La evolución homogénea del dogma católico

252. WHETHER DOGMATIC FACTS ARE OF DIVINE FAITH.—All theologians agree with St. Thomas that nothing can be¹ an object of divine faith unless it has been really and truly revealed by God. "For faith, of which we speak, assents to something only because it is revealed by God"². This is the foundation that St. Thomas lays from the very first article of his immortal treatise on divine faith.

So that dogmatic facts, or any other of the objects of so-called ecclesiastical faith, may be of true divine faith, it is indispensable that they have been truly revealed by God. Now, have dogmatic facts truly been revealed by God? And if they have been, in what way have they been so, or in what way are they truly contained in the deposit of revelation?

Here is the object of the present section. The importance of the question is evident to every theologian.

253. THREE KINDS OF FACTS.—First of all, let us say just a few words about what is meant by dogmatic facts.

There are three kinds of facts: a) expressly revealed facts; b) merely particular facts; c) dogmatic facts. The questions that deal with these various kinds of facts are usually called, respectively, by theologians: a) quaestio facti revelati; b) quaestio facti particularis; c) quaestio facti dogmatici.

By facts expressly revealed, as the name itself indicates, are understood those facts which were expressly entrusted by the Apostles to the Church in the deposit of Sacred Scripture or divine Tradition. Such are, for example, the facts that our most beloved Savior was born in Bethlehem, or that His Most Holy Mother remained always a virgin.

By particular facts are understood all those which not only are not expressly contained in the revealed deposit, but also have no necessary relation to it. They are facts having no connection whatsoever with the doctrine of faith and morals, or which, if they have some connection, concern only particular persons and not the whole Church, not being, therefore, absolutely necessary for the preservation or explanation of the revealed deposit. Such are, for example, besides all exclusively secular facts, the facts of whether a certain marriage was valid or null, whether a certain person committed or did not commit the crime of which he is accused, or whether a certain property belongs to one individual or another. "Ut cum agitur—says Saint Thomas—de possessionibus, vel de criminibus, vel de huiusmodi"³.

Between those two extreme classes—of expressly revealed facts and merely particular facts—there lies the other class of facts which, since the times of Jansenism, has received the name of dogmatic facts. These are those which are likewise not expressly contained in the deposit of revelation, and in this they agree with particular facts; but they differ from the latter in having a necessary relation to the preservation, explanation, or application of revealed doctrine, and they therefore interest not only one or several particular persons, but the whole Church. Such are, among others, the facts referring to the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of texts or books, such as whether the book of Jansenius is heretical or not, or whether it contains or does not contain the five famous heretical propositions which the Church declared that it contained⁴.

254. WHAT IS CERTAIN AND WHAT IS DISPUTABLE.—Concerning the first class of facts, that is, facts explicitly revealed, all theologians agree, and it is self-evident, that they are not only the object of infallibility or of ecclesiastical faith, but also of divine and Catholic faith, at least when the Church defines them, whether by solemn magisterium or by ordinary magisterium. "Fide divina et catholica ea omnia credenda sunt, quae in verbo Dei scripto vel tradito continentur, et ab Ecclesia, sive solemni iudicio, sive ordinario et universali magisterio, tamquam divinitus revelata credenda proponuntur"⁵. If everything divinely revealed can be the object of divine faith, then what is explicitly revealed merits it with all the more reason. When it is a matter of divine revelation or inspiration, doctrines deserve the same faith as facts. The word of God has divine authority, and equal authority in all things.

Regarding the second class of facts, called particular facts, all theologians are likewise agreed in affirming, with St. Thomas, quite the opposite, namely, that not only can they not be the object of divine faith, but not even of ecclesiastical faith or of the infallibility of the Church. "In aliis vero sententiis, quae ad facta particularia pertinent, ut cum agitur de possessionibus, vel de criminibus, vel de huiusmodi, possibile est iudicium Ecclesiae errare⁶"

Finally, regarding the third class of facts, the so-called dogmatic facts, and which is the one that now interests us, there is something on which all theologians agree, from the time of the Jansenist disputes, and something on which they differ. They agree that such facts can be infallibly defined by the Church and that to such infallible definitions there must be given, at least, an assent of faith that is absolutely certain and unconditional, which they call ecclesiastical faith. But they differ as to whether such faith, called ecclesiastical, is truly divine faith or is, on the contrary, a new kind of faith, intermediate between divine faith and human faith.

As we said, nothing can ever be a matter of divine faith unless it is divinely revealed, so the whole question depends on knowing whether such dogmatic facts are or are not truly revealed by God. If they are, they can become a matter of divine faith, and not merely of ecclesiastical faith. We shall endeavor to show that dogmatic facts are truly revealed and how they are revealed.

255. IMPLICIT REVELATION OF THE PARTICULAR IN THE UNIVERSAL.—The first and most essential of the divisions of divine revelation is into explicit revelation and implicit revelation. It is evident that dogmatic facts have not been revealed in an explicit manner. If, therefore, they are revealed at all, they can only be so in an implicit manner.

What is meant by implicit revelation, or how far the implicitness of divine revelation extends, is a question on which, from Molina onward, theologians are not unanimous. However, there is one point on which all or nearly all theologians agree, namely that, once a universal proposition has been explicitly revealed, all the particular propositions certainly contained within it remain implicitly and truly revealed, and are definable as of divine faith.

