La evolución homogénea del dogma católico

278. MEANING OF THE QUESTION.—In our previous section we tried to show that every dogmatic fact was definable by divine faith, and not only by the so-called ecclesiastical faith. Since the canonization of the saints is but a particular case of dogmatic fact, it did not require a separate study, for it sufficed to apply to it the doctrine set forth in that section. We shall nevertheless devote a separate study to it in order to deal with the mind of St. Thomas, who expressly treated this question of canonization.

First of all, one thing is the power of canonizing and quite another is the infallibility in canonizing. That the Church has the power of canonizing is a truth of Catholic faith, and its denial would be heresy. "In this question it must be assumed as certain de fide that the Pontiff and the Church have the power of canonizing Saints. For it is quite different for the Church to have the power of canonizing Saints, and for the Church not to be able to err in the very act of canonizing"¹. "It is heretical to deny the authority in the Church and in the Pontiff for canonizing Saints"².

Secondly, one thing is canonization and another is beatification. Canonization is a definitive judgment of the Church concerning the sanctity and eternal glory of the one canonized, and it also involves a precept to render him cult. In contrast, beatification is a non-definitive judgment, being reformable, and it carries not a precept but permission to render cult to the one beatified. Since without a definitive judgment there can be no infallibility, almost all theologians agree that the Church is not infallible in beatification, although it would be rash to affirm that she has in fact erred in this or that beatification. "Quamvis ex hoc inferri possit, temeritatis aut gravioris theologicae censurae nota esse afficiendum, qui auderet asserere Romanum Pontificem in hac vel illa formali Beatificatione errasse..., concludi tamen certo non potest vel ipsum iudicium esse infallibile aut ad fidem pertinere; cum semper sit permittens, nunquam praecipiens, et ad finem utique conducat, sed non sit extremum"³.

Thirdly, canonization is one thing, and the miracles, private revelations, apparitions, historical facts, or relics of the canonized saint are another. When the Church approves the miracles of a saint in the process of his canonization, or inserts them into the lessons of the breviary, or institutes a special feast to honor the apparition of some saint, such as the feasts of the apparition of Lourdes, the apparition of Saint Michael the Archangel, the translation of the House of Loreto, etc., etc., or approves the private revelations of some saint, such as those of Saint Bridget, or the authenticity or cult of his relics, it is a rather common opinion that such miracles, apparitions, revelations, historical facts, or relics are not infallibly defined, although they always deserve the pious assent and the respect due to all the teachings of the Church, even to those that are not infallible. "When the Church inquires into or pronounces upon revelations, apparitions, miracles, it intends to have only human probability or certainty, and that practical certainty, which is surely sufficient to foster worship. Likewise, when it deals with the authenticity of relics" ⁴

Fourthly, one thing is canonization and another is insertion into the martyrology. Since in the martyrology the Church inscribes the names not only of the canonized, but also of the beatified and even of the merely venerable, it is evident that mere insertion into the Martyrology is not an infallible argument of sanctity.

The present question, therefore, does not concern any of those things mentioned, but exclusively canonization, which is usually defined as: "The ultimate and definitive sentence, by which the Church declares that someone has led a holy life and has been received among the heavenly inhabitants, and proposes him to all the faithful to be venerated and invoked" ⁵

280. STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION.—As we saw in our previous section, modern theologians, when dealing with dogmatic facts, usually distinguish two questions: the question of right and the question of fact. "To the first," they say, "we give assent of divine faith, but to the second, of ecclesiastical faith" (257).

Since canonization is but a variant of a dogmatic fact, they usually do something similar when dealing with canonization. Although they do not speak expressly of a question of right nor of fact, whoever reads them attentively will notice that they regard these two questions as distinct: a) what kind of faith we give to the question of "whether the Church is infallible in the canonization of the saints," which is a question of right; b) what kind of faith we give to the question of "whether such a canonized saint is a true saint or is truly in heaven," which is a question of fact.

Not only do they distinguish these two questions, although without expressly speaking of rights or of facts, but they give them different answers. The faith we give to the first question of "whether the Church is infallible in canonization" is, they say, divine faith. In contrast, the faith we give to the second question of whether "such a canonized saint is truly a saint or is truly in heaven" is, according to them, ecclesiastical faith.

Thus, despite the fact that modern theologians usually distinguish between dogmatic facts and the canonization of saints, the force of logic has led them, and very rightly so, to apply to the canonization of saints the same or a similar solution as to dogmatic facts.

In our previous section we saw that the question of fact, if it is truly a dogmatic fact, includes the question of right, and therefore the one is as much of divine faith as the other. In this chapter we hope to show the same regarding canonization, demonstrating that the question of "whether such a canonized saint is in heaven" merits the same kind of faith as the question of "whether the Church is infallible in canonization," and that, therefore, it is of divine faith.

Indeed, anyone who reads St. Thomas attentively, and even all the Thomists prior to the Jansenist disputes, will immediately notice that these theologians always regard as identical the faith we give to those two questions. Hence they always reduce the question to ascertaining whether the Church has or does not have infallibility or divine assistance in canonization, and what kind of faith we give to that infallibility; for, once it has been ascertained what faith we give to the infallibility of the Church in one question, it is already ascertained what faith we give to that question when the Church infallibly defines it. Let us hear John of St. Thomas: "Dubium ergo ad hoc reducitur an ipsum iudicium quod Ecclesia profert in canonizando Sanctum sit infallibile, et quo gradu certitudinis tenendum sit non posse Pontificem in eo errare⁶.

On this question—that is, on the kind of faith by which we believe the authority and infallibility of the Church in matters connected with the revealed deposit—everything depends, as we shall see. But since there has been an evolution or progress in Catholic theology on this question from the time of St. Thomas, and even from the time of John of St. Thomas, we shall briefly set forth: a) the mind of St. Thomas; b) the opinions of later theologians down to the disputes about the authority of the Church in dogmatic facts, that is, down to Jansenism; c) the opinion of modern theologians.

281. THE MIND OF ST. THOMAS.—One thing is the doctrine, another thing is the facts.

That the Church is infallible in defining the doctrine of faith and morals is a fundamental dogma always believed in the Catholic Church, without there having been any need for a council to define it. It was defined from the beginning in the apostolic teaching itself, since it is like the basis or indispensable condition of every other dogma. The Vatican Council did not define the infallibility of the Church, which it takes for granted, but rather the infallibility of the Pope, declaring that he possesses the same infallibility that Jesus Christ gave to His Church. «We define that the Roman Pontiff... when... he defines a DOCTRINE of faith and morals... enjoys that infallibility with which the divine Redeemer willed that His Church should be endowed»⁷.

