La evolución homogénea del dogma católico

THE DOCTRINE OF THE HOLY FATHERS ON THE EVOLUTION OF DOGMA

353. THE PRIMITIVE CHURCH.—The first centuries of Christianity were centuries of struggle, in which the Church had to devote itself preferentially to defending its doctrine, both against external attackers, such as the pagans and Jews, and against internal corrupters, such as the heretics.

That is why the writings of the Holy Fathers are for the most part devoted to defending the divine origin of dogma against the former, and its immutability against the latter.

However, there has been no lack of Holy Fathers who, while tenaciously defending against heretics the substantial immutability of dogma—the first element of all homogeneous evolution—also indicated its progress by way of consequence, which is the second element that homogeneous evolution requires.

Among those Holy Fathers or ecclesiastical writers are St. Irenaeus, Origen, St. Basil, St. Gregory Nazianzen, St. Jerome, Vincent of Lérins, and St. Anselm. Let us briefly cite their texts.

354. ST. IRENAEUS.—"But the preaching of the Church is everywhere consistent and persists in equality, and has testimony from the prophets and from the Apostles and from all the disciples... and the operation proper to the salvation of man, which is in our faith: which, received from the Church, we guard, and which, always by the Spirit of God, as in a good vessel, is a certain excellent deposit that grows young and makes young the very vessel in which it is" ¹

As can be seen, according to Saint Irenaeus, the revealed deposit has two characteristics. First, it causes the vessel in which it is deposited to progress or rejuvenate, which is the mind of the faithful or of the whole Church: "the deposit making the very vessel in which it is young again." Second, it not only rejuvenates the mind of the faithful, but the deposit itself is rejuvenated: the deposit growing young. The subjective-objective character of dogmatic evolution could not be indicated with greater clarity and beauty in such brief words.

At the same time, it clearly indicates in that text the two factors that intervene in that evolution or rejuvenation: the instrumental factor, which is the Church, and the principal factor, which is the action of the Holy Spirit: from the Church... from the Spirit of God.

355. ORIGEN.—In tracing out in his brilliant treatise On First Principles what the rule of faith is for the Christian, he perfectly distinguishes two classes of doctrines or truths. First, those truths that are clear in the preaching of the Apostles or of the Church: "those things which are plainly handed down through the apostolic preaching," "things defined in the Church's preaching." Second, those that are not clear or manifest; that is, everything that "is not distinguished by sufficiently clear preaching," "which the Church's preaching has not explained with sufficient clarity." The Christian, says Origen, who seeks to know in a perfect and scientific way the doctrine of his faith, as the prophet Hosea commands him, must rely on the first kind of truths and draw from them the consequences that are contained within them, for principles and consequences form but one single body of doctrine. Let us hear the text of Origen: "Therefore, as if using such things as elements and foundations (the first kind of truths: what is manifest or defined in the apostolic or ecclesiastical preaching), according to the commandment that says: Kindle for yourselves the light of knowledge (Hosea, 10, 12), everyone who desires to complete a certain sequence and body from all these things must do so: that with clear and necessary assertions he may investigate what is true concerning each particular point, and, as we have said, form one body by means of examples and affirmations, whether those which he has found in the Holy Scriptures, or those which he has discovered through the investigation of consequence itself and the pursuit of what is right" ²

It is evident, then, that already from the first centuries the idea begins to take shape that the principles and their consequences form a single body in revealed or Christian doctrine. That is the core of dogmatic evolution.

**356. ST. BASIL.—**Passing over Tertullian, who, although he brings an interesting text ³ he wrote it when he was already in heresy, and applied it in a heretical sense, let us cite St. Basil: "Just as a seed while it grows becomes larger indeed from being small, but yet remains the same in itself, and is not changed according to kind but is perfected by increases: so too do I think that the same doctrine has been augmented by progressing, but that the one now in force has in no way succeeded in place of that which was from the beginning ⁴

Although here Saint Basil speaks of the homogeneous growth of dogma in his own spirit, from the time he learned it as a child until he developed it as a bishop, no more fitting description can be given of the growth of dogma in all the faithful or in the entire Church.

357. ST. GREGORY OF NAZIANZUS.—After that of St. Basil comes the testimony of his illustrious fellow student, called by antonomasia the theologian, St. Gregory of Nazianzus. The Macedonian heretics denied the divinity of the Holy Spirit, basing themselves on the fact that nowhere in Sacred Scripture is the Holy Spirit given the name of God. The Holy Doctor answers them that one must believe not only what is expressly stated in Sacred Scripture, but also what is inferred from it. Let us hear his words:

"Since, then, such a great distinction is found between names and things, what reason is there for you to serve letters so zealously, and to attach yourself to Jewish wisdom, and, having abandoned realities, to pursue syllables? But if, when you say twice five or twice seven, I were to gather ten or fourteen; or, because you said that an animal was endowed with reason and mortal, I were to conclude that it was a man, would I seem to you to be trifling? And how could that happen, since I speak yours? For words are no more the speaker's than they are the one who imposes the necessity of speaking. Just as, therefore, in this case I would look not so much to what is said as to what is understood: in the same way, neither, if I should find anything else of those things that are said in no way, or certainly not clearly enough, yet understood and gathered from the Scriptures, would I so much fear you, the sycophant of words, as to flee from the very enunciation?" ⁵

Granados, the great defender of Molina, seeing clearly that this text speaks of proper conclusions, evaded it by saying that St. Gregory understands by divine faith divine faith taken in a broad or improper sense (233). Other more recent theologians, seeing clearly that St. Gregory speaks of divine faith properly so called, since he refers to the divinity of the Holy Spirit, try to evade it by saying that the holy Doctor understands by conclusions only improper conclusions. Resources are never lacking to evade an isolated text, however clear it may be, when it goes against preconceived opinions.

358. ST. JEROME.—Jesus Christ Himself taught us the parable of the mustard seed, comparing the growth of the kingdom of heaven, which is the preaching of the Gospel, to its growth. Since in that preaching of the Gospel the fundamental element is the doctrine or dogma (going, teach), the Greatest Doctor of scriptural exegesis did not hesitate not only to admit doctrinal or dogmatic growth, but to compare it with the growth of the mustard seed of the Gospel. Here are his words:

"This preaching of the Gospel, which seemed small at the beginning, when it has been sown either in the soul of the believer or in the whole world, does not spring up into vegetables, but grows into a tree, so that the birds of the air (which we must believe to be either the souls of believers or the powers devoted to the service of God) come and dwell in its branches. I think the branches of the Gospel tree, which has grown from the mustard seed, are the diversities of doctrines, in each of which the aforementioned birds find rest" ⁶

It is clear that this comparison of dogmatic development with the development of the mustard seed is nothing more than an analogy, and it must be understood with the limitations that we indicated elsewhere. But it indicates quite well how the idea of the development of dogma was no less familiar to the Holy Fathers than the idea that dogma remains immutable in its substance.

359. VINCENT OF LÉRINS.—We shall not repeat again the texts already cited from this celebrated ecclesiastical writer, whose formulas on the evolution of dogma have become classic, and one of which has merited the singular privilege of being adopted literally by the Vatican Council.

In treating the images of the evolution of dogma, we already saw how Vincent of Lérins compares it to true, but homogeneous, vital development, both of the seed and of the human body (222-223). In treating the question of whether the Church perfects revelation, we also cited the words in which Vincent of Lérins admits that some dogmas were not in the primitive deposit but rather incipient and unformed (inchoata et informata), and therefore have need of being cultivated so that they may flourish, mature, grow, and be perfected: "let it be cultivated, let it flourish, let it mature, let it advance, let it be perfected" (187).

No one, like Vincent of Lérins, has given us the key to explain those texts in which some Holy Fathers sometimes express the immutability of dogma with such rigidity that they seem to leave no room for its evolution.

Indeed, no matter how many texts from the Holy Fathers are accumulated to prove that dogma is completely immutable, one will never be found that expresses the immutability of dogma in a manner that seems more absolute and rigid than that lapidary formula of the Lirinensian: “what has always, what has everywhere, what has by all.” And yet, the same hand and in the same book that wrote that formula wrote those others of unfinished and unformed, and of let it ripen, let it advance, and let it be perfected.

In reality, immutability and development are not two opposing things, but rather two harmonious aspects and two complementary facets of the same thing, that is, of homogeneous evolution. With immutability alone, but without development, there would be no evolution, but neither would there be life; with development, but without substantial immutability, there would likewise be no homogeneous evolution, but rather corruption or transformism. From both characteristics united results the true life of dogma, and for that reason both are found united in the Catholic Church and both are lacking in the heretical and even in the schismatic sects.

This explains how two such great Catholic apologists as Bossuet and Newman could employ, in defense of the Catholic Church, arguments that seem contradictory. Bossuet said to Protestantism: "You change, therefore you are not the truth." Newman said to Anglicanism: "You admit no evolution, therefore you have no life." In reality, these two aspects, far from contradicting each other, are the two characteristics that distinguish the truth, when that truth is deposited in human intellects and hearts, to be the life of the individual and of society.

That is the explanation of why all sects separated from the vital principle, which is the divine teaching authority of the Catholic Church, lack one or the other of the two essential characteristics of life. They either lack the character of substantial immutability because they have abandoned truly primitive dogmas, or they lack the character of vital progress because they have limited their creed to the dogmas defined up to such a century or such a council, rejecting all development that those dogmas may have had or may have in later centuries or councils.

Parallel to these two fundamental characteristics of every living being, there exist two characteristics or two states in everything dead or in every corpse: either the immobile and rigid state of the mummy or the dissolving state of corruption. The first state is that of immutability without progress: the second state is that of progress without immutability. The first is the state of the heretical or schismatic sects of the East; the second, the state of the Protestant sects of the West.

Therefore, the formula of true dogmatic life given to us by the Lirinense and adopted by the Vatican Council embraces neither immutability alone nor development alone, but substantial immutability together with vital or homogeneous development: “let it grow, therefore... but in the same sense” ⁷.

**360. ST. ANSELM.—**When dealing with St. Gregory of Nazianzus, we saw that, to prove the divinity of the Holy Spirit, he employed the way of conclusion or consequence, and that he likewise showed that this way led to the knowledge of a dogmatic truth or of divine faith, even if that truth were not expressly contained in Scripture.

St. Anselm follows the same procedure to prove that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, and he teaches the same doctrine concerning the value of the way of reasoning or conclusion. Here are his words:

“Behold, we have seen with how great truth and necessity it follows that the Spirit proceeds from the Son. If this is not true, then either something of those things from which we have said this follows as false, which is against the Christian faith, which we hold with the Greeks, or we have not concluded consistently, which cannot be shown. If this is not true, the Christian faith is destroyed... Since, however, the denial of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son introduces such great falsehood that it destroys those things from which we have shown it to follow, against the Christian faith..., let the rational heart consider by what reason it excludes that belief from the Christian faith. Finally, if it is an error to believe this procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, then divine authority itself leads us into error, since it teaches us both those things from which it follows and those things which follow from it: and nowhere does it deny it, nor does it declare anything that in any way contradicts it. If, therefore, it is objected that divine authority never states it explicitly, and for that reason it should not be affirmed, let it likewise be said that, since it never denies it, nor says anything that contradicts it, it should not be denied. We also say that it affirms it sufficiently, when it asserts those things from which it is proved, and in no way signifies anything from which it would be denied” ⁸.

Here is the reader’s answer to the objection commonly raised by those who deny dogmatic evolution by way of conclusion. They say that God, by affirming what is formal or the principles, does not thereby affirm what is virtual or the consequences, and since only what is affirmed by God can be of divine faith or dogmatic, no consequence properly so called can become dogmatic. Saint Anselm gives us the answer very clearly: “He sufficiently affirms it when he asserts that from which it is proved.” There is nothing more to it than that, since such an affirmation is implicit and needs explanation, it is necessary that that explanation, in order for it to become dogma, be made by divine authority or by the definition of the Church, and not merely by the human reasoning of the theologian.

With this we close the patristic period to move on to that of Scholastic theology. Although the texts cited are not numerous, we believe they will suffice for the reader to see that already in the patristic age the idea of the development of dogma by way of theological conclusion had germinated with considerable clarity; an idea that we will see refined and completed in the vast majority of the great theologians, from Saint Thomas to our own day.

THE DOCTRINE OF SAINT THOMAS ON THE EVOLUTION OF DOGMA

361. THOMISTIC SYNTHESIS.—We have already spoken of St. Thomas's doctrine on almost every page of this work, and later on we will still need to deal with it again (134, 238-243, 296, 302; 304, 466-468). Therefore, to avoid useless repetitions, we will limit ourselves here to giving a brief synthesis of the Holy Doctor's thought.

Saint Thomas and all the great geniuses of Scholasticism treat of the evolution of dogma in connection with two problems: first, the problem of the unity of the faith; second, the problem of the constitutive element of heresy. In reality, these two problems constitute but two aspects or opposite faces of the same problem, since heresy is nothing other than the denial or rupture of the unity of the faith, just as schism is the rupture of the unity of government.

The first of these problems or difficulties concerning the unity of the faith presented itself already to the minds of the Holy Fathers, especially Saint Augustine and Pope Saint Gregory the Great, on the occasion of the evident fact that the doctrine of the faith grew and developed throughout the entire Old Testament up to Jesus Christ and the Apostles; and in treating this problem, the great Scholastics of the Middle Ages extended it also to examining the other evident fact, namely, its growth or development after the Apostles. The problem consists in showing how a thing which, like the doctrine of the faith, grows and develops successively, and of which, therefore, earlier believers know and believe explicitly only a part, while later believers know and believe other parts or developments unknown to the earlier ones, can preserve unity. This problem Saint Thomas and all the other great Scholastics treat under the titles “Utrum eadem sit fides modernorum et antiquorum”, “Utrum fides per successionem temporum profecerit”, “Utrum articuli fidei creverint secundum successionem temporum” and other similar titles ¹. To this first problem, under whatever phase or form it presents itself, Saint Thomas always answers with the same formula, namely, that there was growth of explanation of what was implicit, but there was no growth of substance. The reason he always gives is the same: that all later developments were already implicitly contained in the earlier ones, and since the difference between implicit and explicit does not suffice to destroy the objective or substantial unity of the faith, it follows that the divine faith of the angels in heaven, of our first parents in paradise, of the patriarchs and prophets in the Old Testament, of the Apostles and ourselves in the New, is objectively and substantially one and the same, however great its doctrinal developments have been, for all are steps from the implicit to the explicit, and, therefore, the ancients believed implicitly the same thing that we believe explicitly. Let us listen to Saint Thomas: "The act of the believer does not terminate in the proposition, but in the reality: for we do not form propositions except in order that through them we may have knowledge of realities, as in science, so in faith" ².

"And therefore it must be said that the object of faith can be considered in two ways: either in itself, as it is outside the soul, and thus properly has the nature of an object, and from it the habit receives multitude or unity: or according as it is participated in the knower. It must be said, therefore, that if that which is the object of faith, namely the thing believed, is taken as it is outside the soul, so it is one which is referred to us and to the ancients: and therefore from the unity of the thing faith receives unity. But if it is considered according as it is in our apprehension, so it is multiplied through diverse statements: but from this diversity faith is not diversified. Hence it is clear that faith is in every way one" ³.

"So it must be said that as regards the substance of the articles of faith, they did not increase over the course of time: because whatever later generations believed was contained in the faith of the earlier fathers, albeit implicitly. But as regards their explanation, the number of articles grew, because some things were explicitly known by later generations that were not explicitly known by earlier ones" ⁴.

362. DIFFERENT DEVELOPMENTS.—However, the developments after the Apostles and the developments that had occurred before them, although both are an explanation of what is implicit, differ accidentally because there are two different kinds of implicitness. There is an objective and true implicitness, but so profound that for our intelligence it is as if it did not exist, for it cannot be explained or developed by our intelligence alone, but rather requires new revelation. Such is the implicitness with which some articles are contained in other articles, and all of them in the two most general articles of the faith. Such things are truly implicit in themselves, but not implicit for us. Therefore, the explanation or development of new articles existed throughout the whole time in which new revelations could be accommodated; but it ceased with Jesus Christ and the Apostles, in whom the deposit of revelation was closed. "This explanation was completed through Christ." That is the dogmatic evolution before the Apostles (313).

363. But there is another kind of objective and true implicitness which, to be explained and developed, does not require new revelations, but rather the reasoning of our intellect suffices. These truths are not only contained implicitly in themselves, but they are also contained implicitly for us. These are not dogmas-articles, but dogmas-consequences or derived dogmas. This is the dogmatic explanation or evolution that is possible and has existed and will exist after the Apostles. "And as regards this, the faith can be unfolded daily... and through the study of the holy doctors it has been more and more unfolded".

364. THE TRUE MIND OF ST. THOMAS.—That is the clear, evident, and express mind of the Holy Doctor. If many do not understand it, it is because they have fixed in their heads, through the reading of modern manuals, that St. Thomas in those articles did not treat of dogmatic evolution after the Apostles, but only of evolution in the Old Testament. To convince them of the contrary, we will cite a single text. After the Holy Doctor has demonstrated that the evolution of the Old Testament is homogeneous and that the faith is one and the same, since it is nothing but the evolution of what is implicit, he poses to himself the following objection: "Fifth objection. Furthermore, by this it seems that even now, in the same way, the articles could be multiplied through the succession of times: which seems to be false." Let the reader note that now, which means: now, after the Apostles. Here is the reply: "To the fifth it must be said that something contained in an article can be explained in two ways: in one way, insofar as one article is contained in another, or two in a common one, just as the resurrection of the dead is contained in a certain way in the Resurrection of Christ, and the Passion and the Incarnation in this common" which is the mystery of Redemption (here is the implicitness in itself and not for us); and thus the implicit faith is explained in determinate articles, and this explanation was completed by Christ; hence to His doctrine as regards the essentials of the faith (the articles), neither to add nor to subtract is permitted”.

Up to this point we have seen the explanation or dogmatic evolution of some articles into others through new revelations. Now comes the explanation or evolution after the Apostles through consequences.

“In another way, what is contained in the article is not the article itself, but something accompanying the article, and in this respect the faith can be explained daily, and through the study of the saints (the councils) it has been more and more explained” ⁵

What the Holy Doctor understands by concomitant with the article, the Holy Doctor had told us in the response to the fourth:

“To the fourth it must be said that an article is an indivisible truth, with respect to what is actually expressed in the article, but it is divisible (explicable or evolvable) with respect to those things that are potentially contained in the article; in accordance with which he who says one thing, says in a certain way many things; and these are the things that precede the article or follow from it: and with respect to this the article of faith can be explained and divided” (loc. cit., ad 4). “Because faith, as far as it is in itself, sufficiently inclines toward all things that accompany, precede, or follow from faith” ⁶

Our faith, then, is the same as that of the early Church, because everything we believe was either already explicitly believed by her, or is an implicit consequence of what she explicitly believed. That is St. Thomas's answer to the first problem concerning the unity of faith.

365. REGARDING THE SECOND PROBLEM concerning the constituent of heresy, the answer is the same. This problem is treated by Saint Thomas when he deals with the vices opposed to faith; but he had already treated it in a particular way in the treatise On the Trinity, when studying the divine notions ⁷. This problem was motivated by the incident that happened to Gilbert of Poitiers. This theologian, because of certain opinions of his on the divine notions, had been compelled by the Church to retract under penalty of heresy. Now, how can there be room for heresy and, therefore, for dogma in questions which, like that of the divine notions, are not expressly contained in divine Scripture or Tradition, and concerning which the Holy Fathers have held various opinions?

To this problem, St. Thomas and all the great Scholastics respond in this way: Heresy is nothing more than corruption of the faith. Everything, therefore, that corrupts the faith can become heresy, and its opposite can become dogma. And since faith can be corrupted not only by denying what is formally revealed, but also the absolutely necessary consequences of what is formal, for that reason the Church can condemn as heresy or define as dogma everything that is truly consequential. Here are some texts from St. Thomas:

"Respondeo dicendum that something pertains to faith in two ways. One way directly; as those things which are principally handed down to us by divine revelation... Indirectly, however, pertain to faith those things from which, if denied, something contrary to faith follows" ⁸

I answer that we are now speaking of heresy as meaning the corruption of the Christian faith. To this something may pertain in two ways: in one way, directly and principally, such as the articles of faith; in another way, indirectly and secondarily, such as those things from which follows the corruption of some article; and regarding both there can be heresy, in the same way that there can be faith ⁹.

"The judgment is the same regarding these* (the indirect revealed) and those (the direct revealed), because one follows from the other" ¹⁰

"Because certain things are contained in the faith of the Church, just as conclusions are contained in principles" ¹¹

"And on account of this many things are now considered heretical which were not considered so before, on account of the fact that it is now more manifest what follows from them" ¹²

"Thus, persistence in despising those things which pertain to the faith DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, so as to undergo the judgment of the Church, makes a man a heretic" ¹³

Hence it is that, for St. Thomas, these two things have the same dogmatic value: a) what is directly or formally revealed; b) what is indirectly or virtually revealed, if the Church defines it. As can be seen, that is exactly our doctrine on dogmatic development by way of implicit virtuality, defined by the Church (466-469).

THE DOCTRINE OF THE THEOLOGIANS, FROM SAINT THOMAS TO MOLINA, ON THE EVOLUTION OF DOGMA.

366. IN THE THREE LONG CENTURIES from St. Thomas to the end of the sixteenth century, there is not a single theologian who denied the evolution of Catholic dogma by way of a rigorous and proper theological conclusion. At least we have not found one, despite having leafed through with interest all the theologians of that period who have fallen into our hands during these last twelve years.

We would, therefore, become endless if we were to cite the texts of all the theologians who defend this doctrine. To avoid prolonging ourselves too much, we will choose those theologians from whom we can cite a short text, but one that expresses quite clearly the mind of its author. To proceed in an orderly manner, we will divide them by centuries.

A) 13th Century

367. ST. BONAVENTURE.—“Is it lawful to hold a contrary opinion about the notions? I reply that it must be said that to hold a contrary opinion can be either about those things which pertain to the doctrine of the Christian religion, or about those things which pertain to the doctrine of human inquiry.

Regarding those matters that pertain to the doctrine of human inquiry, it is permissible to hold and assert the contrary opinion, because such matters do not pertain to salvation.

To assert the contrary, however, in those things that pertain to the doctrine of religion, a distinction must be made. For some things are of the necessity of faith, some of the necessity of Scripture, and some are annexed to these, such as those that pertain to the explanation of faith and the exposition of Scripture.

Regarding those things that are of the necessity of faith, to hold a contrary opinion is simply a sin in the one who so errs, namely, in him who holds a false opinion. And if it is a mere opinion, it is the sin of error; but if it is an assertion and defense, it is to be called not only error but heresy.

In those things which pertain to the certainty of Scripture, those who are ignorant of the Scriptures may hold contrary opinions without guilt: as if a simple man believes that Jacob was the father of Isaac, and another does not, but the reverse. And the first, although he suspects or opines what is false, nevertheless does not sin, because he is ignorant of Scripture. But for one who knows Scripture, it is not lawful—indeed, he sins—if he simply holds such an opinion. If, however, he defends it, he is to be judged a heretic, since he contradicts Holy Scripture.

Now comes the important part, namely that which pertains to the theological conclusions. The Saint continues thus: "In those things, however, which are annexed to faith or Scripture, either one opinion follows from faith or Scripture and the opposite follows from the other, and then it must be said that before the examination, although it is lawful to hold contrary opinions: but after the examination it is not lawful, rather it is a sin (that is, the sin of heresy) just as in those things which have been determined by faith and Scripture. As was the case with the opinion of Porretanus concerning the properties... Hence after the inconvenience was shown to him, unless he had retracted the error, he would have been judged a heretic by the Church. But he retracted this in the Council of Reims, as Bernard says" ¹

368. Although we said that we would cite from each theologian only some short text, and so we will do in almost all that follow, we have not been able to resist citing almost in full this article of Saint Bonaventure, so that through it one may see how by indirect or consequential revelation he understood not only what is secondary in Sacred Scripture, as some believe, but also everything truly consequential; and how that consequential matter was of divine faith and its denial heresy once defined by the Church: after the treatment in the council. This will appear even clearer in the following texts of the same Holy Doctor:

"For the understanding of the aforementioned things, it must be noted that the doctrine of faith has certain antecedents, certain consequences, and certain principles or objects. Just as in the other sciences we see that there are certain common principles, which are presupposed, such as axioms. And there are certain intrinsic principles of demonstrations. And there are certain things which are like consequences, such as corollary conclusions. In this same way, in the doctrine of faith the antecedents are those things which pertain to the dictate of natural law. The principles, moreover, are those things toward which the illumination of faith directly directs, and these are called articles. The consequences, moreover, are those things which can be elicited from those articles and which follow from those articles" ²

No less clearly is this expressed in the same place when answering an objection. It says thus:

"To the objection that many things are to be believed which are not contained in the articles, it must be said that this is true of antecedent truths, such as that God exists. And of consequent truths, such as many other things which Sacred Scripture and theological doctrine elicit from the articles themselves, as that Christ from his conception had the fullness of grace, and similar things" ³

We believe that it cannot be clearer for anyone who understands the language of the ancient theologians.

369. LUMINOUS COMMENTARY.—Finally, it will not be superfluous to confirm it with the commentary set forth by the learned editors of the great modern edition of the works of Saint Bonaventure. Commenting on the article in which Saint Bonaventure treats the question of "Whether faith has grown with regard to the number of things to be believed," they say the following: "Saint Bonaventure here and in the following questions suggests a twofold manner in which something is contained in an article, namely, either so that other articles are contained virtually in one article, to be believed determinately later, as the Passion and death of Christ are contained in the mystery of redemption; or so that in the article there is contained not indeed another article, but something that is contained in it as a conclusion. Consult St. Thomas, here, q. 2, a. 2, quaestiuncula 1, ad 5. Therefore, while the substance of faith remains the same, the number of articles to be believed also grew through explicitation: but this explicitation, taken in the first manner, was completed in the Gospel. However, in the other sense (that is, what is contained in the article as a conclusion) taken, the explicitation of faith can progress both in individual men and in the whole Church. This the Vatican Council teaches ⁴: Let it therefore grow, etc. Consult also here q. 2, 3, and the first doubt" ⁵.

**370. CONSEQUENCE.—**Those who say, then, that the doctrine of the evolution of dogma by way of theological conclusion was born with Scotus have not read Saint Thomas and Saint Bonaventure, or they have read them hastily. The most likely thing, it seems to us, is that they have read them with the idea in mind that by conclusion is meant the non-implicit conclusion (the virtual of the fourth type, or virtuale tantum of Suárez); and since Saint Thomas and Saint Bonaventure, when speaking of conclusions, clearly understand implicit conclusions, and therefore call it growth by explanation, certain modern theologians have believed that it was not a matter of proper conclusions, but of improper ones, when implicit conclusions are the only ones properly theological.

**371. EGIDIO ROMANO.—**Exactly like Saint Thomas and Saint Bonaventure, the great Augustinian theologian and disciple of the Angelic Doctor, Giles of Rome, expresses himself. He says the following: "Whether it is lawful to hold contrary opinions about the notions?... 2nd objection: Furthermore, from error concerning the notions there follows error concerning the divine persons: but to err against the divine persons is not without sin: since therefore one of the two contrary positions must necessarily be false, to hold contrary opinions about the notions cannot be done without sin. To the second it is said that someone can err concerning divine things, provided that he does not contradict the articles of faith or those things that have been determined by the Church, even granting that from his words some conclusion could be drawn which would be against the articles of faith or against those things that the Church holds, yet in such a way that he himself would be ignorant of such a deduction. But if such a deduction were made known to him, and it were shown to him that his words contradict those things that the Church holds, if from then on he did not abandon his position, in thus erring he would sin, and if he were to assert his error with obstinacy, he would be a heretic^27.

372. Duns Scotus.—Let us move on to the great theologian, worthy rival of Saint Thomas, who with Saint Bonaventure shares the leadership of the illustrious Franciscan school. In him we shall find on this matter exactly the same doctrine that we have just seen in Saint Thomas, Saint Bonaventure, and Giles of Rome. Let us begin the citations: "Whether it is lawful to hold contrary opinions about the notions? I reply that it must be said that it is lawful to hold one opinion or another about the notions, provided it is done soberly, so that the one holding the opinion is ready to set it aside if the Church declares otherwise. For the clarity of this, it must be known that some things pertain so simply to the substance of faith that all, even the simple, provided they have the use of reason, are bound to believe them explicitly... Other things likewise pertain to the substance of faith, but are to be believed explicitly only by the more learned in the Church... Still other things pertain to the faith in such a way that neither the simple nor the more learned in the Church are compelled to believe them explicitly: and such are many conclusions necessarily included in the articles of faith: for no one is bound to believe these explicitly before they are proposed by the Church as an object of faith after being declared... That the question of the number of the notions, however, belongs to and regards the order of conclusions virtually included in the articles of faith, and that consequently anyone may lawfully hold a contrary opinion about them, is evident from this: that without any mark or suspicion of error, various opinions about the notions have existed, even among the principal Doctors of the Church"^28. "Nothing is to be asserted as being of the truth of faith except what is handed down in Scripture, or is declared by the universal Church, or follows necessarily and evidently from one of these two, as handed down or declared"^29. "Regarding the other point about Cyprian, I say that some things are of the substance of faith, which all, even the simple, are bound to believe explicitly... Other things are explicitly required of the substance of faith,

^{6 7 8} are to be observed by the greater ones of the Church... Others are those which need not be explicitly believed either by these (the greater ones) or by those (the simple ones), because their truth has not yet been declared and determined by the Church, of which sort are many conclusions necessarily included in the articles of faith: but before they have been declared and explained by the Church, it is not necessary for anyone to believe them; yet it is necessary to hold sober opinions about them, so that a person is ready to hold them at the time when their truth has been declared ⁹

“Nothing is to be held as pertaining to the substance of the faith, except what can be expressly had from Scripture, or has been expressly declared by the Church, or evidently follows from something plainly contained in Scripture or plainly determined by the Church.”

We could cite several other theologians of the 13th century, but we believe that the four cited, who are the founders of the three great schools, the Dominican, the Franciscan, and the Augustinian, suffice to show that the doctrine of dogmatic evolution by way of theological conclusion was already a current and common doctrine among the princes of Scholastic theology of the 13th century.

B) 14th and 15th centuries

**373. TWO CENTURIES TOGETHER.—**We group these two centuries under a single heading because in them, and especially in the first, theologians of true merit are scarce. The nominalism of Ockham on the one hand, and on the other the disastrous and very lengthy Western Schism, caused theological studies to languish or plunged them into useless dialectical subtleties. We shall cite the texts of eight theologians, among whom are some of great renown and unquestionable merit, such as Gerson, Denis the Carthusian, Cardinal Torquemada, and above all Capreolus. Of all the theologians of these two centuries whom we have been able to consult, all, without a single exception, continue to defend, like those of the thirteenth century, the development of dogma by way of theological conclusion, properly so called; although some of them, more or less touched by nominalism, do not sufficiently distinguish between the habits of theology and of faith, nor, therefore, between the theological conclusion before and after its definition by the Church. Although Ockham is a few years earlier than Aureolus, we shall begin with the latter, who treats the question ex professo and more extensively.

374. PETER AUREOL.—“When one proceeds from one believed proposition and another necessary one, or from two believed ones, to inquire what must be held regarding something that is doubtful in the faith, no other habit is acquired except faith. Indeed, that habit is faith whose opposite is heresy. But the opposite of a conclusion deduced from one article and one necessary proposition is heretical, as for instance to say that in Christ there are not two wills, which indeed follows from the article saying that ‘in Christ there are two wills,’ namely the divine and the human, and from this necessary proposition ‘Every intellectual nature has its own will’: therefore such a conclusion is held by faith, and such a deduction does not generate another habit distinct from faith.”

