La evolución homogénea del dogma católico

OBJECTIONS AGAINST DOGMATIC EVOLUTION IN GENERAL

299. FIRST OBSERVATION.—As the objections we are about to address were presented to us in the form of observations, we will transcribe them in that same form. Here is the first one:

“I understand by dogma of faith every truth formally or immediately revealed by God in divine Scripture or Tradition and proposed as such by the Church to all the faithful.”

Answer.—If our objector begins by not holding as a dogma of faith, or as definable of faith, anything but what is formally or immediately revealed, then he assumes the very point in dispute and precisely what he ought to prove.

For a thing to be definable as of divine faith, the Church has never required that it be formally or immediately revealed, but simply that it be revealed. Let us hear the Vatican Council: “Moreover, all those things are to be believed with divine and catholic faith which are contained in the word of God, written or handed down, and which are proposed by the Church, whether by a solemn judgment or by her ordinary and universal magisterium, as divinely revealed things to be believed ¹ As can be seen, not a word about its being formally or immediately revealed, but solely and simply that it be revealed.

If we pass from what the Church teaches to what traditional Theology teaches, we will find that, with the sole exception of Molina, all the great theologians before Suárez, Suárez himself and Lugo, and a multitude of theologians after Lugo and Suárez teach that for a thing to be definable as a dogma of faith by the Church, it suffices that it be mediately or virtually revealed. Let us content ourselves for now with quoting the following text from Suárez, which perfectly summarizes the theological tradition. It reads thus: "It must be said, thirdly, that the theological conclusion, which was previously contained only virtually in the revealed truths, once it is defined by the Church, is most properly and formally of faith... This assertion seems to me certain, and is held by the common consensus of theologians... Nor do I find any theologian contradicting this" ².

Our objector is free to hold an opinion contrary to what Suárez calls, and rightly so, the certain doctrine and common opinion of theologians. But let him not make the mistake of taking his own opinion as his starting point, much less of making it a necessary element in the very definition of dogma, even if certain compendiums of Theology, even Thomist ones, do so. In the definitions of theological concepts, such as the concept of dogma, no elements should enter except those that the Church teaches, or that are unanimously admitted by theologians: never those that are debatable, and much less those that go against the nearly common opinion among the great masters of Theology.

300. SECOND OBSERVATION.—"Likewise, I understand by theological conclusion, strictly and properly so called, every truth virtually or mediately revealed, that is, everything deduced from the revealed deposit as 'an effect from a cause' or as 'a property from an essence.' This is, I believe, the definition given by the Salmanticenses and Billuart."

Answer.—That definition of the theological conclusion is well given, and it is the traditional definition (42). But the divergence or the defect is not in the definition, but in the way of understanding it. The Salmanticenses, whom Billuart merely summarizes, understood the virtually revealed or theological conclusion in the manner of Suárez and Lugo, and thus understood, they did very well and were very logical in denying its definability as a matter of faith.

Indeed, from cause to effect, or from essence to property, one can reason or pass by two radically different paths, namely: a) by way of metaphysical-essential connection, which is a connection of identity or objective inclusion, and which not even God Himself can make fail; b) by way of natural, or purely physical, connection, which is a connection without identity or objective inclusion, and which, therefore, God can make fail whenever He pleases.

All the meaning, therefore, of that classic definition depends on how one takes the cause or essence, and how the effect or property, when it is a matter of passing by reasoning from one extreme to the other.

If to deduce as a conclusion an actual effect one takes as a principle or as the major premise the cause in a purely natural or physical sense, that is, the so-called real cause or in essendo, e.g., "it is fire, therefore it burns in fact," such a conclusion is not a theological conclusion, which demands absolute certainty, but a physical and fallible conclusion. Likewise, if to deduce as a conclusion an actual property one takes as a principle or major premise, not the integral or perfect essence, but the pure or bare essence, between which and the actual properties there exists only a natural connection, e.g., "he is a man, therefore he is actually capable of laughter," such a conclusion is not and cannot be a theological conclusion, but a physical conclusion (98, 107).

Now then, let the Salmanticenses be read carefully, and it will be seen that this is what they understand, with Suárez and Lugo, by theological conclusion or virtual revelation, although at times they mix in some concepts derived from the traditional Thomist idea. The same happens with quite a few modern compendiums^3.

By denying, then, that theological conclusion or virtual revelation is definable as of divine faith, such authors in reality deny only the definability of a thing that is neither a true theological conclusion nor true virtual revelation. On the other hand, by affirming that the formal-confused revealed is definable as of divine faith, they affirm the definability of true Theology, for they have placed within that formal-confused, without realizing it, all true, and proper, and unique Theology, which does not exist without an essential or absolute connection^[³ or objectively infallible, between the principle or major and the conclusion (82).

301. THIRD OBSERVATION.—“The Salmanticenses, in number 124 of the first disputation De Fide, cite St. Thomas and a great chorus of ancient Thomists against the definability by divine faith of the virtual revealed or theological conclusion.”

Answer. — Let our objector distinguish two questions that must always be distinguished in this matter.

