La evolución homogénea del dogma católico

312. FIRST OBSERVATION.—“What the Church can define and does define as being of divine faith is that which, in order to be deduced from the deposit of revelation, needs only improper reasoning, and which is called formally implicit. For example: “Fundamentum indeficiens Ecclesiae: ergo infallibilis”; or also, “gratia plena: ergo immaculata”. Such conclusions, even before being defined, were already contained formally, and not only virtually, in the deposit of revelation.”

Response.—We agree that the Church can define as a matter of faith everything that is deduced from the deposit of revelation by improper reasoning. We also agree that what requires only improper reasoning to be deduced is called and is formally implicit. But we are surprised that our objector considers those two cited examples as though they were of improper reasoning or formally implicit. These are not examples of the formally implicit, but of the virtually implicit and of the truly virtual. They are not examples of improper reasoning, but of proper and most proper reasoning.

For there to be only improper reasoning or the formally implicit, it is necessary, as our objector himself confesses, that the deduced conclusion express not a new concept, but the same concept. Where there is a new concept, the reasoning is no longer improper, but proper; what is deduced is no longer formal, but virtual. Now, the concept of “indefectible foundation,” which is a concept from the Gospel, and that of “infallible by itself and not by the consent of the Church,” which is the concept defined by the Vatican Council, are not one and the same concept, but rather two concepts, albeit implicit one in the other. In the same way, the concept of “full of grace,” which is an evangelical concept, and that of “conceived without stain of original sin in the first instant of her conception by the foreseen merits of the death of her Son,” which is the concept defined by Pius IX, are not the same concept, but two concepts or different aspects, although of the same thing or reality. They are not, it is true, opposed concepts: they are not even diverse concepts; but they are indeed new or distinct concepts, derived one from the other. That is the true theology; that is the true virtually implicit; virtual, because there is a distinction of concepts, which is wherein virtual distinction consists; implicit, because one concept proceeds or is derived from the other.

To convince oneself of this, let our objector open any dictionary: let him look up the definition or formal meaning of "indefectible foundation," and see whether anything of "personal infallibility" or "without the consent of the Church" enters into that definition. Let him likewise look up the definition of "Mother of God" and see whether the concepts of "free from original sin," of "first instant," and of "by the foreseen merits of the death of her Son" enter into it. Now then: what does not enter into the definition cannot be for our intellect contained formally in what is defined.

Instead, seek the definition of "whole," and you will find in it the concept of "parts"; seek the definition of any correlative whatsoever, for example, of "father," and you will find in it the concept of the other correlative, of "son"; seek, finally, the definition of "universal," and in it you will find the concept of "singulars." Therefore, what is contained as a part in the whole, as a correlative in its correlative, or as a particular in an actual and unconditioned universal, is formal; because since the one enters into the definition or simple understanding of the other, there exists only one concept under two different words. Everything else is not formal, but virtual, for whoever knows how to distinguish our science or our Theology from simple understanding or from faith.

Our objector will say that, although in the two cited examples one concept does not enter explicitly into the definition of the other, it does enter implicitly; because by analyzing the concept of "unfailing foundation" or of "gratia plena," the defined concepts emerge. So it is. But precisely in that, for us, consists the true virtual implicit or the true and proper reasoning of the higher sciences: in analyzing a concept, decomposing it into two or more, whereby new concepts result. All the higher sciences are analytic. Theology is nothing other than the intellectual analysis of the revealed deposit.

Someone may also say: the passage from one concept to another in these examples is a clear and obvious step; it suffices to penetrate well all the biblical meaning of "inefficient foundation" or of "gratia plena" to see at once the other concepts defined by the Church.

We grant that, if one thoroughly penetrates all the biblical meaning of those concepts, the others emerge or are clearly seen. But in that very thing consists the true conclusion and the true virtual: in thoroughly penetrating all the meaning and not merely the superficial or formal meaning. If our objector takes as formal all the meaning contained in the principles or major premises of the reasoning, then it is clear that every conclusion by way of inclusion is formal. But by formal, all the meaning of a proposition or principle has never been understood, but only the explicit meaning, or also that meaning so superficially implicit that, for its explanation, a simple definition or explanation of names suffices. When, to explain the implicit meaning, conceptual analysis is needed, the implicitness is no longer formal, but virtual; it is no longer of simple intelligence or of faith, but of science or of Theology. Also, whoever thoroughly penetrated all that is contained or implicit in a mathematical or metaphysical principle or theorem would clearly and immediately see all its true conclusions. Which does not prevent that, for our intelligence, which cannot comprehend or penetrate all at a single stroke, such conclusions are true and proper conclusions, and, therefore, true new concepts or true virtual (33-39).

The only reason, in our judgment, why our objector considers those two cited examples as formal-implicit, and not as virtual-implicit, is because he is a priori persuaded that the Church cannot define as divine faith anything but the formal. And since it is a fact that the Church has defined as divine faith those two examples, he has no choice but to perform feats of nomenclature to defend that such examples are examples of the formal, albeit of the formal-implicit, as he says, or of the formal-confused, as others say with more wit. Our opinion is that instead of reasoning in this way: "The Church cannot define but the formal; therefore those examples are of the formal," one ought to reason in this other way: "Such examples are evidently of the virtual; therefore the Church can define the virtual." Thus our ancient theologians always reasoned. Thus the history of dogmas obliges one to reason.

A DIGRESSION ON THE ASSUMPTION OF THE MOST HOLY VIRGIN.* As we have noted elsewhere, it is not necessary, for a doctrine to be definable, that it have been known explicitly by the early Church. It suffices that it have been implicitly present in other explicit dogmas (173).

There is, therefore, absolutely no requirement that the early Church explicitly admitted the Immaculate Conception and the Assumption.

These dogmatic truths, one of which is already defined and the other will not be long in being so, were implicitly contained, like almost all the dogmas referring to the Most Holy Virgin, in the scriptural texts: “I will put enmities,” “Full of grace,” and “Mother of Jesus”—formulas that Christian sensibility has rendered as “worthy Mother of God,” “new Eve.” The inclusive reasoning suffices to deduce them from these. And whatever might have been lacking in the evidence of reasoning has been amply supplied by the sense of the faith, because when this sense of the faith becomes the firm adherence of the entire Church, it suffices by itself to ground the definability of a truth.

