La evolución homogénea del dogma católico

OBJECTIONS AGAINST ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL PROOFS OF DOGMATIC EVOLUTION

340. Among the many proofs we adduced to establish the existence and extent of dogmatic evolution, the eighth proof was based on the character of opposition to the revealed deposit that must exist in every theological error. Since it is impossible for there to be objective opposition without a true implicit contradiction, and since there can be no contradiction without a basis of true identity, we deduced that every true theological conclusion must of necessity be objectively identical with the revealed deposit and, therefore, definable as of divine faith or an object of dogmatic evolution (247). In alluding to that proof in an article in La Cien- cia Tomista¹, we had written the following words: “The formal point of view of the Church, when infallibly defining a theological conclusion or infallibly condemning an opposed error, is not precisely the conformity or opposition of such a conclusion or error with the principles of natural reason, but with the revealed deposit. Errors that are not really opposed to the revealed deposit do not fall under the jurisdiction of infallibility or of Theology, however great and clear their opposition to the principles of natural reason may be. Real opposition to the revealed deposit is like the ratio sub qua by which infallibility and Theology look upon error.” “Now then—we added in that article—, there can be no true opposition between two doctrines or statements if the one is not the negation of something really contained in the other; if the one does not imply, even though it does not express it, a real contradiction with the other; if in both there does not exist one common and really identical sense, affirmed in the one and denied in the other. This—we concluded—is what Saint Thomas teaches, and what can be seen in any manual of Logic, in the treatise that deals with the nature of opposition.”

This assertion of ours that all opposition implicitly entails a contradiction, and our having alluded to Logic, has earned us the following observations.

341. FIRST OBSERVATION.—This is not required by the doctrine of logicians on the opposition of propositions. That doctrine, as Father Urráburu notes, refers to the opposition of propositions not material, ratione materiae circa quam, which logicians are not called upon to judge, e.g., "Peter runs," "Peter is still," but to the formal opposition, by the form or structure of propositions... The judging of the real opposition or "ratione materiae" pertains not to dialecticians, but to theologians.

Answer.—We agree with our illustrious objector that Logic deals directly with formal or terminological opposition and not with real or conceptual opposition. But one thing is what Logic deals with and quite another what is treated in Logic. Nor does Sacred Theology, in its treatise On Faith, deal directly with human faith, but rather with divine faith, and yet there is no theologian or theology manual that, when treating divine faith, does not have to treat what faith in general is and what human faith is, the only means of properly understanding what divine faith is. In the same way, there is no logician or treatise on Logic, if it is complete, that, in order to explain well what logical or formal opposition is, does not have to treat, and does not treat, the nature of opposition in general and the nature of real opposition, the only means of explaining and understanding well what formal opposition is, for if the object of Logic is formal opposition, formal opposition in turn has as its object and end real opposition. Let us hear the classic John of St. Thomas: “Opposition is either real or logical, that is, either of things or of propositions. And these two are so related that real or physical opposition is, as it were, the object of logical opposition, because that being and non-being which exists on the side of reality and in the objects themselves is signified through opposed propositions. Hence, although treating real opposition belongs to the metaphysician, nevertheless, because it belongs to the logician to treat the oppositions of propositions, he must also in some way touch upon what pertains to the opposition of things, insofar as they are the objects of the opposition of propositions.”²

That is why we appeal to Logic, so that in any manual of Logic, and above all in St. Thomas, it might be seen how every opposition involves a contradiction and, therefore, a truly identical sense, affirmed in one and denied in the other of the opposed affirmations. And that was the only thing that was to be proven and that our objector denies.

Well then, since the quotations from Logic, in this question we are treating of real opposition, do not seem to satisfy you, let us set Logic aside and go to Metaphysics, to which it properly belongs, as we have just seen from John of Saint Thomas, to treat such a question. All the more so because Sacred Theology is the metaphysics of the supernatural God or in the order of revelation, just as Theodicy is the metaphysics of the natural God or in the order of reason.

Let us, then, open the immortal Commentaries of St. Thomas on Aristotle's Metaphysics, and in book 10, lesson six, we shall find the following: "Contradiction is included in all other kinds of opposition as something prior and simpler. For things opposed according to any kind of opposition cannot exist at the same time. This indeed happens because one of the opposites by its very nature includes the negation of the other" ³ It could not be said more clearly. In every opposition a contradiction is included.