“Furthermore, the implicit and the explicit do not differentiate the habit of faith, otherwise the faith of the Fathers of the Old Testament and of the New would not be the same. Again, believing more or fewer things does not differentiate faith, otherwise a priest, who is bound to believe more things explicitly, would not have the same faith as an old woman, who is bound to fewer. But a conclusion deduced in this way is nothing other than something explicit from a prior article in which it was implicit; likewise, one who has the deduction of this conclusion does not therefore believe more things than another: Therefore, from this it is not ruled out that that conclusion is known through faith” ¹⁰.

375. WILLIAM OF OCKHAM.—"Only those truths are to be regarded as Catholic and to be believed as necessary for salvation which are asserted explicitly or implicitly in the canon of the Bible, so that if any truths are not contained in the Bible under their own form of words, they can be inferred from its contents alone by necessary and formal consequence" ¹¹.

376. COMMENTARY ON THESE TWO TEXTS.—As can be seen, these two theologians of the fourteenth century, both nominalists, like several whom we will see in the fifteenth century, far from denying dogmatic evolution by way of conclusion, defend it excessively. Because they see that the theological conclusion is truly implicit in the revealed deposit, which suffices for there to be definability of faith or capacity for dogmatic evolution, they believe that merely by the fact that this implicitness is explained by human reasoning, it is already dogmatic or faith truth, without noticing that the explanation of reason is a human explanation, and therefore belongs to a human or theological habit, as long as the divine explanation of the definition of the Church does not intervene.

377. JOHN GERSON.—"The first degree of truths to be believed is the canon of all Sacred Scripture, and of each of the things that are literally asserted in it. The second degree is of truths determined by the Church... The third degree is of truths specially revealed to some, which are to be believed without any doubt by those to whom the revelation was made... The fourth degree contains all and each of the truths that are concluded from the aforementioned truths in certain consequence in the light of faith (from two revealed premises), or in the evident natural light (one revealed and the other of reason); although they are not found there in their own form of words. Just as this truth is to be held as necessary for salvation: that Christ had nerves and veins, although it is not found in Sacred Scripture in its own form of words. And so of similar cases without number; since this is an evident consequence, not only in the light of faith, but in the light of reason among the philosophers: "Christ is true man; therefore Christ had nerves and veins" ¹².

378. JOHN CAPREOLUS.—The so-called "princeps thomistarum," for having been the first, chronologically speaking, among the great printed commentators on St. Thomas, could not fail to defend the implicit character of every true theological conclusion in the revealed deposit, which is the basis of dogmatic development; while at the same time defending the specific distinction between the habits of faith and theology, without which one ends up in confusion between reason and faith, and between the human value of reasoning and the divine value of the Church's dogmatic definitions.

Responding to Scotus, who, precisely on the basis of that implicitness of the conclusions, had denied or not sufficiently distinguished between the habit of theology and that of faith, he expresses himself thus:

"To the fourth [objection] it is said that although the Bible does not proceed in the manner of demonstrative science, nevertheless, from the contents of the Bible, which stand as principles of science, the Saints have demonstratively drawn conclusions about which theology is concerned, arguing against heretics from the principles of theology. And therefore, although theology is not handed down in the sacred canon in a syllogistic style explicitly, nevertheless, in the books of the subsequent theologians it is handed down in a scientific manner and in the manner of an art explicitly. All things, however, are contained IMPLICITLY in the Bible" ¹³.

As we said elsewhere (351), every theologian ought to engrave on his mind that truly golden final phrase of the prince of Thomists: "All things, however (that is, all true theological conclusions) are implicitly contained in the Bible." Therefore, because every true theological conclusion is truly implicit in the revealed deposit or premise of faith, its definition by the Church is nothing other than an explanation of the faith, as St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and Scotus so often repeat.

379. CARDINAL TORQUEMADA.—After the prince of the Thomists comes the distinguished Cardinal Torquemada, the founder or first organizer of the modern treatise On the Church. Let us cite from him at least a couple of texts:

“Catholic truth is that which is obtained from the supernatural light of divine revelation immediately or mediately, explicitly in its own form of words, or implicitly by sound and necessary consequence... For in these two ways something is said to be contained in Sacred Scripture, either in its own form of words, as in this: “Christ was a man”; and something implicitly, which is to say, by sound and necessary consequence it follows from what is formally set down in Sacred Scripture. As from that statement “Christ was a man” (a perfect man), it follows that He had a rational soul, an agent and possible intellect, and all the powers of the soul. Likewise that in His body there were nerves and veins and the like; yet none of these is found in its own form of words in the letter of Sacred Scripture”¹⁴.

Let every reader note how Torquemada, like Capreolus, not only uses the word implicit, but also categorically explains what is meant by implicit when speaking of containment in the revealed deposit. "Implicitly, that is, what follows from what is formally set down in Sacred Scripture by a good and necessary consequence." It is exactly the same formula later employed by Cardinal Cajetan and by Báñez (383, 396).

380. DIONYSIUS THE CARTHUSIAN.—Alongside Cardinal Torquemada, the celebrated Ecstatic Doctor, Dionysius the Carthusian, well deserves to be cited. Although very well known for his scriptural and ascetical works, he is not as well known, or at least not as often cited today as he deserves, for his works of dogmatic theology. His commentaries on the four books of the Sentences, as well as his Summa Fidei Orthodoxae, to which he gave the subtitle “The marrow of the works of St. Thomas,” are most remarkable for the clarity and fidelity with which they express the pure doctrine of St. Thomas. Let us cite some texts on the question that concerns us.

“Is it lawful to hold diverse opinions regarding the notions in the Godhead? Something pertains to faith in two ways, namely, directly, like the articles of faith... Secondly, something pertains to faith indirectly, that is, from which something contrary to faith follows... Regarding such matters (the indirect ones), however, it is lawful to hold diverse opinions without danger of heresy, before it has been determined that something against the faith follows from them: for if after this determination, especially one made by the Church, anyone opines otherwise, heresy is incurred. Hence many things are now reputed heretical which were not heretical of old, either because of a new determination by the Church, or because it is now more manifest what follows from them ¹⁵.

In the third book, fourth article, of the same work, he treats of "how faith is said to have grown through the succession of times", and he resolves it by extracting from Saint Thomas almost in his very words. But the use of the word virtualiter as synonymous with implicitae deserves note, so that one may see how the ancients, when they spoke of virtuality, always understood implicit virtuality. Here is a text for example: "Thus, therefore, some articles of faith are contained virtualiter in others: since in the faith of human Redemption are included implicitae the Incarnation, Passion, Resurrection, and other such things" ¹⁶.

Let us conclude with another similar text: "Objection: it seems illicit to add anything to the Scriptures of both testaments... To this St. Thomas responds: one can add to Scripture in two ways: first, by adding something contrary or diverse, which is erroneous or presumptuous: second, by explaining more clearly what is contained implicitly in the Scriptures, and this is praiseworthy. Hence Richard: One ought not to add what is dissimilar or repugnant, but what is true may be added for its explanation. And this perhaps is not properly adding, but explaining and manifesting what is implicit: since the truth that serves for the exposition of Scripture is contained in it implicitly and virtually" ¹⁷

**381. GABRIEL BIEL.—**Let us close the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, so poor in great theologians, with the nominalist Gabriel Biel, who died in 1495. He speaks thus: "Faith implicit is habitual faith or the actual assent to some general proposition, containing in itself many particular ones. The universal or general proposition is said to contain all those particular ones which can be inferred from it, immediately or mediately, with the assumption indeed made" ¹⁸.

We have, then, that all the theologians of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries continue, like Saint Thomas, Saint Bonaventure, and Scotus, to regard as definable by divine faith, and therefore as capable of dogmatic evolution, all conclusions properly so called. There is no other difference except that the theologians of Scotist or Nominalist allegiance confuse or do not sufficiently distinguish between the habit of theology and that of faith, or between conclusions before and after the Church's definition, making them matters of faith by themselves (per se) or without definition.

C) 16th Century

382. LET US NOW ENTER THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY, the golden age of the restoration of Catholic theology, in which the great geniuses of the thirteenth century at last find worthy commentators and continuators of their glories. Thirteen are the theologians of this century, among those whom we have been able to consult, who treat the question of the evolution of dogma or the definability of the revealed virtuality. Among them figure names as illustrious as Cardinal Cajetan, Melchor Cano, Domingo Soto, Ambrosio Catarino, Bartolomé de Medina, Domingo Báñez, and Pablo Grisaldi, of the Dominican school; Alfonso de Castro, Andrés de Vega, and Antonio de Córdoba, of the Franciscan; Fray Luis de León, of the Augustinian; Cardinal Toledo, of the nascent Society of Jesus, and the bishops Santiago Simancas and Bartolomé de Torres, of the secular clergy. All the schools or tendencies of Catholic theology in the sixteenth century are, therefore, quite well represented in them. Let us begin with the prince of the commentators on St. Thomas Aquinas ¹⁹.

383. CARDINAL CAJETAN.—Every theologian knows that Cardinal Cajetan has a short treatise on the Immaculate Conception, addressed to Pope Leo X when that Supreme Pontiff was endeavoring to examine in the ecumenical Council of Lateran the definability as a matter of faith of the Immaculate Conception. In that treatise Cajetan had occasion to treat ex professo on what things are or are not definable as divine faith. To this he devotes the first chapter, whose title is: "De duplici via discernendi ea quae fidei sunt, vel ei adversantur". Here is how he expresses himself: "There are two ways by which it can be decided what is to be believed for the Christian religion, one ordinary, the other extraordinary. The ordinary way is the divine revelation made to the first Authors of Sacred Scripture, contained in the Canonical books of the Bible, and in the traditions of the Apostles, in the Creed and other things which it is certain the Church received through the Apostles, such as the sacraments... (now comes the important part). Nor does it matter, in Sacred Scripture and the others, whether something is revealed explicitly (such as the creation of the world, the Incarnation of the Word of God, and other things of this kind) or implicitly, as are all those things whose opposites cannot be maintained along with the truth of Sacred Scripture and of the other things which we hold by certain faith, except that ingenuity, labor, reason, and intellect are needed, so that these things may be made manifest, which are said to be contained IMPLICITLY, being NECESSARILY CONNECTED to those things in which they are said to be contained."²⁰

We ask every reader, especially every Thomist reader, to read and reread dispassionately this text of Cardinal Cajetan. In it he will clearly see taught what forms the basis and the nerve of dogmatic evolution, namely, that everything truly implicit in the revealed deposit can be defined as a dogma of faith, and that everything necessarily connected is truly implicit. Implicitly, as are all things whose opposites cannot be maintained with the truth of Sacred Scripture and of the other things which we know by faith...; those things are said to be contained implicitly which are necessarily connected with the things in which they are said to be contained. A clearer definition of implicit containment could not be given.

384. THE CHURCH'S HUMAN LABOR.—Here too the reader has very clearly set forth what the Church's human labor prior to definition consists of. Intellectual work is required, and very laborious work, which sometimes takes entire centuries. Ingenuity, labor, reason, and intellect are needed. For what purpose? Many are content to answer: to ascertain whether the truth that is to be defined is or is not implicit in the deposit of revelation. That is true, and Cardinal Cajetan also acknowledges it. But those theologians forget that the means the Church uses to know whether a truth is implicit in the deposit is to see whether it is necessarily connected with it. "Ingenuity, labor, reason, and intellect are needed to make manifest that these things, which are said to be contained implicitly, are necessarily connected with those things in which they are said to be contained." That is the goal of the Church's labor (labor done in the council or done previously by the holy Fathers, whose texts the council cites), and that suffices for a definition of faith to be possible. The instrument employed has been the connection, but the thing found and defined is the implicit containment or inclusion. Therefore, absolutely necessary connection with what is revealed, implicitness in what is revealed, and definability by divine faith all come to the same thing. That is the Thomistic doctrine that Cajetan inherited from all his predecessors, and that is found in almost all his Thomistic successors, until the Salmanticenses, entangled in the confusion of Suárez and Lugo, in turn confused some later Thomists.

385. ALFONSO DE CASTRO.—After having heard the Dominican Cajetan, let us hear the Franciscan Castro in his celebrated work Against Heresies:

"That proposition, therefore, which contradicts Sacred Scripture, according to the sense received by the Catholic Church, is beyond all controversy to be judged heretical. Nor is it to be considered whether it openly contradicts or latently: since in whatever way it is established to be opposed, it will rightly be marked as heresy. For there are some heresies whose opposites or contradictories are expressly contained in Sacred Scripture... There are also other heresies whose opposites or contradictories, although they are not so expressed in the Sacred Letters that they are held under that exact wording, are nevertheless inferred from them by the most evident consequence, and such assertions latently fight against Sacred Scripture: because Scripture is opposed to those things which necessarily derive from them. And such propositions are also to be regarded as heretical, just like the former ones: since those things which are inferred by necessary consequence from the contents of Sacred Scripture have as much firmness of truth and necessity of faith as those from which they are gathered... This opinion is taught by Gregory Nazianzen, book 5 on theology, saying thus: What is gathered from the Sacred Scriptures is to be regarded just as if it were written in them. Thus Gregory. According to this rule, many Sacred Doctors assert and most constantly proclaim as necessarily to be believed those things which are gathered from the sayings of Sacred Scripture, although they are not found in it." ²¹

Here we have not only the evolution of dogma clearly defended as proceeding by way of true theological conclusion, but also the text of Saint Gregory Nazianzen, which we cited elsewhere (357), interpreted in that sense.

386. DOMINGO SOTO.—Leaving aside for now Melchor Cano, whose thought we will treat in a separate section (449), there follows his fellow friar and colleague in teaching at Salamanca, the celebrated Domingo Soto.

It is well known that Domingo de Soto not only defended the definability of faith of the properly so-called theological conclusion, but went so far as to make it an article of faith by itself (per se) or without a definition of the Church, with the result that only probable or doubtful conclusions would belong to theology if the evident ones belonged per se to faith. In this, Domingo de Soto was opposed by Melchor Cano, by Báñez, and by all the Thomists ²².

Nevertheless, Soto corrected or explained himself in his classic work De natura et gratia,²³ where, in admitting the definability of faith of theological conclusions or deductions, he warns that they are only matters of faith when those deductions are defined by the authority of the Church. Here are his words: “The third point is that which we have already set forth above, not in one place only. For a habit does not produce assent except regarding its proper object (which is an axiom most celebrated among all philosophers, as well as among theologians): but the object or proposal of faith is nothing other than God, and those things which pertain to our hope, revealed in Sacred Scripture, or from it deduced and expressed by the authority of the Church: therefore assent of faith belongs only to those things”^46. If, then, Domingo Soto exceeded himself in any way on this question, it was certainly not in restricting dogmatic development, but in admitting it excessively—an excess which he himself later corrected, explaining himself as all Thomists explain themselves.

387. AMBROSE CATHARINUS.—Alongside Dominic Soto, let us cite his, on several questions, irreconcilable and bilious opponent, the famous Ambrose Catharinus. Famous, we say, not only for his originality and singularity on many questions, but also because, being a Dominican, he seems to have delighted in attacking with preference the opinions of his brothers in the habit. Nevertheless, in this question of the definability by divine faith of conclusions, he follows the traditional doctrine. Let us hear his words: “I conclude, therefore, that just as he is a heretic who not only denies what is expressed in the Scriptures, but also what is contained among those things which are expressed, and what is deduced from them by a necessary and evident consequence, so too is he a transgressor of divine law, not only who violates what is expressly commanded there, but also who neglects what is evidently deduced from it” ²⁴. And shortly before he had said: “This is not opposed to that common saying of theologians, that those conclusions which are deduced from the articles of faith do not pertain to faith, but to theology: [for] the conclusion deducible by evident consequence from an article of faith does not have the same evidence in the one believing, which the article itself has in itself. And from this it is understood that what is deduced by evident consequence from faith is certain by faith; yet it is not an article of faith.” Then he adds: “It is not necessary that everything which is of faith be an article of faith, nor is it necessary that it be expressly contained in the Scriptures; just as it is of faith that Christ is true God and true man, and yet it is not explicitly an article, nor is it expressly found in the Scriptures. Hence let those who say this consider how they miss the point, namely, that a conclusion is said to be of faith in two ways: one, because it is expressly contained in the faith, or is a principal [point] of faith; another, because it is deduced by necessary consequence from those things which are of faith. The latter the heretics do not deny to be of faith, but they deny the consequence; just as the Nestorians and Eutychians did not deny that Christ is the Son of God, but they denied the consequence.” Thus far Catharinus. From these words it clearly follows that, according to him, the infallible authority of the Church can define as of divine faith not only what is expressly contained in the sources of revelation, but also what is deduced from them by evident consequence. One may indeed call into question his examples and some verbal expressions, but the doctrine itself that he sets down is the traditional one, which we are defending. But before Melchor Cano and Báñez, let us listen to Dominic Soto himself, proposing and solving in his own way the argument about the resurrection of Christ. For thus he expresses himself in his commentary on the Posterior Analytics, where, after having proposed the objection, he answers: “To the first argument it is answered that a conclusion of this kind can be considered in two ways. In one way, insofar as it is a conclusion, and thus it does not have the same evidence as the principle; hence it does not have the same assent nor the same certainty. In another way, insofar as the evidence of the conclusion is the same as that of the principle, for it is known through the principle, just as the conclusion is known through the principle: and in this way [a conclusion] is said to be of faith: for they who follow through such a consequence have the same assent of faith... Nor can they be called (the assents of theology) faith: for faith is an assent which is held immediately by authority alone, or which is evidently deduced from it, as Christ is a man, and consequently, is visible” (DOMINIC SOTO, In dialecticam Aristotelis commentarii, 1st part, q. 2, ad 7 [Salmanticae 1574], p. 91). “To the third argument, the most learned Master, Brother Dominic de Soto (bk. 1 Post., q. 2), says that when a conclusion is deduced by evident consequence from the principles of faith, then the conclusion itself is likewise certain according to faith... However, this opinion is false... Likewise, false is what he says, “it is alike of faith: Christ is a man and Christ is capable of laughter.” For if someone were to confess that Christ is a perfect man, but were to deny that He is capable of laughter, because he opines that visibility does not pertain to the perfection of man, he would be a bad philosopher, but not yet a heretic, since it has not so far been defined by the Church that Christ is capable of laughter. But if the Church were to define that visibility pertains to the perfection of human nature, then he who would deny it would already be a heretic” (BÁÑEZ, In 1 partem P. Thomae, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3, argument [Salmanticae 1585], p. 53). Melchor Cano also refutes Soto, although without naming him, since they taught together in Salamanca. The text we shall give later, when treating of the mind of Melchor Cano (455).

**388. ANDRÉS DE VEGA.—**There was no need to cite this Franciscan theologian, for all the manuals bring his name alongside that of Vázquez as a defender of the definability de fide of conclusions properly so called. We believe, however, that the reader will be pleased to know the text, rarely cited, in which he defends his opinion, and which reads as follows:

"Many are the propositions of faith that cannot otherwise be proven to be of faith except because they evidently follow from what is believed, together with at least one proposition evident according to natural light. And this can be shown in many propositions about God and about Christ, which are received by all the faithful on this account as certain, and their opposites are deemed heretical: as is clear concerning these: God is incorporeal, God is immaterial, God is of infinite power; Christ has a heart, Christ has phlegm, Christ according to His body and according to His soul and all things contained in them is under both species of the Sacrament of the Eucharist: Christ without the substance of bread and wine is under both species of bread and wine, and similar ones. For propositions of this kind are not expressed in the Scriptures, but they are evidently deduced from what is contained in them, at least with one evident according to natural light" ²⁵.

The reader will have noted in this text by Vega the same defect that we already noted in almost all theologians of Scotist or nominalist affiliation. They defend dogmatic development, but they defend it excessively, by making it dogmatic or of divine faith, without distinguishing between before or after the Church's definition.

**389. ANTONIO OF CÓRDOBA.—**Let us join with Andrew of Vega his fellow friar Anthony of Córdoba, who defends with no less clarity the dogmatic development by way of conclusion, although with the same defect as Vega. Here are his words:

"A proposition of Catholic faith, or Catholic truth, is a revealed proposition or truth immediately or mediately. It is called a truth revealed immediately or mediately, which others call in itself or in its antecedent... Moreover, a truth revealed mediately, or in its antecedent, is that which is inferred from the aforementioned Catholic truths, in themselves or immediately revealed, in good, certain, and necessary consequence, in the light of faith (from two premises of faith) or natural reason (or with one premise of reason), even if such a truth in its proper form is not contained in Sacred Scripture, such as that Christ had nerves, and blood, and other humors, bones and veins, and the like. And to this class belong almost all the determinations or definitions of Councils and of the Supreme Pontiffs, however, in matters of faith and morals, which are deduced in the aforementioned manner from Sacred Scripture and are proposed as necessarily to be believed by all." ²⁶

This wise Franciscan is not lacking when he qualifies as mediately revealed omnes fere definitiones Conciliorum. Saint Thomas did not say almost all, but was content to say many: "And for this reason many things are now considered heretical, which were not considered so before, because it is now more manifest what follows from them" ²⁷

390. BARTOLOMÉ DE TORRES.—Following the chronological order, let us cite a commentator on Saint Thomas, belonging to the secular clergy, primary professor at the University of Sigüenza in Spain and bishop of the Canary Islands. Commenting on the already so often cited article of Saint Thomas, "Whether it is lawful to hold contrary opinions about the notions," he expresses himself thus:

"St. Thomas therefore, having first laid down a division of the things proposed for belief, establishes two conclusions. The division is plainly this: The things proposed for belief are of two kinds; some pertain to the faith directly, others indirectly. Those things pertain directly to the faith which are principally divinely handed down... But those things pertain indirectly to the faith which are not proposed to us as things chiefly to be believed, but from their opposites something contrary to the faith follows. With this division laid down, the first conclusion of St. Thomas is: to assert with obstinacy something false, contrary to what directly pertains to the faith, is heretical. The second conclusion, to assert without obstinacy something false, repugnant to what indirectly pertains to the faith, is not heresy...

Fourth assertion: Obstinacy consists in this: that someone, deliberately, knowingly, and prudently, dissents from any proposition of the faith, or assents to its opposite, understanding that it is contained in Sacred Scripture, or in a definition of the Church, or is evidently deduced from them, even if he dissents from it for a single moment of time. St. Thomas openly holds this in the present passage²⁸

391. SANTIAGO SIMANCAS.—Let us consider the testimony of another bishop of the secular clergy, who wrote his work On Catholic Institutions at the request of Pope Gregory XIII, to whom it is dedicated. He speaks thus:

"We are bound to believe, not only the divine Scriptures, the traditions of the Church, the just councils, the Constitutions of the Supreme Pontiffs, the decrees of the Fathers, and the received opinions of the holy doctors; but also those truths which are deduced from these by a certain consequence in the light of faith, or by evident natural reason: provided that the truths are inferred in such a way that they are persuasive to all, especially to the wise; because these truths are inherent in them, and are comprehended and contained there, whence they are deduced by such a consequence. And this is the true, received, and Catholic opinion" ²⁹.

Note the reader how by conclusions Simancas understands inclusive conclusions. “Because these are inherent in those, and are comprehended and contained in them, whence such consequences are drawn.” The definability of faith comes from that inclusion or containment; the connection is nothing but the means the Church uses to see it.

392. PAUL GRISALDI.—No less clearly does the Dominican Grisaldi express himself:

"To embrace the whole matter in one word, the proposition of faith is to believe and hold all those things which Sacred Scripture, Apostolic tradition, the Roman See, a general Council, the unanimous exposition of all the Saints on the Sacred Scriptures, and those things which are deduced from these by necessary consequence... Not only that which was expressly revealed to the Apostles belongs to Catholic doctrine, but also that which is drawn from one revealed proposition and another known by natural light, by syllogism and evident inference" ³⁰.

393. BARTOLOMÉ DE MEDINA.—A contemporary of Grisaldi and a Dominican like him is the celebrated theologian Bartolomé de Medina, one of the immortal principal professors of the University of Salamanca and a classic commentator on the Prima Secundae of Saint Thomas ³¹. Let us see how he expresses himself:

"The second question, then, is whether we can know certainly and infallibly that we have divine and supernatural faith. Against the affirmative side one argues thus: for infallible certainty makes us certain only of the divine revelations that the Church proposes... The answer is that the virtue of faith is not only that which is revealed immediately, but also that which is deduced by an evident consequence from divine revelations. This truth—namely, that the believer has true faith—is deduced from revealed truths through an evident consequence, in this manner: it is a matter of faith that no one can assent to all that the Church proposes unless he has true and divine faith; but I experience that I assent to all that the Church proposes; therefore I have true faith"³²

394. FRAY LUIS DE LEÓN.—He well deserves to be placed alongside Medina, his colleague on the faculty at Salamanca, the illustrious Augustinian friar Luis de León, eminent in literature, no less eminent in Scriptural science, and as eminent in sacred speculative theology as in Sacred Scripture or in the fine arts. The fact that his theological works remained for almost three centuries without a good edition is the only thing that can explain why he is not cited as often as he deserves. Let us cite his words concerning the question at hand:

"Concerning the things and propositions of faith, we can speak in two ways: in one way, absolutely, according to themselves; in another way, in relation to us. If we speak in the first way, only those things are of faith which are revealed by God, either immediately, because they have been explicitly handed down by Him, or mediately, because they are evidently deduced from those things which He Himself handed down. But if we speak in the second way, then those things are of faith which are both revealed by God and are known to us by some reason to have been revealed by God. But there are four reasons which can render us certain about this: first, Sacred Scripture; second, the tradition of the Apostles; third, the definitions of councils and popes; fourth, the evidence of reason inferring from one thing to another... But someone will doubt concerning what we have said in the last place, namely, that propositions which are deduced by evident consequence from propositions of faith pertain to faith, such as "Christ is capable of laughter." For this seems false... In this doubt, let this be: First conclusion: such propositions evidently gathered from propositions of faith are also to be considered of faith. This is clear, because they are revealed by God, at least mediately. Likewise, in the Third Council of Constantinople, those who denied that there is a human will in Christ were judged heretics, because this proposition, "Christ has a human will," follows from this one: "Christ is (perfect) man"³³

Note again how the reader observes that the reason theologians always give for saying that the conclusions are definable as of faith is not precisely because there is a connection with what is revealed, but because, there being a truly theological connection, there is implicit containment, and therefore there is true revelation, though mediate for us: "It is clear, because they are REVEALED by God, at least mediately."

395. CARDINAL TOLEDO.—Cardinal Toledo follows, the first cardinal of the Society of Jesus, and no less pious than eminent a theologian. Commenting on the second article of question 11 of the Secunda Secundae, "Whether heresy properly concerns those things which are of faith," he expresses himself thus: "Conclusion: Heresy is an error concerning those things which are of faith directly or indirectly, for instance, concerning the articles of faith or concerning things inferred from them, asserted with obstinacy... You will say: what is called a Catholic proposition? I say that an assertion or proposition is called Catholic in two ways. In one way immediately, for instance, that which is held directly from the rule of faith. But the rule for discerning faith is manifold, as we said above. For it is Sacred Scripture, a General Council, the Pontiff as Pontiff, Apostolic tradition, and the Universal Church. Therefore, those things which are held from any of these rules are called Catholic assertions in the former way. In the other way, an assertion is called Catholic mediately, which is derived by the best and clearest consequence from a former proposition. Therefore, whoever contradicts either of them falls into heresy"³⁴.

396. DOMINGO BÁÑEZ.—We shall conclude our examination of the theologians of the sixteenth century³⁵ with the illustrious name of one of the most penetrating and exact commentators on the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas and, in our judgment, the one who bears off the palm from all the rest, after, as is clear, Cardinal Cajetan. Báñez's doctrine on the evolution of dogma may be summarized in these four propositions: First: the theological conclusion properly so called is not of divine faith before its definition by the Church. Second: but it is of divine faith if the Church defines it. Third: the Church can define, and has in fact defined, rigorous and proper theological conclusions. Fourth: such definitions do not constitute a new faith, but they do constitute a new explanation or a fuller explanation, although not fuller than that which the Apostles possessed. These four propositions, which form as it were the summary of St. Thomas's doctrine on dogmatic evolution, could be proven with abundant texts from Báñez. Let us choose only four short and clear texts.

a) "Ad tertium argumentum doctissimus Magister de Soto ³⁶ says that when a conclusion is deduced through an evident consequence from a principle of faith, then that very conclusion is likewise certain according to faith... However, this opinion is false... Likewise, what he says is false, that "Christ is a man" and "Christ is capable of laughter" are equally matters of faith. For if someone were to confess that Christ is a perfect man, yet deny that He is capable of laughter, because he thinks that capacity for laughter does not pertain to the perfection of a man, this person would be a bad philosopher, but not yet a heretic. For it has not so far been defined by the Church that Christ is capable of laughter... Therefore, the answer to the argument is that the conclusions which are deduced from the principles of faith, or from one principle of faith and another naturally evident one, through a good consequence, are PROPERLY the conclusions of theological science. And nevertheless they are said to be conclusions of faith, not immediately, but mediately: and the opposite of these is said to be an error about faith mediately: and whoever thinks the contrary falls under suspicion of heresy" ³⁷

b) “Since it has not so far been defined by the Church that Christ is capable of laughter, but if the Church were to define that capacity for laughter pertains to the perfection of human nature, just as it has been defined that He has a twofold will, human and divine, then whoever denied that Christ is capable of laughter would be a heretic” ³⁸

c) "Holy Church has many times defined propositions as being of faith which were not expressly contained in Sacred Scripture, but were commonly and constantly affirmed by all theologians and doctors of the Church, and were theological propositions... Therefore, in like manner, those truths in which the whole school of theologians agrees could likewise now be defined as being of faith: hence to contradict them is erroneous: e.g.: all theologians firmly teach that Christ the Lord, from the instant of His Incarnation, saw the Divine Essence. This is not expressly found in Sacred Scripture, nor has it been defined by the Church of God as to be held as of faith: but theologians infer it by good consequence from other passages of Holy Scripture and from the foundations of the faith, and it is so commonly received that no one can deny it without the mark of error, and it could be defined by the Church as being of faith³⁹.

d) “It is an error in faith to assert that after the times of the Apostles, the Doctors of the Church or even the Church herself believes more things pertaining to the faith or more explicitly than the Apostles and the Sacred Writers of evangelical doctrine believed... This is proved secondly: because the Church has so far proposed or defined nothing for the faithful to believe that was not contained in the Sacred Scriptures or in the Apostolic traditions, either expressed or virtually contained, so that it could be drawn thence by evident consequence⁴⁰. “Neither the Supreme Pontiff nor the whole Church can establish a new article or a new dogma as to its substance. This is explained by us with an example. If someone consults a moral philosopher about some moral doubt, and he replies according to moral principles, then that philosopher rather explains what was hidden than is the author of the truth. In this manner, when the Supreme Pontiff defines that something is to be held as a matter of faith, he acts as one explaining a latent truth, not as the author of the truth... And in this sense is St. Thomas to be understood in the article, when he says that the new edition of the Creed pertains to the authority of the Supreme Pontiff, namely as to the new explanation. From which it follows that heretics wrongly object against us that the Supreme Pontiff makes a new faith⁴¹.”

**397. IMPORTANT CONCLUSION.—**Anyone who thoroughly grasps these four assertions of Báñez, which are but a faithful commentary on the doctrine of Saint Thomas, will see how there can exist, and in fact does exist, after the Apostles, a true dogmatic evolution by way of rigorous and proper theological conclusion, yet without the habits of theology and faith thereby ceasing to be specifically distinct; without thereby requiring new revelations or any passage from the non-revealed to the revealed, but rather from the immediately revealed in itself to the immediately revealed for us; without thereby, finally, such evolution being an evolution as regards substance, or heterogeneous, but rather as regards new explanation, or homogeneous.

If certain Thomists, after the golden age of Theology, have not known how to reconcile these things, and even find them contradictory, it is because, blinded by purely connective virtuality (virtuale tantum), they have lost the true Thomistic notion of implicit virtuality, which is the specific constituent of true and proper Theology and the basis, at the same time, of dogmatic evolution. Because it is an evolution of true virtuality, it is true evolution; because it is an evolution of truly implicit virtuality, it is an evolution of explanation or homogeneous evolution.