We cannot but praise certain theologian-historians who devote themselves to studying and collecting all the texts and monuments of antiquity that refer to these dogmas. Frequently it results from this that the explicit belief of the Church has begun earlier than we ordinarily imagine.

But it is also necessary that these theologians not forget that it is not absolutely necessary that the Apostles taught these dogmas explicitly for them to be definable.

Suárez has admirably summarized the traditional doctrine on this question in the following text:

“What is necessary for something to be definable by the Church? I say first, nevertheless, that this truth, namely, that the Virgin was conceived without original sin, can be defined by the Church, when she has judged it expedient... Second, this is declared thus, because this truth is supernatural, highly relevant to the utility and piety of the Church, and the matter can reach that state in which, without a new and explicit revelation, the Church has sufficient motives to define this truth, from the implicit and tacit revelation of God sufficiently proposed to her; therefore. The antecedent is declared, because often the Church, by her own authority, with the Holy Spirit assisting her, has defined similar controversies without a new express revelation, as can be shown by clear examples in the question of infused habits, of the canonical authority of certain books of Sacred Scripture, of the absence of all venial sin in the Virgin herself. One can also add the example of her resurrection, of the glorious Assumption, and of the sanctity of her birth: for of these, some are already of faith, while others are proximate to faith, and no one doubts that they can ultimately be defined. For this definition it is enough that some supernatural truth be implicitly contained in Scripture or Tradition, so that, with the growing common consensus of the Church—through which the Holy Spirit often explicates traditions or declares Scripture—the Church can at length apply her definition, which has the force of a certain revelation with respect to us, because of the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit¹.

Cayetano had condensed the same doctrine in the following lines: "It does not matter in Sacred Scripture and elsewhere whether something is revealed explicitly or implicitly... except that it takes talent, labor, reason, and intellect to manifest these things that are said to be contained implicitly as necessarily connected to those in which they are said to be contained"².

Thus, then, although a truth may not have been the object of explicit belief in the early centuries, it can be defined, if it is implicitly connected with the primitive dogmas, and this in a manner that can be demonstrated with evidence, either by reasoning or by the sense of faith.

This is how the dogma of the Immaculate Conception is implicitly connected with the dogma of the divine Motherhood, and the dogma of the Assumption with the two preceding ones³

Just as Jesus Christ is by nature the "new Adam," Mary is, by the merits of Jesus, the "new Eve": thus has tradition always called her.

Jesus Christ, by nature, was free from all the consequences of original sin—apart from those which, such as death and the bodily defects common to humanity, He voluntarily assumed to redeem us—and the Most Holy Virgin had to be exempt from them by the merits of her Son.

By nature, Jesus had the right to the incorruption of His body, to the resurrection, and to the ascension. Mary, having been preserved, by the merits of her Son, from original sin, had to receive in fact these three privileges, since the corruption of the body, death, and separation from heaven are nothing but consequences of original sin. Therefore, even supposing that the Apostles did not teach explicitly, regarding the Most Holy Virgin, anything more than the dogma of the “worthy Divine Maternity,” they would have taught implicitly all the others, and to this capital dogma the dogmas of the Immaculate Conception and of the Assumption owe their being definable. Whether this “implicitness” be called formal, as the terminology of our objector would have it, or virtual, as ours requires, in the end it matters not at all, provided that they are truly implicit. The Church can dogmatically define everything that is truly implicit in the deposit of revelation, if this “implicitness” is not so hidden that only a new revelation could uncover it.

313. SECOND OBSERVATION.—“Throughout the whole Old Testament it is certain that there was progress not only in formulas, but also in new concepts, for there was progress in new revelations. But after the Apostles, new revelations are no longer possible, and progress is only in formulas, ever clearer and more precise, of the same concepts that God revealed to the Apostles, and which they delivered to the Church.”

Answer.—Our objector mixes together and almost identifies two statements that are radically distinct: First: in the Old Testament there were advances of new revelations, and in the New, after the Apostles, there are none. Second: in the Old Testament there was progress of new dogmatic concepts, and in the New Testament, after the Apostles, neither is it possible nor does it occur.

Of those two assertions, the first is indubitable; but the second, far from being indubitable, is contrary to what Suárez rightly calls certain doctrine and the common sentiment of traditional Theology.

According to the doctrine of Saint Thomas, neither in the Old Testament nor in the New was there or is there progress as regards the substance, but only as regards the explanation. The reason is that all the dogmas revealed by God, both in the Old and in the New Testament, as well as all the dogmas that the Church has defined or will define, were already truly implicit in the two most general articles of faith. Some were implicit by the nature of the thing, such as all those that refer to the divine being. Others were implicit by the will of God, such as all those referring to the supernatural divine providence of God as rewarder. But, in one way or another, all of them, without exception, were and are truly implicit, and, therefore, everything that we call revelations of the Old and New Testament, down to the Apostles, or dogmatic definitions after the Apostles, agree on one thing: on being nothing other than an explanation of what was already implicit in the two most general articles of faith.

The difference, then, between the Old and the New Testament is not a difference or progress as to substance, but a difference in the degree of implicitness, and, consequently, in the means of explanation ⁴.

Because there are two different degrees of implicitness. One implicitness so profound and hidden that, although in itself it may be true implicitness, nevertheless, for human reason it is as if it were not, because neither reason nor human means suffice to explain or unfold it, and divine revelation is needed. Such is the implicitness with which the dogma of the Trinity is found in the dogma of the existence of supernatural God, or the dogma of the Incarnation in the dogma of God as rewarder. Those things which, although they are truly implicit in themselves, are not so for us, are called fundamental dogmas or articles of faith. That kind of implicitness was what God kept explaining more and more throughout the entire Old Testament; and therefore, although in the Old Testament there was no progress as to substance, but only as to explanation, it was progress of new articles or fundamental dogmas, and, consequently, progress of new revelations. This kind of explanation ended with Jesus Christ and His Apostles: “This explanation was completed through Christ” (ST. THOMAS).