But although all believed in the infallibility of the Church in matters of doctrine, Saint Thomas was the first, as far as we know, to deal expressly with the infallibility of the Church in matters of facts, devoting an entire article to the infallibility of the Church in the fact of the canonization of the saints. As was his custom, when treating a particular point such as that of canonization, he rose to the general sphere of principles, and, distinguishing for the first time in the history of theology between doctrine of faith and morals, particular facts, and facts connected with doctrine, he laid the future foundations of an entirely new treatise: the treatise on dogmatic facts, of which the canonization of the saints is but a particular case. Let us, then, carefully examine the method employed by the Angelic Doctor, for that is the surest means of penetrating his mind well.

The question of canonization is treated by Saint Thomas in the Quodlibet 9, a. 16, under the title "Whether the saints who are canonized by the Church are in glory, or whether some of them are in hell." We give the entire article in the note, so that the reader may judge for himself the analysis of the article that we are going to make⁸

After a brief preamble noting that every man is fallible if considered in himself and that he can only be infallible by divine assistance, the Holy Doctor begins his reasoning by positing as the major premise the following three propositions: a) "It is certain that the judgment of the universal Church in those matters which pertain to faith (doctrine of faith or morals) cannot err." b) "But in other opinions which pertain to particular facts... it is possible to err." c) "The canonization of the Saints is a middle course between these two."

Up to this point, the major premise of the reasoning. With it alone we could not draw any conclusion about the infallibility or non-infallibility of the Church in canonization. If we knew nothing more about canonization than that it is a middle term between doctrine, which is the object of infallibility, and particular facts, which are not the object of infallibility, we would remain without knowing whether infallibility could apply to canonization or not.

Hence the Holy Doctor adds a minor premise, which is the root and center of the whole article, and reads as follows: "Quia tamen (let the reader note that tamen, which means: in spite of the "medium est inter haec duo") honor quem Sanctis exhibemus quaedam professio fidei est qua Sanctorum gloriam credimus". That is: although canonization is a middle term between the doctrine of faith and particular facts, nevertheless (tamen), it is a particular application of the doctrine of faith (quaedam professio fidei est); it is something related to the dogma of faith concerning the glory of the saints (qua sanctorum gloriam credimus). Although, then, it is not pure doctrine, but fact, it is a doctrinal fact or, as we would say today, a dogmatic fact.

In this way, although canonization appeared in the major premise as a means between the doctrine of faith and particular facts, or as an island isolated from those two extremes, the Holy Doctor has managed, through the minor premise, to discover a bridge, namely, the doctrinal character of the fact of canonization. This bridge or doctrinal character unites canonization not with particular facts, and therefore with things in which infallibility has no place, but with the doctrine of faith, and, consequently, with things that by their nature fall under the infallibility of the Church.

It is natural, then, that, once this bridge is established, the Holy Doctor should draw with the greatest naturalness the following conclusion: "Pie credendum est quod nec etiam in his iudicium Ecclesiae errare possit".

Having summarily examined the process that the Holy Doctor employs in his reasoning, let us briefly consider the exact meaning of those two famous phrases: a) "canonizatio medium est inter haec duo", which is found in the major premise; b) "pie credendum est", which is found in the conclusion. On these two phrases, the defenders of the modern ecclesiastical faith have made endless conjectures.

282. MEANING OF “CANONIZATIO MEDIUM EST INTER HAEC DUO”.

Above all, let the reader note the complete article of the Holy Doctor, and he will see confirmed what we said before, namely, that for St. Thomas the following two questions are identical: a) what certainty do we have that such a canonized saint is in heaven; b) what certainty do we have that the Church is infallible in canonization. For this reason, he places the first question in the title of the article, and then in the objections, in the sed contra arguments, in the body of the article, and in the replies to the objections, he always answers with the second question. The kind of faith, then, that we give to the first depends on the kind of faith we give to the second. The two questions are one and the same for St. Thomas.

Secondly, let the reader note that the phrase “medium est inter haec duo” does not bear upon the phrase “pie credendum est,” but rather bears upon the word “canonizatio.” Saint Thomas does not, then, say that the “pie credendum est” occupies a middle place; rather, what he says is that that middle place is occupied by the canonization. Canonizatio medium est inter haec duo.

Thirdly, let the reader note that the minor premise or key of the reasoning is not the proposition that “canonization is a middle ground between these two,” but rather the proposition that canonization or the cult of the saints “is a certain profession of faith.” The conclusion, therefore, of “it is piously to be believed” is not deduced by St. Thomas from “canonization holds a middle place,” but from “canonization is a certain profession of faith.” So far is St. Thomas from saying that the “it is piously to be believed” is deduced from “it is a middle ground between these two,” that he expressly says it is deduced in spite of this: “Because nevertheless,” etc.

We insist so much on such an obvious point, because certain defenders of the modern ecclesiastical faith understand this article of St. Thomas as if the Holy Doctor had reasoned thus: “Canonizatio medium est inter haec duo: ergo pie credendum est.” From which they derive that this pious faith of which St. Thomas speaks is a faith midway between divine faith and human faith, that is, the modern ecclesiastical faith. And they fail to notice that St. Thomas reasoned in a completely opposite way, namely: “Canonizatio medium est inter haec duo: atqui tamen professio quaedam fidei est: ergo pie credendum est,” etc. That is: one must not believe it piously because it occupies a middle place, but despite that; for although it is midway between the doctrine of faith and particular facts, nevertheless (tamen) it belongs in a certain way (quaedam professio fidei est) to the first member, the doctrine of faith, because it is necessarily related to the dogma of the glory of the saints.

The Holy Doctor reasons, then, in the following manner: We know for certain that the Church is infallible in one kind of thing, that is, in the doctrine of faith and morals; we also know for certain that the Church is not infallible in another kind of thing, that is, in particular facts. If canonization belonged directly to either of these two kinds of things, we would have the question resolved in the sense of infallibility if it belonged to the first kind, or in the sense of non-infallibility if it belonged to the second. But we find that canonization belongs neither directly to the first nor to the second of these two kinds of things, but rather it is something midway between the two: "Canonization is a middle ground between these two". Therefore, with only those two principles or kinds of things alone, we could draw nothing certain about the infallibility or non-infallibility of the Church in canonization.

