La evolución homogénea del dogma católico

398. THE INFLUENCE OF MOLINA.—In the previous section we have just seen how no theologian before Molina, at least among those we know, had denied the possibility and existence of dogmatic evolution by way of true virtuality or theological conclusion.

In other various places in this work (84 and 233) we have also explained how Molina radically denied the existence and even the possibility of such an evolution, by denying that the Church can define, as a true dogma of divine faith, anything that is virtually or mediately revealed.

No one will be surprised, then, that from Molina onward, the opinion of theologians is no longer completely unanimous on this question. Given the indisputable prestige and well-deserved renown that the original and independent author of "middle knowledge" immediately acquired, if it had come to pass that the host of eminent theologians that the Company of Jesus had in the seventeenth century had supported Molina on this question, as they supported him on so many others, the traditional doctrine on dogmatic development would have run the risk of disappearing from Theology, for the other schools no longer had in that century and in the following one many theologians of the depth and breadth of those of the sixteenth century. The seventeenth century is the golden age of the theologians of the Company; just as the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries had been for the Thomist school.

Fortunately for Catholic theology, the principal theologians of the Society, such as Vázquez, Suárez, Bellarmine, Lugo, Tanner..., declared themselves on this question against Molina, and to this it is due that the vast majority of later theologians, without distinction of schools, have continued to defend in substance the dogmatic development, despite an enormous variety and confusion of new nomenclature.

This is what we will try to show in this section, classifying theologians by centuries, as in the previous section, for greater order and clarity. To avoid going on too long, we will make as few comments as possible. On the other hand, we have chosen only texts from authors whose mind is so clear that it needs no commentary.

399. GABRIEL VÁZQUEZ, Soc. Iesu.—There was no need to cite this eminent theologian, for he is known and cited by all not only as a defender, but as an exaggerator of dogmatic evolution, not distinguishing it well from Theology. We have already cited his text elsewhere (85). We shall only note that the Thomists have always opposed him not for having made theological conclusions definable as matters of faith, but for having made them matters of faith even without a definition by the Church, and much more so for having compared the value of the Church's definition with the value of the theologian's private reasoning.

400. FRANCISCO SUÁREZ AND CARDINAL DE LUGO, Soc. Iesu. We have already cited the texts and set forth the position of the eminent Suárez, the most illustrious of all those of his century, on this problem (65-78). Not only does he defend the definability of faith of the implicit virtuality under the name of confused formal, but he goes so far as to defend the definability of faith of the non-implicit virtuality, believing that this was that virtuality properly so called, whose definability of faith traditional Theology had always defended. By the immense authority he exercised over all contemporary and subsequent theologians, and by the sharp phrase (mirandum est) with which he stigmatized Molina's position on this matter, he has been one of the theologians who have most contributed to the acceptance by all, in substance, of the traditional idea of the development of dogma, while at the same time, with his new non-implicit virtual and his consequent theory of new revelations, he contributed to its denial in formulas. The fecund genius of Suárez has left its traces impressed on this question of dogmatic development, as on almost all other questions, more deeply than any of his contemporaries or successors.

From Cardinal De Lúgo, the prince of moral theologians, after Saint Thomas, according to the opinion of Saint Alphonsus Liguori, and no less a celebrated dogmatic theologian than a moralist, we have already seen (79) that he defends the definability of faith of the theological-metaphysical-connexive conclusion, which is the one that interests us, and he even goes so far as to admit, like Suárez, the definability of the physical-connexive conclusion. Like Suárez, he is one of the theologians who have most influenced the fact that the traditional idea of dogmatic evolution by way of a theological-metaphysical conclusion was fundamentally admitted by almost all later theologians, although under the names of formal-confused or of virtual-identical-real.

401. CARDINAL BELLARMINE.—This distinguished theologian, rightly called the prince of Catholic controversialists against Protestantism, and already beatified for his heroic virtues, could not fail to defend dogmatic development, knowing as he did so perfectly the patristic and theological tradition. Let us cite a few brief texts:

"The dogmas of faith can be proven in four ways. First, from the express testimony of Sacred Scripture... Second, through *evident deduction from those things which are expressly contained in Scripture... Third, from the word of God, not written, but handed down... Fourth, through evident deduction from the handed-down word of God... The sufficiency of these four ways is clear from the fact that only that is of faith which has been revealed by God, either mediately or immediately: and divine revelations are partly written, partly not written. Thus the decrees of councils and of popes, the consensus of the doctors, and all other things are reduced to these four: for they make a matter of faith only when they explain the Word of God or deduce something from it" ¹.

"Councils do not have nor do they write immediate revelations of God, or the words of God, but they only declare what the written or traditional word of God is, and how it must be understood, and furthermore from it they deduce conclusions by reasoning" ².

**102. BALTHASAR NAVARRETE, O.P.—**The Dominican Navarrete follows, a most faithful interpreter of St. Thomas, and whose authority was always very great for all later theologians, especially for John of St. Thomas. Here is how he expresses himself:

Whether propositions defined by the Church, which are gathered from the articles of faith, are the principles of theology?

Molina, on this article, in his first disputation, holds the negative side... This opinion contains many falsehoods, which for now we do not wish to mark with a censure, because it is not sufficiently clear what this author meant...

From this it is also gathered that this proposition: Christ has two wills, can be understood in two ways. First, in the manner in which it is deduced through theological discourse and evident consequence from the principles of faith, namely, that Christ is true God and true man: and thus we assent to it through the habit of theology. Second, in the manner in which that very proposition is defined by the Church, and thus we do not assent to it through the habit of theology, but through the habit of faith... Wherefore the said author (Molina) errs greatly in asserting that the theologian assents to that truth through the habit of theology, just as the Church deduces it: for although the Fathers who were present at the said Councils deduced that proposition through the habit of theology, nevertheless, once the definition was presupposed, they had assent concerning it through the habit of faith" ³

403. JUAN GONZÁLEZ DE ALBEDA, Ord. Praed.—Let us join with Navarrete his fellow religious, and like him a professor at the University of Alcalá, after having been one at the College of Saint Thomas of the Minerva in Rome, Master González de Albeda, no less esteemed and cited than Navarrete by later Thomists. He states the following:

"Second conclusion: The theologian does not assent to propositions demonstrated in theology, before they are defined by the Church, through the habit of faith, but through another lower and subordinate light, namely through the theological habit and assent: for example, to this truth, Christ is capable of laughter, the theologian does not assent immediately through the light of faith, but through the acquired light of theology. This conclusion proceeds against Father Gabriel Vázquez...

Third conclusion: All the faithful, by the habit of faith immediately, assent to propositions immediately defined by the Church. This conclusion is evidently gathered from what was said in the first conclusion, and it is proven first from the common consensus of the Doctors, who teach it with St. Thomas... And therefore every proposition immediately defined by the Church pertains immediately to the habit of faith, on which see the Doctors cited above and Master Bañez.

Secondly, it is confirmed and explained: because the proposition demonstrated by the theologian is not immediately of faith, but only mediately, because although the principles are supernatural, namely the articles of faith, they are nevertheless applied to the demonstrated truth by means of natural discourse, which is carried out in due form through syllogistic art. Hence it depends immediately on something human and natural. But the defined proposition, as regards all things on which it depends, rests upon the testimony of God: for the principles are supernatural, and the discourse is regulated by the motion and assistance of the Holy Spirit, infallibly directing the Pontiff. And if it assumes a natural premise, even regarding that premise He directs him specially...

Therefore there is no doubt that the Supreme Pontiff, when defining, makes a proposition of faith immediately, since he can make an article of faith, not because he thereby makes a new faith, but because he newly and explicitly determines what was implicitly contained in ancient definitions.

The foundations by which Molina is moved... are that in the Church there is no faculty or authority to make something a matter of faith, which it was not before...

It is answered that in the Church there is the power to issue the Symbol of faith, not by a new revelation issuing a new faith, as we said in the notable second point from the beginning; but by explaining the things to be believed, drawing them from the things revealed... And since it is certain by faith immediately that the Church, as ruled by the Holy Spirit, cannot err: it is also certain by faith that in what it here and now proposes, it does not err. For we have already demonstrated above that when a universal proposition is immediately of faith, even the singular propositions of it are immediately of faith, and therefore every proposition defined by the Church is of faith. Yet it is not another faith, neither wholly nor partially, but it is the same faith more fully explained, as St. Thomas teaches ⁴.

All the paragraphs that we have just cited, both from Navarrete and from González, are of the purest Thomistic tradition, without there yet appearing in them the slightest trace of the confusion introduced by the Suarezian nomenclature. Let all Thomists meditate on them, especially those who are scandalized by whatever they do not find in the Salmanticenses or in Billuart.

404. ADAM TANNER, SOC. IESU.—After the two celebrated Spanish theologians just mentioned, let us cite the no less celebrated German theologian and controversialist Adam Tanner, of whom Miguel de San José has justly written: "Among the controversialist theologians of his age, whom Germany alone possessed as its best, the first place must rightly be assigned to Tanner" ⁵. He speaks thus:

“The question concerns conclusions not immediately revealed... First assertion: The assent to a theological conclusion, as such, namely as formally deduced from revealed principles, is not an assent of faith, but of theology. It is the common view against Scotus and Aureolus... Second assertion: Assuming the theological discourse and assent (given the definition of the Church, a Thomist would say) in which either both premises are revealed, or one is revealed and the other is naturally evident, as a condition applying the formal reason of faith, every theological conclusion can also be immediately believed by faith... This is proved... because whoever reveals something also reveals, as far as in him lies, that which is necessarily and evidently connected with it: and hence every truth necessarily and evidently connected with a revealed truth is also revealed” ⁶.

