La evolución homogénea del dogma católico

THE DOCTRINE OF THE THEOLOGIANS, FROM SAINT THOMAS TO MOLINA, ON THE EVOLUTION OF DOGMA.

366. IN THE THREE LONG CENTURIES from St. Thomas to the end of the sixteenth century, there is not a single theologian who denied the evolution of Catholic dogma by way of a rigorous and proper theological conclusion. At least we have not found one, despite having leafed through with interest all the theologians of that period who have fallen into our hands during these last twelve years.

We would, therefore, become endless if we were to cite the texts of all the theologians who defend this doctrine. To avoid prolonging ourselves too much, we will choose those theologians from whom we can cite a short text, but one that expresses quite clearly the mind of its author. To proceed in an orderly manner, we will divide them by centuries.

A) 13th Century

367. ST. BONAVENTURE.—“Is it lawful to hold a contrary opinion about the notions? I reply that it must be said that to hold a contrary opinion can be either about those things which pertain to the doctrine of the Christian religion, or about those things which pertain to the doctrine of human inquiry.

Regarding those matters that pertain to the doctrine of human inquiry, it is permissible to hold and assert the contrary opinion, because such matters do not pertain to salvation.

To assert the contrary, however, in those things that pertain to the doctrine of religion, a distinction must be made. For some things are of the necessity of faith, some of the necessity of Scripture, and some are annexed to these, such as those that pertain to the explanation of faith and the exposition of Scripture.

Regarding those things that are of the necessity of faith, to hold a contrary opinion is simply a sin in the one who so errs, namely, in him who holds a false opinion. And if it is a mere opinion, it is the sin of error; but if it is an assertion and defense, it is to be called not only error but heresy.

In those things which pertain to the certainty of Scripture, those who are ignorant of the Scriptures may hold contrary opinions without guilt: as if a simple man believes that Jacob was the father of Isaac, and another does not, but the reverse. And the first, although he suspects or opines what is false, nevertheless does not sin, because he is ignorant of Scripture. But for one who knows Scripture, it is not lawful—indeed, he sins—if he simply holds such an opinion. If, however, he defends it, he is to be judged a heretic, since he contradicts Holy Scripture.

Now comes the important part, namely that which pertains to the theological conclusions. The Saint continues thus: "In those things, however, which are annexed to faith or Scripture, either one opinion follows from faith or Scripture and the opposite follows from the other, and then it must be said that before the examination, although it is lawful to hold contrary opinions: but after the examination it is not lawful, rather it is a sin (that is, the sin of heresy) just as in those things which have been determined by faith and Scripture. As was the case with the opinion of Porretanus concerning the properties... Hence after the inconvenience was shown to him, unless he had retracted the error, he would have been judged a heretic by the Church. But he retracted this in the Council of Reims, as Bernard says" ¹

368. Although we said that we would cite from each theologian only some short text, and so we will do in almost all that follow, we have not been able to resist citing almost in full this article of Saint Bonaventure, so that through it one may see how by indirect or consequential revelation he understood not only what is secondary in Sacred Scripture, as some believe, but also everything truly consequential; and how that consequential matter was of divine faith and its denial heresy once defined by the Church: after the treatment in the council. This will appear even clearer in the following texts of the same Holy Doctor:

"For the understanding of the aforementioned things, it must be noted that the doctrine of faith has certain antecedents, certain consequences, and certain principles or objects. Just as in the other sciences we see that there are certain common principles, which are presupposed, such as axioms. And there are certain intrinsic principles of demonstrations. And there are certain things which are like consequences, such as corollary conclusions. In this same way, in the doctrine of faith the antecedents are those things which pertain to the dictate of natural law. The principles, moreover, are those things toward which the illumination of faith directly directs, and these are called articles. The consequences, moreover, are those things which can be elicited from those articles and which follow from those articles" ²

No less clearly is this expressed in the same place when answering an objection. It says thus:

"To the objection that many things are to be believed which are not contained in the articles, it must be said that this is true of antecedent truths, such as that God exists. And of consequent truths, such as many other things which Sacred Scripture and theological doctrine elicit from the articles themselves, as that Christ from his conception had the fullness of grace, and similar things" ³

We believe that it cannot be clearer for anyone who understands the language of the ancient theologians.

369. LUMINOUS COMMENTARY.—Finally, it will not be superfluous to confirm it with the commentary set forth by the learned editors of the great modern edition of the works of Saint Bonaventure. Commenting on the article in which Saint Bonaventure treats the question of "Whether faith has grown with regard to the number of things to be believed," they say the following: "Saint Bonaventure here and in the following questions suggests a twofold manner in which something is contained in an article, namely, either so that other articles are contained virtually in one article, to be believed determinately later, as the Passion and death of Christ are contained in the mystery of redemption; or so that in the article there is contained not indeed another article, but something that is contained in it as a conclusion. Consult St. Thomas, here, q. 2, a. 2, quaestiuncula 1, ad 5. Therefore, while the substance of faith remains the same, the number of articles to be believed also grew through explicitation: but this explicitation, taken in the first manner, was completed in the Gospel. However, in the other sense (that is, what is contained in the article as a conclusion) taken, the explicitation of faith can progress both in individual men and in the whole Church. This the Vatican Council teaches ⁴: Let it therefore grow, etc. Consult also here q. 2, 3, and the first doubt" ⁵.