The first is “whether what is virtually revealed or theological conclusions are per se matters of faith, that is, prescinding from the definition of the Church.” This is the true question that the Salmanticenses treat in the said numbers 124 to 127. To this first question, the Salmanticenses respond, and very well, in the negative; and they cite, and very well cited, Saint Thomas and that great chorus of Thomists of which our objector speaks to us. To whatever the Salmanticenses say in those numbers, we subscribe against Vega and Vázquez, and every Thomist will subscribe.

The second question is “whether the theological conclusion or the virtual revealed are definable as of divine faith by the Church, or, which is the same thing, whether they are formally of divine faith after being defined.” The Salmanticenses do not touch this question at all until numbers 143 and following, on the occasion of an objection. To this second question, the Salmanticenses also respond, it is true, negatively; because, having taken the virtual and the conclusion in the same sense as Suárez and Lugo, they had to respond that way. But in this second question, the Salmanticenses cite, nor will anyone cite, a single text of Saint Thomas or of any celebrated Thomist prior to the Suarezian confusion against the definability of faith of the true theological conclusion. On the contrary, texts of all of them can be cited in favor of that definability.

Anyone who reads the Salmanticenses on this question must note three things:

• First, that the Salmanticenses, far from already combating Molina’s opinion, as all earlier Thomists do, including John of St. Thomas, cite Molina, on the contrary, in their favor.

Second, that whenever they cite Suárez or Lugo in order to refute them, the citations or references are to the places where Suárez and Lugo speak of the physical-connective virtual, and not to the places where they speak of the confused formal or metaphysical-inclusive virtual.

Thirdly, that whenever they cite as an example of a theological conclusion the well-known "homo: ergo risibilis", not once do they fail to say "homo perfectus" instead of "homo".

All these, and several others that could be cited, are indications that the Salmanticenses understand by confused formal and by pure virtual the same thing as Suárez and Lugo, or, at least, that they have used the new nomenclature of Suárez and Lugo, without realizing the anti-Thomist contraband that these new names contained. In any case, whether the true mind of the Salmanticenses and Billuart was this or that is, for us, and ought to be for every Thomist, a point of secondary importance; since the mind of all the classical Thomists before the seventeenth century is evidently established, as it is, and that of very many others after it, whose clear and decisive texts the reader will find in the last chapter of this work.

302. FOURTH OBSERVATION.—"What is not known by divine revelation, but by reason, cannot be an article of faith. Now, the theological conclusion is known by reason, not by revelation."

Answer.—That the theological conclusion is not known by revelation? A Thomist should never say that. The formal medium by which every true theological conclusion is known is divine revelation, although the instrument, and nothing more than an instrument, which our theology needs, due to the weakness of our intellect, is the minor premise of reason. Let our objector hear what Saint Thomas set down at the head of his Summa Theologica in his first question and how the two foremost commentators commented on it:

“They are known by the light of divine revelation” ⁴ “They are knowable by divine light” ⁵ “The proper knowledge of this science is through revelation” ⁶ “The reason for knowing in theology is the light of divine revelation” ⁷ “The medium shining with divine light constitutes the theological knowable” ⁸ “The divine light revealing is the formal reason under which our theology [operates]” ⁹

Thus, both divine faith and sacred Theology have as their object what is truly revealed. With no other difference than that what is truly revealed, but revealed in itself, is known without the instrument or means of reasoning, by simple divine authority, and for that reason is called revealed without mediation or immediate. On the other hand, what is truly revealed, but revealed in another, cannot be known by us except through the instrument or means of reasoning, and for that reason we call it mediately revealed. The difference, as can be seen, is not between revelation and non-revelation, but between two different modes of true revelation, or two distinct means of knowing what is truly revealed.

Important Distinction.—Certain theologians, after the sixteenth century, do not seem to distinguish well between these three things: a) formal revelation; b) the formally revealed; c) the virtually revealed.

Both formal revelation (revelation in the active sense) and that which is formally revealed (revelation in the objective sense) are designated by St. Thomas and by his ancient commentators by the name of "divine revelation" (114, 215).

Of these three things mentioned, the first, that is, formal revelation or active revelation, is the formal motive or ratio sub qua of divine faith. The second, that is, what is formally revealed or objective revelation, is the material object of divine faith and, at the same time, the formal motive or ratio sub qua of theology. The third, that is, what is virtually revealed, is the material object of theology.

Indeed, we believe with divine faith what is formally revealed by formal revelation; and we know theologically what is virtually revealed by formal revelation. Now, what is believed or known is always the material element in every cognitive habit, and that by which it is believed or known is the formal element. “Every cognitive habit regards formally the medium through which something is known, and materially the object which is known through the medium” ¹⁰.

What is virtually revealed, or a theological conclusion, is therefore not known immediately by active revelation, the formal motive of divine faith; but it is known by or through objective revelation or the principles of faith, the formal motive of theology. But since, in turn, the principles of faith or objective revelation are known by active revelation, it follows that the theological conclusion is known proximately by the principles of faith or formally revealed truth, and mediately by formal or active revelation, the formal motive of divine faith. Hence the ancient theologians commonly said that the theological conclusion is immediately of theology, but mediately of divine faith (453).

