taught before the Suarezian confusion or innovation (464).

**474. SUÁREZ AND LUGO.—**From Cano our objector jumps to Suárez and Lugo. It would have been better to set forth first the two theories, radically opposed to each other, of Molina and Vázquez, since the doctrine of Suárez is scarcely intelligible except in relation to those two theories that Suárez tried to reconcile or amalgamate (71). But, in short, let us examine the doctrine of Suárez and Lugo.

Our objector begins by citing the three celebrated theses of Suárez and Lugo, which we ourselves have already cited so many times, and which come down to the following:

1.º That which is revealed formally-confusedly is of faith per se or without definition. 2.º That which is revealed purely virtually or purely mediately (purely virtual - purely mediate) is not of faith per se or without definition.

3rd That purely virtual or purely mediated revelation becomes a matter of faith by definition.

In those three propositions Suárez and Lugo make use of two names new in the history of Theology: the names of formal confused and of purely virtual or mediate. Those two names have been invented by Suárez, and Suárez and Lugo understand by those names something quite distinct from what the ancients and many moderns understand by the simple and traditional names of formal and virtual. Because our objector has not noticed this, he moves in a continuous confusion in what he then says about the theologians subsequent to Suárez and to Lugo.

By formally confused (which many later called formally equivalent) Suárez and Lugo understand all conclusions that are really identical, although conceptually distinct, to the revealed principle from which they are deduced. By purely virtual or mediate they understand all conclusions that are really distinct from the revealed principle. Thus Suárez and Lugo explain themselves, and thus have understood them Ripalda, Mazzella, and all the Suarezian authors we have been able to examine, as we have already shown elsewhere (73).

Thus, then, the three aforementioned theses of Suárez and Lugo have the following meaning:

1. Every conclusion really identical with the revealed premise from which it is deduced, even if conceptually distinct, is an article of faith per se.
2. Every conclusion really distinct from that revealed premise is not an article of faith per se.
3. This same really distinct conclusion can be defined as an article of faith by the Church.

This is, and we repeat and will repeat a thousand times, the true meaning of the three theses of Suárez and Lugo, and whoever fixes only on those names of confused and purely virtual formal, without fixing on the meaning that Suárez and Lugo gave them, will understand neither the mind of those authors nor that of countless other later authors who have used the same nomenclature. We believe that this is what has happened to our objector.

Our objector says that Suárez and Lugo's third thesis is inadmissible. This is precisely what we have said and say ourselves. What is purely virtual or mediate, or, what is the same, what is really, and not merely conceptually, distinct from the revealed premise from which it is deduced, cannot be defined as a matter of faith for the simple reason that it is not truly revealed either directly or indirectly, since the conclusion can absolutely fail without the revealed premise failing. In this the Salmanticenses are right in attacking that proposition of Suárez and Lugo, which is the only one the Salmanticenses have in mind when attacking them.

In contrast, regarding the first and second theses of Suárez and Lugo, our objector makes the following most important confession: "This twofold thesis of Suárez almost all theologians henceforth follow, even the Thomists." Our objector is fully justified in this assertion. We have noted the texts of some eighty-plus theologians after Suárez, and of those eighty-plus, more than seventy admit these two Suarezian theses, that is, ninety percent of the theologians. There is no difference except that where Suárez, in his first proposition, says they are de fide, the true Thomists say they are definable de fide.

As can be seen, what our objector confesses here is precisely what we have been saying ourselves. The only difference is that, not having understood the true meaning of the new names confusedly formal and virtual only, used by Suárez and Lugo and repeated by so many later authors, our objector has understood neither the doctrine of Suárez and Lugo nor that of 90% of the later authors, nor our own.

So, let us set aside nomenclature and get to the heart of the matter. Does our objector admit or not admit that "every conclusion really identical, though conceptually distinct from the revealed premise from which it is deduced, is definable as of divine faith"? If he admits it, he is fully in agreement with what we say, and everything else is merely a question of nomenclature. If he does not admit it, he separates himself not only from us, but also from 90 percent of theologians, both ancient and modern.

It remains, therefore, demonstrated that Suárez and Lugo, far from having restricted the definability of faith of the theological conclusion, have exaggerated it. In the first proposition they admitted, and very rightly admitted, the definability of faith of inclusive theological conclusions. But in the third proposition they exaggerated that doctrine by extending it to physically-connected conclusions, which are not rigorously theological. For that reason they had to resort in that third proposition to the famous theories of new revelations or of transforming assistance (78-79).