And in the treatise De fide he repeats the same thing: “Assertion IX: for divine revelation, insofar as it is the formal object of faith, it makes no difference whether the truth to be believed is immediately revealed by God in itself, or only mediately... I taught the same thing in the first volume, although some think otherwise... But the reason for the assertion is general: because for something to be of faith, and thus able and obliged to be believed by me through faith, it is enough that it is in fact revealed by God; but such are these propositions of which we speak, because speaking in itself, whoever reveals something also reveals those things that are necessarily connected with it... By which argument we generally proved in the cited place that every evidently deduced conclusion, whether from two revealed premises, or from one revealed and one evident premise, is objectively of faith ⁷

405. FRANCIS SYLVIUS.—Let us now hear the most faithful commentator on St. Thomas, of Belgian nationality and of the secular clergy, Francis Sylvius. He speaks thus: “The Church, when she either defines or proposes for belief some dogma of faith, does not establish an entirely new article, but partly declares what is contained either in Scripture or in the Apostolic traditions: and partly defines and commands that it be believed in a way in which previously it was not everywhere believed explicitly, because that dogma had not yet been drawn out from its principles” ⁸ “It must therefore be noted which propositions pertain to the faith. Those pertain to the faith which are certainly contained in the Scriptures or in the Apostolic traditions or which have been defined by the Apostolic See, whether in a council or outside of one... But concerning those things which by a necessary and evident consequence follow from some proposition of faith, of which sort are theological conclusions, it must be said that they are not in themselves and immediately pertaining to the faith, and that one who obstinately denies them is not to be judged a heretic, unless he perseveres so obstinately that he does not withdraw from his error even when he sees what follows from this, as Blessed Thomas speaks” ⁹ “The second article (Whether heresy is properly about those things which are of the faith) teaches that heresy is properly concerned only with those things which are of the faith. He adds, moreover, that these are of two kinds. For some things pertain to the faith directly and principally, that is, without a consequence of reason, of which sort are both the articles of faith and other things which it is certain the Church holds as dogmas of faith. But some things pertain indirectly and secondarily or mediately: of which sort are those things which are gathered by a necessary consequence from some proposition immediately pertaining to the faith. What he subjoins: “and heresy can be about both”, is true, but in the way in which he explains himself in lecture 4 on chapter 2 of the first [letter] to the Corinthians. Something pertains, he says, to the discipline of the faith in two ways... But some things indirectly... From such things, however, a person is not judged a heretic, unless he perseveres so obstinately that he does not withdraw from his error, even when he sees what follows"¹⁰

406. DOMINGO GRAVINA, Ord. Praed.—Now comes an Italian Dominican, Domingo Gravina, "not less distinguished for doctrine than for holiness of life"¹¹. In his controversies against heretics he raises the question of "Whether from one proposition of faith and another natural, necessary one, a conclusion of faith follows," and he answers thus: "That which pertains at least indirectly to faith, as St. Thomas teaches (p. 1, q. 23, art. 4), is that to whose negation something contrary to faith follows: but to the negation of such a conclusion this happens in that way, as is manifest: therefore... Before the definition of the Church to deny conclusions of this kind is indeed erroneous... After the definition of the Church to deny them is heretical: for they are proposed to be believed immediately and without discourse, whence they are rightly numbered among the principles"¹². We have chosen these two texts, among many others of Gravina, so that two things may be seen again: first, how St. Thomas includes theological conclusions among that which is revealed indirectly; second, how the Thomists before the Salmanticenses, when treating whether theological conclusions are of faith, always distinguish, unless they take it as understood, between before and after the definition of the Church.

407. JOHN PAUL NAZARIO, Ord. Praed.—Along with Gravina, let another Italian Dominican go, a very well-known and frequently cited commentator on St. Thomas, "a man quick and keen in mind, a distinguished master of Sacred Theology"¹³. Let us also choose two short little texts: "Know moreover that the conclusions deduced and defined by the Holy Fathers assembled in the Councils from the principles of faith pertain immediately to the faith... and from these the error of Molina is evident"¹⁴. "I call that a theological conclusion which is not found in the Sacred Scriptures or in the divine traditions expressly in formal terms, or in entirely equivalent ones, although it may be determined by the Supreme Pontiff or by the sacred Councils and is to be believed by faith"¹⁵.

408. FRANCISCO DEL CASTILLO, Ord. Sti. Franc.—Following in chronological order is the Madrilenian Francisco del Castillo, a Franciscan. As a good Scotist, he could not but depart from Molina on this matter of dogmatic evolution by way of revealed virtuality. A single text will suffice:

"From what has been said, you should infer what must be said regarding that question which Molina raises, loc. cit., and Suárez, namely whether propositions virtually contained in the revealed truths are matters of faith, if they are defined by the Church? I answer that yes: first, because it was already revealed through the conclusion deduced from the premises: whence the Church does not define what is not revealed, which is the inconvenience that compels Molina to assert the opposite; and although such a conclusion is theologically elicited, objectively nevertheless it is of faith" ¹⁶

409. FRANCISCO DE OVIEDO, Soc. Jesu.—Alongside the aforementioned Madrilenian, we shall cite another, also from Madrid, but of the Society of Jesus. The passages we shall quote from him will be longer, not precisely because he was a theologian who “was a man of keen intellect and sound judgment for understanding, handling, and unraveling questions, especially moral ones” ¹⁷, but rather because he is one of the many who have unwittingly exposed the contraband hidden under the new nomenclature of confused form introduced by Suárez. Let us hear him:

"Universal revelation or confused revelation and mediate or remote revelation are also distinguished, in that universal or confused revelation immediately attains the very same object as singular and distinct revelation, and is distinguished from the latter only by the mode of conceiving.

Mediate knowledge, however, does not attain the very object itself which immediate knowledge attains. For immediate knowledge attains the object in itself; mediate knowledge, however, does not attain it in itself, but in something that is inferred from it, as when it is revealed that Christ is a man, the revelation terminates at those things which substantially constitute man, and from the fact that it terminates at this, the revelation is said to be mediate with respect to all those things which are inferred from them through true causality. Thus it is said that, from the fact that it has been revealed that Christ is a man, it is mediately revealed that He is capable of laughter. Now suppose, for the sake of explaining the matter, that risibility is a passion physically distinct from humanity, or substitute in place of risibility any accident distinct and naturally inseparable from humanity: this thing, however, which is to be mediately revealed, is not in reality something revealed, but something necessarily inferred from that which was revealed...

In the preceding point, no. 78, I explained what virtual and mediate revelation is: I now discuss whether this suffices for an act of faith; for example, whether from the very fact that it is revealed that Christ is a man, one can believe by an act of faith that there is in Him a superadded power of laughing. And for the sake of the discussion, I suppose it is evident to every man that this power is in Him. In this way, I agitate the question, and I do not inquire whether from the fact that it is revealed that Christ is a man, one can believe that He is capable of laughter; because although under these terms the same question may be agitated, and it is commonly proposed under them, some abuse them, and they transfer the question to the capacity for laughter identified with the rational predicate: in which sense the question is not to be understood; for the capacity for laughter taken in this way is the same as rationality, and therefore, by the very fact that this is revealed, that also will be in reality revealed.

I say this not superfluously in the matter: for there are some predicates, identified with others, about whose identity we are not surely certain. Let an example be in God: for many are of the opinion that in Him there is justice, a virtue taken in a special sense. Let us grant this opinion to be true; with its truth posited, in God it will be the same thing to be omnipotent, or to be God, and to have the attribute of justice: and therefore the revelation which says that He is God says that He is just, with respect to one who adequately penetrates what the meaning of this name God imports in the reality.

Notwithstanding this, however the matter may stand, in relation to us it has not been revealed that there is in God an attribute of justice, taken specifically as a virtue, because we can only know probable certainty regarding the existence of this attribute, which we can also probably deny. And hence, in reality, by the very fact that God is said to exist, it is said that the attribute of special justice is in Him, because in fact it is the same really as the divine nature: nevertheless, that revelation is not so applied to us, who only hold probable opinions about the existence of this attribute, that by its force we could elicit an act of faith by which we judge that God has the aforesaid attribute of omnipotence, or that He is omnipotent. But in one who evidently knew that omnipotence and the special attribute of justice are really identified, by that very fact, since he could believe one attribute by an act of faith, he could believe the other as well, even under the express concept by which one attribute is formally distinguished from another...

I would say this against Puente Hurtado and others, who confuse the question between predicates that are really distinct and others that are distinguished only formally, and to these—only formally distinct—precisely because one is understood as prior and in the manner of essence, and the other as posterior in the manner of a passion, they wish to extend the opinion asserting that a conclusion drawn from one revealed premise and another evidently known one is not a matter of faith.

With the question understood in this way, the affirmative opinion is held by Cano, Vega... The negative opinion is handed down by the same Cano, Suárez... I embrace this negative opinion... The reason is: an object connected with what is revealed, precisely insofar as it is connected with it, can only be believed because of the connection that exists between it and another revealed object; but this connection is not a motive of faith; therefore it cannot be believed on the motive of faith: therefore it cannot be believed by an act of faith. The major premise is clear: for we suppose that the object is not revealed in itself, but in another with which it is connected and not identified. Hence the entire reason for assenting must be the connection. The minor premise is self-evident, because the formal object of faith is revelation or divine authority: not, indeed, the connection of one predicate with others¹⁸.

We are confident that every professional theologian, and even anyone interested in this most serious problem of what the traditional opinion on the development of dogma is, will forgive us for having copied such a long paragraph because of its value in bringing to light the true meaning of the new nomenclature introduced by Suárez, with the confused formal and pure virtual, and the new meaning thereby given to the traditional names of immediate and mediate. Under the name of confused formal, or of immediate implicit, or of virtual implicit, or of revealed IN RE, they understand what is really identical with the revealed deposit, and they reserve the name of mediate, or virtual, or cohexive for what is really distinct from what is revealed and, therefore, not revealed. In this way they say in substance the same thing as the ancients and as we do, although in their formulas they may seem to say the opposite.