The so-called “virtual revelation” is none other than the second of the three things mentioned, that is, the formally revealed, insofar as it contains within itself and through it is known the third of those things, that is, the virtually revealed or theological conclusion. Thus, then, of these four things, namely: a) formal revelation; b) formally revealed; c) virtual revelation; d) virtually revealed, the second and the third are really identical, when it is a matter of inclusive virtuality. It is the same to say that the virtually revealed or inclusive conclusion is known through virtual revelation as to say that it is known through the formally revealed. And since the formally revealed is nothing other than objective revelation, for that reason Saint Thomas and all the ancient theologians prior to the introduction of the physical-connective virtual, said more briefly, and with great truth, that the theological conclusion is known “by divine revelation” or “by the light of divine (objective) revelation.”

The double sense—active and objective—that the name "revelation" possesses, as well as the different meaning that the names "immediate" and "mediate" have in the systems of Saint Thomas and Scotus , which was further complicated by the introduction of Suárez's mediate or physical virtual , is what has contributed to a horrifying confusion of nomenclature in this question. And it is well known that almost whenever nomenclature becomes tangled, ideas end up becoming tangled as well.

303. FIFTH OBSERVATION.—"As you have told us so many times, the formal or specific object of divine faith is what is immediately revealed; and the formal or specific object of Theology is what is mediately revealed. Now, the formal or specific objects of the sciences or habits are unchangeable, just as species are, unless we admit transformism in dogma, as the modernists wish. The Church cannot, therefore, convert what is mediately revealed into what is immediately revealed. That, not even God Himself can do, as the Salmanticenses very well say. You dealt with this difficulty in an article, but you did not answer it directly, but rather with 'circumlocutions,' as I believe Fr. Matías pointed out to you in his Theological Bulletin."

Answer.—Here goes our direct reply and without "circumlocutions," since this is a very clear matter for anyone who has penetrated the Thomistic doctrine on the true nature of sacred Theology, which is to always use an inclusive procedure.

What is known by deductive reasoning is called mediate; what is known by simple authority is called immediate. But every Thomist knows that if reasoning is inclusive, as in the mathematical, metaphysical, and theological sciences, what we call mediate is only mediate with respect to us, but it is immediate in itself. Let us hear Saint Thomas: "Any proposition whose predicate is in the definition of the subject is immediate and self-evident as far as it is concerned" ¹¹ "For a proposition is self-evident for this reason, that the predicate is included in the definition of the subject" ¹²

Since, then, we are dealing with inclusive conclusions, as all truly theological ones are, that which so frightens our objector, namely that "the Church would convert the mediate into the immediate," is reduced to this other simple thing: "the Church would convert what is immediate in itself into immediate for us," which no one will deny the Church can do. And that is the only thing the Church does when it defines as dogmas of faith theological consequences, or, better said, theological inferences.

Another matter would be if it concerned the mediate or virtual non-inclusive, understood in the manner of Suárez and Lugo, in which in the minor premise the predicate is not really included in the subject, nor, therefore, is the conclusion really included in the revealed major premise. Then, neither can God Himself make that mediate pass into an immediate one, except through a new revelation. In this, the Salmanticenses are right.

What our objector adds about species or specific objects being unchangeable is true; but only in the case where the means of knowledge is not changed. If the means of knowledge is changed, what belonged to one habit passes ipso facto to also belonging to another, because what is formal or specific in cognitive habits (and cognitive habits are Theology and faith) is not the matter or reality of what is known, but the means of knowledge. "Every cognitive habit, formally indeed regards the medium through which something is known; materially, however, that which is known through the medium" ¹³ "The species of any thing is chiefly considered according to its formal aspect, not according to its matter or subject" ¹⁴

Now then: with the dogmatic definition of a theological conclusion by the Church, the means of knowing that conclusion changes for us. Before the definition we knew it only by revelation with reasoning, the formal means of Theology. After the definition we know it already by revelation without reasoning, that is, by revelation explained and proposed by the Church, the formal means of divine faith.

There are changes in the means of knowledge, and, therefore, a change in habits and in assent. But there is by no means any change of matter or of objective reality: nothing, therefore, of transformationism or modernism.

In summary: the Church does not convert, nor can it convert, the mediate non-inclusive into the immediate; but it can convert, and does convert, the mediate inclusive into the immediate, which is nothing more than converting the immediate in itself into the immediate for us (168).

We believe that with this our objector may perhaps accuse us of repetitions, unnecessary for his clear understanding, but not of our having failed to answer him well, categorically, and without "circumlocutions."

304. SIXTH OBSERVATION.—"Nothing is or can be of divine faith if it is not spoken by God. I do not believe that theological conclusions are what God said, but rather what we deduce from what was spoken by God. They are our deductions, not divine utterances."

Answer.—It is evident that nothing can be of divine faith unless it is truly spoken by God; but it is false, in the doctrine of St. Thomas and of traditional theology, that God has spoken only the principles and in no way the conclusions. Let us hear St. Thomas: "He who says one thing, in a certain sense says many things; and these are what precede the article and follow from it, and in this respect the article of faith can be explained and divided" ¹⁵.