Despite this (tamen)—continues the Holy Doctor—there is a third principle or way to ascertain it: that way is the indirect path of relation or consequence. Although canonization is not directly the doctrine of faith itself, since it is a fact, it is nonetheless necessarily related to the doctrine of faith. Why? Because in canonization the cult of the canonized saint is prescribed to all the Church, and that cult or honor is like a profession of faith of the dogma of the glory of the saints. Therefore, if the Church is infallible in the doctrine of faith, it would be impious to believe that she is fallible in the profession of that same faith, that is, in canonization.

In summary: in the phrase "canonizatio medium est inter haec duo," the duo are not two faiths, one divine and the other human, nor is the medium a third faith, intermediate between the divine and the human. Such a notion, invented four centuries later, never crossed the mind of the Holy Doctor. Rather, the duo are two kinds of objects, namely, the doctrine of faith and particular facts; and the medium is a third kind of object, that is, doctrinal facts related, like the fact of canonization, to the doctrine of faith, or in other words, to the first kind. The aim and the merit of Saint Thomas were not to invent a third faith or a middle faith, but to examine that middle object and find for it a relationship or bridge by which, emerging from the middle or from its isolation, it would be united to the first extreme. The synthesis, then, of the entire article of the Holy Doctor, set forth in the form of a simple enthymeme, is as follows: Canonization is necessarily connected with the doctrine of faith: therefore one must piously believe (pie credendum est) that the Church is infallible in it.

**283. MEANING OF “PIE CREDENDUM EST”.—**What value or what meaning does that phrase “pie credendum est” have for Saint Thomas?

It is clear that it does not have the sense that it must be believed with divine faith, since it is a simple consequence deduced exclusively through reasoning or connection with the doctrine of faith, and it is well known that for St. Thomas and his school no consequence or connection is of divine faith unless it is defined by the Church.

Much less still does it make sense that it must be believed with ecclesiastical faith. The reason is quite clear. Ecclesiastical faith, as its defenders understand it, presupposes the infallibility of the Church, since it is founded on that infallibility. Now, that infallibility of the Church is precisely what the Holy Doctor seeks to prove, and it is of that infallibility that he says it must be believed piously. Therefore, to say that one must piously believe the infallibility of the Church and to understand by that "pious belief" believing it with ecclesiastical faith would be equivalent to saying that one must believe the infallibility of the Church because of... the infallibility of the Church. Such theological absurdities are never committed by Saint Thomas.

Thus, that “pie credendum est,” deduced as a mere consequence of a line of reasoning, has for St. Thomas no other meaning or value than the scientific-theological value: the value of a theological conclusion: the same value as everything indirectly revealed or necessarily connected with what is revealed; the same value as everything that “ex quibus sequitur aliquid contrarium vel inconveniens fidei,” which, as long as no definition of the Church intervenes, does not belong to divine faith but “indirectly” or “reductively,” and belongs directly and formally to theology for the one who knows the connection with evidence, or to human faith for the one who, without knowing that connection, assents to it on the authority of theologians who do know it.

For the same reason that this consequence, not yet being defined by the Church, was not yet of divine faith, St. Thomas did not say, nor could he yet say: fide divina credendum est" or "haereticum est". But since such a consequence was quite certain, and moreover it concerned not a purely speculative matter, such as the conclusion, for example, that divine grace is a quality, but rather a matter of piety, such as the cult of the saints, for that reason the holy Doctor did not content himself with the phrase "certum est", but employed the phrase "pie credendum est", thereby qualifying the contrary as impious.

All that has been said has been well expressed by John of St. Thomas in the following words: “That causal [clause] of St. Thomas (namely, “because, however, the honor which we show to the saints is a certain profession of faith, by which we believe in the glory of the saints, it must be piously believed,” etc.) must be explained thus: that *because canonization is a judgment concerning the honor and veneration to be shown to the Saints, in whose very exercise we profess the special glory of some saint, therefore it pertains reductively to faith, and consequently it is piously believed that in such matters the Pope cannot err... We say, therefore, that it is... impious, because it is against the veneration and worship due to the saints themselves... We do not, however, expressly say that he who denies this is a heretic... because it has not been certainly and expressly defined in particular that such canonization is a definition of faith, but only as an inconvenient conclusion it follows from those things which are of faith, that in such canonization error could occur... And therefore it is not directly of faith, but reductively”⁹

In summary, then, the "pie credendum est" that Saint Thomas applies to the infallibility of the Church in canonization means human certainty or human faith, for it is formally human, although materially divine, every certainty or every faith that is founded solely on theological reasoning. Such is, for example, the certainty that theologians today have, or the faith that the faithful have, regarding the theological conclusion that "the soul of Christ enjoyed the beatific vision from the first instant of His conception," or any other theological conclusion that has not yet been defined by the Church. Such conclusions are certain, but they are not infallibly certain or certain with divine faith. To deny them is rash or impious, but it is not heretical.

284. LATER THEOLOGIANS UP TO THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.—Since St. Thomas dealt with the canonization of the saints, almost all later theologians took up the subject. The vast majority maintained the same position that St. Thomas had defended, namely, that the infallibility of the Church in canonization and, therefore, the holiness and glory of the canonized saint were theologically certain, but not infallibly certain or certain by divine faith.

No few theologians, however, were lacking who denied that infallibility, just as there were no lack of others who, from the opposite extreme, affirmed that this infallibility was already a matter of divine faith and that its denial was heresy.

Thus there resulted three opinions, which John of St. Thomas concisely sets forth in the following words: “The first opinion teaches that the Pope can err in the canonization of saints. The second opinion, going to the other extreme, holds that it is of faith that the Pope cannot err in the canonization of saints, and thus, once canonization has taken place, it is of faith that such a saint is in glory. The third opinion is a middle one: that it is indeed certain that the Pope cannot err in the canonization of saints, and that he who would say the opposite is worthy of censure, yet he would not be a heretic, but reckless, impious, and scandalous, indeed close to error or savoring of heresy. This opinion is the more common among the recent authors... and is drawn from St. Thomas” (Quodlib. 9, a. 16)¹⁰. In the same manner, though much more fully, Benedict XIV describes these three opinions¹¹.