If simply because it deals with Theology, our objector still has some scruple about being guided by quotations from Metaphysics, even though Metaphysics is a transcendent science, let him turn to the Summa Theologica of Saint Thomas, and there, in the Prima-Secundae, question 67, article 3, where the Holy Doctor precisely treats a question relating to nothing less than divine faith, he will find the following: "I reply that it must be said that opposition is the proper and per se cause that one of two opposites is excluded from the other, insofar as in all opposites there is included the opposition of affirmation and negation."⁴

We have, then, that every opposition, even if it is not a formal contradiction or one of terms and expressly contradictory structure, involves or implies a real contradiction or one of meaning. And since no doctrine is erroneous in the theological order or in the order of infallibility unless it is opposed to the revealed principles or revealed deposit, we have that between every theological or infallibly erroneous proposition and the revealed deposit there is involved or implied a real contradiction or one of meaning. And since there can be no real contradiction or one of meaning between two doctrines or affirmations unless there is one and the same identical meaning, affirmed in one and denied in the other, we have that in the revealed deposit or principles of faith there must be a meaning identical to the one denied in the theological and infallibly erroneous proposition, or, which is the same thing, that between the revealed datum and the dogma (first and second degrees of Catholic doctrine), on the one hand, and the infallible truth and the theological truth (third and fourth degrees), on the other, there is an identity of meaning, which is what is called real or objective homogeneity of the four degrees of Catholic doctrine. And we will have, finally, that whenever the Church defines a doctrine as infallibly true or erroneous, or whenever Sacred Theology deduces a conclusion as demonstratively true or false, neither does the Church define nor does Theology conclude a meaning foreign to the revealed deposit or objectively distinct from the meaning of the revealed deposit, but rather a meaning really identical with that of the revealed deposit; a meaning not formally expressed, but truly included or implicit in the revealed deposit.

Anyone who meditates on and understands those two principles will infallibly have to arrive at these consequences: first, truth and error, in the order of infallibility as in the order of Theology, are relations of conformity or opposition, not precisely with the principles of reason, but with the principles of faith or the revealed deposit; second, every true opposition involves or implies, although it does not always express it, a contradiction. The first principle is fundamental in Theology; the second is fundamental in Philosophy. Both are expressly from St. Thomas. Both are evident.

If despite this evidence, and perhaps because he is familiar with the idea that the majority of modern manuals usually give of Theology, our objector still resists admitting a true contradiction involved between the revealed deposit and theological error and, therefore, a true real identity between said deposit and theological truth, he has only to look at that other elementary and indubitable principle—that "God can do everything that does not imply contradiction." Now then, can God make a true theological conclusion ever be false, or ever fail, or can He make a theological error ever be true? No, and a thousand times no. "For whatever is found in the other sciences contrary to the truth of this science (Sacred Theology), is wholly to be regarded as false" ⁵ Sacred Theology, the Wisdom among wisdoms, the Queen of the sciences, has an objective certainty superior to that of all other natural sciences, whether physical, mathematical, or metaphysical. "I answer that, since this science is partly speculative and partly practical, it surpasses all others, both speculative and practical. For one speculative science is said to be more worthy than another, both on account of its certainty and on account of the dignity of its subject matter. And in both respects this science exceeds the other speculative sciences" ⁶

If God, then, cannot cause a true mathematical or metaphysical conclusion ever to fail, much less can He cause a true theological conclusion to fail. If God cannot do it, then it involves a contradiction. If a contradiction is involved, then a real identity of meaning is involved. The principles of contradiction and of identity are correlative.

342. SECOND OBSERVATION.—The argument copied above from Fr. Marín-Sola has no force. Is it true that the Church, when giving those infallible definitions, looks to the revealed deposit which it is her duty to guard, and also to the very truths defined, under the aspect of their conformity or opposition to the revealed deposit? Perfectly, so it is; but from this it does not follow that this conformity is identity. What is conformable to a thing is not the same thing, although it may bear with it likeness, proportion, correspondence; what is identical with another thing is indeed the same thing.

Answer.—For starters, our objector concedes, as every theologian must concede, that infallible and theological truth, just like infallibly condemned error and theological error, are truths or errors by their conformity or opposition, respectively, with the revealed deposit. We have just seen that not only according to the logicians, but also according to the metaphysicians and theologians, and according to the prince of them all, Saint Thomas, every opposition between two affirmations implies or involves a contradiction between them. It is evident that contradiction presupposes identity, and not merely extrinsic proportion, similarity, or correspondence. Hence it is evident that, if there is true opposition between theological or infallibly condemned error and the revealed deposit, there must be a contradiction implied between those two extremes, and that if there is contradiction between those two extremes, there must be real identity, and not mere similarity or proportion, between the revealed deposit and infallible or theological truth. This is inescapable, granting what our objector grants, and what every theologian must grant. The concept of identity is deduced apodictically from the concept of opposition through the concept of contradiction.

The reasons why our objector, who admits the concept of opposition, nevertheless refuses to admit the concept of contradiction and, consequently, that of identity, are, in our judgment, two. One is that when speaking of a theological conclusion, his thought instinctively turns to the trite model of "Christ is a man; therefore he is capable of laughter"; but understanding in that model, in Suarezian style, the "man" in a purely essential or abstract sense and the "capable of laughter" in an actual sense. And, of course!, thus understood, that model has neither can there be identity between the "man" and the "capable of laughter," nor contradiction between the "man" and the "not capable of laughter"; but this is simply because between the "man" (essential) and the "not capable of laughter" (actual) there is no true opposition, nor, therefore, is there true theology nor a true object of infallibility. Of this we have already spoken at length in another section (89-102), and we shall touch upon it again at the end of this one.

