La evolución homogénea del dogma católico

OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE EXTENT OF DOGMATIC EVOLUTION WITH THE EXTENT OF THE INFALLIBILITY OF THE CHURCH

322. THE FORMAL VIEWPOINT OF THE INFALLIBILITY OF THE CHURCH.—When treating the six types of reasoning or connection, we said that conclusions or connections of the fourth type were not the object of the infallibility of the Church. When later treating the extension of dogmatic evolution, we also said that this extension was the same as that of infallibility (99-295).

Against those two affirmations of ours, intimately linked to each other and to the evolution of dogma, several observations have been made to us, which we shall answer in this section. But first it is fitting to say a few words about the formal point of view of the infallibility of the Church, the only way to properly appreciate its relationships with revelation, with faith, with theology, and therefore with the evolution of dogma.

To appreciate any question with exactness and depth, it is fitting to place oneself from the very outset at its formal point of view, which is what Saint Thomas frequently calls the per se point of view. The material or per accidens points of view often disorient thought unless one takes the greatest care to consider them solely and exclusively in their relation to the formal point ¹.

Now then, infallibility was given by God to the Church not for new revelations nor for doctrines unrelated to revelation, but solely and exclusively for the integral preservation and faithful exposition of the divine revelation or deposit of faith which the Apostles handed over to the Church.

To preserve and set forth the divine revelation or deposit of the faith is, therefore, the formal viewpoint or "ratio sub qua" of the infallibility of the Church. Nothing, therefore, can belong to the infallibility of the Church that is not divine revelation or related to divine revelation: nothing that is not the deposit of the faith or related to the deposit of the faith. On the other hand, everything that is an object of divine revelation or of the deposit of the faith, or that has a necessary connection with the preservation and exposition of divine revelation, must be an object of the infallibility of the Church, and to the same extent that it is an object of revelation and of faith.

Let us listen to the Vatican Council: “For the Holy Spirit was promised to the successors of Peter not so that, by his revelation, they might make known new doctrine, but so that, by his assistance (infallibility), they might holily guard and faithfully expound the revelation or deposit of faith handed down through the Apostles” ². “We teach that the object of infallibility extends only as far as the deposit of faith extends and the duty of guarding it requires: and therefore that the prerogative of infallibility, with which the Church of Christ is endowed, embraces in its scope both the entire revealed word of God, and everything which, although in itself not revealed, is nevertheless of such a kind that, without it, that word cannot be safely preserved, certainly and definitively proposed for belief, or explained, or validly asserted and defended against the errors of men and the opposition of falsely so-called knowledge” ³.

Let us listen to Schaezler and Franzelin: “And therefore the magisterium of the Church, whose role it is to apply the light of divine revelation to nascent questions of faith, considers in that same light many things which, taken in themselves, lie outside the object of revelation, yet fall under its light insofar as they are referred to a question of faith to be decided by the Church from the light of divine revelation. Now, only under this aspect, that is, only insofar as truths of this kind, although of themselves natural, are nevertheless illumined by the supernatural light of divine revelation, are they subject to the magisterium of the Church” ⁴ “Thus the magisterium of the Church teaches such truths and can judge infallibly concerning such errors, not by teaching the human sciences from their own principles, but by judging from its own principles. Therefore the Church, which is infallible, never judges, nor can the Holy Spirit ever permit that it judge by way of definition, whether concerning truths or concerning errors, except in order to guard the deposit and by virtue of the office divinely enjoined upon it of guarding the deposit” ⁵

Examine these two propositions. First: Infallibility extends not only to faith and theology, but also to philosophy, sociology, etc. Second: Infallibility extends only to faith and theology. Both propositions are true. But the first is materially true and formally false or inexact. The second is formally true and exact. Philosophy, sociology, etc., do not fall under infallibility, but only and insofar as they are necessarily related to the revealed deposit. But from that point of view they are no longer formally philosophy, nor sociology, nor politics, nor history, etc., but theology.

The concept, then, of the infallibility of the Church is not an absolute concept or one of indefinite extension like the concept of the infallibility of God, but rather an essentially relative concept and one essentially limited to the preservation and exposition of revelation and of faith, and its field cannot extend beyond the field or departments of faith and revelation. Since, therefore, the infallibility of the Church is a concept relative to divine faith and divine revelation, it is fitting to assess with exactness the extent or departments of divine faith and divine revelation, if one wishes to assess duly and formally the extent and departments of the object of the infallibility of the Church. That is the only scientific and sure procedure in the examination of every relative concept.

**323. TWO GREAT DEPARTMENTS OF DIVINE FAITH.—**The Angelic Doctor, whose treatise De fide is among the most sublime and finished works ever written ⁶, divides the entire field of truth into two great departments, essentially and radically distinct: first, truths that in one way or another belong to divine faith; second, truths that in no way belong to divine faith. Since there are two different ways of belonging to divine faith, directly or principally, and indirectly or secondarily, the holy Doctor subdivides the first department into two others, corresponding to these two ways of belonging to the faith. With this, the entire field of truth is divided by St. Thomas into three departments, which, because of their importance, we shall set forth separately: First department: Truths that directly or principally belong to divine faith. Second department: Truths that indirectly or secondarily belong to divine faith. Third department: Truths that in no way belong to divine faith. These are, in Thomistic doctrine, the three formal departments of: a) divine faith; b) Sacred Theology; c) pure human reason. Whoever wishes to understand St. Thomas and his commentators when they speak of faith, infallibility, or theology must never lose sight of the classification of these three departments and the observations we shall take the liberty of making about them. But let us first cite a brief text from St. Thomas: "I answer that we are now speaking of heresy insofar as it implies corruption of the Christian faith. Now it does not pertain to the corruption of the Christian faith if someone holds a false opinion in matters that are not of the faith, for example in geometry or in other such things that cannot possibly pertain to the faith (thus far the third department of things that in no way are or can be matters of faith); but only when someone holds a false opinion concerning those things that pertain to the faith (now the subdivision of the first and second departments of divine faith will begin). To which something pertains in two ways, as was said above: one way, directly and principally, as the articles of faith (thus far the first department of the faith); another way, indirectly and secondarily, as those things from whose denial follows corruption of some article (thus far the second department of the faith): and concerning both (about the truths of both the first and the second department) there can be heresy, in the same way as there can be faith"⁷. When those truths of the second department, which can be matters of faith and heresy, pass in fact into being directly matters of faith, and their denial into being true heresy, the same holy Doctor explains in that same article, in the reply to the third argument: "Thus, therefore, some doctors (the Holy Fathers) seem to have disagreed, either about those things of which nothing pertains to the faith (third department) whether they are held in one way or another: or also about certain things pertaining to the faith that had not yet been determined by the Church (second department); but after they had been determined by the authority of the universal Church (by which they pass into the first department), if anyone were pertinaciously to resist such an ordination, he would be deemed a heretic" ⁸.