The first opinion, which denies the infallibility of the Church in canonization, is followed by few and not very illustrious theologians, although the eminent Cardinal Cajetan is often cited among them. The third, which not only affirms that the infallibility of the Church in canonization is certain, but also that it is already of divine faith, is also affirmed by relatively few, although among them are names as illustrious as the Franciscan Alfonso de Castro and the Jesuits Valencia and Tirso González. Finally, the second, which is that of St. Thomas, and which affirms that the infallibility of the Church in canonization is certain, but is not yet infallibly certain or of divine faith, is followed by the vast majority of theologians, not only Thomists, but from all schools. The names and citations of all these theologians are given by Benedict XIV in chapters 43 and 45 of his cited work¹².

The Thomistic opinion, which we have already seen expressed by John of Saint Thomas, is also expressed by Suárez in the following words: “Likewise, it is not lawful for the faithful to doubt the glory of a canonized saint: for the Pontiffs command this under a precise obligation in the canonization itself: therefore it is necessary that error cannot underlie that precept, otherwise God would have failed in a matter most necessary to the Church, which is contrary to His providence and promises. And therefore, although this INFERENCE is not of faith, I judge it to be sufficiently certain, and the contrary to be impious and rash¹³.”

Although in this period, then, which runs from Saint Thomas to the second half of the seventeenth century, the question may have remained almost in the same state, two things are worthy of note:

1. That all these theologians, of whichever of the three opinions mentioned, continue to regard with Saint Thomas as identical these two questions: a) with what certainty we believe the infallibility of the Church in canonization; b) with what certainty we believe the sanctity or glory of the canonized saint.
2. That all those who continue to deny with Saint Thomas that the second question is of divine faith, do so because they continue to deny with Saint Thomas that the first is of divine faith, that is, that the infallibility of the Church in canonization is of divine faith.

285. FROM THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY TO OUR DAYS.—As we said when reviewing the history of ecclesial faith, the disputes over the question of fact concerning the five propositions of Jansenius’s book, which took place in the second half of the seventeenth century and even continued for a long time afterward, were fruitful for the study of the question of “the infallibility of the Church in dogmatic facts,” and likewise gave rise to the introduction into Catholic theology of what is called ecclesial faith. Since the canonization of the saints is neither more nor less than a dogmatic fact or a fact connected with dogma, every advance in the doctrine on dogmatic facts was bound to be reflected, sooner or later, if theologians were logical, in the doctrine on canonization.

Faced with the repeated papal bulls infallibly defining not only the question of right regarding the propositions of Jansenius's book, but also the question of fact, and requiring of all the faithful not only an external obedience or a religious silence, but also an internal and unconditional obedience, all Catholic theologians, some later than others, agreed on the following proposition: "It is absolutely certain that the Church is infallible in the definition of dogmatic facts", that is, in the definition of any fact necessarily connected with the preservation or explanation of the revealed deposit. Since the canonization of saints is but a particular case of dogmatic fact, there was no longer any theologian after that date who denied the infallibility of the Church in canonization.

Once the question of the Church's infallibility in dogmatic facts was thus resolved, a second question arose, namely, “what kind of faith such dogmatic facts deserve once infallibly defined.”

On this question the theologians were divided. Some said that this faith was divine faith, founded on divine revelation; others that it was ecclesiastical faith, founded on the infallibility of the Church. Those who applied so-called ecclesiastical faith to dogmatic facts also applied it, and very logically, to the canonization of the saints.

Finally, from this question there necessarily arose, though somewhat later, a third one, namely: “with what kind of faith do we believe the infallibility of the Church in dogmatic facts.” If we believe dogmatic facts because of the infallibility of the Church, with what faith do we believe that infallibility?

The answer to this third question necessarily had to be unanimous. Those who maintained that dogmatic facts were of divine faith, and therefore that they were truly revealed, had all the more reason to maintain that the infallibility of the Church in these facts was also of divine faith, since the infallibility of the Church in all that is revealed has always been regarded as of divine faith. In turn, those who maintained that dogmatic facts were of ecclesiastical faith had to arrive, sooner or later, at the same conclusion. To say that we believe dogmatic facts with ecclesiastical faith means that we believe them by reason of the infallibility of the Church. If we were also to believe that infallibility of the Church with ecclesiastical faith, we would have the absurdity or vicious circle of believing the infallibility of the Church by reason of the infallibility of the Church. Therefore, that infallibility of the Church cannot be believed with ecclesiastical faith, but with divine faith. Which is the same as saying that that infallibility of the Church is a truth truly revealed.

With this the reader can already note the immense progress made in Catholic theology since the seventeenth century on the question of “whether the Church is infallible in the facts connected with the revealed deposit.” To that question, St. Thomas and the vast majority of Catholic theologians before Jansenism answered that “pie credendum est,” that is, that this infallibility was theologically certain, but that it was not yet of divine faith. After the definitions and attitude of the Church against Jansenism, and much more so after the Vatican Council, all or almost all theologians answer that the infallibility of the Church in facts connected with dogma is a truth of divine faith, already defined by the practice or ordinary magisterium of the Church, or at least a revealed and definable truth of divine faith.

Although this is clear and although we are accused of repeating the same things, let us briefly cite some texts:

“Infertur hinc primo: Pontificem, etiam extra Concilium errare non posse in canonizatione Sanctorum; quod communius cum Bonaventura, Valentia, Belarmino, Amico docent esse de fide; alii vero cum Suario, Azorio, Granados, esse fidei proximum”¹⁴ “Which infallibility, indeed, is held by most as also formally revealed...; which infallibility could be defined as a dogma of faith”¹⁵ “In the opinion of many, it is heresy, although it has not so far been explicitly condemned as heresy”¹⁶ “This faith (that is, the ecclesiastical faith we give to dogmatic facts) is said to be mediately revealed, because the assent to it rests on the infallible authority of the Church, which we believe by divine and catholic faith”¹⁷ “If anyone denies that the Church is infallible in defining these things, he is by that very fact formally a heretic”¹⁸ “Perhaps this controversy could be settled by noting that it is one thing that the Supreme Pontiff is infallible in decreeing the canonization of some Saint, but another thing that it is of faith that this Saint, whom the Pontiff canonizes, is blessed in heaven. And the first is indeed of divine-catholic faith”¹⁹

286. ANSWER TO THE QUESTION.—This being presupposed, it is very easy to show that the fact that “such a canonized saint is in heaven” is an implicitly revealed truth and, therefore, definable by divine faith and not only by ecclesiastical faith.

To do so, it suffices to apply to that fact the same principles that in the previous section we have applied to dogmatic facts in general, and that all theologians today apply in particular to the facts of whether such a council is a rule of faith or whether such a pope is a true pope.

