La evolución homogénea del dogma católico

THE TRUE MIND OF MELCHOR CANO ON THE DEFINABILITY OF FAITH OF THE THEOLOGICAL CONCLUSION

449. CLARIFICATION OF THE QUESTION.—Several times in the course of this work we have promised to deal with Melchor Cano's mind on the nature and definability of faith of the theological conclusion. We are going to fulfill what we promised. The theological conclusion is like the central point of the most serious question of dogmatic progress, and it is well worth ascertaining what the true mind of the illustrious founder of the discipline of the Theological Loci is on this question, that great genius who is, undoubtedly, one of the greatest glories of Catholic Theology and who, in the opinion of Natalis Alexander, occupies the first place among the Dominican theologians after the Angelic Doctor ^[132. 'Melchior Canus... by his talent, learning and industry, left a perpetual monument, the twelve books on the Loci Theologici... Whose genius, above all other writers of the Dominican Order after the Angelic mind of Saint Thomas, I especially extol' (NATALIS ALEXANDER, Hist. Eccles., saec. XVI, c. 5, a. 2, n. 18).—'With immortal fame prepared for himself, in that work of scarcely a full volume, which truly has as many praisers and admirers as readers, namely the Loci Theologici 1, 12' (NICOLAS ANTONIO).—'Distinguished equally in learning and talent, great in reputation, greater in reality, I speak of Melchior Cano, who with a truly golden volume, before all and above all, carried out this very treatment of the Loci Theologici' (CARDINAL PALLAVICINO, S. I.).—'I can most truly affirm that Melchior Cano alone... in the very academy of the learned of the Dominican institute, was able to serve in place of an entire class' (FRANCISCO GARCÍA, S. I.).—'His fame was greatest and most brilliant. No one after his time better explained the mysteries of the Sacred Scriptures with the authority that Peter had. Aptly, therefore, the Supreme Pontiffs and wisely referred those evangelical testimonies to the Roman Bishop and the Apostolic See' (Cano, De Locis Theologicis, l. 6, c. last, to the tenth).. better explained (BENITO PEREIRA, S. I.).—'He wrote that most learned book, which today is worn by the hands of all everywhere, on merit, whose title is De Locis Theologicis, in which so notably and precisely and with such eloquence he establishes what are the most powerful places for the theologian to establish his conclusions, and as it were the bases upon which the whole theological structure ought to rise, so that nothing could be more exact and more complete'. (SIxtus of Siena).—'The treatise on the Loci Theologici is a plainly golden work, and complete in all its numbers, and composed with the greatest elegance' (ELIAS DU-PIN).—'That illustrious author wrote a whole and golden book on the twelve loci, which they may truly call a treasure, extracted from various mines, in which nothing is found that is not precious, not refined gold, not complete in all its numbers... Whoever will read this attentively and seriously will freely admit that scarcely any book so far has appeared in human memory either richer in abundance, or more suitable in method, or more fruitful in variety, or more polished in style, or more illustrious in the arrangement of all things (the Fathers of the Church alone excepted): inasmuch as in it an outstanding splendor of elegance, sublime wisdom, and profound erudition contend for the palm' (VINCENT CONTENSON).

We propose in this section to show that a confusion has been incurred regarding the mind of Melchor Cano on this question, and that this confusion has been transmitted without examination from one to another until it has already become current coin among the generality of theologians.

Nothing, in fact, is more common among theological writers than the assertion that Melchor Cano defended, like Vázquez and Vega, that theological conclusions are of divine faith. Let any treatise on theology be opened, let the place be sought where the question is treated of whether theological conclusions or what is mediately or virtually revealed are or are not of divine faith, and one will invariably stumble upon the following or similar words: "The first opinion affirms that these theological conclusions are of faith, and accordingly that it suffices for faith that they be virtually revealed or virtually contained in the revealed. Thus holds Cano, book sixth of the Loci, last chapter, to the tenth; more fully Vega, book 9 on the Council of Trent, chapter 39; and defends it Vázquez, first part, disputation 5, chapter 3".

Thus Suárez expresses himself¹, and in similar terms the majority of authors express themselves, invariably citing

Many other praises can be seen from distinguished writers in the preliminary dissertation of SERRY to his edition of Cano's works. Nowadays, since the most fundamental subject of Locis is frequently studied through modern compendiums, Melchor Cano is neither read, nor cited, nor praised with the frequency and enthusiasm that our forebears showed. Nevertheless, we believe that anyone who has studied or read with the attention it deserves the classic and imperishable work of the founder of the Theological Loci, and compares it with whatever has been written in modern times on this matter, cannot but subscribe to the judgment of the illustrious and competent Fr. Berthier when he says of Cano: He was altogether the prince AND HAS REMAINED SO. "Thus he himself, who first devised the science of the Theological Loci, was and has remained altogether the author and prince of that discipline; although something may seem to need to be added to and changed in his work, on account of the greater breadth of certain sciences" (BERTHIER, De Locis Theologicis, prol., p. 8, Augustae Taurinorum 1888). Melchor Cano, in turn, considers Cardinal Cajetan as the greatest among the disciples of Saint Thomas: "Cajetan, whom I dare call the one most eminent in genius and learning of our family" (De Locis, l. 12, c. 5). It is well known that, by the phrase we or our family, Cano usually understands the Thomist school. "Ours, that is, the family of St. Thomas" (l. c., l. 9, c. 9). namely the same place that Suárez cites and that Vázquez had already cited, turning the water to his own mill: that is, the ad decimum of the last chapter of the sixth book of the immortal work of Melchor Cano.

450. THE TEXT OF MELCHOR CANO.—Let us begin by quoting literally that famous ad decimum of Melchor Cano, which is what has given rise to this question. It reads as follows: “But this too must finally be considered (for it is a matter of great importance and most worthy of careful consideration): not only does that belong to Catholic doctrine which was expressly revealed to the Apostles, but also that which is deduced from one revealed proposition and another certain one in the natural light, by evident syllogism and inference.”

This is what Melchor Cano said in his much-cited ad decimum, adding afterwards in confirmation three examples which, due to their great length, we place in a note ². On this text rests the persuasion, now general, that Melchor Cano defended, as Vega and Vázquez seem to have defended, that the theological conclusion is of divine faith; understanding the phrase of divine faith in the sense of being immediately of divine faith, which is how that phrase is generally understood today, for that the theological conclusion is mediately of divine faith is commonly admitted by theologians.