Before leaving Suárez and Lugo, one more word. Our objector, in order to insinuate that Lugo regards as modern that doctrine of the definability of the theological conclusion, says thus: "And the opinion of Suárez soon prevailed so much that Lugo already declared it common among recent doctors." We cannot explain this so strange affirmation of our objector except by supposing that, in wanting to turn a page of Lugo, he has turned eight pages without noticing it. The question of the definability of the theological conclusion, deduced from a premise of faith and another of reason, which is what we are dealing with, Lugo treats in numbers 258-277 of the first disputation of the treatise On Faith; and, on the other hand, that phrase of recent doctors Lugo brings in number 326, treating the question of "how it is of faith that this is the true and legitimate Pope", a completely different question, and in which, just as Suárez and Lugo, John of Saint Thomas and the Salmanticenses also opine. So far is Lugo from believing modern that doctrine of the definability of the conclusion, that he expressly says: "Which, beyond the arguments brought by Suárez, are confirmed by the practice and usage of all" ³³

475. JOHN OF SAINT THOMAS.—After Suárez and Lugo, our objector cites John of Saint Thomas, the Salmanticenses, and Billuart. Of John of Saint Thomas he is forced to confess that “John of Saint Thomas, with Navarrete and Master González, declares this opinion common among the Thomists, at least as regards the definability of conclusions.” Only, our objector strives in vain to persuade that John of Saint Thomas limits that doctrine to improper conclusions.

To ascertain whether John of St. Thomas speaks of proper or improper conclusions, there is a very objective and very simple means. As is well known, John of St. Thomas confesses that he follows Navarrete and González against Molina and Granados. Well then, let anyone open on his table those five theologians, who treat the question ex professo: let him compare them with one another, and if after having done this he still insists that the question in which Navarrete attacks Molina and Granados defends Molina against Navarrete and John of St. Thomas attacks Molina and Granados with Navarrete and González concerns the improper conclusions and not the proper conclusions, he will have to be given up as impossible ³⁴

The texts cited by our objector, and with which we have already dealt (307), are brought forward by John of St. Thomas in the first part, first question, second disputation, fourth article. Now then: in the treatise De Fide John of St. Thomas has expressly and authentically explained the meaning of what he had said in that place. Let his words be heard: “From what has been said it is inferred that virtual revelation, whether mediate or deduced by means of a discourse, such as is found in theology, differs in kind from the immediate revelation which is had from the testimony of the one speaking, and which attains that which is to be believed by faith, as we have handed down more fully in the first part, first question, second disputation, fourth article (there is the place cited by our objector), where we rejected two extreme opinions: one, that of Vázquez, who holds that a conclusion deduced from the premises of faith is just as certain, with respect to one who knows the discourse, as a proposition defined by the Church: the other, that of Molina, who holds that even if a definition of the Church should supervene upon some proposition which previously was not of faith, it would not make it to be of faith; but that the Holy Spirit assists the Church lest it err, not, however, to make to be of faith things which previously were not of faith. Which opinions in the cited place can be seen as refuted” ³⁵

Here is our objector’s proof of how, when John of St. Thomas defended against Molina the definability as a matter of faith of the theological conclusion, he spoke of the proper conclusion, since no one will say that revelation mediate, virtual, deduced by discourse, specifically different from the immediate, as John of St. Thomas authentically explains it there, is an improper conclusion. If in solving the objections John of St. Thomas called that conclusion immediate, and even added that nothing that is merely mediate can be defined as a matter of faith, it is because the truly theological conclusion, which alone is the inclusive or implicit or conceptual one, is always immediate in itself, and is only mediate with respect to us, as St. Thomas repeats so many times and as we have already explained elsewhere. If only John of St. Thomas, when saying that only the immediate can be defined, had added to the word immediate the words in itself, we would have nothing to reproach in him, and for that reason we have only censured him for imprecision of nomenclature. But John of St. Thomas expressed himself clearly enough at the end of the whole question by saying that what the Church can define and does define is the virtual implicit, not the merely connective (connective only). That is exactly what we have said and do say. Connection without inclusion does not suffice for definability, just as it does not suffice for true or rigorous Theology.

476. THE SALMANTICENSES AND BILLUART.—The Salmanticenses, whom Billuart merely transcribes, are the theologians who, by having used the new nomenclature of Suárez and Lugo rather than the traditional Thomistic nomenclature, have entangled most of the modern Thomists.

According to the Salmanticenses, that which is revealed formally and confusedly or formally and equivalently is definable as a matter of faith; that which is purely virtual (virtuale tantum) is not definable as a matter of faith.