**370. CONSEQUENCE.—**Those who say, then, that the doctrine of the evolution of dogma by way of theological conclusion was born with Scotus have not read Saint Thomas and Saint Bonaventure, or they have read them hastily. The most likely thing, it seems to us, is that they have read them with the idea in mind that by conclusion is meant the non-implicit conclusion (the virtual of the fourth type, or virtuale tantum of Suárez); and since Saint Thomas and Saint Bonaventure, when speaking of conclusions, clearly understand implicit conclusions, and therefore call it growth by explanation, certain modern theologians have believed that it was not a matter of proper conclusions, but of improper ones, when implicit conclusions are the only ones properly theological.

**371. EGIDIO ROMANO.—**Exactly like Saint Thomas and Saint Bonaventure, the great Augustinian theologian and disciple of the Angelic Doctor, Giles of Rome, expresses himself. He says the following: "Whether it is lawful to hold contrary opinions about the notions?... 2nd objection: Furthermore, from error concerning the notions there follows error concerning the divine persons: but to err against the divine persons is not without sin: since therefore one of the two contrary positions must necessarily be false, to hold contrary opinions about the notions cannot be done without sin. To the second it is said that someone can err concerning divine things, provided that he does not contradict the articles of faith or those things that have been determined by the Church, even granting that from his words some conclusion could be drawn which would be against the articles of faith or against those things that the Church holds, yet in such a way that he himself would be ignorant of such a deduction. But if such a deduction were made known to him, and it were shown to him that his words contradict those things that the Church holds, if from then on he did not abandon his position, in thus erring he would sin, and if he were to assert his error with obstinacy, he would be a heretic^27.

372. Duns Scotus.—Let us move on to the great theologian, worthy rival of Saint Thomas, who with Saint Bonaventure shares the leadership of the illustrious Franciscan school. In him we shall find on this matter exactly the same doctrine that we have just seen in Saint Thomas, Saint Bonaventure, and Giles of Rome. Let us begin the citations: "Whether it is lawful to hold contrary opinions about the notions? I reply that it must be said that it is lawful to hold one opinion or another about the notions, provided it is done soberly, so that the one holding the opinion is ready to set it aside if the Church declares otherwise. For the clarity of this, it must be known that some things pertain so simply to the substance of faith that all, even the simple, provided they have the use of reason, are bound to believe them explicitly... Other things likewise pertain to the substance of faith, but are to be believed explicitly only by the more learned in the Church... Still other things pertain to the faith in such a way that neither the simple nor the more learned in the Church are compelled to believe them explicitly: and such are many conclusions necessarily included in the articles of faith: for no one is bound to believe these explicitly before they are proposed by the Church as an object of faith after being declared... That the question of the number of the notions, however, belongs to and regards the order of conclusions virtually included in the articles of faith, and that consequently anyone may lawfully hold a contrary opinion about them, is evident from this: that without any mark or suspicion of error, various opinions about the notions have existed, even among the principal Doctors of the Church"^28. "Nothing is to be asserted as being of the truth of faith except what is handed down in Scripture, or is declared by the universal Church, or follows necessarily and evidently from one of these two, as handed down or declared"^29. "Regarding the other point about Cyprian, I say that some things are of the substance of faith, which all, even the simple, are bound to believe explicitly... Other things are explicitly required of the substance of faith,

^{6 7 8} are to be observed by the greater ones of the Church... Others are those which need not be explicitly believed either by these (the greater ones) or by those (the simple ones), because their truth has not yet been declared and determined by the Church, of which sort are many conclusions necessarily included in the articles of faith: but before they have been declared and explained by the Church, it is not necessary for anyone to believe them; yet it is necessary to hold sober opinions about them, so that a person is ready to hold them at the time when their truth has been declared ⁹

“Nothing is to be held as pertaining to the substance of the faith, except what can be expressly had from Scripture, or has been expressly declared by the Church, or evidently follows from something plainly contained in Scripture or plainly determined by the Church.”

We could cite several other theologians of the 13th century, but we believe that the four cited, who are the founders of the three great schools, the Dominican, the Franciscan, and the Augustinian, suffice to show that the doctrine of dogmatic evolution by way of theological conclusion was already a current and common doctrine among the princes of Scholastic theology of the 13th century.

B) 14th and 15th centuries

**373. TWO CENTURIES TOGETHER.—**We group these two centuries under a single heading because in them, and especially in the first, theologians of true merit are scarce. The nominalism of Ockham on the one hand, and on the other the disastrous and very lengthy Western Schism, caused theological studies to languish or plunged them into useless dialectical subtleties. We shall cite the texts of eight theologians, among whom are some of great renown and unquestionable merit, such as Gerson, Denis the Carthusian, Cardinal Torquemada, and above all Capreolus. Of all the theologians of these two centuries whom we have been able to consult, all, without a single exception, continue to defend, like those of the thirteenth century, the development of dogma by way of theological conclusion, properly so called; although some of them, more or less touched by nominalism, do not sufficiently distinguish between the habits of theology and of faith, nor, therefore, between the theological conclusion before and after its definition by the Church. Although Ockham is a few years earlier than Aureolus, we shall begin with the latter, who treats the question ex professo and more extensively.

374. PETER AUREOL.—“When one proceeds from one believed proposition and another necessary one, or from two believed ones, to inquire what must be held regarding something that is doubtful in the faith, no other habit is acquired except faith. Indeed, that habit is faith whose opposite is heresy. But the opposite of a conclusion deduced from one article and one necessary proposition is heretical, as for instance to say that in Christ there are not two wills, which indeed follows from the article saying that ‘in Christ there are two wills,’ namely the divine and the human, and from this necessary proposition ‘Every intellectual nature has its own will’: therefore such a conclusion is held by faith, and such a deduction does not generate another habit distinct from faith.”