This is the classic and most finely crafted article of the Holy Doctor on the subject, for it is from the Summa Theologica and from the treatise De fide. The first part of the same Summa ⁹ with Cajetan's commentary and the Sententiaries ¹⁰, where he treats the same matter, may be consulted as parallel passages. Although, as an example of the second department, the Holy Doctor frequently places the secondary things of Sacred Scripture, such as that "Abraham had two sons," it is evident that he also includes in that second department all true theological conclusions, both because this follows evidently from the context; both because the Holy Doctor applies this doctrine to the treatise on the divine notions; both because theology does not fit into the third department, which is completely profane, nor into the first, which is of itself and formally of faith; both because the Saint expressly indicates this in the last of the parallel passages cited above (467-468).

Báñez has well expressed the mind of the Holy Doctor regarding what is indirectly revealed when he says: "It is asked what St. Thomas means by directly and indirectly pertaining to faith? Because either it is understood... or it is understood... or finally it is understood by that directly that something is what immediately falls under the habit of faith, that is, without a process of reasoning: but that is said to pertain indirectly to faith which is gathered by necessary consequence from some proposition that is immediate according to faith. To this doubt it is answered that St. Thomas is to be understood in this last way. And although he placed an example in the articles of faith, which pertain directly to faith, nevertheless he does not exclude that other things would pertain directly to faith. For all things that are in Sacred Scripture pertain directly to faith. Even the traditions of the Apostles and the definitions of the Councils pertain directly to faith. But those things are indirectly of faith through the denial of which it follows by good

consequentiam it is false that what is asserted by faith is false: as if someone denies "that Christ is capable of laughter," he errs in the Catholic faith consequently and indirectly. Because it follows well by a consequence known by natural light that "Christ is not a PERFECT man" ¹¹

324. OBSERVATIONS ON THE TWO DEPARTMENTS OF DIVINE FAITH.—Leaving entirely aside the third department, which, being completely profane, or without any necessary relation to faith, must also be foreign to infallibility and to theology, it is fitting to make, with Saint Thomas, the following observations on the other two departments:

1. To the first department belong all and only the truths revealed by God and defined as such by the ordinary or solemn magisterium of the Church, or, in other words, all and only the dogmas of faith.

2. To the second department belong all the truths that follow necessarily from the first, or that are necessarily connected with the first, or from whose denial follows the denial of the first, or from whose corruption follows the corruption of the first. All these phrases come to mean the same thing, and the Holy Doctor employs them indiscriminately.

3. Divine faith has as its primary object (or per se, or direct, or immediate, or formal, for all these terms mean the same thing) the truths of the first department: and as its secondary object (or per accidens, or mediate, or indirect, or virtual, for all these terms mean the same thing) the truths of the second department.

4. The infallibility of the Church, which exists only in relation to divine faith, must have and does have the same object as the latter, that is, as its primary object, the truths of the first department, and as its secondary object, the truths of the second department.

5. Sacred Theology, which, as is well known, has as its starting point the dogma and as its conclusions or proper object everything necessarily connected with the dogma, will therefore have and does have as its starting point or principles the truths of the first department, and as its conclusions or proper object the truths of the second department. The second department is, then, the proper, or specific, or per se object of theology, just as the first department is the proper, or per se or specific object of divine faith ¹²

6. If there are some truths that meet at once the conditions of both the first and the second department—that is, that on the one hand they are revealed and defined (medium cognitionis of the first department or of divine faith), and on the other hand they are a necessary consequence (medium cognitionis of the second department or of theology) of other revealed and defined truths—such truths will belong at once and directly to both faith and theology (126).

7. The truths of the second department, per se or without definition by the Church, that is, when they are known only through reasoning or through the necessary connection they have with the truths of the first department, are properly, rigorously, and exclusively theological conclusions, and they alone and exclusively merit theological assent. But since theological assent is neither of pure natural reason nor of pure divine faith, but an assent of reason-faith in that sense, they are said to belong mediately to divine faith. In the doctrine of Saint Thomas, to be mediately of divine faith means the same as to be immediately and formally of theology and of pure theology. It is in this seventh observation that Vázquez and Vega depart from Saint Thomas, by not distinguishing theology and faith well and formally (85).

8th. These same truths of the second department, after the definition of divine faith by the Church (after they have, however, been determined by the authority of the universal Church), pass into the first department, that is, they become true dogmas of divine faith, and their denial becomes true heresy. They pass from conclusions of theology to principles of theology and of faith, because they are now known by a new means, not by their mere connection with what is revealed, which is the formal means of theology, but by their revelation explained by the Church, which is the formal means of divine faith. In this, Vázquez, Vega, and Cano did nothing other than follow Saint Thomas and the whole Thomistic school, and Molina departed from this Thomistic theory, and Kilber and some others followed Molina.

These eight observations, which we recommend for the meditation of every Thomistic theologian, contain, in our judgment, the true key to the whole doctrine of Saint Thomas on divine faith and, consequently, on infallibility and theology, which are two things essentially related to divine faith.

325. TWO GREAT DEPARTMENTS OF DIVINE REVELATION.— Since divine revelation is the formal object of divine faith, the departments of the former must be the same as those of the latter. Or, speaking more logically, the departments of divine faith that we have described must have been taken from the departments of divine revelation that we are now going to briefly describe.

Thomist theology divides the entire field of truth into two great departments, completely and radically distinct: first, into truths that in one way or another have been revealed by God and truths that in no way have been revealed by God.

Just as there are two modes of true divine revelation, one consisting in revealing a thing in itself and another consisting in revealing a thing in another in which it is necessarily implied, and from which it can be unfolded or extracted, or drawn out or deduced, the first department is subdivided into two others: first, into truths revealed in themselves; second, into truths revealed in another.