In the preceding texts of the Madrilenian Oviedo, a contemporary and compatriot of John of St. Thomas, the reader will have been able to notice the sense given in the seventeenth century to the phrase revealed in re. By it they understand every virtuality or conclusion really identical with the revealed datum. Among the Thomists, that phrase appears for the first time in John of St. Thomas, and precisely in the final and most interesting paragraph, in which John of St. Thomas summarizes and concludes all his celebrated fourth article on the definability of faith of the theological conclusion. He says thus: "From which you may gather, that in the truths of faith something can be contained virtually, in two ways. In one way, virtually illatively ONLY, and this pertains to theology, which has as its object the conclusions drawn from the truths of faith. In another way, virtually implicitly, THAT IS, those which in re are revealed, and intended by the Holy Spirit, but hidden from us, and therefore touched upon by discourse. And these (that is, everything revealed in re, or really identical with what is revealed in se), the Church can define and declare"¹⁹.

As can be seen, John of St. Thomas understands by virtual implicit exactly the same thing as we do, that is, everything really identical with the revealed statements. Whether the modern Thomists want it or not, we must confess that John of St. Thomas, like quite a few other later theologians, suffered the overwhelming influence of Suárez's prestige, and that all that nomenclature of virtualiter, illativa tantum and in re revelatum which John of St. Thomas uses, and which other Thomists later used, is of Suárezian origin.

410. MARCOS SERRA, Ord. Praed.—Omitting Lugo and John of St. Thomas, contemporaries of Oviedo, since we have already spoken of them elsewhere (79 and 307), it remains to cite the Valencian Dominican Serra, illustrious commentator on the Summa of St. Thomas. Let us hear him, for he deserves it: “That certain theological conclusions have been defined by the Church solely because they are mediately revealed, in that they are evidently deduced from propositions immediately revealed, not all admit. For some assert that ‘Christ has a human will’ was not defined by the Church for this reason, but because it is contained in Scripture, and they say the same of other similar cases. But although we grant that, as seems to me it must be granted, such conclusions are defined by the Church: yet it does not follow from this that before such a definition they have the certainty of faith, nor that its opposite is heretical, but only erroneous. For the definition of the Church, just as it can bring it about that something manifestly pertains to the faith, so also that it pertains to the faith immediately, and thus has the certainty of faith, and its opposite is heretical, which before was only erroneous. Nor is it necessary that what is immediately of the faith be immediately revealed by God: but it suffices that, although it is mediately revealed by God, it be immediately proposed by the Church” ²⁰.

All of this is of pure Thomistic stock. Serra has known how to express traditional Thomism not only in substance, but also in nomenclature.

411. HONORATUS FABRI, of the Society of Jesus.—No less clearly does the Jesuit Fabri express himself, although his terminology is not so precise. He says the following: “You will ask: what is to be said about those conclusions which are deduced from the principles of faith? I distinguish the answer to this question by several numbers... Secondly, when the predicate of the consequent is identified with the predicate of the antecedent, if the antecedent is of faith, then the consequent is also of faith (it would be definable as of faith, Serra would have said): e.g., it is of faith that the Word was made man: therefore it is of faith that Christ has a body and a soul, that He is a rational animal, that He is capable of laughter, intellective, volitive, etc. The reason for both answers is that everything is of faith which is believed implicitly: but... in the act by which I believe that Christ is a man, I certainly believe implicitly everything that man signifies by his nature: that is, to have a body and a soul, to be intellective, volitive, capable of laughter, etc.: therefore I believe this confusedly and implicitly: therefore they are of faith: otherwise I do not know what it is to believe something implicitly and confusedly²¹.

412. PEDRO ANNATO, Soc. Iesu.—Let us place beside Fabri his fellow religious, Pedro Annato, of whom our Contenson says: "in writing theological matters acutely and clearly, he is without controversy second to none in the Society"²². He speaks thus: "Erroneous is any proposition that opposes... a doctrine which, although it is not defined by the Church, nor formally and expressly revealed, is nevertheless commonly inferred by theologians through reasoning from revealed truths, whence it is also called a theological conclusion: and so it is virtually revealed, and closely approaching the faith, because it is close that it be defined by the Church, and nothing is lacking to it to become of faith except the definition of the Church... You will press: that something be believed with divine faith, it must be immediately revealed, or by formal and immediate revelation: therefore virtual and mediate revelation does not suffice. I reply: I deny the antecedent. The reason is first, because, as the doctors of the celebrated University of Douai well note in their declaration, nowhere is it found written that immediate revelation is required for divine faith, and that mediate revelation does not suffice"²³.

413. FELIPE DE LA SANTÍSIMA TRINIDAD, Carmelite.—Now it is the turn of the celebrated Carmelite Felipe de la Santísima Trinidad. Of him Gonet says that "he published works worthy of cedar," and of his Summa Theologiae thomisticae Hurter says: "It is held in high esteem by the disciples of St. Thomas: for it excels in remarkable perspicuity and clarity." From this distinguished Thomist we take the following paragraphs: "That which is believed with divine faith, must either be immediately revealed by God, or be deduced from things immediately revealed through the assistance of the Holy Spirit"²⁴. "The common consensus of the Church concerning a proposition deducible from two premises, one of which is of faith and the other naturally known, makes the matter one of faith. For if the consensus of a general Council concerning a similar proposition makes it a matter of faith, as happens whenever a general Council, from one proposition of faith and another naturally certain, deduces a theological conclusion: much more does the common consensus of the Church concerning a similar proposition make it a matter of faith²⁵.

Also worth reading from this author is his commentary on the phrase of Saint Thomas²⁶: “But after it has been made manifest, and especially if it has been determined by the Church,” as well as his commentary on the question of “how the object of the faith in its totality is contained in the Creed”²⁷: It is among the best we have read after the classical commentators of the sixteenth century.

414. DOMINIC DE MARINIS, Ord. Praed.—After the previous: after the Carmelite Thomist comes one of the most illustrious Dominican Thomists. He is the Italian Dominic de Marinis, whose commentaries on St. Thomas, in Margott's opinion, "should be numbered among the better theological works of the other half of the seventeenth century." Commenting on the classic article "Whether heresy is properly about those things which are of faith," this great theologian expresses himself as follows:

“D. Thomas here posits as the proper object and matter of heresy that which directly and manifestly opposes some truth of faith: and as the less principal object of it, yet within the latitude of the object, he constitutes that from which something manifestly contrary to faith is gathered or inferred by evident consequence...

Directly, therefore, it pertains to infidelity: that proposition which imports something manifestly contrary to the faith. Indirectly, however, it pertains to that which imports an error from which something manifestly contrary to the faith is mediately and indirectly inferred, such as propositions contrary to truths demonstrated in theology from one or both of the sources of faith; for then by means of a syllogism the opposite of the faith is inferred... For he who is obstinate in a proposition from which something is evidently inferred that is manifestly against the faith errs in the faith and is a heretic”²⁸.

And before this, he had said: “Because the Church has never up to now proposed or defined anything for the faithful to believe that is not contained in the Sacred Scriptures, or expressed in the Apostolic traditions or virtually contained in them”²⁹.

415. JUAN MARTÍNEZ DE RIPALDA, Soc. Iesu.—Once again the renowned Society of Jesus returns with one of its many eminent theologians of the seventeenth century, the Navarrese Martínez de Ripalda, of whom the oft-cited Hurter says with evident family affection: "The foremost scholastic theologian of this age in Spain, and perhaps in all of Europe, along with Card. De Lugo"³⁰. Anyone versed in these questions will have noticed that Ripalda is cited by some against dogmatic evolution and by others in favor of it. Both sides have their share of reason. Ripalda admits dogmatic evolution, but not to the extent that we have seen most other theologians admit it. Of the five types of conclusion or implicit virtuality that we have explained elsewhere (45), Ripalda denies the definability of the first three, in which metaphysical or radical properties are deduced; but he admits that of the fifth and sixth, which is to deduce the actual or physical properties of the connatural or perfect essence. Let us hear his words:

I assert secondly: That can be credible by faith as an object which is known from one revealed truth and another evidently known truth... For Christ is not only believed by faith and revealed to be a man in the metaphysical sense, but in the natural and physical sense, namely, the sense of the revelation manifesting that Christ is a man (not only) by a precise and metaphysical concept of the essence or of animality and rationality, but also by the natural and physical concept of man, comprising what is proper to man according to physical and natural laws, in those things that do not detract from the dignity of the divine supposit and of the Redeemer of the world. But the humanity revealed in the natural and physical sense includes formally (the virtual implicit Thomistic) and not only virtually (the extrinsic virtual of Suárez) the natural properties connected to it, setting aside miracle, one of which is the power of laughter. Therefore, by the sole revelation of the humanity of Christ, in that sense commonly conceived by the faithful, it pertains to faith (it would be definable de fide, a Thomist would say) that the intellect is distinct from the soul, as well as the formal will of the same, and quantity distinct from the substance of the body, nor are other singular revelations of these properties necessary; because the sense of that revelation commonly held by all the faithful universally includes, besides the essence and substance of man, also the properties physically and naturally connected to him, under which are comprehended as particular species the intellect and the will, quantity, and imagination, as well as the power of laughter"³¹.

By admitting the definability of physical or actual properties while denying, however, that of essential or radical properties, Ripalda has given us one of the many examples of his inclination toward singular opinions. We do not now recall any other theologian of stature who has fallen into that incoherence. In any case, Ripalda is to be praised for having maintained dogmatic development by way of theological conclusion, although he did not do so with the breadth of Suárez and Lugo, since a proper theological conclusion must be called, and is, the deducing of properties from the essence, whether the properties in question are radical or actual. By that path almost all the conclusions of the treatise on the Incarnation have been developed, some of which, such as the two understandings and two wills of Christ, have already been defined as matters of faith, and all the others could equally be defined, supposing that they are truly evident or demonstrated conclusions (100 and 317).