Thus, once it is revealed that all things were created by God, it is implicitly revealed, and definable as divine faith, that such a particular thing, the angels, for example, have been created. Once it is revealed that all men have been redeemed by Jesus Christ, it is implicitly revealed, and definable as divine faith, that such a man has been redeemed. Once it is revealed that all ecumenical Councils are infallible rules of faith, it is implicitly revealed, and definable as divine faith, that such a Council, the Council of Trent for example, is an infallible rule of faith. Once it is revealed that all Popes accepted by the universal Church are successors of Saint Peter, it is implicitly revealed that such a Pope, our Most Holy Father Pius XI, for example, is a successor of Saint Peter, or a true Pope. On this point, all or nearly all theologians today agree. But precisely because nearly all theologians agree on this, it is necessary to pause briefly to analyze it, in order then to pass from what all admit to what all ought to admit, if they were logical.

We are told, and it is true, that it is implicitly revealed that the Council of Trent is infallible, that the Vulgate is authentic in matters of faith and morals, that the current Pope is the true Pope. Now: we all know that the deposit of divine revelation was closed with the death of the last of the Apostles, and that after that no new public or catholic revelation is possible. How, then, can facts that, like the Vulgate, the Council of Trent, or the current Pontiff, took place many centuries after the Apostles, be truly revealed by God? Is this not a true addition to the revealed deposit? Is this not admitting that the Church can give us new dogmas?

Every student of theology knows what answer is given, and well given, to such questions. The revealed deposit was closed with the Apostles with regard to new Catholic revelation; but it was not closed, but rather continues and will continue to be open, with regard to the infallible explanation or application of the ancient revelation. The Church cannot give us new dogmas in the sense that they are new simpliciter, or new as to their substance; but it can give us new dogmas in the sense that they are only new secundum quid (secundum quid, that is, secundum aliquid, namely, new as to their explanation, provided that this explanation is not made through new revelations, as was done until the death of the last of the Apostles, but through mere infallibility or assistance of the Holy Spirit⁷. Well then: that, and nothing more than that, is what the Church does when it applies the proposition already revealed in universal to a particular proposition.

256. CONDITIONED PROPOSITIONS.—To see clearly that such particular propositions are nothing but a mere explanation and application of the revealed universal proposition, one need only consider the nature or meaning of those universals. They are conditioned universals. The universal proposition that "every ecumenical Council is a rule of faith" means that "every Council is a rule of faith, if it is ecumenical." Thus, then, it is true that a particular Council, for example, the Council of Trent, was not held until many centuries after the Apostles or after the closing of the deposit of revelation; but it is no less true that before the deposit of revelation was closed, and in the time of the Apostles, it was already truly revealed "that any Council, for example, the Council of Trent, is a rule of faith, if it is ecumenical." By merely purifying or infallibly fulfilling that condition, the conditioned proposition that "it is revealed that the Council of Trent is a rule of faith if it is ecumenical" is converted into this absolute proposition: "It is revealed that the Council of Trent is a rule of faith."

Therefore, without any new revelation, and merely by purifying or verifying a condition, any particular proposition contained in a universal or conditional proposition can become a matter of divine faith, at least when there is infallibility to verify or purify the condition, as there is in the Church, according to all theologians.

Even at the risk of being labeled as verbose or tedious, let us put the preceding observations into the form of reasoning, for once this is well understood, it will be easy to understand the nature of every truly dogmatic fact. Let the following reasoning be:

It is revealed that "every ecumenical council is infallible," or what is the same, it is revealed that "every council is infallible if it is ecumenical".

Thus such a Council is certainly ecumenical:

Then such a Council is infallible.

Note the reader the conclusion, which is precisely the fact of which we treat, and he will see clearly that it is but a particular case of the more universal revealed major, with no difference save that the condition has disappeared. Note likewise the minor, and he will also see that in that minor nothing doctrinal is added to or removed from the major: nothing is done but to verify or purify the condition.

Therefore, the minor premise does not enter into that reasoning as a formal motive or as a cause of the conclusion, but merely as a condition. Now, it is a very common doctrine among theologians that when in a reasoning the minor premise does not enter as a formal motive, but as a mere condition for explaining or applying the revealed major, the conclusion is also revealed and definable by divine faith. Hence theologians commonly admit that the Church can define as a matter of divine faith, and not only as a matter of ecclesiastical faith, that such a Council, for example the Vatican, is infallible, or that such a Pope, for example the current Pope, is a true Pope ⁸.

257. THE FAMOUS BOOK OF JANSENIUS.—Everything said thus far, when applied to those two well-known facts of the ecumenicity or infallibility of such a Council, or of the legitimacy of such a Pope, is generally admitted by modern authors. When addressing whether such facts are of divine faith or only of ecclesiastical faith, they answer that they are of divine faith, without any distinction between a question of right and a question of fact.

Despite all this, when they later deal with other dogmatic facts, known under the general name of “orthodoxy or heterodoxy of books or texts,” such as, for example, whether the book of Jansenius called Augustinus contains or does not contain the five heretical propositions that the Church declared it contained, they suddenly change their opinion, distinguishing between a question of right and a question of fact. The question of right is “whether such propositions are or are not heretical,” and this the Church can define as a matter of divine faith. The question of fact is “whether such propositions are or are not found in the book of Jansenius,” and this, they say, the Church cannot define as a matter of divine faith, but only as a matter of ecclesiastical faith. The reason for this, they say, is that the question of right is revealed, while the question of fact is not, and it is well known that nothing that is not truly revealed can be defined or believed as a matter of divine faith.

For starters, we could ask such theologians why, when dealing with the case of whether such a Council is truly infallible, they have not made that same distinction, and why they have not answered that the question of right, that is, that “every ecumenical Council is infallible,” was of divine faith, and that the question of fact, that is, whether “such a Council is ecumenical,” was only of ecclesiastical faith.