Since the phrase in se means for the Thomistic school the same as “formally” or “immediately,” and the phrase in alio means the same as “virtually” or “mediately,” the whole field of truth is divided by the Thomists into three great departments, which we shall also set forth separately.

First department: Truths revealed in themselves, or formally revealed, or immediately revealed. Second department: Truths revealed in something else, or virtually revealed, or mediately revealed. Third department: Truths not revealed in any way: neither in themselves, nor in something else; neither formally nor virtually; neither immediately nor mediately.

Anyone who wishes to understand well the doctrine of Saint Thomas and of the Thomistic school should never forget the classification of these three departments, to which correspond the three that we made earlier when speaking of faith.

The third department is completely foreign to divine revelation, and, therefore, to divine faith, to infallibility, and to theology. Only the first two have to do with theology, infallibility, and faith, since they are the two departments into which divine revelation is divided. Let the same eight observations that we made when speaking of the two departments of divine faith be applied proportionally to these two departments of divine revelation. We omit them, since they would have to be transcribed again almost word for word. We will only recall the eighth observation, which is the most important, namely, that the truths of the second department are definable by the Church as of divine faith, and not only of ecclesiastical faith; and that this is the doctrine, not only of Vázquez, and Vega, and Cano, and Bellarmine, but of the entire Thomist school. What is peculiar to Vázquez and Vega does not lie in this, as is commonly said by the majority of modern theologians, but in the seventh observation, that is, in formally making the truths of the second department matters of divine faith, even without a definition by the Church, merely by knowing them through evident human reasoning.

**326. REVEALED “IN SE” AND REVEALED “IN ALIO”.—**As has been seen, the first and second departments of divine revelation, which are, respectively, the proper or specific departments of divine faith and of theology, are constituted and distinguished in the Thomistic school by the one being revealed in se and the other being revealed in alio.

But it is fitting to keep very much in mind that what is revealed in itself and what is revealed in another are for the Thomists two members of the division of the revealed or of divine revelation. Therefore, revealed in itself and revealed in another does not mean revealed and not revealed, for that would not be a division of revelation, but rather it means two different modes of true revelation.

Something similar happens in the vulgar divisions of the known in se (principles) and the known in alio (conclusions); or of the existing in se (substance) and the existing in alio (accident), by which knowledge and being are usually divided. Known in se and known in alio do not mean known and not known, but rather two different modes of true knowledge. Just as existing in itself and existing in alio do not mean existing and not existing, but rather two different modes of true existence.

To deny, therefore, that a thing is revealed in itself (or formally, or immediately), does not mean for the Thomists to deny its revelation, but only to deny one of the modes of revelation, without that preventing the thing from being truly revealed in the other mode, that is, revealed in another .

In the same way, to affirm that a thing is revealed "in alio" (or mediately or virtually) does not mean improper or metaphorical revelation, but rather another mode of true and proper revelation; for true revelation, like true evidence, has two modes: the immediate mode, or in se or formal, and the mediate mode, or in alio, or virtual. "He who says one thing, says in a certain way many things" (ST. THOMAS) (304).

327. IMPLICIT CONNECTIVE AND NON-IMPLICIT CONNECTIVE.— "Revealed in another" means the same as "necessarily connected with what is revealed in itself."

But let it not be forgotten that connected and implicit are not two opposing or mutually exclusive concepts. On the contrary, the connected is divided into implicit and non-implicit. One need only observe that every true syllogism involves a connection of the conclusion with the major premise through the minor premise. Every conclusion, therefore, is connective. But there are minor premises, and therefore conclusions, that are implicit or inclusive in the majors, and there are others that are not implicit or inclusive, but merely connective. There will, then, also be implicit or inclusive connections and connections that are neither implicit nor inclusive. The former constitute the implicit virtual; the latter, the purely connective virtual: virtuale tantum (40-41). These correspond to the virtual or connected of the fourth type; those, to the virtual or connected of the other five types (46). To believe that what is virtual cannot be implicit, or that what is truly implicit cannot be truly virtual, is to have lost the idea of implicit virtuality: the idea of true theology, one of the keys to dogmatic progress.

328. REPLY TO SOME OBSERVATIONS ADDRESSED TO US. From what has been said, it will be very easy to reply to some observations that have been directed to us. For, because we said (89-99) that the consequent or conclusion of the fourth type cannot be the object of infallibility, a learned theologian thought that this was limiting the infallibility of the Church, and he made to us the following observations:

FIRST OBSERVATION.—All theologians, without exception, teach, and the practice of the Church in the infallible condemnation of errors also teaches, that the infallibility of the Church extends to everything necessarily connected with what is revealed: now, according to Fr. Marín, the infallibility of the Church does not extend to everything connected with what is revealed; therefore, Fr. Marín limits the infallibility of the Church too much, against the unanimous opinion of theologians and against the practice of the Church itself.

Answer.—The attentive reader will immediately notice that in this line of reasoning there is a fundamental flaw, namely that in the major premise it says necessarily connected and in the minor premise it only says connected, as if everything “connected” were “necessarily connected.” That is the latent flaw in all of our objector’s argumentation. He assumes that we deny that infallibility extends to everything necessarily connected, and that is not true. To see this clearly, we will examine separately the major and the minor premises of that reasoning.

The major premise of that reasoning is irreproachable. All theologians admit, and the practice of the Church teaches, that the infallibility of the Church extends not only to what is formally revealed, but also to everything necessarily connected with it. But we too admit that, and, therefore, that major premise is fully granted once and for all, and let it not be spoken of again. That is not the issue, for that is the ABC of theology.

All the force of that argument, if the argument has any force, must therefore lie in the minor premise. In that minor premise it is said that, according to us, the infallibility of the Church does not extend to everything “connected.” But to which “connected” thing does our objector refer? If he refers to one of the five well-known connected things, it is not true that we exclude them from the secondary object of infallibility. Not only do we make them the secondary object of infallibility, but we hold them to be definable as divine faith, and not only as the modernly so-called ecclesiastical faith. With respect, then, to those five connected things, which encompass all the rigorous theological conclusions deduced through inclusive minor premises, far from limiting the infallible authority of the Church, we extend it more than certain authors, and with them our objector, seem to extend it.