The second reason why our objector does not see true identity or contradiction, respectively, despite admitting true opposition, is that he does not seem to distinguish between formal identity, which is not at issue here, and real identity, which is the only one that interests us. Nor does he seem to distinguish between total identity, which we do not need at all, and partial identity, which is what we seek and suffice. By partial identity we do not mean part of identity, which would make no sense, but rather identity with part of the revealed deposit, even if it is not with the entire deposit. Let us see this.

When two propositions or statements have the same subject and the same verb, all their identity or contradiction of meaning depends on the predicate or predicates. If one affirms or denies the predicate of the other, and affirms or denies it in the same form and, therefore, in the same concept and in the same reality, the identity or contradiction is formal. If it affirms or denies it with a different concept, but within the same reality, the identity or contradiction is only real. In the propositions "God is eternal," "God is not eternal" (which is the same as "God is non-eternal"), there is formal contradiction, for the predicate affirmed in one and denied in the other is the same under all concepts; but in the propositions "God is eternal," "God is not immutable," there is only real contradiction. There is real contradiction because the predicates "eternal" and "immutable," respectively affirmed in one and denied in the other, are the same divine reality: but the contradiction is not formal, because those predicates, although of identical reality, are distinct formalities or distinct concepts.

In turn, in the propositions "God is merciful and eternal," "God is merciful, but not eternal," there is formal contradiction, because one of the predicates is formally denied; but it is partial, because the other predicate is not denied, nor, consequently, is the whole predicate of the proposition. In the same way, in the propositions "God is merciful and eternal," "God is merciful, but immutable," there is real, but partial, contradiction. Real and not formal, because the predicates "eternal" and "immutable" are distinct formalities or concepts: partial and not total, because of the two predicates only one is denied, or from the total predicate only part is denied.

But, as can be seen, in all these affirmations and negations, whether formal or real, total or partial, as long as they are within the same reality, that is, as long as one of the predicates is inclusive or implicit in the subject, there is always an affirmation or negation of identity, not of mere similarity, proportion, or extrinsic correspondence.

343. APPLICATION TO THE DEPOSIT OF REVELATION—Let us now apply all this to the deposit of revelation. The deposit of revelation is not a single proposition or revealed affirmation, but rather a set of affirmations and, therefore, of revealed meanings. For an error to involve true contradiction with the meaning of the deposit of revelation, or for a truth to have identity with said deposit, it is not necessary that it involve contradiction or identity with each and every one of the affirmations of the deposit, but it suffices that it involve it with just one.

Thus, for example, the first verse of Genesis affirms creation, and the first verse of the Gospel of Saint John affirms the Divinity of the Word. Whoever affirms the Divinity of the Word affirms a meaning identical to the revealed deposit, because it is identical to one of the truths of the revealed deposit, to the first verse of Saint John, even though that affirmation is not identical to, nor has anything to do with, other truths of the revealed deposit, for example, with the first verse of Genesis concerning creation.

In the same way, whoever denies one of the truths of the revealed deposit, for example, the creation of the world, his denial is contradictory to the revealed deposit, because it is so with one of the truths or meanings of the revealed deposit, even if that denial has or would have nothing to do with the other truths of the deposit. Therefore, for there to be true identity or true contradiction with the revealed deposit, it is enough that there be such with one of the meanings or truths of the deposit, even if there is not with all the meanings or with the entire deposit.

This, which everyone knows and which may even seem to many a theological commonplace, will serve us as a stepping stone to explain something else which, though everyone knows it, some seem frequently to forget.

Each of the affirmations or propositions of the revealed deposit, although it expresses only one predicate or meaning, implies or may imply many predicates or concepts. This is proper to every affirmation, whether divine or human.

All those predicates or concepts not expressed, but indeed implied in each of the revealed affirmations, are not known nor can they be known all at once, but rather they demand time and study and are known successively, sometimes requiring for this deep and complicated reasonings, delicate analyses and syntheses, contact with diverse sciences and civilizations, a long chain of internal and external experiences...; in short, all that complicated and laborious series of factors that enter into every human progress, even if it is only a matter of the progress or development of what was already implicit in the primitive datum or point of departure. That is proper and exclusive to poor and, at the same time, rich human reason. Poor, because it needs time and work in order to know; because it knows by reasoning, that is, by passing from one

in aliud, something that neither God nor the angels themselves need. Rich, because in passing from one thing in aliud it can pass not only from one reality to another, as the senses do, but it can also pass from one concept to another within the same and identical reality, within the same and identical primitive datum, thus sharing in the procedure, not only rational, but intellectual, of the procedure of identity, proper to the angels and to God.