398. THE INFLUENCE OF MOLINA.—In the previous section we have just seen how no theologian before Molina, at least among those we know, had denied the possibility and existence of dogmatic evolution by way of true virtuality or theological conclusion.

In other various places in this work (84 and 233) we have also explained how Molina radically denied the existence and even the possibility of such an evolution, by denying that the Church can define, as a true dogma of divine faith, anything that is virtually or mediately revealed.

No one will be surprised, then, that from Molina onward, the opinion of theologians is no longer completely unanimous on this question. Given the indisputable prestige and well-deserved renown that the original and independent author of "middle knowledge" immediately acquired, if it had come to pass that the host of eminent theologians that the Company of Jesus had in the seventeenth century had supported Molina on this question, as they supported him on so many others, the traditional doctrine on dogmatic development would have run the risk of disappearing from Theology, for the other schools no longer had in that century and in the following one many theologians of the depth and breadth of those of the sixteenth century. The seventeenth century is the golden age of the theologians of the Company; just as the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries had been for the Thomist school.

Fortunately for Catholic theology, the principal theologians of the Society, such as Vázquez, Suárez, Bellarmine, Lugo, Tanner..., declared themselves on this question against Molina, and to this it is due that the vast majority of later theologians, without distinction of schools, have continued to defend in substance the dogmatic development, despite an enormous variety and confusion of new nomenclature.

This is what we will try to show in this section, classifying theologians by centuries, as in the previous section, for greater order and clarity. To avoid going on too long, we will make as few comments as possible. On the other hand, we have chosen only texts from authors whose mind is so clear that it needs no commentary.

399. GABRIEL VÁZQUEZ, Soc. Iesu.—There was no need to cite this eminent theologian, for he is known and cited by all not only as a defender, but as an exaggerator of dogmatic evolution, not distinguishing it well from Theology. We have already cited his text elsewhere (85). We shall only note that the Thomists have always opposed him not for having made theological conclusions definable as matters of faith, but for having made them matters of faith even without a definition by the Church, and much more so for having compared the value of the Church's definition with the value of the theologian's private reasoning.

400. FRANCISCO SUÁREZ AND CARDINAL DE LUGO, Soc. Iesu. We have already cited the texts and set forth the position of the eminent Suárez, the most illustrious of all those of his century, on this problem (65-78). Not only does he defend the definability of faith of the implicit virtuality under the name of confused formal, but he goes so far as to defend the definability of faith of the non-implicit virtuality, believing that this was that virtuality properly so called, whose definability of faith traditional Theology had always defended. By the immense authority he exercised over all contemporary and subsequent theologians, and by the sharp phrase (mirandum est) with which he stigmatized Molina's position on this matter, he has been one of the theologians who have most contributed to the acceptance by all, in substance, of the traditional idea of the development of dogma, while at the same time, with his new non-implicit virtual and his consequent theory of new revelations, he contributed to its denial in formulas. The fecund genius of Suárez has left its traces impressed on this question of dogmatic development, as on almost all other questions, more deeply than any of his contemporaries or successors.

From Cardinal De Lúgo, the prince of moral theologians, after Saint Thomas, according to the opinion of Saint Alphonsus Liguori, and no less a celebrated dogmatic theologian than a moralist, we have already seen (79) that he defends the definability of faith of the theological-metaphysical-connexive conclusion, which is the one that interests us, and he even goes so far as to admit, like Suárez, the definability of the physical-connexive conclusion. Like Suárez, he is one of the theologians who have most influenced the fact that the traditional idea of dogmatic evolution by way of a theological-metaphysical conclusion was fundamentally admitted by almost all later theologians, although under the names of formal-confused or of virtual-identical-real.

401. CARDINAL BELLARMINE.—This distinguished theologian, rightly called the prince of Catholic controversialists against Protestantism, and already beatified for his heroic virtues, could not fail to defend dogmatic development, knowing as he did so perfectly the patristic and theological tradition. Let us cite a few brief texts:

"The dogmas of faith can be proven in four ways. First, from the express testimony of Sacred Scripture... Second, through *evident deduction from those things which are expressly contained in Scripture... Third, from the word of God, not written, but handed down... Fourth, through evident deduction from the handed-down word of God... The sufficiency of these four ways is clear from the fact that only that is of faith which has been revealed by God, either mediately or immediately: and divine revelations are partly written, partly not written. Thus the decrees of councils and of popes, the consensus of the doctors, and all other things are reduced to these four: for they make a matter of faith only when they explain the Word of God or deduce something from it" ¹.

"Councils do not have nor do they write immediate revelations of God, or the words of God, but they only declare what the written or traditional word of God is, and how it must be understood, and furthermore from it they deduce conclusions by reasoning" ².

**102. BALTHASAR NAVARRETE, O.P.—**The Dominican Navarrete follows, a most faithful interpreter of St. Thomas, and whose authority was always very great for all later theologians, especially for John of St. Thomas. Here is how he expresses himself:

Whether propositions defined by the Church, which are gathered from the articles of faith, are the principles of theology?

Molina, on this article, in his first disputation, holds the negative side... This opinion contains many falsehoods, which for now we do not wish to mark with a censure, because it is not sufficiently clear what this author meant...

From this it is also gathered that this proposition: Christ has two wills, can be understood in two ways. First, in the manner in which it is deduced through theological discourse and evident consequence from the principles of faith, namely, that Christ is true God and true man: and thus we assent to it through the habit of theology. Second, in the manner in which that very proposition is defined by the Church, and thus we do not assent to it through the habit of theology, but through the habit of faith... Wherefore the said author (Molina) errs greatly in asserting that the theologian assents to that truth through the habit of theology, just as the Church deduces it: for although the Fathers who were present at the said Councils deduced that proposition through the habit of theology, nevertheless, once the definition was presupposed, they had assent concerning it through the habit of faith" ³

403. JUAN GONZÁLEZ DE ALBEDA, Ord. Praed.—Let us join with Navarrete his fellow religious, and like him a professor at the University of Alcalá, after having been one at the College of Saint Thomas of the Minerva in Rome, Master González de Albeda, no less esteemed and cited than Navarrete by later Thomists. He states the following:

"Second conclusion: The theologian does not assent to propositions demonstrated in theology, before they are defined by the Church, through the habit of faith, but through another lower and subordinate light, namely through the theological habit and assent: for example, to this truth, Christ is capable of laughter, the theologian does not assent immediately through the light of faith, but through the acquired light of theology. This conclusion proceeds against Father Gabriel Vázquez...

Third conclusion: All the faithful, by the habit of faith immediately, assent to propositions immediately defined by the Church. This conclusion is evidently gathered from what was said in the first conclusion, and it is proven first from the common consensus of the Doctors, who teach it with St. Thomas... And therefore every proposition immediately defined by the Church pertains immediately to the habit of faith, on which see the Doctors cited above and Master Bañez.

Secondly, it is confirmed and explained: because the proposition demonstrated by the theologian is not immediately of faith, but only mediately, because although the principles are supernatural, namely the articles of faith, they are nevertheless applied to the demonstrated truth by means of natural discourse, which is carried out in due form through syllogistic art. Hence it depends immediately on something human and natural. But the defined proposition, as regards all things on which it depends, rests upon the testimony of God: for the principles are supernatural, and the discourse is regulated by the motion and assistance of the Holy Spirit, infallibly directing the Pontiff. And if it assumes a natural premise, even regarding that premise He directs him specially...

Therefore there is no doubt that the Supreme Pontiff, when defining, makes a proposition of faith immediately, since he can make an article of faith, not because he thereby makes a new faith, but because he newly and explicitly determines what was implicitly contained in ancient definitions.

The foundations by which Molina is moved... are that in the Church there is no faculty or authority to make something a matter of faith, which it was not before...

It is answered that in the Church there is the power to issue the Symbol of faith, not by a new revelation issuing a new faith, as we said in the notable second point from the beginning; but by explaining the things to be believed, drawing them from the things revealed... And since it is certain by faith immediately that the Church, as ruled by the Holy Spirit, cannot err: it is also certain by faith that in what it here and now proposes, it does not err. For we have already demonstrated above that when a universal proposition is immediately of faith, even the singular propositions of it are immediately of faith, and therefore every proposition defined by the Church is of faith. Yet it is not another faith, neither wholly nor partially, but it is the same faith more fully explained, as St. Thomas teaches ⁴.

All the paragraphs that we have just cited, both from Navarrete and from González, are of the purest Thomistic tradition, without there yet appearing in them the slightest trace of the confusion introduced by the Suarezian nomenclature. Let all Thomists meditate on them, especially those who are scandalized by whatever they do not find in the Salmanticenses or in Billuart.

404. ADAM TANNER, SOC. IESU.—After the two celebrated Spanish theologians just mentioned, let us cite the no less celebrated German theologian and controversialist Adam Tanner, of whom Miguel de San José has justly written: "Among the controversialist theologians of his age, whom Germany alone possessed as its best, the first place must rightly be assigned to Tanner" ⁵. He speaks thus:

“The question concerns conclusions not immediately revealed... First assertion: The assent to a theological conclusion, as such, namely as formally deduced from revealed principles, is not an assent of faith, but of theology. It is the common view against Scotus and Aureolus... Second assertion: Assuming the theological discourse and assent (given the definition of the Church, a Thomist would say) in which either both premises are revealed, or one is revealed and the other is naturally evident, as a condition applying the formal reason of faith, every theological conclusion can also be immediately believed by faith... This is proved... because whoever reveals something also reveals, as far as in him lies, that which is necessarily and evidently connected with it: and hence every truth necessarily and evidently connected with a revealed truth is also revealed” ⁶.

And in the treatise De fide he repeats the same thing: “Assertion IX: for divine revelation, insofar as it is the formal object of faith, it makes no difference whether the truth to be believed is immediately revealed by God in itself, or only mediately... I taught the same thing in the first volume, although some think otherwise... But the reason for the assertion is general: because for something to be of faith, and thus able and obliged to be believed by me through faith, it is enough that it is in fact revealed by God; but such are these propositions of which we speak, because speaking in itself, whoever reveals something also reveals those things that are necessarily connected with it... By which argument we generally proved in the cited place that every evidently deduced conclusion, whether from two revealed premises, or from one revealed and one evident premise, is objectively of faith ⁷

405. FRANCIS SYLVIUS.—Let us now hear the most faithful commentator on St. Thomas, of Belgian nationality and of the secular clergy, Francis Sylvius. He speaks thus: “The Church, when she either defines or proposes for belief some dogma of faith, does not establish an entirely new article, but partly declares what is contained either in Scripture or in the Apostolic traditions: and partly defines and commands that it be believed in a way in which previously it was not everywhere believed explicitly, because that dogma had not yet been drawn out from its principles” ⁸ “It must therefore be noted which propositions pertain to the faith. Those pertain to the faith which are certainly contained in the Scriptures or in the Apostolic traditions or which have been defined by the Apostolic See, whether in a council or outside of one... But concerning those things which by a necessary and evident consequence follow from some proposition of faith, of which sort are theological conclusions, it must be said that they are not in themselves and immediately pertaining to the faith, and that one who obstinately denies them is not to be judged a heretic, unless he perseveres so obstinately that he does not withdraw from his error even when he sees what follows from this, as Blessed Thomas speaks” ⁹ “The second article (Whether heresy is properly about those things which are of the faith) teaches that heresy is properly concerned only with those things which are of the faith. He adds, moreover, that these are of two kinds. For some things pertain to the faith directly and principally, that is, without a consequence of reason, of which sort are both the articles of faith and other things which it is certain the Church holds as dogmas of faith. But some things pertain indirectly and secondarily or mediately: of which sort are those things which are gathered by a necessary consequence from some proposition immediately pertaining to the faith. What he subjoins: “and heresy can be about both”, is true, but in the way in which he explains himself in lecture 4 on chapter 2 of the first [letter] to the Corinthians. Something pertains, he says, to the discipline of the faith in two ways... But some things indirectly... From such things, however, a person is not judged a heretic, unless he perseveres so obstinately that he does not withdraw from his error, even when he sees what follows"¹⁰

406. DOMINGO GRAVINA, Ord. Praed.—Now comes an Italian Dominican, Domingo Gravina, "not less distinguished for doctrine than for holiness of life"¹¹. In his controversies against heretics he raises the question of "Whether from one proposition of faith and another natural, necessary one, a conclusion of faith follows," and he answers thus: "That which pertains at least indirectly to faith, as St. Thomas teaches (p. 1, q. 23, art. 4), is that to whose negation something contrary to faith follows: but to the negation of such a conclusion this happens in that way, as is manifest: therefore... Before the definition of the Church to deny conclusions of this kind is indeed erroneous... After the definition of the Church to deny them is heretical: for they are proposed to be believed immediately and without discourse, whence they are rightly numbered among the principles"¹². We have chosen these two texts, among many others of Gravina, so that two things may be seen again: first, how St. Thomas includes theological conclusions among that which is revealed indirectly; second, how the Thomists before the Salmanticenses, when treating whether theological conclusions are of faith, always distinguish, unless they take it as understood, between before and after the definition of the Church.

407. JOHN PAUL NAZARIO, Ord. Praed.—Along with Gravina, let another Italian Dominican go, a very well-known and frequently cited commentator on St. Thomas, "a man quick and keen in mind, a distinguished master of Sacred Theology"¹³. Let us also choose two short little texts: "Know moreover that the conclusions deduced and defined by the Holy Fathers assembled in the Councils from the principles of faith pertain immediately to the faith... and from these the error of Molina is evident"¹⁴. "I call that a theological conclusion which is not found in the Sacred Scriptures or in the divine traditions expressly in formal terms, or in entirely equivalent ones, although it may be determined by the Supreme Pontiff or by the sacred Councils and is to be believed by faith"¹⁵.

408. FRANCISCO DEL CASTILLO, Ord. Sti. Franc.—Following in chronological order is the Madrilenian Francisco del Castillo, a Franciscan. As a good Scotist, he could not but depart from Molina on this matter of dogmatic evolution by way of revealed virtuality. A single text will suffice:

"From what has been said, you should infer what must be said regarding that question which Molina raises, loc. cit., and Suárez, namely whether propositions virtually contained in the revealed truths are matters of faith, if they are defined by the Church? I answer that yes: first, because it was already revealed through the conclusion deduced from the premises: whence the Church does not define what is not revealed, which is the inconvenience that compels Molina to assert the opposite; and although such a conclusion is theologically elicited, objectively nevertheless it is of faith" ¹⁶

409. FRANCISCO DE OVIEDO, Soc. Jesu.—Alongside the aforementioned Madrilenian, we shall cite another, also from Madrid, but of the Society of Jesus. The passages we shall quote from him will be longer, not precisely because he was a theologian who “was a man of keen intellect and sound judgment for understanding, handling, and unraveling questions, especially moral ones” ¹⁷, but rather because he is one of the many who have unwittingly exposed the contraband hidden under the new nomenclature of confused form introduced by Suárez. Let us hear him:

"Universal revelation or confused revelation and mediate or remote revelation are also distinguished, in that universal or confused revelation immediately attains the very same object as singular and distinct revelation, and is distinguished from the latter only by the mode of conceiving.

Mediate knowledge, however, does not attain the very object itself which immediate knowledge attains. For immediate knowledge attains the object in itself; mediate knowledge, however, does not attain it in itself, but in something that is inferred from it, as when it is revealed that Christ is a man, the revelation terminates at those things which substantially constitute man, and from the fact that it terminates at this, the revelation is said to be mediate with respect to all those things which are inferred from them through true causality. Thus it is said that, from the fact that it has been revealed that Christ is a man, it is mediately revealed that He is capable of laughter. Now suppose, for the sake of explaining the matter, that risibility is a passion physically distinct from humanity, or substitute in place of risibility any accident distinct and naturally inseparable from humanity: this thing, however, which is to be mediately revealed, is not in reality something revealed, but something necessarily inferred from that which was revealed...

In the preceding point, no. 78, I explained what virtual and mediate revelation is: I now discuss whether this suffices for an act of faith; for example, whether from the very fact that it is revealed that Christ is a man, one can believe by an act of faith that there is in Him a superadded power of laughing. And for the sake of the discussion, I suppose it is evident to every man that this power is in Him. In this way, I agitate the question, and I do not inquire whether from the fact that it is revealed that Christ is a man, one can believe that He is capable of laughter; because although under these terms the same question may be agitated, and it is commonly proposed under them, some abuse them, and they transfer the question to the capacity for laughter identified with the rational predicate: in which sense the question is not to be understood; for the capacity for laughter taken in this way is the same as rationality, and therefore, by the very fact that this is revealed, that also will be in reality revealed.

I say this not superfluously in the matter: for there are some predicates, identified with others, about whose identity we are not surely certain. Let an example be in God: for many are of the opinion that in Him there is justice, a virtue taken in a special sense. Let us grant this opinion to be true; with its truth posited, in God it will be the same thing to be omnipotent, or to be God, and to have the attribute of justice: and therefore the revelation which says that He is God says that He is just, with respect to one who adequately penetrates what the meaning of this name God imports in the reality.

Notwithstanding this, however the matter may stand, in relation to us it has not been revealed that there is in God an attribute of justice, taken specifically as a virtue, because we can only know probable certainty regarding the existence of this attribute, which we can also probably deny. And hence, in reality, by the very fact that God is said to exist, it is said that the attribute of special justice is in Him, because in fact it is the same really as the divine nature: nevertheless, that revelation is not so applied to us, who only hold probable opinions about the existence of this attribute, that by its force we could elicit an act of faith by which we judge that God has the aforesaid attribute of omnipotence, or that He is omnipotent. But in one who evidently knew that omnipotence and the special attribute of justice are really identified, by that very fact, since he could believe one attribute by an act of faith, he could believe the other as well, even under the express concept by which one attribute is formally distinguished from another...

I would say this against Puente Hurtado and others, who confuse the question between predicates that are really distinct and others that are distinguished only formally, and to these—only formally distinct—precisely because one is understood as prior and in the manner of essence, and the other as posterior in the manner of a passion, they wish to extend the opinion asserting that a conclusion drawn from one revealed premise and another evidently known one is not a matter of faith.

With the question understood in this way, the affirmative opinion is held by Cano, Vega... The negative opinion is handed down by the same Cano, Suárez... I embrace this negative opinion... The reason is: an object connected with what is revealed, precisely insofar as it is connected with it, can only be believed because of the connection that exists between it and another revealed object; but this connection is not a motive of faith; therefore it cannot be believed on the motive of faith: therefore it cannot be believed by an act of faith. The major premise is clear: for we suppose that the object is not revealed in itself, but in another with which it is connected and not identified. Hence the entire reason for assenting must be the connection. The minor premise is self-evident, because the formal object of faith is revelation or divine authority: not, indeed, the connection of one predicate with others¹⁸.

We are confident that every professional theologian, and even anyone interested in this most serious problem of what the traditional opinion on the development of dogma is, will forgive us for having copied such a long paragraph because of its value in bringing to light the true meaning of the new nomenclature introduced by Suárez, with the confused formal and pure virtual, and the new meaning thereby given to the traditional names of immediate and mediate. Under the name of confused formal, or of immediate implicit, or of virtual implicit, or of revealed IN RE, they understand what is really identical with the revealed deposit, and they reserve the name of mediate, or virtual, or cohexive for what is really distinct from what is revealed and, therefore, not revealed. In this way they say in substance the same thing as the ancients and as we do, although in their formulas they may seem to say the opposite.

In the preceding texts of the Madrilenian Oviedo, a contemporary and compatriot of John of St. Thomas, the reader will have been able to notice the sense given in the seventeenth century to the phrase revealed in re. By it they understand every virtuality or conclusion really identical with the revealed datum. Among the Thomists, that phrase appears for the first time in John of St. Thomas, and precisely in the final and most interesting paragraph, in which John of St. Thomas summarizes and concludes all his celebrated fourth article on the definability of faith of the theological conclusion. He says thus: "From which you may gather, that in the truths of faith something can be contained virtually, in two ways. In one way, virtually illatively ONLY, and this pertains to theology, which has as its object the conclusions drawn from the truths of faith. In another way, virtually implicitly, THAT IS, those which in re are revealed, and intended by the Holy Spirit, but hidden from us, and therefore touched upon by discourse. And these (that is, everything revealed in re, or really identical with what is revealed in se), the Church can define and declare"¹⁹.

As can be seen, John of St. Thomas understands by virtual implicit exactly the same thing as we do, that is, everything really identical with the revealed statements. Whether the modern Thomists want it or not, we must confess that John of St. Thomas, like quite a few other later theologians, suffered the overwhelming influence of Suárez's prestige, and that all that nomenclature of virtualiter, illativa tantum and in re revelatum which John of St. Thomas uses, and which other Thomists later used, is of Suárezian origin.

410. MARCOS SERRA, Ord. Praed.—Omitting Lugo and John of St. Thomas, contemporaries of Oviedo, since we have already spoken of them elsewhere (79 and 307), it remains to cite the Valencian Dominican Serra, illustrious commentator on the Summa of St. Thomas. Let us hear him, for he deserves it: “That certain theological conclusions have been defined by the Church solely because they are mediately revealed, in that they are evidently deduced from propositions immediately revealed, not all admit. For some assert that ‘Christ has a human will’ was not defined by the Church for this reason, but because it is contained in Scripture, and they say the same of other similar cases. But although we grant that, as seems to me it must be granted, such conclusions are defined by the Church: yet it does not follow from this that before such a definition they have the certainty of faith, nor that its opposite is heretical, but only erroneous. For the definition of the Church, just as it can bring it about that something manifestly pertains to the faith, so also that it pertains to the faith immediately, and thus has the certainty of faith, and its opposite is heretical, which before was only erroneous. Nor is it necessary that what is immediately of the faith be immediately revealed by God: but it suffices that, although it is mediately revealed by God, it be immediately proposed by the Church” ²⁰.

All of this is of pure Thomistic stock. Serra has known how to express traditional Thomism not only in substance, but also in nomenclature.

411. HONORATUS FABRI, of the Society of Jesus.—No less clearly does the Jesuit Fabri express himself, although his terminology is not so precise. He says the following: “You will ask: what is to be said about those conclusions which are deduced from the principles of faith? I distinguish the answer to this question by several numbers... Secondly, when the predicate of the consequent is identified with the predicate of the antecedent, if the antecedent is of faith, then the consequent is also of faith (it would be definable as of faith, Serra would have said): e.g., it is of faith that the Word was made man: therefore it is of faith that Christ has a body and a soul, that He is a rational animal, that He is capable of laughter, intellective, volitive, etc. The reason for both answers is that everything is of faith which is believed implicitly: but... in the act by which I believe that Christ is a man, I certainly believe implicitly everything that man signifies by his nature: that is, to have a body and a soul, to be intellective, volitive, capable of laughter, etc.: therefore I believe this confusedly and implicitly: therefore they are of faith: otherwise I do not know what it is to believe something implicitly and confusedly²¹.

412. PEDRO ANNATO, Soc. Iesu.—Let us place beside Fabri his fellow religious, Pedro Annato, of whom our Contenson says: "in writing theological matters acutely and clearly, he is without controversy second to none in the Society"²². He speaks thus: "Erroneous is any proposition that opposes... a doctrine which, although it is not defined by the Church, nor formally and expressly revealed, is nevertheless commonly inferred by theologians through reasoning from revealed truths, whence it is also called a theological conclusion: and so it is virtually revealed, and closely approaching the faith, because it is close that it be defined by the Church, and nothing is lacking to it to become of faith except the definition of the Church... You will press: that something be believed with divine faith, it must be immediately revealed, or by formal and immediate revelation: therefore virtual and mediate revelation does not suffice. I reply: I deny the antecedent. The reason is first, because, as the doctors of the celebrated University of Douai well note in their declaration, nowhere is it found written that immediate revelation is required for divine faith, and that mediate revelation does not suffice"²³.

413. FELIPE DE LA SANTÍSIMA TRINIDAD, Carmelite.—Now it is the turn of the celebrated Carmelite Felipe de la Santísima Trinidad. Of him Gonet says that "he published works worthy of cedar," and of his Summa Theologiae thomisticae Hurter says: "It is held in high esteem by the disciples of St. Thomas: for it excels in remarkable perspicuity and clarity." From this distinguished Thomist we take the following paragraphs: "That which is believed with divine faith, must either be immediately revealed by God, or be deduced from things immediately revealed through the assistance of the Holy Spirit"²⁴. "The common consensus of the Church concerning a proposition deducible from two premises, one of which is of faith and the other naturally known, makes the matter one of faith. For if the consensus of a general Council concerning a similar proposition makes it a matter of faith, as happens whenever a general Council, from one proposition of faith and another naturally certain, deduces a theological conclusion: much more does the common consensus of the Church concerning a similar proposition make it a matter of faith²⁵.

Also worth reading from this author is his commentary on the phrase of Saint Thomas²⁶: “But after it has been made manifest, and especially if it has been determined by the Church,” as well as his commentary on the question of “how the object of the faith in its totality is contained in the Creed”²⁷: It is among the best we have read after the classical commentators of the sixteenth century.

414. DOMINIC DE MARINIS, Ord. Praed.—After the previous: after the Carmelite Thomist comes one of the most illustrious Dominican Thomists. He is the Italian Dominic de Marinis, whose commentaries on St. Thomas, in Margott's opinion, "should be numbered among the better theological works of the other half of the seventeenth century." Commenting on the classic article "Whether heresy is properly about those things which are of faith," this great theologian expresses himself as follows:

“D. Thomas here posits as the proper object and matter of heresy that which directly and manifestly opposes some truth of faith: and as the less principal object of it, yet within the latitude of the object, he constitutes that from which something manifestly contrary to faith is gathered or inferred by evident consequence...

Directly, therefore, it pertains to infidelity: that proposition which imports something manifestly contrary to the faith. Indirectly, however, it pertains to that which imports an error from which something manifestly contrary to the faith is mediately and indirectly inferred, such as propositions contrary to truths demonstrated in theology from one or both of the sources of faith; for then by means of a syllogism the opposite of the faith is inferred... For he who is obstinate in a proposition from which something is evidently inferred that is manifestly against the faith errs in the faith and is a heretic”²⁸.

And before this, he had said: “Because the Church has never up to now proposed or defined anything for the faithful to believe that is not contained in the Sacred Scriptures, or expressed in the Apostolic traditions or virtually contained in them”²⁹.

415. JUAN MARTÍNEZ DE RIPALDA, Soc. Iesu.—Once again the renowned Society of Jesus returns with one of its many eminent theologians of the seventeenth century, the Navarrese Martínez de Ripalda, of whom the oft-cited Hurter says with evident family affection: "The foremost scholastic theologian of this age in Spain, and perhaps in all of Europe, along with Card. De Lugo"³⁰. Anyone versed in these questions will have noticed that Ripalda is cited by some against dogmatic evolution and by others in favor of it. Both sides have their share of reason. Ripalda admits dogmatic evolution, but not to the extent that we have seen most other theologians admit it. Of the five types of conclusion or implicit virtuality that we have explained elsewhere (45), Ripalda denies the definability of the first three, in which metaphysical or radical properties are deduced; but he admits that of the fifth and sixth, which is to deduce the actual or physical properties of the connatural or perfect essence. Let us hear his words:

I assert secondly: That can be credible by faith as an object which is known from one revealed truth and another evidently known truth... For Christ is not only believed by faith and revealed to be a man in the metaphysical sense, but in the natural and physical sense, namely, the sense of the revelation manifesting that Christ is a man (not only) by a precise and metaphysical concept of the essence or of animality and rationality, but also by the natural and physical concept of man, comprising what is proper to man according to physical and natural laws, in those things that do not detract from the dignity of the divine supposit and of the Redeemer of the world. But the humanity revealed in the natural and physical sense includes formally (the virtual implicit Thomistic) and not only virtually (the extrinsic virtual of Suárez) the natural properties connected to it, setting aside miracle, one of which is the power of laughter. Therefore, by the sole revelation of the humanity of Christ, in that sense commonly conceived by the faithful, it pertains to faith (it would be definable de fide, a Thomist would say) that the intellect is distinct from the soul, as well as the formal will of the same, and quantity distinct from the substance of the body, nor are other singular revelations of these properties necessary; because the sense of that revelation commonly held by all the faithful universally includes, besides the essence and substance of man, also the properties physically and naturally connected to him, under which are comprehended as particular species the intellect and the will, quantity, and imagination, as well as the power of laughter"³¹.

By admitting the definability of physical or actual properties while denying, however, that of essential or radical properties, Ripalda has given us one of the many examples of his inclination toward singular opinions. We do not now recall any other theologian of stature who has fallen into that incoherence. In any case, Ripalda is to be praised for having maintained dogmatic development by way of theological conclusion, although he did not do so with the breadth of Suárez and Lugo, since a proper theological conclusion must be called, and is, the deducing of properties from the essence, whether the properties in question are radical or actual. By that path almost all the conclusions of the treatise on the Incarnation have been developed, some of which, such as the two understandings and two wills of Christ, have already been defined as matters of faith, and all the others could equally be defined, supposing that they are truly evident or demonstrated conclusions (100 and 317).

416. JACOB PLATEL, S.J.—Along with Ripalda we may unite other Jesuit theologians who still remain for us from this century. The first is the eminent Platel, whose Synopsis cursus theologici has gone through very numerous editions, "because of its conciseness, clarity, solidity, and usefulness" ³². Let us hear him teach the definability by divine faith of every theological conclusion and even of every dogmatic fact:

"Every conclusion deduced from one revealed truth and another certain by the light of nature is a matter of faith. Because when a predicate is affirmed of a subject, all things that are certainly and evidently known to be identically or necessarily connected with such a predicate are simultaneously affirmed mediately and virtually, and therefore really... Therefore this conclusion, Christ is capable of laughter... is sufficiently revealed... so that it can be believed with divine faith" ³³.

Let us now hear him defend, and very well, the extension of dogmatic evolution to the facts that are for good reason called dogmatic:

"Probatur quinto: quia propositiones eiusmodi facta continentes deduci possunt ex maiori revelata, et minori moraliter certa: atqui tales propositiones sunt a Pontifice definibiles ut fide divina credenda: ergo..." (loc. cit.).

417. TIRSO GONZÁLEZ AND DOMINGO VIVA, S.J.—Not only does he admit as of divine faith the conclusions and the facts, but he extends it to the canonization of the saints. Instead of citing long texts from him, suffice it to say that the title of the sixth section of his work is It is of faith that the men canonized are truly saints ³⁴.

We find the same doctrine in Domingo Viva, the classical commentator on the Damnatae Theses, who expresses himself as follows: “The Pope can define as a matter of faith any theological conclusion derived from one premise of faith and another morally evident one. For example, it can be defined as a matter of faith that the Council of Trent had the assistance of the Holy Spirit, which is a theological conclusion derived from this premise of faith, that a legitimately assembled General Council has the assistance of the Holy Spirit, and from this other morally evident premise, namely, that Trent was legitimately assembled.”

“Ergo, the Pontiff can equally define de fide a fact connected with a right, or a theological conclusion descending from one premise de fide concerning a right and another morally certain premise concerning a fact, such as that condemned conclusion that the propositions of Jansenius contained in his book are heretical in the obvious sense that the words themselves present. For it descends from this premise de fide concerning a right, namely that those propositions are heretical, as for example: “For merit, freedom from coercion suffices,” and from this other premise morally certain, that they are contained in the obvious sense in the book of Jansenius, as is clear from the experience of all who read Jansenius.”

“And in fact, the Church has defined many theological conclusions of this kind to be de fide, e.g.: that Christ had a human will, which descends from this revealed premise, that Christ is man, and from this other naturally certain premise, that man has a will. Likewise, it has been defined de fide in the Council of Trent that the substance of bread does not remain under the Eucharistic accidents, which is inferred from this revealed premise, that Christ remains under the Eucharistic accidents, and from this other naturally certain premise, that two complete substances cannot exist under the same accidents...”