Now then: is it true that Melchor Cano defended, as is generally attributed to him, that the theological conclusion is immediately of divine faith? Is that the meaning of the cited text from the famous ad decimum? Let us examine this, but first making two simple observations.

451. FIRST OBSERVATION.—All the great scholastic theologians divide divine revelation into immediate and mediate, there being, according to all theologians, truths immediately revealed and mediately revealed. Consequently, a thing can belong to the divine faith or to Catholic doctrine in two distinct ways: immediately or mediately. Therefore (and this must never be forgotten), when in the ancient theologians one reads the phrase to be of divine faith or to belong to the divine faith, one must take note of whether they are speaking of being immediately of divine faith, or of being so only mediately.

452. SECOND OBSERVATION.—Although Vázquez may have confused or seemed to confuse the value of the authority of the Church with the value of theological reasoning, nevertheless, for the generality of theologians, and very especially for Thomistic theologians, those two values are essentially distinct. Consequently, when any theologian, above all a Thomistic theologian, speaks of whether a thing is or is not of divine faith, one must carefully consider whether he says or understands that it is of faith after the definition of the Church or that it is of faith before or without a definition of the Church.

453. CONFIRMATION.—Indeed: in the ancient theologians the phrases revealed truth, matter of faith, belonging to Catholic doctrine are often taken not only in the strict sense of today, namely of being so immediately, but also

Not one word more or less than what was copied did Cano say, regarding this question, in his much-cited ad decimum. The three examples of Cano that we cite in this note offer no special difficulty and are admitted by the generality of theologians. The difficulty lies in the general rule that Cano establishes in the words previously cited in the text, where he affirms that the conclusions deduced from one premise of faith and another of reason are de fide or belong to Catholic doctrine. What Cano understands by being de fide or by belonging to Catholic doctrine is what we are going to examine in this section. also in the broader sense of being so whether immediately or mediately. Although this is evident to anyone, we will cite a few brief texts from ancient theologians of different backgrounds:

“Revealed doctrine, immediately as it is faith, or mediately as it is theology” ³

“You ask: what is called a catholic proposition? I say that an assertion or proposition is called catholic in two ways. In one way immediately, namely, that which is directly derived from the rule of faith... In another way, an assertion is called catholic mediately, which is derived by a very good and clear consequence from the prior proposition” ⁴

“Fides ergo Catholica duobus modis accipi potest: one strictly, for the habit and assent to those things which are immediately, that is, formally and in themselves, revealed; another broadly, for the habit and assent both to these things and to those which are MEDIATELY, that is, by virtue of and in another thing, revealed: such as the conclusions which are deduced from the articles. For we are accustomed to say that those things are of faith which are clearly deduced from the articles” ⁵

“It is customary to say that something is of faith immediately and formally, and mediately or virtually. That is said to be immediately, and primarily in itself, of faith which by the light of God and through the act of believing is immediately attained as immediately revealed. That, however, is said to be mediately, and secondarily in itself, attained which is reached from a proposition of faith through inference, and thus it pertains to the theological light which is inferential from those things that are of faith” ⁶

“I suppose first, that something can be said to be of divine faith in two ways, namely either immediately, or only mediately, that is, virtually. That is said to be of divine faith immediately which is immediately revealed by God; mediately, however, what is clearly deduced from one proposition immediately revealed by God and from another known by the natural light” ⁷

“Something can be called a dogma of faith, either immediately, because it is certainly contained in the written or transmitted word of God: or mediately, because it is necessarily inferred and deduced from the word of God in this manner. For such a kind of conclusions, which are necessarily connected with the things of faith, at least mediately must be said to pertain to faith” ⁸

All these texts from such different and distinguished theologians are but a development of that principle already expressly formulated by Saint Thomas: "Something pertains to the faith in two ways: in one way, directly, such as the articles of faith...; in another way, indirectly, such as those things from which something contrary to the faith follows" ⁹ (323, 469).

The point here is not to demonstrate whether the ancient nomenclature is better or worse than the modern one, but only that the phrases being of divine faith, belonging to Catholic doctrine, etc., have in all our classical theologians two senses: being of faith immediately 'or being so mediately.

In modern times, the phrase to be of the faith is already coming to be understood in only one sense, namely as being so immediately, and it is even now almost understood solely as being immediately not only of divine faith, but of Catholic faith. "Quando aliquid dicitur esse de fide, mos ita generaliter invaluit ut communiter intelligatur de fide catholica" ¹⁰ As we have seen, in former times theologians ordinarily understood something very different: "Consuevimus dicere de fide esse, quae ex articulis evidenter deducuntur" ¹¹ "Solet dici quod aliquid sit de fide, immediate et formaliter, et mediate seu virtualiter" ¹² Whoever, then, in reading the ancient theologians, and especially Melchor Cano, forgets this double meaning of the phrases to be of the faith or Catholic doctrine, closes off to himself the understanding of traditional theology and will attribute, with the best of good faith, to an author precisely the contrary of what he says.

Regarding the second distinction of before or after the definition of the Church, it suffices to cite the following words of John of Saint Thomas: "Concerning the certainty of the conclusions which Theology draws, one must distinguish: for either they are attained by theological reasoning alone, or, beyond reasoning, the definition of the Church is also added to them" ¹³

Combining, then, both observations, it follows that, in order to properly appreciate the mind of an ancient theologian when he says that this or that belongs to divine faith, two things must be noted: a) whether he says or implies that it belongs immediately or only mediately; b) whether he says or implies that it belongs even before the Church's definition or only after its definition.