Our reply is very simple. Do the Salmanticenses understand by confused formal the same thing as Suárez, that is, all conclusions really identical with the revealed principles, although conceptually distinct? Then, in admitting the definability of such conclusions, they say exactly the same thing as we do. Do they not understand by confused formal such conclusions? Then, in denying their definability, they depart from 90 percent of ancient and modern theologians, and our objector does wrong in joining the Salmanticenses with Suárez and Lugo.

Likewise, do they understand by purely virtual the same thing as Suárez and Lugo, namely, "only those conclusions that are really distinct from the revealed principles"? If they understand it in this way, by denying their definability as a matter of faith, they say exactly the same thing as we do.

Finally, when the Salmanticenses and Billuart, and with them our objector, define the theological conclusion as "that which is contained in the revealed premise as an effect in its cause," do they understand by cause the natural or physical or in essendo cause? If they understand it thus, then in denying the definability de fide of such a conclusion they say exactly the same thing as we do. A conclusion joined to the revealed premise by only a physical connection can hardly be an object of faith when it cannot even be an object of infallibility, nor even of rigorous theology. Do they understand, on the other hand, by cause the virtual or metaphysical or in cognoscendo cause, as it must be understood when dealing with sciences of absolute certainty? For if they understand it thus, and nevertheless deny the definability de fide of such conclusions, we grant our objector the Salmanticenses and Billuart, and even, if he wishes, John of St. Thomas, since such a doctrine would not only be against what we regard as certain and evident doctrine, but also against what the immense majority of theologians teach with certainty and evidence, not only ancient ones, but also modern ones, for there are few modern theologians who do not admit the definability de fide of the conceptual or identically-real conclusion (490).

Thus, then, and to cut short once and for all that tangle created in the Thomist school by the Salmanticenses and Billuart, let our objector choose once and for all the horn of the dilemma that pleases him most. If the Salmanticenses and Billuart, in admitting the definability de fide of the confused or equivalent formal [object], understand those names in the same sense as Suárez and Lugo, then the Salmanticenses and Billuart are with us and not with our objector. If they understand them in a different sense, then the fictitious chain by which our objector has sought to unite the Salmanticenses and Billuart with Suárez and Lugo is completely broken, and those two Thomist theologians remain completely isolated; for if one excepts Kilber, scarcely half a dozen post-Suárezian theologians will be found who deny the definability de fide of the confused formal [object] in the sense in which Suárez and Lugo understood it, that is, the conceptual or really-identical conclusion. Hence the learned P. Gardeil has said with his customary critical sense: "This idea of the development of the doctrine of faith by way of a true theological conclusion, that is, one having a metaphysical connection with the revealed datum and involving a real inclusion of the conclusion in it, within the difference of the concepts by which it expresses it, the Salmanticenses and Billuart, deceived by Suárez, had obscured, dragging along—at the price of what struggles against the evidence of the definition by the Church of theological conclusions—even Thomist theologians themselves" ³⁶.

477. STATE OF THE QUESTION AT THE END OF THE 18TH CENTURY.—Because Montaigne is one of the theologians who deny the definability of the theological conclusion, our objector, with true lawyerly skill, closes the history of this third period by saying: "Montaigne represents the state of the question at the end of the 18th century".

We have found that skillful historical artifice most gracious. Why, instead of closing the eighteenth century with Montaigne, one of the few post-Suárezian theologians who deny the definability de fide of the conclusion, has he not closed it with some other theologian from among the very many who affirm that definability, and indeed many of them the definability of dogmatic facts? We shall cite only, besides the many already cited (399-434), four: two Jesuits and two Dominicans; all later than the Salmanticenses and all contemporaries of Billuart and of Montaigne.

Let us listen to the Jesuit Gautier: "A theological conclusion, strictly speaking, becomes pressingly dogmatic and belongs to the sphere of faith, if it has been formulated by the Church herself or by the Apostolic See, and is proposed to all the faithful for belief through her definition, that is, through the application of divine revelation" ³⁷.