Does that minor premise refer only to the connected truth? Then he ought to know that we have said that this connected truth is not NECESSARILY connected with the revealed deposit, an indispensable condition, according to all theologians, for something to be a true theological conclusion (89102). It is therefore up to our objector to prove that, "according to all theologians and according to the practice of the Church," this connected truth is necessarily connected, and on this point he says not a single word nor will he ever prove it.

329. SECOND OBSERVATION.—Our objector proposes the same thing in another form, which may be summarized thus: All theologians extend infallibility, not only to what is really revealed, but also to what is necessarily connected with it; but Fr. Marín limits it to what is really revealed; therefore...

Answer.—In that argument, two essentially distinct questions are again being confused. First, whether infallibility extends to what is necessarily connected with what has been revealed. Second, whether what is necessarily connected, by way of conclusion, with what has been revealed is truly revealed. To the first question, which is the only one that has to do with the extension of infallibility, all theologians respond affirmatively, and we respond the same. To the second question, which has absolutely nothing to do with the present question of infallibility, but rather with the question of the definability of divine faith, not all theologians respond unanimously, as our objector seems to believe, but rather there are two schools. One school responds affirmatively, and we are of that opinion. Another school responds negatively, and of that school our objector seems to be.

The first school, to which we subscribe, far from diminishing the authority of the Church, as our objector believes, increases it. He who, holding what is necessarily connected as not really revealed, were to say that the infallibility of the Church extends only to what is really revealed, would diminish the infallibility of the Church, for he would exclude from it what is necessarily connected. But he who, holding all that is necessarily connected as really revealed, were to say that "the infallibility of the Church extends only to what is really revealed," extends infallibility to everything to which it ought to extend, which is to what is necessarily connected, and also extends to that same thing the authority of the divine faith of the Church. Let not, then, completely diverse questions and formulas be confused. Infallibility comprises two things: first, what is formally revealed, and this is its primary object; second, what is necessarily connected with what is formally revealed, and this is its secondary object. In this we all agree. The question of whether that secondary object is or is not really revealed is irrelevant to the question of the extent of infallibility.

330. THIRD OBSERVATION.—A text from the Bishop of Brescia, who in one of the preparatory sessions of the Vatican Council said that absolutely all theologians admit that it would be a most serious error to limit infallibility to what is revealed in itself, and not to extend it to everything necessarily connected with what is revealed.

Answer.—We say the very same thing; but that is not the question at issue. Our objector fails to distinguish these three propositions: first, all theologians extend infallibility to everything necessarily connected with the deposit of revelation; second, all theologians admit that a connection of the fourth kind is necessarily connected with the deposit of revelation; third, all theologians admit that what is necessarily connected with the deposit of revelation is not really revealed. Our objector devotes all his effort to proving the first proposition, which no one denies, and forgets to prove the second and third, which are the only ones that needed proving. The Bishop of Brescia affirms, and we do too, the first; but he says not a word, nor could he say one, about the second and third.

The question of whether what is virtually revealed, or what is necessarily connected by way of conclusion with what is revealed, is or is not truly revealed and, therefore, definable by divine faith, has remained as free and as debatable after the Vatican Council as it was before. On this there have always been and are two schools. Let Vacant be heard, commenting on the Vatican Council: “We believe as true the things that God has revealed, ab eo revelata. Behold the matter, or, to speak in scholastic language, the material object of the act of faith. The faith of which we speak here is, in effect, divine faith, that is, that which is founded on the authority of God who reveals. There is, therefore, only the assent to the revealed truths of God that is an act of faith; and conversely, every truth revealed by God can become the matter of an act of faith. But must we not rank among the revealed truths only those that are formally revealed, or can we join to them the truths virtually revealed? This is a question that our Council leaves the theologians free to discuss” ¹³. And further on he adds: “We have already said that one school demands that newly defined dogmas be formally contained in those that were originally of Catholic faith and that they be deduced from them by a reasoning whose universal principle is revealed; another school considers that it suffices that they be contained in them virtually and that they be deduced by a reasoning whose universal principle is supplied by reason” ¹⁴. There was not lacking, however, a Father in the Vatican Council who proposed an amendment asking that the Council decide that only what is immediately (or formally or in se) revealed can be defined as of divine faith; but the Council took no notice of such a suggestion. “An amendment proposed to the Council asked that they put in our text ‘quae in verbo Dei scripto vel tradito immediate continentur...’ But this amendment was not taken into consideration” ¹⁵. On the question, then, of whether “infallibility extends not only to what is formally revealed, but also to what is necessarily connected with it,” there is complete unanimity among theologians, and that same thing we have said and say. But on the question of “whether what is virtually revealed or what is necessarily connected by way of conclusion with what is revealed is or is not truly revealed and definable by divine faith,” there is no unanimity, as some believe, but rather two schools. It is a completely free question, after as before the Vatican Council. Thus, then, it is fitting not to confuse very distinct questions.

331. FOURTH OBSERVATION.—The Sovereign Pontiffs have defined ex cathedra propositions that are necessarily connected, as can be seen in several propositions that are cited in particular; for example, proposition 37 of the bull Auctorem fidei, in which the necessity of jurisdiction for the power of absolving is defined ¹⁶

Answer.—Always the same confusion. The Sovereign Pontiffs have defined propositions referring to the five inclusive connected concepts, which are not in question here; but they have defined none that belongs exclusively to the fourth or physical-connected concept, which is the only one in question. To see this, one need only open Denzinger, and the best proof of it is that very proposition 37 which our objector cites as an example or model. Does our objector think that the necessity of jurisdiction is deduced from the power of absolving (which is revealed) by way of the fourth connected concept, or as a physically distinct property? No, rather it is deduced by way of the other connected concepts, by the essential or inclusive way, by analysis of the concept of judicial power, from the reason or nature of judgment.

The argument or reasoning by which the Church has deduced that truth or condemned its contradictory is as follows, as every theologian knows:

“The Sacrament of Penance was instituted in the manner of a judgment (greater truth revealed or of faith); it is thus that the nature or essence of judgment (nature and rationale of judgment) include jurisdiction or superiority of the judge over the accused (lesser truth of reason inclusive, not physically distinct); therefore, every absolution without ordinary or delegated jurisdiction is invalid or non-sacramental” (theological conclusion, object of infallibility, as necessarily connective, according to all, and definable as of faith by inclusion, according to the Thomistic school).