“By the same reasoning the Church can define that St. Ignatius, for example, is a Saint and is to be honored with the worship of dulia; since this follows from this premise of faith, that he is to be honored who dies in the embrace of the Lord after heroic virtues, and from this other morally certain premise, after so many prior investigations by the Church, that St. Ignatius, after heroic virtues, died in the embrace of the Lord” ³⁵

418. GERVASIUS BIJONIUS.—The penetrating supplementer of Becanus's Summa, Gervasius Bijonius, is no less clear. He speaks thus:

“Every theological conclusion, by that very fact, is believable with divine faith...”

You will object, first: The act of divine faith immediately rests on divine revelation: therefore it has as its object a proposition immediately revealed, of which kind a theological conclusion that is only mediately revealed is not: therefore...

I answer that I deny the consequence. It is one thing for the act of divine faith to rest immediately on divine revelation, and another for it to rest on immediate revelation.

You will insist: For a proposition to be believable with divine faith, it must be revealed in itself... I distinguish the major premise: If the meaning is that it must be immediately revealed, I deny it. If the meaning is that it must be truly revealed ³⁶, I grant it.

These two objections are admirably resolved. The only thing missing in Bijonius, as in almost all non-Thomist theologians, is the observation that this deduction or intellectual explanation of the implicit conclusion is not formally a matter of faith until it is defined by the Church. The Church alone has the mission to explain divinely or dogmatically the implicit virtuality of the deposit. The explanation or deduction of the theologian is human.

419. VICENTE CONTENSON, Ord. Praed.—Let us now listen to a theologian of true Thomist stock, the author, no less wise than pious, of the celebrated Theology of the Mind and Heart. He speaks thus:

"Although all things pertaining to the faith are virtually contained in the Scriptures, they are nevertheless not formally explained, but many of them are deduced by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, just as various conclusions are derived from principles" ³⁷.

"The second condition of the object of faith is: formal, or VIRTUAL revelation declared by the Church. The object of faith must be not only virtually, but formally revealed, or at least declared by the Church. The reason is that what is virtually revealed is deduced through reasoning, and is a theological conclusion, about which there is controversy among the learned, and even among the holy Fathers themselves: therefore it does not pertain to the object of faith, until, upon the arrival of the Church's determination, it is declared that the connection between the formally revealed proposition and the virtually revealed proposition is necessary... and then the proposition begins to pertain to the (formal or immediate) object of faith, not precisely because it is virtually revealed, but because, since it is virtually revealed, it is formally declared by the Church and drawn out from the article in which it lay hidden" ³⁸.

Doctrine and nomenclature in these two texts by Contenson are of pure Thomist quarry. One seems to be hearing St. Thomas, Cajetan, or Bañez.

420. CARDINAL GOTTI, Ord. Praed.—We had proposed to ourselves, and we have fulfilled it up to the present, not to cite on dogmatic evolution any theologian whose mind was not clear, not only in itself, but even upon the simple reading of the passages adduced. But before taking leave of the theologians of the seventeenth century, we are going to make an exception in favor of an eminent Thomistic theologian, whose mind on this question is clear, but whose nomenclature is not so much so. Since John of St. Thomas, employing Suárez's nomenclature, called the virtual implicit the immediate implicit, there are some later Thomists who say and repeat that the Church cannot define as of divine faith anything but what is immediately or formally revealed, but it is evident that they understand by immediate or formal the same thing that the pre-Suarezian Thomistic tradition always called virtual or consequential. One of those Thomists is Cardinal Gotti. Here is how he expresses himself:

“Cum ergo Ecclesia definit aliquid de novo tenendum esse de fide, quod antea non tenebatur, non facit id quod erat solum mediate (the virtual implicit is not “solum mediate,” but rather it is mediate with respect to us, yet immediate in itself) to be revealed immediately: rather, the truths which, although they had previously been immediately revealed to the Apostles (the point is not how it was revealed to the Apostles, but how the Apostles handed it on to the Church; see no. 58), it was nonetheless not certain that they had been immediately revealed... Therefore, one must distinguish two things: one, that a thing is of faith; the other, that the faithful are obliged to believe it as of faith. As to the first, through the Church’s definition no change occurs in any respect: for this truth, “Christ has two wills,” was always... immediately of faith (immediate in itself, mediate with respect to us). A change does, however, occur as to the second: insofar as what was of faith and immediately revealed (in itself), yet did not oblige belief in it; once the Church’s definition is in place that it is of faith, it begins to oblige.”

Anyone who read Gotti’s preceding paragraphs, especially without the parentheses, which are ours, would be persuaded that Gotti denied that the mediate or virtual is definable by faith and, therefore, denied dogmatic development. Read, however, the following texts, and you will see in what sense Gotti takes the word immediate:

“I say: The articles of faith in their substance have not grown, but only in their explanation... The first part is proven. Knowledge is not said to grow in substance because some of its conclusions are now known which were previously unknown; therefore, neither should faith or its articles be said to grow in substance because some things are now believed which were not believed before. The consequence is proven. For the first point holds because those conclusions, even if unknown, were nevertheless contained implicitly in the principles of that science; but all things we now believe were contained implicitly, either in those two principles handed down by the Apostle... or in those things revealed to the ancient Patriarchs and Prophets: or finally more explicitly in those things which Christ taught and the Apostles inspired by the Holy Spirit handed down: therefore.

The latter part (which alone concerns the explanation) follows from what has been said. For if all things to be believed have been revealed, at least implicitly, and with the passage of time only an explanation has been made of those things that were contained implicitly in what had already been revealed; therefore, when the Church proposed something as to be held by faith, this was not done by a new revelation made to her, but by a new explanation of the revelation already made, or of the thing already revealed. Hence the Church never proposed or defined anything for the faithful to believe that was not at least virtually contained either in Sacred Scripture or in divine or apostolic traditions. ³⁹

421. THIS IS SEEN VERY CLEARLY in that when Gotti says that only the immediate is definable, he understands by immediate the virtual implicit, since he expressly admits the definability of the latter. And it will be seen even more clearly by copying the following texts from the treatise On Sacred Theology, where he says thus: “I declare: A proposition or doctrine is heretical which immediately opposes either the expressed word of God, or the expressed definition of the Church. It is further said “or the expressed definition of the Church,” since a proposition which is contained implicitly only in the word of God, after the Church has declared that it is truly contained therein, must be expressly believed by divine faith, by those to whom the judgment issued by the Church has sufficiently become known. I declare a proposition erroneous in faith to be one which opposes... a doctrine not indeed defined by the Church, or formally or expressly revealed, but commonly derived by the Doctors through reasoning from revealed truths. Therefore a theological conclusion is commonly said to be virtually revealed, because it approaches faith so closely that nothing is lacking to it for being of faith, except the express definition of the Church. Whence it happens that an erroneous proposition and one proximate to heresy coincide" ⁴⁰

The mind of the illustrious Cardinal Gotti is therefore quite clear regarding the definability of faith of conclusions properly so called. But how much more clarity his nomenclature would have gained, as well as that of John of Saint Thomas, if they had never used as synonyms the names of immediate and virtual, upon which the nature of faith and of theology depends, thereby entangling so many modern Thomists!

422. GABRIEL BOYVIN, O.F.M.—Leaving aside, so as not to make ourselves interminable, many other theologians, let us close the seventeenth century with the Franciscan Boyvin, since we have cited so many Jesuits and Dominicans. He says the following: “The question is raised: are those propositions (namely, the conclusions of theology) defined by the Church, of faith? To this question Molina, considering that the Church does not have the power to make something a matter of faith that did not previously pertain to faith, because no new revelations are given to her, responds that the definitions of the Church are not of faith, but only, within the breadth of the certainty of theology, are more certain than the private definitions of theologians, and so certain due to the special assistance of the Holy Spirit that error cannot underlie them. The contrary, however, must be asserted, namely, that any conclusion whatsoever defined by the Church is of faith... From all these things, therefore, it must be concluded that a theological conclusion as such is not of faith; but as defined by the Church, it is of faith, and is to be placed among the principles of theology, and that it is owed assent through the habit of faith, and not only through the habit of theology, as Molina wishes”⁴¹.

We have, then, that throughout the seventeenth century, and despite Molina's innovation, the majority of theologians continue to defend the evolution of dogma by way of properly so-called theological conclusion.

Eighteenth Century

423. IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER.—We have just seen that throughout the seventeenth century the great majority of theologians of all schools or nationalities continued to defend, despite the contrary opinion of Molina, the traditional doctrine on the evolution of dogma by way of theological conclusion. We shall see the same in the eighteenth century. We shall continue to cite theologians in approximately chronological order rather than by schools.

424. JUAN LORENZO BERTI, Ord. S. Aug.—Let us begin with the illustrious theologian Berti, worthy representative of the glorious Augustinian school. He speaks thus: “For since a proposition of faith is that which is expressly contained in the Sacred Scriptures, in the traditions received by the Church, in the decrees and definitions of the Church, or is deduced therefrom by a certain, manifest, and most firm connection, that proposition is to be regarded as heretical which is found to be diametrically opposed to any one of these”⁴².

425. FRANCIS HENNO, Ord. S. Franc.—The Franciscan Henno follows, the most illustrious representative of the Scotist school in this century. Let us copy a text: “Revelation need not always be immediate, but a proposition of faith can be given, although it is not in itself and immediately revealed, but only virtually and implicitly contained in revealed propositions. If, however, it is inferred from one revealed [premise] and another natural one, it will not be of faith (by itself or before a definition)... It should be noted that although a proposition as it follows from one non-revealed [premise] and another revealed one is not of faith: by that very fact, however, when it is defined by the Church, it becomes of faith, and not merely certain... Because the Church proposes to us many things to be believed as faith which are not contained explicitly, formally, and immediately in the Scriptures, but are only deduced from them by consequence" ⁴³

426. GABRIEL ANTOINE, S. J.—Now comes a most meritorious theologian of the Society, both dogmatist and moralist, and one of the best theologians of the eighteenth century. His Theologia universa speculativa et dogmatica is worthy of being consulted on this question of dogmatic progress. Let us hear him: "I say fourthly: A proposition legitimately deduced from a major universal that is altogether certain and a minor that is revealed is of faith, and can be believed with divine faith. It is proved first: because such a proposition is sufficiently revealed. It is proved thirdly: because the Church proposes as revealed and to be believed by faith the propositions legitimately deduced from a universal proposition that is altogether certain, though not revealed, and from a minor that is revealed... You will object firstly: the proposition in question, e.g., Christ is capable of laughter... is not revealed formally, not even implicitly; therefore it cannot be believed with divine faith. I reply: by denying the consequence. Because for a proposition to be believed with divine faith, it suffices that it be revealed mediately and virtually... and it can be believed with divine faith, indeed it must be, at least when a definition of the Church intervenes" ⁴⁴

427. EDMUND SIMONET, S.J.—Let us join with Antoine another theologian of the Society, Edmund Simonet, who expresses himself no less clearly: "Generally speaking, every conclusion legitimately deduced from one premise that is of absolutely revealed faith, and from another that is completely certain... is of faith with respect to the power of believing, indeed even with respect to the obligation, at least when the definition of the Church is added. Hence, by divine faith the conclusion of this syllogism can be believed: Every man is capable of laughter: Christ is a man: therefore He is capable of laughter" ⁴⁵

428. JUAN MARÍN, S.J.—A third theologian now appears, also a Jesuit, no less famous than Antoine and much more so than Simonet: the Spaniard Juan Marín. He has the merit not only of holding the same opinion as all the previous authors on the question of dogmatic evolution, but also of being yet another witness as to what Suárez and Lugo understand by confused formal or immediate implicit, that is, what is really identical with what has been revealed, even though it is formally distinct. Here are his words: “The greater difficulty concerns the conclusion drawn from one premise that is of faith and another that is natural... Suárez, Lugo... say that the conclusion is of faith when it is identified with the revealed object; otherwise when it is not identified... This opinion pleases me... You insist: God revealing omnipotence reveals only what this word signifies among those who hear it, because the meaning of the word must be common to the speaker and the hearer. But this word “omnipotence” signifies only omnipotence , as distinct from immensity and the other attributes : therefore... I reply, granting the major, by distinguishing the minor: it signifies omnipotence only formally , I grant the minor; really , I deny the minor. And therefore the hearer forms a concept of omnipotence only formally ; nevertheless he forms really a concept of immensity: because that concept really affirms immensity , even if not formally” ⁴⁶
This doctrine of Suárez and Lugo which Marín here follows, regarding as definable by faith everything really identical with the revealed deposit, even though formally distinct, is affirmed by at least ninety percent of post-Suarezian theologians under the name of confused formal or equivalent. The great merit of Suárez and Lugo, which will never be sufficiently appreciated, consists in having covered with their great authority the definability of that virtual-identical-objective, which is precisely what the ancient theologians designated by the simple names of “virtual” or “implicit,” since it is the true constitutive element of the proper and rigorous theological conclusion. Everything else is nothing but physics (73).

429. BERTOLD CRASSOUS, Carmelite.—Let us now cite a Carmelite theologian, if only to show how, despite the tangle raised in this question by the Salmanticenses with their famous nego maiorem (80), the theologians of his Order continued even a century later to defend the traditional doctrine of the definability as a matter of faith of true theological conclusions. Let us hear Crassous: “Every theological conclusion, as contained in the premises, is of faith, namely, in that way in which it is contained in the premises; so that it is formally of faith, if it is formally contained in the premises; but only virtually, if it is only virtually contained in them... Now the second part of the conclusion is proven, namely, that a theological conclusion virtually contained in premises that are of faith is virtually of faith. That is virtually of faith which is virtually revealed: for in the same way in which something is revealed, it is likewise of faith; otherwise God would not merit faith in something revealed by Him; but a conclusion virtually contained in a premise or in premises that are of faith is virtually revealed; for in the same way it is revealed as it is contained in the revealed premise: therefore it is virtually of faith. And consequently, this conclusion “therefore Christ is capable of laughter,” drawn from this antecedent “Christ is a man,” is only virtually of faith, because it is contained only virtually in this antecedent. Note, however, with Father Henry, that if the Church defined this proposition to be held as of faith, it would immediately become formally and directly of faith... Against this doctrine only Molina dissents, as Suárez testifies” ⁴⁷.

We believe that the Thomistic doctrine cannot be expressed more beautifully nor reasoned with more clarity.

430. MIGUEL HERCE, O.S.B.—As a representative of the Benedictine Order, always fruitful in scholars, we will cite the Benedictine Herce, for many years a professor at Salamanca and later General of the Order. He follows the Salmanticenses in almost everything, and uses their arguments and even their very words, but he departs from them to follow the traditional doctrine regarding the definability of conclusions by the Church. He states thus:

"Whether virtual or mediate revelation is the formal object of faith (per se or without a definition of the Church). The first opinion defends the affirmative side... The second, extremely contrary opinion teaches... that it is not sufficient for the formal object of faith... The Thomists commonly hold this, and among the fathers of the Society, the distinguished Doctor with many others: among whom Father Molina so extends the opinion as to say that a conclusion drawn from one article of faith and another evident one is not a matter of faith, even if it is defined by the Church..."

He argues first: that God is omnipotent, infinite, and the like, is a truth pertaining to the faith; but this is not immediately revealed... Therefore...

For the proof drawn from examples, I grant the major premise and deny the minor. For that God is incorporeal, infinite, and similar attributes is sufficiently and immediately evident from Sacred Scripture, if not in the same terms, then in others that are equivalent and signify the same thing, as when Sacred Scripture says that God is spirit and almighty (up to this point it is almost literally all from the Salmanticenses, whom he frequently cites; but now he continues speaking on his own): besides the fact that such things are defined by the Church, and on this title alone they would pertain to the faith, even if no express or equivalent revelation were found concerning them ⁴⁸

431. ANSELM SCHNELL, O. S. B.—To the same period and Benedictine Order belongs Schnell, of whom it will suffice to transcribe the following lines:

"Fourth, it must be noted that those things are called virtually revealed which, although they are not in themselves immediately and formally revealed, are nevertheless contained in another thing that is formally revealed. This being supposed, it must be held that virtual revelation is a sufficient motive of faith. The reason is that such a thing, being virtually revealed, is immediately believed on account of divine revelation" ⁴⁹

432. JUAN SANTIAGO SIDRO VILLARROYO, O. S. A.—The Augustinian school is also represented by the illustrious Villarroyo, who continues to defend, like Giles of Rome, like Fray Luis de León, like Berti, and like all those of his school, the traditional doctrine. He speaks thus:

All things revealed by God, or proposed by the whole Church as deduced from the revealed truths, we call theological dogmas. Indeed, there is this one distinction between dogmas and articles of faith: that explicit faith must be given to the latter, but not so to the former... But since whoever expressly denies either one opposes faith equally, it follows that both dogmas and articles of faith are truths of faith, and are rightly included under the common name of dogmas. Therefore, some dogmas are immediately revealed by God, while others are only mediately so, namely, those that are contained in the former and are derived from them by necessary consequence ⁵⁰

433. ST. ALPHONSUS MARY OF LIGUORI.—Omitting many other theologians of this century, as we have omitted them in the previous one, some of whom there will still be occasion to cite elsewhere (477-478), we will close the eighteenth century with the greatest one there was in that century, and who has merited being placed among the Doctors of the Church. Although St. Liguori is more frequently cited as a moral theologian than as a dogmatic one, his authority is great in everything, not only because of his sacred character as a Doctor of the Church, but also because of the extraordinary impartiality of his theological judgment, so free of any factionalism or passion of school or family, that we believe hardly anyone equal to him in this regard is found, after St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Bonaventure, among the scholastic theologians. Here is how he expresses himself: "For all propositions condemned by the Popes, although not all are heretical, but some are rash, some erroneous, some scandalous, etc.; nevertheless, when the Pontiff's definition intervenes, it must be held as a matter of faith that those propositions are truly rash or are affected by another mark, which the Pontiff declared them to bear" ⁵¹

"Indeed, although our opinion (concerning the preservation of the Blessed Virgin from original sin) has not yet been defined by the Church, it can nevertheless rightly be held as a matter of faith... For St. Thomas says that we can believe as a matter of faith not only those things which we have through infused faith, but also those which we perceive through theological conclusions" ⁵²

**434. SYNTHESIS OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.—**We see, then, that all these authors of the eighteenth century continue, like those of previous centuries, defending the definability by divine faith of the true theological conclusion. Although each expresses it in his own way, and with a variety of opinion in particular details, all agree on the evolution of dogma by way of virtuality or consequence properly so called.

Nineteenth Century

**435. NEW THOMISTIC FLOWERING.—**If the eighteenth century was for theology a century of decadence, much more so was the nineteenth century; especially during the first two thirds, which preceded the encyclical Aeterni Patris of Leo XIII. With the renewal of Thomistic studies by this immortal Pontiff, the glories of Catholic philosophy and theology also began to be rejuvenated, although we are still very far from possessing many philosophers or theologians of the stature of those of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, much less of the stature of those of the thirteenth century. From among those theologians, relatively few, who have written in the nineteenth century or in what we have so far covered of the twentieth, we are going to choose a few to show how the traditional doctrine of dogmatic evolution by way of theological conclusion has continued and still continues to be taught, as in previous centuries.

**436. LEOPOLD LIEBERMANN.—**Let us begin with that most pious as well as wise theologian, the Alsatian Liebermann, whose theological institutes so greatly contributed to promoting the study of sound theology in the first half of the nineteenth century. He speaks thus:

"«If, however, a conclusion is deduced from faith through evident consequence, it must be said to pertain to faith, at least mediately and indirectly; and the theologian who comprehends the force of the argument must assent to it as pertaining to faith. Nor should you say that reason, therefore, produces faith: for a conclusion of this kind does not pertain to faith because it is deduced by legitimate consequence from the premises, but because by this manner of reasoning it appears that it was already contained in the revealed premise. Reason sees the consequence; faith embraces the consequent, as contained in the sources of revelation. Therefore reason is only a means and an instrument by which it is made certain to me that the conclusion is contained in the directly revealed dogma, and once this is known to me, I already adhere to it with firm faith on account of the authority of God revealing»⁵³

It is exactly the doctrine of Vázquez. They defend dogmatic evolution, but to excess, by viewing it as a matter of faith or dogma before the Church’s definition.

437. FATHER HILARY OF PARIS, Capuchin.—With no less clarity, but with much greater precision and with a rigorously Thomistic criterion, the eminent Capuchin theologian Father Hilary expresses himself. The following text deserves to be copied, even if it is somewhat long:

“The conclusions that flow from faith are of three kinds, according to whether they carry with them faith, or certainty, or probability.”

Faith conclusions are those which are deduced infallibly from the revealed word of God with respect to the Church... For the Church not only preserves, but also infallibly explains the word revealed by God: this explanation, however, is not made by a new revelation; therefore it is necessary that the Church apply its reason to this kind of work, to which, nevertheless, the Holy Spirit assists, so that the Church's reasoning may proceed infallibly. Moreover, when something is infallibly established to be so connected to the word of God that it cannot be denied without denying the very word of God itself, then it is clear that this also is revealed by God and pertains to the faith.

Conclusions of theological certainty are those which the unanimous and constant consensus of theologians teaches; such conclusions touch the truth of faith closely, and therefore they possess a certainty that is near to divine infallibility. For the Church uses these theological conclusions to determine the conclusions of faith... But must they be believed as an object of faith (before a definition of the Church)? The theologians themselves dispute this. Hence, however, some with Veronius distinguish a twofold faith, divine and catholic... Thus something could be of divine faith and not of catholic faith, e.g., if a learned man clearly perceives that something is contained in revelation which the Church does not propose; and this seems to be the opinion of Father Perrone... Nevertheless this distinction (which is as ancient as Vázquez) although it has pleased some recently, is more prudently to be rejected: because it rests on a false supposition, namely, that the medium or organ for proposing divine faith could be twofold, one universal, namely the Church, and another particular, namely science, by which the learned would be constrained to believe what the Church has not promulgated. Moreover, the sole medium or organ for promulgating faith is holy Mother Church. Science indeed is the medium for drawing out theological conclusions: but it is not a medium possessing divine infallibility, which Christ conferred on the Church alone. Moreover, without divine infallibility, the word of God is not proposed divinely as the word of God, but as the word of men, as the word of science... Therefore the conclusions of theologians (without a definition of the Church) avail for certainty, but they do not suffice for faith.

Nor does a conclusion drawn from two revealed truths pertain more to faith, if such a conclusion is not among those things which are customarily taught universally by the Church... Therefore, for the theologian himself, a scientific conclusion, even if certain, will never be a conclusion of faith, as long as it has not been transmitted through the infallible organ: for the theologian and the simple faithful are equal in faith ⁵⁴.

438. TRULY GOLDEN are all the preceding paragraphs. In our judgment, it is the most faithful expression that can be made of the true Thomistic position reflected in the previous work, holding a middle course between that of Vázquez and Molina. One seems to be reading one of the classic expositors of Thomistic doctrine in the sixteenth century.

439. CARDINAL MAZZELLA, S.J.—Let us move on to one of those many illustrious theologians who have honored the Society of Jesus and its renowned Gregorian University in the nineteenth century. Thus says Cardinal Mazzella:

“Once these things have been explained, it must be known that all concede that the truths formally contained in those explicitly revealed (this is the implicit-formal), are themselves revealed truths, and therefore the material object of faith...

Quaestio igitur est inter theologos, utrum idem dicendum sit de veritatibus quae solum virtualiter continentur in explicite revelatis... If the question concerns a truth that is contained implicitly (the implicit virtual or identical-real) in another explicitly revealed truth, with which, however, it is only really, not formally, identical, Ripalda, the Wirceburgenses, and others hold that it is not revealed; the contrary, however, is held by De Lugo, Suárez (and all the theologians prior to Molina). And I think this latter opinion is to be subscribed to. For the object thus implicitly contained in another explicitly revealed truth is truly said by God. For God intends to manifest that which the sign He uses can signify to those to whom the discourse is directed: but the sign of one object can signify to men also another object only formally distinct from it, if the real identity of both can be known by us without a new revelation: therefore... Hence they rightly say that the unrevealed premise is employed in this case to understand the signification of the divine discourse, not to infer properly something else connected with it (let the reader note what the post-Suárezian authors understand by "by reason of signification" and by "by reason of connection"). Thus, from this they say that the metaphysical property of some nature is credible by faith from the revelation of that nature itself; but not so the physical property, which they suppose to be really distinct and, by at least absolute power, separable from the nature. If, however, the question concerns an object that is said to be contained in another explicitly revealed truth, insofar as it is only connected with it or follows from it (this they call properly virtual comprehension), Suárez himself, De Lugo, etc., deny that it is said per se by God and credible with divine faith. Hence they say that the conclusion inferred from one premise of faith and another naturally known premise is not per se revealed, if the latter does not explain the signification of the former premise, but shows the connection of some object with what is explicitly revealed in that premise. I would here employ a distinction which seems to be in line with the mind of those doctors ⁵⁵: for either the implicit object so follows from the explicitly revealed truth that in no hypothesis can it be separated from it (Suárez, Lugo, Mazzella, and countless others have not noticed that this is precisely what happens in every rigorous theological, metaphysical, or mathematical conclusion...), and I would say that it is revealed, for otherwise the truth of the explicitly revealed object could in no way stand: or it can be separated from it, at least by God's absolute power (this happens only in physics, or only in conclusions of the fourth type), and then the opinion of Suárez, Lugo, etc. prevails." ⁵⁶ We have allowed ourselves to transcribe such a long text for two reasons. First, so that it may be clearly seen that this most wise theologian extends dogmatic development, as we do, to everything really identical with the revealed deposit, even if formally distinct; that is, to all the implicit virtuality of the deposit. Second, so that it may appear clear once more that Suárez and Lugo, like their later disciples, understand under the name of formal confused or equivalent all implicit virtuality, and understand by proper virtual the non-implicit virtual or that of the fourth type.

440. CARDINAL FRANZELIN, S.J.—To Cardinal Mazzella let us join the even more illustrious name of Cardinal Franzelin, of the same Society of Jesus, and his successor in the professorship at the Gregorian University. Whoever has read of Franzelin only his classic work On Divine Tradition and Scripture will have gained the impression that he is an enemy of all dogmatic evolution. So much and so well does he bring out the first characteristic of dogma, which is its objective immutability, that he seems to leave no room for the second characteristic, which is development or evolution within that same immutable objectivity. But whoever has read his treatise On the One God and the beautiful introduction on the nature of Theology that he placed before that treatise will have become convinced that Cardinal Franzelin admits, albeit with different phraseology, an evolution as ample as that of Cardinal Mazzella. Let us copy the following text:

“Since it is certain that both premises are revealed truth, or when one premise already implicitly contains what is stated in the conclusion, and the other, although not revealed, clearly manifests this comprehension of the conclusion in the revealed premise (this happens in every syllogism of lesser metaphysical certainty, as Franzelin will say at the end), without doubt the truth stated in such a conclusion is revealed... An example of a conclusion under the second form (that is: an example of a conclusion from one revealed and one unrevealed premise): can be adduced against the Monothelites. The revealed proposition, that Christ, besides His divine nature, has a perfect human nature, through which He is a true (perfect, it is understood, as he has just said, for otherwise there would be no implicitness) man, already contains the other truth, that Christ, besides His divine will, also has a rational will and human volitions. When, therefore, the other proposition is assumed to complete the argument: Christ is a true man; but the faculty of rational will is essential to man; therefore Christ has a human will: that assumed proposition only manifests the comprehension of this conclusion in the revealed proposition. This being granted, the truth of the consequent can be considered in two ways: either formally as revealed by God: then indeed an assent of faith corresponds to the proposition...

Now, if one of the premises is revealed, while the other is certain only by the light of reason, and if what is enunciated in the conclusion is contained only in both taken together (this can never happen when the minor premise is of metaphysical certainty, as he later confesses): what is enunciated in the conclusion is indeed certain (it will be moral certainty, but not metaphysical, and therefore much less theological certainty), yet it is not simply contained in revelation, and therefore it is not an object of divine faith, but only of theological assent, which rests partly on the revealed truth of the premises and partly on the naturally certain truth of them. It is revealed that the sacrament, for example, of baptism confers grace on those who place no obstacle: when I see an infant being baptized by a minister and in such a manner that no suspicion can arise against the validity of the sacrament, it becomes certain, though not revealed, that this infant has been validly baptized: hence the conclusion, that this infant has been justified, is theologically certain, yet it is not of faith (as can be seen, in order to find an example of a theological conclusion that is not definable as a matter of faith, Franzelin has had to resort to one that is neither a rigorous theological conclusion nor anything that amounts to it. But this is accidental. The essential point, and the only one for which we cite Cardinal Franzelin, is what now follows, and to which we draw the reader's attention); as for what Cano and Vega say (and why is Vázquez passed over in silence?), that a proposition deduced from one premise that is of faith and another that is naturally evident is itself also an object of faith, this is truly not contrary: for they themselves speak of a conclusion that is wholly contained in the revealed premise in such a way that the naturally evident proposition merely manifests this containment of the conclusion in the other, revealed premise, which meaning of theirs can easily be established from the examples they use to explain their view. (Now comes the best part.) In reality, in these theological syllogisms, the naturally certain proposition, especially where the certainty is METAPHYSICAL, USUALLY merely manifests the containment of the consequent in the revealed premise: and therefore conclusions of this kind are contained implicitly in objective revelation and, consequently, can be proposed and defined by the Church as matters to be believed by faith⁵⁷.

Three things are notable in this text of the illustrious cardinal. First, that he admits that the greater part (plerumque) of theological conclusions are inclusive and definable as of divine faith. Second, that he admits that this is verified especially in the conclusions that are less metaphysically certain, or what is the same, in all rigorous metaphysical conclusions, since for us and for every Thomist who knows what he is saying, there are no other rigorous theological conclusions than those. Third, that when Cano and Vega and Vázquez spoke of conclusions of faith, they understood those metaphysical-inclusive conclusions. That is evident, since no one, before Suárez, thought of calling a physical-connexive conclusion a rigorous conclusion.

Franzelin is right in saying that Cano and Vázquez understood by conclusions the implicit conclusions, since no theologian before Suárez, as far as we know, understood by theological conclusions what is not implicit or physical-connexive. "For the theologian gathers his conclusions from the principles of faith revealed by God, and unfolds those implicit in the principles themselves through an argumentation suited to nature"⁵⁸. "As we have often said elsewhere, neither the Councils, nor the Pontiff of the Apostolic See, nor the holy interpreters of the Scriptures give new revelations to the faithful, but what the Church received from the Apostles they either express, interpret, or certainly gather as consequences and connected truths, making manifest what is adverse and repugnant"⁵⁹. As can be seen, Cano understands by theological connectedness the same as by implicitness, since what is not implicit is not theological, nor metaphysical, nor mathematical, but physical.

441. SANTOS SCHIFFINI and GUILLERMO WILMERS, S. I.—Let us join to the two preceding another illustrious theologian of the same Society. After having denied, and rightly so, that what is virtually revealed is of divine faith per se or without a definition of the Church, in which every true Thomist must hold the opinion of Ripalda and the Wirceburgenses, and not that of Vázquez and so many others, he clearly admits that it is of divine faith after the definition of the Church. Let it suffice to cite the following text:

"You will insist: The Church defines not only those things which are formally implicit in divine-apostolic doctrine, but also many things which, although they are not formally implicit in this doctrine, are nevertheless necessarily connected with it by a bond: but, as was said earlier, this necessary connection does not suffice for such conclusions to be called implicitly revealed or implicitly of faith: Therefore.

I respond: the major premise being granted, I distinguish the minor: if this connection is considered alone, and apart from a definition of the Church, which may have intervened, I grant it; once a definition of the Church intervenes, I deny it"⁶⁰.