Let us hear also the Jesuit Platelius: "A conclusion deduced from a universal [premise] that is entirely certain, and from a subsumed [premise] that is revealed, and thus generally every conclusion deduced from one revealed [premise] and another that is certain and evident by natural light, is de fide... Our conclusion is proven because when a predicate is affirmed of a subject, all things that are certainly and evidently known to be identified with or necessarily connected to such a conclusion are simultaneously affirmed mediately and virtually, and therefore really. Therefore this conclusion: 'Christ is capable of laughter,' deduced from these premises: 'every man is capable of laughter' and 'Christ is man,' of which the first is known by natural light and the other is de fide, is sufficiently revealed ³⁸

Let us listen to the Dominican Labat: “Whoever denied a theological conclusion, even one inferred from two revealed premises, precisely as such (that is, without definition) would not be a heretic... I said, precisely as such, because whoever denied a theological conclusion, elsewhere defined by the Church, would be truly a heretic, whatever Molina may say to the contrary” ³⁹

Let us finally listen to the Dominican Preingué: "You will object firstly: It is not of faith that the Church is infallible in defining what the sense of some proposition is, since this has not been revealed. The reply denies the assumption. Because that infallibility at least mediately is revealed, insofar as it is revealed that the Church is infallible in determining what kind of sense the proposition has: and such a revelation suffices for something to pertain to the faith. Hence St. Thomas in this passage (2-2, q. 11, a. 2, in the body) says: 'something pertains to the faith in two ways. In one way directly... In another way indirectly... and concerning both there can be heresy in the same way as there can be faith" ⁴⁰

We have chosen this text from Preingué so that the meaning of Saint Thomas’s indirect revelation may be seen once again.

178. OTHER THEOLOGIANS OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.—In the same way that we have cited to our objector four theologians from the end of the eighteenth century, we are going to cite to him four others from the end of the seventeenth century, also choosing them from among those not yet cited, and they will be: an Augustinian, a Benedictine, a Jesuit, and a Capuchin.

Thus says the Augustinian Gabardi: "I say fourth: The conclusions of theology, in whatever way they are defined by the Church (whether as deduced or as not deduced), pertain to the faith and are principles of theology; not so the indefinite conclusions. The second part is against Vázquez, who thinks that a conclusion not defined is proposed as to be believed to those to whom it becomes known through theological discourse ⁴¹

Here now is how the Benedictine Mezger expresses himself: "It should be noted first that something can be revealed formally or virtually... What is revealed virtually is that which, because it is contained in something formally revealed as if radically and by virtue, has an infallible connection with it, deducible by natural reasoning. First conclusion: Not only formal, confused, and universal revelation, but also virtual revelation, is a sufficient motive of faith... This is proved first: because many propositions, not only formally confused but also virtually revealed, are in fact proposed to all for belief and defined by the Church" ⁴²

The renowned theologian of the Sorbonne, Martin Grandin, follows, saying thus: "Does mediate revelation suffice for faith? Immediate revelation is that which falls immediately upon some proposition: thus revelation falls upon this immediately: 'Christ is man.' Mediate revelation is that which, by means of that proposition, falls upon another proposition, just as by means of the superior proposition revelation falls upon this: 'Christ is capable of laughter.' The question is: whether mediate revelation suffices."

Unica conclusio: Such conclusions are de fide... Proof: when two things are necessarily connected to each other, if God says one, He says also the other, and that to the extent sufficient for divine faith... It can be confirmed at least a posteriori in this way: when two things are connected, the Church, if one is to be believed, can propose the other: therefore, when one is connected to another, if God says one, He says also the other, and that to the extent sufficient for divine faith" ⁴³

Now comes the Jesuit Haunold, who expresses himself thus: "When some theologians are wont to say that there are no new dogmas in the Church, to be believed anew, they mean nothing more than that nothing begins to be a matter of faith formally and explicitly which was not previously a matter of faith radically, implicitly, and virtually, inasmuch as the Church defines as explicitly to be believed only those things which, through the assistance of the Holy Spirit, she knows to be contained virtually in an object already previously formally revealed" ⁴⁴

Finally, the Capuchin Gervase of Brisach speaks: "You ask thirdly: Whether a virtual revelation, namely one deduced from another revealed truth by a good inference, suffices for the object of faith or theological faith, or whether it is only a theological conclusion?"

I answer that there are two opinions. Some affirm... Others deny... Meanwhile, however, all Catholics agree that, with the definition of the Church having intervened, it suffices for divine faith⁴⁵. And thus we could go on citing innumerable theologians from this entire post-Tridentine period.

Let the reader see, then, to what has been reduced that dogmatic assertion of our objector: “In this period the nominalistic formula is no longer admitted without qualification, but with restriction.” Thus is history written!

**479. THE VATICAN COUNCIL.—**Our objector titles the fourth period “Concilium Vaticanum.” His observations on this period are reduced to the following:

FIRST OBSERVATION.—“Therefore, as regards the substance of the doctrine, a common consensus of the scholastics is held. Hence the doctrine was sufficiently prepared for a definition, if necessity should urge it. This necessity presented itself to the Vatican Council, because of the error of the Protestants, the Rationalists, and of Günther, who refused to admit dogmas defined by the Church as divinely revealed.”