In our judgment, one would need to have completely muddled ideas about the “connected” [proposition] not to see that this minor premise and this reasoning do not belong to the fourth connected [proposition], but to the other connected ones, since it is evident that it is deduced from the reason or essence of the judicial or imperative act. But if anyone doubts this, let him turn to the Summa Theologica ¹⁷, where Saint Thomas analyzes and deduces that conclusion, analyzing the essence of the act of command, which includes superiority or jurisdiction; or let him turn to the Council of Trent (which is alluded to in the very condemnation of that proposition), and there he will find the following: “Since therefore the nature and rationale of judgment requires that a sentence be passed only upon subjects, it has always been held in the Church of God, and this holy Synod confirms it to be most true, that the absolution which a priest pronounces upon one over whom he does not have ordinary or subdelegated jurisdiction must be of no effect” ^{18 19}.

The same thing that has happened to our objector with this proposition that he has cited to us as a model of a non-inclusive connected proposition, by trusting manuals, will happen to him with any other proposition from Denzinger.

**332. FIFTH OBSERVATION.—**The traditional opinion is that everything virtual is an object of infallibility.

Response.—The traditional opinion is not that everything virtual is an object of infallibility, but rather that everything virtually revealed, or everything virtual theological, is. Now, the physical-connective virtual is neither revealed nor theological, because it has no absolutely necessary connection with the revealed deposit. Nothing rigorously theological can ever fail, and the physical-connective virtual can fail and does in fact fail whenever it pleases God. If one wishes to call it “theological,” just as uncertain or probable conclusions are called theological, there is no difficulty in that; but such conclusions are not rigorously theological, since theology is a science of absolute certainty (89).

333. SIXTH OBSERVATION.—On the other hand, nothing truly virtual can be of divine faith. The virtual cannot be deduced except through one premise of faith and another of reason, and the rule of every syllogism is that "the conclusion always follows the weaker part."

Answer.—We admit the aphorism that the conclusion always follows the weaker premise. Therefore, if the premise of reason is physical-connective and, consequently, an objective addition to the premise of faith, the conclusion is also an objective addition. If the minor premise is metaphysical-inclusive and, consequently, an objective explanation of the premise of faith, the conclusion will likewise be an objective explanation of the premise of faith, and nothing more. If the objective explanation or metaphysical-inclusive minor premise is employed by human reason alone, the conclusion is not of faith, since reason, in explaining what is revealed, is the “weaker part” than the premise of faith: that conclusion will be only a human explanation of the premise of faith, that is, theology. If, instead of the minor premise, the definition of the Church is set down, there is no longer a weaker part, because the Church’s explanation of revelation is not a weaker part, but a part equal to revelation itself or to the premise of faith. In explaining what is revealed, the authority of the Church is neither less nor weaker, but equal to that of God and of the Apostles (176).

The syllogistic rule “the conclusion always follows the worse part” proves, then, very well that the theological conclusion cannot be formally of divine faith before the Church’s definition; but it does not prove the same way for after its definition. The minor premise of reason is for our human intelligence a part of the theological reasoning, and it essentially determines the nature of the “habitus” and of the certainty of the assent to the conclusion, since it is nothing more than a preliminary condition of the Church’s definition, and it does not determine in the least the nature of the “habitus,” of the certainty, and of the assent to the definition. Therefore, while in theology the assent we give to the conclusion depends on ourselves, necessarily, on the nature and value of the minor premise of reason, in the Church’s definition the assent is absolutely independent (132-133).

334. SEVENTH OBSERVATION.—That which is virtually revealed is not simpliciter revealed, but revealed secundum quid. Response.—If what is virtually revealed is virtual implicitly or inclusively, it already has revelation as to its substance, and only lacks explanation. It is not, then, "simpliciter" revealed, if by "simpliciter" is understood what is explicit; but it is "simpliciter" revealed, if by "simpliciter" is understood what is implicit. Its proper name is revealable, that is, explicable by the revelation already made by God, and in which it is truly implicit. Such an image is really imprinted on the photographic plate, although imperceptibly, asking for nothing other than to be developed (214).

335. EIGHTH OBSERVATION.—One thing is reality and another thing is truth. From the fact that two statements express the same reality it does not follow that they express the same truth. Response.—Reality and truth are distinguished logically or subjectively, but not really or objectively. Therefore, two statements whose predicates and subjects are really identical have the same objective meaning. The difference is only subjective, although founded on the fecundity of the object. Such are all really-identical conclusions. Such are all the successive formulas of dogmatic progress (515). It is true that the real identity of two propositions does not suffice for belonging to the same "habitus" if they are not known by the same means. We have already explained at length elsewhere (123), following St. Thomas and Capreolus, that the specific distinction of habits is not taken from the reality known (res cognita), but from the means of knowledge (medium cognitionis) or, as Cajetan aptly says, it is taken not from the object as it is (ut res est), but from the object as knowable (ut scibile) ²⁰. Thus, with regard to the same reality, the divinity, there is room for several specifically distinct habits: faith, theology, theodicy. The theological conclusion, really identical to the revealed datum, does not belong to faith, but to theology, as long as it is not defined. Because then it is known only by human reasoning, which is the instrument of theology to the exclusion of faith. But it follows that this same conclusion, once defined or explained by the divine authority of the Church, is known by another means: "Revelation explained by the Church", the formal means of faith. After its definition it is of faith, without ceasing to belong to theology, because it is known in two distinct ways (127, 168). It is necessary, therefore, to distinguish carefully these three means of

a) Explicit revelation. This is revelation explained by God Himself. b) Implicit revelation before definition, known only by reasoning. This is revelation explained by human reason; the theological conclusion before its definition. c) Implicit revelation defined by the Church. This is revelation explained by God through the Church; the theological conclusion after its definition.

The first and third of these means of knowledge have the same value, that of divine authority, of faith. Since the Church has the truly divine power to explain everything that is really implicit in the revealed datum, the value of the implicit revelation made explicit by the Church (third means) is the same as that in explicit revelation (first means), that is, the authority explained by God. The authority of the Church is certainly less than divine authority or apostolic authority with regard to new revelations and even to truths not implicitly contained in the primitive datum, but it is equal to them in everything that is truly implicit, given that the explanation does not require a new revelation (175-176).

On the contrary, the second means—implicit revelation explained by the theologian's individual reason—has only a human theological value, specifically distinct from the value of the other two means (309). Thus, the theological conclusion is a matter of faith in the third case, not in the second.