“Furthermore, the implicit and the explicit do not differentiate the habit of faith, otherwise the faith of the Fathers of the Old Testament and of the New would not be the same. Again, believing more or fewer things does not differentiate faith, otherwise a priest, who is bound to believe more things explicitly, would not have the same faith as an old woman, who is bound to fewer. But a conclusion deduced in this way is nothing other than something explicit from a prior article in which it was implicit; likewise, one who has the deduction of this conclusion does not therefore believe more things than another: Therefore, from this it is not ruled out that that conclusion is known through faith” ¹⁰.

375. WILLIAM OF OCKHAM.—"Only those truths are to be regarded as Catholic and to be believed as necessary for salvation which are asserted explicitly or implicitly in the canon of the Bible, so that if any truths are not contained in the Bible under their own form of words, they can be inferred from its contents alone by necessary and formal consequence" ¹¹.

376. COMMENTARY ON THESE TWO TEXTS.—As can be seen, these two theologians of the fourteenth century, both nominalists, like several whom we will see in the fifteenth century, far from denying dogmatic evolution by way of conclusion, defend it excessively. Because they see that the theological conclusion is truly implicit in the revealed deposit, which suffices for there to be definability of faith or capacity for dogmatic evolution, they believe that merely by the fact that this implicitness is explained by human reasoning, it is already dogmatic or faith truth, without noticing that the explanation of reason is a human explanation, and therefore belongs to a human or theological habit, as long as the divine explanation of the definition of the Church does not intervene.

377. JOHN GERSON.—"The first degree of truths to be believed is the canon of all Sacred Scripture, and of each of the things that are literally asserted in it. The second degree is of truths determined by the Church... The third degree is of truths specially revealed to some, which are to be believed without any doubt by those to whom the revelation was made... The fourth degree contains all and each of the truths that are concluded from the aforementioned truths in certain consequence in the light of faith (from two revealed premises), or in the evident natural light (one revealed and the other of reason); although they are not found there in their own form of words. Just as this truth is to be held as necessary for salvation: that Christ had nerves and veins, although it is not found in Sacred Scripture in its own form of words. And so of similar cases without number; since this is an evident consequence, not only in the light of faith, but in the light of reason among the philosophers: "Christ is true man; therefore Christ had nerves and veins" ¹².

378. JOHN CAPREOLUS.—The so-called "princeps thomistarum," for having been the first, chronologically speaking, among the great printed commentators on St. Thomas, could not fail to defend the implicit character of every true theological conclusion in the revealed deposit, which is the basis of dogmatic development; while at the same time defending the specific distinction between the habits of faith and theology, without which one ends up in confusion between reason and faith, and between the human value of reasoning and the divine value of the Church's dogmatic definitions.

Responding to Scotus, who, precisely on the basis of that implicitness of the conclusions, had denied or not sufficiently distinguished between the habit of theology and that of faith, he expresses himself thus:

"To the fourth [objection] it is said that although the Bible does not proceed in the manner of demonstrative science, nevertheless, from the contents of the Bible, which stand as principles of science, the Saints have demonstratively drawn conclusions about which theology is concerned, arguing against heretics from the principles of theology. And therefore, although theology is not handed down in the sacred canon in a syllogistic style explicitly, nevertheless, in the books of the subsequent theologians it is handed down in a scientific manner and in the manner of an art explicitly. All things, however, are contained IMPLICITLY in the Bible" ¹³.

As we said elsewhere (351), every theologian ought to engrave on his mind that truly golden final phrase of the prince of Thomists: "All things, however (that is, all true theological conclusions) are implicitly contained in the Bible." Therefore, because every true theological conclusion is truly implicit in the revealed deposit or premise of faith, its definition by the Church is nothing other than an explanation of the faith, as St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and Scotus so often repeat.

379. CARDINAL TORQUEMADA.—After the prince of the Thomists comes the distinguished Cardinal Torquemada, the founder or first organizer of the modern treatise On the Church. Let us cite from him at least a couple of texts:

“Catholic truth is that which is obtained from the supernatural light of divine revelation immediately or mediately, explicitly in its own form of words, or implicitly by sound and necessary consequence... For in these two ways something is said to be contained in Sacred Scripture, either in its own form of words, as in this: “Christ was a man”; and something implicitly, which is to say, by sound and necessary consequence it follows from what is formally set down in Sacred Scripture. As from that statement “Christ was a man” (a perfect man), it follows that He had a rational soul, an agent and possible intellect, and all the powers of the soul. Likewise that in His body there were nerves and veins and the like; yet none of these is found in its own form of words in the letter of Sacred Scripture”¹⁴.

Let every reader note how Torquemada, like Capreolus, not only uses the word implicit, but also categorically explains what is meant by implicit when speaking of containment in the revealed deposit. "Implicitly, that is, what follows from what is formally set down in Sacred Scripture by a good and necessary consequence." It is exactly the same formula later employed by Cardinal Cajetan and by Báñez (383, 396).

380. DIONYSIUS THE CARTHUSIAN.—Alongside Cardinal Torquemada, the celebrated Ecstatic Doctor, Dionysius the Carthusian, well deserves to be cited. Although very well known for his scriptural and ascetical works, he is not as well known, or at least not as often cited today as he deserves, for his works of dogmatic theology. His commentaries on the four books of the Sentences, as well as his Summa Fidei Orthodoxae, to which he gave the subtitle “The marrow of the works of St. Thomas,” are most remarkable for the clarity and fidelity with which they express the pure doctrine of St. Thomas. Let us cite some texts on the question that concerns us.