Here are some interesting paragraphs from Wilmers:

"Whatever has been revealed by God can be believed with divine faith. But it has been revealed by God that each individual act of the supreme magisterium is infallible in deciding and determining those things that pertain to religion, whether it infallibly declares that some doctrine is revealed, that another is opposed to revealed doctrine either immediately or mediately, that the doctrine of this or that book agrees with revealed truth or is opposed to it. Therefore, because of divine revelation and hence by divine faith it can be believed that each individual defining act of the supreme magisterium is infallible, or that the Church infallibly declares that some doctrine is revealed, that another is opposed to the revealed one either immediately or mediately. Furthermore, by believing that the Church infallibly declares that some doctrine is revealed, that another is opposed to the revealed one either immediately or mediately, we at the same time implicitly believe that the doctrine is in reality such as the Church declares it to be; for the act cannot be thought without its object.

Second, it is proven from the simultaneous concurrence of two motives. When two motives concur in affirming the same thing, or present themselves equally, it is left to our choice to assent to the thing on account of either the one or the other. But whenever the Church defines by supreme judgment that something is so, two motives present themselves to us equally for affirming the truth of the definition: one is the created authority of the Church, the other is the authority of God revealing the infallibility of the Church in all her supreme judgments, and therefore also in this or that particular one. Therefore, we can believe that what the Church defines is infallibly defined either on account of the authority of the Church or on account of the authority of God revealing. If we believe it to be infallibly defined on account of the latter, we perform an act of divine faith.

First Corollary: Assuming the infallibility of the Church in the solemn canonization of the Saints, it can be believed with divine faith by all that the canonized deceased is blessed...

Second Corollary: After the condemnation of the five propositions extracted from the book of Jansenius, anyone can believe with divine faith that those five propositions, as they are contained in Jansenius’s book, are foreign to the faith" ⁶¹

442. PARTHENIO MINGUES, O.F.M.—As a representative of the Franciscan school in this century, let us cite the learned professor of Theology in Munich, the Very Reverend Father Parthenio Mingues, whose Compendium of Dogmatic Theology is so highly esteemed by all for understanding the mind of Saint Bonaventure and Scotus. He says the following:

“In all these cases (that is, what is contained as particular in the universal or as part in the whole), the conclusion can be said to be formally revealed, because it shines forth immediately from the mere explanation of the terms, so that only an explanatory syllogism is needed.

But it is not a dogma if a theological conclusion is contained only virtually, mediately, and more or less obscurely in another truth, so that proper reasoning is needed to know that truth which is contained in the other. For example, the proposition has been revealed: the soul is spiritual; from the spirituality of the soul it can be deduced that it is incorruptible and immediately produced by God Himself. Yet this conclusion requires true reasoning; it does not follow of itself from the consideration of the term “spirit.” Therefore this truth is not a dogma.

Verumtamen eiusmodi conclusio per propositionem eccle-

siasticam potest fieri dogma fidei, or at least a Catholic truth. Thus it became a dogma that Mary was conceived immaculate, even though it was only revealed virtually. Regarding conclusions of this kind, Scotus says (4 Sent., d. 5, q. 1, n. 7): “There are other things which need not be explicitly believed either by these (the learned) or by those (simple Christians), because their truth has not yet been declared and determined by the Church: such are many conclusions necessarily included in the articles of faith: but before they are declared and explained by the Church, no one is bound to believe them: nevertheless one ought to think soberly about them, so that a person is ready to hold them at the time when the truth has been declared” ⁶²

Fr. Mingues expresses well in those paragraphs the traditional doctrine with which we are already familiar. The virtually revealed is not of divine faith by itself or without definition; but it can become so by definition. In parentheses, let the reader note that text of Scotus which Fr. Mingues cites there, and which we had already cited (372). Although Scotus, as everyone recognizes, speaks of theological conclusions properly so called, he calls declaration, determination, or explanation the definition of such conclusions by the Church, exactly as St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure call it. Let certain modern theologians take note of this, who seem to have lost the key to the nomenclature of the great masters of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries on this question (506).

443. HONORATUS DEL VAL and AURELIUS PALMIERI, O.S.A.— Let us move on to another theologian no less illustrious than those before him and one who knew how to continue in the nineteenth century the glorious theological traditions of the Augustinian school. His beautiful text of dogmatic theology is comparable to the best works written in the last century. He says the following:

“If something entirely distinct from it is virtually contained in something explicitly revealed and is inseparable from it (for the Thomists this is the only rigorous theological conclusion), it is more probably said that this other thing is in itself an object of divine faith (definable as of divine faith, a Thomist would say); although for us, due to a lack of knowledge, it is not always an object that must necessarily be believed.

Regarding those things especially virtually revealed, theologians debate whether they are in themselves the object of divine faith. In this inquiry, nothing new remains for us to add beyond what we said in the preliminary treatise on dogmatic Sacred Theology. Namely:

Affirmativam sentence is defended by Melchior Cano, Bellarmine, and other theologians of great name... Negativam opinion, however, is championed by several theologians along with Veronius and the Salmanticenses... For my part, the affirmative response pleases me, where it concerns conclusions logically necessary (the metaphysical connection), such that the negation of the consequent proposition cannot but imply the negation of the divinely revealed premise⁶³.

Let us add another celebrated Augustinian theologian, Fr. PALMIERI, whose works on "orthodox theology" are so universally appreciated. Here is an extract:

Augmentum declarativum fidei, that is, dogmatic progress in a certain sense, or, as St. Anselm says, "the progress of the faithful in faith, rather than of faith in the faithful," is taught by Catholic theology as possible, necessary, and real, through the Church endowed with the divine prerogative of infallible teaching authority.

Before the thesis is proven, a distinction must be made between those things that are held explicitly or implicitly by divine faith... If someone, for example, explicitly believes that the soul is a spiritual nature, by that very fact he implicitly believes that the soul is simple, incorruptible, rational, etc., all of which are requisites of any spiritual nature... If these are denied, God would be said to have commanded men to dig up treasures from the earth, which He Himself gave them: to have revealed the principles of a higher science, from which man would have no right to draw conclusions"⁶⁴.

444. JOAQUÍN BERTHIER, Ord. Praed.—Let us add the name of a distinguished Dominican, no less a theologian than a historian and artist, whose work on Loci Theologici is, in our judgment, one of the best modern supplements to the now three-centuries-old, though ever perennial, work of Melchior Cano. Let us hear Fr. Berthier:

"Among men there is no truth that can be comprehended and expressed whole at once in itself and in its consequences, because man, being composed of body and soul through a substantial unity, has nothing in his intellect that he did not first have in his senses, and therefore he must reason, and investigate truths with a slow and halting step: hence it is that he attains truth as it were scattered in parts, nor, like the Angel, does he see at the first glance all the consequences and connections. Moreover, with all and each of the truths, especially the higher ones, that is, those of the supernatural order, countless other truths are connected, which it was neither easy nor useful to express all at once. These are called implicitly expressed, because they are asserted not in themselves, but in others. Therefore, when the Holy Spirit revealed the principles, He likewise revealed the consequences... For if the one cannot be denied without the ruin of the other, it is a sign that between the two there exists a very great connection, and that in the revelation of the former the revelation of the latter is contained... Since, however, the Holy Spirit, as the author of divine traditions, sees all connected truths in all truths, hence He willed to hand them down together... Hence it is easy to discern concerning which truths the Church exercises her magisterium. First... second... third, all truths that are drawn from some revealed truth by force of necessary conclusion. For all know that both what is said explicitly and what is said implicitly belong to the same author... The same is evident from countless examples of the Fathers and doctors, who always and everywhere defended the truth and rejected falsehood from the Scriptures through drawn-out conclusions, even dogmatically." ⁶⁵

445. ALEXIS LEPICIER, O.S.M.—This renowned theologian, professor at the Urban College of the Propaganda and General of the Servites, is well known to all; his clarity, his conciseness, his faithful adherence to Saint Thomas, and his profoundly conservative judgment in all questions are recognized by everyone. Let us hear his opinion on the question under discussion: “Therefore, all those things which the Church, by her infallible magisterium, proposes for our belief as formally or virtually contained in written or transmitted revelation pertain to the divine-Catholic faith. Formally indeed, inasmuch as that truth is found expressed and signified in the written or transmitted word of God, whether in so many words or in equivalent words; but virtually, inasmuch as it is deduced by a logical process from a formally revealed truth… And if the authority of the Church should intervene, such a conclusion (virtually revealed) will itself also be held by divine Catholic faith; otherwise it will remain a merely theological conclusion” ⁶⁶

The author could not have expressed with greater clarity in so few lines how dogmatic evolution is possible by way of true virtuality or conclusion, how that evolution is merely theological before the definition and how it becomes dogmatic after the definition of the Church. That is the true Thomist position, midway between that of Molina and that of Vázquez.

446. M. M. TUYAERTS, Ord. Praed.—Let us now hear an illustrious Belgian Dominican, Father Tuyaerts, who expresses himself thus: “It suffices to survey the definitions issued by the Church to find there, from the earliest centuries down to the present times, theological conclusions, in a surprisingly large number, defined as revealed by God, as to be believed with divine faith. To cite but a few examples: The Church has defined that the intellective soul is, per se et essentialiter, the substantial form of the human body; that the minister must, in administering the sacraments, have the intention of doing what the Church does; that baptism conferred by heretics is valid; that this sacrament must not be repeated for those who fall into apostasy; that the holy Virgin Mary was conceived without original sin; that the pope, teaching ex cathedra doctrines revealed concerning faith or morals, is infallible, etc. It is certain, on the one hand, that the points of doctrine just mentioned, taken at random from among hundreds of others, are not immediately revealed truths; one would seek them in vain, expressed according to the given wording or in an equivalent form, in the deposit of faith. On the other hand, it is no less certain that the Church proposes these doctrines as divine and catholic dogmas, to be believed with divine and catholic faith... We may boldly conclude that the Church, by the constant practice of her infallible magisterium, teaches that theological conclusions can become dogmas of faith⁶⁷

447. OTHER AUTHORS.—The list of authors we have just cited could be enlarged with many more names of renowned theologians, especially from the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, some of whom we will still have occasion to cite (477-478).

Even limiting ourselves to contemporary theologians, we could have cited the names of several very renowned ones, who, if they deny dogmatic evolution, do so only to then affirm it again, without realizing the contradiction into which they fall.

Thus, for example, we could have cited the Jesuit Christiano Pesch, who says: "But here a question arises: Is this consequent sense the true sense of Scripture? I reply that a distinction must be made between those things which follow logically, and those things which are connected by human consideration because of some similarity with the literal sense. If there is a necessary logical connection, the consequent sense is not without reason called the sense of Scripture; for although not every man is deemed to wish to express in his words all those things which can be duly gathered from them down to the ultimate conclusions, since perhaps he may not even suspect these conclusions, nevertheless the Holy Spirit, who knows perfectly well what is contained in His words, and what men will legitimately deduce from them, is rightly said to [will] all these things."

nia exprimere voluisse⁶⁸ And what is all that but the evolution of dogma by way of theological conclusion properly so called?

We could also have cited Vacant, the classic commentator on the Vatican Council, who says: “But this controversy (whether the virtually revealed is or is not truly revealed and definable as of divine faith) is of little importance from the point of view that concerns us, if one notes with Cardinal Mazzella ⁶⁹ that every truth must certainly be regarded as revealed which, without being expressed in any of the formulas of Scripture or tradition, is nevertheless connected with those formulas, in such a way that one may think that in revealing the dogmas affirmed in those formulas, God intended also to manifest those truths. In communicating His revelations to us, God has indeed conformed Himself to our human manner of manifesting our thoughts. Now when a man speaks, he intends to make known, not only what he affirms, but also everything he implies, and in particular all the thoughts that must be attributed to him in order to reconcile his affirmations... Since God possesses infinite knowledge and perfectly knows all the dogmas without which men could not reconcile the truths formulated in His revelation in express terms, there is all the more reason to think that He willed to manifest these dogmas, in revealing these truths. Consequently, one may consider as revealed and as contained in the deposit of Catholic tradition, all the points of doctrine, not yet defined by the Church, but which one will need to admit in order to reconcile among themselves the truths of the Catholic faith... The Church can therefore define as belonging to the faith all the truths without which one could not bring into harmony the dogmas previously believed. It is possible that these truths may have remained completely unknown in themselves. It is also possible that some authors may have opposed them before their definition: for these authors may have failed to see that these truths which they rejected were in necessary connection with the dogmas they admitted” ⁷⁰ And what is all this but admitting the evolution of dogma by way of theological conclusion properly so called?

We could have cited many other modern theologians in that same vein, but we did not wish to do so in order to adduce only those who defend it clearly, and consistently, without denying in one part what they affirm in another.

Among all those we have cited, the reader will have noticed that there is variety in the manner of admitting dogmatic evolution by way of theological conclusion properly so called, but that all admit it. Some admit it more extensively than others. Some regard it as dogmatic or as of divine faith, in the style of Vázquez and Vega, even before the definition of the Church. Others, in a truly Thomistic style, do not regard it as formally of divine faith, but only after the definition of the Church. But all of them agree in admitting true evolution of dogma by way of theological conclusion properly so called.

448. COROLLARY.—The minimum conclusion, then, that every reader free from preconceived opinions will necessarily have to draw from this brief historical study we have just undertaken is the following: whoever affirms that the doctrine of the development of dogma by way of theological conclusion, properly so called, is a recently born doctrine, or one held by few theologians, or contrary to the common opinion of the Thomist school, or dangerous, simply ignores the history of this question.

THE TRUE MIND OF MELCHOR CANO ON THE DEFINABILITY OF FAITH OF THE THEOLOGICAL CONCLUSION

449. CLARIFICATION OF THE QUESTION.—Several times in the course of this work we have promised to deal with Melchor Cano's mind on the nature and definability of faith of the theological conclusion. We are going to fulfill what we promised. The theological conclusion is like the central point of the most serious question of dogmatic progress, and it is well worth ascertaining what the true mind of the illustrious founder of the discipline of the Theological Loci is on this question, that great genius who is, undoubtedly, one of the greatest glories of Catholic Theology and who, in the opinion of Natalis Alexander, occupies the first place among the Dominican theologians after the Angelic Doctor ^[132. 'Melchior Canus... by his talent, learning and industry, left a perpetual monument, the twelve books on the Loci Theologici... Whose genius, above all other writers of the Dominican Order after the Angelic mind of Saint Thomas, I especially extol' (NATALIS ALEXANDER, Hist. Eccles., saec. XVI, c. 5, a. 2, n. 18).—'With immortal fame prepared for himself, in that work of scarcely a full volume, which truly has as many praisers and admirers as readers, namely the Loci Theologici 1, 12' (NICOLAS ANTONIO).—'Distinguished equally in learning and talent, great in reputation, greater in reality, I speak of Melchior Cano, who with a truly golden volume, before all and above all, carried out this very treatment of the Loci Theologici' (CARDINAL PALLAVICINO, S. I.).—'I can most truly affirm that Melchior Cano alone... in the very academy of the learned of the Dominican institute, was able to serve in place of an entire class' (FRANCISCO GARCÍA, S. I.).—'His fame was greatest and most brilliant. No one after his time better explained the mysteries of the Sacred Scriptures with the authority that Peter had. Aptly, therefore, the Supreme Pontiffs and wisely referred those evangelical testimonies to the Roman Bishop and the Apostolic See' (Cano, De Locis Theologicis, l. 6, c. last, to the tenth).. better explained (BENITO PEREIRA, S. I.).—'He wrote that most learned book, which today is worn by the hands of all everywhere, on merit, whose title is De Locis Theologicis, in which so notably and precisely and with such eloquence he establishes what are the most powerful places for the theologian to establish his conclusions, and as it were the bases upon which the whole theological structure ought to rise, so that nothing could be more exact and more complete'. (SIxtus of Siena).—'The treatise on the Loci Theologici is a plainly golden work, and complete in all its numbers, and composed with the greatest elegance' (ELIAS DU-PIN).—'That illustrious author wrote a whole and golden book on the twelve loci, which they may truly call a treasure, extracted from various mines, in which nothing is found that is not precious, not refined gold, not complete in all its numbers... Whoever will read this attentively and seriously will freely admit that scarcely any book so far has appeared in human memory either richer in abundance, or more suitable in method, or more fruitful in variety, or more polished in style, or more illustrious in the arrangement of all things (the Fathers of the Church alone excepted): inasmuch as in it an outstanding splendor of elegance, sublime wisdom, and profound erudition contend for the palm' (VINCENT CONTENSON).

We propose in this section to show that a confusion has been incurred regarding the mind of Melchor Cano on this question, and that this confusion has been transmitted without examination from one to another until it has already become current coin among the generality of theologians.

Nothing, in fact, is more common among theological writers than the assertion that Melchor Cano defended, like Vázquez and Vega, that theological conclusions are of divine faith. Let any treatise on theology be opened, let the place be sought where the question is treated of whether theological conclusions or what is mediately or virtually revealed are or are not of divine faith, and one will invariably stumble upon the following or similar words: "The first opinion affirms that these theological conclusions are of faith, and accordingly that it suffices for faith that they be virtually revealed or virtually contained in the revealed. Thus holds Cano, book sixth of the Loci, last chapter, to the tenth; more fully Vega, book 9 on the Council of Trent, chapter 39; and defends it Vázquez, first part, disputation 5, chapter 3".

Thus Suárez expresses himself¹, and in similar terms the majority of authors express themselves, invariably citing

Many other praises can be seen from distinguished writers in the preliminary dissertation of SERRY to his edition of Cano's works. Nowadays, since the most fundamental subject of Locis is frequently studied through modern compendiums, Melchor Cano is neither read, nor cited, nor praised with the frequency and enthusiasm that our forebears showed. Nevertheless, we believe that anyone who has studied or read with the attention it deserves the classic and imperishable work of the founder of the Theological Loci, and compares it with whatever has been written in modern times on this matter, cannot but subscribe to the judgment of the illustrious and competent Fr. Berthier when he says of Cano: He was altogether the prince AND HAS REMAINED SO. "Thus he himself, who first devised the science of the Theological Loci, was and has remained altogether the author and prince of that discipline; although something may seem to need to be added to and changed in his work, on account of the greater breadth of certain sciences" (BERTHIER, De Locis Theologicis, prol., p. 8, Augustae Taurinorum 1888). Melchor Cano, in turn, considers Cardinal Cajetan as the greatest among the disciples of Saint Thomas: "Cajetan, whom I dare call the one most eminent in genius and learning of our family" (De Locis, l. 12, c. 5). It is well known that, by the phrase we or our family, Cano usually understands the Thomist school. "Ours, that is, the family of St. Thomas" (l. c., l. 9, c. 9). namely the same place that Suárez cites and that Vázquez had already cited, turning the water to his own mill: that is, the ad decimum of the last chapter of the sixth book of the immortal work of Melchor Cano.

450. THE TEXT OF MELCHOR CANO.—Let us begin by quoting literally that famous ad decimum of Melchor Cano, which is what has given rise to this question. It reads as follows: “But this too must finally be considered (for it is a matter of great importance and most worthy of careful consideration): not only does that belong to Catholic doctrine which was expressly revealed to the Apostles, but also that which is deduced from one revealed proposition and another certain one in the natural light, by evident syllogism and inference.”

This is what Melchor Cano said in his much-cited ad decimum, adding afterwards in confirmation three examples which, due to their great length, we place in a note ². On this text rests the persuasion, now general, that Melchor Cano defended, as Vega and Vázquez seem to have defended, that the theological conclusion is of divine faith; understanding the phrase of divine faith in the sense of being immediately of divine faith, which is how that phrase is generally understood today, for that the theological conclusion is mediately of divine faith is commonly admitted by theologians.

Now then: is it true that Melchor Cano defended, as is generally attributed to him, that the theological conclusion is immediately of divine faith? Is that the meaning of the cited text from the famous ad decimum? Let us examine this, but first making two simple observations.

451. FIRST OBSERVATION.—All the great scholastic theologians divide divine revelation into immediate and mediate, there being, according to all theologians, truths immediately revealed and mediately revealed. Consequently, a thing can belong to the divine faith or to Catholic doctrine in two distinct ways: immediately or mediately. Therefore (and this must never be forgotten), when in the ancient theologians one reads the phrase to be of divine faith or to belong to the divine faith, one must take note of whether they are speaking of being immediately of divine faith, or of being so only mediately.

452. SECOND OBSERVATION.—Although Vázquez may have confused or seemed to confuse the value of the authority of the Church with the value of theological reasoning, nevertheless, for the generality of theologians, and very especially for Thomistic theologians, those two values are essentially distinct. Consequently, when any theologian, above all a Thomistic theologian, speaks of whether a thing is or is not of divine faith, one must carefully consider whether he says or understands that it is of faith after the definition of the Church or that it is of faith before or without a definition of the Church.

453. CONFIRMATION.—Indeed: in the ancient theologians the phrases revealed truth, matter of faith, belonging to Catholic doctrine are often taken not only in the strict sense of today, namely of being so immediately, but also

Not one word more or less than what was copied did Cano say, regarding this question, in his much-cited ad decimum. The three examples of Cano that we cite in this note offer no special difficulty and are admitted by the generality of theologians. The difficulty lies in the general rule that Cano establishes in the words previously cited in the text, where he affirms that the conclusions deduced from one premise of faith and another of reason are de fide or belong to Catholic doctrine. What Cano understands by being de fide or by belonging to Catholic doctrine is what we are going to examine in this section. also in the broader sense of being so whether immediately or mediately. Although this is evident to anyone, we will cite a few brief texts from ancient theologians of different backgrounds:

“Revealed doctrine, immediately as it is faith, or mediately as it is theology” ³

“You ask: what is called a catholic proposition? I say that an assertion or proposition is called catholic in two ways. In one way immediately, namely, that which is directly derived from the rule of faith... In another way, an assertion is called catholic mediately, which is derived by a very good and clear consequence from the prior proposition” ⁴

“Fides ergo Catholica duobus modis accipi potest: one strictly, for the habit and assent to those things which are immediately, that is, formally and in themselves, revealed; another broadly, for the habit and assent both to these things and to those which are MEDIATELY, that is, by virtue of and in another thing, revealed: such as the conclusions which are deduced from the articles. For we are accustomed to say that those things are of faith which are clearly deduced from the articles” ⁵

“It is customary to say that something is of faith immediately and formally, and mediately or virtually. That is said to be immediately, and primarily in itself, of faith which by the light of God and through the act of believing is immediately attained as immediately revealed. That, however, is said to be mediately, and secondarily in itself, attained which is reached from a proposition of faith through inference, and thus it pertains to the theological light which is inferential from those things that are of faith” ⁶

“I suppose first, that something can be said to be of divine faith in two ways, namely either immediately, or only mediately, that is, virtually. That is said to be of divine faith immediately which is immediately revealed by God; mediately, however, what is clearly deduced from one proposition immediately revealed by God and from another known by the natural light” ⁷

“Something can be called a dogma of faith, either immediately, because it is certainly contained in the written or transmitted word of God: or mediately, because it is necessarily inferred and deduced from the word of God in this manner. For such a kind of conclusions, which are necessarily connected with the things of faith, at least mediately must be said to pertain to faith” ⁸

All these texts from such different and distinguished theologians are but a development of that principle already expressly formulated by Saint Thomas: "Something pertains to the faith in two ways: in one way, directly, such as the articles of faith...; in another way, indirectly, such as those things from which something contrary to the faith follows" ⁹ (323, 469).

The point here is not to demonstrate whether the ancient nomenclature is better or worse than the modern one, but only that the phrases being of divine faith, belonging to Catholic doctrine, etc., have in all our classical theologians two senses: being of faith immediately 'or being so mediately.

In modern times, the phrase to be of the faith is already coming to be understood in only one sense, namely as being so immediately, and it is even now almost understood solely as being immediately not only of divine faith, but of Catholic faith. "Quando aliquid dicitur esse de fide, mos ita generaliter invaluit ut communiter intelligatur de fide catholica" ¹⁰ As we have seen, in former times theologians ordinarily understood something very different: "Consuevimus dicere de fide esse, quae ex articulis evidenter deducuntur" ¹¹ "Solet dici quod aliquid sit de fide, immediate et formaliter, et mediate seu virtualiter" ¹² Whoever, then, in reading the ancient theologians, and especially Melchor Cano, forgets this double meaning of the phrases to be of the faith or Catholic doctrine, closes off to himself the understanding of traditional theology and will attribute, with the best of good faith, to an author precisely the contrary of what he says.

Regarding the second distinction of before or after the definition of the Church, it suffices to cite the following words of John of Saint Thomas: "Concerning the certainty of the conclusions which Theology draws, one must distinguish: for either they are attained by theological reasoning alone, or, beyond reasoning, the definition of the Church is also added to them" ¹³

Combining, then, both observations, it follows that, in order to properly appreciate the mind of an ancient theologian when he says that this or that belongs to divine faith, two things must be noted: a) whether he says or implies that it belongs immediately or only mediately; b) whether he says or implies that it belongs even before the Church's definition or only after its definition.

454. THE TRUE MIND OF MELCHOR CANO.—When an author has explained himself, and has explained himself not once but repeatedly, and has done so in express and categorical terms, no one has the right to attribute another meaning to him. Now then: Melchor Cano himself is going to give us a categorical explanation of what he understood in his famous ad decimum when he said that theological conclusions belong to the faith or to Catholic doctrine. Let us see, first of all, whether he understood or intended to say that they belong immediately or only that they belong mediately. Let us turn to book 5, chapter 5, where he deals with what things are of faith and can be defined as being of faith by the ecumenical council. Here are his words: "Two kinds of truths can be defined in the council. One, of those truths that are properly theological, because they are deduced from two premises of faith or from one premise of faith and another of reason. Another, of those truths that the Holy Spirit Himself revealed to the apostles, evangelists, and prophets; but since this was not clear, the council declares it. The first belong to the faith secondarily or, so to speak, mediately. Wherefore, as we shall explain at length in its proper place, whoever denies them is only a heretic ex consequenti, that is, insofar as he denies the principle of faith from which they are deduced. But those that are of the second kind belong to the faith properly and of themselves; and of these neither the councils nor the pontiffs can give us any new one" ¹⁴. It could not be said more clearly. Theological conclusions, whether they are deduced from two premises of faith or from one of faith and another of reason, only belong to the faith mediately, secondarily, ex consequenti. Here is categorically explained by Melchor Cano himself in what sense theological conclusions can be called and are called by him [things] of faith. And this doctrine, thus explained by Cano himself, far from being the doctrine of Vázquez and Vega, is the doctrine of the whole Thomistic school and that which all modern theologians commonly follow. There is only one difference between Cano and the moderns, and it is in favor of Melchor Cano. That difference consists in the fact that modern theologians, when they say that the theological conclusion is only of faith mediately, except the conclusions deduced from two premises of faith, and even those deduced from one premise of faith and another of reason, if this premise of reason is of an inclusive or explanatory character; which conclusions, according to the moderns, are not only mediately of faith, but are so immediately. While for Melchor Cano, as for all Thomists, no conclusion, even one deduced from two premises of faith, is immediately of faith, but rather it is properly and immediately theological and only belongs to the faith mediately.

The doctrine, then, of Melchor Cano is not only opposed to that of Vázquez and Vega, but it is more radically opposed than the one commonly followed today by non-Thomist theologians.

455. MORE TEXTS FROM MELCHOR CANO.—Although the preceding text sufficed by its explicitness and definitiveness to reveal Melchor Cano’s mind, there are many other texts that place the matter beyond any shadow of doubt.

It will have been noticed that in the previous quotation Melchor Cano himself says that he intends to treat the question extensively in its proper place. "We will explain this at length later in its proper place." That place, as anyone who knows Melchor Cano's work thoroughly knows, and as Melchor Cano himself expressly points out later, is the twelfth book. In that book the author treats extensively the nature of faith and theology, and in a special way the principles and theological conclusions ¹⁵. It seemed natural that the authors, when seeking to know the mind of Melchor Cano on this question, should turn preferably to the place where Cano treats it ex professo and extensively, and not merely to an offhand word in another book where he touches on it only incidentally and to resolve an objection relating to a different matter. Let us turn, then, to book twelve as Cano himself advises us, and leaving aside the prologue, which in the edition we use constitutes the first chapter, let us see what the author tells us from the second chapter on whether the theological conclusions are or are not de fide. Let us hear his own words:

"To call faith what does not rest immediately on authority, but on reason and syllogism, is absurd... The weak and even foolish argument on which some rely for this is that if a theological conclusion is clearly and evidently deduced from its principles, such a conclusion belongs, not to theology, but to faith. But this argument is ridiculous and is rightly rejected by the majority of theologians. The distinction between faith and theology is very easy and very clear: of faith is what is known immediately by authority, of theology what is known immediately by reasoning... The certainty and evidence of the deduction does not take the conclusion out of being theological, but rather makes it theological; for precisely in that does theology consist... If, then, one of the premises is uncertain, or if the connection or reasoning is not evident, we will have neither faith nor theology, but opinion. But if both premises are certain and the connection is evident, then it is that we have a true theological conclusion and true theology; whether it is a conclusion deduced from two premises of faith, or from one of faith and another of evident reason. For, as we already said and will repeat a thousand times over, theological conclusions do not belong to faith except in the sense in which the human sciences belong to the simple understanding or habit of principles. And since this is so obvious that it needs no proof, let us leave it and move on to something else" ^[148. For to call faith what rests not proximately on authority, but on reason and syllogism, is absurd... The argument they put forward for this is not at all acute but exceedingly dull, namely that if the connection were certain and clear, conclusions would pertain no longer to theology but to faith. Yet this reasoning is ridiculous, and is rightly censured by most. For the distinction between faith and theology is easy and clear, because faith rests proximately and, so to speak, immediately on authority: whereas theology rests proximately and immediately on reason. For they are related, as I said above, faith and theology no otherwise than the HABIT OF PRINCIPLES and the SCIENCE OF CONCLUSIONS... But to the point. When the connection is uncertain, or one of the propositions taken with a principle of faith is uncertain, there will be opinion about the conclusion, it will not properly be theology. But whether both principles of the syllogism be of faith, or one be certain from faith and the other evident from nature, the conclusion will pertain to theology, provided the consequence is known either by the clear light of nature or by the illumination of faith. For not otherwise—which I have often said and will say again and again—not otherwise, I say, is the knowledge of such a conclusion referred to faith, than the natural disciplines are referred to the habit of principles. Since these things are so at hand that the matter needs no argument, having set these aside, let us proceed to the rest" (CANO, Book Twelve, c. 2, toward the end). So be it, as with almost everything

We believe that few theologians have expressed themselves with greater clarity, exactness, and energy on the distinction between theology and faith and on the nature of the true theological conclusion. For Melchor Cano, the formal medium of faith is only divine authority; but into the formal medium of theology there also enters human reasoning. Although both faith and theology are grounded in divine revelation, faith has as its medium of knowledge divine revelation declared by the divine authority of the Church; theology has as its medium reasoned divine revelation, that is, declared by the human reason of the theologian. What is known through the first medium is founded solely and immediately on divine authority; what is known only through the second medium is founded immediately on the human reasoning of the theologian, and only mediately on revelation or divine authority.

This distinction of formal means of knowledge (for faith and theology are not purely affective habits or of the will, in which one may give them whatever kind of assent one pleases, but rather cognitive or intellectual habits that admit no more kinds of assent than the kinds of means of knowledge available to them) makes faith and theology be distinguished by a distinction that is easy and evident. “For the difference between faith and theology is easy and clear; because faith is proximately and, so to speak, immediately based on authority; but theology is proximately and immediately based on reason. For faith and theology are related, as I said above, no differently than the habit of principles and the knowledge of conclusions” ¹⁶. Who would have told Melchor Cano that there would be those who would attribute to him such a confusion between theology and faith, as would be making immediately an article of faith of conclusions known only by reasoning!

But let us continue citing the twelfth book, where Melchor Cano told us that his mind was to be studied on this question and where clear and explicit texts abound. In chapter five he expresses himself thus: “There are two kinds of questions of faith. Some belong to faith immediately, as truly everything that God revealed to his Church by word or in writing belongs to it. Others are of faith mediately, as are all the conclusions that are evidently deduced from the former. These latter, because they were not revealed in themselves, but in others, as in their principles, are said to belong to faith mediately, and whoever denies them is said to deny faith in that same sense” ¹⁷.