They will surely tell us that they have not made such a distinction, because the question of fact is but a particular case of a revealed universal proposition, and that, therefore, it is likewise revealed and of divine faith. Let us also proceed to show that the question of fact concerning the book of Jansenius, or any other dogmatic fact of any kind whatsoever, provided it is truly dogmatic, is nothing other than a particular case of a revealed universal, and that, therefore, the fact of Jansenius is as truly revealed by God as the fact of such a Council, and that it is so in exactly the same manner, that is, as particular within the universal. But let us first make four brief observations.

**258. FIRST OBSERVATION.—**When the Church defines that these or those heretical propositions are in such a book, she does not understand, nor is it necessary, that they be there according to the material words, but only according to the sense. The reason for this is very obvious. In revelation, as in faith, what is essential is the sense. The words, provided they express the same sense, are accidental.

Therefore, to define that such a book contains such propositions means no more than that it contains the same meaning as those propositions. And conversely, to contain the same meaning as those propositions is to contain those propositions. On this point all theologians agree.

**259. SECOND OBSERVATION.—**Not only is the deposit of Sacred Scripture and divine tradition revealed or inspired in general, but also each one of the parts, or truths, or propositions of which said deposit consists is revealed.

Therefore, not only is that heretical which is contradictorily opposed to the entire deposit, but also that which is contradictorily opposed to this or that part, or truth, or proposition of the deposit.

**260. THIRD OBSERVATION.—**The Church can, therefore, condemn a book as heretical in two ways: first, by condemning it simply as heretical, or as contradictorily opposed to the revealed deposit in general, that is, without specifying which particular heresy it contains or to which particular doctrine or proposition of the revealed deposit it is opposed; second, by condemning it as heretical in particular, that is, by pointing out which particular heresy it contains, or to which particular portion or proposition of the revealed deposit it is opposed.

**261. FOURTH OBSERVATION.—**The following two universal propositions are truly revealed by God: first, "every book that contains a sense contradictorily opposed to the sense of the revealed deposit contains heresy"; second, "every book that contains a sense contradictorily opposed to the sense of such a truth or proposition of the revealed deposit contains such heresy or such a heretical proposition"; for, as we said in the first observation, to contain such a proposition means nothing other than to contain the sense of such a proposition.

Having made these four observations, which we believe every theologian will admit, and we even fear that some will label them truisms, we shall set forth two examples or lines of reasoning: one in which the Church condemns a book as containing heresy in general, and another in which it condemns it as containing such-and-such heresy or such-and-such heretical propositions in particular. These are the two ways in which the Church is accustomed to condemn the books of heretics. In the first way it condemned very many books or writings, before and after Jansenius, and in the second way it condemned the Augustinus of Jansenius. In both we shall see how the so-called question of fact, that is, whether such a book contains heresy, or whether it contains such heresy or such heretical propositions, is, no more and no less, a proposition or particular case of a revealed universal.

262. FIRST EXAMPLE.—Every book that contains a meaning contradictorily opposed to the meaning of the revealed deposit contains heresy. Or, what is the same, every book contains heresy if it contains a meaning contradictorily opposed to the meaning of the revealed deposit.

Thus this book contains a meaning contradictory and opposed to the meaning of the revealed deposit:

Then this book contains heresy.

263. SECOND EXAMPLE.—Any book that contains a meaning contradictorily opposed to the meaning of such particular propositions of the revealed deposit contains such heretical propositions. Or, what is the same: any book contains such heretical propositions if it contains such a meaning contradictorily opposed to the meaning of such propositions of the revealed deposit.

Thus, this book (that of Jansenius, for example) contains a meaning contradictorily opposed to the meaning of such propositions of the revealed deposit.

Then this book contains such heretical propositions.

The reader should note these conclusions and will see that they are precisely the matter of fact in question. Let him then compare them with the greater revealed universals, and he will see clearly that they are, neither more nor less, a particular case of those universals (all — this), with no other difference than that the condition has disappeared. Finally, let him note the minors, and he will see that they add or subtract nothing doctrinal from the majors, and that they are limited exclusively to verifying or purifying a condition of those revealed majors.

Since, then, it is the common doctrine of theologians that every proposition contained in the revealed deposit as a particular in the universal is of divine faith, and not merely of ecclesiastical faith; since, moreover, it is common doctrine that every conclusion in which the minor premise enters only as a condition is of divine faith, and not merely of ecclesiastical faith, every theologian must admit that dogmatic facts are of divine faith, and not merely of ecclesiastical faith.

Inconsistencies of some theologians.—We believe that almost all modern manuals fall into a manifest inconsistency on this matter. When they try to prove the infallibility of the Church in dogmatic facts, they adduce as an argument the constant practice of the Church, and as examples of this practice they cite the condemnation of Arius’s book by the Council of Nicaea, that of the writings of Nestorius by the Council of Ephesus, the declaration of the authenticity of the Vulgate by the Council of Trent, the absence of all error in the canon of the Mass, declared by the same Council, and other infallible definitions of dogmatic facts given by the Church.

Listen, for example, to the ever clear and concise Van Noort: "It is proved secondly from the practice of the Church, which often in a definitive manner rejected heretical writings, as, for instance, Thalia of Arius at the Council of Nicaea, the writings of Nestorius at the Council of Ephesus: at the Council of Trent it declared the Vulgate authentic, and the canon of the Mass free from every error"⁹.