“Is it lawful to hold diverse opinions regarding the notions in the Godhead? Something pertains to faith in two ways, namely, directly, like the articles of faith... Secondly, something pertains to faith indirectly, that is, from which something contrary to faith follows... Regarding such matters (the indirect ones), however, it is lawful to hold diverse opinions without danger of heresy, before it has been determined that something against the faith follows from them: for if after this determination, especially one made by the Church, anyone opines otherwise, heresy is incurred. Hence many things are now reputed heretical which were not heretical of old, either because of a new determination by the Church, or because it is now more manifest what follows from them ¹⁵.

In the third book, fourth article, of the same work, he treats of "how faith is said to have grown through the succession of times", and he resolves it by extracting from Saint Thomas almost in his very words. But the use of the word virtualiter as synonymous with implicitae deserves note, so that one may see how the ancients, when they spoke of virtuality, always understood implicit virtuality. Here is a text for example: "Thus, therefore, some articles of faith are contained virtualiter in others: since in the faith of human Redemption are included implicitae the Incarnation, Passion, Resurrection, and other such things" ¹⁶.

Let us conclude with another similar text: "Objection: it seems illicit to add anything to the Scriptures of both testaments... To this St. Thomas responds: one can add to Scripture in two ways: first, by adding something contrary or diverse, which is erroneous or presumptuous: second, by explaining more clearly what is contained implicitly in the Scriptures, and this is praiseworthy. Hence Richard: One ought not to add what is dissimilar or repugnant, but what is true may be added for its explanation. And this perhaps is not properly adding, but explaining and manifesting what is implicit: since the truth that serves for the exposition of Scripture is contained in it implicitly and virtually" ¹⁷

**381. GABRIEL BIEL.—**Let us close the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, so poor in great theologians, with the nominalist Gabriel Biel, who died in 1495. He speaks thus: "Faith implicit is habitual faith or the actual assent to some general proposition, containing in itself many particular ones. The universal or general proposition is said to contain all those particular ones which can be inferred from it, immediately or mediately, with the assumption indeed made" ¹⁸.

We have, then, that all the theologians of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries continue, like Saint Thomas, Saint Bonaventure, and Scotus, to regard as definable by divine faith, and therefore as capable of dogmatic evolution, all conclusions properly so called. There is no other difference except that the theologians of Scotist or Nominalist allegiance confuse or do not sufficiently distinguish between the habit of theology and that of faith, or between conclusions before and after the Church's definition, making them matters of faith by themselves (per se) or without definition.

C) 16th Century

382. LET US NOW ENTER THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY, the golden age of the restoration of Catholic theology, in which the great geniuses of the thirteenth century at last find worthy commentators and continuators of their glories. Thirteen are the theologians of this century, among those whom we have been able to consult, who treat the question of the evolution of dogma or the definability of the revealed virtuality. Among them figure names as illustrious as Cardinal Cajetan, Melchor Cano, Domingo Soto, Ambrosio Catarino, Bartolomé de Medina, Domingo Báñez, and Pablo Grisaldi, of the Dominican school; Alfonso de Castro, Andrés de Vega, and Antonio de Córdoba, of the Franciscan; Fray Luis de León, of the Augustinian; Cardinal Toledo, of the nascent Society of Jesus, and the bishops Santiago Simancas and Bartolomé de Torres, of the secular clergy. All the schools or tendencies of Catholic theology in the sixteenth century are, therefore, quite well represented in them. Let us begin with the prince of the commentators on St. Thomas Aquinas ¹⁹.

383. CARDINAL CAJETAN.—Every theologian knows that Cardinal Cajetan has a short treatise on the Immaculate Conception, addressed to Pope Leo X when that Supreme Pontiff was endeavoring to examine in the ecumenical Council of Lateran the definability as a matter of faith of the Immaculate Conception. In that treatise Cajetan had occasion to treat ex professo on what things are or are not definable as divine faith. To this he devotes the first chapter, whose title is: "De duplici via discernendi ea quae fidei sunt, vel ei adversantur". Here is how he expresses himself: "There are two ways by which it can be decided what is to be believed for the Christian religion, one ordinary, the other extraordinary. The ordinary way is the divine revelation made to the first Authors of Sacred Scripture, contained in the Canonical books of the Bible, and in the traditions of the Apostles, in the Creed and other things which it is certain the Church received through the Apostles, such as the sacraments... (now comes the important part). Nor does it matter, in Sacred Scripture and the others, whether something is revealed explicitly (such as the creation of the world, the Incarnation of the Word of God, and other things of this kind) or implicitly, as are all those things whose opposites cannot be maintained along with the truth of Sacred Scripture and of the other things which we hold by certain faith, except that ingenuity, labor, reason, and intellect are needed, so that these things may be made manifest, which are said to be contained IMPLICITLY, being NECESSARILY CONNECTED to those things in which they are said to be contained."²⁰

We ask every reader, especially every Thomist reader, to read and reread dispassionately this text of Cardinal Cajetan. In it he will clearly see taught what forms the basis and the nerve of dogmatic evolution, namely, that everything truly implicit in the revealed deposit can be defined as a dogma of faith, and that everything necessarily connected is truly implicit. Implicitly, as are all things whose opposites cannot be maintained with the truth of Sacred Scripture and of the other things which we know by faith...; those things are said to be contained implicitly which are necessarily connected with the things in which they are said to be contained. A clearer definition of implicit containment could not be given.