If in that text St. Thomas uses, with his habitual precision, the word quodammodo, it is because there are two true modes of saying or of sayings: a) saying something, explaining it fully; b) saying something, but without explaining it fully. There are, therefore, two kinds of sayings of God: fully explained sayings and unexplained sayings, or implicit ones. The former are the articles or greater [truths] of faith: the latter, the theological conclusions. Let us hear St. Thomas again: "To explain the articles of faith can happen in two ways... In another way, with respect to those things which are contained in the articles themselves implicitly, which indeed happens when a person knows those things which follow from the articles" ¹⁶. "Because there are some things which are contained in the faith of the Church as conclusions are contained in principles" ¹⁷.

Thus, then, the First Truth, or God, finished speaking or revealing with the last of the Apostles; but He has not finished, nor will He finish, explaining what was said or revealed. Every definition of the Church is nothing other than an explanation that God gives of what He had already said with the Apostles. That is why Cardinal Cajetan graphically calls the Church "the minister of the object of faith... through which the First Truth proposes and explains itself and the other things to be believed" ¹⁸.

Thus, both the theologian with his undefined conclusions and the Church defining those conclusions give us nothing more than the explanation of what God has said implicitly.

ARE THE DEFINITIONS OF THE CHURCH “THE WORD OF GOD”?—

The difference lies in the fact that although theological conclusions, if they are inclusive, are truly what God has said, because they are included in what God said, they are not, however, until the Church defines them, anything other than what God has said explained by man. On the other hand, those same conclusions, after being defined, are already what God has said explained by God, although for that explanation God makes use of the ministry of the Church.

Therefore the theologian, however wise and holy he may be, and however clear his deduction or conclusion may be, can say no more than it seemed to me. In contrast, the Church, in every infallible definition—and infallibility extends to theological conclusions and not only to principles—can say, and does say without any metaphor: It seemed to the Holy Spirit.

ARE THE DEFINITIONS OF THE CHURCH “THE WORD OF GOD”?—
Here one clearly sees the answer to be given to the question of whether the definitions of the Church are or are not the word of God: the word of God.

The name “word,” like the name “writing,” can be taken in two senses: objective or material, and subjective or formal. One thing is “what is written” (objective writing), and another thing is “the writing” (formal or subjective writing); just as one thing is “what is said” (objective word), and another is “the diction” (subjective word). Peter may write his own ideas or write what John said. In the first case, what is written and the writing are Peter’s; in the second, the writing is Peter’s, but what is written is John’s. In the same way, if Peter says his own ideas, both what is said and the diction are Peter’s: but if he says or repeats what John said, the diction (subjective word) is Peter’s, but what is said (objective word) is John’s.

In Sacred Scripture, the inspired authors, both what is said or written and the diction or writing, are from God. It is, therefore, the word of God, both objectively and subjectively. In the definitions of the Church, what is said is from God, since the Church does nothing but repeat, more explicitly, what was already implicitly said by God; but the diction is not from God: for God does not move it to say it, as in inspiration, but simply assists it so that it, and it alone, says it. The definitions of the Church are, therefore, the word of God objectively, but not subjectively: for this reason they are not Sacred Scripture.

When, therefore, numerous and classical ancient theologians deny that the definitions of the Church are divine word, let the reader note, as he reads them, and he will clearly see two things: a) that they say this not only of infallible definitions, but also of definitions of divine faith, which no one will deny are God's objective word; b) that they take the phrase "divine word" in the sense of "Sacred Scripture" or "inspired word," and in that sense every theologian must deny that the definitions of the Church, even those of faith, are "the word of God."

305. SEVENTH OBSERVATION.—“With the Apostles the revealed deposit was closed and complete. This is the common doctrine of theologians, which has already been consecrated by the Church in the twenty-first proposition of the anti-modernist Syllabus of Pius X.”

Answer.—With the Apostles, the deposit was closed and complete as regards Revelation; but not closed nor complete, but open and complendus through the divine magisterium of the Church, as regards the explanation of the truths already revealed. That dogmatic or divine explanation of the Church extends, as we have already seen through Saint Thomas, not only to the principles of the deposit, but also to the conclusions (those things which follow from the articles), without thereby ceasing to be an explanation of what was revealed: explanation of the faith.

Let our objector not confuse, then, these two propositions, which are radically distinct: first, that with the Apostles the Catholic Revelation was closed and completed; second, that with the Apostles the divine explanation of the Catholic Revelation was closed and completed. The first proposition is true, and it is the one taught by the unanimous consent of theologians and consecrated by the Syllabus of Pius X. The second is false.

306. EIGHTH OBSERVATION.—“For there to be a theological conclusion, strict or properly so-called, I agree that it is not necessary for the conclusion to express a new objectivity; but it is necessary, as you yourself confess, that it express a new concept and not merely a new formula.

Now then: a new concept is the same as a new meaning or a new dogma. Therefore, if the Church were to give us as a matter of divine faith any properly so-called theological conclusion, we would have new dogmas. That is inadmissible. The Church cannot give us new dogmas, although she can and does give us new formulas of the same and ancient dogmas.