The same is expressed by De Groot¹⁰ and by almost all the manuals. Now, let anyone consult the acts of those cited Councils and he will see that such facts have been defined by the Church, not only as infallible or as matters of ecclesiastical faith, but also with the very same formula of anathema sit, which is the classic formula for definitions of heresy and divine faith. It suffices to cite the definition of the Council of Trent regarding the canon of the Mass: "If anyone says that the canon of the Mass contains errors, and therefore ought to be abrogated: anathema sit"¹¹. There the reader has a true dogmatic fact, and yet it is defined, not only as a matter of ecclesiastical faith, but as a matter of divine faith. With the same formula of anathema sit or anathematizamus, the Church has condemned the book of Nestorius, the writings of Arius, the writings called "the Three Chapters," and other dogmatic facts. This constitutes new proof that dogmatic facts can be defined as a matter of divine faith, and, therefore, that so-called ecclesiastical faith is truly divine faith.

Almost all the manuals, especially the Thomistic ones, also fall into another contradiction. After denying that theological conclusions and dogmatic facts are definable as of divine faith, they affirm, as is natural, that they are objects of infallibility, and to prove this latter point they cite the texts of St. Thomas referring to the indirect revealed¹², in which St. Thomas expressly affirms that the denial of the indirectly revealed corrupts the faith. Now, either under the name of "indirect" St. Thomas includes the conclusions and the facts, or he does not. If he does not include them, such texts are irrelevant, and, moreover, there are no other texts in the Holy Doctor than those applicable to the secondary object of infallibility. If he does include them, then they are definable as of divine faith, since St. Thomas expressly says that the indirectly revealed, once defined by the Church, is of divine faith, and its denial is true heresy.

264. THE ROOT OF THE CONFUSION.—The root of the confusion into which many theologians fall on this matter lies, in our judgment, in poorly making or not properly understanding the aforementioned division of the dogmatic fact into a question of right and a question of fact. They make or understand this division in the following way:

Question of right: "Whether these or the other propositions are heretical". Question of fact: "Whether these or the other propositions are contained in such a book". (Let the reader note that in the question of fact, thus formulated, the word heretical no longer enters, nor the word erroneous, nor anything indicating a relation to the revealed deposit).

Once thus formulated, that division, they grant that the question of right is definable as a matter of divine faith; but they deny that the question of fact can ever be a matter of divine faith, although they grant that it can be, and is, a matter of ecclesiastical faith.

To this we respond, and every theologian ought to respond, that the question thus formulated is not, nor can it be, of divine faith; but neither is it, nor can it be, of ecclesiastical faith, since it does not fall under the infallibility of the Church. The reason is very simple. That question of fact, thus formulated, is not a matter of dogmatic fact, but merely of particular fact, and where there is no dogmatic fact, but only a particular one, there is no room for divine faith, nor is there room for infallibility. They have failed to notice that in this division, of Jansenist origin, and which countless theologians continue to make in the same manner, all the dogmatic character that the fact possessed has been placed in one of the members (in the question of right), while the other member (the question of fact) has been left without a trace of the dogmatic, and so it is hardly surprising that that question of fact, as thus formulated, is not of divine faith, since neither is it of any infallible faith, because it is not a matter of dogmatic fact. Let us see if we can explain this question with something of the evident clarity that it possesses in itself, and with which we believe we see it.

What makes a question fall under the infallible authority of the Church is not precisely its character as a matter of right nor its character as a matter of fact, but exclusively its character as dogmatic, or necessarily connected with the deposit of revelation. Without that dogmatic character, no question falls under the infallibility of the Church, whether it is a question of right or a question of fact. On the other hand, with that dogmatic character, every question, whether of right or of fact, falls under infallibility.

Thus, the question of "whether such a mathematical proposition is true or false" is a question of right; the question of "whether that same proposition is found or not in such a book of Euclid" is a question of fact; and neither one nor the other falls under the infallible authority of the Church. They lack a dogmatic character.

On the other hand, the question of whether such a question is heretical is a question of right; the question of whether that same heretical question is found in such a book is a question of fact; and both fall under the infallibility of the Church, but they fall under it exclusively by reason of their dogmatic character, that is, by that character of being heretical or opposed to the deposit of revelation which they possess. Remove that character from either of these two questions, and infallibility disappears.

Therefore, if one wishes to divide the dogmatic fact of Jansenius into two questions, and that both fall under infallibility, it is necessary to divide it, not into a question of right and a question of fact, but into a question of dogmatic right and of dogmatic fact, making the character of heretical, or opposed to the revealed deposit, enter into both in the following manner: Question of dogmatic right: "Whether such propositions are heretical". Question of dogmatic fact: "Whether such heretical propositions are contained in the book of Jansenius".

If from either of those two questions we remove that word heretical or opposed to the deposit of revelation, their dogmatic character disappears, and with it there disappears not only divine faith, but also infallibility or ecclesiastical faith. On the other hand, if we leave that dogmatic character in both, then not only is the question of right a matter of divine faith, but so also is the question of fact, since such a question of dogmatic fact is nothing but a particular case of a revealed universal, as every reader will see with evident clarity merely by rereading the second example of reasoning set forth above. The conclusion, which is precisely the question of fact, but of dogmatic fact, is nothing but a particular case (all — this) of the major premise, which is a revealed universal.

265. THE DOGMATIC FACT IS INDIVISIBLE.—In reality, the dogmatic fact, in its relations with the authority of the Church or with our faith, is indivisible or indecomposable. It could be divided only in two ways: a) into a question of dogmatic right and a question of non-dogmatic fact; b) into a question of dogmatic right and a question of dogmatic fact.