384. THE CHURCH'S HUMAN LABOR.—Here too the reader has very clearly set forth what the Church's human labor prior to definition consists of. Intellectual work is required, and very laborious work, which sometimes takes entire centuries. Ingenuity, labor, reason, and intellect are needed. For what purpose? Many are content to answer: to ascertain whether the truth that is to be defined is or is not implicit in the deposit of revelation. That is true, and Cardinal Cajetan also acknowledges it. But those theologians forget that the means the Church uses to know whether a truth is implicit in the deposit is to see whether it is necessarily connected with it. "Ingenuity, labor, reason, and intellect are needed to make manifest that these things, which are said to be contained implicitly, are necessarily connected with those things in which they are said to be contained." That is the goal of the Church's labor (labor done in the council or done previously by the holy Fathers, whose texts the council cites), and that suffices for a definition of faith to be possible. The instrument employed has been the connection, but the thing found and defined is the implicit containment or inclusion. Therefore, absolutely necessary connection with what is revealed, implicitness in what is revealed, and definability by divine faith all come to the same thing. That is the Thomistic doctrine that Cajetan inherited from all his predecessors, and that is found in almost all his Thomistic successors, until the Salmanticenses, entangled in the confusion of Suárez and Lugo, in turn confused some later Thomists.

385. ALFONSO DE CASTRO.—After having heard the Dominican Cajetan, let us hear the Franciscan Castro in his celebrated work Against Heresies:

"That proposition, therefore, which contradicts Sacred Scripture, according to the sense received by the Catholic Church, is beyond all controversy to be judged heretical. Nor is it to be considered whether it openly contradicts or latently: since in whatever way it is established to be opposed, it will rightly be marked as heresy. For there are some heresies whose opposites or contradictories are expressly contained in Sacred Scripture... There are also other heresies whose opposites or contradictories, although they are not so expressed in the Sacred Letters that they are held under that exact wording, are nevertheless inferred from them by the most evident consequence, and such assertions latently fight against Sacred Scripture: because Scripture is opposed to those things which necessarily derive from them. And such propositions are also to be regarded as heretical, just like the former ones: since those things which are inferred by necessary consequence from the contents of Sacred Scripture have as much firmness of truth and necessity of faith as those from which they are gathered... This opinion is taught by Gregory Nazianzen, book 5 on theology, saying thus: What is gathered from the Sacred Scriptures is to be regarded just as if it were written in them. Thus Gregory. According to this rule, many Sacred Doctors assert and most constantly proclaim as necessarily to be believed those things which are gathered from the sayings of Sacred Scripture, although they are not found in it." ²¹

Here we have not only the evolution of dogma clearly defended as proceeding by way of true theological conclusion, but also the text of Saint Gregory Nazianzen, which we cited elsewhere (357), interpreted in that sense.

386. DOMINGO SOTO.—Leaving aside for now Melchor Cano, whose thought we will treat in a separate section (449), there follows his fellow friar and colleague in teaching at Salamanca, the celebrated Domingo Soto.

It is well known that Domingo de Soto not only defended the definability of faith of the properly so-called theological conclusion, but went so far as to make it an article of faith by itself (per se) or without a definition of the Church, with the result that only probable or doubtful conclusions would belong to theology if the evident ones belonged per se to faith. In this, Domingo de Soto was opposed by Melchor Cano, by Báñez, and by all the Thomists ²².

Nevertheless, Soto corrected or explained himself in his classic work De natura et gratia,²³ where, in admitting the definability of faith of theological conclusions or deductions, he warns that they are only matters of faith when those deductions are defined by the authority of the Church. Here are his words: “The third point is that which we have already set forth above, not in one place only. For a habit does not produce assent except regarding its proper object (which is an axiom most celebrated among all philosophers, as well as among theologians): but the object or proposal of faith is nothing other than God, and those things which pertain to our hope, revealed in Sacred Scripture, or from it deduced and expressed by the authority of the Church: therefore assent of faith belongs only to those things”^46. If, then, Domingo Soto exceeded himself in any way on this question, it was certainly not in restricting dogmatic development, but in admitting it excessively—an excess which he himself later corrected, explaining himself as all Thomists explain themselves.