Answer.—There are three kinds of new concepts. First, new concepts, but ones that are not completely new, since they are deduced or derived from the old ones, and for this reason they are called derived or conforming concepts. Second, concepts that are not only new, but are completely new, since they do not come from the old ones, although they are not incompatible with them either, and they are called diverse concepts. Third, concepts that are not only completely new, since they do not come from the old ones, but are also incompatible with them, and for this reason they are called contrary or opposed concepts.

We have, then, three kinds of new concepts: a) derived or conforming; b) diverse; c) contrary or opposed.

An example of the first kind is absolute immutability and eternity, or spirituality and immortality, or immateriality and knowability, and, in a word, all those concepts that, like the attributes in God, are distinguished only per modum impliciti et expliciti (in the manner of the implicit and the explicit). An example of the second kind is the concepts of quantity and quality, or of color and flavor. An example of the third kind is the concepts of spiritual and material, of uncreated and contingent, of white and black.

Derived or conforming concepts emerge from one another by inclusive reasoning; diverse or opposite concepts do not emerge nor can they emerge from one another, since what is not within cannot emerge.

When something new is acquired, but it does not proceed from within what was already possessed, it is called in Thomistic doctrine new quoad substantiam; when something new is acquired, but it proceeds entirely from within what was already possessed, it is called new quoad explicationem.

The concepts, then, that are diverse or contrary are new not only with respect to their explanation [quoad explicationem], but also with respect to their substance [quoad substantiam]; derived concepts are new with respect to their explanation [quoad explicationem], but not with respect to their substance [quoad substantiam].

With this, it is easy to perceive clearly where the weakness of the objection lies.

When our illustrious objector, along with so many modern authors, objects that if the Church could define as a matter of faith the inclusive theological conclusions, then we would have new concepts, new senses, new dogmas, a simple distinction suffices in any of the following three ways:

First distinction: new, that is, completely new, I deny; new, but not completely new, I grant.

Second distinction: new, that is, contrary or diverse, I deny; new, but not contrary nor diverse, but derived entirely from the old, I grant.

Third distinction: new, that is, new as to substance, I deny; new, that is, new as to explanation, I grant. These three ways of distinguishing express exactly the same thing.

WHAT IS THE EVOLUTION OF THE DOGMA CONDEMNED BY THE CHUR-

SIA?—What the Church condemns, then, is not the evolution of dogma in the same sense, which is the homogeneous evolution, but the evolution of dogma in a diverse sense, and, therefore, much more so in a contrary sense, which is every transformist evolution. "I utterly reject the heretical invention of the evolution of dogmas, passing from one to another sense, diverse from that which the Church previously held"¹⁹. The evolution of dogma in the same sense, far from being condemned, is taught by the Church: "May it grow, therefore... but in the same sense" (Vatican Council). Or as St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure had already said: "There is a twofold addition: either something that is contrary or diverse, and this is erroneous or presumptuous; or that which is contained implicitly, by way of explanation, and this is praiseworthy"²⁰. "There is an addition in which what is added is contrary: and one in which what is added is diverse: and one in which it is consonant. The first addition is of error: the second, of presumption: the third, of faithful instruction, because what is implicit, it makes explicit"²¹. What is meant by implicit, St. Thomas himself tells us: "When many things are contained virtually in one, they are said to be in it implicitly, as conclusions in principles"^{22 23}. "A diversity of reason does not vary anything on the part of the thing"²⁴. The so-called new dogmas, therefore, as long as they are not really, but only conceptually, distinct from the primitive dogmas, do not in any way alter the primitive or revealed datum. It is a conceptual or subjective novelty: not a real one. It is novelty in a certain respect: not substantial novelty. The mode is new, a new aspect: the objectivity, which is what is substantial, is not new, but the same. That is why Lirinensis said very well: "So that when you say newly, you do not say new things"²⁵. "From one to another according to reason, which is not another according to the thing"²⁶. That is what happens in every conceptual conclusion, in every rigorously theological conclusion.

When an ancient tree sprouts a new branch, the branch is new, but not completely new nor new as to its substance; because that branch springs from the same substance or sap that the tree already possessed. The analogy of the tree with the revealed deposit is not complete, because in the tree the sap is formed with elements that come from outside. If the sap of the tree were formed exclusively from the very substance of the tree, without the intussusception of any foreign element, then the analogy of the development of dogma with the development of the tree would be more perfect (223). Thus are the new dogmas defined by way of implicit virtuality: new branches of the ancient tree of the revealed deposit.

Therefore we said elsewhere (180), and we will repeat again now, that dogmatic progress after the Apostles is neither purely subjective nor purely objective, but subjective-objective. Speaking in strictly Scholastic terms, it is formally or "simpliciter" subjective, but "secundum quid" objective.

It is "simpliciter" subjective because the distinction and, therefore, the novelty of that progress are not in the object itself or independently of the subject, but are made by the subject, as happens in every virtual or conceptual distinction.

It is objectively "secundum quid" because the foundation of that distinction and, therefore, of that newness is not solely in the subject, as happens in a purely logical distinction or one of mere formulas, but rather it is in the object itself, that is, in the fecundity and richness of objective aspects, already implicitly contained from the beginning in the object itself or in the primitive deposit.