Answer.—Neither the Protestant error, nor the rationalist one, nor that of Günther have anything to do with this whole question we are treating. All Catholic theologians admit that only what is revealed can be defined as dogma, and that suffices. The question of whether only the principles are revealed or also the true theological conclusions is a completely free question, before and after the Vatican Council. On this there is no unanimous agreement starting from Molina, although ninety percent admit that “all conclusions deduced from the revealed principles by means of conceptual reasoning” are truly revealed and definable as matters of faith. That is our opinion. And these are, according to the Thomistic school, true and rigorous theological conclusions.

480. SECOND OBSERVATION.—“De facto, the Vatican Council approved the doctrine of the scholastics, at least in substance”.

Answer.—The Vatican Council has defined only that what is revealed cannot be defined as dogma. If our objector calls that the substance of scholastic doctrine, undoubtedly it is defined. But the Council has not said a single word about whether only what is formally revealed is revealed, or whether what is virtually revealed is also revealed. We repeat that this is a question left free after, as before, the Vatican Council. Let us hear the classic commentator on the Council commenting precisely on the texts to which our objector alludes: “We believe true the things that God has revealed: by him revealed. That is the matter, or to speak the scholastic language, the material object of the act of faith. But must we place among the revealed truths only those that are formally revealed, or can we join to them the virtually revealed truths? That is a question that our Council leaves free for theologians to discuss”⁴⁶.

481. THIRD OBSERVATION.—The Vatican Council says expressly that "the Holy Spirit was promised to the successors of Peter, not that by His revelation they might make known new doctrine, but that by His assistance they might holily guard and faithfully expound the revelation delivered through the Apostles, the deposit of faith."

Answer.—From that text nothing is deduced against those who defend the definability of faith of the theological conclusion, since those theologians maintain at the same time, against Kilber and Ripalda, that the theological conclusion is not new doctrine, but new conceptual explanation of the same revealed doctrine.

On the contrary, that Vatican text proves them right. Indeed, according to that Vatican text, the Holy Spirit or, what is the same thing, infallibility was not promised to the Church for new doctrine; but since, according to all theologians, the Holy Spirit or infallibility was promised to the Church for every true theological conclusion and even for every true dogmatic fact, it follows that neither the true theological conclusion nor the true dogmatic fact constitutes new doctrine and, therefore, they are definable as of divine faith. That is what is deduced from the Vatican Council, and that is what we hope will one day be admitted by all theologians without exception (248).

482. FOURTH OBSERVATION.—"Among the Scotists, Fr. Parthenius Minges⁴⁷ simply holds that theological conclusions are definable as dogmas, and thus that the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary was defined, without considering Scotus's correction on the part of later scholastics, nor considering that Pius IX defined the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary as revealed."

Answer.—That Scotist theologian, whom we have already cited elsewhere (442), is fully within his rights in saying all that he says in that paragraph, and we congratulate him for it. As for the definability of the theological conclusion or of the indirectly revealed, Scotus has not needed to be corrected by anyone; on the contrary, ninety percent of theologians follow in this matter Thomas Aquinas and Scotus against Molina, against Kilber and, if it pleases our objector, against the Salmanticenses and Billuart. On the other hand, Pius IX defined that the dogma of the Immaculate Conception is revealed, but he did not say that it is formally revealed. It may have been revealed indirectly as a conceptual conclusion from the principle of the worthy divine motherhood. And thus we believe, with Fr. Minges, that it was revealed. That is the indirectly revealed of Thomas Aquinas, St. Bonaventure, and Scotus in the question "Whether it is lawful to hold contrary opinions about the notions" (209).

483. FIFTH OBSERVATION.—"The School of the Society of Jesus is divided, although the greater part holds that only those things are capable of being defined as dogmas which are revealed formally, and not merely virtually, as Cardinal Billot, Mazzella, Schifini, Pesch". Response.—In the first place, if the school of the Society of Jesus is divided on this question, our objector does wrong in repeating so many times that, after the Salmanticenses and Billuart, as if there were no other theologians in the world besides those two, the question "is already solved in its substance", and that "the common consensus of the scholastics is had", and even that "the doctrine was sufficiently prepared for definition (;!!) if necessity should urge it". As if the renowned Society of Jesus counted for nothing! In the second place, among those four Jesuit theologians whom our objector has chosen, Schifini not only defends, as we do, the definability of conclusions that are conceptually distinct, but even of those that are really distinct⁴⁸. Cardinal Mazzella not only defends, with us, the definability of conceptual conclusions, but even maintains that they are of faith before being defined⁴⁹. Cardinal Billot and Pesch, since they do not distinguish clearly, as Suárez, Lugo, and Mazzella do, between conclusions conceptually distinct and really distinct, we do not know for certain whether, in denying the definability as a matter of faith of the theological conclusion, they deny the definability of every conclusion or only that of the conclusion really distinct. At any rate, we have already seen that Pesch admits the definability of every truly consequential sense of the Bible, which is the same as admitting the definability of the conclusion properly so called (447).