On the other hand, there is another kind of implicitness, not so superficial that it requires only an explanation of names, nor yet so deep or hidden that it demands revelation, but rather one that requires only, and suffices, human reasoning to explain or develop it. Such is the implicitness with which the dogma of the two intellects and two wills of Christ is found in the dogma of the two perfect natures, or the dogma of the Immaculate Conception in the dogma of the divine motherhood.

These things, which, because they are truly implicit, are truly revealed, but which, because they possess an implicitness explicable by human reason, do not require a new revelation, constitute the implicitness of the New Testament after the Apostles. If that explanation is made by human reason alone, without divine assistance or authority, it is called Theology or theological progress; if it is made by human reason, with divine assistance or authority, as is done in dogmatic definition, it is called dogmatic progress; but dogmatic progress, not of fundamental dogmas or articles of faith, but of derived dogmas or simple truths of faith.

All this had been said with his customary profundity and conciseness by Saint Thomas in the following words: “Ad quintum dicendum quod aliquid quod in articulo continetur potest explicari dupliciter: uno modo, secundum quod unus articulus continetur quandoque in alio, vel duo in communi (let the reader note that this concerns the containment of articles within articles) sicut resurrectio mortuorum continetur quoddammodo in resurrectione Christi, et passio et incarnatio in hoc communi quod est mysterium redemptionis: et sic fides implicita explicatur in articulis fidei determinatis, et haec explicatio completa est per Christum (that is, by Christ and his Apostles), whence to his doctrine, as regards the essentials of faith, it is not lawful to add or to subtract, as is said in the last chapter of Revelation. But before the coming of Christ it was not complete (this concerns articles); hence even as regards the greater ones it grew according to the different times. (Up to this point, the dogmatic progress of articles within articles, or of the Old Testament; now comes the dogmatic progress of articles into consequences, or of the New Testament.) Alio modo, id quod in articulo continetur, non est articulus sed aliquid concomitans articulum: et quantum ad hoc potest fides quotidie explicari et per studium Sanctorum magis ac magis explicata est” ⁵ Words worthy of being engraved in indelible characters for all who study the extent of dogmatic progress. It is well known what Saint Thomas understands by that “concomitans articulum”, that is, “ea quae ex articulis consequuntur” ⁶.

Today in almost all manuals, every dogma of faith is already called an article of faith. Such nomenclature is not only improper, but it also contributes to many people later failing to understand Saint Thomas and our classical theologians and failing to form a true idea of the immense extent of dogmatic progress after the Apostles. Saint Thomas has always distinguished between dogmas-articles and dogmas-conclusions. Of the former there was growth throughout the Old Testament, but there is none now nor can there be after the Apostles. Of the latter, progress continues and will continue until the consummation of the ages, for the revealed deposit is of such fecundity that we shall not finish penetrating it completely until we see the divine essence. “But as for the second kind of explanation, one is not bound to know in such a way that all things contained in the articles concerning salvation are explained, because this can only be in the homeland where the full truth of the articles will be seen” ⁷.

In summary, the difference between the Old and New Testaments does not consist in whether or not there are new concepts, but in the kind of new concepts. In both Testaments there has been and is progress of new concepts. In the Old Testament there was progress of concept-articles, which require revelation. In the New there is progress of concept-consequences, for which assistance suffices in the use of the human means at our disposal: inclusive reasoning and the sense of faith. The divine existence acts in the definition.

314. THIRD OBSERVATION.—“For this reason Saint Thomas, when speaking of dogmatic progress in the Old Testament and of how all subsequent dogmas were contained in the earlier ones, does not use the word virtually, but with admirable depth and precision always says implicitly.”

Response.—In the first place, our objector falls unwittingly into a manifest contradiction. Previously he had told us, and it is true, that in the Old Testament there was progress of new concepts. And now he tells us that rightly Saint Thomas never calls that progress progress of virtuality, but rather of implicitness. If it was progress or containment of new concepts, it had to be of virtuality, since virtual and new concept are the same thing. The equivocation lies in believing that, if it was virtual, it could not be implicit, when precisely it was implicit-virtual.

Secondly, it is true that Saint Thomas uses the name implicit with depth and precision; but it is simply because in this matter, for Saint Thomas, implicit containment amounts to the same as virtual containment. Let our objector hear the holy Doctor in a parallel passage where he treats exactly the same question: "When many things are contained virtually in some one thing, they are said to be in it implicitly, just as conclusions are in principles" ⁸.

Read also our objector to the Holy Doctor when he deals with how the New Law was contained in the Old, which is the same as how the dogmas of the New Testament were contained in those of the Old, and you will see that the Holy Doctor says expressly that they were contained “virtually, as a tree is contained in its seed” ⁹.

Let our objector also read any great commentator on the Angelic Doctor, for example, Bañez, and he will see that where St. Thomas says implicitly, Bañez always translates virtually implicitly or simply virtually 48. And even with regard to the New Testament, which is more serious, he says the following: "It is proved secondly, because the Church has hitherto proposed or defined nothing for the faithful to believe that was not contained in the Sacred Scriptures or in the Apostolic traditions, either expressly or virtually contained, so that it might be drawn from them by an evident consequence" ¹⁰. There our objector has the implicitly translated very clearly by virtually, which is the same thing we have so often repeated. That is the true Thomistic doctrine.