387. AMBROSE CATHARINUS.—Alongside Dominic Soto, let us cite his, on several questions, irreconcilable and bilious opponent, the famous Ambrose Catharinus. Famous, we say, not only for his originality and singularity on many questions, but also because, being a Dominican, he seems to have delighted in attacking with preference the opinions of his brothers in the habit. Nevertheless, in this question of the definability by divine faith of conclusions, he follows the traditional doctrine. Let us hear his words: “I conclude, therefore, that just as he is a heretic who not only denies what is expressed in the Scriptures, but also what is contained among those things which are expressed, and what is deduced from them by a necessary and evident consequence, so too is he a transgressor of divine law, not only who violates what is expressly commanded there, but also who neglects what is evidently deduced from it” ²⁴. And shortly before he had said: “This is not opposed to that common saying of theologians, that those conclusions which are deduced from the articles of faith do not pertain to faith, but to theology: [for] the conclusion deducible by evident consequence from an article of faith does not have the same evidence in the one believing, which the article itself has in itself. And from this it is understood that what is deduced by evident consequence from faith is certain by faith; yet it is not an article of faith.” Then he adds: “It is not necessary that everything which is of faith be an article of faith, nor is it necessary that it be expressly contained in the Scriptures; just as it is of faith that Christ is true God and true man, and yet it is not explicitly an article, nor is it expressly found in the Scriptures. Hence let those who say this consider how they miss the point, namely, that a conclusion is said to be of faith in two ways: one, because it is expressly contained in the faith, or is a principal [point] of faith; another, because it is deduced by necessary consequence from those things which are of faith. The latter the heretics do not deny to be of faith, but they deny the consequence; just as the Nestorians and Eutychians did not deny that Christ is the Son of God, but they denied the consequence.” Thus far Catharinus. From these words it clearly follows that, according to him, the infallible authority of the Church can define as of divine faith not only what is expressly contained in the sources of revelation, but also what is deduced from them by evident consequence. One may indeed call into question his examples and some verbal expressions, but the doctrine itself that he sets down is the traditional one, which we are defending. But before Melchor Cano and Báñez, let us listen to Dominic Soto himself, proposing and solving in his own way the argument about the resurrection of Christ. For thus he expresses himself in his commentary on the Posterior Analytics, where, after having proposed the objection, he answers: “To the first argument it is answered that a conclusion of this kind can be considered in two ways. In one way, insofar as it is a conclusion, and thus it does not have the same evidence as the principle; hence it does not have the same assent nor the same certainty. In another way, insofar as the evidence of the conclusion is the same as that of the principle, for it is known through the principle, just as the conclusion is known through the principle: and in this way [a conclusion] is said to be of faith: for they who follow through such a consequence have the same assent of faith... Nor can they be called (the assents of theology) faith: for faith is an assent which is held immediately by authority alone, or which is evidently deduced from it, as Christ is a man, and consequently, is visible” (DOMINIC SOTO, In dialecticam Aristotelis commentarii, 1st part, q. 2, ad 7 [Salmanticae 1574], p. 91). “To the third argument, the most learned Master, Brother Dominic de Soto (bk. 1 Post., q. 2), says that when a conclusion is deduced by evident consequence from the principles of faith, then the conclusion itself is likewise certain according to faith... However, this opinion is false... Likewise, false is what he says, “it is alike of faith: Christ is a man and Christ is capable of laughter.” For if someone were to confess that Christ is a perfect man, but were to deny that He is capable of laughter, because he opines that visibility does not pertain to the perfection of man, he would be a bad philosopher, but not yet a heretic, since it has not so far been defined by the Church that Christ is capable of laughter. But if the Church were to define that visibility pertains to the perfection of human nature, then he who would deny it would already be a heretic” (BÁÑEZ, In 1 partem P. Thomae, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3, argument [Salmanticae 1585], p. 53). Melchor Cano also refutes Soto, although without naming him, since they taught together in Salamanca. The text we shall give later, when treating of the mind of Melchor Cano (455).

**388. ANDRÉS DE VEGA.—**There was no need to cite this Franciscan theologian, for all the manuals bring his name alongside that of Vázquez as a defender of the definability de fide of conclusions properly so called. We believe, however, that the reader will be pleased to know the text, rarely cited, in which he defends his opinion, and which reads as follows:

"Many are the propositions of faith that cannot otherwise be proven to be of faith except because they evidently follow from what is believed, together with at least one proposition evident according to natural light. And this can be shown in many propositions about God and about Christ, which are received by all the faithful on this account as certain, and their opposites are deemed heretical: as is clear concerning these: God is incorporeal, God is immaterial, God is of infinite power; Christ has a heart, Christ has phlegm, Christ according to His body and according to His soul and all things contained in them is under both species of the Sacrament of the Eucharist: Christ without the substance of bread and wine is under both species of bread and wine, and similar ones. For propositions of this kind are not expressed in the Scriptures, but they are evidently deduced from what is contained in them, at least with one evident according to natural light" ²⁵.

The reader will have noted in this text by Vega the same defect that we already noted in almost all theologians of Scotist or nominalist affiliation. They defend dogmatic development, but they defend it excessively, by making it dogmatic or of divine faith, without distinguishing between before or after the Church's definition.

**389. ANTONIO OF CÓRDOBA.—**Let us join with Andrew of Vega his fellow friar Anthony of Córdoba, who defends with no less clarity the dogmatic development by way of conclusion, although with the same defect as Vega. Here are his words:

"A proposition of Catholic faith, or Catholic truth, is a revealed proposition or truth immediately or mediately. It is called a truth revealed immediately or mediately, which others call in itself or in its antecedent... Moreover, a truth revealed mediately, or in its antecedent, is that which is inferred from the aforementioned Catholic truths, in themselves or immediately revealed, in good, certain, and necessary consequence, in the light of faith (from two premises of faith) or natural reason (or with one premise of reason), even if such a truth in its proper form is not contained in Sacred Scripture, such as that Christ had nerves, and blood, and other humors, bones and veins, and the like. And to this class belong almost all the determinations or definitions of Councils and of the Supreme Pontiffs, however, in matters of faith and morals, which are deduced in the aforementioned manner from Sacred Scripture and are proposed as necessarily to be believed by all." ²⁶

This wise Franciscan is not lacking when he qualifies as mediately revealed omnes fere definitiones Conciliorum. Saint Thomas did not say almost all, but was content to say many: "And for this reason many things are now considered heretical, which were not considered so before, because it is now more manifest what follows from them" ²⁷

390. BARTOLOMÉ DE TORRES.—Following the chronological order, let us cite a commentator on Saint Thomas, belonging to the secular clergy, primary professor at the University of Sigüenza in Spain and bishop of the Canary Islands. Commenting on the already so often cited article of Saint Thomas, "Whether it is lawful to hold contrary opinions about the notions," he expresses himself thus:

"St. Thomas therefore, having first laid down a division of the things proposed for belief, establishes two conclusions. The division is plainly this: The things proposed for belief are of two kinds; some pertain to the faith directly, others indirectly. Those things pertain directly to the faith which are principally divinely handed down... But those things pertain indirectly to the faith which are not proposed to us as things chiefly to be believed, but from their opposites something contrary to the faith follows. With this division laid down, the first conclusion of St. Thomas is: to assert with obstinacy something false, contrary to what directly pertains to the faith, is heretical. The second conclusion, to assert without obstinacy something false, repugnant to what indirectly pertains to the faith, is not heresy...