416. JACOB PLATEL, S.J.—Along with Ripalda we may unite other Jesuit theologians who still remain for us from this century. The first is the eminent Platel, whose Synopsis cursus theologici has gone through very numerous editions, "because of its conciseness, clarity, solidity, and usefulness" ³². Let us hear him teach the definability by divine faith of every theological conclusion and even of every dogmatic fact:

"Every conclusion deduced from one revealed truth and another certain by the light of nature is a matter of faith. Because when a predicate is affirmed of a subject, all things that are certainly and evidently known to be identically or necessarily connected with such a predicate are simultaneously affirmed mediately and virtually, and therefore really... Therefore this conclusion, Christ is capable of laughter... is sufficiently revealed... so that it can be believed with divine faith" ³³.

Let us now hear him defend, and very well, the extension of dogmatic evolution to the facts that are for good reason called dogmatic:

"Probatur quinto: quia propositiones eiusmodi facta continentes deduci possunt ex maiori revelata, et minori moraliter certa: atqui tales propositiones sunt a Pontifice definibiles ut fide divina credenda: ergo..." (loc. cit.).

417. TIRSO GONZÁLEZ AND DOMINGO VIVA, S.J.—Not only does he admit as of divine faith the conclusions and the facts, but he extends it to the canonization of the saints. Instead of citing long texts from him, suffice it to say that the title of the sixth section of his work is It is of faith that the men canonized are truly saints ³⁴.

We find the same doctrine in Domingo Viva, the classical commentator on the Damnatae Theses, who expresses himself as follows: “The Pope can define as a matter of faith any theological conclusion derived from one premise of faith and another morally evident one. For example, it can be defined as a matter of faith that the Council of Trent had the assistance of the Holy Spirit, which is a theological conclusion derived from this premise of faith, that a legitimately assembled General Council has the assistance of the Holy Spirit, and from this other morally evident premise, namely, that Trent was legitimately assembled.”

“Ergo, the Pontiff can equally define de fide a fact connected with a right, or a theological conclusion descending from one premise de fide concerning a right and another morally certain premise concerning a fact, such as that condemned conclusion that the propositions of Jansenius contained in his book are heretical in the obvious sense that the words themselves present. For it descends from this premise de fide concerning a right, namely that those propositions are heretical, as for example: “For merit, freedom from coercion suffices,” and from this other premise morally certain, that they are contained in the obvious sense in the book of Jansenius, as is clear from the experience of all who read Jansenius.”

“And in fact, the Church has defined many theological conclusions of this kind to be de fide, e.g.: that Christ had a human will, which descends from this revealed premise, that Christ is man, and from this other naturally certain premise, that man has a will. Likewise, it has been defined de fide in the Council of Trent that the substance of bread does not remain under the Eucharistic accidents, which is inferred from this revealed premise, that Christ remains under the Eucharistic accidents, and from this other naturally certain premise, that two complete substances cannot exist under the same accidents...”

“By the same reasoning the Church can define that St. Ignatius, for example, is a Saint and is to be honored with the worship of dulia; since this follows from this premise of faith, that he is to be honored who dies in the embrace of the Lord after heroic virtues, and from this other morally certain premise, after so many prior investigations by the Church, that St. Ignatius, after heroic virtues, died in the embrace of the Lord” ³⁵

418. GERVASIUS BIJONIUS.—The penetrating supplementer of Becanus's Summa, Gervasius Bijonius, is no less clear. He speaks thus:

“Every theological conclusion, by that very fact, is believable with divine faith...”

You will object, first: The act of divine faith immediately rests on divine revelation: therefore it has as its object a proposition immediately revealed, of which kind a theological conclusion that is only mediately revealed is not: therefore...

I answer that I deny the consequence. It is one thing for the act of divine faith to rest immediately on divine revelation, and another for it to rest on immediate revelation.

You will insist: For a proposition to be believable with divine faith, it must be revealed in itself... I distinguish the major premise: If the meaning is that it must be immediately revealed, I deny it. If the meaning is that it must be truly revealed ³⁶, I grant it.

These two objections are admirably resolved. The only thing missing in Bijonius, as in almost all non-Thomist theologians, is the observation that this deduction or intellectual explanation of the implicit conclusion is not formally a matter of faith until it is defined by the Church. The Church alone has the mission to explain divinely or dogmatically the implicit virtuality of the deposit. The explanation or deduction of the theologian is human.

419. VICENTE CONTENSON, Ord. Praed.—Let us now listen to a theologian of true Thomist stock, the author, no less wise than pious, of the celebrated Theology of the Mind and Heart. He speaks thus:

"Although all things pertaining to the faith are virtually contained in the Scriptures, they are nevertheless not formally explained, but many of them are deduced by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, just as various conclusions are derived from principles" ³⁷.

"The second condition of the object of faith is: formal, or VIRTUAL revelation declared by the Church. The object of faith must be not only virtually, but formally revealed, or at least declared by the Church. The reason is that what is virtually revealed is deduced through reasoning, and is a theological conclusion, about which there is controversy among the learned, and even among the holy Fathers themselves: therefore it does not pertain to the object of faith, until, upon the arrival of the Church's determination, it is declared that the connection between the formally revealed proposition and the virtually revealed proposition is necessary... and then the proposition begins to pertain to the (formal or immediate) object of faith, not precisely because it is virtually revealed, but because, since it is virtually revealed, it is formally declared by the Church and drawn out from the article in which it lay hidden" ³⁸.

Doctrine and nomenclature in these two texts by Contenson are of pure Thomist quarry. One seems to be hearing St. Thomas, Cajetan, or Bañez.

420. CARDINAL GOTTI, Ord. Praed.—We had proposed to ourselves, and we have fulfilled it up to the present, not to cite on dogmatic evolution any theologian whose mind was not clear, not only in itself, but even upon the simple reading of the passages adduced. But before taking leave of the theologians of the seventeenth century, we are going to make an exception in favor of an eminent Thomistic theologian, whose mind on this question is clear, but whose nomenclature is not so much so. Since John of St. Thomas, employing Suárez's nomenclature, called the virtual implicit the immediate implicit, there are some later Thomists who say and repeat that the Church cannot define as of divine faith anything but what is immediately or formally revealed, but it is evident that they understand by immediate or formal the same thing that the pre-Suarezian Thomistic tradition always called virtual or consequential. One of those Thomists is Cardinal Gotti. Here is how he expresses himself:

“Cum ergo Ecclesia definit aliquid de novo tenendum esse de fide, quod antea non tenebatur, non facit id quod erat solum mediate (the virtual implicit is not “solum mediate,” but rather it is mediate with respect to us, yet immediate in itself) to be revealed immediately: rather, the truths which, although they had previously been immediately revealed to the Apostles (the point is not how it was revealed to the Apostles, but how the Apostles handed it on to the Church; see no. 58), it was nonetheless not certain that they had been immediately revealed... Therefore, one must distinguish two things: one, that a thing is of faith; the other, that the faithful are obliged to believe it as of faith. As to the first, through the Church’s definition no change occurs in any respect: for this truth, “Christ has two wills,” was always... immediately of faith (immediate in itself, mediate with respect to us). A change does, however, occur as to the second: insofar as what was of faith and immediately revealed (in itself), yet did not oblige belief in it; once the Church’s definition is in place that it is of faith, it begins to oblige.”

Anyone who read Gotti’s preceding paragraphs, especially without the parentheses, which are ours, would be persuaded that Gotti denied that the mediate or virtual is definable by faith and, therefore, denied dogmatic development. Read, however, the following texts, and you will see in what sense Gotti takes the word immediate:

“I say: The articles of faith in their substance have not grown, but only in their explanation... The first part is proven. Knowledge is not said to grow in substance because some of its conclusions are now known which were previously unknown; therefore, neither should faith or its articles be said to grow in substance because some things are now believed which were not believed before. The consequence is proven. For the first point holds because those conclusions, even if unknown, were nevertheless contained implicitly in the principles of that science; but all things we now believe were contained implicitly, either in those two principles handed down by the Apostle... or in those things revealed to the ancient Patriarchs and Prophets: or finally more explicitly in those things which Christ taught and the Apostles inspired by the Holy Spirit handed down: therefore.

The latter part (which alone concerns the explanation) follows from what has been said. For if all things to be believed have been revealed, at least implicitly, and with the passage of time only an explanation has been made of those things that were contained implicitly in what had already been revealed; therefore, when the Church proposed something as to be held by faith, this was not done by a new revelation made to her, but by a new explanation of the revelation already made, or of the thing already revealed. Hence the Church never proposed or defined anything for the faithful to believe that was not at least virtually contained either in Sacred Scripture or in divine or apostolic traditions. ³⁹

421. THIS IS SEEN VERY CLEARLY in that when Gotti says that only the immediate is definable, he understands by immediate the virtual implicit, since he expressly admits the definability of the latter. And it will be seen even more clearly by copying the following texts from the treatise On Sacred Theology, where he says thus: “I declare: A proposition or doctrine is heretical which immediately opposes either the expressed word of God, or the expressed definition of the Church. It is further said “or the expressed definition of the Church,” since a proposition which is contained implicitly only in the word of God, after the Church has declared that it is truly contained therein, must be expressly believed by divine faith, by those to whom the judgment issued by the Church has sufficiently become known. I declare a proposition erroneous in faith to be one which opposes... a doctrine not indeed defined by the Church, or formally or expressly revealed, but commonly derived by the Doctors through reasoning from revealed truths. Therefore a theological conclusion is commonly said to be virtually revealed, because it approaches faith so closely that nothing is lacking to it for being of faith, except the express definition of the Church. Whence it happens that an erroneous proposition and one proximate to heresy coincide" ⁴⁰

The mind of the illustrious Cardinal Gotti is therefore quite clear regarding the definability of faith of conclusions properly so called. But how much more clarity his nomenclature would have gained, as well as that of John of Saint Thomas, if they had never used as synonyms the names of immediate and virtual, upon which the nature of faith and of theology depends, thereby entangling so many modern Thomists!