Later on, in the sixth chapter, it is expressed in a similar manner: “Since there are two kinds, as we have said, of questions of faith, and some pertain to faith mediately and others immediately, we must begin by distinguishing two kinds of propositions of faith. One, of those which are the legitimate principles of Theology, whether primary or secondary principles, that is, all the truths revealed in themselves by God to the Church. Another, of those which are necessarily deduced from the first” ¹⁸.

We believe that with these texts, so explicit and decisive, it is more than enough to know clearly what Melchor Cano's mind is on whether theological conclusions are or are not de fide. For Melchor Cano, as for Saint Thomas and the Thomists, theological conclusions, whether they are deduced from two premises of faith, or from one of faith and another of reason, are in themselves immediately theological, not of faith; they only belong and are said to belong to faith mediately. This we believe is or should be an established point and beyond all doubt for anyone who, without prejudice, reads not an isolated ad decimum, but the entire work of Melchor Cano, and, above all, his golden twelfth book, where he treats the question ex professo and to which he always refers whenever he alludes to it.

456. THE THEOLOGICAL CONCLUSION AFTER THE DEFINITION OF THE CHURCH.—As we saw at the beginning of this section, in order to know the mind of a theologian, especially of a Thomistic theologian, when he says that something belongs or does not belong to the faith, two things must be noted: first, whether he says or understands that they belong to the faith immediately or only mediately, for these are essentially distinct things; second, whether he says or understands that they belong to the faith before or after the dogmatic definition of the Church, for these too are very distinct things.

We have already seen Melchor Cano's mind on the first question. Theological conclusions of themselves (per se, as Melchor Cano tells us) belong to the faith only mediately. It remains to examine the second question. How, according to Melchor Cano, do theological conclusions belong to the faith after the Church's definition?

If in the first question Melchor Cano was categorical, he is no less so in the second. Following St. Thomas and all his school, he establishes that those conclusions, once dogmatically defined by the Church, are already of divine faith not only mediately, but with the same propriety and rigor as the very articles of faith, and that whoever knowingly denies them after the definition is as properly a heretic as one who denies the Bible or divine tradition. And this Melchor Cano establishes not as a more or less probable opinion, but as one of the unquestionable canons or precepts of theological loci. Let us hear his own words:

RULE SEVENTH.— If the Church, or the Ecumenical Council, or the Apostolic See, or the Holy Fathers with completely unanimous consent deduce a THEOLOGICAL CONCLUSION and IMPOSE it authoritatively upon the faithful, this conclusion must be held as truly CATHOLIC TRUTH as if it had been revealed IN ITSELF by Jesus Christ, and those who deny it will be as much heretics as if they denied the Holy Scriptures or the divine traditions.

And in confirmation of the above rule, Cano brings numerous examples of true dogmas of divine faith and not merely of ecclesiastical faith, which, in his judgment, are found in the revealed deposit not as truths revealed in themselves or immediately, but revealed only in others, from which reason deduces them by way of conclusion or reasoning, that is, revealed only mediately, and the proper and immediate object of theology, not of divine faith, until the Church defined them ¹⁹

For Cano, then, theological conclusions, before the definition, are only mediately of faith and properly and rigorously theological; after the dogmatic definition of the Church they are properly of divine faith and require the immediate assent of divine faith and not merely theological assent or assent of ecclesiastical faith.

This is the doctrine of Melchor Cano, and this doctrine is not only opposed to that of Vázquez and of Molina, but it is the one commonly followed afterward by almost all the great theologians, both within and outside the Thomistic school, although in modern times the contrary may seem to be taught.

457. OTHER EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE TRUE MIND OF MELCHOR CANO.—Although the cited texts and others that could be cited are clear and decisive and leave, in our judgment, no doubt whatsoever about the true mind of Melchor Cano on this question, we shall employ other evidence of an indirect nature, which we believe serves to confirm all that we have just said. The evidence we shall adduce is like extrinsic indications that corroborate what we already know directly from the texts of Melchor Cano. Among many others, we shall use only three.

As the reader will understand, with these quotations from Cano we do not intend precisely to defend that the examples or arguments adduced by him are or are not conclusive; what we seek to demonstrate is what Melchor Cano’s mind is on the theological conclusion, or how, according to Cano, the theological conclusion is truly and properly of divine faith, dogma of faith, but only after the definition of the Church; for when the Church has not yet defined it and it is known by solely theological reasoning, it is not of faith, but mediately, which means that it is immediately theological and only merits theological assent.

158. FIRST INDICATION.—When on a question there are two extreme or radically opposed solutions, and the defenders of each of them cite and bring a famous author to their favor, without expressing the slightest doubt that this author agrees with them, it is a grave indication that this author does not fully agree with either of the two extreme solutions.

Now then, it is well known that on the most serious question of whether theological conclusions are or are not de fide, there exist in traditional theology two radically opposed solutions. One is the theory of Vázquez; the other, that of Molina. For Vázquez, the theological conclusion is immediately of divine faith, even without a definition by the Church. For Molina, the theological conclusion is only mediately of divine faith, even with a definition by the Church. For Vázquez, to the theological conclusion, evidently deduced, one can and must give true assent of divine faith and not merely theological assent, even before the definition of the Church. For Molina, to the theological conclusion one can and must give only theological assent and never immediate assent of divine faith, even if the Church defines it. The opposition between the two theories could not be more complete.

However, there is a curious fact to which, as far as we know, no one has yet called attention, and it is that both Vázquez and Molina cite Cano in favor of their opposing theories, and they cite him as something evident about which no doubt is possible, a serious indication that Cano stands in the middle ground.

That Vázquez (85) cites Cano in his favor will surprise few, since it is already so common today to see Cano cited as sharing the opinion of Vázquez and Vega. But we believe that it will indeed surprise the reader to see Cano cited by Molina to prove that conclusions are not only not of themselves matters of faith, but that they are not so even if the Church defines them dogmatically, as it defined the conclusion of the two wills in Christ. Here once again is the text of Molina:

"In this doctrine, the principles are all those things which are immediately and in themselves revealed by God... There have not been lacking those who would say that even those definitions are to be counted among the principles of theology by which the Church establishes that it sees something clearly deduced from what is revealed: such as that in Christ there are two wills, divine and human, which, although not expressed in Sacred Scripture, is nevertheless clearly gathered from it... This opinion does not please me, and Cano also rejected it, in book twelve On the Topics, chapter 3. For the assistance by which the Holy Spirit is present to the Catholic Church, and to its Head, the Supreme Pontiff, is not to make something a matter of faith that was not previously a matter of faith, but only to prevent error in declaring those things which pertain to faith mediately or immediately" ²⁰

Here is Cano, whom we are accustomed to see cited as being of the opinion of Vázquez, cited by Molina as being of the diametrically opposite opinion.

The reason why both Vázquez and Molina have been able, in the best of good faith, to cite Cano in favor of two radically opposed theories is very simple. Extremes, as is commonly said, touch each other, that is, radically opposed theories frequently start from a common point or end up at a common point. That common point in the theories of Vázquez and Molina is the failure in both to recognize the essential distinction that exists between the divine or dogmatic value of the definition of the Church and the human or theological value of science and reasoning in the question concerning whether theological conclusions are or can come to be of faith. That failure to recognize values that are specifically distinct causes both Molina and Vázquez, when they treat whether the theological conclusion is or is not of faith, to eliminate as accidental and irrelevant the distinction between before and after the definition of the Church. Both answer that the theological conclusion is of faith or is not of faith, without any distinction relative to the definition of the Church. Vázquez answers: it is of faith, for the one who evidently sees the conclusion, the same before as after the definition, since that matter of before or after is accidental. Molina says: it is not of faith either before or after the definition, for the definition is accidental and does not pertain to the case. Since both theologians hold that matter of before or after the definition to be accidental, it is not surprising that when they read other authors they give no importance to it nor pay much attention to whether those authors, when they affirm that the theological conclusion is or is not of faith, understand it of before or after the definition. If an author says that theological conclusions are of faith, for Vázquez it is evident that that author agrees with him. If, on the contrary, he says that they are not of faith, for Molina it is clear that that author is of his same opinion.

This explains very well how such illustrious theologians as Vázquez and Molina have been able, respectively, to cite Melchor Cano in favor of radically opposed theories. In Melchor Cano's theory, as in that of every true Thomist, two equally true assertions fit on this question: first, theological conclusions are not of faith; second, theological conclusions are of faith. That is: of themselves (per se) or before the Church's definition they are not immediately of faith, but mediately, for they are properly and immediately theological. But by definition or after the Church's definition they are of faith properly and immediately, and not merely theological, for the dogmatic definition of the Church supplies another distinct formal medium, namely divine revelation explained or defined by the Church. Vázquez will read the second assertion of Melchor Cano in the famous ad decimum and will cite him in his favor, saying that, according to Melchor Cano, theological conclusions are of faith. Molina will read the first assertion in many other places and, above all, in the twelfth book, and will also cite him in his favor, saying that, according to Melchor Cano, they are not of faith. Both are right in their own way, for both assertions of Melchor Cano are true in Thomistic doctrine.

This, in our judgment, is the true explanation of how Vázquez and Molina, both theologians of the first rank, but both frequently unfaithful to Thomistic doctrine, have been able to cite Melchor Cano in favor of their opposed theories, a sign that he is not completely with either of them, but rather in the middle ground, as we have already seen from the clear and definitive texts of Cano himself.

159. CONFIRMATION.—Even making a small digression, it will not be out of place to cite here a few short passages from John of St. Thomas, Báñez, Gotti, and De Groot. John of St. Thomas is, as is well known, one of the most profound and almost always most faithful commentators on the true thought of St. Thomas and of the Thomist school. Of him Contenson has rightly said: "John of St. Thomas, second to none in his skill in and penetration of the doctrine of the Angelic St. Thomas" ²¹ Here, then, is how John of St. Thomas expresses himself on the position of Vázquez and Molina regarding Thomist doctrine on this question: "What is the certainty of a theological conclusion without a definition of the Church or with it? Regarding the certainty of the conclusions which theology deduces, one must distinguish, because they are reached either by theological discourse alone, or, beyond the discourse, the definition of the Church is also joined to them. If they are taken in the first way, there are two opinions. Some hold that conclusions evidently deduced from the principles of faith also pertain to faith, as Master Soto seems to think (Soto explained himself when he said "provided that they are defined by the Church," as we already saw in number 386). Molina also attributes this to Scotus, when he (Scotus) says that the habit of faith and of theology is the same. The opinion of others, and the more common one, is that conclusions thus deduced do not pertain immediately to faith, but mediately; but of themselves they pertain to theological science.

If, in the second way, the certainty of theology is considered, the authors also vary. For Father Vázquez equates the declaration of the Church, when it declares something of faith, with theological demonstration itself, and he posits only a purely material difference, namely, that the Council proposes what it defines as something to be believed by the whole Church; theological reason, however, only to those for whom such a consequence is evident. Here he equates the definition of faith with theological reason. On the other hand, Molina (with others whom Granados cites and follows) holds that propositions deduced by the Church, and thus defined by virtue of the deduction, are not immediately of faith, but still belong to theological science as conclusions, nor can they become principles of theology... The third opinion is that propositions evidently deduced from the principles of faith, if defined by the Church, pertain immediately to faith, and become principles of theology, nor do they any longer rest on discourse, but their certainty comes from the divine testimony proposed through the Church according to the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit in defining matters of faith. The Thomists commonly follow this opinion ²² And in the treatise On Faith, alluding to this very passage we have just cited, he expresses himself thus: “From what has been said it is inferred that virtual revelation, or mediate or deduced through discourse, such as is found in theology, is distinguished specifically from immediate revelation, which is had from the testimony of the one speaking and attains what is to be believed as a matter of faith, as we have more fully handed on in the first part, q. 1, disp. 2, art. 4, where we rejected two extreme opinions: one of Vázquez, who thinks that a conclusion deduced from premises of faith is as certain, for one who knows the discourse, as a proposition defined by the Church: the other of P. Molina, who thinks that even if a definition of the Church supervenes upon some proposition which previously was not of faith, it would not make it a matter of faith, but that the Holy Spirit assists the Church lest it err, not so as to make matters of faith of those things which previously were not of faith. These opinions can be seen as refuted in the cited place” ²³

The great commentator on St. Thomas, Domingo Báñez, expresses himself in the same way: “Just as divine revelation immediately is the formal principle of faith, but mediately of theological science, so faith itself immediately and per se only inclines toward the articles of faith and toward those things that have been expressly revealed, but mediately and consequently it is also concerned with the conclusions that are drawn from the articles of faith by an evident consequence. Hence it is necessary that dissent concerning the propositions of theology mediately and consequently opposes faith” ²⁴ : “For if someone confesses that Christ is a perfect man, but denies that He is capable of laughter, because he thinks that capability of laughter does not pertain to the perfection of human nature, he would be a bad philosopher, but not yet a heretic, because it has not so far been defined by the Church that Christ is capable of laughter. But if the Church were to define that capability of laughter pertains to the perfection of human nature, just as it has been defined that Christ has a twofold will, human and divine, then whoever denied it would be a heretic, because he would contradict the doctrine of the Church, which is the pillar and foundation of truth. It is answered, therefore, to the argument that the conclusions which are deduced from the principles of faith, or from one principle of faith and another naturally evident one, through a good consequence, are properly conclusions of theological science. And nevertheless they are said to be conclusions of faith, not immediately but mediately; and the opposite of them is called an error concerning faith mediatedly; and whoever thinks the contrary falls under suspicion of heresy, especially if he is a philosopher, because he is not to be believed to deny what is known by the natural light, and consequently he is believed to deny the principle of faith. This opinion my teacher Cano holds, book twelve, on the Theological Places, chapter 2 ²⁵.

Similarly, Gotti expresses himself: "Something can be called a dogma of faith either immediately, because it is contained in the written or transmitted word of God, or mediately, because it is necessarily inferred and deduced from the word of God in this way... Therefore, a theological conclusion is commonly called virtually revealed, because it approaches faith so closely that nothing is lacking for it to be of faith except the express definition of the Church" ²⁶.

As can be seen, then, Báñez, John of St. Thomas, and Gotti (and likewise all the other Thomists could be cited) resolve this question in the same sense and with the same two distinctions as Melchior Cano: the distinction between belonging to the faith immediately or mediately, and the distinction of before or after the Church’s definition. Vázquez did not notice the first distinction, and believed that Melchior Cano was of his own opinion; Molina did not notice the second, and attributed to Cano the opposite opinion.

460. FR. DE GROOT.—We insist so much on these things, even at the risk of being accused of being wearisome and diffuse, because these two distinctions are the key not only to the understanding of Melchor Cano, but of the whole Thomistic doctrine on these questions, and because, by failing to note them, things very different from what Cano actually said are today being attributed to Cano, even by illustrious Thomists.

Thus, for example, to cite but one domestic theologian, the learned Fr. De Groot, whose Summa Apologetica is so universally and so justly appreciated, after saying that theological conclusions are not immediately of faith, but mediately or ex consequenti, and that their denial, therefore, can only be called heresy in a mediate or illative sense (which is the very doctrine of Cano ²⁷; but provided that this is understood of the theological conclusion before its definition of faith by the Church), adds: "From that precept of Cano, however, he seems to depart with certain others, saying: 'this (truly theological conclusion) will be regarded as Catholic truth, as if it had been revealed by Christ Himself; and those who oppose it will be just as heretical as if they contradicted the Sacred Scriptures or the traditions of the Apostles'" ²⁸.

The complete statement of Cano cited here by De Groot, but of which Fr. De Groot has omitted the first part as deeming it unnecessary, reads as follows, as the reader already knows: "Seventh precept: If either the Church, or a Council, or the Apostolic See, or even the Saints, with one mind and with one voice, have both established some theological conclusion AND HAVE ALSO PRESCRIBED IT TO THE FAITHFUL, this truth will be regarded as Catholic, etc." (Cano, loc. cit.). From the underlined words, which Fr. De Groot has omitted with the best of good faith, believing them accidental to the question, anyone can clearly see that Cano, in this precept, is dealing with the theological conclusion after the definition of the Church. Now then, that the theological conclusion, after the definition of the Church, is immediately of divine faith, and that its denial constitutes heresy in a proper and immediate sense and not only in a mediate or illative sense—this is not the particular opinion of Cano cum nonnullis aliis, as Fr. De Groot says, but the constant doctrine of the whole Thomist school, of the whole Scotist school, and of the immense majority of the great theologians of all other schools. Fr. De Groot, in citing, innocently truncated, the Seventh Precept of Melchior Cano, did not notice the distinction between before and after the definition of the Church; just as very many moderns, when reading or citing the other texts of Melchior Cano, do not notice the distinction between belonging to the faith immediately or mediately. Both distinctions are essential in this question for the Thomists.

461. SECOND INDICATION.—One of the best indications for knowing whether a theologian holds theological conclusions, known only through evident reasoning, as immediately [an object] of faith, or whether he holds them only mediately [as an object] of faith, is to see whether that theologian admits or does not admit a specific distinction between the habits of faith and of theology, or between the habit of the principles and the habit of the conclusions of the sacred science.

The theologian who specifically identifies the habits of faith and theology must logically admit that theological conclusions are immediately of faith as soon as they are known by evident reasoning or by deduction from what is revealed, which is the formal medium or immediate medium of theology, just as the theologian who admits that the habits of theology and faith are specifically distinct must consequently admit that theological conclusions known only through the theological medium, that is, through reasoning, are immediately theological and only mediately of faith. And conversely: the one who admits that theological conclusions, known only by reasoning, are immediately of faith must grant that the habits of theology and faith are not essentially distinct; just as the one who admits that such conclusions belong properly and immediately to theology and only mediately to faith must logically conclude that faith and theology are specifically distinguished.

This rule or criterion, which is self-evident to anyone familiar with these matters, and which could be proven inductively by reviewing the different schools and theologians, is very well and expressly formulated by Suárez. Speaking of the opinion that denies that theological conclusions are of themselves immediately matters of faith, he expresses himself thus: "And so for this opinion they can cite those who distinguish the habit of faith from the habit of theology" ²⁹ And speaking later of the opposite opinion, he points out the same rule in the reverse sense: "And Aureolus and certain Doctors hold the same view, who do not distinguish between the habit of faith, insofar as it gives assent to conclusions, and the habit of theology" ³⁰ Lugo ³¹ and many other authors point out the same rule.

To know, then, whether Melchor Cano defended that theological conclusions were immediately of faith or only mediately so, there is no better indicator than to see whether he specifically distinguishes faith from theology. If he does not specifically distinguish them, he must logically defend that theological conclusions, known only by evident reasoning and without any definition of the Church, are immediately of faith. On the other hand, if he specifically distinguishes faith and theology, that is, the principles and the conclusions of the sacred science, he must logically defend that theological conclusions, known only through the formal medium of theology, which is reasoning or deduction from what is revealed, are immediately and properly theological and belong to faith only mediately, or indirectly, or ex consequenti. Now, has Melchor Cano specifically distinguished or not specifically distinguished the habits of faith and theology, or the habits of the principles and conclusions of the sacred science? Not only has he distinguished them specifically, but even generically, and with very forceful words. Let us hear him: “For the distinction between faith and theology is easy and clear: because faith rests proximately and immediately on authority: but theology rests proximately and immediately on reason. For faith and theology are related, as I said above, in no other way than as the habit of principles and the science of conclusions” ³² “By which distinction, as we have said, theology and faith are separated not in words and thought, but in the whole matter and in their entire genus” ³³ The root of this distinction, says Melchor Cano, lies in the fact that theology is related to faith as reason or science is related to simple understanding. “But if we wish to draw this matter from its source and see whence all things flow, we must nevertheless understand this, that the habit of faith in relation to the discipline of theology is as the habit of understanding is related to the human sciences and faculties” ³⁴ “For in no other way—and although I have said this, I will say it again and again—in no other way, I say, is the knowledge of such conclusions referred to faith, than the natural disciplines are referred to the habit of principles” ³⁵ All of which is but a faithful commentary on that great principle which Saint Thomas repeats so many times and in so many forms: “In this way the articles of faith are related to the doctrine of faith, as self-evident principles are related to the doctrine which is had through natural reason” ³⁶ Cano, therefore, has clearly and radically distinguished theology from faith, and the principles from the conclusions, and in the same manner as Saint Thomas. This is a good indication that he cannot defend that theological conclusions are of themselves, or without a definition of the Church, immediately of faith, but only mediately, as we have seen from his own and express texts.

462. CONFIRMATION.—The following complete passage from Cano is also worth reading on the distinction between theology and faith and on the manner in which one who denies an evident theological conclusion is or is called a heretic. After having laid down in the seventh preception of the seventh chapter of the twelfth book that the one who denies the theological conclusion, after its definition of faith by the Church, is properly and formally a heretic, and after having said in the eighth preception that when all theologians, with absolute unanimity, teach a conclusion and impose it on the faithful, that conclusion must be regarded as Catholic truth, and its denial as proximate to heresy ³⁷, he continues thus:

“But let no one wonder why, since it is agreed among almost all theologians, and has often been affirmed by me myself, that conclusions of this kind, which are derived from the faith by an explicit consequence, belong PROPERLY TO THEOLOGY, NOT TO FAITH, I now so confuse them, as if theology and faith were the same virtue. For if an error in a theological conclusion is an error of faith, as it truly is; if to deny it is heresy, it follows that faith and theology pertain to the same virtue, since errors contrary to either faculty pertain to the same vice. For both are heresies. But it will not be difficult for him who re-reads the foregoing to trample and crush this CALUMNY. For we have said that faith, although not immediately, nevertheless is concerned with those conclusions which are gathered from the articles of faith by an evident and necessary consequence. Wherefore it is necessary that unbelief mediately also be concerned with conclusions contrary to theology. Since, moreover, from errors of this kind, not only a sickness of faith but also its corruption follows, it happens that there is between them and faith an indeed indirect and consequent, but true and natural repugnance. Therefore the Church, although it understands that conclusions of this kind depend not only on faith but also on the principles of nature; yet because it does not think that a rational man denies those things which are clear and manifest to reason, it judges as a heretic him who has denied them. For it assumes, and with the greatest reason it assumes, that he is not limping in the natural reason, which was evident, but in the faith. But if anyone either were ignorant of a consequence otherwise evident in things, or even of a natural principle which is taken together with an article of faith to infer a theological conclusion, certainly he would not be a heretic. As if an unlearned man, for example, thought that this proposition were false, every man is capable of laughter, whence although he believed Christ to be a man, he would not therefore think that He could laugh; this man would certainly not be properly an unbeliever but a fool, who would not resist the supernatural light per se, but the natural one. But since foolishness of this kind, although per accidens and indirectly, nevertheless consequently corrupts and depraves the judgment of faith, rightly in the Church it is held not as foolishness but as crime” ³⁸

In the same way, and almost with the same words, all Thomists express themselves. It suffices to hear Bañez: "But an argument offers itself against this conclusion. For if an error against theological propositions is also an error against faith, it follows that faith and theology are not formally distinct habits: the consequent is false; therefore, so is the antecedent. That the consequent is false was stated above in the second article. And I prove the consequence. Because one contrary cannot be opposed to two formally distinct contraries, but only to one; for white is opposed only to black, and cold only to hot; therefore, if an error against theology is opposed to faith, theology and faith will not be formally diverse. To this argument it is replied that just as divine revelation immediately is the formal principle of faith, but mediately of theological science, so faith itself immediately and of itself inclines only to the articles of faith and to those things which are expressly revealed; mediately however and consequently it is also concerned with conclusions which are drawn from the articles of faith through an evident consequence. Hence it is necessary that dissent concerning theological propositions, mediately and consequently, be opposed to faith. Just as a physical agent, which destroys the accidents necessary for the conservation of a substance, consequently destroys the substance itself. Wherefore the Church condemns as unfaithful one who attacks such theological propositions. For although she understands that they are deduced not from faith alone, but also from natural principles; nevertheless it is presumed that a rational man denies not those things which are known according to reason, but those things which are held from faith. For example, if someone denied that Christ is capable of laughter, which is gathered from these two premises: every man is capable of laughter, Christ is a man, he would be condemned as unfaithful. For he should not be thought to deny that proposition, every man is capable of laughter, which is evident by the natural light, nor the goodness of the consequence, which is also known of itself, but the truth of that assumed minor premise, Christ is a man. But if someone were so rustic, or foolish, that he did not perceive either the goodness of the consequence or the truth of the natural principle, such a one could deny a theological proposition, with Catholic faith intact, because he would be excused by ignorance" ³⁹ All this before the definition of the Church; for, as we have already seen, Bañez acknowledges with Cano that after the definition of the Church the theological conclusion is properly and rigorously of divine faith, and that he who knowingly denied it would be properly and formally a heretic, and not merely presumptively: "But if it were defined by the Church that risibility pertains to the perfection of human nature, just as it has been defined that Christ has a double will, human and divine, then he who denied it would be a heretic^174.

Suárez himself defends this general doctrine of the Thomists: "Someone will say: he who denies, for example, this proposition, Christ is risible, is rightly considered a heretic, because it is not believed of him that he denies the evident proposition: Every man is risible, and therefore he is convicted of denying another article of faith, Christ is man: therefore he falls into heresy by denying that conclusion: therefore the proposition opposed to that conclusion is heretical. It is replied that it is one thing to speak of that man according to human presumption or external appearance; another thing according to internal truth. In the first way the argument made proceeds, because men judge according to what appears externally, and do not behold the heart: and therefore if that man be stubborn in such an opinion, he will rightly be punished as a heretic. But if inwardly he believes Christ to be man, and does not believe Him to be risible, either because he foolishly denies that universal principle, or because he rashly imagines that God separated in Christ that property from the essence, he will not be formally a heretic, but erroneous in faith, until that proposition: Christ is risible, is immediately defined by the Church" ⁴⁰ And the same as Cano, Báñez, and Suárez, Lugo expresses himself, saying: "It can be asked, if the Church defines in a legitimate Council some proposition evidently deduced from one revealed premise and another evident non-revealed premise, whether he who afterwards denies it is properly a heretic? Concerning this I have also spoken in the cited place ⁴¹ that that proposition after the Church's definition is of faith, whence consequently it must be said that the one denying afterwards that proposition is properly a heretic" ⁴²

463. THIRD INDICATION.—We shall point out one last indication, and one of the most serious and convincing, namely that Suárez himself expressly acknowledges that Cano on this question is not with Vázquez and Vega, as is generally attributed to him and as Suárez himself had previously attributed to him, but rather with Saint Thomas and the whole Thomistic school. We do not know that anyone, until now, has fixed their attention on this important fact.

It is true that Suárez, in the place and text we cited at the beginning of this section, affirmed without any restriction that Cano follows, like Vázquez and Vega, the opinion that theological conclusions are immediately of faith, even without a definition by the Church, and that for this purpose he cites the well-known ad decimum of the sixth book of Cano. But the same Suárez, when dealing later with the opposite opinion, that is, the opinion which holds that such conclusions are immediately theological and only mediately of faith, expresses himself thus: “In addition to the authors cited in the second opinion (namely, Capreolus, Cajetan, and the Thomists, and others, and clearly St. Thomas), Cano held this opinion in book twelve of On the Theological Loci, chapter 7, in the eighth precept, thus declaring or correcting what he had earlier said there” ⁴³ And he repeats almost the same thing much further on: “Thus the Doctors commonly think with St. Thomas, Cajetan, Capreolus, and Cano thinks the same better, in book twelve of On the Theological Loci, chapter 3, in the third conclusion” ⁴⁴

As can be seen, here Suárez confesses two things: first, that Cano's opinion is that theological conclusions are not immediately of faith, but immediately theological, and only mediately of faith; second, that with this, said expressly by Cano in book twelve, Cano has explained or corrected what is commonly attributed to him from what was said in the ad decimum of book six. How, after such a categorical confession by Suárez, have his readers continued to cite Cano so calmly as holding the opinion of Vázquez and Vega, and citing for this purpose the authority of Suárez many times, without noticing or without telling us that Suárez himself had at last recognized the contrary? All the more so because Cano did not need to correct anything in this matter, since what Suárez calls explanation or correction is merely explanation, and an explanation that Cano did not wait to give until book twelve, as Suárez seems to indicate, but rather had already given it from book five, that is, long before the famous ad decimum, which is in book six. In that book five, and already referring in advance to what he intended to say in book twelve, Cano had given the whole key to his thought with the following words: “Two kinds of conclusions can be defined in a Council. One kind is those that are proper to the theological faculty, since they are drawn either from two principles believed by faith, or from one believed and another known by the light of nature. The other kind, however, is that of the things which the Holy Spirit Himself revealed indeed to the Apostles, Evangelists, or Prophets, but since it was not thereby equally manifest, it is declared by the synod. Those that are of the first kind pertain to faith secondarily and, so to speak, MEDIATELY” ⁴⁵ The mind, therefore, of Cano, which Suárez saw, and rightly, throughout book twelve, was not a correction of anything, but a clearer and fuller explanation of what Cano had already set forth before and after his ad decimum of book six.

In any case, it is an undeniable fact that Suárez recognizes that Cano's definitive mind on this matter of the theological conclusion is not the mind of Vázquez and Vega, as has been attributed, but rather that of "Capreolus, Cajetan, and the Thomists, and others, and plainly St. Thomas"⁴⁶.

**464. SUMMARY.—**From all that has been set forth, it seems to us that it is evidently proven that the mind of Melchor Cano, on this question, can be summarized in the following two propositions:

1. Of themselves, or without a definition by the Church, theological conclusions are not immediately matters of faith, but rather immediately and purely theological, and they belong to the faith only mediately.
2. After the dogmatic definition of the Church, theological conclusions are properly and immediately matters of faith.

The first proposition is the exact opposite of the doctrine of Vázquez and Vega; the second is the exact opposite of the doctrine of Molina. Both united contain that great theory of the Angelic Doctor, of which John of Saint Thomas says: The Thomists commonly follow this opinion⁴⁷.

RESPONSE TO SOME HISTORICAL OBJECTIONS

**465. A HISTORICAL STUDY.—**In the preceding sections we have just seen what is the opinion of traditional theology on the homogeneous evolution of Catholic dogma by way of inclusive theological conclusion.

As a complement to the subject matter, we shall briefly concern ourselves in this section with certain historical objections that have been raised against us by an illustrious theologian. Our objector proposes to prove that traditional theology, in teaching the definability of theological conclusions, understood by conclusions those conclusions improperly so called. To that end, he divides his historical study into four periods: a) the great scholastics of the thirteenth century; b) from Scotus to the Council of Trent; c) from the Council of Trent to the Vatican; d) from the Vatican Council to our own day. That same shall be our division.

**466. THE GREAT SCHOLASTICS UP TO SCOTUS.—**As we have said, our objector proposes to prove that when St. Thomas and the great Scholastics of the thirteenth century affirm that the consequences of the articles of faith are definable by divine faith, they understand by consequences the improper consequences, that is, the truths formally revealed. To this end, he sets forth with great wealth of erudition a matter that we have already expounded several times, namely, that the great Scholastics consider the body of revealed truths as an organism, and divide it into articles and non-articles. By articles they understand those fundamental truths that offer "special difficulty." Everything that offers no special difficulty, although it be formally revealed, they have classified under the name of "non-articles," and they have frequently subdivided it into antecedents, concomitants, and consequences of the articles. From which it follows—says our objector—that when they speak of "consequences" of the articles, they understand by consequences the truths that, though not articles, are formally revealed, and, therefore, improper consequences. A proof of this also is that they place among the non-articles the Eucharist, and no one will say that the Eucharist is not a formally revealed truth. To this, and only this, is reduced whatever our objector says regarding this first period.