The first division is useless for the end we are pursuing, since over a non-dogmatic fact infallibility cannot apply. The second is purely nominal, and sins against the elementary rules of logic, which teaches that none of the members of the division should include another of the members, nor should it exhaust the thing divided. It is as if we divided man into animal and rational animal, that is, into animal and man, where there would be no true division, since the second member includes the first and exhausts the thing divided.

Thus also the so-called question of fact, if it is in fact dogmatic, essentially and inseparably includes the question of right, and therefore the one is just as much of divine faith as the other, since both constitute one and the same judgment; just as the act by which the eye sees the color and the act by which it sees the existence or location of the colored thing are no more than one and the same act of vision, because color is the ratio sub qua of all vision of the bodily eye. "Sicut materia et forma," says St. Thomas, "sunt unum in esse, ita ratio cognoscendi et res cognita sunt unum cognitum, et propter hoc utriusque est una cognitio secundum actum et secundum habitum"

Therefore, anyone who does not lose sight of the fact that this dogmatic character is the ratio sub qua of all the Church’s authority will see that every question of right, if it is truly a question of dogmatic right, is at the same time a question of fact; and conversely, any question of fact, if it is truly a dogmatic fact, is at the same time a question of right.

Indeed: to say that "such a proposition is (a matter of right) heretical" is exactly the same as saying that "such a proposition contains (a matter of fact) a meaning contradictorily opposed to the meaning of such a portion or proposition of the revealed deposit."

In the same way, to say that "such a book contains (a question of fact) such a heretical proposition" is exactly the same as saying that "the meaning of such a book is (a question of right) contradictorily opposed to such a portion or proposition of the revealed deposit."

266. DEEPER ROOT OF THIS CONFUSION.—The ultimate root of all this lies in the fact that the judgments of the Church are not judgments of mere law, or of intrinsic analysis of the subject or predicate of a proposition, but judgments of fact, or of comparison between the proposition or book, on the one hand, and the revealed deposit, on the other. For that comparison the Church has divine authority. If it did not have it, no divine faith could be placed in any decision of the Church, neither in those we call de jure nor in those we call de facto. If it has it, it has it equally for all comparisons, unless someone imagines that for comparing a short proposition or five isolated propositions with the revealed deposit it has divine authority; and that when those propositions are longer or are joined or bound in a book, it has only ecclesiastical authority.

It is being forgotten that the eyes or eyeglasses of the Church are the revealed deposit, and only the revealed deposit. If it looks without those eyeglasses, it sees nothing, whether the matter be one of right or of fact, of a single proposition or of an entire book. If it looks through those eyeglasses, it sees everything and only what is dogmatic, with no distinction between facts or rights. Place before the Church this proposition: "A triangle equals two right angles," and, despite the evidence of such a proposition, the Church, as Church, sees nothing, because there is nothing dogmatic. Place before it this other: "Christ is (or is not) God," and the Church immediately sees its orthodox or heterodox character. Its divine eyeglasses mark it.

Likewise, place before him a profane book, and he sees nothing. Place before him a dogmatic book or a mixture of profane and dogmatic, and the divine lens immediately marks the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of however many dogmatic propositions exist in the book.

Where the Church sees these propositions as orthodox or heterodox is in the book of Jansenius; but the means or eyeglasses through which it sees them is the revealed deposit, divine revelation. Grammar, philology, history, all the labor of human reason that the Church employs, are not the eyeglasses nor the act of vision, for they precede the Church's definition or vision, and are not even required of the Church except as prior conditions. Infallibility itself is not a means of vision, but a simple assistance: assistance to verify infallibly well the act of vision, to apply perfectly and without error to the book of Jansenius the eyeglass of the revealed deposit.

Let the reader, if not, return to read the two cited examples of reasoning, and he will clearly see that the minor premises of those reasonings, in which the labor of the Church consists, are nothing more than a confrontation between the book of Jansenius and the revealed deposit. The book of Jansenius is the subject or object of those minor premises; the sense of the revealed deposit is the predicate or eyeglasses; the verb or copula is nothing but the result of the act of confrontation: the vision.

267. REFLECTOR OF DIVINE LIGHT.—If we did not fear, then, that some, for not knowing how to properly transpose certain sensible images or metaphors to the intellectual order, might regard them as anthropomorphic, we would compare the revealed deposit to a focus or reflector of divine light which, projected with infallible certainty by the Church upon the book of Jansenius, reveals or colors, in the manner of certain chemical reagents, all and only those passages or propositions in the book that are written in orthodox ink or in heterodox ink. Whatever in the book is written in another ink remains blank for the Church, insofar as it is the Church, however colored and legible it may appear to human reason. Infallibility (we will not tire of repeating it) is not for increasing, diminishing, or modifying the light of that divine focus of the greater revealed universal, but for projecting or applying it without error to the particular conclusion. Hence, what the Church sees, which is precisely the particular conclusion or dogmatic fact, it sees with divine light, with the very light of the revealed deposit or of the revealed universal. Hence, finally, that conclusion or dogmatic fact is nothing human nor ecclesiastical, but something divine: because it is nothing other than the infallible application of the revealed universal to a particular case or proposition.

268. ANOTHER DEMONSTRATION.—There is another, even simpler means of proving that the dogmatic fact, once infallibly defined by the Church, is not only a matter of ecclesiastical faith, but also of true divine faith.