Fourth assertion: Obstinacy consists in this: that someone, deliberately, knowingly, and prudently, dissents from any proposition of the faith, or assents to its opposite, understanding that it is contained in Sacred Scripture, or in a definition of the Church, or is evidently deduced from them, even if he dissents from it for a single moment of time. St. Thomas openly holds this in the present passage²⁸

391. SANTIAGO SIMANCAS.—Let us consider the testimony of another bishop of the secular clergy, who wrote his work On Catholic Institutions at the request of Pope Gregory XIII, to whom it is dedicated. He speaks thus:

"We are bound to believe, not only the divine Scriptures, the traditions of the Church, the just councils, the Constitutions of the Supreme Pontiffs, the decrees of the Fathers, and the received opinions of the holy doctors; but also those truths which are deduced from these by a certain consequence in the light of faith, or by evident natural reason: provided that the truths are inferred in such a way that they are persuasive to all, especially to the wise; because these truths are inherent in them, and are comprehended and contained there, whence they are deduced by such a consequence. And this is the true, received, and Catholic opinion" ²⁹.

Note the reader how by conclusions Simancas understands inclusive conclusions. “Because these are inherent in those, and are comprehended and contained in them, whence such consequences are drawn.” The definability of faith comes from that inclusion or containment; the connection is nothing but the means the Church uses to see it.

392. PAUL GRISALDI.—No less clearly does the Dominican Grisaldi express himself:

"To embrace the whole matter in one word, the proposition of faith is to believe and hold all those things which Sacred Scripture, Apostolic tradition, the Roman See, a general Council, the unanimous exposition of all the Saints on the Sacred Scriptures, and those things which are deduced from these by necessary consequence... Not only that which was expressly revealed to the Apostles belongs to Catholic doctrine, but also that which is drawn from one revealed proposition and another known by natural light, by syllogism and evident inference" ³⁰.

393. BARTOLOMÉ DE MEDINA.—A contemporary of Grisaldi and a Dominican like him is the celebrated theologian Bartolomé de Medina, one of the immortal principal professors of the University of Salamanca and a classic commentator on the Prima Secundae of Saint Thomas ³¹. Let us see how he expresses himself:

"The second question, then, is whether we can know certainly and infallibly that we have divine and supernatural faith. Against the affirmative side one argues thus: for infallible certainty makes us certain only of the divine revelations that the Church proposes... The answer is that the virtue of faith is not only that which is revealed immediately, but also that which is deduced by an evident consequence from divine revelations. This truth—namely, that the believer has true faith—is deduced from revealed truths through an evident consequence, in this manner: it is a matter of faith that no one can assent to all that the Church proposes unless he has true and divine faith; but I experience that I assent to all that the Church proposes; therefore I have true faith"³²

394. FRAY LUIS DE LEÓN.—He well deserves to be placed alongside Medina, his colleague on the faculty at Salamanca, the illustrious Augustinian friar Luis de León, eminent in literature, no less eminent in Scriptural science, and as eminent in sacred speculative theology as in Sacred Scripture or in the fine arts. The fact that his theological works remained for almost three centuries without a good edition is the only thing that can explain why he is not cited as often as he deserves. Let us cite his words concerning the question at hand:

"Concerning the things and propositions of faith, we can speak in two ways: in one way, absolutely, according to themselves; in another way, in relation to us. If we speak in the first way, only those things are of faith which are revealed by God, either immediately, because they have been explicitly handed down by Him, or mediately, because they are evidently deduced from those things which He Himself handed down. But if we speak in the second way, then those things are of faith which are both revealed by God and are known to us by some reason to have been revealed by God. But there are four reasons which can render us certain about this: first, Sacred Scripture; second, the tradition of the Apostles; third, the definitions of councils and popes; fourth, the evidence of reason inferring from one thing to another... But someone will doubt concerning what we have said in the last place, namely, that propositions which are deduced by evident consequence from propositions of faith pertain to faith, such as "Christ is capable of laughter." For this seems false... In this doubt, let this be: First conclusion: such propositions evidently gathered from propositions of faith are also to be considered of faith. This is clear, because they are revealed by God, at least mediately. Likewise, in the Third Council of Constantinople, those who denied that there is a human will in Christ were judged heretics, because this proposition, "Christ has a human will," follows from this one: "Christ is (perfect) man"³³

Note again how the reader observes that the reason theologians always give for saying that the conclusions are definable as of faith is not precisely because there is a connection with what is revealed, but because, there being a truly theological connection, there is implicit containment, and therefore there is true revelation, though mediate for us: "It is clear, because they are REVEALED by God, at least mediately."