454. THE TRUE MIND OF MELCHOR CANO.—When an author has explained himself, and has explained himself not once but repeatedly, and has done so in express and categorical terms, no one has the right to attribute another meaning to him. Now then: Melchor Cano himself is going to give us a categorical explanation of what he understood in his famous ad decimum when he said that theological conclusions belong to the faith or to Catholic doctrine. Let us see, first of all, whether he understood or intended to say that they belong immediately or only that they belong mediately. Let us turn to book 5, chapter 5, where he deals with what things are of faith and can be defined as being of faith by the ecumenical council. Here are his words: "Two kinds of truths can be defined in the council. One, of those truths that are properly theological, because they are deduced from two premises of faith or from one premise of faith and another of reason. Another, of those truths that the Holy Spirit Himself revealed to the apostles, evangelists, and prophets; but since this was not clear, the council declares it. The first belong to the faith secondarily or, so to speak, mediately. Wherefore, as we shall explain at length in its proper place, whoever denies them is only a heretic ex consequenti, that is, insofar as he denies the principle of faith from which they are deduced. But those that are of the second kind belong to the faith properly and of themselves; and of these neither the councils nor the pontiffs can give us any new one" ¹⁴. It could not be said more clearly. Theological conclusions, whether they are deduced from two premises of faith or from one of faith and another of reason, only belong to the faith mediately, secondarily, ex consequenti. Here is categorically explained by Melchor Cano himself in what sense theological conclusions can be called and are called by him [things] of faith. And this doctrine, thus explained by Cano himself, far from being the doctrine of Vázquez and Vega, is the doctrine of the whole Thomistic school and that which all modern theologians commonly follow. There is only one difference between Cano and the moderns, and it is in favor of Melchor Cano. That difference consists in the fact that modern theologians, when they say that the theological conclusion is only of faith mediately, except the conclusions deduced from two premises of faith, and even those deduced from one premise of faith and another of reason, if this premise of reason is of an inclusive or explanatory character; which conclusions, according to the moderns, are not only mediately of faith, but are so immediately. While for Melchor Cano, as for all Thomists, no conclusion, even one deduced from two premises of faith, is immediately of faith, but rather it is properly and immediately theological and only belongs to the faith mediately.

The doctrine, then, of Melchor Cano is not only opposed to that of Vázquez and Vega, but it is more radically opposed than the one commonly followed today by non-Thomist theologians.

455. MORE TEXTS FROM MELCHOR CANO.—Although the preceding text sufficed by its explicitness and definitiveness to reveal Melchor Cano’s mind, there are many other texts that place the matter beyond any shadow of doubt.

It will have been noticed that in the previous quotation Melchor Cano himself says that he intends to treat the question extensively in its proper place. "We will explain this at length later in its proper place." That place, as anyone who knows Melchor Cano's work thoroughly knows, and as Melchor Cano himself expressly points out later, is the twelfth book. In that book the author treats extensively the nature of faith and theology, and in a special way the principles and theological conclusions ¹⁵. It seemed natural that the authors, when seeking to know the mind of Melchor Cano on this question, should turn preferably to the place where Cano treats it ex professo and extensively, and not merely to an offhand word in another book where he touches on it only incidentally and to resolve an objection relating to a different matter. Let us turn, then, to book twelve as Cano himself advises us, and leaving aside the prologue, which in the edition we use constitutes the first chapter, let us see what the author tells us from the second chapter on whether the theological conclusions are or are not de fide. Let us hear his own words:

"To call faith what does not rest immediately on authority, but on reason and syllogism, is absurd... The weak and even foolish argument on which some rely for this is that if a theological conclusion is clearly and evidently deduced from its principles, such a conclusion belongs, not to theology, but to faith. But this argument is ridiculous and is rightly rejected by the majority of theologians. The distinction between faith and theology is very easy and very clear: of faith is what is known immediately by authority, of theology what is known immediately by reasoning... The certainty and evidence of the deduction does not take the conclusion out of being theological, but rather makes it theological; for precisely in that does theology consist... If, then, one of the premises is uncertain, or if the connection or reasoning is not evident, we will have neither faith nor theology, but opinion. But if both premises are certain and the connection is evident, then it is that we have a true theological conclusion and true theology; whether it is a conclusion deduced from two premises of faith, or from one of faith and another of evident reason. For, as we already said and will repeat a thousand times over, theological conclusions do not belong to faith except in the sense in which the human sciences belong to the simple understanding or habit of principles. And since this is so obvious that it needs no proof, let us leave it and move on to something else" ^[148. For to call faith what rests not proximately on authority, but on reason and syllogism, is absurd... The argument they put forward for this is not at all acute but exceedingly dull, namely that if the connection were certain and clear, conclusions would pertain no longer to theology but to faith. Yet this reasoning is ridiculous, and is rightly censured by most. For the distinction between faith and theology is easy and clear, because faith rests proximately and, so to speak, immediately on authority: whereas theology rests proximately and immediately on reason. For they are related, as I said above, faith and theology no otherwise than the HABIT OF PRINCIPLES and the SCIENCE OF CONCLUSIONS... But to the point. When the connection is uncertain, or one of the propositions taken with a principle of faith is uncertain, there will be opinion about the conclusion, it will not properly be theology. But whether both principles of the syllogism be of faith, or one be certain from faith and the other evident from nature, the conclusion will pertain to theology, provided the consequence is known either by the clear light of nature or by the illumination of faith. For not otherwise—which I have often said and will say again and again—not otherwise, I say, is the knowledge of such a conclusion referred to faith, than the natural disciplines are referred to the habit of principles. Since these things are so at hand that the matter needs no argument, having set these aside, let us proceed to the rest" (CANO, Book Twelve, c. 2, toward the end). So be it, as with almost everything

We believe that few theologians have expressed themselves with greater clarity, exactness, and energy on the distinction between theology and faith and on the nature of the true theological conclusion. For Melchor Cano, the formal medium of faith is only divine authority; but into the formal medium of theology there also enters human reasoning. Although both faith and theology are grounded in divine revelation, faith has as its medium of knowledge divine revelation declared by the divine authority of the Church; theology has as its medium reasoned divine revelation, that is, declared by the human reason of the theologian. What is known through the first medium is founded solely and immediately on divine authority; what is known only through the second medium is founded immediately on the human reasoning of the theologian, and only mediately on revelation or divine authority.

This distinction of formal means of knowledge (for faith and theology are not purely affective habits or of the will, in which one may give them whatever kind of assent one pleases, but rather cognitive or intellectual habits that admit no more kinds of assent than the kinds of means of knowledge available to them) makes faith and theology be distinguished by a distinction that is easy and evident. “For the difference between faith and theology is easy and clear; because faith is proximately and, so to speak, immediately based on authority; but theology is proximately and immediately based on reason. For faith and theology are related, as I said above, no differently than the habit of principles and the knowledge of conclusions” ¹⁶. Who would have told Melchor Cano that there would be those who would attribute to him such a confusion between theology and faith, as would be making immediately an article of faith of conclusions known only by reasoning!