Therefore, the word implicit, whether applied to the Old Testament or to the New, generally means the same as virtual, the same as new notions. But applied to the Old Testament, it is a virtual implicitness so profound that new revelations are needed to explain it. Whereas applied to the New Testament, it means a virtual implicitness that does not require new revelations to explain it, but rather suffices with divine assistance. This divine assistance, precisely because it is mere assistance and not revelation, necessarily requires the use of human means. And the human means most connatural to man for explaining or developing an intellectual deposit is reasoning or the path of new concepts within the same thing. “From one to another according to reason, which is not another according to reality.” "Diversity of reason does not vary anything on the part of the reality" ¹¹

315. FOURTH OBSERVATION.—"In my judgment, the dogmas are contained in the revealed deposit not in a virtual manner, as the genus contains its differences which are extrinsic to it, but in an implicit manner, as being contains all other notions, or as the Divinity contains all perfections 'simpliciter simplices' or pure ones, that is, in a formal and actual manner, not a virtual or potential one." Response.—We agree that no dogma can be in the revealed deposit in the manner that specific differences are in the genus, that is, in an extrinsic manner. Therefore, we also agree that, understanding by virtual the extrinsic virtual or non-implicit, as our objector always understands it, no dogma is in the deposit in a virtual manner. That extrinsic or non-implicit virtual cannot be a dogma, and in this the Salmanticenses saw very well, but neither can it be nor is it a true theological conclusion. Every true theological conclusion is truly implicit in the revealed deposit, because it is deduced by an inclusive path; and since every true theological conclusion is virtual, hence it follows that every true theological conclusion is at once implicit and virtual. The reason is that in theology, as in metaphysics or mathematics, the rational procedure is always analytical, as we say today, or intellectual, as the scholastics said. "Whence it is clear that the consideration of metaphysics or theology is maximally intellectual" ¹². Being implicit, then, is not opposed to being virtual, nor is being virtual opposed to being implicit. It is precisely virtual-implicit. That is true theology. Because it is virtual and not formal, it is reason or science and not simple understanding or faith. Because it is implicit, it is definable as a matter of faith. Hence the double character of every true theological conclusion: a) not being per se or formally of faith, and yet, b) being definable as a matter of faith. Vázquez did not understand the first well; Molina did not understand the second. The Thomists have always positioned themselves between Vázquez and Molina, affirming both the first and the second.

Regarding what our objector says about the manner in which successive concepts are contained in being or in the Divinity, we believe that our objector does not distinguish two manners of containment, very different for our human reason, namely: a) the manner in which such concepts are contained in the objective reality of the Divinity or of being; b) the manner in which they are contained, not in the reality of being or of the Divinity, but in the concept that we have of that reality.

In the divine reality are contained formally, and not only virtually, all the concepts that we deduce from it, such as wisdom, immutability, eternity, etc. God is not virtually wise or immutable or eternal, but He is so formally.

On the contrary, in the concept that we form of the Divinity, all those attributes deduced in the treatise De Deo uno are not formally contained but virtually, although with intrinsic or implicit virtuality. The proof is that such attributes require for our reason true and proper demonstration, and true and proper demonstration amounts to the same as true and proper virtuality. Whoever believed that, once the existence of God had been demonstrated in the second question of the Summa Theologica, the remaining questions that follow on the divine attributes are not true and proper conclusions, but conclusions improperly so called, that person does not know what theology or a conclusion is. Those questions that follow on the divine attributes are already formally contained in the reality of God, whose existence is demonstrated in the second question; but they are contained not formally, but virtually, in the abstract and fragmentary concept that our intellect has of that reality. And whoever, on the contrary, believed that because there is true and proper conclusion and true and proper virtuality, therefore there was no implicitness, that person confuses metaphysical or theological virtuality with physical virtuality and destroys all the absolute or transcendent value of theological reasoning.

The constitutive element, then, of the entire treatise on God, which is the same as saying of every theological treatise, is the virtual implicit. The reason is the one already stated: at the beginning of the Summa or of Theology we possess or see the concept of God, not the reality of God; and although in the reality of God everything is formal, in the concept that we possess of God it is present only in a virtual manner.

Now then (and here lies the root and key of everything): what we call divine revelation or the revealed deposit is not a revelation of the divine reality itself, as is the revelation or vision of the blessed in heaven, but rather it is only a revelation of a set of formulas or concepts about that same and unique divine reality, which remains for us unseen and obscure. When, therefore, it is asked how the dogmas are contained in the revealed deposit, one is not asking how they are contained in that divine reality of the deposit that we do not see, but rather how they are contained in the concepts or formulas that God revealed to us about that reality.

If it is a question, then, of the reality of the revealed deposit, all dogmas are formally contained in the deposit; but if it is a question, as it is, of our concept of reality, not all dogmas are contained formally, but many are contained virtually, although with an implicit or inclusive virtuality.

CURRENT INCLUSION, “IN ITSELF”; BUT POTENTIAL, “FOR US”.

Therefore, since in the conceptual order of our reason formal is the same as actual, and virtual the same as potential, not all dogmas are contained for us actu-implicite in the revealed deposit, as our objector says, but many are potentia-implicite, as the Thomistic school has always taught. Let us hear St. Thomas: "An article is an indivisible truth as regards what is actually explained in the article: but it is divisible (developable, explicable, definable) as regards those things which are contained potentially in the article, inasmuch as he who says one thing, in a certain way says many; and these are the things that precede the article and follow from it, and in this respect (the potential or consequential), the article of faith can be explained and divided"¹³. "And in this respect the faith can daily be explained and through the study of the Saints has been more and more explained"¹⁴.

Let us also add the following text of Gravina: "Could any addition be made and still be made to the Apostles' Creed by the Church?... Catholic conclusion: An addition to the Apostles' Creed was lawfully made by the Church and can be made... The increase or addition commonly called addition can be understood in two ways.

One way is when something is added to another thing, and this addition is outside the substance of the thing, whether it is a form contrary to the subject to which it is added, such as heat to water, or beyond the essence of that thing, such as whiteness to a body.

Altero modo, something is added to something else by way of contracting and determining that which was only in potency with respect to what is determined... and according to this manner conclusions are added to principles. The same must be said about the addition to the Creed... for just as food that was in potency becomes actually flesh and living, nevertheless the same in number (the living thing) perseveres unchanged, so it happens in the explanation of dogmas, as Vincent of Lérins says: "Let the religion of souls imitate the nature of bodies, which, although over the course of years they unfold and develop their numbers, yet remain the same as they were," and later: "The small limbs of infants, the large limbs of young men, are still the same." Since, with the same rule remaining intact in its order, through the addition and explanation of subsequent synods, that which lay hidden in potency is explained, and what was in potency regarding us with respect to faith becomes actually a matter of faith through declaration" ¹⁵

Our objector can see here how dogmatic progress extends also to what is contained for us in the deposit in a POTENTIAL or consequential manner, even if it is a truly implicit potential.