Therefore, when certain overly meticulous theologians do not dare to say that the deposit itself grows and take refuge in the sacred phrase that what grows is "our" explanation of the deposit, they fail to notice that what they call "our explanation of the deposit," by being "ours," does not cease to be "of the deposit," and since this new or greater explanation, when made by the Church, comes to be incorporated into the deposit itself and to form an integral part of it, it is just the same to say that the explanation of the deposit grows as to say that the deposit itself grows with regard to the explanation (186).

One thing, then, is that the deposit grows in itself, that is, in its real objectivity, and another thing is that the deposit itself grows, not in its objectivity, but in its greater explanation. Through the definitions of the Church, the deposit does not grow in itself, but the deposit itself grows as its explanation grows and that new or greater explanation comes to form an integral part of it. Progress of explanation, but progress of the revealed deposit itself (173).

307. NINTH OBSERVATION.—“John of Saint Thomas says expressly and repeats several times that nothing can be defined as of divine faith by the Church unless it is immediately revealed.”

Answer.—In the place to which our objector alludes (De Sacra Theologia, d. 2, a. 4), John of Saint Thomas says expressly and clearly five things:

1.º That the question of whether the true theological conclusion is or is not of divine faith cannot be answered except by distinguishing between before and after the definition of the Church ²⁷ 2.º That before the definition of the Church the true theological conclusion does not belong to faith immediately, but mediately, and therefore belongs of itself (per se) to theological science. This is, he adds, the most common opinion of the theologians against Vázquez, and John of St. Thomas adheres to it ²⁸

3rd. That after the definition of the Church that same conclusion becomes a matter of divine faith and a true principle of theology. This is, he says, the opinion commonly followed by the Thomists against Molina²⁹

4th. That although such true conclusions may be known before the definition by reasoning alone, nevertheless, the Church does not define them as matters of faith insofar as they are known precisely by reasoning, but insofar as they are intended, although in a hidden manner, by the Holy Spirit. To know or discover that hidden intention of the Holy Spirit, the Church has divine assistance³⁰

5th. If we call immediately revealed everything intended by the Holy Spirit, it follows that nothing can be defined as of divine faith by the Church unless it has been immediately revealed, at least in a hidden or implicit manner³¹

In these five assertions is faithfully condensed everything John of Saint Thomas says. Now then: does our objector admit those five assertions, and especially the first three, and very particularly the third, of which John of Saint Thomas says: The Thomists commonly follow this opinion? If he admits them, we agree on everything substantial, and only an imprecision of nomenclature remains regarding the names of immediate and mediate; an imprecision that dates from Suárez, and from which some later Thomists, among them John of Saint Thomas, are not entirely free.

That imprecision or vagueness of nomenclature is found in the fifth proposition, which is the only one to which our objector seems to have paid attention. There John of St. Thomas takes the word immediate as synonymous with intended by the Holy Spirit. Taken in this sense, it is clear that nothing can be defined as of divine faith without being immediately revealed, that is, without being intended by the Holy Spirit. Taken in this way, the word immediate would give no meaning to the question disputed between the Thomists and Vázquez on the one hand, and between the Thomists and Molina on the other, since all without distinction admit that nothing can be defined as of divine faith without being truly revealed, that is, without being truly intended by the Holy Spirit. But true revelation or what is truly intended by the Holy Spirit has always been divided into two members: a) revealed or intended in itself; b) revealed or intended in another. The first is called, for our reason, revealed immediate or formal, never mediate or virtual; the second is called revealed mediate or virtual, never immediate or formal. The first is revealed not only in reality, but also in itself; the second is, for our reason, revealed in reality, but not in itself. This precisely constitutes the specific difference between faith and our theology.

That small imprecision or vagueness of calling everything revealed or intended by the Holy Spirit immediate has led John of Saint Thomas into a genuine contradiction in nomenclature, for he ends up calling—and rightly so—virtual implicit and revealed IN RE what he had earlier ambiguously called revealed IMMEDIATE ³². This is precisely what Saint Thomas calls immediate in itself, but mediate with respect to us.

That is the true name of the true theological conclusion: virtual implicit or revealed in re. Thus are all true theological conclusions. Virtual, because to know them or explain them or deduce them we need true reasoning, and we cannot know them without reasoning. Implicit, because the reasoning is one of real identity or intellectual inclusion.

Thus, then, and setting aside ambiguous terminologies, the doctrine of John of Saint Thomas, which is that which “the Thomists commonly follow,” is a middle doctrine between the extreme opinions of Vázquez and Molina, and it comprises these two parts: a) the opinion of Vázquez is false, namely, that the true conclusion or true mediate or virtual revealed truth is de fide divina before the definition of the Church; b) the opinion of Molina is false, namely, that the true theological conclusion is not de fide divina after the definition of the Church.