But let us continue citing the twelfth book, where Melchor Cano told us that his mind was to be studied on this question and where clear and explicit texts abound. In chapter five he expresses himself thus: “There are two kinds of questions of faith. Some belong to faith immediately, as truly everything that God revealed to his Church by word or in writing belongs to it. Others are of faith mediately, as are all the conclusions that are evidently deduced from the former. These latter, because they were not revealed in themselves, but in others, as in their principles, are said to belong to faith mediately, and whoever denies them is said to deny faith in that same sense” ¹⁷.

Later on, in the sixth chapter, it is expressed in a similar manner: “Since there are two kinds, as we have said, of questions of faith, and some pertain to faith mediately and others immediately, we must begin by distinguishing two kinds of propositions of faith. One, of those which are the legitimate principles of Theology, whether primary or secondary principles, that is, all the truths revealed in themselves by God to the Church. Another, of those which are necessarily deduced from the first” ¹⁸.

We believe that with these texts, so explicit and decisive, it is more than enough to know clearly what Melchor Cano's mind is on whether theological conclusions are or are not de fide. For Melchor Cano, as for Saint Thomas and the Thomists, theological conclusions, whether they are deduced from two premises of faith, or from one of faith and another of reason, are in themselves immediately theological, not of faith; they only belong and are said to belong to faith mediately. This we believe is or should be an established point and beyond all doubt for anyone who, without prejudice, reads not an isolated ad decimum, but the entire work of Melchor Cano, and, above all, his golden twelfth book, where he treats the question ex professo and to which he always refers whenever he alludes to it.

456. THE THEOLOGICAL CONCLUSION AFTER THE DEFINITION OF THE CHURCH.—As we saw at the beginning of this section, in order to know the mind of a theologian, especially of a Thomistic theologian, when he says that something belongs or does not belong to the faith, two things must be noted: first, whether he says or understands that they belong to the faith immediately or only mediately, for these are essentially distinct things; second, whether he says or understands that they belong to the faith before or after the dogmatic definition of the Church, for these too are very distinct things.

We have already seen Melchor Cano's mind on the first question. Theological conclusions of themselves (per se, as Melchor Cano tells us) belong to the faith only mediately. It remains to examine the second question. How, according to Melchor Cano, do theological conclusions belong to the faith after the Church's definition?

If in the first question Melchor Cano was categorical, he is no less so in the second. Following St. Thomas and all his school, he establishes that those conclusions, once dogmatically defined by the Church, are already of divine faith not only mediately, but with the same propriety and rigor as the very articles of faith, and that whoever knowingly denies them after the definition is as properly a heretic as one who denies the Bible or divine tradition. And this Melchor Cano establishes not as a more or less probable opinion, but as one of the unquestionable canons or precepts of theological loci. Let us hear his own words:

RULE SEVENTH.— If the Church, or the Ecumenical Council, or the Apostolic See, or the Holy Fathers with completely unanimous consent deduce a THEOLOGICAL CONCLUSION and IMPOSE it authoritatively upon the faithful, this conclusion must be held as truly CATHOLIC TRUTH as if it had been revealed IN ITSELF by Jesus Christ, and those who deny it will be as much heretics as if they denied the Holy Scriptures or the divine traditions.

And in confirmation of the above rule, Cano brings numerous examples of true dogmas of divine faith and not merely of ecclesiastical faith, which, in his judgment, are found in the revealed deposit not as truths revealed in themselves or immediately, but revealed only in others, from which reason deduces them by way of conclusion or reasoning, that is, revealed only mediately, and the proper and immediate object of theology, not of divine faith, until the Church defined them ¹⁹

For Cano, then, theological conclusions, before the definition, are only mediately of faith and properly and rigorously theological; after the dogmatic definition of the Church they are properly of divine faith and require the immediate assent of divine faith and not merely theological assent or assent of ecclesiastical faith.

This is the doctrine of Melchor Cano, and this doctrine is not only opposed to that of Vázquez and of Molina, but it is the one commonly followed afterward by almost all the great theologians, both within and outside the Thomistic school, although in modern times the contrary may seem to be taught.

457. OTHER EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE TRUE MIND OF MELCHOR CANO.—Although the cited texts and others that could be cited are clear and decisive and leave, in our judgment, no doubt whatsoever about the true mind of Melchor Cano on this question, we shall employ other evidence of an indirect nature, which we believe serves to confirm all that we have just said. The evidence we shall adduce is like extrinsic indications that corroborate what we already know directly from the texts of Melchor Cano. Among many others, we shall use only three.

As the reader will understand, with these quotations from Cano we do not intend precisely to defend that the examples or arguments adduced by him are or are not conclusive; what we seek to demonstrate is what Melchor Cano’s mind is on the theological conclusion, or how, according to Cano, the theological conclusion is truly and properly of divine faith, dogma of faith, but only after the definition of the Church; for when the Church has not yet defined it and it is known by solely theological reasoning, it is not of faith, but mediately, which means that it is immediately theological and only merits theological assent.

158. FIRST INDICATION.—When on a question there are two extreme or radically opposed solutions, and the defenders of each of them cite and bring a famous author to their favor, without expressing the slightest doubt that this author agrees with them, it is a grave indication that this author does not fully agree with either of the two extreme solutions.

Now then, it is well known that on the most serious question of whether theological conclusions are or are not de fide, there exist in traditional theology two radically opposed solutions. One is the theory of Vázquez; the other, that of Molina. For Vázquez, the theological conclusion is immediately of divine faith, even without a definition by the Church. For Molina, the theological conclusion is only mediately of divine faith, even with a definition by the Church. For Vázquez, to the theological conclusion, evidently deduced, one can and must give true assent of divine faith and not merely theological assent, even before the definition of the Church. For Molina, to the theological conclusion one can and must give only theological assent and never immediate assent of divine faith, even if the Church defines it. The opposition between the two theories could not be more complete.

However, there is a curious fact to which, as far as we know, no one has yet called attention, and it is that both Vázquez and Molina cite Cano in favor of their opposing theories, and they cite him as something evident about which no doubt is possible, a serious indication that Cano stands in the middle ground.