Here is an example given by Cajetan of actual inclusion "on the part of the thing," and potential or virtual inclusion "on our part": "Regarding the second point, it is said that the Father does not understand essence and fatherhood as two formal objects in themselves, but as one formally and many virtually... Not in such a way that in that supreme THING and formal reason fatherhood and essence are virtually; but in such a way that they are formally and really: but their distinction is virtual... Therefore Augustine and the Doctors speak of essence and relation as of things formally distinct. For this on the part of the thing is founded on the fact that they are formally distinct virtually, although not actually. On our part, however, because by objective reason among us they are distinguished actually" ¹⁶

As we have observed elsewhere, and will note again shortly (306, 517), the distinction between the dogmas that the Church can define and those of the primitive datum is exactly the same as that which exists between the Persons and the divine Essence, or between the divine Essence and its attributes, and among the attributes. It is a distinction "by way of the implicit and the explicit," and not "by way of the excluded and the excluding." This is why all our dogmas were contained in the revealed datum in an actual manner "in themselves," but potentially, not actually "for us." "Those things that are contained potentially in an article" (ST. THOMAS).

Here is our objector shown how dogmatic progress extends also to what is contained for us in the deposit in a potential or consequential manner, although truly implicitly potential (296).

316. FIFTH OBSERVATION.— "One must clearly distinguish between the implicit virtual and the connective virtual. The former can be defined as of divine faith; the latter, not." Reply.—If the connective virtual is not implicit, as it is not when the virtual is understood in the manner of Suárez, we agree that it must be distinguished well, and very well and very radically, from the implicit virtual. But if the connective virtual is implicit, as it is in every true theological conclusion, then there is no need to distinguish between the one and the other at all. Exactly the same thing is connective-theological virtual as implicit virtual.

Therefore, if our objector concedes that the virtual implicit is definable de fide, as indeed it is, he already concedes that every theological virtual is definable de fide. The rest is merely a matter of names. Let our objector note but one thing. A conclusion that absolutely or by divine power can fail is not a theological conclusion. That is evident. On the other hand, a conclusion that not even by divine power can fail is necessarily implicit, since only that which is of the essence or de intellectu of the thing cannot fail. Every true theological conclusion is, therefore, de intellectu of the revealed principles or the revealed deposit. No clearer implicitness can be given, unless we play with names.

Conversely, since the formally revealed constitutes, according to all, the proper or per se object of divine faith, and the virtually revealed the proper or per se object of Theology, every theologian must always distinguish well between formal and virtual, and therefore never confuse the implicit formal with the implicit virtual. Whoever does not distinguish them, as our objector sometimes does, confuses theology with faith, or confuses their respective and specific nomenclatures. The formal-implicit does not comprise nor can it comprise for our reason anything but conclusions of nominal distinction, such as the passage from the definition to the defined, from one correlative to another, from the whole to the part, or from the universal to the singular. Wherever there is conceptual explanation or a combination of multiple concepts within the same thing, it is no longer for our intellect formal or immediate, neither explicit nor implicit, but virtual or mediate (61, 64). Dogmatic progress is a progress of new concepts within the very objectivity of the revealed datum; it is the virtual implicit. It is not merely a progress of formulas, but a progress of meaning, of implicit meaning; it is a progress of explication of meaning: in the same sense.

317. SIXTH OBSERVATION.—“Therefore, the conclusions of virtual connection, such as, for example, the conclusion that “Christ has infused science,” cannot be defined as of divine faith by the Church, for it is not revealed truth.” Response.—We grant that the conclusion of Christ’s infused science is a true and proper theological conclusion. We grant, therefore, that it is not revealed, that is, that it is not formally or in se revealed; for when revealed is said without qualification, what is always understood or ought to be understood among technical theologians is what is formally revealed. The language of the true theologian is always formal, and it is well known that the true and proper theological conclusion is not for us formally revealed, but virtually. All this is clear. But whence does our objector draw that this conclusion cannot be defined as of divine faith by the Church?

If our objector says this because for him such a conclusion is doubtful or not demonstrable, since it cannot be deduced with absolute certainty from any revealed principle, then let it pass that it cannot be defined as of divine faith. We say let it pass because in that supposition this example is completely irrelevant; for what cannot be deduced with certainty from any revealed principle is not a true theological conclusion, but a theological opinion or system, and that is not the issue here ¹⁷.

On the other hand, if our objector believes that this is a true theological conclusion, then he has no choice but to admit that it is definable as of divine faith. Why? For a very simple reason, which we hope anyone familiar with the treatise De Incarnatione will understand. That conclusion concerning the infused science of Christ is deduced from the same revealed principle, and by the same logical process or by the same minor premise of reasoning as the other conclusions that Christ has a human intellect, and that He has a human will, and that He has human knowledge, and that He has all the virtues, etc., etc.

Let any reader turn to Saint Thomas or his commentators, and he will see that the process for deducing all these conclusions is one and the same, namely:

Major of faith: “Christ is not only man, but a perfect man.” This major or principle of faith means, according to the Church’s understanding, that Christ is perfect in all orders, natural and supernatural, and in all those perfections that do not involve imperfection or that do not oppose the end of the Incarnation.

Menores de razón: Thus it is that the human understanding is a perfection; thus it is that the human will is a perfection; thus it is that infused knowledge is a perfection; thus it is that acquired knowledge is a perfection; thus it is that all the virtues are perfections, etc., etc.

Theological conclusions: Therefore Christ has a human intellect; therefore He has a human will; therefore He has infused knowledge; therefore He has acquired knowledge; therefore He has all the virtues, etc.