And of that procedure of absolute identity, of unconditional truth, human reason disposes, not in the contingent physical sciences, but indeed in the eternal mathematical and metaphysical sciences, and much more in eternal and divine Theology, for the theological procedure is the most intellectual of all sciences, and the one that most closely approaches the knowledge of pure intelligences, to the knowledge of simple intelligence: “The theological consideration is most intellectual” ⁷. But let us not digress.

344. EXAMPLE OF CRYSTAL-CLEAR CLARITY: JESUS CHRIST IS GOD.

We were saying that each affirmation of the revealed deposit, even if it expresses only one predicate, implies or includes many, really identical ones.

Thus, for example, let us take the following revealed proposition: “Jesus Christ is God.” For greater clarity, let us set aside entirely every other revealed truth except that one, or let us suppose that there is no other revealed truth than that one. In the same way that science, in order to study a sensible phenomenon, seeks to isolate it from every extraneous condition, so the best way to analyze any question is to isolate it or abstract it from everything else. “To abstract is not to lie,” runs the Scholastic adage. Let us therefore set aside every other revealed truth and suppose that we have revealed to us only this proposition: “Jesus Christ is God.” In that proposition there is explicit only one predicate: God. But implicit there are very many.

Indeed: what is God? Note that the question is not what things distinct from God are connected with God, nor what things are like or proportionate to God, but rather what thing is God. For to this question the Catechism of Father Astete answers us: “He is a thing the most excellent and admirable that can be said (ineffability) or thought (incomprehensibility); He is a Lord infinitely good, powerful, wise, just, beginning and end of all things.”

As if saying nothing at all, the explicitly unique concept of God has been broken down into eight concepts implicit in Him, namely: ineffability, incomprehensibility, infinite goodness, omnipotence, infinite wisdom, infinite justice, first principle and ultimate end of all things. And if, instead of asking the Catechism, which might be accused of speaking from faith rather than from demonstration or theology, we had asked the Summa Theologica of Saint Thomas, who in this matter of divine attributes demonstrates apodictically everything he says, it would answer us, not only with the eight concepts of the Catechism, but with many other divine attributes, deduced from the concept or idea of God, by a rigorous process of real identity, in his magnificent treatise on Deo Uno, for the Catechism does not even name in its definition of God the divine simplicity, His immensity, His immutability, His eternity, His providence, etc...

The verse, then, revealed as "Jesus Christ is God" expresses no more than one predicate, and yet, under that single predicate it contains implicitly, and really and identically, many other predicates. It expresses formally no more than one sense, but it implies really many senses or truths.

Now then: one who, after this truth has been revealed, were to affirm that very proposition that "Jesus Christ is God," that one would not only affirm a sense identical with the revealed proposition, but would affirm all the explicit sense of the revealed truth, since he would affirm it in the very form in which it is revealed. His affirmation contains an identity with the revealed truth, but an identity not only partial, but total; not only real, but formal.

Likewise, anyone who denied that revealed proposition by saying, “Jesus Christ is not God” would be denying not merely one sense of that revealed truth, but the whole explicit sense of that revealed truth, since he would be denying it in the very form or concept in which it is revealed. It is a contradiction of sense with the revealed truth; but a contradiction not only implicit, but explicit; not only partial, but total; not only real, but formal. That is the defining character of formal opposition or explicit contradiction: the denial of the whole meaning of its contradictory. For this reason, logicians call it of a malignant nature⁸, in contrast to the other oppositions, which carry only the implicit contradiction and do not deny everything, but do deny a real and implicit part of their opposite, as we shall see.

Continuing under the same hypothesis that we have only the proposition "Jesus Christ is God" revealed; suppose that one neither expressly affirms nor denies that proposition, but does affirm that Jesus Christ is one of the many concepts, virtually distinct, but really implicit, in the concept of God, saying, for example: "Jesus Christ is ineffable," or "he is incomprehensible," or "he is infinitely good," or "wise," etc. In affirming any of those predicates which we have seen are implicit in the word "God," but which human reason cannot know, or develop, or make explicit without true ratiocination, without discursive reasoning; in affirming, we repeat, those predicates, those true theological conclusions, one would not affirm something extrinsic to the predicate God, nor something purely similar or externally conformable to what God is, but rather one would affirm something intrinsic to God, really identical to the revealed predicate "God," really identical with the revealed proposition. The identity is not formal, because those predicates are distinct formalities, distinct concepts, virtually distinct; it is not total, since none of those predicates exhausts the predicate "God," just as no property, however metaphysical it may be, exhausts the essence, nor does any conclusion, however implicit it may be, exhaust the principle; but it is real identity, because those predicates are really identical with the revealed predicate "God." That is what constitutes theological truth, Theology. There is not, then, merely correspondence, proportion, likeness between theological truth and what is revealed: there is real identity of meaning.