That Vázquez (85) cites Cano in his favor will surprise few, since it is already so common today to see Cano cited as sharing the opinion of Vázquez and Vega. But we believe that it will indeed surprise the reader to see Cano cited by Molina to prove that conclusions are not only not of themselves matters of faith, but that they are not so even if the Church defines them dogmatically, as it defined the conclusion of the two wills in Christ. Here once again is the text of Molina:

"In this doctrine, the principles are all those things which are immediately and in themselves revealed by God... There have not been lacking those who would say that even those definitions are to be counted among the principles of theology by which the Church establishes that it sees something clearly deduced from what is revealed: such as that in Christ there are two wills, divine and human, which, although not expressed in Sacred Scripture, is nevertheless clearly gathered from it... This opinion does not please me, and Cano also rejected it, in book twelve On the Topics, chapter 3. For the assistance by which the Holy Spirit is present to the Catholic Church, and to its Head, the Supreme Pontiff, is not to make something a matter of faith that was not previously a matter of faith, but only to prevent error in declaring those things which pertain to faith mediately or immediately" ²⁰

Here is Cano, whom we are accustomed to see cited as being of the opinion of Vázquez, cited by Molina as being of the diametrically opposite opinion.

The reason why both Vázquez and Molina have been able, in the best of good faith, to cite Cano in favor of two radically opposed theories is very simple. Extremes, as is commonly said, touch each other, that is, radically opposed theories frequently start from a common point or end up at a common point. That common point in the theories of Vázquez and Molina is the failure in both to recognize the essential distinction that exists between the divine or dogmatic value of the definition of the Church and the human or theological value of science and reasoning in the question concerning whether theological conclusions are or can come to be of faith. That failure to recognize values that are specifically distinct causes both Molina and Vázquez, when they treat whether the theological conclusion is or is not of faith, to eliminate as accidental and irrelevant the distinction between before and after the definition of the Church. Both answer that the theological conclusion is of faith or is not of faith, without any distinction relative to the definition of the Church. Vázquez answers: it is of faith, for the one who evidently sees the conclusion, the same before as after the definition, since that matter of before or after is accidental. Molina says: it is not of faith either before or after the definition, for the definition is accidental and does not pertain to the case. Since both theologians hold that matter of before or after the definition to be accidental, it is not surprising that when they read other authors they give no importance to it nor pay much attention to whether those authors, when they affirm that the theological conclusion is or is not of faith, understand it of before or after the definition. If an author says that theological conclusions are of faith, for Vázquez it is evident that that author agrees with him. If, on the contrary, he says that they are not of faith, for Molina it is clear that that author is of his same opinion.

This explains very well how such illustrious theologians as Vázquez and Molina have been able, respectively, to cite Melchor Cano in favor of radically opposed theories. In Melchor Cano's theory, as in that of every true Thomist, two equally true assertions fit on this question: first, theological conclusions are not of faith; second, theological conclusions are of faith. That is: of themselves (per se) or before the Church's definition they are not immediately of faith, but mediately, for they are properly and immediately theological. But by definition or after the Church's definition they are of faith properly and immediately, and not merely theological, for the dogmatic definition of the Church supplies another distinct formal medium, namely divine revelation explained or defined by the Church. Vázquez will read the second assertion of Melchor Cano in the famous ad decimum and will cite him in his favor, saying that, according to Melchor Cano, theological conclusions are of faith. Molina will read the first assertion in many other places and, above all, in the twelfth book, and will also cite him in his favor, saying that, according to Melchor Cano, they are not of faith. Both are right in their own way, for both assertions of Melchor Cano are true in Thomistic doctrine.

This, in our judgment, is the true explanation of how Vázquez and Molina, both theologians of the first rank, but both frequently unfaithful to Thomistic doctrine, have been able to cite Melchor Cano in favor of their opposed theories, a sign that he is not completely with either of them, but rather in the middle ground, as we have already seen from the clear and definitive texts of Cano himself.

159. CONFIRMATION.—Even making a small digression, it will not be out of place to cite here a few short passages from John of St. Thomas, Báñez, Gotti, and De Groot. John of St. Thomas is, as is well known, one of the most profound and almost always most faithful commentators on the true thought of St. Thomas and of the Thomist school. Of him Contenson has rightly said: "John of St. Thomas, second to none in his skill in and penetration of the doctrine of the Angelic St. Thomas" ²¹ Here, then, is how John of St. Thomas expresses himself on the position of Vázquez and Molina regarding Thomist doctrine on this question: "What is the certainty of a theological conclusion without a definition of the Church or with it? Regarding the certainty of the conclusions which theology deduces, one must distinguish, because they are reached either by theological discourse alone, or, beyond the discourse, the definition of the Church is also joined to them. If they are taken in the first way, there are two opinions. Some hold that conclusions evidently deduced from the principles of faith also pertain to faith, as Master Soto seems to think (Soto explained himself when he said "provided that they are defined by the Church," as we already saw in number 386). Molina also attributes this to Scotus, when he (Scotus) says that the habit of faith and of theology is the same. The opinion of others, and the more common one, is that conclusions thus deduced do not pertain immediately to faith, but mediately; but of themselves they pertain to theological science.

If, in the second way, the certainty of theology is considered, the authors also vary. For Father Vázquez equates the declaration of the Church, when it declares something of faith, with theological demonstration itself, and he posits only a purely material difference, namely, that the Council proposes what it defines as something to be believed by the whole Church; theological reason, however, only to those for whom such a consequence is evident. Here he equates the definition of faith with theological reason. On the other hand, Molina (with others whom Granados cites and follows) holds that propositions deduced by the Church, and thus defined by virtue of the deduction, are not immediately of faith, but still belong to theological science as conclusions, nor can they become principles of theology... The third opinion is that propositions evidently deduced from the principles of faith, if defined by the Church, pertain immediately to faith, and become principles of theology, nor do they any longer rest on discourse, but their certainty comes from the divine testimony proposed through the Church according to the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit in defining matters of faith. The Thomists commonly follow this opinion ²² And in the treatise On Faith, alluding to this very passage we have just cited, he expresses himself thus: “From what has been said it is inferred that virtual revelation, or mediate or deduced through discourse, such as is found in theology, is distinguished specifically from immediate revelation, which is had from the testimony of the one speaking and attains what is to be believed as a matter of faith, as we have more fully handed on in the first part, q. 1, disp. 2, art. 4, where we rejected two extreme opinions: one of Vázquez, who thinks that a conclusion deduced from premises of faith is as certain, for one who knows the discourse, as a proposition defined by the Church: the other of P. Molina, who thinks that even if a definition of the Church supervenes upon some proposition which previously was not of faith, it would not make it a matter of faith, but that the Holy Spirit assists the Church lest it err, not so as to make matters of faith of those things which previously were not of faith. These opinions can be seen as refuted in the cited place” ²³