Let us take the following universal proposition: “It is revealed that the Church is infallible in the definition of every dogmatic fact.” This proposition is commonly admitted by theologians, even by those who deny or seem to deny the definability as a matter of faith of theological conclusions¹³

That universal proposition, merely by turning it into the passive voice, is exactly the same as this other one: “It is revealed that every dogmatic fact defined by the Church is infallibly true”; or, what is the same thing: “It is revealed that every dogmatic fact is infallibly true if the Church defines it.”

With this presupposed, which is evident, it is easy to show that the question of dogmatic fact, and not only the question of right, is truly revealed as a particular in the universal, and that, therefore, it is of divine faith. Let the following reasoning be:

It is revealed that every dogmatic fact is infallibly true, if the Church defines it.

Thus the Church has defined this dogmatic fact, for example, the containment of the five heretical propositions in the book of Jansenius.

It is then revealed that this dogmatic fact is infallibly true.

We beg every reader to read and reread the foregoing reasoning without prejudice. In it he will see that the conclusion is, no more and no less, a particular case (all — this one) of the greater universal revealed. In it he will likewise see that the minor premise only purifies or infallibly certifies a condition of the major.

Then if, according to all theologians, everything contained in revelation is truly revealed as the particular in the universal; if, moreover, and also according to all theologians, every conclusion is revealed when the minor premise enters only as a condition, it follows that every dogmatic fact defined by the Church is of divine faith.

In short, let the reader note how in that reasoning the formal motive for assenting to the conclusion is the major premise, since the minor enters only as a condition. Since all the work of the authority or infallibility of the Church is reduced to that minor premise, that is, to purifying the condition, it is clearly seen how in the act of faith that we give to this conclusion, which is precisely the dogmatic fact, the authority of the Church enters not as a formal motive, but as a condition. The formal motive is the containment in a greater universal revealed, that is, divine revelation.

269. If, despite all this, we do not call heretic the one who denies a dogmatic fact, it is because, although the major premise, and therefore the particular conclusion, are truly revealed, nevertheless it is not yet defined, at least clearly, that they are revealed. And to call someone a heretic, it is not enough that the thing he denies is truly revealed, but it is necessary that it has been defined by the Church as revealed. Now, the major premise of this reasoning is commonly admitted by theologians as revealed; but its revelation has not yet been, at least clearly, defined by the Church.

270. AN OBJECTION.—A most learned theologian who treats all questions with notable profundity seems to have realized the inescapable force of this second reason that we have just adduced, and tries to respond indirectly to it in the following manner:

“You will object: Nothing of those things which have been defined by the infallible teaching authority of the Church can be rejected without heresy, because from the very fact that it would be rejected, the infallibility of the Church, which is revealed by God, would also be denied: But whatever cannot be rejected without heresy must be believed with divine faith: therefore.

“Nunc autem vitium is, as it seems, in a lesser degree than this way you may distinguish: by divine faith one must believe that which cannot be rejected without heresy; I distinguish: directly incurred by the rejection of such an object, I concede; without merely concomitant heresy, I deny. Moreover, even if it were granted that heresy would be incurred from the denial of a dogmatic fact defined by the Church, this would not be because of the rejection of the dogmatic fact in itself, but only because of the concomitant denial.

In contrast, in the case of facts such as whether a given Council is ecumenical or infallible; whether a given Pope is a true Pope; whether a given version of the Bible is authentic; whether such orthodox or heterodox propositions are contained in such a creed or book, etc., etc., before the definition or acceptance or approval of the Church, it is also possible to be mistaken or to err, and therefore no divine faith is admissible, despite all universal revelations. But since such facts are related to the doctrine or faith of the whole Church, and not only to that of these or those particular persons, they can be infallibly defined by the Church, and after such definition they are of divine faith. That divine faith comes to such facts not precisely from the definition or authority or infallibility of the Church, but from their own containment in the universal revelation, a containment that is infallibly made known to us by the definition. The authority, then, or definition of the Church is not the cause of their containment, but only of our infallible knowledge of that containment. of the infallibility of the Church in defining such matters, which infallibility could indeed be defined as a dogma of faith, although it has not so far been expressly defined. And therefore it was cautiously stated in the thesis that the things in question here cannot be matter of heresy per se and by reason of themselves.

First, that videtur and that caute already clearly indicate that the author himself does not have full confidence in that solution. They give the impression that the author, seeing that the argument was conclusive, and yet being unable to admit the conclusion, does not know whether to distinguish the major or the minor premise, and decides, albeit cautiously, to distinguish the minor one. "The flaw is, as it seems, in the minor premise."

Secondly, our objector, after so much caution, comes to concede that dogmatic facts are truly of divine faith, since he only denies that they are so by reason of themselves; but he does not deny that they are so, even if they are so by reason of another truth. What matters for us to know is whether or not they are of true divine faith; whether they are so for one reason or another matters little.

Thirdly, it also seems to have been momentarily forgotten that being of true divine faith, and yet being so not by reason of themselves, but by reason of another truth, is proper not only to dogmatic facts, but to everything indirectly revealed, even to what is expressly contained in the Bible. The fact that Samuel was the son of Elkanah, and all the other secondary facts of Sacred Scripture, are of true divine faith, and yet they are so not by reason of themselves, but by reason of another revealed truth that is wrapped up in them, or in which they are wrapped up, and which is affirmed or denied by affirming or denying such facts. That other revealed truth is the following: "Sacred Scripture is inspired by God and, therefore, cannot be false." And since that revealed truth would be denied by denying the fact that Samuel was the son of Elkanah, for that reason, and only for that reason, and not by reason of themselves, are these facts of divine faith. "Indirectly, indeed, those things pertain to faith from which something contrary to faith follows: as if someone were to say that Samuel was not the son of Elkanah; for from this it follows that divine Scripture is false"¹⁴

Fourthly, and this is the main point, the wise theologian has not noted that the fact that Samuel was the son of Elkanah is of divine faith, not precisely because the Bible is revealed or inspired in general, but because it is so in everything, and, therefore, it is also so in that particular fact. Without that, that fact would not be of faith.