These principles, as the reader will recall, are two, namely: a) once a universal proposition is revealed, all the particular propositions contained within it are revealed; b) the minor premise of the reasoning, in such cases, does not enter as a formal motive, but rather as an explanation or application of the universal major to the particular conclusion. These two principles are generally admitted by all theologians.

By that path of containment of the particular in the universal, we could adduce numerous proofs to demonstrate that it is of divine faith that such a canonized saint is in heaven. We will limit ourselves to two proofs: one taken from the universal revealed truth that the Church is infallible in the canonization of every saint, and another, taken from the universal, also revealed truth, of the glory of all the saints in heaven.

287. FIRST PROOF.—According to all or nearly all theologians of today, it is truly revealed that “the Church is infallible in the canonization of the saints” or, what is the same thing, in the canonization of every saint.

This proposition, simply by turning it around, is exactly the same as the following: “It is revealed that every saint canonized by the Church is infallibly a saint and is infallibly in heaven,” for that is what we understand by canonization.

Put in conditional form, in order to better see the structure of the reasoning and the function of the minor premise in such reasoning, the following proposition results exactly: “It is revealed that every saint, if the Church canonizes him, is infallibly a saint or is infallibly in heaven”.

Let this, then, be the following reasoning:

It is revealed that every saint, if the Church canonizes him, is infallibly holy or is infallibly in heaven.

Thus this saint (Saint Isidore, for example) has been canonized by the Church.

Then it is revealed that this saint is infallibly holy or is infallibly in heaven.

We invite every reader to examine without prejudice the three propositions of this reasoning. The major is a universal revealed and definable truth of divine faith, if it is not already defined, according to almost all modern theologians. The minor comes down to verifying a condition of the revealed major. The conclusion is exactly the same revealed major, with no difference (all — this) other than that of universal and particular. Therefore, if a universal proposition being revealed entails that all the particular propositions contained within it are revealed, it is as clear as the light of day that the conclusion that “such a canonized saint is in heaven” is also revealed and is credible by divine faith.

If St. Thomas and the vast majority of theologians before Jansenism did not yet admit as a matter of divine faith that particular conclusion, it is because they did not yet admit as a matter of divine faith, but only as pious faith, the universal major premise. But today such a universal major premise is already admitted as a matter of divine faith by almost all theologians.

288. SECOND PROOF.—Instead of taking as the universal major premise of the reasoning the infallibility of the Church in the canonization of every saint, let us take as the universal major premise the glory due in heaven to every saint, which is also a truth of divine faith. Let the following reasoning, then, be:

It is of divine faith that the souls of all the true saints are enjoying God in heaven. Put in conditional form for greater clarity, the following results: It is of divine faith that every soul is enjoying God in heaven if it was truly holy.

Thus this soul (that of Saint Isidore or of any other canonized saint) is truly holy.

It is therefore a matter of divine faith that this soul is enjoying God in heaven.

We ask the reader once again to examine the three propositions of that reasoning. The major is a universal revealed and defined as of divine faith by Benedict XII²⁰. The minor is the very formula that the Church uses in the canonization of the saints, and it has no other purpose than to fulfill a condition of the major of faith. The conclusion is exactly the same as the major of faith, with no difference other than that between universal and particular (all — this).

Then, either one must deny the principles commonly admitted by all theologians, or one must admit that the fact that "such canonized saint is in heaven" is of divine faith or definable as of divine faith, and not merely of ecclesiastical faith.

289. THE SALMANTICENSES AND JOHN OF SAINT THOMAS.—As confirmation of what has been said, we shall adduce the testimony of two theologians, precisely the two from whom this would least be expected on this question. They are the Salmanticenses and John of Saint Thomas.

These theologians, like almost all those before the Church’s decisions on dogmatic facts, defended with Saint Thomas that the dogmatic fact of canonization was not a matter of divine faith, but of theological certainty or human faith; yet they already made it quite clear that this fact of canonization was not of divine faith, because the infallibility of the Church was not yet a matter of divine faith.

In defending the claim that it is of divine faith that "this pope is a true pope," the Salmanticenses pose to themselves the following objection: "Just as the universal Church accepts Innocent XI as Supreme Pontiff, so it accepts, for example, St. Isidore among the number of Saints existing in glory: but it is not immediately of faith that this man has been canonized and exists in glory: therefore it is not immediately of faith that Innocent XI is Supreme Pontiff."

Here now is his truly remarkable reply: "Ad confirmationem neganda est maior, quia haec propositio omnis homo rite canonizatus et acceptus ab Ecclesia in numerum Sanctorum, est Sanctus et existit in gloria", is not immediately de fide, as Ferre rightly shows. Hence the consequent that is drawn, namely that St. Isidore is truly holy and exists in heaven, is not immediately de fide. (Now comes the good part.) But if the contrary supposition be made and that universal proposition be said: "Every man duly canonized", etc., to be immediately de fide, consequently it must be said to be immediately de fide that St. Isidore is in glory and is truly holy"²¹.

Let the reader note that concession which the Salmanticenses already made in their time, namely, that if it is admitted that it is of divine faith that all canonized saints are in heaven, one must also logically admit that it is of divine faith that this particular saint is in heaven. Now, the majority of modern theologians already admit that it is of divine faith that all canonized saints are infallibly in heaven, by admitting that the infallibility of the Church in the canonization of all saints is of divine faith²².

Another no less clear confirmation is given to us by John of Saint Thomas. Answering an objection of Granados, who, in order to deny that theological conclusions were of divine faith even after the definition of the Church, had adduced the example of the canonization of the saints, he expresses himself thus: “For the canonization of the saints it is piously believed that the Holy Spirit assists, lest the Church err, as St. Thomas says, Quodlibet 9, a. 16, but it is not certain by faith, as he says there: but in defining matters of faith it is certain by faith that the Holy Spirit assists, and that that definition proceeds from His direction: whence (let the reader note that whence) the assent to it does not rest on human authority, but on divine”²³.

As can be seen, John of Saint Thomas’s reply amounts to the following: If, instead of being only a “credible fact,” it were of divine faith that the Holy Spirit assists the Church in canonization, then the fact of the canonization, or that such a canonized saint is in heaven, would also be of divine faith and not human. Now, we all know that the theologians of today admit that the assistance of the Holy Spirit to the Church in canonization is of divine faith, inasmuch as they admit that the infallibility of the Church is of divine faith, for infallibility and assistance of the Holy Spirit amount to the same thing.