If instead of affirming any of those predicates we were to deny them, saying, for example: "Jesus Christ is not ineffable," "He is not incomprehensible," "He is not omnipotent...", those negations would not only involve disagreement, disproportion, dissimilarity, but they would involve a true contradiction with the revealed truth that "Christ is God." The contradiction is not explicit, but it is implied; it is not formal, but it is real. Being God and not being ineffable, or not being incomprehensible, or not being omnipotent, are truly contradictory predicates; they imply a contradiction. And the palpable proof that they imply it is that not even God can do the opposite. And God can do whatever does not imply contradiction. Therefore, theological error implies, even if it does not express, a real contradiction with the revealed deposit. Therefore, theological truth implies a real identity with it.

This analysis of the treatise De Deo should suffice for anyone who considers what Theology is. The proper and primary object of Theology is God, and nothing enters into Theology except by relation to God. If in that treatise every theological truth is one of real identity, it follows that the process of identity constitutes and must constitute the proper and primary character of every theological conclusion and of every true theological reasoning. But let us see practically how the same thing happens in any other revealed proposition from any other treatise of Theology.

Second example: Jesus Christ is man.—Let us take, for example, the revealed proposition "Christ is man." In that proposition there is explicit nothing more than one predicate: "man," or, if you will, there is explicit one predicate: the predicate "man." But in this predicate there are implicit or enveloped many others, not only as similar or proportionate, but as really identical.

Indeed: if, as we previously asked what God is, we now ask what man is, it will be truly answered that man is a rational animal. Up to this point we are still in the formal realm, since rational animal is the very definition of man. But if we now ask what rational is, it will be truly answered that what is rational is really immaterial, spiritual, immortal, free, capable of morality, of merit, of beatitude, and capable of powers, and of wonder, of "laughter", etc., etc. All of this emerges through true reasoning, through true minor premises of reason, through true theological conclusion. And yet these conclusions retain real identity. And the proof that they retain it is that God cannot make a being rational and not immaterial, spiritual, immortal, or not have the capacity (radical properties) for merit, for morality, for powers, for wonder, for laughter.

Third example: Jesus Christ is perfect man —If instead of analyzing the predicate "man" we analyze the predicate "perfect man," or connatural man, or man like us in all things, we shall find that man in a connatural or perfect state is man with all actual properties: actual understanding, actual will, actual admirability, actual risibility, etc., etc.: for a man without any of these actual properties is not a man in a connatural state, but in a non-connatural state, which is precisely the negation of the revealed predicate. Therefore, the theological conclusions that affirm some radical property of the Savior's humanity affirm a sense really included in the revealed predicate "man"; and those that affirm any of the actual properties also affirm a sense really included in the revealed predicate: not in the predicate "man," from which they are really distinguished, but indeed in the revealed predicate "perfect man," or connatural man, or man like us. Just as we have analyzed the predicate "rational," so too can we analyze the predicate "animal," or the predicates "body" and "soul," or any other predicate of any other revealed proposition. Provided that, if only the essence of a predicate is revealed, no more than its essential or radical properties be deduced, and that if the perfection or connaturalness of such an essence is revealed, its actual properties be deduced; the deduction is rigorously scientific and rigorously theological, and, nevertheless, rather, precisely for that reason, it is also really identical and rigorously homogeneous.

345. COMPARISON OF THE THREE EXAMPLES.—Of the three models examined, namely: "Christ is God," "Christ is essential man," "Christ is perfect or connatural man," the first is a model of a divine predicate; the second, of a created-essential predicate; and the third, of a created-accidental predicate. These are the three fundamental types of revealed predicate and, therefore, of theological process, and no other type exists that does not reduce to one of these three. In all three we have seen that there is real identity or identity of meaning, and not merely proportion, or similarity, or mere extrinsic correspondence. Therefore, theological truth (the fourth grade of Catholic doctrine), from which infallible truth (the third grade) proceeds, is really homogeneous with the dogma and the revealed datum (the second and first grades), and there is homogeneity or real identity of meaning among the four grades of Catholic doctrine.

346. THIRD OBSERVATION.—When the bishop of Brescia affirmed, at the Vatican Council, that not all truths belonging to faith or morals are necessary in the same degree for the custody of the deposit, he clearly indicates that the revealed truths and the connected truths may be neither identical nor have an identical sense: that conformity is not identity. Response.—We agree that there are degrees in the truths of faith and morals, or in their necessity for the preservation of the revealed deposit. To prove something so obvious and which no one has denied, there is still a greater authority than that of the bishop of Brescia, namely that of the Vatican Council itself, and no less than in its dogmatic constitution on the Catholic Faith, at the end of which the following is read: "It is not enough to avoid heretical wickedness, unless those errors too are avoided which more or less approach it ⁹

But we do not see what relation that having degrees may have to having or not having identity. Our objector forgets again that we are dealing with identity, not formal, but real, and not total, but partial; that is, identity with part of the revealed deposit. In formal or total identity, degrees have no place; in real and partial identity, they do have a place, according to the greater or lesser part that is affirmed or denied of the revealed predicate. And not only do they have a place, but precisely because it is real identity, it requires degrees.