There is no escape here. Either one denies (as some deny) one of those minor premises, and then its respective conclusion is not a true conclusion and we are outside the case, or one admits the minor premises as true, and then all those conclusions are of the same nature, for they have the same principle and the same process.

Now then: the conclusion that Christ has a human intellect and a human will is not only definable as of divine faith, but is already defined. Likewise, the conclusion that Christ has all the virtues is either already defined by ordinary magisterium or, at least, is, according to all, definable. Therefore, the conclusion that Christ has infused science or any other perfection is also definable as of divine faith ¹⁸

The confusion of many in this matter, as we have already repeated several times, comes from the fact that in the classic example of "Christus est homo: ergo risibilis", they understand that "homo" as "man" pure and simple, when it should be understood and is understood as "homo perfectus". If we had not been revealed that Christ is "man," none of those conclusions would be a true theological conclusion, since absolutely or theologically speaking, one can be man without any of those non-essential properties or perfections. But if we have been revealed, as indeed we have, that Christ is perfect man, all those conclusions are true and proper conclusions, because not even God Himself can make one be perfect and yet lack that perfection. But then they are also definable as of divine faith, since they are deduced by the implicit or inclusive way.

The conclusion, then, that "Christ has infused knowledge" is not only virtually connective, as our objector says, but also virtually connective-implicit. For this reason it is a true and proper theological conclusion, but for that very reason it is definable as a matter of divine faith. That conclusion is implicit, not in the man, but in the "perfect man." In this way all true theological conclusions must be implicit, and in this way they always are.

Then if this doctrine of the infused knowledge of Christ cannot yet be defined as a matter of faith, it is not because it is not definable matter of faith, but because, not yet being demonstrated with evidence, nor admitted by the common and certain consent of theologians, it is not yet for the Church what is rigorously called a theological conclusion.

Consequently, either this example means nothing, since it is not a true theological conclusion; or, if it is considered as a true theological conclusion, one must also admit that it can be defined as of divine faith. Therefore, this conclusion is deduced from the revealed deposit by exactly the same inclusive process, according to which other theological conclusions—already defined, moreover, as of faith—have been deduced concerning the perfections of Christ.

318. SEVENTH OBSERVATION.—“Otherwise one would have to say that the Church can define as of divine faith the entire Summa Theologica. That is manifestly inadmissible.”

Response.—Our objector exaggerates and tries to take things to extremes. From the fact that every rigorous theological conclusion is definable as of divine faith, it does not follow that the whole Summa Theologica is; just as from the fact that a house is made of marble it does not follow that everything in the house is made of marble, since in a marble house there may be silk curtains and wooden paintings with a multitude of ornaments of all kinds, which are in the house without forming an essential part of it. Thus, in the Summa Theologica not everything is rigorously theological, although everything is of theological utility or theological ornament.

Let us, therefore, first set aside all conclusions that have no necessary relation to the revealed deposit, because they belong exclusively to the physical sciences; e.g.: "Whether light is a body; Whether it is a quality; Whether semen comes from surplus food" ¹⁹

Let us dismiss, secondly, all conclusions which, although they are not physical but metaphysical, likewise have no necessary relation to the revealed deposit; e.g.: "Whether the nature of good consists in measure, species, and order; Whether hope is the same as desire or longing; Whether habit is a determinate species of quality" ²⁰

Thirdly, let us set aside all conclusions that perhaps in themselves have a certain relationship to the revealed deposit, and therefore in themselves will be true and rigorous conclusions; but which, for human reason in general, or at least for the common run of mortals, have only a doubtful or merely probable relationship, and which have been and will continue eternally to be disputed among the various schools. Such conclusions do not constitute rigorous theology, but rather the theological systems or opinions. The Summa Theologica is filled with these conclusions, as with those of the two preceding groups. "The Summa of St. Thomas is full of such questions." ²¹ Although innumerable examples of this class of conclusions could be given, it is better not to give them, since often what today seems to us doubtful or probable may within a century be certain. But as long as they are doubtful or merely probable, they are not rigorous conclusions, and, therefore, they are not relevant to the question of definability.

From the whole Summa Theologica there remain for us, then, only those conclusions that are rigorously theological, that is, that have for us an absolutely certain and evident connection with the revealed principles. If our objector speaks of these, we have no difficulty in answering him that all of them are definable as divine faith, and that this, far from being inadmissible or unheard of, is the common doctrine of all traditional theology.

This, which to our objector and to so many others today seems unheard of and inadmissible, seemed the clearest and most ordinary thing to St. Thomas with all his disciples, and to St. Bonaventure and Scotus with all theirs. The only discordant voice came in the seventeenth century with Molina. But does our objector know how this new and strange opinion of Molina was received inside and outside his own house? The Thomists, through the mouth of Navarrete, unleashed the following broadside against him: "This opinion contains many false things, which for now we do not wish to mark with censure, because it is not sufficiently clear what this author meant" ²² And the great Suárez, who knew well the tradition of the school, could not help but cross himself in stupefaction (it must be wondered at!, are the words of Suárez) and declare it contrary to the common sentiment of the theologians ²³ All this is authentic history, rather forgotten by certain modern manuals, and which we have related at length elsewhere (84).

Let us take from the Summa Theologica an example, and the most extreme example that can be given, namely, the real distinction between essence and existence. It is not possible to choose an example more to the liking of our objector, who will surely say that such a conclusion is not definable as of divine faith, and perhaps even say that it is not even a theological conclusion, but purely philosophical. Well, then: that conclusion, for every true Thomist, is not a purely philosophical conclusion, but truly and properly theological, and precisely because it is truly theological it is contained objectively in the revealed deposit, which is the only thing required for it to be definable as of faith. Let us hear a witness who is by no means suspect, the most wise Cardinal Billot. He says the following: "And thus it is also clear that the real distinction between essence and existence in creatures is established by theological reasoning... This, I say, is the simplest analysis of the revealed principle... Hence it follows that the unity of the act of existing (in Christ) is objectively contained according to the Angelic Doctor in the doctrine which asserts the union according to subsistence, which is of faith" ²⁴ Such are all the rigorous conclusions of the Summa Theologica: analysis of a revealed principle. For this reason they are objectively contained in revelation. For this reason they are definable as of faith. By this same path of analysis, that other truth, apparently purely philosophical, was defined by the Council of Vienne, namely, that the human soul is per se the substantial form of the body. By this same path, many, if not all, of the propositions of the Thomistic Syllabus of Pius X could be defined.