In a word, St. Thomas and all the ancient theologians always regarded as identical the faith by which we believe the infallibility of the Church in canonization and the faith by which we believe the glory of the canonized saint, but since the former was not yet of divine faith, for that reason they did not admit the latter as of divine faith²⁴.

Today it is generally admitted as being of divine faith the first point. Hence, whoever wishes to follow the principles and the spirit of Saint Thomas and of the great theologians must admit that the second point is also of divine faith. The contrary is to cling to the material letter of traditional theology, abandoning its spirit and its guiding principles in the treatise on faith.

290. ANOTHER CONFIRMATION.—As a final confirmation, we will briefly indicate another proof that we have already adduced when dealing with dogmatic facts in general.

Suppose that Jesus Christ in person were now to come down from heaven and say to His Church: “All the saints you have canonized up to now are with Me in heaven.” No one will deny that, in such a hypothesis, this would be of divine faith, because it is “spoken by God.”

Now then, let every theologian note that the very same thing Jesus Christ would tell us now He had already told us before, and the question of now and before does not change the kind of faith. It is the same to admit that “it is revealed that the Church is infallible in the canonization of all the saints,” as most theologians admit today, as to admit that “God has said it,” and to what God has said corresponds divine faith and not merely ecclesiastical faith.

The act, then, of faith that we give to the canonization of the saints (or to any other infallible definition of the Church) is not well formulated by saying: "I believe that such a saint is in heaven, because the Church says so." Nor is it exactly formulated by saying: "I believe that such a saint is in heaven, because the Holy Spirit assists the Church in canonization." Rather, it is formulated and must be formulated with full truth by saying: "I believe that such a canonized saint is in heaven, because God has revealed that the Church is infallible in the canonization of every saint." Such an act is evidently of divine faith.

291. RESPONSE TO OBJECTIONS.—Almost all the objections usually raised on this question reduce to the following: that holiness is an internal fact or phenomenon, incapable of being verified with full certainty; that witnesses can deceive; that even the holiest person may fall into mortal sin at the last moment and be damned, despite all external appearances to the contrary; that, even supposing he has not been damned, it is impossible to know whether he is still in purgatory, etc., etc.

All these objections, as any discerning reader who examines them will note, are out of tune with the question we are treating here, for they would prove not only that no divine faith is possible regarding the fact that such a saint is in heaven, but they would equally prove that neither is infallibility possible, nor, therefore, ecclesiastical faith.

Thus, the answer to all objections of this kind is one and the same, and very simple. Either divine assistance is admitted in canonization, which is the same as infallibility, or it is not. If divine assistance is not admitted, then evidently there can be no divine faith, but neither can there be ecclesiastical faith. On the other hand, if divine assistance is admitted, all those objections fall to the ground, for although holiness is an internal fact about which any man can be deceived, it is not a fact about which God—or the man assisted by God—can be deceived.

Also, if it had no divine assistance, the Church could be deceived in judging whether such a council was ecumenical or not (and even whether such a council existed or not): whether such a pope is a true pope; whether such a translation of Sacred Scripture, for example, the Vulgate, is well made, etc., etc., and where deception is possible, divine faith is not possible. But since there is divine assistance to verify the particular fact, no deception or fallibility is possible in such a fact, and since, on the other hand, that particular fact forms part of a revealed universal (every council, every pope, every translation of the Bible, every canonized saint...), for that reason, and not precisely because of divine assistance, although not without that assistance, such particular facts, once defined, are of divine faith ²⁵.

292. ANOTHER OBJECTION that could be raised is the following: the fact that this particular saint is in heaven is something more than the universally revealed truth that every saint in general is in heaven. Now, if it is something more and is of divine faith, which is the same as being revealed, then we will have some increase, however small, in revelation after the Apostles, which cannot be admitted.

We confess that every time we read or hear such an objection, we cannot help forming a very poor opinion of those who raise it. It reveals, in our judgment, an extremely narrow theological criterion regarding the divine authority of the Church, as if her only function were to preserve the revealed deposit and not also to explain and apply it. Such theologians seem to imagine that for something to be of divine faith, it must have come from the lips of the Apostles with all its particulars and details, and that the Church has no other function than to transmit or faithfully repeat, like a phonograph, what the Apostles said, without the slightest increase, development, or novelty. This extremely narrow conception of the Church's dogmatic function and of the development of dogma causes many modern theologians, out of a puerile fear of falling into transformist modernism, to fail to grasp the full scope of the broad theory of the Lirinense and of Saint Thomas, the only theory that can successfully explain the authentic facts that history presents of true dogmatic development by way of genuine connection or theological conclusion or by way of dogmatic fact.

We concede, then, that the theological conclusion is something more than the revealed principle from which it is deduced. But if that conclusion is deduced by an inclusive or implicit route, and only thus is it definable as of divine faith, that something more is not something more of doctrine or objectivity, but something more of explanation of the same and only revealed doctrine. We also concede that every dogmatic fact and every canonization of saints is something more than the universal revealed truth with which such facts are connected; but that something more is not something more of objectivity or doctrine, but of application to particular cases of the same and only doctrine already revealed in universal terms.

The only thing, then, deduced from this is that the Church has divine authority for something more than conserving the revealed deposit, for it also has it for explaining and applying it, provided this can be done without new revelation.

293. THE THIRD OBJECTION.—Finally, some will raise the point that if the canonization of the saints and every infallible definition of the Church is a matter of divine faith, then all distinction seems to disappear between what is defined as a dogma of faith and what is defined as merely infallible, or between what is condemned as heretical and what is condemned as erroneous, or with some other censure lower than that of heresy.

The response to this objection is that, although both classes of definitions are of divine faith and, therefore, there is no specific or formal difference between them, there have always been and continue to be between them two accidental or material differences.

The first difference is that what the Church expressly defines as a dogma of faith or condemns its contradiction as heretical is not only of divine faith, but also it is of divine faith that it is of divine faith, and therefore, whoever denies it is a heretic. Whereas what it defines simply as an infallible truth or condemns its contrary with a note inferior to heresy is also of divine faith, but it is not of divine faith that it is of divine faith, and for that reason whoever denies it is not a heretic. The reason for this difference is that the Church has already defined that one must believe with divine faith, and under pain of heresy, everything that she defines as revealed, but she has not yet defined that there is an obligation to believe with divine faith or under pain of heresy what she defines as infallible²⁶.