The great commentator on St. Thomas, Domingo Báñez, expresses himself in the same way: “Just as divine revelation immediately is the formal principle of faith, but mediately of theological science, so faith itself immediately and per se only inclines toward the articles of faith and toward those things that have been expressly revealed, but mediately and consequently it is also concerned with the conclusions that are drawn from the articles of faith by an evident consequence. Hence it is necessary that dissent concerning the propositions of theology mediately and consequently opposes faith” ²⁴ : “For if someone confesses that Christ is a perfect man, but denies that He is capable of laughter, because he thinks that capability of laughter does not pertain to the perfection of human nature, he would be a bad philosopher, but not yet a heretic, because it has not so far been defined by the Church that Christ is capable of laughter. But if the Church were to define that capability of laughter pertains to the perfection of human nature, just as it has been defined that Christ has a twofold will, human and divine, then whoever denied it would be a heretic, because he would contradict the doctrine of the Church, which is the pillar and foundation of truth. It is answered, therefore, to the argument that the conclusions which are deduced from the principles of faith, or from one principle of faith and another naturally evident one, through a good consequence, are properly conclusions of theological science. And nevertheless they are said to be conclusions of faith, not immediately but mediately; and the opposite of them is called an error concerning faith mediatedly; and whoever thinks the contrary falls under suspicion of heresy, especially if he is a philosopher, because he is not to be believed to deny what is known by the natural light, and consequently he is believed to deny the principle of faith. This opinion my teacher Cano holds, book twelve, on the Theological Places, chapter 2 ²⁵.

Similarly, Gotti expresses himself: "Something can be called a dogma of faith either immediately, because it is contained in the written or transmitted word of God, or mediately, because it is necessarily inferred and deduced from the word of God in this way... Therefore, a theological conclusion is commonly called virtually revealed, because it approaches faith so closely that nothing is lacking for it to be of faith except the express definition of the Church" ²⁶.

As can be seen, then, Báñez, John of St. Thomas, and Gotti (and likewise all the other Thomists could be cited) resolve this question in the same sense and with the same two distinctions as Melchior Cano: the distinction between belonging to the faith immediately or mediately, and the distinction of before or after the Church’s definition. Vázquez did not notice the first distinction, and believed that Melchior Cano was of his own opinion; Molina did not notice the second, and attributed to Cano the opposite opinion.

460. FR. DE GROOT.—We insist so much on these things, even at the risk of being accused of being wearisome and diffuse, because these two distinctions are the key not only to the understanding of Melchor Cano, but of the whole Thomistic doctrine on these questions, and because, by failing to note them, things very different from what Cano actually said are today being attributed to Cano, even by illustrious Thomists.

Thus, for example, to cite but one domestic theologian, the learned Fr. De Groot, whose Summa Apologetica is so universally and so justly appreciated, after saying that theological conclusions are not immediately of faith, but mediately or ex consequenti, and that their denial, therefore, can only be called heresy in a mediate or illative sense (which is the very doctrine of Cano ²⁷; but provided that this is understood of the theological conclusion before its definition of faith by the Church), adds: "From that precept of Cano, however, he seems to depart with certain others, saying: 'this (truly theological conclusion) will be regarded as Catholic truth, as if it had been revealed by Christ Himself; and those who oppose it will be just as heretical as if they contradicted the Sacred Scriptures or the traditions of the Apostles'" ²⁸.

The complete statement of Cano cited here by De Groot, but of which Fr. De Groot has omitted the first part as deeming it unnecessary, reads as follows, as the reader already knows: "Seventh precept: If either the Church, or a Council, or the Apostolic See, or even the Saints, with one mind and with one voice, have both established some theological conclusion AND HAVE ALSO PRESCRIBED IT TO THE FAITHFUL, this truth will be regarded as Catholic, etc." (Cano, loc. cit.). From the underlined words, which Fr. De Groot has omitted with the best of good faith, believing them accidental to the question, anyone can clearly see that Cano, in this precept, is dealing with the theological conclusion after the definition of the Church. Now then, that the theological conclusion, after the definition of the Church, is immediately of divine faith, and that its denial constitutes heresy in a proper and immediate sense and not only in a mediate or illative sense—this is not the particular opinion of Cano cum nonnullis aliis, as Fr. De Groot says, but the constant doctrine of the whole Thomist school, of the whole Scotist school, and of the immense majority of the great theologians of all other schools. Fr. De Groot, in citing, innocently truncated, the Seventh Precept of Melchior Cano, did not notice the distinction between before and after the definition of the Church; just as very many moderns, when reading or citing the other texts of Melchior Cano, do not notice the distinction between belonging to the faith immediately or mediately. Both distinctions are essential in this question for the Thomists.

461. SECOND INDICATION.—One of the best indications for knowing whether a theologian holds theological conclusions, known only through evident reasoning, as immediately [an object] of faith, or whether he holds them only mediately [as an object] of faith, is to see whether that theologian admits or does not admit a specific distinction between the habits of faith and of theology, or between the habit of the principles and the habit of the conclusions of the sacred science.

The theologian who specifically identifies the habits of faith and theology must logically admit that theological conclusions are immediately of faith as soon as they are known by evident reasoning or by deduction from what is revealed, which is the formal medium or immediate medium of theology, just as the theologian who admits that the habits of theology and faith are specifically distinct must consequently admit that theological conclusions known only through the theological medium, that is, through reasoning, are immediately theological and only mediately of faith. And conversely: the one who admits that theological conclusions, known only by reasoning, are immediately of faith must grant that the habits of theology and faith are not essentially distinct; just as the one who admits that such conclusions belong properly and immediately to theology and only mediately to faith must logically conclude that faith and theology are specifically distinguished.