Anyone who wishes to see with perfect clarity that this is the true meaning of John of Saint Thomas should turn to the treatise De fide, where John of Saint Thomas, making express allusion to that very fourth article cited by our objector, says the following:

“From what has been said it is inferred that virtual revelation, or mediate revelation, or revelation deduced by way of reasoning, such as is found in theology, is specifically distinct from immediate revelation, which is had from the testimony of the one speaking, and which attains that which is to be believed by faith, as we have taught more fully in the first part, q. 1, d. 2, article four, where we rejected two extreme opinions: that of Vázquez, who holds that a conclusion deduced from the premises of faith is so certain for one who knows the reasoning as is a proposition defined by the Church; and that of Molina, who holds that even if the definition of the Church should supervene upon some [proposition],”

However, although John of Saint Thomas clearly defends with all Thomists against Molina the definability of true and proper theological conclusions, he has a small weak point. This consists in not indicating any objective or ante factum criterion for discerning which ones are definable and which are not. Definable, he says, are all those conclusions that were intended, albeit hiddenly, by the Holy Spirit. And all those that the Church, with divine assistance, defines were intended hiddenly by the Holy Spirit. Which is equivalent to saying: the defined are definable. This weakness of John of Saint Thomas was already noted by the learned Father Gardeil in his fine work The Revealed Given, p. 173. What we need and what the Church herself needs is an objective criterion of definability, for the Church does not enjoy revelation, but only pure assistance. That criterion, according to Saint Thomas, is the intellectually explanatory or implicit character that every true theological conclusion has with respect to the revealed major premise. The minor is nothing but an instrument of explanation. "To a proposition that previously was not of faith, it would not make it of faith, but the Holy Spirit assists the Church lest it err, not however to make of faith those things that previously were not of faith. Which opinions can be seen as impugned at the cited place"³³.

Any student of theology knows that Molina and Vázquez, whom John of Saint Thomas combats, speak of the true and proper mediate or virtual (409, 475).

308. TENTH OBSERVATION.—“The 'starting point' of Theology or, as it is commonly said, the 'principles of Theology' is or are the 'revealed'. Therefore, if a truth is truly revealed, it is not truly a conclusion or progress, but purely a starting point or principle. And vice versa, if a truth is truly a conclusion, it cannot be something truly revealed, for then it would be a principle of Theology and not a conclusion.”

Answer.—The starting point or first principles of Theology is not revelation taken bare, as our objector says, but what is revealed immediately or formally or in itself, or better still, what is revealed explicitly (37).

But in what is explicitly revealed there is much content or implicit revelation, and that implicit revelation is what constitutes progress and conclusion. If that implicitness is only of name or formula, that is, an implicitness so shallow or superficial that to explain or unfold it there is no need to employ reasoning of one's own or of different concepts, but mere explanation of names, then the progress or conclusion is also improper and there is not yet true virtual or mediate [revelation]. That is what is called formal implicit or immediate implicit. Such is the implicitness between the defined and its definition, between correlatives, between the whole and its parts, and between the unconditioned universal and its particulars.

On the other hand, if it is an implicitness so recondite or profound that to explain or unfold it requires a combination of concepts and not merely of names, and therefore true and proper reasoning, then the progress and the conclusion, without ceasing to be a true explanation of the implicit and, consequently, without ceasing to be an explanation of what is truly revealed, are already a true and rigorous progress of concepts or ideas, and not of formulas alone; they are already a true and proper conclusion and not a principle: such is true and proper and rigorous Theology (33).

When the Church, which has divine authority not only to propose what is revealed, but also to explain everything that is implicit in what is revealed, defines as of divine faith that conclusion, then what was a conclusion becomes a principle of Sacred Theology: what was not formally a matter of faith, but of theology, becomes formally a matter of faith.

In the human habits of simple intelligence and science, what is science can never become simple intelligence; for in human matters we have no means of knowing without reasoning or immediately what previously we could not know except by reasoning or mediately. But in the habits that deal with the supernatural or divine or revealed, as do divine faith and Sacred Theology, we have a means of knowing without reasoning or by divine authority the very thing that previously we did not know nor could know except by reasoning. Hence it is that we have a means of converting conclusions into principles or Theology into divine faith. That means is divine authority or the dogmatic definition of the Church, which presupposes reasoning as an instrument or as a prior condition, but which is not formally founded on reasoning, but on divine assistance. Therefore John of Saint Thomas profoundly says that Theology has something proper or exclusive that the other sciences do not have, and it consists in this: that its conclusions can come to be converted into principles. "And therefore it is special to theology that what at one time are conclusions can become principles" ³⁴

In parentheses, our objector has there a new proof that John of Saint Thomas, when he defends the definability by divine faith of the theological conclusion, speaks of true and proper conclusions. Improper conclusions can become and are principles not only in Theology, but in all sciences. That would not be peculiar to Theology.

309. ELEVENTH OBSERVATION.—“For this very reason, the generality of Thomists maintain, against Contenson, that Theology is not formally supernatural, but only radically so.”