The second difference is that what the Church defines as a dogma of faith or condemns the contrary as heretical is of divine faith that it is revealed truth, whereas what the Church defines only as infallible truth or condemns the contrary with a note inferior to heresy is of divine faith that it is infallible truth, but it is not yet of divine faith that it is revealed truth. The reason for this second difference is that faith, not being discursive, limits itself to assenting to what is defined, and only to what is defined. Now, in the first kind of definitions, the Church not only defines the truth, but also the revelation of such truth. While in the second kind of definitions, the Church defines the truth, without yet expressly defining the revelation of such truth. But the one kind is just as revealed as the other. The former God has revealed in particular; the latter He has revealed in universal. In revealing that the Church is infallible in the definition of every dogmatic fact and in the canonization of every saint, God revealed implicitly, but truly, that this dogmatic fact or this saint are infallibly certain once defined.

Thus, between so-called ecclesiastical faith and divine faith the differences are accidental or material. What is essential or formal in faith in both—that is, the formal motive for believing them—is the same: divine revelation. Both, therefore, are divine faith.

294. SUMMARY.—With this question of the canonization of the saints and with the questions previously studied on the theological conclusion and dogmatic facts, we believe that the nature of modern ecclesiastical faith, and with it the extension of dogmatic progress, has been sufficiently examined.

As the reader will have noticed, especially the reader who is truly Thomistic, the nature of the faith called ecclesiastical depends necessarily and entirely upon the nature of the faith by which we assent to the following proposition: "The Church is infallible in everything necessarily connected with the revealed deposit." If this proposition is of divine faith, as is admitted today by almost all theologians, then every true Thomist who knows not only the letter but also the spirit of St. Thomas's principles must admit that the so called ecclesiastical faith is truly divine faith. If, on the other hand, someone believes that the Church's infallibility in such matters is not yet of divine faith, but merely a theological conclusion (as the ancients believed with regard to dogmatic facts), then he must logically admit that ecclesiastical faith is formally human, since every faith or certainty founded solely upon theological connection is formally human. In any case, whatever supposition one adopts, ecclesiastical faith must be, for every true Thomist, either divine faith or human faith. A faith specifically intermediate between divine faith and human faith is an evident contradiction within Thomistic doctrine.²⁷

Thus, although the definability by divine faith of dogmatic facts and of the canonization of the saints is intimately linked with the definability by divine faith of the true and rigorous theological conclusion, the Thomistic theologian must not confuse these two questions as if they were of equal value.

That genuinely and rigorously theological conclusions—that is, conclusions absolutely connected with the revealed deposit—are definable as divine faith, we regard as an evident and fundamental truth; as a truth expressly affirmed by Saint Thomas and by all traditional theology up to the confusion introduced in the seventeenth century concerning the “virtually revealed”; as a truth without which the authentic facts of the history of dogmas cannot be explained.

On the other hand, we consider the question of whether dogmatic facts, and consequently the canonization of the saints, are of divine faith or only of human faith as a secondary question and of little importance or relevance for the fundamental question of dogmatic progress. Although we are persuaded, and believe we have proven, that the faith we give to dogmatic facts and to the canonization of the saints is truly divine faith, it would matter little to us if someone denied this, provided that they affirm that the Church can define as a dogma of divine and Catholic faith all those theological conclusions that are deduced from the revealed deposit through a process of real identity, or essential connection, or absolute certainty ²⁸. That is what Suárez and Lugo called this formal- confused revealed, what moderns call virtual identical-material or connective-essential, and what traditional theology had called by the simple names of implicit or virtual, since implicitness, to be rigorously scientific or theological, must be virtual, and virtuality, to be rigorously theological, and not purely physical, must be connective-essential, and therefore objectively implicit.

295. THE CONCLUSION to be drawn from this chapter on ecclesiastical faith is that the evolution of dogma is so great that it extends to the four grades of Catholic doctrine. These four grades are: a) revealed datum or truths expressly revealed; b) truths already defined as dogmas of faith; c) truths defined as infallible, although not yet as dogmas; d) truths not yet defined, but necessarily connected with any of the three preceding grades, and which we call theological conclusions and dogmatic facts.

The difference between those four grades is not a difference between revealed and unrevealed, but between explicitly revealed and implicitly revealed. Since everything truly revealed by God, whether explicit or implicit, is infallible truth, all the truths of those four grades of Catholic doctrine combine two characteristics: a) they are revealed truths; b) they are infallible truths.

The Church can, if it so wishes, define at one stroke the revealed character or of divine faith of any of the propositions of those four degrees, without any prior definition having been made concerning their character as infallible truth. Thus, for example, it defined as of divine faith the theological conclusions of the two understandings and two wills in Christ, or the obligation of confessing the circumstances that change the species of sin, and the dogmatic facts that the Vulgate is authentic or that the canon of the Mass is free from all error.

On the other hand, it can also—and this is the most ordinary procedure—first define a conclusion or dogmatic fact as an infallible truth, without yet defining it as revealed or of divine faith. Thus, for example, it has already defined as an infallible truth the theological conclusion of the necessity of jurisdiction in the confessor, or the dogmatic fact of the book of Jansenius, without having so far defined them as revealed or of divine faith. But although it has not yet defined them as revealed, it can define them on whatever day it pleases or is necessary. Just as the Church has said: "If anyone shall say that in the sacrament of Penance, for the remission of sins, it is not necessary by divine law to confess... the circumstances that change the species of the sin: let him be anathema," and "If anyone shall say that the canon of the Mass contains errors and therefore ought to be abrogated: let him be anathema," in the same way it could say: "If anyone shall say that in the sacrament of Penance jurisdiction in the confessor is not necessary: let him be anathema," or "If anyone shall say that the Symbol commonly called of St. Athanasius contains errors, or that the book of Jansenius, called Augustinus, does not contain errors: let him be anathema." The necessity of confessing the specific circumstances of sins is as much a theological conclusion as the necessity of jurisdiction in the confessor, and the purity of the canon of the Mass is as much a dogmatic fact as the orthodoxy of the Symbol of St. Athanasius or the heterodoxy of the book of Jansenius. The same may be said of any other conclusion, provided it is rigorously theological, and of any other fact, provided it is truly dogmatic.