In these matters every true Thomist must avoid two extreme theories: that of Molina and that of Vázquez (87, 119).

Believing, with Molina, that the theological conclusion properly so-called has a completely new content relative to the revealed datum, which makes it undefinable as a matter of faith. Here there is an error. The theological conclusion, provided that it is inclusive, contains, it is true, something new by the very fact that it is a true conclusion; but because it is implicit, this newness refers to the explanation of the same doctrine. Thus, the Church, when defining, does nothing more than explain the revealed datum: this conclusion is, therefore, a matter of faith after its definition (306).

It would fall into the opposite extreme to think, with Vázquez, that the theological conclusion, being truly inclusive, should contain nothing new and, therefore, is a matter of faith not only after, but also before its definition, for a theologian who deduces it with evidence.

This conception is not, like Molina’s, contrary to dogmatic development, but rather favors it excessively; yet we do not believe it to be less erroneous, because it disregards the specific difference that exists between theology and faith and forgets the entirely divine character of this second habit (156).

In fact, every true theological conclusion, however implicit, contains something new. It is not a new doctrine, but a new explanation. Otherwise, it would not be a true conclusion. To be convinced of this, it suffices to consider the following two equations: Theological conclusion = revealed datum. Theological conclusion = revealed datum + explanation.

The first is formally false, because it identifies conclusions and science with principles and simple intelligence and confuses theology and faith.

The second equation is exact, but it indicates that the conclusion contains a new element, something more than what was found in the principle or revealed datum. When I make an act of faith regarding this conclusion, I embrace not only the revealed datum but also something new. For this, it is necessary that this "something new" be formally divine, because in the object of the act of faith nothing formally human must enter. Therefore, before the definition of the Church, this new element, constitutive of the conclusion, is formally human, as theology itself is (309). It is, then, necessary to have the intervention of the Church, which alone possesses the divine authority needed for the explanation of the revealed datum. This explanation, made by a theologian, is formally human; made by the Church, it is formally divine, and therefore, of faith. Hence, this definition of the Church is not only necessary so that the definition may not be erroneous; it is necessary, above all, so that the deduction may be formally divine.

Now, the real identity of the conclusion and of its principle, the revealed datum, is the reason why this conclusion is implicit, which in turn makes it definable by the Church. But neither its real identity nor its definable implicit character suffice to make it formally a matter of faith until it is defined, that is, known through "revelation explained by the Church," the medium of our faith.

Before the definition there was between the conclusion and the datum "identitas rei," but not "identitas scibilis." After the definition there is not only "identitas rei," but "identitas scibilis," or, better, "identitas credibilis," because then the conclusion is no longer known by rational demonstration, the means of science, but by the explanation of the Church, the means of knowledge of faith. Before the definition it is merely theological; after it, it is also believable, of divine faith. "Every cognitive habit formally regards the medium through which it knows: materially, however, that which is known through the medium... Moreover, the formal aspect of the object in faith is the First Truth manifested through the teaching of the Church: just as the formal aspect of science is the means of demonstration ²¹

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REASON FOR DOGMATIC PROGRESS.—As we have said (160-161), the psychological reason for human intellectual progress—whether in the natural order or in the order of faith—must be sought in our connatural way of knowing "by way of statement". Not being completely intellectual or intuitive, like God and the angels, but rational and discursive, we cannot know at one stroke everything that is implicit in our starting point, and we must use partial and successive statements, deducing some from others by an inclusive reasoning process.

While these statements serve only to develop what was from the beginning truly implicit in our starting point, we preserve the objective unity of science or of faith, despite the plurality of statements.

The reason for this is—as St. Thomas profoundly observes—that the act of faith, like that of science, does not find its term in the statement, but in the objective reality. "Now the act of the believer does not terminate in a proposition, but in a thing; for we do not form propositions except in order to have knowledge of things through them, just as in science so also in faith" ²²

From this point of view, the Holy Doctor assigns to us, at the beginning of the cited article, the reason for this assimilation of science and faith. Faith is a knowledge; now, all knowledge is made according to the connatural mode of the one who knows. Therefore, the human way of knowing is by proceeding through statements; such will consequently also be the human way of knowing and developing the supernatural datum. "Things known are in the one who knows according to the mode of the one who knows. But the proper mode of the human intellect is to know the truth by composing and dividing, as has been said" (I, q. 85, a. 3). "And therefore those things that are in themselves simple, the human intellect knows according to a certain composition" ²³ "From the same source it comes about that our intellect understands by discoursing, and by composing and dividing, namely from the fact that it cannot at once, in the first apprehension of some first thing apprehended (the natural datum or the revealed datum), inspect whatever is virtually contained in it: which happens from the weakness of the intellectual light in us" ²⁴ "And according to this, it must compose and divide one thing apprehended with another and proceed from one composition and division to another, which is to reason" ²⁵. These successive "compositions and divisions," these multiple statements when they are contained implicitly in the primitive datum, but our reason cannot see them except through reasoning, is what the Thomistic school has always understood by immediate or "per se notum quoad se" and mediate or "non per se notum quoad nos". We call them immediate or "per se nota quoad se" because they are objectively and truly implicit, and mediate or "non per se nota quoad nos" because they require from our reason a true demonstration (165).

This is why Saint Thomas, always so profound and so logical in his writings, placed at the beginning of his treatise On God the question "Whether the existence of God is self-evident"²⁶, because the nature of all our knowledge of God depends on it. And in parallel, at the beginning of his treatise On Faith he placed the question "Whether the object of faith is something complex, in the manner of a proposition"²⁷, a question which so many authors, even Thomists, have greatly neglected, when the entire nature of the genesis and development of our faith depends on it.

We are pleased to see that some modern Thomists are finally becoming aware of the paramount importance of these questions; we refer to the fine articles by Fr. Chenu, O. P., entitled "Contribution to the history of the treatise on faith: historical commentary on 2-2, q. 1, a. 2" and "The psychological reason for the development of dogma according to Saint Thomas"²⁸.