To show how broadly our great theologians conceived of dogmatic progress, even after the Apostles, the following paragraph from Báñez is worthy of being read and meditated upon: "It should be noted in the fifth place, that neither the Supreme Pontiff nor the whole Church can grant a new article or new dogma as to its substance, just as they cannot institute a new sacrament: indeed much less so, because faith is the principal foundation in the Church. Wherefore even Christ the Lord Himself, although He instituted new Sacraments, did not however institute or make a new article of faith as to its substance. For just as all the truths of the sciences are contained in this principle, everything is or is not: so there is no truth of faith which, as to its substance, is not contained in that principle set down by the Apostle in Hebrews 11: He who comes to God must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder of those who seek Him. From which it follows that when we ask whether the Supreme Pontiff can err in defining matters of faith, we understand matters of faith to be explained by his definition. What is explained is shown by us by example. If someone were to consult a moral philosopher about some moral doubt, and he were to respond according to moral principles, then truly that philosopher rather explains what was hidden, than he is himself the author of the truth. In this manner when the Supreme Pontiff defines something as being held in faith, he acts as one explaining a hidden truth, not as the author of the truth. And in this way is St. Thomas to be understood in the article where he says that a new edition of the Creed pertains to the authority of the Supreme Pontiff, namely as to a new explanation. From which it follows that heretics wrongly object against us (which is the same thing that our illustrious friend objects to our theory) that the Supreme Pontiff would make a new faith²⁵. "Because the Church has so far proposed or defined nothing for the faithful to believe that was not contained in the sacred Scriptures or apostolic traditions expressly or virtually contained, so that it could be drawn from them by an evident consequence"²⁶. "Therefore she could likewise now define as a matter of faith those truths in which the whole school of theologians agrees"²⁷. That is exactly what we have said and repeat. That very thing is what all the theologians before Molina and the vast majority of those after him have said, whose texts we will cite in due time (353-448).

319. EIGHTH OBSERVATION.—“But the Church,” says our objector, “cannot define as divine faith anything but ‘what is revealed.’” Response.—In that phrase “what is revealed” our objector is always confused, because that phrase is ambiguous. The Church can propose as divine faith not only “what is revealed,” but also “the explanation of what is revealed.” That is what traditional theology teaches and what the Vatican Council has already defined. Now, the true theological conclusion is nothing other than the intellectual explanation of what is revealed. Let us hear Saint Thomas: “To explain the articles of faith is possible... as regards those things which are contained in the articles themselves implicitly, which happens when a person knows those things which follow from the articles”²⁸.

From this arises that other fundamental affirmation of St. Thomas: "Fides quantum in se est, ad omnia quae fidem concomitantur vel sequuntur vel praecedunt, sufficienter inclinat" ²⁹. What traditional Theology understands by consequentia ad fidem, St. Thomas himself states there; but it will be well to add the authority of St. Bonaventure: "For the understanding of the aforesaid, it must be noted that the doctrine of the faith has certain antecedent things, certain consequent things, and certain principles or objects... Consequent things, such as corollary conclusions... or those which can be elicited from those articles, and which are bound to follow from those articles" ³⁰. Or as Scotus likewise says: "For the evidentness of which, it must be known that certain things belong so simply to the substance of the faith that all, even the simple, are bound to believe them explicitly... Other things similarly belong to the substance of the faith, but are to be believed explicitly only by the greater ones in the Church... Finally, other things pertain to the faith in such a way that neither the simple nor the greater ones in the Church are compelled to believe them explicitly: and of this sort are many conclusions necessarily included in the articles believed: for no one is bound to believe these explicitly before they are proposed by the Church as an object of faith... and these pertain to the order of conclusions virtually included in the articles of faith" ³¹. As we have already said, that the true theological conclusion is definable by divine faith is the common opinion of all theologians before Molina.

320. NINTH OBSERVATION.—“If every theological conclusion were definable as of divine faith, the Church would not take so long either to define dogmas or to ascertain whether a truth is definable or not.”

Answer.—It is not the same thing to be definable as of divine faith as to be proximately definable. For a truth to be definable, two conditions suffice: a) that it be explicitly or implicitly contained in the deposit of revelation, and we have already said that implicit-virtual containment is truly implicit containment; b) that this containment be knowable with certainty by human reason without new revelation.

But for it to be definable in the near future, a third condition is required, namely: c) that this continence be not only knowable, but that it be actually known with certainty.

Now then: since the Church does not have revelation, but only pure divine assistance, and divine assistance is nothing more than the infallible preservation from error in the use of human means, it follows that no truth is proximately definable while its containment in the deposit has not been known with certainty by a human means. The human means available to the Church for defining are the same, as Melchor Cano very well observes, as those available to the theologian for deducing, namely, the theological sources. "The Supreme Pontiff and the Councils, in settling matters of this kind, consult not only the Sacred Scriptures, but also the institutions of the Apostles, earlier Councils, the decrees of the Supreme Pontiffs, the writings of the ancient Fathers, the teachings of the scholastics, and sound philosophical reasoning. In short, the case under discussion is referred to those sources about which this book of ours is concerned. For they could not derive arguments from other sources for solving questions of faith or theology. But to seek new revelations and sacred scriptures is characteristic of the Jews, who even now await recent prophets" ³².

As a general canon, then, the following may be established: "Every truth is proximately definable as of divine faith whose explicit or implicit containment in the revealed deposit is established with theological certainty, that is, by means of one of the certain theological loci."

Of those theological sources, which are many, the Church is bound to none in particular. The Pope may define without relying on Sacred Scripture, relying only on tradition; he may likewise define without looking to primitive tradition, looking only to later tradition; he may, finally, define guided by present tradition, and in present tradition he is free to attend to the consent of the theologians or to that of the faithful of the present Church ³³.