This rule or criterion, which is self-evident to anyone familiar with these matters, and which could be proven inductively by reviewing the different schools and theologians, is very well and expressly formulated by Suárez. Speaking of the opinion that denies that theological conclusions are of themselves immediately matters of faith, he expresses himself thus: "And so for this opinion they can cite those who distinguish the habit of faith from the habit of theology" ²⁹ And speaking later of the opposite opinion, he points out the same rule in the reverse sense: "And Aureolus and certain Doctors hold the same view, who do not distinguish between the habit of faith, insofar as it gives assent to conclusions, and the habit of theology" ³⁰ Lugo ³¹ and many other authors point out the same rule.

To know, then, whether Melchor Cano defended that theological conclusions were immediately of faith or only mediately so, there is no better indicator than to see whether he specifically distinguishes faith from theology. If he does not specifically distinguish them, he must logically defend that theological conclusions, known only by evident reasoning and without any definition of the Church, are immediately of faith. On the other hand, if he specifically distinguishes faith and theology, that is, the principles and the conclusions of the sacred science, he must logically defend that theological conclusions, known only through the formal medium of theology, which is reasoning or deduction from what is revealed, are immediately and properly theological and belong to faith only mediately, or indirectly, or ex consequenti. Now, has Melchor Cano specifically distinguished or not specifically distinguished the habits of faith and theology, or the habits of the principles and conclusions of the sacred science? Not only has he distinguished them specifically, but even generically, and with very forceful words. Let us hear him: “For the distinction between faith and theology is easy and clear: because faith rests proximately and immediately on authority: but theology rests proximately and immediately on reason. For faith and theology are related, as I said above, in no other way than as the habit of principles and the science of conclusions” ³² “By which distinction, as we have said, theology and faith are separated not in words and thought, but in the whole matter and in their entire genus” ³³ The root of this distinction, says Melchor Cano, lies in the fact that theology is related to faith as reason or science is related to simple understanding. “But if we wish to draw this matter from its source and see whence all things flow, we must nevertheless understand this, that the habit of faith in relation to the discipline of theology is as the habit of understanding is related to the human sciences and faculties” ³⁴ “For in no other way—and although I have said this, I will say it again and again—in no other way, I say, is the knowledge of such conclusions referred to faith, than the natural disciplines are referred to the habit of principles” ³⁵ All of which is but a faithful commentary on that great principle which Saint Thomas repeats so many times and in so many forms: “In this way the articles of faith are related to the doctrine of faith, as self-evident principles are related to the doctrine which is had through natural reason” ³⁶ Cano, therefore, has clearly and radically distinguished theology from faith, and the principles from the conclusions, and in the same manner as Saint Thomas. This is a good indication that he cannot defend that theological conclusions are of themselves, or without a definition of the Church, immediately of faith, but only mediately, as we have seen from his own and express texts.

462. CONFIRMATION.—The following complete passage from Cano is also worth reading on the distinction between theology and faith and on the manner in which one who denies an evident theological conclusion is or is called a heretic. After having laid down in the seventh preception of the seventh chapter of the twelfth book that the one who denies the theological conclusion, after its definition of faith by the Church, is properly and formally a heretic, and after having said in the eighth preception that when all theologians, with absolute unanimity, teach a conclusion and impose it on the faithful, that conclusion must be regarded as Catholic truth, and its denial as proximate to heresy ³⁷, he continues thus:

“But let no one wonder why, since it is agreed among almost all theologians, and has often been affirmed by me myself, that conclusions of this kind, which are derived from the faith by an explicit consequence, belong PROPERLY TO THEOLOGY, NOT TO FAITH, I now so confuse them, as if theology and faith were the same virtue. For if an error in a theological conclusion is an error of faith, as it truly is; if to deny it is heresy, it follows that faith and theology pertain to the same virtue, since errors contrary to either faculty pertain to the same vice. For both are heresies. But it will not be difficult for him who re-reads the foregoing to trample and crush this CALUMNY. For we have said that faith, although not immediately, nevertheless is concerned with those conclusions which are gathered from the articles of faith by an evident and necessary consequence. Wherefore it is necessary that unbelief mediately also be concerned with conclusions contrary to theology. Since, moreover, from errors of this kind, not only a sickness of faith but also its corruption follows, it happens that there is between them and faith an indeed indirect and consequent, but true and natural repugnance. Therefore the Church, although it understands that conclusions of this kind depend not only on faith but also on the principles of nature; yet because it does not think that a rational man denies those things which are clear and manifest to reason, it judges as a heretic him who has denied them. For it assumes, and with the greatest reason it assumes, that he is not limping in the natural reason, which was evident, but in the faith. But if anyone either were ignorant of a consequence otherwise evident in things, or even of a natural principle which is taken together with an article of faith to infer a theological conclusion, certainly he would not be a heretic. As if an unlearned man, for example, thought that this proposition were false, every man is capable of laughter, whence although he believed Christ to be a man, he would not therefore think that He could laugh; this man would certainly not be properly an unbeliever but a fool, who would not resist the supernatural light per se, but the natural one. But since foolishness of this kind, although per accidens and indirectly, nevertheless consequently corrupts and depraves the judgment of faith, rightly in the Church it is held not as foolishness but as crime” ³⁸

In the same way, and almost with the same words, all Thomists express themselves. It suffices to hear Bañez: "But an argument offers itself against this conclusion. For if an error against theological propositions is also an error against faith, it follows that faith and theology are not formally distinct habits: the consequent is false; therefore, so is the antecedent. That the consequent is false was stated above in the second article. And I prove the consequence. Because one contrary cannot be opposed to two formally distinct contraries, but only to one; for white is opposed only to black, and cold only to hot; therefore, if an error against theology is opposed to faith, theology and faith will not be formally diverse. To this argument it is replied that just as divine revelation immediately is the formal principle of faith, but mediately of theological science, so faith itself immediately and of itself inclines only to the articles of faith and to those things which are expressly revealed; mediately however and consequently it is also concerned with conclusions which are drawn from the articles of faith through an evident consequence. Hence it is necessary that dissent concerning theological propositions, mediately and consequently, be opposed to faith. Just as a physical agent, which destroys the accidents necessary for the conservation of a substance, consequently destroys the substance itself. Wherefore the Church condemns as unfaithful one who attacks such theological propositions. For although she understands that they are deduced not from faith alone, but also from natural principles; nevertheless it is presumed that a rational man denies not those things which are known according to reason, but those things which are held from faith. For example, if someone denied that Christ is capable of laughter, which is gathered from these two premises: every man is capable of laughter, Christ is a man, he would be condemned as unfaithful. For he should not be thought to deny that proposition, every man is capable of laughter, which is evident by the natural light, nor the goodness of the consequence, which is also known of itself, but the truth of that assumed minor premise, Christ is a man. But if someone were so rustic, or foolish, that he did not perceive either the goodness of the consequence or the truth of the natural principle, such a one could deny a theological proposition, with Catholic faith intact, because he would be excused by ignorance" ³⁹ All this before the definition of the Church; for, as we have already seen, Bañez acknowledges with Cano that after the definition of the Church the theological conclusion is properly and rigorously of divine faith, and that he who knowingly denied it would be properly and formally a heretic, and not merely presumptively: "But if it were defined by the Church that risibility pertains to the perfection of human nature, just as it has been defined that Christ has a double will, human and divine, then he who denied it would be a heretic^174.