Nine years ago we wrote in Ciencia Tomista the following sentences: "One cannot thoroughly penetrate and successfully resolve the questions so burning today concerning modernist dogmatic evolution and Catholic dogmatic progress without deeply penetrating those per se nota and per modum enuntiabilis, which many regard as antiquated or little more, but which are the key to understanding all those most serious questions in which the nature and distinction of faith and science, of the Church and individual reason, of modernist evolution or Catholic progress are involved. For some reason, we repeat, the Holy Doctor, who always proceeds with admirable logical order from principles to conclusions, from the essential to the accidental, placed them at the head of his immortal treatises On God and On Faith. That is why we insist so much on these things, even at the risk of being accused of digressing or repeating what, for many readers, would be unnecessary" ²⁹

336. NINTH OBSERVATION.—If St. Thomas, for example, laid down a principle and the Thomists draw the consequences, no one will say that they are not two doctrines.

Answer.—Without a doubt, no one will attribute to an author the implicit conclusions of his writings if he has not foreseen and noted them. But if it is supposed that they have clearly seen these implicit consequences and that they have left to their disciples the mission of bringing them to light, then they are attributable to them, without any doubt.

Now then, God, in revealing the deposit of Sacred Scripture and Tradition, although He clearly saw all the implicit consequences, did not stop until He instituted the teaching authority of the Church to make them explicit. Such consequences, once explained by the Church, are divine conclusions, that is, dogmatic ones.

This distinction between the authors of human books and God, the author of Sacred Scripture, is one of the main arguments anticipated by Saint Thomas to prove the existence of a multiplicity of senses in Sacred Scripture, unlike purely human works. To the texts already cited, we add these others from Saint Thomas:

“Whether multiple senses lie hidden in the same words of Sacred Scripture.

“Fifth objection. Furthermore, any sense drawn from the words of a Scripture which the author did not intend is not its proper sense; because an author cannot understand more than one meaning by one passage of Scripture, since it is not possible to understand several things at once, according to the Philosopher. Therefore, there cannot be several proper senses of Sacred Scripture.

“To the fifth it must be said that the principal author of Sacred Scripture is the Holy Spirit, who in one word of Sacred Scripture understood far more than what is expounded or discerned by the commentators of Sacred Scripture” ³⁰

“Whether the aforesaid senses ought to be distinguished in other scriptures.

“Third objection. Furthermore, the Philosopher says that whoever says one in a certain way says many. Therefore, it seems that in other sciences many things can be designated in one sense.”

“Ad tertium dicendum that whoever says “one” in a certain way says many things, namely in potency, insofar as conclusions are in potency in principles, for from one principle many conclusions follow: not that in other sciences by way of signification what is said of one thing is at the same time understood of others as signified, although it can be drawn from it by argumentation

"Whether through the succession of times the faith has progressed. "Fourth objection. Furthermore, an article is indivisible truth. But what is indivisible cannot be further distinguished. Therefore, since the faith has always been contained under certain articles, it seems that it could not have been further distinguished, so that the articles might be explicitly known. "Reply to the fourth: it must be said that an article is called indivisible truth with respect to what is actually expressed in the article; but it is divisible with respect to those things that are potentially contained in the article, according to which one who says one thing in a certain way says many things: and these are the things that precede the article and follow from it; and in this respect the article of faith can be unfolded and divided" "And in this way the faith can be unfolded daily and has been more and more unfolded through the study of the Saints"

Upon carefully comparing these texts of Saint Thomas, two things will be observed with complete clarity: a) that he understands by potential or consequential continence (those things which are contained in potential in the article: those things which follow from the articles) the conclusions properly speaking; b) that these conclusions are not always foreseen and pointed out by men in their writings, but they are always so by God in Sacred Scripture.

If St. Thomas laid down a principle: if we further suppose that these are consequences implied in that principle: if we also suppose that St. Thomas saw those consequences and saw that his school would draw them out: if we suppose, finally, that St. Thomas commissioned his school to draw them out, everyone will say that his school, in drawing them out, does nothing other than develop or explain the very doctrine of St. Thomas. And that is the true case between God and His Church

Speaking of the consequences of the doctrine of St. Thomas, Nuño expresses himself thus: "Without a reasonable cause and without any foundation, Father Suárez contradicts Lord Cajetan. And first he says, that a certain negative proposition is not found in St. Thomas, which Cajetan concedes, namely: contrition by its essence is not a part of the sacrament of Penance... But certainly Master Suárez either did not understand Master Cajetan, or under that name he wished secretly to impugn St. Thomas. And indeed it is first proved that that proposition is clearly gathered from the very words of St. Thomas, and so much so, that it is contained in him implicitly and virtually" (Nuño, o. c., in 3 p., q. 90, a. 2, pp. 251-252). Everything, then, that is clearly deduced from the doctrine of St. Thomas is implicitly contained in it; and to deduce such evident consequences is not to teach another doctrine, but to explain, or unfold, or develop, or evolve homogeneously the same doctrine. When the Molinists or Scotists depart from what we, the Thomists, regard as evident consequences of the principles of St. Thomas, we do not tell them only that they depart from us, but that they depart from the doctrine of St. Thomas. And if they reject such an accusation, it is because they deny that such things are evident consequences of the doctrine of the Holy Doctor; but they would certainly not deny it if they confessed that they were evident consequences of the doctrine of the Saint. See the texts of Berthier and Pesch on the consequent sense of Sacred Scripture, which we cite in numbers 444 and 447. Related to this, we are going to cite another little text of Cardinal Cajetan, among a thousand that could be noted. Commenting on those words of St. Thomas: "The remission of guilt cannot be UNDERSTOOD without the infusion of grace", he expresses himself thus: "For it is certain that if it were possible according to absolute power, it could be UNDERSTOOD" (In 1-2, q. 113, a. 2). Everything, then, that can be by absolute power is intelligible, and everything that is repugnant by absolute power is unintelligible. Since a metaphysically-connected consequence is the same as an absolutely necessary consequence, it follows that every metaphysically-connected theological consequence is of the understanding of the revealed deposit, and that the Church, in defining it, gives us nothing more than the intelligence of the revealed deposit. That is the nature of the inclusive or intellectual character of true theology (103-109).]

337. TENTH OBSERVATION.—“The certainty of divine faith must be infinitely superior not only to physical certainty, but also to metaphysical certainty. Therefore, the metaphysically-inclusive conclusion is just as far from divine faith as is the physically-connective one.”