Our answer to all this is quite simple. In the great scholastics, and very particularly in Saint Thomas, there are two divisions of the revealed, which, since they are made from different points of view, are very different from each other. The first division is into articles and non-articles of the Creed. All the great scholastics treat this first division in connection with the Apostles' Creed in the third book of the Sentences. The second division is into revealed directly and revealed indirectly, which they also sometimes call the division into things "that are contained in revelation in an explicit or determinate manner," and into things "from whose denial or corruption the denial or corruption of what is explicitly or determinately revealed would follow." All the great scholastics, both of the thirteenth century and of the following centuries, treat this second division in the first book of the Sentences, especially in connection with the question "Whether it is lawful to hold contrary opinions about the divine notions"¹.

Pues bien: our objector has focused almost exclusively on the first division between articles and non-articles, when he ought to have focused mainly on the second division, between the directly and indirectly revealed. Because he has focused on the first division and has seen that in the second member of that division, that is, in the non-articles, Saint Thomas places the Eucharist, he has deduced that the division between articles and non-articles is a division within what is formally revealed. Let our objector note the second division and he will see that Saint Thomas never places the Eucharist, nor any other Sacrament, in the second member, that is, in what is indirectly revealed ²

To this division of the revealed into direct and indirect revelation, which is the one that now concerns us, Saint Thomas gives such sovereign importance that he devotes a separate article to it in four different places in his works, apart from other secondary places: a) in book 1 of the Sentences, d. 33, q. 1, a. 5, under the title Whether contrary opinions about the divine notions can exist without sin; b) in book 4 of the same Sentences, d. 13, q. 2, a. 1, under the title Whether heresy denotes perversity of faith; c) in the Summa Theologica, part 1, q. 32, a. 4, under the title Whether it is lawful to hold contrary opinions about the divine notions; d) in the same Summa, Secunda-Secundae, q. 11, a. 2, under the title Whether heresy is properly about those things which pertain to the faith. These four articles, perfectly parallel to one another, as well as the parallel articles found in Saint Bonaventure and Scotus, must be read and reread, analyzed and compared by anyone who wishes to ascertain the mind of the great Scholastics, and above all of Saint Thomas, regarding dogmatic progress by way of theological conclusion.

The difference between direct and indirect revelation does not lie, like that between articles and non-articles, in offering greater or lesser difficulty, but in something else very important, and to which many do not pay sufficient attention. For Saint Thomas, as for Saint Bonaventure and Scotus, that is called and is indirect revelation everything the denial or corruption of which necessarily entails the denial or corruption of what is directly revealed. And this indirect revelation, once defined by the Church, becomes a matter of true divine faith, and its denial true heresy. Let us cite some texts:

"Respondeo dicendum that something belongs to faith in two ways. In one way directly, as those things which are principally divinely handed down to us... indirectly indeed those things belong to faith from the denial of which something contrary to faith follows" ³.

I reply that we are now speaking of heresy insofar as it implies corruption of the Christian faith... To which something pertains in two ways: in one way directly and principally, such as the articles of faith; in another way indirectly and secondarily, such as those things from which the corruption of some article follows: and with regard to both there can be heresy, in the same way that faith can be ⁴.

“I reply that it must be said that... a contradiction regarding those things which pertain to the faith can be twofold: either because it concerns those things which are explicitly contained in the articles of faith...; or it concerns those things from which some inconvenience and something contrary to the faith follows” ⁵

Now then: according to St. Thomas, from the denial of every true and proper conclusion there follows the denial of the principle from which it is deduced and, therefore, from the denial of every true and proper theological conclusion there follows the denial of the directly revealed. "This is the relationship of conclusion to principle, that once the conclusion is destroyed, the principle is destroyed" ⁶ "Demonstrative conclusions have a necessary relationship to the principles from which they are demonstrated, so that if the conclusions are not true, it is necessary that the principles are not true" ⁷ "And because there are certain things which are contained implicitly in the faith of the Church, as conclusions are contained in principles, therefore in these matters diverse opinions are tolerated until it is determined by the Church that one of them is contrary to the faith of the Church, because from it something directly contrary to the faith follows" ⁸

Finally, when this indirect revelation is defined by the Church, "idem iudicium est de his (concerning what is indirectly revealed) et de illis (concerning what is directly revealed) quae determinata sunt in fide, quia ad unum sequitur alterum" ⁹ "In this matter one cannot err without heresy" ¹⁰ "If anyone were to resist such an ordinance, he would be deemed a heretic" ¹¹ "Thus, therefore, the obstinacy whereby someone despises submitting to the judgment of the Church in those things that pertain to faith, whether DIRECTLY or INDIRECTLY, makes a man a heretic" ¹²

467. THE INDIRECTLY REVEALED.—Thus, under this second member of the indirectly revealed, St. Thomas, like St. Bonaventure and Scotus (367-372), includes two things: a) everything purely ornamental or secondary in Sacred Scripture, such as whether Abraham had two sons, or whether Tobias’s dog wagged its tail; because although such things are not of any importance in themselves (per se), they are so by their necessary relation to something directly revealed, since from their denial would follow the denial of the dogma of the total inspiration of Sacred Scripture, which is directly revealed; b) all true theological conclusions; for the same reason, namely, by their necessary relation to the directly revealed, since from the denial or corruption of the theological conclusion follows the denial of the directly revealed dogma from which such a conclusion is deduced: “Because from it follows something contrary to the faith directly” ¹³.

Read and reread without prejudice, like any Thomist, those four most fundamental articles where the Holy Doctor speaks of indirect revelation; analyze them and compare them with one another, and you will see with evidence that under that definition of what is indirectly revealed, Saint Thomas includes every true theological conclusion.

Do not focus only on the example that Saint Thomas gives, for examples are always given of clear and obvious things in order to apply them afterward to what is more difficult or obscure, but rather focus on the definition that Saint Thomas gives of indirect revelation, and also on the application that he makes of it to the question of divine notions and theological conclusions.

Also when St. Thomas treats, for instance, of life, he defines it as "everything that moves from within," and he gives as an example the animals. If some empirical reader were to focus only on the example, he would deduce from it that, according to St. Thomas, angels or God do not have life, since they are not animals. Such a way of interpreting St. Thomas would be laughable, for although the example that St. Thomas usually gives when treating of life does not apply to angels and to God, his definition does apply to them. In the same way, when treating of indirect revelation, St. Thomas gives as an example what is secondary in Scripture; but he gives as the definition: "everything the denial or corruption of which entails the denial or corruption of direct revelation." And it is evident that this definition fully applies to theological conclusions, for, as the same holy Doctor tells us, "once the conclusion is destroyed, the principle is destroyed."

Furthermore, in the first and fourth of those four cited articles, Saint Thomas expressly and radically distinguishes between truths that can in one way or another belong to the faith and truths that can in no way belong to it, and he subdivides the former into truths that belong to the faith directly and truths that belong indirectly. Thus, according to Saint Thomas, every truth, whatever it may be, must be classified into one of these three groups: a) truths that belong to the faith directly; b) truths that belong to the faith indirectly; c) truths that do not belong and cannot belong to the faith in any way (323).

Of the first ones, he says that they are of divine faith per se. Of the second ones, he says that they are of divine faith by their necessary relationship with the first ones, and that they must be believed with divine faith after being defined by the Church. Of the third ones, he says that they are absolutely indifferent for faith and that they may be freely affirmed or denied without any sin, unless, perhaps, the subjective sin of vanity or presumption, which can be present in every human act, even in dealing with the most profane matters indifferent to faith. "There is no sin, except perhaps accidentally, namely of presumption or vain glory or of many other things, because accidental causes are infinite" ¹⁴.

Now, let every Thomist speak frankly: In which of those three departments or groups does he place theological conclusions and even dogmatic facts? If he places them in the third group, such truths would be completely indifferent for the preservation of the faith, which is the Jansenist error. If he places them in the second or first, he must confess that, according to St. Thomas, such truths become truly of divine faith once defined by the Church. In this there is no possible escape for anyone who admits those two fundamental articles of St. Thomas.

Add to this that in the first and third of the four articles cited, Saint Thomas expressly applies that doctrine on the indirect revealed to the divine notions. A very clear proof that by indirect revealed Saint Thomas does not mean only what is secondary in Scripture, for the divine notions are not scriptural ¹⁵. The reason why the divine notions fall under the indirect revealed and, therefore, are definable as of divine faith, Saint Thomas expressly gives us, namely, because from the denial of the notions the denial of the persons would follow, and since the persons are direct revealed, for that reason the notions remain indirectly revealed and are definable as of divine faith. "The same judgment must be made of these and of those things which are determined in the faith, because one follows from the other... Because "from error concerning the notions error concerning the persons follows". From this the holy Doctor deduces that most fundamental corollary, which no theologian or historian of dogmas should ever forget: "And for this reason many things are now reputed heretical which previously were not reputed". To which doctrines does Saint Thomas refer there when he says that today they are held by the Church as heretical and previously they were not? He is certainly not referring to directly revealed doctrines, for he is speaking of the indirect revealed. Nor is he referring to what is secondary or ornamental in Scripture, for of that the Church has defined nothing as heretical. Saint Thomas therefore evidently refers to true theological conclusions, that is, to those truths that have not been directly revealed, but from whose denial the denial of a directly revealed principle follows, which suffices for them also to remain indirectly revealed and to be defined as of divine faith. The same holy Doctor indicates it very clearly: "And for this reason many things are now reputed heretical, which previously were not reputed, because now it is more manifest what follows from them".

Let every Thomist note that propter hoc. Many modern theologians calmly say that if the Church employs reasoning, it is solely to ascertain whether the conclusion was or was not from the beginning implicitly contained in revelation or in the intention of the revealing God. All that is very true, and the Church has no other end than that. But they do not notice that, according to Saint Thomas and according to Saint Bonaventure and Scotus, the means or human instrument (although always under divine assistance or authority) available to the Church to ascertain whether a conclusion was already from the beginning contained in revelation or in the intention of the revealing God, is to ascertain whether such a conclusion has an absolutely necessary connection with a directly revealed principle, and that, therefore, for Saint Thomas an absolutely necessary connection (and that is the theological conclusion properly so-called) with a directly revealed principle is the same thing as implicit containment in the intention of the revealing God or in divine revelation.

**468. SUMMARY.—**Thus, all our argumentation, which we have already set forth on other occasions and which we repeat anew with the most intimate persuasion, is condensed into the following four propositions of Saint Thomas:

1. Everything indirectly revealed can be defined as of divine faith.

2. By indirectly revealed is understood everything whose denial necessarily entails the denial of something directly revealed.

3. From the denial of every true theological conclusion, the denial of something directly revealed necessarily follows.

4. Then every true theological conclusion is definable as of divine faith.

469. FINAL CONFIRMATION.—For readers unfamiliar with these matters, there is a clear and decisive confirmation: the classical commentators of St. Thomas Aquinas. The whole question depends on what St. Thomas and the great thirteenth-century Scholastics understand by indirect revelation. Let us hear Báñez commenting on the classic article of St. Thomas¹⁶: “First conclusion: Concerning those things which pertain to the faith directly or indirectly, there can be heresy... These things being so established, regarding the first conclusion of the second article, the question arises: what does St. Thomas understand by pertaining to the faith directly or indirectly? For either it is understood... or it is understood... or finally by 'directly' it is understood that something falls immediately under the habit of faith, that is, without a process of reasoning: while it is said to pertain indirectly to the faith, what is gathered by necessary consequence from some proposition immediate according to faith. To this doubt it is replied that St. Thomas is to be understood in this last way... Thus if someone denies that Christ is capable of laughter, he errs in the catholic faith consequently and indirectly. For it follows well by a consequence known by the natural light, that Christ is not a perfect man”¹⁷. It could not be said more clearly. And elsewhere he adds: “For if someone were to confess that Christ is a perfect man, but were to deny that He is capable of laughter, because he opines that the capacity for laughter does not pertain to the perfection of man, this one would be a bad philosopher, but not yet a heretic. Since it has not so far been defined by the Church that Christ is capable of laughter. But if it were defined by the Church that the capacity for laughter pertains to the perfection of human nature, just as it has been defined that Christ has a twofold will, namely human and divine, then whoever would deny that Christ is capable of laughter would be a heretic”¹⁸.

We advise every Thomist to read in its entirety Báñez’s commentary on the cited article¹⁹; it is pure gold.

Nevertheless, one phrase seems to us inaccurate: “All things, indeed, which are in Sacred Scripture pertain directly to the faith.” Báñez does not seem to have observed that St. Thomas expressly affirms that what is secondary in Sacred Scripture pertains to the faith only indirectly.

But this has no importance as regards properly so-called theological conclusions, the only ones that concern us. On this point, all or almost all the commentators interpret St. Thomas as Báñez does; they affirm that these conclusions are included by St. Thomas among the truths that pertain to the faith indirectly. As we have said elsewhere (263), there is no theologian who, to prove that the infallibility of the Church extends to properly so-called theological conclusions, does not make use of St. Thomas’s texts on the indirect revealed. We have already cited the texts of Torres, Toledo, Silvio, Gravina, Serra, Philip of the Most Holy Trinity, de Marinis (390. 395, 405. 406, 410, 413, 243. 414). And we will even cite some others.

A heretical proposition is one that directly and immediately contradicts a truth of faith immediately revealed by Sacred Scripture, or defined by the Church. This is the common definition handed down by Saint Thomas, 2-2, question eleven, article two, and by the commentators on that question... In the second degree is the erroneous proposition. And an erroneous proposition of this kind is one that contradicts a truth revealed by God mediately, that is, indirectly and secondarily, AS ST. THOMAS EXPRESSLY TEACHES, in the cited question eleven, article two ²⁰

On the formal reason under which theological conclusions are to be regarded as the object of infallibility. This formal reason is the reason of the connection between what is immediately revealed and those things which are required for safeguarding, proposing, explaining, and defending the truths thus revealed... "To this faith—says Saint Thomas. 2-2, q. 11, a. 2—something pertains in two ways... in one way directly and principally, like the articles of faith: in another way indirectly and secondarily, like those things from whose denial the corruption of some article follows; and concerning both there can be heresy, in the same way as there can be faith" ²¹

Neque theologi hac in re dissentium (namely, regarding the extension of the Church's infallibility to properly so-called theological conclusions), except as to the censure which the opposite opinion deserves. Something pertains to the doctrine of faith—says St. Thomas, In I ad Cor., ch. 11, lect. 4—in two ways: in one way directly, the articles of faith which are proposed for belief in themselves; in another way indirectly, insofar as from their denial something contrary to faith follows ²²

We could cite many theologians, ancient and modern, Thomist and non-Thomist, who interpret Saint Thomas in the same way. But we will limit ourselves to a text that will undoubtedly please our opponent, since it is from the Salmanticenses themselves. Here is what they say: “A proposition is erroneous when it immediately and evidently opposes a truth revealed mediately and secondarily, or when it immediately and evidently contradicts a theological conclusion; such as this proposition: “Christ is not capable of laughter.” THIS IS GATHERED FROM SAINT THOMAS, 2-2, q. 11, a. 2, and taught by Suárez, Báñez, Tapia, and commonly by modern Doctors” ²³

Our opponent can see here St. Thomas and the great Scholastics of the thirteenth century explained by Báñez and by the majority of theologians, in exactly the same sense in which we ourselves have explained them. St. Thomas, then, understands by indirectly revealed theological conclusions properly so called.

Here is our objector, Saint Thomas and the great Scholastics of the thirteenth century, explained by the distinguished Báñez in the very same sense in which we have explained them. There he has clearly and explicitly explained what Saint Thomas understands by indirect revelation or by conclusions or consequences of what is directly revealed: he understands the true, proper, and rigorous theological conclusions.

Now let our objector again read St. Thomas or any great Scholastic of the thirteenth century, and he will see that they place the Eucharist and other similar truths among the non-articles of the Creed, but they never place them among what is indirectly revealed. Our objector has amused himself by analyzing only those questions in which the Scholastics treat of "How all the truths of faith are contained in the Creed" or "How the Eucharist is contained in the Creed," which is where they treat of the accidental division between articles and non-articles; when he ought also to have devoted himself to analyzing those questions in which they treat of Whether it is lawful to hold contrary opinions about the notions or Whether heresy concerns those things which are of faith, which is where they treat of the most fundamental division of directly and indirectly revealed truth. Because he has confused or not sufficiently distinguished these two divisions of what is revealed, everything our objector has told us with such erudition about that first period of the great Scholastics of the thirteenth century is beside the point ²⁴.

470. FROM SCOTUS TO THE COUNCIL OF TRENT.—In this second period our objector cites Scotus, Ockham, Gerson, Aureolus and, among the Thomists, Cardinal Torquemada. Of all of them, even of Cardinal Torquemada, he is forced to confess that they expressly and clearly defend the definability by divine faith of the theological conclusion properly so called.

Our objector could equally have cited many others from that period, which we have noted, and which say exactly the same thing (372-398). Rather, he could have limited himself to simply saying that all, without exception, follow the same opinion, for we have not found, nor do we believe one will be found, a single theologian before Molina who has said the contrary. Since our objector frankly confesses this, we could with that alone leave this period and move on to the next.

However, since Capreolus carries great weight in the Thomistic tradition and belongs to this second period, our opponent could not pass him over in silence, nor should we. After conceding that all the theologians cited from this period agree with us, and being unable to find any clear text in Capreolus to the contrary, our opponent has contented himself with saying that "Capreolus seems to disagree" (contradicere videtur Capreolus). But whence does our opponent derive this hesitant seems (videtur)? Did Capreolus, who never lets a single deviation from Thomistic doctrine by Scotus, Aureolus, or others pass without correction, make the slightest correction of these theologians' teaching concerning the definability (definibilitas) of the theological conclusion? No. Our opponent has not been able to find a single word in Capreolus on this matter. He has found only that Capreolus, when discussing whether theology is a science (scientia), not with respect to the articles of faith but to theological conclusions, and whether it is a habit distinct (habitus distinctus) from faith, answers both questions in the affirmative. We fail to see on what grounds our opponent reproduces these passages from Capreolus, for this is precisely the answer that all Thomists, following St. Thomas, have always given, still give, and always will give to these two questions. These questions bear upon whether theological conclusions are objects of faith through themselves (per se), that is, prior to a definition of the Church, something that Thomists have always denied. But they bear not the slightest relation to the question whether such conclusions become objects of faith by virtue of their relation to what has been directly revealed, once that relation has been defined by the Church, something that Thomists have always affirmed.

On the other hand, after having previously affirmed that Saint Thomas, when he speaks of conclusions, means improper conclusions, and having cited in confirmation of this that text of Saint Thomas In Boetium: "Those things which we hold by faith are, as it were, the principles in this science, and other things are, as it were, the conclusions", now our objector says, and rightly, that when Capreolus speaks of conclusions, he means proper conclusions. And he has not noticed that Capreolus (in the very place to which our objector alludes), in order to prove this point about proper conclusions, adduces precisely that text of Saint Thomas which our objector wishes to understand as referring to improper conclusions ²⁵.

Stranger still is that a text from Capreolus which was the only one relevant to the case has escaped our objector, and it reads as follows: "To the fourth it is said that although Sacred Scripture does not proceed in the manner of demonstrative science, nevertheless from the contents of Sacred Scripture, which are related as principles of science, the saints demonstratively inferred conclusions about which theology is concerned, arguing against heretics from the principles of theology. And therefore, although theology is not handed down in the sacred canon in syllogistic style explicitly, nevertheless in the books of the subsequent theologians it is handed down in a scientific manner and in the manner of an art explicitly. ALL THINGS, HOWEVER, ARE CONTAINED IMPLICITLY IN SACRED SCRIPTURE"²⁶. There our objector has it how for Capreolus, just as for Saint Thomas, the true and proper theological conclusions, since it is of these that our objector rightly confesses Capreolus speaks, are implicit in Sacred Scripture, which is all that is required for them to be definable as of divine faith.

With Capreolus our objector comes to an end, and we too will bring the second period to a close.

**471. TRANSCENDENTAL CONFESSION: FROM TRENT TO VATICAN.—**Upon entering this third period, our objector begins by making frankly and nobly the following most important confession: "By the common consensus of theologians, the doctrine that considered conclusions as de fide (that is, as definable as de fide) remained common even after Trent. Thus in the sixteenth century it is held by Peter Soto, Bellarmine, Cardinal Toletus (he could have added Cajetan, Cano, Dominic Soto, Báñez, Medina, etc., etc.). Indeed, even John of St. Thomas, together with Navarrete and Master González, declares that opinion common among the Thomists, at least as regards the definability of conclusions".

Let the reader note well that momentous confession. That is precisely what we have repeated so many times in this work against certain manuals that present the definability of the theological conclusion as a particular opinion of Cano, Vázquez, and Vega, when it was the common opinion of all theologians before Molina and of almost all those after him. Where Vázquez and Vega exceeded themselves was in making them de fide per se or without a definition of the Church, not in making them definable as de fide, for that was the common opinion, as our objector confesses and as Suárez had already acknowledged before. We congratulate ourselves that a historian of the stature of our objector has come to rest at that most important conclusion.

But despite that frank confession, our objector opines that later theologians have restricted that common doctrine, and that one must adhere to that restriction. He says thus: "However, in this period the nominalistic formula is no longer simply admitted, but only with restriction and distinction, in such a way that it is reduced to the path of truth."

First of all, it is amusing to qualify as "nominalist" a formula that has just been confessed to be admitted without restriction or distinction of any kind by all theologians, before and after the Council of Trent, up to Molina. Are, perhaps, all those classical sixteenth-century theologians nominalists, who admit without distinctions or restrictions the definability of faith of the true theological conclusion? All the more so since that doctrine does not come at all from the nominalist period, but rather, both the common opinion and the formula that our objector is pleased to call nominalist, are derived from the notion that the great Scholastics had given of the indirect revealed, and very especially St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure (361-370).

Secondly, when a doctrine has been common doctrine before and after Trent, and above all among all the classical theologians of the sixteenth century, it matters little that later some theologians have restricted it, even if those theologians are called John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses, and Billuart. These are the three theologians who, after Suárez, have sown confusion in the Thomist school on this question. The first, by confusion of nomenclature, sometimes using the names of immediate and virtual promiscuously. The other two, using Suárez's new nomenclature of confused formal or equivalent and pure virtual (virtuale tantum), and giving occasion for dispute as to whether they take these terms in the same or a different sense than that which they had and have since Suárez, who invented them.

But let us leave this aside and see who those theologians are who, in our objector's judgment, have made that restriction or cooperated in it. He says the following: “The first impulse seems to have been given by Cajetan: M. Canus first raised the question: Suárez was the first to pose the question of definability: John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses, and Billuart sufficiently solved the question.” Let us examine one by one, but briefly, those six theologians, who are the only ones our objector cites in what he calls the restriction of the common doctrine.

472. CARDINAL CAJETAN.—Of Cajetan, our objector tells us the following: “Cajetan, following in the footsteps of Capreolus, established the conclusions as the proper object of theology. To this end, he distinguishes two kinds of revealed truth: ‘formally revealed, that is, in itself; and virtually revealed, that is, in its principles’.” That is all our objector has found in Cajetan.

Frankly, we do not see what that text of Cajetan, which we all admit and which we ourselves had already cited several times, has to do with the restriction we are now discussing. We suspect, however, that with the phrase “by clinging to the footprints of Capreolus,” and with what he had previously said about Capreolus, our objector wishes to imply—without daring to say it plainly—that Capreolus first and Cajetan later, in pointing out as the object of theology the proper conclusions, have modified or restricted the doctrine of St. Thomas, who, according to our objector, had understood by conclusions the improper ones. Is that not so?

Now, let anyone read the third article of the first question of the Summa Theologica, “Utrum sacra doctrina sit una scientia,” and he will see that St. Thomas makes therein the division of revealed and revealable, pointing out the revealed as the proper object of divine faith and the revealable as the proper object of Theology. “Since therefore sacred doctrine considers certain things insofar as they are revealed by God, all things whatsoever that are revealable by God share in the one formal reason of this science” ²⁷.

It is strange that our objector should have missed that most fundamental division of “revealed” and “revealable” made by St. Thomas, when that “revealable” is precisely the theological conclusion properly so called, and the root and seed of all dogmatic progress by way of rigorous theological conclusion. The division which Capreolus later made into “principles” and “conclusions” properly so called, as well as that which Cajetan made into the “formal” and “virtual” revealed, are not restrictions or amplifications, but an exact translation of the division of the “revealed” and the “revealable” of the Holy Doctor. Although this is evident, we will cite the words of the commentator, who in this question seems to be the favorite of our objector. Thus says John of St. Thomas, commenting on the article and text of the Holy Doctor which we have just cited: “Where St. Thomas, for Scripture, posits immediately revealed things, because those things which Scripture hands down are believable by faith: but for the science of theology he posits revealable things, which are virtually or in potency revealed” ²⁸.

Here the reader has clearly expressed not only that the division of Cajetan and of Capreolus is the same as that of St. Thomas, but also that St. Thomas and the great Scholastics, when they spoke of conclusions, understood the proper conclusions (virtually or in revealed potency), as our objector confesses that Capreolus and Cajetan understand them.

In contrast, our objector has forgotten to cite a very important text where Cardinal Cajetan treats and resolves ex professo the question of the definability as a matter of faith of everything necessarily connected with the revealed principles, which is precisely what we are dealing with. He says the following: “There are two ways by which it can be decided for the Christian religion what is to be believed... Nor does it matter whether something is revealed in Sacred Scripture and elsewhere explicitly (such as the creation of the world, the incarnation of the Word of God, and other things of this kind) or implicitly, as are all those things whose opposites cannot be maintained together with the truth of Sacred Scripture and of the other things that we know with certain faith, except that it takes ingenuity, effort, reason, and intellect to make manifest that these things which are said to be contained implicitly are NECESSARILY CONNECTED to those things in which they are said to be contained ²⁹

Here we have explicitly affirmed by Cardinal Cajetan the same thing that we already knew from Capreolus and Saint Thomas: that everything necessarily connected, with true theological connection, is implicit and definable as of divine faith. Are Báñez, Capreolus, and Cardinal Cajetan also nominalists?

473. MELCHOR CANO.—Concerning the distinguished founder of the discipline of Loci Theologici, our objector makes three assertions, and we regret to have to say that all three are inaccurate.

He says first that Cano began by affirming in chapter 8 of the sixth book the common doctrine that theological conclusions are of faith; but that later, in the twelfth book, he expressly added that they were only of faith mediately. That is not accurate. That doctrine that they are of faith mediately had already been pointed out by Cano from the fifth book, chapter 5, in the paragraph beginning "But the final argument" (463).

Secondly, he says that by making that affirmation that the conclusions are matters of faith mediately, Cano modified the common opinion that he himself had previously expressed. This is even more inaccurate. That the theological conclusion is not a matter of faith except mediately is what Cano says when dealing with the theological conclusion per se or without a definition by the Church. But when dealing with conclusions defined by the Church, Cano affirms expressly and categorically that they are as immediate and as formally matters of faith as the articles of faith or the Gospel itself, and this Cano affirms not as a probable opinion, but as one of the fundamental rules or "praeceptiones" of the theological loci. Let us hear Cano: "Seventh rule: If either the Church, or a Council, or the Apostolic See, or even the Saints with one mind and the same voice, have both established some theological conclusion and also prescribed it to the faithful, this truth will be regarded as Catholic as if it had been revealed by Christ Himself per se; and whoever opposes it will be just as much a heretic as if he contradicted the Sacred Scriptures and the traditions of the Apostles." ³⁰ It could not have been said more clearly (456).

Our objector states, thirdly, that Cano calls theological conclusions "appendices of the faith," and that Cano asserts that with the denial of a theological conclusion "faith grows weak, it does not perish." Evidently our objector has read Cano hastily. This matter of "appendices of the faith" and of "faith grows weak, it does not perish," which Cano brings up at the beginning of chapter 5, Cano says not about theological conclusions, but about other truths that do not attain the category of conclusions because they have no necessary but vehement relation, and about which Cano had just spoken at the end of the previous chapter ³¹. Let our objector read them again and he will confess that this is so. So far is Cano from believing that with the denial of conclusions "faith grows weak, it does not perish," that he expressly says shortly after the words cited by our objector: "But when from adverse errors of this kind (that is, the denial of conclusions) not only a weakening of faith, but also its corruption follows, etc." ³²

The doctrine, then, of Melchor Cano is represented by these two propositions: a) true theological conclusions (and that is not a true and rigorous theological conclusion which does not have an absolute or metaphysically certain connection with the revealed principle from which it is deduced) are purely theological or mediately of faith per se or without definition of the Church; b) but they are formally or immediately of faith after the definition. From the first proposition Vázquez departed; from the second Molina departed. Both propositions united represent exactly the doctrine which, as we have seen, St. Thomas teaches concerning the indirectly revealed or theological conclusion. This is the doctrine which all the classical Thomists taught before the Suarezian confusion or innovation (464).

**474. SUÁREZ AND LUGO.—**From Cano our objector jumps to Suárez and Lugo. It would have been better to set forth first the two theories, radically opposed to each other, of Molina and Vázquez, since the doctrine of Suárez is scarcely intelligible except in relation to those two theories that Suárez tried to reconcile or amalgamate (71). But, in short, let us examine the doctrine of Suárez and Lugo.

Our objector begins by citing the three celebrated theses of Suárez and Lugo, which we ourselves have already cited so many times, and which come down to the following:

1.º That which is revealed formally-confusedly is of faith per se or without definition. 2.º That which is revealed purely virtually or purely mediately (purely virtual - purely mediate) is not of faith per se or without definition.

3rd That purely virtual or purely mediated revelation becomes a matter of faith by definition.

In those three propositions Suárez and Lugo make use of two names new in the history of Theology: the names of formal confused and of purely virtual or mediate. Those two names have been invented by Suárez, and Suárez and Lugo understand by those names something quite distinct from what the ancients and many moderns understand by the simple and traditional names of formal and virtual. Because our objector has not noticed this, he moves in a continuous confusion in what he then says about the theologians subsequent to Suárez and to Lugo.

By formally confused (which many later called formally equivalent) Suárez and Lugo understand all conclusions that are really identical, although conceptually distinct, to the revealed principle from which they are deduced. By purely virtual or mediate they understand all conclusions that are really distinct from the revealed principle. Thus Suárez and Lugo explain themselves, and thus have understood them Ripalda, Mazzella, and all the Suarezian authors we have been able to examine, as we have already shown elsewhere (73).

Thus, then, the three aforementioned theses of Suárez and Lugo have the following meaning:

1. Every conclusion really identical with the revealed premise from which it is deduced, even if conceptually distinct, is an article of faith per se.
2. Every conclusion really distinct from that revealed premise is not an article of faith per se.
3. This same really distinct conclusion can be defined as an article of faith by the Church.

This is, and we repeat and will repeat a thousand times, the true meaning of the three theses of Suárez and Lugo, and whoever fixes only on those names of confused and purely virtual formal, without fixing on the meaning that Suárez and Lugo gave them, will understand neither the mind of those authors nor that of countless other later authors who have used the same nomenclature. We believe that this is what has happened to our objector.

Our objector says that Suárez and Lugo's third thesis is inadmissible. This is precisely what we have said and say ourselves. What is purely virtual or mediate, or, what is the same, what is really, and not merely conceptually, distinct from the revealed premise from which it is deduced, cannot be defined as a matter of faith for the simple reason that it is not truly revealed either directly or indirectly, since the conclusion can absolutely fail without the revealed premise failing. In this the Salmanticenses are right in attacking that proposition of Suárez and Lugo, which is the only one the Salmanticenses have in mind when attacking them.

In contrast, regarding the first and second theses of Suárez and Lugo, our objector makes the following most important confession: "This twofold thesis of Suárez almost all theologians henceforth follow, even the Thomists." Our objector is fully justified in this assertion. We have noted the texts of some eighty-plus theologians after Suárez, and of those eighty-plus, more than seventy admit these two Suarezian theses, that is, ninety percent of the theologians. There is no difference except that where Suárez, in his first proposition, says they are de fide, the true Thomists say they are definable de fide.