484. SIXTH OBSERVATION.—"Among the Thomists, M. Tuyaerts holds that all things connected with the revealed truths, the judgments of the Church even concerning dogmatic facts..., can be defined as dogmas, even though such judgments are evidently not revealed." Response.—"They are evidently not revealed," if we are speaking of direct revelation; but "they are evidently revealed," if we are speaking of indirect revelation. Now, according to Saint Thomas, what is indirectly revealed can be defined as a matter of faith. The definition of conclusions by the Church is nothing other than the infallible explication of revelation, just as the definition of dogmatic facts is nothing other than the infallible application of revelation. For both things the Church has divine authority. Let the cited texts of Bañez and of Preingué be recalled, commenting on the directe and indirecte of Saint Thomas ⁵⁰. In our judgment, Fr. Tuyaerts is deficient only in three things:

a) in not having distinguished between conceptual conclusions or those of metaphysical-absolute certainty and conclusions that are really distinct or of physical-contingent certainty, since only the former are rigorous theological conclusions and definable as matters of faith;
b) in not having distinguished between before and after the definition, since before the definition no conclusion, not even one drawn from two revealed premises, can receive the assent of divine faith, whatever the Salmanticenses may say;
c) in having attributed everything to speculative reasoning and little or nothing to the practical sense of faith, which is just as important as, or more important than, reasoning, as Fr. Gardeil rightly pointed out to him.

485. SEVENTH OBSERVATION.—“Not even Nestor among the Thomists of France, P. A. Gardeil, seems to have been satisfied by the doctrine of the Thomists (that is, the doctrine of the Salmanticenses and Billuart) although in practice he holds it”.

Answer.—We do not know why our objector, in order to classify Fr. Gardeil's opinion, does not cite what the latter has recently written, which reads as follows: "This idea, which the Salmanticenses and Billuart, misled by Suárez, had obscured, leading even Thomist theologians astray. Fr. Marín-Sola has done us the service of restoring our tradition to full light. I do not hesitate to range myself entirely on the side of this conception of the direct definition of the true

theological conclusions" ⁵¹. Father Gardeil was the first among modern Thomists to draw attention to the famous "revealable," in which St. Thomas makes the specific object of Sacred Theology consist, and which is the true bridge and the true source of dogmatic progress. In our opinion, the two invaluable monographs of Father Gardeil The Revealed Given and Credibility have been the true origin of all that has been said afterward that is good on the two questions of dogmatic progress and the nature of apologetics.

486. FINAL OBSERVATION.—"Finally, Fr. Marín-Sola did indeed touch a certain wound in Suarezian doctrine, but he did not heal it."

Answer.—Because our objector has not understood the true meaning of the confused formal [concept], which is what the first of the three cited theses of Suárez and Lugo deals with, he has also not understood what we have censured in Suárez and Lugo and what we have approved.

As we have already said, and all disciples of Suárez will admit it, Suárez and Lugo include under the name of confused formal [concept] "all conclusions really identical or absolutely inseparable from the revealed premise from which they are deduced."

The definability of these conclusions is admitted by Suárez and Lugo. In this, we, far from censuring Suárez and Lugo, agree with them. Do the Salmanticenses, Billuart, and our objector agree with us on this or not? If they agree, the question is settled, for these are the true and proper conclusions whose definability we have been discussing throughout our entire work. If they do not agree, then they evidently depart not only from us, but from Suárez and Lugo (in the first, and not only in the third, of their theses) and from ninety percent of ancient and modern theologians. In this we are certain that we have with us all the true disciples of Suárez.

In what we have censured Suárez, there have been four things: a) that in the first of his three theses, and under the new name of "confused formal," he denied that conceptual conclusions are conclusions properly so called; b) that he affirmed that such conclusions are of faith per se or without definition; c) that in the second and third of his theses, and under the also new name of virtuale tantum, he said that the conclusion properly so called is the really distinct conclusion or one of physical certainty; d) that he made this conclusion definable as of divine faith, the—

⁵² having for that purpose to resort to new revelations. In these four censures of Suárez we believe that anyone who has studied this question—not in the Salmanticenses or Billuart, confused by Suárez's new nomenclature, but in St. Thomas himself or in his commentators prior to the confusion created by Suárez's new nomenclature—will agree with us.

487. SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS AND QUESTIONS OF NAMING.—The Salmanticenses, speaking on another topic, make the following most apt observation: "From the freedom to invent new meanings of words, or to relax old ones at will, arise lengthy and interminable questions about ways of speaking; and likewise false and dangerous opinions which, by playing with words, are protected by their ambiguity, so that they cannot be convicted of their falsity" ⁵³

This is happening to many modern theologians with the new names of confused formal, equivalent formal, pure virtual, pure mediate, and other similar ones. Ever since Suárez invented those names, a confusion has arisen among theologians on this question similar to what would arise among the clerks of a pharmacy on the day a prankster took the whim of furtively changing the labels on the jars. From that moment on, the clerks would swear that they had dispensed quinine, as the medical prescription prescribed, while the buyers or the doctor would swear, in turn, that they had not received quinine, but arsenic. To untangle the mess, there would be no other means left than to completely disregard the labels and examine the substance or real content of the jars.

Let us, therefore, set aside for a moment all those new nomenclatures or labels and go to the heart of the matter. Of course, we cannot go to the heart without using names; but instead of making use of ambiguous or elastic names, let us employ only those names whose meaning is exact and precise and admitted by all.

Now then, everyone knows with perfect precision what the name explicit revelation means; every theologian likewise knows the exact meaning of the names distinction of reason ratiocinating, distinction of reason ratiocinated, and real distinction. With these four names there is enough to place before the eyes of every reader, however unlearned, the exact substance of the problem called "the definability as a matter of faith of the theological conclusion" and to classify with absolute precision the different opinions of the post-Suarezian theologians.

Indeed, God revealed to the Apostles, and they handed on to the Church, a definite set of explicit propositions, which are called the deposit of faith or the starting point of all development, both theological and dogmatic. From these explicit propositions, only three kinds of conclusions could have emerged by reasoning: a) conclusions that are distinguished from the apostolic propositions only by a distinction of reason reasoning; b) conclusions that are distinguished by a distinction of reason reasoned; c) conclusions that are distinguished by a real distinction. There can be, and there can only be, no more and no fewer kinds of conclusions than these.

**488. FOUR GROUPS OF TRUTHS.—**We have, then, four groups of truths, namely: First group: Explicitly revealed truths. Second group: Conclusions that are not distinguished from the preceding ones except by a distinction of reasoning reason. Third group: Conclusions that are distinguished by a distinction of reasoned reason, or conceptual, or virtual. Fourth group: Conclusions that are distinguished by a real distinction.

To these four groups, so perfectly delineated, there correspond in post-Suarezian theology four opinions that are perfectly characterized and essentially distinct from one another, namely:

First opinion: That of those who believe that only the truths of the first group are definable as matters of faith. The most characteristic representative of this rigid opinion is, in a certain way, Arriaga, followed by Maistrio and some other rare theologian. This opinion is today completely abandoned.

Second opinion: That of those who say that the propositions of the first two groups are definable, but not those of the third. The most characteristic representative of this opinion is Kilber or the so-called Wirceburgenses, who in this partly follows Ripalda and wholly follows Molina and Granados. This opinion has also been followed by a few later theologians after Kilber.

Third opinion: That of those who say that the propositions of the first three groups are definable, that is, not only what is explicitly revealed (first group) and the conclusions of discursive reason (second group), but also the conclusions of reasoned reason, or conceptual ones, or identical-real ones (third group). The most characteristic representatives of this opinion are, besides all the theologians before Molina, Suárez and Lugo (in the first of their theses under the name of confused formal), and in this the immense majority of later theologians have followed Suárez and Lugo, even in our own day. That is also our opinion.

Fourth opinion: That of those who say that not only the propositions of the first three groups are definable, but also those of the fourth group, that is, not only the conclusions of conceptual distinction, but also those of real distinction or of purely physical necessity. This is the singular opinion of Suárez and Lugo (in the third of their theses under the name of virtual only) and the one that logically led those two distinguished theologians to the inadmissible theories of new revelations or of indefinite and transforming assistance.

The theologian or historian of dogmas who does not clearly distinguish between those four opinions, perfectly characterized and completely irreducible among themselves, or who imagines, as our objector seems to imagine, that the four are equal quoad substantiam, does not know the post-Suarezian history of this question or confuses substance or core with nomenclature.