422. GABRIEL BOYVIN, O.F.M.—Leaving aside, so as not to make ourselves interminable, many other theologians, let us close the seventeenth century with the Franciscan Boyvin, since we have cited so many Jesuits and Dominicans. He says the following: “The question is raised: are those propositions (namely, the conclusions of theology) defined by the Church, of faith? To this question Molina, considering that the Church does not have the power to make something a matter of faith that did not previously pertain to faith, because no new revelations are given to her, responds that the definitions of the Church are not of faith, but only, within the breadth of the certainty of theology, are more certain than the private definitions of theologians, and so certain due to the special assistance of the Holy Spirit that error cannot underlie them. The contrary, however, must be asserted, namely, that any conclusion whatsoever defined by the Church is of faith... From all these things, therefore, it must be concluded that a theological conclusion as such is not of faith; but as defined by the Church, it is of faith, and is to be placed among the principles of theology, and that it is owed assent through the habit of faith, and not only through the habit of theology, as Molina wishes”⁴¹.

We have, then, that throughout the seventeenth century, and despite Molina's innovation, the majority of theologians continue to defend the evolution of dogma by way of properly so-called theological conclusion.

Eighteenth Century

423. IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER.—We have just seen that throughout the seventeenth century the great majority of theologians of all schools or nationalities continued to defend, despite the contrary opinion of Molina, the traditional doctrine on the evolution of dogma by way of theological conclusion. We shall see the same in the eighteenth century. We shall continue to cite theologians in approximately chronological order rather than by schools.

424. JUAN LORENZO BERTI, Ord. S. Aug.—Let us begin with the illustrious theologian Berti, worthy representative of the glorious Augustinian school. He speaks thus: “For since a proposition of faith is that which is expressly contained in the Sacred Scriptures, in the traditions received by the Church, in the decrees and definitions of the Church, or is deduced therefrom by a certain, manifest, and most firm connection, that proposition is to be regarded as heretical which is found to be diametrically opposed to any one of these”⁴².

425. FRANCIS HENNO, Ord. S. Franc.—The Franciscan Henno follows, the most illustrious representative of the Scotist school in this century. Let us copy a text: “Revelation need not always be immediate, but a proposition of faith can be given, although it is not in itself and immediately revealed, but only virtually and implicitly contained in revealed propositions. If, however, it is inferred from one revealed [premise] and another natural one, it will not be of faith (by itself or before a definition)... It should be noted that although a proposition as it follows from one non-revealed [premise] and another revealed one is not of faith: by that very fact, however, when it is defined by the Church, it becomes of faith, and not merely certain... Because the Church proposes to us many things to be believed as faith which are not contained explicitly, formally, and immediately in the Scriptures, but are only deduced from them by consequence" ⁴³

426. GABRIEL ANTOINE, S. J.—Now comes a most meritorious theologian of the Society, both dogmatist and moralist, and one of the best theologians of the eighteenth century. His Theologia universa speculativa et dogmatica is worthy of being consulted on this question of dogmatic progress. Let us hear him: "I say fourthly: A proposition legitimately deduced from a major universal that is altogether certain and a minor that is revealed is of faith, and can be believed with divine faith. It is proved first: because such a proposition is sufficiently revealed. It is proved thirdly: because the Church proposes as revealed and to be believed by faith the propositions legitimately deduced from a universal proposition that is altogether certain, though not revealed, and from a minor that is revealed... You will object firstly: the proposition in question, e.g., Christ is capable of laughter... is not revealed formally, not even implicitly; therefore it cannot be believed with divine faith. I reply: by denying the consequence. Because for a proposition to be believed with divine faith, it suffices that it be revealed mediately and virtually... and it can be believed with divine faith, indeed it must be, at least when a definition of the Church intervenes" ⁴⁴

427. EDMUND SIMONET, S.J.—Let us join with Antoine another theologian of the Society, Edmund Simonet, who expresses himself no less clearly: "Generally speaking, every conclusion legitimately deduced from one premise that is of absolutely revealed faith, and from another that is completely certain... is of faith with respect to the power of believing, indeed even with respect to the obligation, at least when the definition of the Church is added. Hence, by divine faith the conclusion of this syllogism can be believed: Every man is capable of laughter: Christ is a man: therefore He is capable of laughter" ⁴⁵

428. JUAN MARÍN, S.J.—A third theologian now appears, also a Jesuit, no less famous than Antoine and much more so than Simonet: the Spaniard Juan Marín. He has the merit not only of holding the same opinion as all the previous authors on the question of dogmatic evolution, but also of being yet another witness as to what Suárez and Lugo understand by confused formal or immediate implicit, that is, what is really identical with what has been revealed, even though it is formally distinct. Here are his words: “The greater difficulty concerns the conclusion drawn from one premise that is of faith and another that is natural... Suárez, Lugo... say that the conclusion is of faith when it is identified with the revealed object; otherwise when it is not identified... This opinion pleases me... You insist: God revealing omnipotence reveals only what this word signifies among those who hear it, because the meaning of the word must be common to the speaker and the hearer. But this word “omnipotence” signifies only omnipotence , as distinct from immensity and the other attributes : therefore... I reply, granting the major, by distinguishing the minor: it signifies omnipotence only formally , I grant the minor; really , I deny the minor. And therefore the hearer forms a concept of omnipotence only formally ; nevertheless he forms really a concept of immensity: because that concept really affirms immensity , even if not formally” ⁴⁶
This doctrine of Suárez and Lugo which Marín here follows, regarding as definable by faith everything really identical with the revealed deposit, even though formally distinct, is affirmed by at least ninety percent of post-Suarezian theologians under the name of confused formal or equivalent. The great merit of Suárez and Lugo, which will never be sufficiently appreciated, consists in having covered with their great authority the definability of that virtual-identical-objective, which is precisely what the ancient theologians designated by the simple names of “virtual” or “implicit,” since it is the true constitutive element of the proper and rigorous theological conclusion. Everything else is nothing but physics (73).

429. BERTOLD CRASSOUS, Carmelite.—Let us now cite a Carmelite theologian, if only to show how, despite the tangle raised in this question by the Salmanticenses with their famous nego maiorem (80), the theologians of his Order continued even a century later to defend the traditional doctrine of the definability as a matter of faith of true theological conclusions. Let us hear Crassous: “Every theological conclusion, as contained in the premises, is of faith, namely, in that way in which it is contained in the premises; so that it is formally of faith, if it is formally contained in the premises; but only virtually, if it is only virtually contained in them... Now the second part of the conclusion is proven, namely, that a theological conclusion virtually contained in premises that are of faith is virtually of faith. That is virtually of faith which is virtually revealed: for in the same way in which something is revealed, it is likewise of faith; otherwise God would not merit faith in something revealed by Him; but a conclusion virtually contained in a premise or in premises that are of faith is virtually revealed; for in the same way it is revealed as it is contained in the revealed premise: therefore it is virtually of faith. And consequently, this conclusion “therefore Christ is capable of laughter,” drawn from this antecedent “Christ is a man,” is only virtually of faith, because it is contained only virtually in this antecedent. Note, however, with Father Henry, that if the Church defined this proposition to be held as of faith, it would immediately become formally and directly of faith... Against this doctrine only Molina dissents, as Suárez testifies” ⁴⁷.

We believe that the Thomistic doctrine cannot be expressed more beautifully nor reasoned with more clarity.

430. MIGUEL HERCE, O.S.B.—As a representative of the Benedictine Order, always fruitful in scholars, we will cite the Benedictine Herce, for many years a professor at Salamanca and later General of the Order. He follows the Salmanticenses in almost everything, and uses their arguments and even their very words, but he departs from them to follow the traditional doctrine regarding the definability of conclusions by the Church. He states thus:

"Whether virtual or mediate revelation is the formal object of faith (per se or without a definition of the Church). The first opinion defends the affirmative side... The second, extremely contrary opinion teaches... that it is not sufficient for the formal object of faith... The Thomists commonly hold this, and among the fathers of the Society, the distinguished Doctor with many others: among whom Father Molina so extends the opinion as to say that a conclusion drawn from one article of faith and another evident one is not a matter of faith, even if it is defined by the Church..."

He argues first: that God is omnipotent, infinite, and the like, is a truth pertaining to the faith; but this is not immediately revealed... Therefore...