Indeed, being an identity and not a mere likeness or proportion, it must be within the deposit and not outside it: being real and not formal, it must be implicit and not explicit, for the explicit is always formal. Now, the fact that a truth is more or less implicit, more or less profound, more or less latent in another truth—that indeed admits of degrees, as is evident.

From that greater or lesser implicitness or depth in which a truth stands with respect to the formal object of the deposit or to what is already defined as of faith, depends precisely its greater degree of necessity for the preservation of the deposit, because on it depends the greater or lesser certainty or evidence with which human reason (for which the deposit was given and for which there is necessity of preserving and explaining it) sees the more remote or more proximate relation of such a truth to the formal object of the deposit or to what is defined of the deposit. On whether or not the relation of a doctrine to the deposit exists depends the necessity or non-necessity of such a truth; on the greater or lesser implicitness of that relation depends its greater or lesser degree of necessity.

Thus, for example, every doctrine or statement that concerns the Divinity or Trinity (revealed predicates) must be true or false by way of real identity, since with respect to God no other way is possible. And yet, every theologian knows that with regard both to the Trinity and to the Divinity there are doctrines of faith, there are those close to faith, there are those simply certain, there are those more probable, there are those merely probable, there are those improbable, there are those erroneous, there are those close to error, there are those simply rash, and there are even those completely doubtful or free. A complete range of degrees of implicitness in the deposit and of degrees of necessity for the preservation of the deposit. And yet, all those truths or all those errors conform to or oppose the deposit by way of identity, since with respect to the Divinity or Trinity no other way is possible.

What happens with the revealed predicate "God" happens with any other revealed predicate, provided that the true theological process is preserved, that is, provided that one passes from the revelation of the pure essence to the deduction of its metaphysical or radical properties, or from the revelation of the connatural or perfect essence to the deduction of its actual properties. The process is one of identity with what is revealed, but of real identity, not formal, and, therefore, of implicit identity, not explicit, and for that reason capable of various degrees of implicitness, of various degrees of relation, of various degrees of necessity. Every homogeneous progress carries with it those two characteristics: because it is homogeneous it carries real identity; because it is progress it carries various degrees or stages of implicitness or development ¹⁰.

347 FOURTH OBSERVATION.—But now we shall see where the root of all our objector’s confusion lies, who continues thus:

“An example will clarify this. Suppose it is not revealed that Jesus Christ is physically perfect man, but only that He is true man, a rational animal, and that later the Church defines as infallible truth, with a note lower than that of faith, that Jesus Christ has actual visibility. Will that definition teach us that this proposition: “Jesus Christ has actual visibility” has the same meaning as this other: “Jesus Christ is true man?” Clearly not, because actual visibility, as a physical power, is a reality really distinct from the essence of man. The propositions, therefore, will not be identical, although they are in conformity.

Answer.—Our reply is very simple and very clear: I DENY THE SUPPOSITION. That is: we categorically deny that the Church could define as infallibly true the proposition "Christ has actual risibility," or that she could condemn as infallibly erroneous the opposite proposition: "Jesus Christ does not have actual risibility," on the supposition which our objector makes that it was not revealed that Christ is a perfect or connatural man, but only that He is a true or essential man.

Our objector, like so many post-Suárezian manuals, has it fixed in his head, and even believes it to be the opinion of all theologians, that in the traditional type of theological conclusion “Christ is a man: therefore he is capable of laughter,” the “capable of laughter” can be taken in an actual sense, when man is taken in a purely essential sense.

In our judgment, they suffer in this an evident error with far-reaching consequences for the nature of true Theology and of infallibility, as we believe we have made clear elsewhere (99-102).

We do not deny, then, that the Church can define as infallibly true, and even as of divine faith, the proposition "Christ has radical risibility," since it is revealed that Christ is true or essential man. Nor do we deny that the Church can define as infallibly true, and even as of divine faith, the proposition "Christ has actual risibility," or any other of the properties really distinct from the essence, since it is truly revealed that "Christ is perfect man." In both cases there is a true theological conclusion, in both cases there is true definability: but in both cases there is also true real identity between the principle and the conclusion, and not mere likeness, proportion, or correspondence.

What we have denied and continue to deny is that the Church could define as infallibly true, and much less as a truth of faith, the proposition "Christ has actual risibility," on the supposition that only "Christ is essential man" were revealed. The reasoning "Christ is essential man, therefore He has such an actual property" can hardly be an object of divine faith or an object of infallibility when it does not even have theological certainty. It has the same and identical certainty as these other reasonings: "Christ is essential man, therefore He has human personality," or "Most Holy Mary is true Mother, therefore She is not a Virgin." What a beautiful theological certainty!

348. IN LIGHT OF THE OPPOSITION—In order not to repeat what we have reasoned and documented at length in the place already cited, let us be content with briefly examining such lines of reasoning in light of the concept of opposition, which is what we have been studying in this section.