Therefore, in affirming or denying that fact, we not only affirm or deny the revelation of another truth, but we deny the revelation of that fact. Hence, that fact is capable of divine faith and of heresy, not only in a concomitant manner, but in an immediate manner or in itself. Although the fact is not revealed for its own sake, the fact itself is revealed.

In exactly the same way, not only is the infallibility of the Church in general revealed, but also the infallibility of the Church in every dogmatic fact, and, therefore, in this dogmatic fact. By denying, then, that dogmatic fact after it has been defined, one denies not only the revelation of another truth, but also of that truth. The fact itself is revealed, although it is not so for its own sake.

They are therefore mistaken who believe that the formal motive for assenting to the definitions of a dogmatic fact is the infallibility of the Church, and that for this reason it is ecclesiastical faith. It is not the infallibility of the Church, but the divine revelation of that infallibility in every dogmatic fact, and therefore in this dogmatic fact. Because it is divine revelation, it is divine faith, and because it is of this dogmatic fact, it is divine faith, not concomitant, but proper, formal, and immediate.

In truth, let any theologian tell us: if Jesus Christ Himself were now to descend from heaven and tell us that such a dogmatic fact, for example, the containment of the five propositions in the book of Jansenius, was true, would that fact be of divine faith or not? For the same thing that He would tell us now He had already told us twenty centuries ago. In telling us or revealing to us that the Church was infallible in every dogmatic fact, and, therefore, in that dogmatic fact of Jansenius, He had told us that that dogmatic fact of Jansenius, once defined, was true.

271. This also resolves another objection raised by the wise theologian, namely: that for a particular proposition to be revealed in the universal, the universal and the particular must have the same subject, as they do in the propositions “every Council is infallible” and “this Council is infallible”; whereas in dogmatic facts the revealed universal is “the Church is infallible,” and the particular is “this dogmatic fact is infallible,” where the subjects are distinct.

From what has been said, the reader knows the solution to that dialectical subtlety. The revealed universal proposition is not merely that "the Church is infallible," but that "the Church is infallible in all dogmatic facts," or, what amounts to the same thing, that "all dogmatic facts, once defined, are infallible." And that proposition has the same subject as the following: "this defined dogmatic fact is infallible." Therefore, it is of divine faith.

272. THE THOMIST OPINION.—Those Thomists of today who deny that the theological conclusion is definable by divine faith also deny, and with even greater vigor, the definability by divine faith of dogmatic facts. We believe that in this they are consistent.

But since those Thomists, when denying the definability of faith of theological conclusions, usually cite Billuart to us and attach great importance to him as a representative of the Thomistic tradition, it will not be amiss for us also to cite, briefly, what Billuart thinks about the definability of dogmatic facts. Here are his words:

“You press: Faith comes from hearing, and hearing through the Word of God; but the fact of Jansenius is not contained in the Word of God: therefore.
“Again, the Church has no new revelations, nor do the articles of faith grow with the succession of times; but these two things seem to have to be admitted, if the fact of Jansenius is revealed and of divine faith: therefore.
“I reply that the solutions to these objections flow from what has been said.
“To the first, I distinguish the minor premise: The fact of Jansenius is not contained in the Word of God explicitly and immediately, I grant; implicitly and mediately, I deny. For it is contained in this universal revealed proposition: Every text condemned by the Church is condemnable.
“To the second. This universal revelation just mentioned is not new, but has existed from the beginning; consequently, the condemnation of the text of Jansenius is not a new article of faith, but an explanation and application of the universal revelation to a particular and determinate object: just as when a man is born, it is a matter of faith that he has sinned in Adam; yet it is not a new revelation, nor a new article of faith, but only an explanation and application of this universal revelation, all have sinned in Adam, to a particular object”.

And shortly before he had said: “Porro revelatum est universaliter omnem textum, omnem propositionem, omnem librum ab Ecclesia damnatum, esse vero damnabilem, id namque comprehenditur sub infallibilitate Ecclesiae revelata: ergo et hunc textum huius propositionis, puta Iansenii”¹⁵

Now then: how has Billuart, who so clearly seems to deny the definability by divine faith of theological conclusions, been able to arrive at admitting the definability by divine faith of dogmatic facts? Because one must note—and therein lies the amusing part—that to admit the definability by divine faith of dogmatic facts, Billuart relies, and relies well, on the reason that "the infallibility of the Church in every dogmatic fact is truly revealed," without noticing that in the same way the infallibility of the Church in everything truly connected with the revealed deposit is revealed, and therefore in every true theological conclusion, as almost all theologians today recognize (212).

273. The explanation of this oversight on Billuart’s part is quite simple. It is well known that Billuart frequently does little more than summarize, albeit with his truly French clarity, the doctrines of John of Saint Thomas and of the Salmanticenses. These two eminent theologians, having failed to discern properly the Suarezian tangle concerning the virtual revealed or theological conclusion, denied, and rightly denied, the definability de fide of the purely virtual (virtuale tantum — connexive tantum), since it is not a rigorous theological conclusion, but rather a purely physical conclusion; yet they used such phrases that they seem to deny the definability de fide of every true virtual, even of the identical or implicit virtual, and therefore of every true and rigorous theological conclusion. Billuart, in this as in almost everything else, did nothing but summarize those two theologians.