For the proof drawn from examples, I grant the major premise and deny the minor. For that God is incorporeal, infinite, and similar attributes is sufficiently and immediately evident from Sacred Scripture, if not in the same terms, then in others that are equivalent and signify the same thing, as when Sacred Scripture says that God is spirit and almighty (up to this point it is almost literally all from the Salmanticenses, whom he frequently cites; but now he continues speaking on his own): besides the fact that such things are defined by the Church, and on this title alone they would pertain to the faith, even if no express or equivalent revelation were found concerning them ⁴⁸

431. ANSELM SCHNELL, O. S. B.—To the same period and Benedictine Order belongs Schnell, of whom it will suffice to transcribe the following lines:

"Fourth, it must be noted that those things are called virtually revealed which, although they are not in themselves immediately and formally revealed, are nevertheless contained in another thing that is formally revealed. This being supposed, it must be held that virtual revelation is a sufficient motive of faith. The reason is that such a thing, being virtually revealed, is immediately believed on account of divine revelation" ⁴⁹

432. JUAN SANTIAGO SIDRO VILLARROYO, O. S. A.—The Augustinian school is also represented by the illustrious Villarroyo, who continues to defend, like Giles of Rome, like Fray Luis de León, like Berti, and like all those of his school, the traditional doctrine. He speaks thus:

All things revealed by God, or proposed by the whole Church as deduced from the revealed truths, we call theological dogmas. Indeed, there is this one distinction between dogmas and articles of faith: that explicit faith must be given to the latter, but not so to the former... But since whoever expressly denies either one opposes faith equally, it follows that both dogmas and articles of faith are truths of faith, and are rightly included under the common name of dogmas. Therefore, some dogmas are immediately revealed by God, while others are only mediately so, namely, those that are contained in the former and are derived from them by necessary consequence ⁵⁰

433. ST. ALPHONSUS MARY OF LIGUORI.—Omitting many other theologians of this century, as we have omitted them in the previous one, some of whom there will still be occasion to cite elsewhere (477-478), we will close the eighteenth century with the greatest one there was in that century, and who has merited being placed among the Doctors of the Church. Although St. Liguori is more frequently cited as a moral theologian than as a dogmatic one, his authority is great in everything, not only because of his sacred character as a Doctor of the Church, but also because of the extraordinary impartiality of his theological judgment, so free of any factionalism or passion of school or family, that we believe hardly anyone equal to him in this regard is found, after St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Bonaventure, among the scholastic theologians. Here is how he expresses himself: "For all propositions condemned by the Popes, although not all are heretical, but some are rash, some erroneous, some scandalous, etc.; nevertheless, when the Pontiff's definition intervenes, it must be held as a matter of faith that those propositions are truly rash or are affected by another mark, which the Pontiff declared them to bear" ⁵¹

"Indeed, although our opinion (concerning the preservation of the Blessed Virgin from original sin) has not yet been defined by the Church, it can nevertheless rightly be held as a matter of faith... For St. Thomas says that we can believe as a matter of faith not only those things which we have through infused faith, but also those which we perceive through theological conclusions" ⁵²

**434. SYNTHESIS OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.—**We see, then, that all these authors of the eighteenth century continue, like those of previous centuries, defending the definability by divine faith of the true theological conclusion. Although each expresses it in his own way, and with a variety of opinion in particular details, all agree on the evolution of dogma by way of virtuality or consequence properly so called.

Nineteenth Century

**435. NEW THOMISTIC FLOWERING.—**If the eighteenth century was for theology a century of decadence, much more so was the nineteenth century; especially during the first two thirds, which preceded the encyclical Aeterni Patris of Leo XIII. With the renewal of Thomistic studies by this immortal Pontiff, the glories of Catholic philosophy and theology also began to be rejuvenated, although we are still very far from possessing many philosophers or theologians of the stature of those of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, much less of the stature of those of the thirteenth century. From among those theologians, relatively few, who have written in the nineteenth century or in what we have so far covered of the twentieth, we are going to choose a few to show how the traditional doctrine of dogmatic evolution by way of theological conclusion has continued and still continues to be taught, as in previous centuries.

**436. LEOPOLD LIEBERMANN.—**Let us begin with that most pious as well as wise theologian, the Alsatian Liebermann, whose theological institutes so greatly contributed to promoting the study of sound theology in the first half of the nineteenth century. He speaks thus:

"«If, however, a conclusion is deduced from faith through evident consequence, it must be said to pertain to faith, at least mediately and indirectly; and the theologian who comprehends the force of the argument must assent to it as pertaining to faith. Nor should you say that reason, therefore, produces faith: for a conclusion of this kind does not pertain to faith because it is deduced by legitimate consequence from the premises, but because by this manner of reasoning it appears that it was already contained in the revealed premise. Reason sees the consequence; faith embraces the consequent, as contained in the sources of revelation. Therefore reason is only a means and an instrument by which it is made certain to me that the conclusion is contained in the directly revealed dogma, and once this is known to me, I already adhere to it with firm faith on account of the authority of God revealing»⁵³

It is exactly the doctrine of Vázquez. They defend dogmatic evolution, but to excess, by viewing it as a matter of faith or dogma before the Church’s definition.

437. FATHER HILARY OF PARIS, Capuchin.—With no less clarity, but with much greater precision and with a rigorously Thomistic criterion, the eminent Capuchin theologian Father Hilary expresses himself. The following text deserves to be copied, even if it is somewhat long:

“The conclusions that flow from faith are of three kinds, according to whether they carry with them faith, or certainty, or probability.”

Faith conclusions are those which are deduced infallibly from the revealed word of God with respect to the Church... For the Church not only preserves, but also infallibly explains the word revealed by God: this explanation, however, is not made by a new revelation; therefore it is necessary that the Church apply its reason to this kind of work, to which, nevertheless, the Holy Spirit assists, so that the Church's reasoning may proceed infallibly. Moreover, when something is infallibly established to be so connected to the word of God that it cannot be denied without denying the very word of God itself, then it is clear that this also is revealed by God and pertains to the faith.

Conclusions of theological certainty are those which the unanimous and constant consensus of theologians teaches; such conclusions touch the truth of faith closely, and therefore they possess a certainty that is near to divine infallibility. For the Church uses these theological conclusions to determine the conclusions of faith... But must they be believed as an object of faith (before a definition of the Church)? The theologians themselves dispute this. Hence, however, some with Veronius distinguish a twofold faith, divine and catholic... Thus something could be of divine faith and not of catholic faith, e.g., if a learned man clearly perceives that something is contained in revelation which the Church does not propose; and this seems to be the opinion of Father Perrone... Nevertheless this distinction (which is as ancient as Vázquez) although it has pleased some recently, is more prudently to be rejected: because it rests on a false supposition, namely, that the medium or organ for proposing divine faith could be twofold, one universal, namely the Church, and another particular, namely science, by which the learned would be constrained to believe what the Church has not promulgated. Moreover, the sole medium or organ for promulgating faith is holy Mother Church. Science indeed is the medium for drawing out theological conclusions: but it is not a medium possessing divine infallibility, which Christ conferred on the Church alone. Moreover, without divine infallibility, the word of God is not proposed divinely as the word of God, but as the word of men, as the word of science... Therefore the conclusions of theologians (without a definition of the Church) avail for certainty, but they do not suffice for faith.

Nor does a conclusion drawn from two revealed truths pertain more to faith, if such a conclusion is not among those things which are customarily taught universally by the Church... Therefore, for the theologian himself, a scientific conclusion, even if certain, will never be a conclusion of faith, as long as it has not been transmitted through the infallible organ: for the theologian and the simple faithful are equal in faith ⁵⁴.

438. TRULY GOLDEN are all the preceding paragraphs. In our judgment, it is the most faithful expression that can be made of the true Thomistic position reflected in the previous work, holding a middle course between that of Vázquez and Molina. One seems to be reading one of the classic expositors of Thomistic doctrine in the sixteenth century.

439. CARDINAL MAZZELLA, S.J.—Let us move on to one of those many illustrious theologians who have honored the Society of Jesus and its renowned Gregorian University in the nineteenth century. Thus says Cardinal Mazzella:

“Once these things have been explained, it must be known that all concede that the truths formally contained in those explicitly revealed (this is the implicit-formal), are themselves revealed truths, and therefore the material object of faith...

Quaestio igitur est inter theologos, utrum idem dicendum sit de veritatibus quae solum virtualiter continentur in explicite revelatis... If the question concerns a truth that is contained implicitly (the implicit virtual or identical-real) in another explicitly revealed truth, with which, however, it is only really, not formally, identical, Ripalda, the Wirceburgenses, and others hold that it is not revealed; the contrary, however, is held by De Lugo, Suárez (and all the theologians prior to Molina). And I think this latter opinion is to be subscribed to. For the object thus implicitly contained in another explicitly revealed truth is truly said by God. For God intends to manifest that which the sign He uses can signify to those to whom the discourse is directed: but the sign of one object can signify to men also another object only formally distinct from it, if the real identity of both can be known by us without a new revelation: therefore... Hence they rightly say that the unrevealed premise is employed in this case to understand the signification of the divine discourse, not to infer properly something else connected with it (let the reader note what the post-Suárezian authors understand by "by reason of signification" and by "by reason of connection"). Thus, from this they say that the metaphysical property of some nature is credible by faith from the revelation of that nature itself; but not so the physical property, which they suppose to be really distinct and, by at least absolute power, separable from the nature. If, however, the question concerns an object that is said to be contained in another explicitly revealed truth, insofar as it is only connected with it or follows from it (this they call properly virtual comprehension), Suárez himself, De Lugo, etc., deny that it is said per se by God and credible with divine faith. Hence they say that the conclusion inferred from one premise of faith and another naturally known premise is not per se revealed, if the latter does not explain the signification of the former premise, but shows the connection of some object with what is explicitly revealed in that premise. I would here employ a distinction which seems to be in line with the mind of those doctors ⁵⁵: for either the implicit object so follows from the explicitly revealed truth that in no hypothesis can it be separated from it (Suárez, Lugo, Mazzella, and countless others have not noticed that this is precisely what happens in every rigorous theological, metaphysical, or mathematical conclusion...), and I would say that it is revealed, for otherwise the truth of the explicitly revealed object could in no way stand: or it can be separated from it, at least by God's absolute power (this happens only in physics, or only in conclusions of the fourth type), and then the opinion of Suárez, Lugo, etc. prevails." ⁵⁶ We have allowed ourselves to transcribe such a long text for two reasons. First, so that it may be clearly seen that this most wise theologian extends dogmatic development, as we do, to everything really identical with the revealed deposit, even if formally distinct; that is, to all the implicit virtuality of the deposit. Second, so that it may appear clear once more that Suárez and Lugo, like their later disciples, understand under the name of formal confused or equivalent all implicit virtuality, and understand by proper virtual the non-implicit virtual or that of the fourth type.