Indeed, nothing can be condemned as erroneous in the domain of Theology or in that of infallibility unless it is truly opposed to the revealed deposit. This our objector admits. Well then: it is evident that between these two propositions: "Christ is essentially man" and "Christ has no actual risibility," there is no true opposition. One can be essentially man and not actually risible, just as one can be essentially man without being actually, or in fact, a human person, and one can be essentially a mother without ceasing to be a virgin. Such extremes can absolutely coexist: such propositions, which they try to make us pass off as opposed, can absolutely be both true, and two propositions that can absolutely be both true, or two extremes that can absolutely coexist, are not truly opposed, says Saint Thomas. "For opposites, according to any genus of opposition, cannot exist at the same time."

And so that no one might be confused by thinking of merely physical impossibility, the Holy Doctor immediately added that for opposition, absolute or essential impossibility was required. "This comes about from the fact that one of the opposites by its very notion (essence) has the negation of the other." And precisely from this the Holy Doctor deduces that fundamental principle that "Contradiction is included in all opposites" ¹¹

Now then: the propositions "Christ is essentially man" and "Christ is not actually capable of laughter" can absolutely both be true, can absolutely coexist in the same subject, involve no essential repugnance, involve no contradiction. Therefore they involve no true opposition. Therefore, on the supposition made by our objector that only "Christ is essentially man" were revealed, the proposition "Christ has no actual capability of laughter" would not be truly opposed to the revealed deposit, and not being opposed to the revealed deposit, it could not be condemned as erroneous either by infallibility or by Theology.

349. NOR SHOULD IT BE ARGUED THAT, at least, it could be infallibly condemned as rash. Undoubtedly it could. But here we are not at all dealing with the rashness that goes against prudence; rather, we are dealing with the erroneous, which goes against truth. The Church can also infallibly condemn as rash the proposition "the last judgment will take place next year," without its being deduced from this that its contradictory, "the last judgment will not take place next year," has theological certainty or is an object of infallibility, either as erroneous or as true. It is only an object of infallibility or of theology as imprudent ¹²

350. FINAL OBSERVATION.—Let us hear, finally, to close this already too-long chapter, the last observation of our objector, who speaks thus:

"For us, Catholic doctrine is the doctrine that the Church, through its solemn magisterium or its ordinary magisterium, teaches directly or indirectly to all the faithful as a dogma of faith revealed by God or as an infallible truth in accordance with revelation... To all of it can be applied the famous saying of the Lirinense, cited by the Vatican Council: "Let it grow, therefore... and make great and vigorous progress, in the understanding, knowledge, and wisdom of individuals as well as of all, of one man as well as of the whole Church, according to the stages of ages and centuries: but only in its own kind, that is, in the same dogma, with the same meaning, and the same judgment.""

Answer.—Very well said, and we make our own the entire preceding paragraph of our objector. But either our objector has suffered a slight distraction in that paragraph, or he comes therein to admit everything we have said about the real identity of meaning among all the degrees of Catholic doctrine, and to overturn everything he has tried to establish in his earlier observations.

Indeed, according to that paragraph of our objector, Catholic doctrine encompasses not only what is defined as a dogma of faith (and, therefore, the first and second degrees), but also what is defined as an infallible truth (third degree).

According to that same paragraph, all that doctrine of the Catholic faith may be applied the famous saying of the Lirinense, which the Vatican Council has made its own.

Thus, as every theologian knows, the phrase of Vincent of Lérins, “in eodem dumtaxat genere, in eodem scilicet dogmate, eodem sensu, eademque sententia,” means not only likeness, proportion, and correspondence, but also a true implicitness, a true real identity of meaning.

Then, if the saying of Lirinensis and of the Vatican Council applies to all Catholic doctrine, and this embraces the first three grades, our objector thereby comes to acknowledge that there is an identity of meaning among those three grades of Catholic doctrine. We have claimed nothing more than that in this work, nor is more than that needed to recognize the homogeneous evolution of Catholic dogma.

It is true that our objector says nothing explicitly about the theological truth (fourth degree); but everyone knows, and our objector will surely not deny it, that this fourth degree is of the same nature as the third, since there is no true theological conclusion that cannot become an object of infallibility ¹³.

**351. SUMMARY.—**The two principles on which we have based this entire section are the following: First: Theological error, like error infallibly condemned, must necessarily be truly opposed to the deposited revelation and not merely to natural reason. Second: There can be no true opposition between two statements if a true contradiction is not implied between them. We do not recall any theologian or philosopher who has denied or called into doubt either of these principles, and what matters most to us, both are from Saint Thomas.

Anyone who, without allowing himself to be confused by a faulty understanding of "Christus est homo: ergo est risibilis", serenely meditates upon the scope of those two principles, will come to see with evidence, not only that there is real identity or objective homogeneity among the four degrees of Catholic doctrine, but also (and this is the foundation of the other) that the constitutive element of theological truth or theological conclusion is the virtual implicit. Its implicitness in the revealed deposit is what gives Theology the character of real identity or objective homogeneity with faith: its virtuality (or distinction of concepts within the same reality and, therefore, the need for true reasoning) is what gives it its character as a conclusion and its formal distinction from faith.