On the other hand, the question of dogmatic facts was not treated by John of Saint Thomas or by the Salmanticenses, since that question did not occupy theologians until the Jansenist evasions prompted it. This meant that in the question of dogmatic facts Billuart could reason on his own and came to the conclusion, as every Thomist must come, that dogmatic facts are implicitly revealed as the particular in the universal, and are therefore definable as of divine faith. Hence the two times he treats this question¹⁶ he places that solution that dogmatic facts are of divine faith alongside the then quite common one that they were of ecclesiastical faith, and he takes pleasure in giving an extensive solution to all the objections that the Jansenists raised against it.

274. If John of St. Thomas and the Salmanticenses had lived a little later and treated this question, it is certain that they would have arrived at the same conclusion. In treating whether it is of divine faith that "the present pope is the true pope" or that "the Council of Trent is a legitimate council," the only facts that were then usually discussed in speaking of faith, both answer affirmatively, basing themselves on the fact that these facts are truly contained in divine revelation as the particular in the universal¹⁷

For in the very same way is contained every dogmatic fact, and for that reason it is definable by divine faith and not only by ecclesiastical faith.

275. If the older Thomists, such as Torquemada, Cajetan, Cano, etc., denied that certain dogmatic facts, even the fact that "such a pope is the true pope," were of divine faith, it is because it was not yet clear that the infallibility of the Church in such facts was revealed. Those great Thomists never fell into the flagrant inconsistency of admitting the revelation of the Church's infallibility in one thing and denying that such a thing was of divine faith after it had been defined. Since today Thomists and non-Thomists alike already admit that infallibility in dogmatic facts is revealed, all must admit that such facts, once defined, are of divine faith.

276. THE ATTITUDE OF THE CHURCH.—Regarding this question of facts, as with so many others, there has been progress in Catholic theology, and to this the practice or attitude of the Roman Church has contributed chiefly, as almost always happens. The energetic attitude of Clement VIII at the beginning of the seventeenth century against the defenders of the celebrated thesis of Alcalá ("It is not of faith that this man, e.g., Clement VIII, is the true Pope"), oriented the thought of theologians toward the study of that particular dogmatic fact, and since then almost all admit that this fact is of divine faith¹⁸.

The subsequent and no less vigorous attitude of Popes Innocent X, Alexander VII, and Clement XI against the resistance and interminable Jansenist quibbling also directed Catholic theology in the study of the dogmatic fact in general, and since then there is scarcely any theologian who does not admit that the infallibility of the Church in every dogmatic fact is revealed. This amounts, for every Thomist, to saying that every dogmatic fact is revealed, and, therefore, that it is revealed that this dogmatic fact, once defined, is infallibly true. In other words, that it is a matter of divine faith, since what God reveals is just as much of divine faith as what God reveals to be true. The only thing is that, although this is of divine faith because it is contained as a particular in a universal revealed truth, it is not of divine faith that it is of divine faith, because that universal revelation is not yet defined. Hence, he who denies it is not a heretic.

May the reader excuse so much insistence or repetition, for all of it is necessary when it comes to uprooting ideas as vulgarized as that modern and heterogeneous ecclesiastical faith. On the other hand, we believe that that name of ecclesiastical faith would have come in handy to designate the kind of faith or human, and not divine, religious assent that we give to the non-infallible teachings of the Church.

277. APPLICATIONS.—Everything said in this section about dogmatic facts applies equally to the facts of whether a given law or discipline or custom of the universal Church or whether a given rule or constitutions of a religious Order are moral (for the question is not whether they are opportune or prudent) or to any other fact that is truly dogmatic, that is, that is necessarily connected with the revealed deposit or that is necessary for its preservation, explanation, or application and has been infallibly defined or approved by the Church. The morality of such a fact is of divine faith and not merely of ecclesiastical faith.

There is not the slightest difference between defining the truth of such a conclusion or fact and defining the morality of such a rule or constitutions, of such a law or discipline, of such a practice or custom. In the same way that it can be defined as of divine faith that "such a council is infallible," because it is but a particular case or application of this universal revealed principle: "every ecumenical council is infallible," in that same way it can be defined as of divine faith, and not merely as of ecclesiastical faith, that "such a law or custom or rule, etc., is moral," because it is but a particular case of application of this universal revealed principle: "every law or custom or rule, etc., in conformity with the morality of the revealed deposit is moral." The divine faith of such a particular proposition does not come from the authority or infallibility of the Church, but from its containment in the universal revealed principle or revealed deposit. The authority or infallibility of the Church does not cause that containment; it causes nothing more than our infallible knowledge of that containment. It enters not as the formal motive, but as a condition or application of the formal motive, which is divine revelation. It is, therefore, divine faith, not ecclesiastical faith nor human faith¹⁹.

277. Finally, the canonization of the saints is not, in all probability, anything but an accidental variant of a dogmatic fact, and, therefore, of divine faith. But since its dogmatic character, that is, its necessary relation to a universal revealed truth or revealed deposit, is not, at first glance, so clear, and, above all, since this question has been expressly treated by St. Thomas and by almost all Thomists (although we have already noted that in these questions of facts there has been progress in theology), we shall deal with it in a separate section, for we believe it deserves it.

For now, let it suffice that we have shown, as we believe, that every truly dogmatic fact is implicitly revealed by God as the particular in the universal, and that, therefore, once infallibly defined, it is of true and proper divine faith, and not merely of that modern faith called ecclesiastical. With this it is demonstrated that the evolution of dogma extends not only to theological conclusions, but also to dogmatic facts.