440. CARDINAL FRANZELIN, S.J.—To Cardinal Mazzella let us join the even more illustrious name of Cardinal Franzelin, of the same Society of Jesus, and his successor in the professorship at the Gregorian University. Whoever has read of Franzelin only his classic work On Divine Tradition and Scripture will have gained the impression that he is an enemy of all dogmatic evolution. So much and so well does he bring out the first characteristic of dogma, which is its objective immutability, that he seems to leave no room for the second characteristic, which is development or evolution within that same immutable objectivity. But whoever has read his treatise On the One God and the beautiful introduction on the nature of Theology that he placed before that treatise will have become convinced that Cardinal Franzelin admits, albeit with different phraseology, an evolution as ample as that of Cardinal Mazzella. Let us copy the following text:

“Since it is certain that both premises are revealed truth, or when one premise already implicitly contains what is stated in the conclusion, and the other, although not revealed, clearly manifests this comprehension of the conclusion in the revealed premise (this happens in every syllogism of lesser metaphysical certainty, as Franzelin will say at the end), without doubt the truth stated in such a conclusion is revealed... An example of a conclusion under the second form (that is: an example of a conclusion from one revealed and one unrevealed premise): can be adduced against the Monothelites. The revealed proposition, that Christ, besides His divine nature, has a perfect human nature, through which He is a true (perfect, it is understood, as he has just said, for otherwise there would be no implicitness) man, already contains the other truth, that Christ, besides His divine will, also has a rational will and human volitions. When, therefore, the other proposition is assumed to complete the argument: Christ is a true man; but the faculty of rational will is essential to man; therefore Christ has a human will: that assumed proposition only manifests the comprehension of this conclusion in the revealed proposition. This being granted, the truth of the consequent can be considered in two ways: either formally as revealed by God: then indeed an assent of faith corresponds to the proposition...

Now, if one of the premises is revealed, while the other is certain only by the light of reason, and if what is enunciated in the conclusion is contained only in both taken together (this can never happen when the minor premise is of metaphysical certainty, as he later confesses): what is enunciated in the conclusion is indeed certain (it will be moral certainty, but not metaphysical, and therefore much less theological certainty), yet it is not simply contained in revelation, and therefore it is not an object of divine faith, but only of theological assent, which rests partly on the revealed truth of the premises and partly on the naturally certain truth of them. It is revealed that the sacrament, for example, of baptism confers grace on those who place no obstacle: when I see an infant being baptized by a minister and in such a manner that no suspicion can arise against the validity of the sacrament, it becomes certain, though not revealed, that this infant has been validly baptized: hence the conclusion, that this infant has been justified, is theologically certain, yet it is not of faith (as can be seen, in order to find an example of a theological conclusion that is not definable as a matter of faith, Franzelin has had to resort to one that is neither a rigorous theological conclusion nor anything that amounts to it. But this is accidental. The essential point, and the only one for which we cite Cardinal Franzelin, is what now follows, and to which we draw the reader's attention); as for what Cano and Vega say (and why is Vázquez passed over in silence?), that a proposition deduced from one premise that is of faith and another that is naturally evident is itself also an object of faith, this is truly not contrary: for they themselves speak of a conclusion that is wholly contained in the revealed premise in such a way that the naturally evident proposition merely manifests this containment of the conclusion in the other, revealed premise, which meaning of theirs can easily be established from the examples they use to explain their view. (Now comes the best part.) In reality, in these theological syllogisms, the naturally certain proposition, especially where the certainty is METAPHYSICAL, USUALLY merely manifests the containment of the consequent in the revealed premise: and therefore conclusions of this kind are contained implicitly in objective revelation and, consequently, can be proposed and defined by the Church as matters to be believed by faith⁵⁷.

Three things are notable in this text of the illustrious cardinal. First, that he admits that the greater part (plerumque) of theological conclusions are inclusive and definable as of divine faith. Second, that he admits that this is verified especially in the conclusions that are less metaphysically certain, or what is the same, in all rigorous metaphysical conclusions, since for us and for every Thomist who knows what he is saying, there are no other rigorous theological conclusions than those. Third, that when Cano and Vega and Vázquez spoke of conclusions of faith, they understood those metaphysical-inclusive conclusions. That is evident, since no one, before Suárez, thought of calling a physical-connexive conclusion a rigorous conclusion.

Franzelin is right in saying that Cano and Vázquez understood by conclusions the implicit conclusions, since no theologian before Suárez, as far as we know, understood by theological conclusions what is not implicit or physical-connexive. "For the theologian gathers his conclusions from the principles of faith revealed by God, and unfolds those implicit in the principles themselves through an argumentation suited to nature"⁵⁸. "As we have often said elsewhere, neither the Councils, nor the Pontiff of the Apostolic See, nor the holy interpreters of the Scriptures give new revelations to the faithful, but what the Church received from the Apostles they either express, interpret, or certainly gather as consequences and connected truths, making manifest what is adverse and repugnant"⁵⁹. As can be seen, Cano understands by theological connectedness the same as by implicitness, since what is not implicit is not theological, nor metaphysical, nor mathematical, but physical.

441. SANTOS SCHIFFINI and GUILLERMO WILMERS, S. I.—Let us join to the two preceding another illustrious theologian of the same Society. After having denied, and rightly so, that what is virtually revealed is of divine faith per se or without a definition of the Church, in which every true Thomist must hold the opinion of Ripalda and the Wirceburgenses, and not that of Vázquez and so many others, he clearly admits that it is of divine faith after the definition of the Church. Let it suffice to cite the following text:

"You will insist: The Church defines not only those things which are formally implicit in divine-apostolic doctrine, but also many things which, although they are not formally implicit in this doctrine, are nevertheless necessarily connected with it by a bond: but, as was said earlier, this necessary connection does not suffice for such conclusions to be called implicitly revealed or implicitly of faith: Therefore.

I respond: the major premise being granted, I distinguish the minor: if this connection is considered alone, and apart from a definition of the Church, which may have intervened, I grant it; once a definition of the Church intervenes, I deny it"⁶⁰.

Here are some interesting paragraphs from Wilmers:

"Whatever has been revealed by God can be believed with divine faith. But it has been revealed by God that each individual act of the supreme magisterium is infallible in deciding and determining those things that pertain to religion, whether it infallibly declares that some doctrine is revealed, that another is opposed to revealed doctrine either immediately or mediately, that the doctrine of this or that book agrees with revealed truth or is opposed to it. Therefore, because of divine revelation and hence by divine faith it can be believed that each individual defining act of the supreme magisterium is infallible, or that the Church infallibly declares that some doctrine is revealed, that another is opposed to the revealed one either immediately or mediately. Furthermore, by believing that the Church infallibly declares that some doctrine is revealed, that another is opposed to the revealed one either immediately or mediately, we at the same time implicitly believe that the doctrine is in reality such as the Church declares it to be; for the act cannot be thought without its object.

Second, it is proven from the simultaneous concurrence of two motives. When two motives concur in affirming the same thing, or present themselves equally, it is left to our choice to assent to the thing on account of either the one or the other. But whenever the Church defines by supreme judgment that something is so, two motives present themselves to us equally for affirming the truth of the definition: one is the created authority of the Church, the other is the authority of God revealing the infallibility of the Church in all her supreme judgments, and therefore also in this or that particular one. Therefore, we can believe that what the Church defines is infallibly defined either on account of the authority of the Church or on account of the authority of God revealing. If we believe it to be infallibly defined on account of the latter, we perform an act of divine faith.

First Corollary: Assuming the infallibility of the Church in the solemn canonization of the Saints, it can be believed with divine faith by all that the canonized deceased is blessed...

Second Corollary: After the condemnation of the five propositions extracted from the book of Jansenius, anyone can believe with divine faith that those five propositions, as they are contained in Jansenius’s book, are foreign to the faith" ⁶¹

442. PARTHENIO MINGUES, O.F.M.—As a representative of the Franciscan school in this century, let us cite the learned professor of Theology in Munich, the Very Reverend Father Parthenio Mingues, whose Compendium of Dogmatic Theology is so highly esteemed by all for understanding the mind of Saint Bonaventure and Scotus. He says the following:

“In all these cases (that is, what is contained as particular in the universal or as part in the whole), the conclusion can be said to be formally revealed, because it shines forth immediately from the mere explanation of the terms, so that only an explanatory syllogism is needed.

But it is not a dogma if a theological conclusion is contained only virtually, mediately, and more or less obscurely in another truth, so that proper reasoning is needed to know that truth which is contained in the other. For example, the proposition has been revealed: the soul is spiritual; from the spirituality of the soul it can be deduced that it is incorruptible and immediately produced by God Himself. Yet this conclusion requires true reasoning; it does not follow of itself from the consideration of the term “spirit.” Therefore this truth is not a dogma.

Verumtamen eiusmodi conclusio per propositionem eccle-

siasticam potest fieri dogma fidei, or at least a Catholic truth. Thus it became a dogma that Mary was conceived immaculate, even though it was only revealed virtually. Regarding conclusions of this kind, Scotus says (4 Sent., d. 5, q. 1, n. 7): “There are other things which need not be explicitly believed either by these (the learned) or by those (simple Christians), because their truth has not yet been declared and determined by the Church: such are many conclusions necessarily included in the articles of faith: but before they are declared and explained by the Church, no one is bound to believe them: nevertheless one ought to think soberly about them, so that a person is ready to hold them at the time when the truth has been declared” ⁶²

Fr. Mingues expresses well in those paragraphs the traditional doctrine with which we are already familiar. The virtually revealed is not of divine faith by itself or without definition; but it can become so by definition. In parentheses, let the reader note that text of Scotus which Fr. Mingues cites there, and which we had already cited (372). Although Scotus, as everyone recognizes, speaks of theological conclusions properly so called, he calls declaration, determination, or explanation the definition of such conclusions by the Church, exactly as St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure call it. Let certain modern theologians take note of this, who seem to have lost the key to the nomenclature of the great masters of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries on this question (506).