Suárez himself defends this general doctrine of the Thomists: "Someone will say: he who denies, for example, this proposition, Christ is risible, is rightly considered a heretic, because it is not believed of him that he denies the evident proposition: Every man is risible, and therefore he is convicted of denying another article of faith, Christ is man: therefore he falls into heresy by denying that conclusion: therefore the proposition opposed to that conclusion is heretical. It is replied that it is one thing to speak of that man according to human presumption or external appearance; another thing according to internal truth. In the first way the argument made proceeds, because men judge according to what appears externally, and do not behold the heart: and therefore if that man be stubborn in such an opinion, he will rightly be punished as a heretic. But if inwardly he believes Christ to be man, and does not believe Him to be risible, either because he foolishly denies that universal principle, or because he rashly imagines that God separated in Christ that property from the essence, he will not be formally a heretic, but erroneous in faith, until that proposition: Christ is risible, is immediately defined by the Church" ⁴⁰ And the same as Cano, Báñez, and Suárez, Lugo expresses himself, saying: "It can be asked, if the Church defines in a legitimate Council some proposition evidently deduced from one revealed premise and another evident non-revealed premise, whether he who afterwards denies it is properly a heretic? Concerning this I have also spoken in the cited place ⁴¹ that that proposition after the Church's definition is of faith, whence consequently it must be said that the one denying afterwards that proposition is properly a heretic" ⁴²

463. THIRD INDICATION.—We shall point out one last indication, and one of the most serious and convincing, namely that Suárez himself expressly acknowledges that Cano on this question is not with Vázquez and Vega, as is generally attributed to him and as Suárez himself had previously attributed to him, but rather with Saint Thomas and the whole Thomistic school. We do not know that anyone, until now, has fixed their attention on this important fact.

It is true that Suárez, in the place and text we cited at the beginning of this section, affirmed without any restriction that Cano follows, like Vázquez and Vega, the opinion that theological conclusions are immediately of faith, even without a definition by the Church, and that for this purpose he cites the well-known ad decimum of the sixth book of Cano. But the same Suárez, when dealing later with the opposite opinion, that is, the opinion which holds that such conclusions are immediately theological and only mediately of faith, expresses himself thus: “In addition to the authors cited in the second opinion (namely, Capreolus, Cajetan, and the Thomists, and others, and clearly St. Thomas), Cano held this opinion in book twelve of On the Theological Loci, chapter 7, in the eighth precept, thus declaring or correcting what he had earlier said there” ⁴³ And he repeats almost the same thing much further on: “Thus the Doctors commonly think with St. Thomas, Cajetan, Capreolus, and Cano thinks the same better, in book twelve of On the Theological Loci, chapter 3, in the third conclusion” ⁴⁴

As can be seen, here Suárez confesses two things: first, that Cano's opinion is that theological conclusions are not immediately of faith, but immediately theological, and only mediately of faith; second, that with this, said expressly by Cano in book twelve, Cano has explained or corrected what is commonly attributed to him from what was said in the ad decimum of book six. How, after such a categorical confession by Suárez, have his readers continued to cite Cano so calmly as holding the opinion of Vázquez and Vega, and citing for this purpose the authority of Suárez many times, without noticing or without telling us that Suárez himself had at last recognized the contrary? All the more so because Cano did not need to correct anything in this matter, since what Suárez calls explanation or correction is merely explanation, and an explanation that Cano did not wait to give until book twelve, as Suárez seems to indicate, but rather had already given it from book five, that is, long before the famous ad decimum, which is in book six. In that book five, and already referring in advance to what he intended to say in book twelve, Cano had given the whole key to his thought with the following words: “Two kinds of conclusions can be defined in a Council. One kind is those that are proper to the theological faculty, since they are drawn either from two principles believed by faith, or from one believed and another known by the light of nature. The other kind, however, is that of the things which the Holy Spirit Himself revealed indeed to the Apostles, Evangelists, or Prophets, but since it was not thereby equally manifest, it is declared by the synod. Those that are of the first kind pertain to faith secondarily and, so to speak, MEDIATELY” ⁴⁵ The mind, therefore, of Cano, which Suárez saw, and rightly, throughout book twelve, was not a correction of anything, but a clearer and fuller explanation of what Cano had already set forth before and after his ad decimum of book six.

In any case, it is an undeniable fact that Suárez recognizes that Cano's definitive mind on this matter of the theological conclusion is not the mind of Vázquez and Vega, as has been attributed, but rather that of "Capreolus, Cajetan, and the Thomists, and others, and plainly St. Thomas"⁴⁶.

**464. SUMMARY.—**From all that has been set forth, it seems to us that it is evidently proven that the mind of Melchor Cano, on this question, can be summarized in the following two propositions:

1. Of themselves, or without a definition by the Church, theological conclusions are not immediately matters of faith, but rather immediately and purely theological, and they belong to the faith only mediately.
2. After the dogmatic definition of the Church, theological conclusions are properly and immediately matters of faith.

The first proposition is the exact opposite of the doctrine of Vázquez and Vega; the second is the exact opposite of the doctrine of Molina. Both united contain that great theory of the Angelic Doctor, of which John of Saint Thomas says: The Thomists commonly follow this opinion⁴⁷.