The implicit virtuality of the revealed deposit is, then, the essence of theological truth. Its character of implicitness in the sacred deposit is admirably condensed in that laconic phrase of the "Princeps Thomistarum," the illustrious Capreolus: "ALL (theological truths) ARE CONTAINED IMPLICITLY IN THE BIBLE," a golden formula that ought to be engraved on the mind of every Thomist and inscribed on the first page of every theological manual ¹⁴. Its character of virtuality was described by the prince commentator Cajetan in that other no less concise phrase: "Theological science is contained virtually in the principles of which faith is the habit" ¹⁵. Both characteristics, that of virtuality and that of implicitness, are united in that text of St. Thomas: "When several things are in something, they are said to be in it implicitly in the principles" ¹⁶ And even better in: to unfold the articles of faith happens in two ways: in one way, with regard to the very substance of the articles, the one knowing the articles distinctly; in another way, [unfolding] those things which are contained implicitly in the articles ¹⁷ happens while a man knows those things which [follow] from the articles*.

Let every theologian note the perfect pair of phrases that Saint Thomas takes as a) “those things which are contained in the articles” and b) “those things which follow from the articles”. These are the principles of theological truth, of sacred Theology itself, according to Saint Thomas; this is the root of the homogeneity of dogma in its four degrees of development. And the divine authority of the Church to explain through the homogeneous evolution of dogma.

¹⁸

Anyone who, without allowing himself to be confused by a faulty understanding of “Christus est homo: ergo est risibilis,” serenely meditates on the scope of those two principles, will come to see with evidence, not only that there is a real identity or objective homogeneity among the four degrees of Catholic doctrine, but also (and this is the foundation of the other) that the constitutive element of theological truth or theological conclusion is the virtual implicit. Its implicitness in the revealed deposit is what gives Theology the character of real identity or objective homogeneity with faith: its virtuality (or distinction of concepts within the same reality and, therefore, the need for true reasoning) is what gives it its character of conclusion and its formal distinction from faith.

The implicit virtuality of the revealed deposit is, therefore, the essence of theological truth. Its character of implicitness in the sacred deposit is admirably condensed in that laconic phrase of the “Princeps Thomistarum,” the illustrious Capreolus: “ALL THINGS (theological) ARE CONTAINED IMPLICITLY IN THE BIBLE,” a golden formula that ought to be engraved in the mind of every Thomist and inscribed on the first page of every theological manual ¹⁹. Its character of virtuality was described by the prince of commentators, Cajetan, in that other no less concise phrase: “Theological science is contained virtually in the principles whose object is faith” ²⁰. Both characteristics, that of virtuality and that of implicitness, are brought together in that text of Saint Thomas: “When many things are contained virtually in something, they are said to be in it implicitly, just as conclusions are in principles” ²¹ And still better in that other text: “To unfold the articles of faith can happen in two ways. One way, as regards the substance of the articles themselves, according as one knows the articles distinctly. Another way, as regards those things which are contained implicitly in the articles; this indeed happens when a man knows those things which follow from the articles” ²²

Let every theologian note the perfect parallelism of those two phrases that Saint Thomas takes as identical, namely: a) "those things which are contained implicitly in the articles"; b) "those things which follow from the articles." These are the two essential characteristics of theological truth, of the theological conclusion, of Sacred Theology, according to Saint Thomas. That virtual implicitness is the root of the homogeneity of Catholic doctrine in its four degrees of development. That implicitness and the divine authority of the Church to explain it are the two keys to the homogeneous evolution of Catholic dogma.

1.º In truth, no one should be surprised that many writers and historians of our day say that the Catholic Church has ceased to exist.—If this is not understood in this way, it is because we have not noticed the form in which the Church exists today, if it is compared with what it was at least from the second century until the French Revolution.

2.º It should not be surprising that this institution is judged to have lost its social effectiveness.—If this is not understood, it is because we do not know what kind of effectiveness the Church has had in the past, nor the kind it has today, under conditions and by means that were previously absolutely unthinkable.

3.º It should not be surprising that it is said that Catholicism, considered as a system, has ended or is in its death throes.—If this is not understood, it is because we have not distinguished the immutable doctrine of Catholicism from the contingent forms with which it has clothed that doctrine in History. The doctrine cannot die. But those historical forms not only can change, but necessarily will change continually.

4.º Finally, it should come as no surprise that it is said that Catholicism is, for the Latin peoples, a religion already surpassed, and for the Anglo-Saxons, an institution that is not in line with their historical vitality.—If this is not understood, it is because one has not seen how Catholicism has historically been one of the greatest generative forces of the culture of the Latin peoples, and one has not realized how Catholicism has had to undergo a purifying process of its strength in order to be grafted today onto other peoples, without it seeming that it is simply a survival of Latin culture.