443. HONORATUS DEL VAL and AURELIUS PALMIERI, O.S.A.— Let us move on to another theologian no less illustrious than those before him and one who knew how to continue in the nineteenth century the glorious theological traditions of the Augustinian school. His beautiful text of dogmatic theology is comparable to the best works written in the last century. He says the following:

“If something entirely distinct from it is virtually contained in something explicitly revealed and is inseparable from it (for the Thomists this is the only rigorous theological conclusion), it is more probably said that this other thing is in itself an object of divine faith (definable as of divine faith, a Thomist would say); although for us, due to a lack of knowledge, it is not always an object that must necessarily be believed.

Regarding those things especially virtually revealed, theologians debate whether they are in themselves the object of divine faith. In this inquiry, nothing new remains for us to add beyond what we said in the preliminary treatise on dogmatic Sacred Theology. Namely:

Affirmativam sentence is defended by Melchior Cano, Bellarmine, and other theologians of great name... Negativam opinion, however, is championed by several theologians along with Veronius and the Salmanticenses... For my part, the affirmative response pleases me, where it concerns conclusions logically necessary (the metaphysical connection), such that the negation of the consequent proposition cannot but imply the negation of the divinely revealed premise⁶³.

Let us add another celebrated Augustinian theologian, Fr. PALMIERI, whose works on "orthodox theology" are so universally appreciated. Here is an extract:

Augmentum declarativum fidei, that is, dogmatic progress in a certain sense, or, as St. Anselm says, "the progress of the faithful in faith, rather than of faith in the faithful," is taught by Catholic theology as possible, necessary, and real, through the Church endowed with the divine prerogative of infallible teaching authority.

Before the thesis is proven, a distinction must be made between those things that are held explicitly or implicitly by divine faith... If someone, for example, explicitly believes that the soul is a spiritual nature, by that very fact he implicitly believes that the soul is simple, incorruptible, rational, etc., all of which are requisites of any spiritual nature... If these are denied, God would be said to have commanded men to dig up treasures from the earth, which He Himself gave them: to have revealed the principles of a higher science, from which man would have no right to draw conclusions"⁶⁴.

444. JOAQUÍN BERTHIER, Ord. Praed.—Let us add the name of a distinguished Dominican, no less a theologian than a historian and artist, whose work on Loci Theologici is, in our judgment, one of the best modern supplements to the now three-centuries-old, though ever perennial, work of Melchior Cano. Let us hear Fr. Berthier:

"Among men there is no truth that can be comprehended and expressed whole at once in itself and in its consequences, because man, being composed of body and soul through a substantial unity, has nothing in his intellect that he did not first have in his senses, and therefore he must reason, and investigate truths with a slow and halting step: hence it is that he attains truth as it were scattered in parts, nor, like the Angel, does he see at the first glance all the consequences and connections. Moreover, with all and each of the truths, especially the higher ones, that is, those of the supernatural order, countless other truths are connected, which it was neither easy nor useful to express all at once. These are called implicitly expressed, because they are asserted not in themselves, but in others. Therefore, when the Holy Spirit revealed the principles, He likewise revealed the consequences... For if the one cannot be denied without the ruin of the other, it is a sign that between the two there exists a very great connection, and that in the revelation of the former the revelation of the latter is contained... Since, however, the Holy Spirit, as the author of divine traditions, sees all connected truths in all truths, hence He willed to hand them down together... Hence it is easy to discern concerning which truths the Church exercises her magisterium. First... second... third, all truths that are drawn from some revealed truth by force of necessary conclusion. For all know that both what is said explicitly and what is said implicitly belong to the same author... The same is evident from countless examples of the Fathers and doctors, who always and everywhere defended the truth and rejected falsehood from the Scriptures through drawn-out conclusions, even dogmatically." ⁶⁵

445. ALEXIS LEPICIER, O.S.M.—This renowned theologian, professor at the Urban College of the Propaganda and General of the Servites, is well known to all; his clarity, his conciseness, his faithful adherence to Saint Thomas, and his profoundly conservative judgment in all questions are recognized by everyone. Let us hear his opinion on the question under discussion: “Therefore, all those things which the Church, by her infallible magisterium, proposes for our belief as formally or virtually contained in written or transmitted revelation pertain to the divine-Catholic faith. Formally indeed, inasmuch as that truth is found expressed and signified in the written or transmitted word of God, whether in so many words or in equivalent words; but virtually, inasmuch as it is deduced by a logical process from a formally revealed truth… And if the authority of the Church should intervene, such a conclusion (virtually revealed) will itself also be held by divine Catholic faith; otherwise it will remain a merely theological conclusion” ⁶⁶

The author could not have expressed with greater clarity in so few lines how dogmatic evolution is possible by way of true virtuality or conclusion, how that evolution is merely theological before the definition and how it becomes dogmatic after the definition of the Church. That is the true Thomist position, midway between that of Molina and that of Vázquez.

446. M. M. TUYAERTS, Ord. Praed.—Let us now hear an illustrious Belgian Dominican, Father Tuyaerts, who expresses himself thus: “It suffices to survey the definitions issued by the Church to find there, from the earliest centuries down to the present times, theological conclusions, in a surprisingly large number, defined as revealed by God, as to be believed with divine faith. To cite but a few examples: The Church has defined that the intellective soul is, per se et essentialiter, the substantial form of the human body; that the minister must, in administering the sacraments, have the intention of doing what the Church does; that baptism conferred by heretics is valid; that this sacrament must not be repeated for those who fall into apostasy; that the holy Virgin Mary was conceived without original sin; that the pope, teaching ex cathedra doctrines revealed concerning faith or morals, is infallible, etc. It is certain, on the one hand, that the points of doctrine just mentioned, taken at random from among hundreds of others, are not immediately revealed truths; one would seek them in vain, expressed according to the given wording or in an equivalent form, in the deposit of faith. On the other hand, it is no less certain that the Church proposes these doctrines as divine and catholic dogmas, to be believed with divine and catholic faith... We may boldly conclude that the Church, by the constant practice of her infallible magisterium, teaches that theological conclusions can become dogmas of faith⁶⁷

447. OTHER AUTHORS.—The list of authors we have just cited could be enlarged with many more names of renowned theologians, especially from the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, some of whom we will still have occasion to cite (477-478).

Even limiting ourselves to contemporary theologians, we could have cited the names of several very renowned ones, who, if they deny dogmatic evolution, do so only to then affirm it again, without realizing the contradiction into which they fall.

Thus, for example, we could have cited the Jesuit Christiano Pesch, who says: "But here a question arises: Is this consequent sense the true sense of Scripture? I reply that a distinction must be made between those things which follow logically, and those things which are connected by human consideration because of some similarity with the literal sense. If there is a necessary logical connection, the consequent sense is not without reason called the sense of Scripture; for although not every man is deemed to wish to express in his words all those things which can be duly gathered from them down to the ultimate conclusions, since perhaps he may not even suspect these conclusions, nevertheless the Holy Spirit, who knows perfectly well what is contained in His words, and what men will legitimately deduce from them, is rightly said to [will] all these things."

nia exprimere voluisse⁶⁸ And what is all that but the evolution of dogma by way of theological conclusion properly so called?

We could also have cited Vacant, the classic commentator on the Vatican Council, who says: “But this controversy (whether the virtually revealed is or is not truly revealed and definable as of divine faith) is of little importance from the point of view that concerns us, if one notes with Cardinal Mazzella ⁶⁹ that every truth must certainly be regarded as revealed which, without being expressed in any of the formulas of Scripture or tradition, is nevertheless connected with those formulas, in such a way that one may think that in revealing the dogmas affirmed in those formulas, God intended also to manifest those truths. In communicating His revelations to us, God has indeed conformed Himself to our human manner of manifesting our thoughts. Now when a man speaks, he intends to make known, not only what he affirms, but also everything he implies, and in particular all the thoughts that must be attributed to him in order to reconcile his affirmations... Since God possesses infinite knowledge and perfectly knows all the dogmas without which men could not reconcile the truths formulated in His revelation in express terms, there is all the more reason to think that He willed to manifest these dogmas, in revealing these truths. Consequently, one may consider as revealed and as contained in the deposit of Catholic tradition, all the points of doctrine, not yet defined by the Church, but which one will need to admit in order to reconcile among themselves the truths of the Catholic faith... The Church can therefore define as belonging to the faith all the truths without which one could not bring into harmony the dogmas previously believed. It is possible that these truths may have remained completely unknown in themselves. It is also possible that some authors may have opposed them before their definition: for these authors may have failed to see that these truths which they rejected were in necessary connection with the dogmas they admitted” ⁷⁰ And what is all this but admitting the evolution of dogma by way of theological conclusion properly so called?

We could have cited many other modern theologians in that same vein, but we did not wish to do so in order to adduce only those who defend it clearly, and consistently, without denying in one part what they affirm in another.

Among all those we have cited, the reader will have noticed that there is variety in the manner of admitting dogmatic evolution by way of theological conclusion properly so called, but that all admit it. Some admit it more extensively than others. Some regard it as dogmatic or as of divine faith, in the style of Vázquez and Vega, even before the definition of the Church. Others, in a truly Thomistic style, do not regard it as formally of divine faith, but only after the definition of the Church. But all of them agree in admitting true evolution of dogma by way of theological conclusion properly so called.

448. COROLLARY.—The minimum conclusion, then, that every reader free from preconceived opinions will necessarily have to draw from this brief historical study we have just undertaken is the following: whoever affirms that the doctrine of the development of dogma by way of theological conclusion, properly so called, is a recently born doctrine, or one held by few theologians, or contrary to the common opinion of the Thomist school, or dangerous, simply ignores the history of this question.