395. CARDINAL TOLEDO.—Cardinal Toledo follows, the first cardinal of the Society of Jesus, and no less pious than eminent a theologian. Commenting on the second article of question 11 of the Secunda Secundae, "Whether heresy properly concerns those things which are of faith," he expresses himself thus: "Conclusion: Heresy is an error concerning those things which are of faith directly or indirectly, for instance, concerning the articles of faith or concerning things inferred from them, asserted with obstinacy... You will say: what is called a Catholic proposition? I say that an assertion or proposition is called Catholic in two ways. In one way immediately, for instance, that which is held directly from the rule of faith. But the rule for discerning faith is manifold, as we said above. For it is Sacred Scripture, a General Council, the Pontiff as Pontiff, Apostolic tradition, and the Universal Church. Therefore, those things which are held from any of these rules are called Catholic assertions in the former way. In the other way, an assertion is called Catholic mediately, which is derived by the best and clearest consequence from a former proposition. Therefore, whoever contradicts either of them falls into heresy"³⁴.

396. DOMINGO BÁÑEZ.—We shall conclude our examination of the theologians of the sixteenth century³⁵ with the illustrious name of one of the most penetrating and exact commentators on the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas and, in our judgment, the one who bears off the palm from all the rest, after, as is clear, Cardinal Cajetan. Báñez's doctrine on the evolution of dogma may be summarized in these four propositions: First: the theological conclusion properly so called is not of divine faith before its definition by the Church. Second: but it is of divine faith if the Church defines it. Third: the Church can define, and has in fact defined, rigorous and proper theological conclusions. Fourth: such definitions do not constitute a new faith, but they do constitute a new explanation or a fuller explanation, although not fuller than that which the Apostles possessed. These four propositions, which form as it were the summary of St. Thomas's doctrine on dogmatic evolution, could be proven with abundant texts from Báñez. Let us choose only four short and clear texts.

a) "Ad tertium argumentum doctissimus Magister de Soto ³⁶ says that when a conclusion is deduced through an evident consequence from a principle of faith, then that very conclusion is likewise certain according to faith... However, this opinion is false... Likewise, what he says is false, that "Christ is a man" and "Christ is capable of laughter" are equally matters of faith. For if someone were to confess that Christ is a perfect man, yet deny that He is capable of laughter, because he thinks that capacity for laughter does not pertain to the perfection of a man, this person would be a bad philosopher, but not yet a heretic. For it has not so far been defined by the Church that Christ is capable of laughter... Therefore, the answer to the argument is that the conclusions which are deduced from the principles of faith, or from one principle of faith and another naturally evident one, through a good consequence, are PROPERLY the conclusions of theological science. And nevertheless they are said to be conclusions of faith, not immediately, but mediately: and the opposite of these is said to be an error about faith mediately: and whoever thinks the contrary falls under suspicion of heresy" ³⁷

b) “Since it has not so far been defined by the Church that Christ is capable of laughter, but if the Church were to define that capacity for laughter pertains to the perfection of human nature, just as it has been defined that He has a twofold will, human and divine, then whoever denied that Christ is capable of laughter would be a heretic” ³⁸

c) "Holy Church has many times defined propositions as being of faith which were not expressly contained in Sacred Scripture, but were commonly and constantly affirmed by all theologians and doctors of the Church, and were theological propositions... Therefore, in like manner, those truths in which the whole school of theologians agrees could likewise now be defined as being of faith: hence to contradict them is erroneous: e.g.: all theologians firmly teach that Christ the Lord, from the instant of His Incarnation, saw the Divine Essence. This is not expressly found in Sacred Scripture, nor has it been defined by the Church of God as to be held as of faith: but theologians infer it by good consequence from other passages of Holy Scripture and from the foundations of the faith, and it is so commonly received that no one can deny it without the mark of error, and it could be defined by the Church as being of faith³⁹.

d) “It is an error in faith to assert that after the times of the Apostles, the Doctors of the Church or even the Church herself believes more things pertaining to the faith or more explicitly than the Apostles and the Sacred Writers of evangelical doctrine believed... This is proved secondly: because the Church has so far proposed or defined nothing for the faithful to believe that was not contained in the Sacred Scriptures or in the Apostolic traditions, either expressed or virtually contained, so that it could be drawn thence by evident consequence⁴⁰. “Neither the Supreme Pontiff nor the whole Church can establish a new article or a new dogma as to its substance. This is explained by us with an example. If someone consults a moral philosopher about some moral doubt, and he replies according to moral principles, then that philosopher rather explains what was hidden than is the author of the truth. In this manner, when the Supreme Pontiff defines that something is to be held as a matter of faith, he acts as one explaining a latent truth, not as the author of the truth... And in this sense is St. Thomas to be understood in the article, when he says that the new edition of the Creed pertains to the authority of the Supreme Pontiff, namely as to the new explanation. From which it follows that heretics wrongly object against us that the Supreme Pontiff makes a new faith⁴¹.”

**397. IMPORTANT CONCLUSION.—**Anyone who thoroughly grasps these four assertions of Báñez, which are but a faithful commentary on the doctrine of Saint Thomas, will see how there can exist, and in fact does exist, after the Apostles, a true dogmatic evolution by way of rigorous and proper theological conclusion, yet without the habits of theology and faith thereby ceasing to be specifically distinct; without thereby requiring new revelations or any passage from the non-revealed to the revealed, but rather from the immediately revealed in itself to the immediately revealed for us; without thereby, finally, such evolution being an evolution as regards substance, or heterogeneous, but rather as regards new explanation, or homogeneous.

If certain Thomists, after the golden age of Theology, have not known how to reconcile these things, and even find them contradictory, it is because, blinded by purely connective virtuality (virtuale tantum), they have lost the true Thomistic notion of implicit virtuality, which is the specific constituent of true and proper Theology and the basis, at the same time, of dogmatic evolution. Because it is an evolution of true virtuality, it is true evolution; because it is an evolution of truly implicit virtuality, it is an evolution of explanation or homogeneous evolution.