**Answer.—**The requirement that the conclusion be metaphysically inclusive in order for it to be definable as a matter of faith is not because metaphysical certainty has anything to do with the certainty of faith, which is infinitely superior, but rather because, when there is metaphysical connection, there is identity or objective inclusion with the greater revealed truth, which is a matter of faith. The conclusion is definable, not because of its metaphysical connection, but because of its inclusion. Therefore, metaphysical certainty has nothing to do with the certainty of faith; but the inclusion or implicitness of that conclusion in the premise of faith not only has to do with definability as a matter of faith, but it is all that is required and suffices for definability, provided that such inclusion can be known with evidence without new revelation.

**338. ELEVENTH OBSERVATION.—**That which is truly identical with what is revealed is contained in itself, but it is not contained for us.

**Answer.—**If our reason cannot draw it out with evidence without a new revelation, it is contained in itself, but not for us, like the Trinity in the unity of God. But if our reason can draw it out by its own powers, then it is also contained for our reason.

339. Two final objections. TWELFTH OBSERVATION.—“Between what God has said and its theological conclusions there is only a purely contingent connection.”

Answer.—In rigorous theology, as in rigorous metaphysics, there is never pure connection, but connection with inclusion. Theological and metaphysical conclusions, considered objectively, are not connected, but identical in their principles; they are only connected considered subjectively. The virtual distinction on which they are founded is not in the object, but in the subject.

THIRTEENTH OBSERVATION.—Events that occurred many centuries after the Apostles, and after the deposit of revelation had been closed, cannot be defined as matters of divine faith, and therefore as revealed.

Answer.—It is false that contingent facts which took place after the Apostles cannot be truly revealed and definable as of divine faith. The celebration of the Council of Trent, the drafting of the current canon of the Mass, the translation of the Vulgate, the election of such a pope, the conception of such a man... are contingent facts that occurred after the Apostles. Nevertheless, it is defined or definable as of divine faith, and therefore it is revealed, that the Council of Trent is ecumenical or a rule of faith, that the canon of the Mass is free from error, that the Vulgate is authentic in the essential matters of faith and morals, that Our Most Holy Father Pius XI is the true pope, that such a man has been redeemed by Jesus Christ.

It is true that the Council of Trent could have not been held, and in that sense it is a contingent fact; but once held, as it was held, it is not a contingent matter, but an absolutely necessary one, that it be ecumenical or a rule of faith. In the same way, Jansenius's Augustinus could have never been written, and in that sole sense it is a contingent fact, but once written, as it was written, it is not a contingent matter, but absolutely necessary, its formal opposition to the revealed deposit, that is, its heretical character.

Now then: upon the death of the last of the Apostles, the Church remained in possession not only of a doctrinal deposit, but also of a dogmatic authority to judge, by means of that deposit, the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of every doctrinal formula. Let the reader note that “every.” It is not only for judging oral doctrinal formulas, but also written ones; not only short formulas, but also long ones, even if they are so long as to form an entire book; not only the formulas that were already spoken or written before the deposit was closed, but also those that in the future might be spoken or written.

Before, then, Jansenius wrote his book, the Church already had the rule, which is the revealed deposit, and the dogmatic authority to judge it; but it could not apply such a rule or such authority to such a book while such a book did not exist. But as soon as such a book existed, the Church needed to do nothing more than apply to it the measure of the revealed deposit to see whether it was identical or contradictory to it, that is, to see whether or not it contained heretical doctrine. With that application the revealed deposit neither increases, decreases, nor changes in any way; just as an old meter or thermometer does not change, increase, or decrease because I measure with it the length or temperature of something new. When, then, the Church declares as a matter of divine faith a new dogmatic fact, there is no novelty in the ancient doctrine, but simply novelty of application or a new application of the ancient and always identical doctrine to a new doctrine in order to judge it.

When the last of the Apostles died, and the deposit of Catholic revelation was thereby closed, it was not yet of divine faith that the book of Jansenius contained heresy, but it was already of divine faith that if a book were written such as the book of Jansenius was written, such a book contained heresy. Therefore, when Jansenius wrote his book in the manner in which he wrote it, and when the Church declared that such a book contains heresy, there was nothing more than a simple verification of a condition that was already contained in the revealed deposit. That dogmatic fact, once defined by the Church, is of divine faith, not precisely because in the seventeenth century the Church said it, but because earlier, in the revealed deposit, God had already said it. Only, God had said it universally or conditionally, and the Church says it particularly, verifying the condition.

The difficulty that many theologians find in admitting this doctrine arises, in our judgment, from the fact that they have formed so narrow an idea of the dogmatic authority of the Church, as if that authority were reduced solely to the immutable preservation of the revealed deposit. It extends not only to preserving it immutably, but also to explaining and applying it faithfully. The definition of revealed virtuality or theological conclusion, provided that it concerns inclusive or implicit conclusions, for these are the only definable ones, is nothing other than an explanation of the revealed deposit. The definition of facts, provided that they are dogmatic facts, for these are the only definable facts, is nothing other than an application of the revealed deposit.

In reality, these three things (conservation, explanation, application) are nothing but three degrees or phases of the same thing, for the revealed deposit is a doctrinal deposit, and every doctrine, by being faithfully explained, is conserved, and by being faithfully applied, is explained. The dogmatic facts, which constitute that application, represent, with respect to the doctrine revealed by God, exactly the same thing that a work of moral cases by an author represents with respect to another work of moral doctrine by the same author. If the author in his work of moral cases has limited himself to faithfully applying to the resolution of such cases the same doctrine that he had already set forth in his moral work, no one will say that this constitutes a different morality, but rather an application of the same morality. Thus also, when the Church faithfully and infallibly applies the revealed deposit to dogmatic facts, she does not give us a doctrine different from the revealed deposit, but an application of the same doctrine; and all theologians agree or ought to agree that everything that is not new doctrine, but the same doctrine as that which God revealed, is definable as of divine faith and not merely of ecclesiastical faith. When, therefore, the last of the Apostles died, the revealed deposit was closed with regard to new revelations and with regard to new doctrines, but not with regard to new explanations or new applications of the same doctrine.

In short, since the infallibility of the Church extends also to those same three things (conservation, explanation, and application) and to them alone, it clearly follows that the extension of the Church's dogmatic authority or of divine faith, and the extension of infallibility or of the so-called ecclesiastical faith, are exactly the same. That is the precise extension of the homogeneous evolution of Catholic dogma.