The difference, then, between infallible definitions and definitions of divine faith, and therefore between ecclesiastical faith and divine faith, is not a specific difference of doctrine or of objectivity, but a difference of degree through which one and the same doctrine passes or may pass before reaching the supreme degree of dogma of faith. There is no truth definable as of divine faith that cannot beforehand be defined as an infallible truth; nor is there any truth defined or definable as infallible that cannot be defined as of divine faith. This is, in our judgment, a most certain and traditional doctrine, if we are dealing with rigorously theological conclusions, and a most probable doctrine, not to say certain, if we are dealing with truly dogmatic facts²⁹.

296. THE CAUSE OF THE TWO TENDENCIES.—If certain modern Thomists do not accept this doctrine, it is because they imagine that for something to be implicitly revealed and definable as of divine faith, it must be contained in the revealed datum in a direct manner, and not merely indirectly; in a formal manner, and not merely virtually or consequentially.

On the other hand, we hold it as evident that for Saint Thomas and for all traditional theology prior to the confusion introduced on this question in the seventeenth century, everything contained in the apostolic deposit in an indirect manner is also implicitly revealed and definable by divine faith, everything contained in a rigorously theological, or virtual, or consequential manner, everything from the denial of which the denial of what is formally revealed necessarily follows with absolute necessity. Let us hear Saint Thomas: “It must be said that an article is an indivisible truth, as regards what is actually set forth in the article: but it is divisible as regards those things which are potentially contained in the article, inasmuch as he who says one thing, in a certain way says many things: and these are the things which precede the article or follow from it: and in this respect the article of faith can be set forth and divided”³⁰ “To set forth the articles of faith can happen in two ways: in one way...: in another way, as regards those things which are implicitly contained in the articles themselves: this indeed happens when a man knows those things which follow from the articles”³¹ “And in this respect faith can be set forth daily, and through the study of the saints it has been more and more set forth” (ibid.). “Something pertains to faith in two ways... Indirectly, however, those things pertain to faith from the denial of which something contrary to faith follows”³² “Those things from which the corruption of some article follows”³³ “Those things from which follows something inconvenient and contrary to faith”³⁴

When this inclusive, or indirect, or consequential revelation is defined by the Church, “the judgment is the same regarding these (the indirect) and those (the direct) which have been determined in the faith, because one follows from the other” (last cited place). “And for this reason many things are now reputed heretical which were not previously reputed so, because it is now more manifest what follows from them”³⁵ “It is answered that St. Thomas understands by indirectly pertaining to the faith that which is gathered by necessary consequence from some proposition immediate according to the faith. As if someone denies that Christ is capable of laughter, he errs in the Catholic faith consequently and indirectly... For it has not thus far been defined by the Church that Christ is capable of laughter. But if it were defined by the Church, then he who would deny that Christ is capable of laughter would be a heretic”³⁶ All the ancient Thomists express the same thing³⁷.

297. THE THOMISTIC FORMULA.—The formula, therefore, that is truly Thomistic and traditional regarding the extension of dogmatic progress is not the narrow formula of the Salmanticenses, which says: “The Church never defines as a dogma of faith that which is not presupposed to its definition as formally revealed” ³⁸, but rather that other truly broad one of Báñez: “The Church has so far proposed or defined nothing for the faithful to believe that was not contained in Sacred Scripture or the traditions of the Apostles expressly or virtually, so that it might be drawn from them by evident consequence” ³⁹.

This formula of Báñez is the true formula of traditional theology: the formula of St. Thomas, of St. Bonaventure, and of Scotus; the formula of all theologians before Molina; the formula of Suárez and Lugo; the formula, in short, of the immense majority of later theologians, although many of these, by using the new and ambiguous nomenclature of Suárez, may sometimes seem to say the opposite.

The extension, then, of dogmatic progress is as great as the virtuality implicit in the revealed deposit ⁴⁰. That implicit virtuality, explained or developed by the individual reason of theologians through reasoning of real identity or essential connection, constitutes the true and rigorous theology or theological conclusion. That same implicit virtuality, explained or developed by the divine authority of the Church, under the assistance of the Holy Spirit, constitutes the dogma of faith. The explanation made by the individual reason of theologians, however evident and clear the reasoning may be, is a formally human or theological explanation, never of divine faith (neither for oneself nor for others), as long as the definition of the Church does not intervene. On the other hand, the Church has divine authority, and not merely human or ecclesiastical authority, to explain or unfold, and not merely to preserve, everything truly implicit in the revealed datum. Whether that implicitness is formal or virtual is indifferent, provided that it be true implicitness and can be explained or unfolded without new revelation.

1st If it is a matter of an article of faith defined by the Church, it is clear that its formulation is immutable in its substantial sense. What the Church has defined, it has defined forever, and no one can alter its meaning.

2nd. If it is a question of a theological truth, that is, of a truth deduced from the articles of faith, its formulation may vary, but its meaning remains the same. The variation in formulation does not imply a variation in meaning, but rather greater clarity and precision in the expression of the same truth.

3rd If it is a theological opinion, that is, a truth that is not necessarily deduced from the articles of faith, but is proposed as probable, its formulation and its meaning may vary. What is held today as probable may be rejected tomorrow, and vice versa.

4th. If it is a question of a philosophical truth, that is, a truth known by natural reason, its formulation and its meaning may vary, but its content remains the same. Philosophy advances and progresses, but its fundamental truths are immutable.

5th If it is a question of a historical truth, that is, a truth known through human testimony, its formulation and its meaning may vary, but its content remains the same. History is written and rewritten, but historical facts are immutable.

6th If it is a matter of a scientific truth, that is, a truth known through observation and experimentation, its formulation and its meaning may vary, but its content remains the same. Science advances and progresses, but its fundamental laws are immutable.

7th If it is a question of a moral truth, that is, of a truth known by natural reason and divine revelation, its formulation and its meaning may vary, but its content remains the same. Morality is immutable in its fundamental principles, but its application may vary according to circumstances.

8th. If it is a liturgical truth, that is, a truth expressed in the liturgy of the Church, its formulation and its meaning may vary, but its content remains the same. Liturgy is immutable in its essence, but its form may vary according to times and places.

9th If it is a canonical truth, that is, a truth expressed in the canon law of the Church, its formulation and its meaning may vary, but its content remains the same. Canon law is immutable in its fundamental principles, but its application may vary according to circumstances.

10th. If it is a matter of a spiritual truth, that is, of a truth known through spiritual experience, its formulation and its meaning may vary, but its content remains the same. Spirituality is immutable in its essence, but its expression may vary according to times and places.