As can be seen, what our objector confesses here is precisely what we have been saying ourselves. The only difference is that, not having understood the true meaning of the new names confusedly formal and virtual only, used by Suárez and Lugo and repeated by so many later authors, our objector has understood neither the doctrine of Suárez and Lugo nor that of 90% of the later authors, nor our own.

So, let us set aside nomenclature and get to the heart of the matter. Does our objector admit or not admit that "every conclusion really identical, though conceptually distinct from the revealed premise from which it is deduced, is definable as of divine faith"? If he admits it, he is fully in agreement with what we say, and everything else is merely a question of nomenclature. If he does not admit it, he separates himself not only from us, but also from 90 percent of theologians, both ancient and modern.

It remains, therefore, demonstrated that Suárez and Lugo, far from having restricted the definability of faith of the theological conclusion, have exaggerated it. In the first proposition they admitted, and very rightly admitted, the definability of faith of inclusive theological conclusions. But in the third proposition they exaggerated that doctrine by extending it to physically-connected conclusions, which are not rigorously theological. For that reason they had to resort in that third proposition to the famous theories of new revelations or of transforming assistance (78-79).

Before leaving Suárez and Lugo, one more word. Our objector, in order to insinuate that Lugo regards as modern that doctrine of the definability of the theological conclusion, says thus: "And the opinion of Suárez soon prevailed so much that Lugo already declared it common among recent doctors." We cannot explain this so strange affirmation of our objector except by supposing that, in wanting to turn a page of Lugo, he has turned eight pages without noticing it. The question of the definability of the theological conclusion, deduced from a premise of faith and another of reason, which is what we are dealing with, Lugo treats in numbers 258-277 of the first disputation of the treatise On Faith; and, on the other hand, that phrase of recent doctors Lugo brings in number 326, treating the question of "how it is of faith that this is the true and legitimate Pope", a completely different question, and in which, just as Suárez and Lugo, John of Saint Thomas and the Salmanticenses also opine. So far is Lugo from believing modern that doctrine of the definability of the conclusion, that he expressly says: "Which, beyond the arguments brought by Suárez, are confirmed by the practice and usage of all" ³³

475. JOHN OF SAINT THOMAS.—After Suárez and Lugo, our objector cites John of Saint Thomas, the Salmanticenses, and Billuart. Of John of Saint Thomas he is forced to confess that “John of Saint Thomas, with Navarrete and Master González, declares this opinion common among the Thomists, at least as regards the definability of conclusions.” Only, our objector strives in vain to persuade that John of Saint Thomas limits that doctrine to improper conclusions.

To ascertain whether John of St. Thomas speaks of proper or improper conclusions, there is a very objective and very simple means. As is well known, John of St. Thomas confesses that he follows Navarrete and González against Molina and Granados. Well then, let anyone open on his table those five theologians, who treat the question ex professo: let him compare them with one another, and if after having done this he still insists that the question in which Navarrete attacks Molina and Granados defends Molina against Navarrete and John of St. Thomas attacks Molina and Granados with Navarrete and González concerns the improper conclusions and not the proper conclusions, he will have to be given up as impossible ³⁴

The texts cited by our objector, and with which we have already dealt (307), are brought forward by John of St. Thomas in the first part, first question, second disputation, fourth article. Now then: in the treatise De Fide John of St. Thomas has expressly and authentically explained the meaning of what he had said in that place. Let his words be heard: “From what has been said it is inferred that virtual revelation, whether mediate or deduced by means of a discourse, such as is found in theology, differs in kind from the immediate revelation which is had from the testimony of the one speaking, and which attains that which is to be believed by faith, as we have handed down more fully in the first part, first question, second disputation, fourth article (there is the place cited by our objector), where we rejected two extreme opinions: one, that of Vázquez, who holds that a conclusion deduced from the premises of faith is just as certain, with respect to one who knows the discourse, as a proposition defined by the Church: the other, that of Molina, who holds that even if a definition of the Church should supervene upon some proposition which previously was not of faith, it would not make it to be of faith; but that the Holy Spirit assists the Church lest it err, not, however, to make to be of faith things which previously were not of faith. Which opinions in the cited place can be seen as refuted” ³⁵

Here is our objector’s proof of how, when John of St. Thomas defended against Molina the definability as a matter of faith of the theological conclusion, he spoke of the proper conclusion, since no one will say that revelation mediate, virtual, deduced by discourse, specifically different from the immediate, as John of St. Thomas authentically explains it there, is an improper conclusion. If in solving the objections John of St. Thomas called that conclusion immediate, and even added that nothing that is merely mediate can be defined as a matter of faith, it is because the truly theological conclusion, which alone is the inclusive or implicit or conceptual one, is always immediate in itself, and is only mediate with respect to us, as St. Thomas repeats so many times and as we have already explained elsewhere. If only John of St. Thomas, when saying that only the immediate can be defined, had added to the word immediate the words in itself, we would have nothing to reproach in him, and for that reason we have only censured him for imprecision of nomenclature. But John of St. Thomas expressed himself clearly enough at the end of the whole question by saying that what the Church can define and does define is the virtual implicit, not the merely connective (connective only). That is exactly what we have said and do say. Connection without inclusion does not suffice for definability, just as it does not suffice for true or rigorous Theology.

476. THE SALMANTICENSES AND BILLUART.—The Salmanticenses, whom Billuart merely transcribes, are the theologians who, by having used the new nomenclature of Suárez and Lugo rather than the traditional Thomistic nomenclature, have entangled most of the modern Thomists.

According to the Salmanticenses, that which is revealed formally and confusedly or formally and equivalently is definable as a matter of faith; that which is purely virtual (virtuale tantum) is not definable as a matter of faith.

Our reply is very simple. Do the Salmanticenses understand by confused formal the same thing as Suárez, that is, all conclusions really identical with the revealed principles, although conceptually distinct? Then, in admitting the definability of such conclusions, they say exactly the same thing as we do. Do they not understand by confused formal such conclusions? Then, in denying their definability, they depart from 90 percent of ancient and modern theologians, and our objector does wrong in joining the Salmanticenses with Suárez and Lugo.

Likewise, do they understand by purely virtual the same thing as Suárez and Lugo, namely, "only those conclusions that are really distinct from the revealed principles"? If they understand it in this way, by denying their definability as a matter of faith, they say exactly the same thing as we do.

Finally, when the Salmanticenses and Billuart, and with them our objector, define the theological conclusion as "that which is contained in the revealed premise as an effect in its cause," do they understand by cause the natural or physical or in essendo cause? If they understand it thus, then in denying the definability de fide of such a conclusion they say exactly the same thing as we do. A conclusion joined to the revealed premise by only a physical connection can hardly be an object of faith when it cannot even be an object of infallibility, nor even of rigorous theology. Do they understand, on the other hand, by cause the virtual or metaphysical or in cognoscendo cause, as it must be understood when dealing with sciences of absolute certainty? For if they understand it thus, and nevertheless deny the definability de fide of such conclusions, we grant our objector the Salmanticenses and Billuart, and even, if he wishes, John of St. Thomas, since such a doctrine would not only be against what we regard as certain and evident doctrine, but also against what the immense majority of theologians teach with certainty and evidence, not only ancient ones, but also modern ones, for there are few modern theologians who do not admit the definability de fide of the conceptual or identically-real conclusion (490).

Thus, then, and to cut short once and for all that tangle created in the Thomist school by the Salmanticenses and Billuart, let our objector choose once and for all the horn of the dilemma that pleases him most. If the Salmanticenses and Billuart, in admitting the definability de fide of the confused or equivalent formal [object], understand those names in the same sense as Suárez and Lugo, then the Salmanticenses and Billuart are with us and not with our objector. If they understand them in a different sense, then the fictitious chain by which our objector has sought to unite the Salmanticenses and Billuart with Suárez and Lugo is completely broken, and those two Thomist theologians remain completely isolated; for if one excepts Kilber, scarcely half a dozen post-Suárezian theologians will be found who deny the definability de fide of the confused formal [object] in the sense in which Suárez and Lugo understood it, that is, the conceptual or really-identical conclusion. Hence the learned P. Gardeil has said with his customary critical sense: "This idea of the development of the doctrine of faith by way of a true theological conclusion, that is, one having a metaphysical connection with the revealed datum and involving a real inclusion of the conclusion in it, within the difference of the concepts by which it expresses it, the Salmanticenses and Billuart, deceived by Suárez, had obscured, dragging along—at the price of what struggles against the evidence of the definition by the Church of theological conclusions—even Thomist theologians themselves" ³⁶.

477. STATE OF THE QUESTION AT THE END OF THE 18TH CENTURY.—Because Montaigne is one of the theologians who deny the definability of the theological conclusion, our objector, with true lawyerly skill, closes the history of this third period by saying: "Montaigne represents the state of the question at the end of the 18th century".

We have found that skillful historical artifice most gracious. Why, instead of closing the eighteenth century with Montaigne, one of the few post-Suárezian theologians who deny the definability de fide of the conclusion, has he not closed it with some other theologian from among the very many who affirm that definability, and indeed many of them the definability of dogmatic facts? We shall cite only, besides the many already cited (399-434), four: two Jesuits and two Dominicans; all later than the Salmanticenses and all contemporaries of Billuart and of Montaigne.

Let us listen to the Jesuit Gautier: "A theological conclusion, strictly speaking, becomes pressingly dogmatic and belongs to the sphere of faith, if it has been formulated by the Church herself or by the Apostolic See, and is proposed to all the faithful for belief through her definition, that is, through the application of divine revelation" ³⁷.

Let us hear also the Jesuit Platelius: "A conclusion deduced from a universal [premise] that is entirely certain, and from a subsumed [premise] that is revealed, and thus generally every conclusion deduced from one revealed [premise] and another that is certain and evident by natural light, is de fide... Our conclusion is proven because when a predicate is affirmed of a subject, all things that are certainly and evidently known to be identified with or necessarily connected to such a conclusion are simultaneously affirmed mediately and virtually, and therefore really. Therefore this conclusion: 'Christ is capable of laughter,' deduced from these premises: 'every man is capable of laughter' and 'Christ is man,' of which the first is known by natural light and the other is de fide, is sufficiently revealed ³⁸

Let us listen to the Dominican Labat: “Whoever denied a theological conclusion, even one inferred from two revealed premises, precisely as such (that is, without definition) would not be a heretic... I said, precisely as such, because whoever denied a theological conclusion, elsewhere defined by the Church, would be truly a heretic, whatever Molina may say to the contrary” ³⁹

Let us finally listen to the Dominican Preingué: "You will object firstly: It is not of faith that the Church is infallible in defining what the sense of some proposition is, since this has not been revealed. The reply denies the assumption. Because that infallibility at least mediately is revealed, insofar as it is revealed that the Church is infallible in determining what kind of sense the proposition has: and such a revelation suffices for something to pertain to the faith. Hence St. Thomas in this passage (2-2, q. 11, a. 2, in the body) says: 'something pertains to the faith in two ways. In one way directly... In another way indirectly... and concerning both there can be heresy in the same way as there can be faith" ⁴⁰

We have chosen this text from Preingué so that the meaning of Saint Thomas’s indirect revelation may be seen once again.

178. OTHER THEOLOGIANS OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.—In the same way that we have cited to our objector four theologians from the end of the eighteenth century, we are going to cite to him four others from the end of the seventeenth century, also choosing them from among those not yet cited, and they will be: an Augustinian, a Benedictine, a Jesuit, and a Capuchin.

Thus says the Augustinian Gabardi: "I say fourth: The conclusions of theology, in whatever way they are defined by the Church (whether as deduced or as not deduced), pertain to the faith and are principles of theology; not so the indefinite conclusions. The second part is against Vázquez, who thinks that a conclusion not defined is proposed as to be believed to those to whom it becomes known through theological discourse ⁴¹

Here now is how the Benedictine Mezger expresses himself: "It should be noted first that something can be revealed formally or virtually... What is revealed virtually is that which, because it is contained in something formally revealed as if radically and by virtue, has an infallible connection with it, deducible by natural reasoning. First conclusion: Not only formal, confused, and universal revelation, but also virtual revelation, is a sufficient motive of faith... This is proved first: because many propositions, not only formally confused but also virtually revealed, are in fact proposed to all for belief and defined by the Church" ⁴²

The renowned theologian of the Sorbonne, Martin Grandin, follows, saying thus: "Does mediate revelation suffice for faith? Immediate revelation is that which falls immediately upon some proposition: thus revelation falls upon this immediately: 'Christ is man.' Mediate revelation is that which, by means of that proposition, falls upon another proposition, just as by means of the superior proposition revelation falls upon this: 'Christ is capable of laughter.' The question is: whether mediate revelation suffices."

Unica conclusio: Such conclusions are de fide... Proof: when two things are necessarily connected to each other, if God says one, He says also the other, and that to the extent sufficient for divine faith... It can be confirmed at least a posteriori in this way: when two things are connected, the Church, if one is to be believed, can propose the other: therefore, when one is connected to another, if God says one, He says also the other, and that to the extent sufficient for divine faith" ⁴³

Now comes the Jesuit Haunold, who expresses himself thus: "When some theologians are wont to say that there are no new dogmas in the Church, to be believed anew, they mean nothing more than that nothing begins to be a matter of faith formally and explicitly which was not previously a matter of faith radically, implicitly, and virtually, inasmuch as the Church defines as explicitly to be believed only those things which, through the assistance of the Holy Spirit, she knows to be contained virtually in an object already previously formally revealed" ⁴⁴

Finally, the Capuchin Gervase of Brisach speaks: "You ask thirdly: Whether a virtual revelation, namely one deduced from another revealed truth by a good inference, suffices for the object of faith or theological faith, or whether it is only a theological conclusion?"

I answer that there are two opinions. Some affirm... Others deny... Meanwhile, however, all Catholics agree that, with the definition of the Church having intervened, it suffices for divine faith⁴⁵. And thus we could go on citing innumerable theologians from this entire post-Tridentine period.

Let the reader see, then, to what has been reduced that dogmatic assertion of our objector: “In this period the nominalistic formula is no longer admitted without qualification, but with restriction.” Thus is history written!

**479. THE VATICAN COUNCIL.—**Our objector titles the fourth period “Concilium Vaticanum.” His observations on this period are reduced to the following:

FIRST OBSERVATION.—“Therefore, as regards the substance of the doctrine, a common consensus of the scholastics is held. Hence the doctrine was sufficiently prepared for a definition, if necessity should urge it. This necessity presented itself to the Vatican Council, because of the error of the Protestants, the Rationalists, and of Günther, who refused to admit dogmas defined by the Church as divinely revealed.”

Answer.—Neither the Protestant error, nor the rationalist one, nor that of Günther have anything to do with this whole question we are treating. All Catholic theologians admit that only what is revealed can be defined as dogma, and that suffices. The question of whether only the principles are revealed or also the true theological conclusions is a completely free question, before and after the Vatican Council. On this there is no unanimous agreement starting from Molina, although ninety percent admit that “all conclusions deduced from the revealed principles by means of conceptual reasoning” are truly revealed and definable as matters of faith. That is our opinion. And these are, according to the Thomistic school, true and rigorous theological conclusions.

480. SECOND OBSERVATION.—“De facto, the Vatican Council approved the doctrine of the scholastics, at least in substance”.

Answer.—The Vatican Council has defined only that what is revealed cannot be defined as dogma. If our objector calls that the substance of scholastic doctrine, undoubtedly it is defined. But the Council has not said a single word about whether only what is formally revealed is revealed, or whether what is virtually revealed is also revealed. We repeat that this is a question left free after, as before, the Vatican Council. Let us hear the classic commentator on the Council commenting precisely on the texts to which our objector alludes: “We believe true the things that God has revealed: by him revealed. That is the matter, or to speak the scholastic language, the material object of the act of faith. But must we place among the revealed truths only those that are formally revealed, or can we join to them the virtually revealed truths? That is a question that our Council leaves free for theologians to discuss”⁴⁶.

481. THIRD OBSERVATION.—The Vatican Council says expressly that "the Holy Spirit was promised to the successors of Peter, not that by His revelation they might make known new doctrine, but that by His assistance they might holily guard and faithfully expound the revelation delivered through the Apostles, the deposit of faith."

Answer.—From that text nothing is deduced against those who defend the definability of faith of the theological conclusion, since those theologians maintain at the same time, against Kilber and Ripalda, that the theological conclusion is not new doctrine, but new conceptual explanation of the same revealed doctrine.

On the contrary, that Vatican text proves them right. Indeed, according to that Vatican text, the Holy Spirit or, what is the same thing, infallibility was not promised to the Church for new doctrine; but since, according to all theologians, the Holy Spirit or infallibility was promised to the Church for every true theological conclusion and even for every true dogmatic fact, it follows that neither the true theological conclusion nor the true dogmatic fact constitutes new doctrine and, therefore, they are definable as of divine faith. That is what is deduced from the Vatican Council, and that is what we hope will one day be admitted by all theologians without exception (248).

482. FOURTH OBSERVATION.—"Among the Scotists, Fr. Parthenius Minges⁴⁷ simply holds that theological conclusions are definable as dogmas, and thus that the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary was defined, without considering Scotus's correction on the part of later scholastics, nor considering that Pius IX defined the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary as revealed."

Answer.—That Scotist theologian, whom we have already cited elsewhere (442), is fully within his rights in saying all that he says in that paragraph, and we congratulate him for it. As for the definability of the theological conclusion or of the indirectly revealed, Scotus has not needed to be corrected by anyone; on the contrary, ninety percent of theologians follow in this matter Thomas Aquinas and Scotus against Molina, against Kilber and, if it pleases our objector, against the Salmanticenses and Billuart. On the other hand, Pius IX defined that the dogma of the Immaculate Conception is revealed, but he did not say that it is formally revealed. It may have been revealed indirectly as a conceptual conclusion from the principle of the worthy divine motherhood. And thus we believe, with Fr. Minges, that it was revealed. That is the indirectly revealed of Thomas Aquinas, St. Bonaventure, and Scotus in the question "Whether it is lawful to hold contrary opinions about the notions" (209).

483. FIFTH OBSERVATION.—"The School of the Society of Jesus is divided, although the greater part holds that only those things are capable of being defined as dogmas which are revealed formally, and not merely virtually, as Cardinal Billot, Mazzella, Schifini, Pesch". Response.—In the first place, if the school of the Society of Jesus is divided on this question, our objector does wrong in repeating so many times that, after the Salmanticenses and Billuart, as if there were no other theologians in the world besides those two, the question "is already solved in its substance", and that "the common consensus of the scholastics is had", and even that "the doctrine was sufficiently prepared for definition (;!!) if necessity should urge it". As if the renowned Society of Jesus counted for nothing! In the second place, among those four Jesuit theologians whom our objector has chosen, Schifini not only defends, as we do, the definability of conclusions that are conceptually distinct, but even of those that are really distinct⁴⁸. Cardinal Mazzella not only defends, with us, the definability of conceptual conclusions, but even maintains that they are of faith before being defined⁴⁹. Cardinal Billot and Pesch, since they do not distinguish clearly, as Suárez, Lugo, and Mazzella do, between conclusions conceptually distinct and really distinct, we do not know for certain whether, in denying the definability as a matter of faith of the theological conclusion, they deny the definability of every conclusion or only that of the conclusion really distinct. At any rate, we have already seen that Pesch admits the definability of every truly consequential sense of the Bible, which is the same as admitting the definability of the conclusion properly so called (447).

484. SIXTH OBSERVATION.—"Among the Thomists, M. Tuyaerts holds that all things connected with the revealed truths, the judgments of the Church even concerning dogmatic facts..., can be defined as dogmas, even though such judgments are evidently not revealed." Response.—"They are evidently not revealed," if we are speaking of direct revelation; but "they are evidently revealed," if we are speaking of indirect revelation. Now, according to Saint Thomas, what is indirectly revealed can be defined as a matter of faith. The definition of conclusions by the Church is nothing other than the infallible explication of revelation, just as the definition of dogmatic facts is nothing other than the infallible application of revelation. For both things the Church has divine authority. Let the cited texts of Bañez and of Preingué be recalled, commenting on the directe and indirecte of Saint Thomas ⁵⁰. In our judgment, Fr. Tuyaerts is deficient only in three things:

a) in not having distinguished between conceptual conclusions or those of metaphysical-absolute certainty and conclusions that are really distinct or of physical-contingent certainty, since only the former are rigorous theological conclusions and definable as matters of faith;
b) in not having distinguished between before and after the definition, since before the definition no conclusion, not even one drawn from two revealed premises, can receive the assent of divine faith, whatever the Salmanticenses may say;
c) in having attributed everything to speculative reasoning and little or nothing to the practical sense of faith, which is just as important as, or more important than, reasoning, as Fr. Gardeil rightly pointed out to him.

485. SEVENTH OBSERVATION.—“Not even Nestor among the Thomists of France, P. A. Gardeil, seems to have been satisfied by the doctrine of the Thomists (that is, the doctrine of the Salmanticenses and Billuart) although in practice he holds it”.

Answer.—We do not know why our objector, in order to classify Fr. Gardeil's opinion, does not cite what the latter has recently written, which reads as follows: "This idea, which the Salmanticenses and Billuart, misled by Suárez, had obscured, leading even Thomist theologians astray. Fr. Marín-Sola has done us the service of restoring our tradition to full light. I do not hesitate to range myself entirely on the side of this conception of the direct definition of the true

theological conclusions" ⁵¹. Father Gardeil was the first among modern Thomists to draw attention to the famous "revealable," in which St. Thomas makes the specific object of Sacred Theology consist, and which is the true bridge and the true source of dogmatic progress. In our opinion, the two invaluable monographs of Father Gardeil The Revealed Given and Credibility have been the true origin of all that has been said afterward that is good on the two questions of dogmatic progress and the nature of apologetics.

486. FINAL OBSERVATION.—"Finally, Fr. Marín-Sola did indeed touch a certain wound in Suarezian doctrine, but he did not heal it."

Answer.—Because our objector has not understood the true meaning of the confused formal [concept], which is what the first of the three cited theses of Suárez and Lugo deals with, he has also not understood what we have censured in Suárez and Lugo and what we have approved.

As we have already said, and all disciples of Suárez will admit it, Suárez and Lugo include under the name of confused formal [concept] "all conclusions really identical or absolutely inseparable from the revealed premise from which they are deduced."

The definability of these conclusions is admitted by Suárez and Lugo. In this, we, far from censuring Suárez and Lugo, agree with them. Do the Salmanticenses, Billuart, and our objector agree with us on this or not? If they agree, the question is settled, for these are the true and proper conclusions whose definability we have been discussing throughout our entire work. If they do not agree, then they evidently depart not only from us, but from Suárez and Lugo (in the first, and not only in the third, of their theses) and from ninety percent of ancient and modern theologians. In this we are certain that we have with us all the true disciples of Suárez.

In what we have censured Suárez, there have been four things: a) that in the first of his three theses, and under the new name of "confused formal," he denied that conceptual conclusions are conclusions properly so called; b) that he affirmed that such conclusions are of faith per se or without definition; c) that in the second and third of his theses, and under the also new name of virtuale tantum, he said that the conclusion properly so called is the really distinct conclusion or one of physical certainty; d) that he made this conclusion definable as of divine faith, the—

⁵² having for that purpose to resort to new revelations. In these four censures of Suárez we believe that anyone who has studied this question—not in the Salmanticenses or Billuart, confused by Suárez's new nomenclature, but in St. Thomas himself or in his commentators prior to the confusion created by Suárez's new nomenclature—will agree with us.

487. SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS AND QUESTIONS OF NAMING.—The Salmanticenses, speaking on another topic, make the following most apt observation: "From the freedom to invent new meanings of words, or to relax old ones at will, arise lengthy and interminable questions about ways of speaking; and likewise false and dangerous opinions which, by playing with words, are protected by their ambiguity, so that they cannot be convicted of their falsity" ⁵³

This is happening to many modern theologians with the new names of confused formal, equivalent formal, pure virtual, pure mediate, and other similar ones. Ever since Suárez invented those names, a confusion has arisen among theologians on this question similar to what would arise among the clerks of a pharmacy on the day a prankster took the whim of furtively changing the labels on the jars. From that moment on, the clerks would swear that they had dispensed quinine, as the medical prescription prescribed, while the buyers or the doctor would swear, in turn, that they had not received quinine, but arsenic. To untangle the mess, there would be no other means left than to completely disregard the labels and examine the substance or real content of the jars.

Let us, therefore, set aside for a moment all those new nomenclatures or labels and go to the heart of the matter. Of course, we cannot go to the heart without using names; but instead of making use of ambiguous or elastic names, let us employ only those names whose meaning is exact and precise and admitted by all.

Now then, everyone knows with perfect precision what the name explicit revelation means; every theologian likewise knows the exact meaning of the names distinction of reason ratiocinating, distinction of reason ratiocinated, and real distinction. With these four names there is enough to place before the eyes of every reader, however unlearned, the exact substance of the problem called "the definability as a matter of faith of the theological conclusion" and to classify with absolute precision the different opinions of the post-Suarezian theologians.

Indeed, God revealed to the Apostles, and they handed on to the Church, a definite set of explicit propositions, which are called the deposit of faith or the starting point of all development, both theological and dogmatic. From these explicit propositions, only three kinds of conclusions could have emerged by reasoning: a) conclusions that are distinguished from the apostolic propositions only by a distinction of reason reasoning; b) conclusions that are distinguished by a distinction of reason reasoned; c) conclusions that are distinguished by a real distinction. There can be, and there can only be, no more and no fewer kinds of conclusions than these.

**488. FOUR GROUPS OF TRUTHS.—**We have, then, four groups of truths, namely: First group: Explicitly revealed truths. Second group: Conclusions that are not distinguished from the preceding ones except by a distinction of reasoning reason. Third group: Conclusions that are distinguished by a distinction of reasoned reason, or conceptual, or virtual. Fourth group: Conclusions that are distinguished by a real distinction.

To these four groups, so perfectly delineated, there correspond in post-Suarezian theology four opinions that are perfectly characterized and essentially distinct from one another, namely:

First opinion: That of those who believe that only the truths of the first group are definable as matters of faith. The most characteristic representative of this rigid opinion is, in a certain way, Arriaga, followed by Maistrio and some other rare theologian. This opinion is today completely abandoned.

Second opinion: That of those who say that the propositions of the first two groups are definable, but not those of the third. The most characteristic representative of this opinion is Kilber or the so-called Wirceburgenses, who in this partly follows Ripalda and wholly follows Molina and Granados. This opinion has also been followed by a few later theologians after Kilber.

Third opinion: That of those who say that the propositions of the first three groups are definable, that is, not only what is explicitly revealed (first group) and the conclusions of discursive reason (second group), but also the conclusions of reasoned reason, or conceptual ones, or identical-real ones (third group). The most characteristic representatives of this opinion are, besides all the theologians before Molina, Suárez and Lugo (in the first of their theses under the name of confused formal), and in this the immense majority of later theologians have followed Suárez and Lugo, even in our own day. That is also our opinion.

Fourth opinion: That of those who say that not only the propositions of the first three groups are definable, but also those of the fourth group, that is, not only the conclusions of conceptual distinction, but also those of real distinction or of purely physical necessity. This is the singular opinion of Suárez and Lugo (in the third of their theses under the name of virtual only) and the one that logically led those two distinguished theologians to the inadmissible theories of new revelations or of indefinite and transforming assistance.

The theologian or historian of dogmas who does not clearly distinguish between those four opinions, perfectly characterized and completely irreducible among themselves, or who imagines, as our objector seems to imagine, that the four are equal quoad substantiam, does not know the post-Suarezian history of this question or confuses substance or core with nomenclature.

As we have said and repeat, if it is a question of the definability of the theological conclusion, our opinion is that of the third group. Therefore, let our objector have the kindness to distinguish carefully in this problem the question of substance from the question of nomenclature.

The underlying question is this: "Once a proposition has been explicitly revealed, are all other propositions really identical to it, although conceptually distinct, also or thereby implicitly revealed and, therefore, definable as a matter of faith?" No one is unaware of the very grave significance of this question for the problem of the extent of dogmatic progress and of the nature of sacred theology.

On the other hand, the question of nomenclature is as follows: Such truths, really identical with the explicitly revealed propositions, but conceptually distinct: should they be called formally revealed or virtually revealed?

Anyone will understand that the problem of the definability of such conceptual truths, which is what we are dealing with, depends on the answer to the substantive question, not to the question of nomenclature. If the answer is that they are truly revealed, we will all say that they are definable, whatever they may be called. If the answer is that they are not revealed, we will all say that they are not definable, whatever name may be given to them.

Now then, how does our objector answer the substantive question? If he answers yes, he is fully in agreement with us, and all the rest is merely a secondary matter. If he answers no, let him not doubt for a moment that he is departing not only from us, but also from ninety percent of ancient and modern theologians.

It would be useless to try to evade a categorical answer with plays on nomenclature, saying that such conclusions are definable if they do not express new doctrine, but that they are not so otherwise. That is precisely the point: to know whether such conclusions, only conceptually distinct from the revealed premise from which they are deduced, express new doctrine or not. If our objector concedes that such conclusions do not express new doctrine, which is the same as conceding that they are definable as matters of faith, he agrees with us on everything. If he answers that they express completely new doctrine, which is the same as denying that they are definable, he departs not only from us, but also from the vast majority of theologians, both ancient and modern.

490. AN IMPARTIAL TESTIMONY.—In order to show our objector that this is the opinion of the vast majority of theologians, not only ancient but also modern, we will close this section with the words of a very modern and impartial author, who, when he wrote, thought of everything except that he was going to serve as a "confirmatur" for our doctrine. He is the most modern theologian on this question that has fallen into our hands. We refer to the Jesuit Father Daniel Sola, illustrious professor of the Pontifical Seminary of Comillas, in Spain. He says the following:

"In explicitly revealed [truth] something can be contained either formally or virtually. It is contained formally implicitly when it is formally, that is, according to the very concept it is the same as what is explicitly revealed, so that there is only a distinction of reasoning reason... It is said that one thing is contained in another materially and identically (let our objector note this, for this is what interests us) when between them there is indeed no real distinction, but there is a metaphysical distinction, or an adequate distinction of reasoned reason. Thus the omnipotence of God is contained in His immensity, or vice versa, and so on with the other divine attributes."

As our objector sees it, what Father Daniel calls material continence or identical continence are the conceptual conclusions we are discussing. Now hear the thesis of Father Daniel Sola, for it is worthy of being heard:

Thesis 76: A truth formally and implicitly contained in one explicitly revealed pertains of itself to the material object of faith. The same is to be said, more probably, of those things which are contained in the explicitly revealed, not formally, but materially and identically, or essentially and connexively.

"Censure. First part, that is, that the truth formally contained in what is explicitly revealed is, in itself, the material object of faith, or truly and really revealed, is certain and common against Arriaga... Second part (let our objector hear it) is in reality MOST COMMON and very more probable, at least if the real identity of both can be certainly known by us without a new revelation. Among the more ancient authors, Suárez, Lugo (in the first, not in the third of his theses), Oviedo, Marín, and very many others hold it, and the MORE RECENT ones COMMONLY, against Ripalda, the Würzburg theologians, and others" ⁵⁴ There our objector has how the opinion that we defend, and which our objector seems to regard as a singular opinion, is not only very more probable and followed by the ancient theologians, but is also followed by the more recent ones commonly. The defect of our objector's entire thesis lies in the fact that, entangled with the new and ambiguous nomenclature of "formally confused" and "only virtually," invented by Suárez and Lugo, and poorly discerned by the Salmanticenses, he has failed to grasp the true substance of that conceptual or really-identical conclusion which Suárez and Lugo called formally confused, and whose definability by divine faith has always been, and is today, defended by the great majority of theologians against Ripalda and the Würzburg theologians. Provided that our objector admits that substance, the nomenclature would matter little, although we do not believe that any Thomist worthy of that name would dare to maintain that the conceptual conclusion is not a conclusion properly speaking, and a proper and rigorous virtually revealed or theological conclusion.