As we have said and repeat, if it is a question of the definability of the theological conclusion, our opinion is that of the third group. Therefore, let our objector have the kindness to distinguish carefully in this problem the question of substance from the question of nomenclature.

The underlying question is this: "Once a proposition has been explicitly revealed, are all other propositions really identical to it, although conceptually distinct, also or thereby implicitly revealed and, therefore, definable as a matter of faith?" No one is unaware of the very grave significance of this question for the problem of the extent of dogmatic progress and of the nature of sacred theology.

On the other hand, the question of nomenclature is as follows: Such truths, really identical with the explicitly revealed propositions, but conceptually distinct: should they be called formally revealed or virtually revealed?

Anyone will understand that the problem of the definability of such conceptual truths, which is what we are dealing with, depends on the answer to the substantive question, not to the question of nomenclature. If the answer is that they are truly revealed, we will all say that they are definable, whatever they may be called. If the answer is that they are not revealed, we will all say that they are not definable, whatever name may be given to them.

Now then, how does our objector answer the substantive question? If he answers yes, he is fully in agreement with us, and all the rest is merely a secondary matter. If he answers no, let him not doubt for a moment that he is departing not only from us, but also from ninety percent of ancient and modern theologians.

It would be useless to try to evade a categorical answer with plays on nomenclature, saying that such conclusions are definable if they do not express new doctrine, but that they are not so otherwise. That is precisely the point: to know whether such conclusions, only conceptually distinct from the revealed premise from which they are deduced, express new doctrine or not. If our objector concedes that such conclusions do not express new doctrine, which is the same as conceding that they are definable as matters of faith, he agrees with us on everything. If he answers that they express completely new doctrine, which is the same as denying that they are definable, he departs not only from us, but also from the vast majority of theologians, both ancient and modern.

490. AN IMPARTIAL TESTIMONY.—In order to show our objector that this is the opinion of the vast majority of theologians, not only ancient but also modern, we will close this section with the words of a very modern and impartial author, who, when he wrote, thought of everything except that he was going to serve as a "confirmatur" for our doctrine. He is the most modern theologian on this question that has fallen into our hands. We refer to the Jesuit Father Daniel Sola, illustrious professor of the Pontifical Seminary of Comillas, in Spain. He says the following:

"In explicitly revealed [truth] something can be contained either formally or virtually. It is contained formally implicitly when it is formally, that is, according to the very concept it is the same as what is explicitly revealed, so that there is only a distinction of reasoning reason... It is said that one thing is contained in another materially and identically (let our objector note this, for this is what interests us) when between them there is indeed no real distinction, but there is a metaphysical distinction, or an adequate distinction of reasoned reason. Thus the omnipotence of God is contained in His immensity, or vice versa, and so on with the other divine attributes."

As our objector sees it, what Father Daniel calls material continence or identical continence are the conceptual conclusions we are discussing. Now hear the thesis of Father Daniel Sola, for it is worthy of being heard:

Thesis 76: A truth formally and implicitly contained in one explicitly revealed pertains of itself to the material object of faith. The same is to be said, more probably, of those things which are contained in the explicitly revealed, not formally, but materially and identically, or essentially and connexively.

"Censure. First part, that is, that the truth formally contained in what is explicitly revealed is, in itself, the material object of faith, or truly and really revealed, is certain and common against Arriaga... Second part (let our objector hear it) is in reality MOST COMMON and very more probable, at least if the real identity of both can be certainly known by us without a new revelation. Among the more ancient authors, Suárez, Lugo (in the first, not in the third of his theses), Oviedo, Marín, and very many others hold it, and the MORE RECENT ones COMMONLY, against Ripalda, the Würzburg theologians, and others" ⁵⁴ There our objector has how the opinion that we defend, and which our objector seems to regard as a singular opinion, is not only very more probable and followed by the ancient theologians, but is also followed by the more recent ones commonly. The defect of our objector's entire thesis lies in the fact that, entangled with the new and ambiguous nomenclature of "formally confused" and "only virtually," invented by Suárez and Lugo, and poorly discerned by the Salmanticenses, he has failed to grasp the true substance of that conceptual or really-identical conclusion which Suárez and Lugo called formally confused, and whose definability by divine faith has always been, and is today, defended by the great majority of theologians against Ripalda and the Würzburg theologians. Provided that our objector admits that substance, the nomenclature would matter little, although we do not believe that any Thomist worthy of that name would dare to maintain that the conceptual conclusion is not a conclusion properly speaking, and a proper and rigorous virtually revealed or theological conclusion.