Any of those criteria or theological sources, when it meets the true conditions, is a theologically certain criterion, and the Supreme Pontiff is not, as modernism would have it, a recording device of the Church’s social conscience, nor is he bound to this or that theological source, but rather he is the infallible judge and teacher of the doctrinal conscience of the whole Church and the supreme rule for the explanation and application of every theological source.

But although it is a theoretical truth, already defined by the Vatican Council, that the Supreme Pontiff is infallible of himself, not however by the consent of the Church, and that this infallibility and independence is understood not only with respect to the antecedent consent of the Church, but to all consent, whether antecedent, concomitant, or consequent, it is no less certain, historically and practically speaking, that the Church does not usually define a truth without there first existing the common consent of the theologians of the time, that is, such a consent that either it is universal or, at least, the few who hold the contrary are regarded either as insignificant, or as manifestly mistaken, or as blinded by school or party passions, as happened with the few theologians who still denied the Immaculate Conception or pontifical infallibility on the eve of their definition.

Thus, then, as a practical canon of proximate definability, the following may be established: "Every truth whose explicit or implicit containment in the deposit of revelation is affirmed as certain by the common consent of theologians is proximately definable as of divine faith."

Finally, since we admit, and believe that every theologian must admit with the traditional opinion, that implicit-virtual continence or a rigorous theological conclusion is true implicit continence, the previous canon becomes the following canon: "Every truly theological conclusion admitted as absolutely certain by the common consent of theologians is proximately definable as of divine faith." That is the truly Thomistic canon, which Báñez formulates thus: "Those truths in which the whole school of theologians agrees could now be defined as being of faith" ³⁴.

Whoever, then, wishes to have a true index of propositions that are proximate to being definable as of divine faith need not ask it of us, for he can easily form it himself. Let him first open Denzinger, and mark all the propositions already defined infallibly. Let him then open a true course or treatise on theology, and mark all the propositions that are truly theological and already admitted as absolutely certain by the common consent of theologians or by the common consent of all the faithful. The "last dispositio praevia" to definability. To form this common consent of theologians and of the faithful, that is, of the whole society of the Church, the "sense of faith" contributes as much as or more than reasoning, especially when it is a matter of dogma of a practical and affective character. This is why, as we have already observed (220), this sense of faith, from the moment it becomes general and becomes the common sentiment of bishops, theologians, and faithful, is for the Church a sufficient criterion of definability.

The purpose of this common and social consent of the Church is not to create a non-existent "implicitness" of the revealed datum, but to confirm it when it has already been discovered by speculative reasoning, or to discover it by way of affectivity when, existing from the beginning, it cannot be discerned with certainty by reasoning alone.

As we see, although it is true in theory that the Pope, in order to define a truth, does not necessarily depend on the consent of the Church, it is no less true that, in practice, he always or almost always counts on it. In this sense, we believe that Fr. Gardeil is right in affirming that the "social sense of the Church" or the "lived theology" is thus like the ultimate prior disposition to the definability of a dogma³⁵.

We have so often repeated the words "truly theological conclusions" because not all the conclusions found in theology courses are rigorously theological, but only those "from whose denial the denial of the premise of faith necessarily follows with absolute necessity". If the Church delays in defining such truths, it is for two reasons: first, because there is not always common consent of theologians regarding them, without which the Church never usually defines; second, because there are not always heretics who deny them or fervent pleas of the Christian people for them to be defined, which are the two occasional causes without at least one of which the Church is not accustomed to define.

321. TENTH OBSERVATION.—"But," insists our objector, "how can that be defined as of divine faith which is only connected or related to what is revealed? Because for a thing to be defined as of divine faith it is not enough that it be related to the deposit; it must be in or within the deposit.

The answer to this last objection, we believe, is the key to this entire question. Our objector focuses only on the fact that the conclusions are relations of other things to the deposit, when he ought to focus on the fact that they are also, and above all, relations of the deposit to other things. This latter, and only this latter, is the formal point of view from which such relations fall under the Church and Theology, not insofar as they are relations of other things to the deposit, but of the deposit to other things. They are, therefore, relations of the deposit, something belonging to the deposit itself. Sacred Theology does not study, nor can it study, other things distinct from dogma; it does not study, nor can it study, anything but dogma and its relations to other things. That is precisely what we call conclusions. They are relations of dogma itself, dogmatic relations. Our human reason would not know these relations or conclusions without the so-called minor premises of reason; but the minor premises do not create or invent these relations. They merely explain or discover them in the major premises of faith (245).

Thus, the Summa of Saint Thomas, insofar as it is rigorously theological, and all true Theology, is nothing other than an explanation of the implicit virtuality of the revealed deposit. If only God, in giving us the revealed deposit, had deigned to explain Himself further, we would have, instead of the deposit, the Summa of Saint Thomas. Therefore, the Gospel or revealed deposit is nothing other than the substance of the "Summa Theologica"; the Summa Theologica, insofar as it is rigorously Theological (318), is nothing more than the explained Gospel ³⁶

Of the four degrees or stages that constitute the whole of Catholic doctrine, namely: primitive datum, dogmas of faith, infallible truths, and theological conclusions ³⁷.

The first degree is the shrub, small still in development or size, but fruitful and pregnant with substance, with sap, with potential, with divine life. The other three degrees that sprout and emerge homogeneously from the first are the same shrub, the very same in terms of substance, but already grown and transformed into a gigantic tree with new branches, flowers, and fruits.

Two gardeners have contributed and will always contribute to preserving, cultivating, and developing that sacred shrub of the primitive deposit of faith—one human, the other divine: the theologian and the Church. Both, the theologian with his human and fallible reasoning and the Church with her infallible and divine authority, have an analogous mission; not the mission of adding, removing, or changing anything in the shrub, but rather of preserving and explaining it. In that sacred mission the theologian is a pope without authority or any divine assistance; the pope is a theologian with divine authority, a divinely assisted theologian.