Answer.—We also hold, with the majority of Thomists, against Contenson, that Theology is not a formally supernatural habit, but only radically. But in Thomistic doctrine radically means the same as objectively or with respect to the thing known; just as formally means with respect to the mode of knowledge. Theological conclusions are, therefore, objectively supernatural or revealed, although modally natural or acquired. Now, since it is the mode or means of knowing, and not the thing known, that formally specifies cognitive habits, hence it is that the habit of Theology is formally natural or acquired, despite being objectively supernatural³⁵ The difference, then, between the major premises of faith or the habit of faith and theological conclusions or the habit of Theology is not a difference in the objectivity known, but in the mode of knowing it. Let us hear John of St. Thomas:

"To the arguments from the beginning, it is answered: to the first, that the object of theology is something supernatural, yet disposed in a natural manner, and penetrated or inferred, and therefore it belongs to a natural and acquired habit... And so, although it treats and infers many supernatural things about God, nevertheless it attains them under a natural and inferential mode through one's own industry and study... Whence, when it is said that the means of proving is supernatural, namely the truths of faith, I distinguish: as connected and penetrated in a natural manner and by acquired study, I concede; as standing precisely under supernatural light, I deny. Moreover, for the rationale of supernatural light, any dependence whatsoever does not suffice, but it is required that the very mode of illumination be supernatural, and not disposed, acquired, and penetrated in a natural manner... and from this we seek the formal reason"³⁶.

Our objector should note that entire paragraph of John of Saint Thomas and with how much insistence he repeats that the difference between the objects of faith and of Theology is one of mode of knowledge and not of known objectivity. Above all, let him note that profound and masterly definition of the object of Theology, that is, of the theological conclusion: "The object of theology is something supernatural, yet arranged in a natural mode." The conclusion or thing known is supernatural or revealed; the mode of deducing or knowing it is natural or scientific or acquired.

310. THEOLOGICAL EQUATIONS.—Many modern manuals, and with them our objector, imagine a distinction of objectivity where there is only a distinction of modality. Between faith and theology there is no objective-real distinction; both contain the same thing, but in a different mode or degree of explanation. The one is nothing other than a greater explanation or penetration of the other.

The idea that these modern manuals give, and which our objector seems to hold, regarding the formal objects of divine faith, of Sacred Theology, and of purely human sciences could be expressed in the following formulas or equations:

Divine faith = revealed. Sacred Theology = not revealed. Human sciences = not revealed.

The third of those equations is evidently correct. But in the first two there are, in our judgment, two fundamental deficiencies.

The first deficiency is found in the first formula concerning divine faith, and it consists in the fact that in that formula the "proposal and explanation by the Church" does not appear at all. Our objector will say that this matter of the Church is an accidental condition for divine faith. We will answer that, according to St. Thomas and the Thomistic school, it is an accidental condition for divine faith in itself, but it is an essential or formal condition for our divine faith, that is, for the faith of those who do not receive revelation immediately from God, like the angels, patriarchs, and apostles, but mediately (146). He will also say that the Church is required for Catholic faith, but not for divine faith. We will answer that this distinction between Catholic faith and divine faith is or can be good when it concerns private revelations; but when, without any private revelation, it concerns public or Catholic revelation, such as the revealed deposit, there is no divine faith that is not Catholic faith, that is, there is no divine faith without proposal or explanation by the Church. The contrary is precisely the doctrine of Vázquez ³⁷

The second deficiency, and an even more serious one, lies in the second formula or equation, concerning Sacred Theology. This deficiency consists in the fact that, since there neither are, nor can be, for those three formulas anything but two generic objects, namely, the revealed and the non-revealed, Sacred Theology is placed in the company of purely human sciences, as if they were two members or subdivisions of the same trunk, which is what is non-revealed, when Saint Thomas and the whole tradition have always placed it alongside faith as two members or subdivisions of what is revealed (323-325).

If Sacred Theology had as its object or as its conclusions that which is not revealed, as the profane sciences do, then such Theology would have nothing of sacred but the name, for in reality it would be as profane and as foreign to the supernatural life as any of the purely human or natural sciences.

It will be said that although Sacred Theology may have as its object or as its conclusions what is non-revealed, it has as its origin what is revealed, unlike the profane sciences. But that response saves nothing. What gives value to a thing is not its origin, but its being, and the origin has no value except insofar as it can influence some distinction in the being. The nature of the sight miraculously received from Jesus Christ by the man born blind in no way differs from the sight of other men, for although its origin was distinct or supernatural, its being is the same or natural. Hence such sight was completely natural as to its substance and only supernatural as to its mode. On the contrary, Sacred Theology is and must be the very opposite: that is, supernatural as to its object or material, and only natural as to its mode. Recall the text of John of Saint Thomas: "The object of theology is something supernatural, yet disposed in a natural manner" (309) ³⁸

311. Thus, in our judgment, the formulas or equations of divine faith, of Sacred Theology, and of the profane sciences are the following:

DIVINE FAITH... = revealed and explained by the Church. SACRED THEOLOGY = revealed, explained by reason.

SECULAR SCIENCES = not revealed, explained by reason. In these three formulas, three things of supreme and transcendental importance stand out at first glance: a) that between Sacred Theology and the secular sciences there is a difference regarding the substance (revealed and not revealed) and they agree only regarding the mode (explanation by way of human reasoning in both); b) that, on the contrary, between Theology and faith, the substance is the same (what is revealed in both), and the difference lies only in the mode (by way of divine authority or of the Church in faith, and by way of human reasoning in Theology); c) the possibility of the passage or conversion of Theology into divine faith, merely by changing the mode or means or way of knowledge; that is, merely by the Church proposing or explaining to us with divine authority or assistance that same thing that the theologian proposed and explained to us by way of human reasoning. Such is, in our judgment, the true Thomistic doctrine.