La evolución homogénea del dogma católico

238. We will attempt to show in this section that, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, the so-called ecclesiastical faith which we give to the infallible definitions of theological conclusions by the Church is true divine faith, of the same species as that which we give to the articles of faith.

We will first adduce some proofs taken literally from Saint Thomas and then others taken from theological reason. So that these proofs may be clear, we will always begin by formulating them in a brief syllogism.

239. FIRST PROOF.—Ecclesiastical faith is infallible faith:

Thus, there can be no infallible faith unless its formal motive is the testimony of God.

Then ecclesiastical faith has as its formal motive the testimony of God. Or, what is the same: thus ecclesiastical faith is divine faith.

The major premise of that reasoning is admitted by all, for that is what we understand by ecclesiastical faith. The minor premise, in which lies the entire root of this question, is taught by Saint Thomas in the following words: “Neque hominis neque angeli testimonio assentire, infallibiliter in veritatem duceret, nisi quatenus in eo loquentis Dei testimonium consideratur.” Which, rendered into the vernacular, means: “The testimony of no man whatsoever, whether patriarch, prophet, apostle, or pope, nor the testimony of any angel or other creature whatsoever, can merit infallible faith unless that testimony is, at the same time and truly, the testimony of God.”

The text is perfectly clear. But since even the clearest texts can give rise to doubt or furnish occasion for quibbles and evasions when they are not studied in their true and complete context, we shall take the liberty of reproducing almost the entire article of St. Thomas in which these words are found. It is the eighth article of Question Fourteen among the disputed questions On Truth (De veritate). That fourteenth question is devoted entirely to divine faith, and the title of the eighth article is: "Whether the proper object of faith (proprium obiectum fidei) is the First Truth (Veritas Prima)." This is equivalent to asking whether the formal motive of divine faith is the testimony of God. Here is the Holy Doctor's reply:

"I answer that the proper object of faith is the First Truth. This can be understood as follows. No habit has the character of a virtue unless its act is always good. Otherwise it would not be the perfection of a faculty. Since, therefore, the act of the intellect is good insofar as it considers the truth, it follows that a habit existing in the intellect cannot be a virtue unless it is such that through it one infallibly judges the truth. For this reason opinion is not an intellectual virtue, whereas science and understanding are, as is stated in the sixth book of the Ethics."

"Now faith does not possess the character of a virtue by reason of the evidence of the things themselves, since it concerns things that are unseen. It must therefore derive this from adhering to a testimony in which truth is found infallibly."

"But just as created being, considered in itself, is empty and liable to fail unless it is sustained by uncreated being, so every created truth is liable to fail unless it is corrected by the uncreated Truth."

"Therefore, assent to the testimony of neither a man (for example, the Pope or a Council) nor an angel would lead infallibly to the truth except insofar as the testimony of God speaking is recognized in them."

"Hence, faith that is a virtue, that is, every faith by which one infallibly judges the truth, causes the human intellect to adhere to the truth that exists in the divine knowledge, transcending the truth of its own intellect..."

"And thus the faith that unites man to the divine knowledge through assent has God Himself as its principal object; everything else pertains to it only consequently."¹

"Accordingly, the First Truth (Veritas Prima) stands in relation to faith (that is, to every faith by which one infallibly judges the truth) both as its means (medium) and as its object (obiectum)." ²

We earnestly recommend that every reader, and especially every Thomist reader, read and reread, analyze and meditate upon the foregoing article of St. Thomas. It is one of fundamental importance, taken from the very treatise On Faith (De Fide), in which St. Thomas lays the foundation of the entire treatise by proving that the formal object, or formal motive, of every infallible faith must necessarily be the divine testimony.

The entire force of that article consists in the following proposition: "There is no infallible faith without an infallible testimony, and there is no infallible testimony except the divine testimony." And this is precisely the minor premise of the syllogism that we were seeking to prove.

For those unfamiliar with St. Thomas's language, the cited article could be summarized in the following propositions:

1. Divine faith is an intellectual virtue.
2. It cannot be an intellectual virtue unless it always inclines toward the truth.
3. It cannot always incline toward the truth unless it has as its formal motive an infallible testimony.
4. It cannot have as its formal motive an infallible testimony unless it has as its formal motive the very testimony of God.
5. Therefore, divine faith has as its formal motive the testimony of God, that is, the First Truth.

Let the reader note the fourth proposition, which is the basis of all of St. Thomas’s reasoning. If that fourth proposition is denied or distinguished, the conclusion and the entire article of St. Thomas collapse at their foundation. On the other hand, if that fourth proposition is admitted without distinctions, as it ought to be, it is proven that all infallible faith, and therefore ecclesiastical faith, is divine faith.

The Holy Doctor proves this fourth proposition with those beautiful words: “Just as created being, as far as it is in itself, is vain and defective, unless it is held together by uncreated being: so all created truth is defective, unless insofar as it is rectified by uncreated truth”.

With that principle established, which is evident, the Holy Doctor argues thus: “Either faith has as its formal motive the created truth in itself, and then it is not infallible faith nor, therefore, divine faith, or it has as its formal motive the created truth insofar as it is rectified by the uncreated truth, and then the true formal motive is not the created truth, but the Uncreated Truth, and, therefore, it is divine faith.”

If we apply that same doctrine of St. Thomas to ecclesiastical faith, it becomes evident that it is divine faith. The matter is clear. When we say that ecclesiastical faith has as its formal motive the authority of the Church, we need only apply St. Thomas's same reasoning. Either that authority of the Church is a created authority, not rectified by the uncreated authority, or it is a created authority, rectified by the uncreated authority. If the former, it is not infallible faith, nor, therefore, ecclesiastical faith. If the latter, it comes to the same thing, according to St. Thomas, whether the formal motive is created truth, rectified by uncreated truth, or the formal motive is uncreated truth, and therefore it is divine faith.

There will surely be no lack of readers who, accustomed by modern manuals to distinguish specifically between divine faith and infallible faith, will deny or distinguish some of those propositions on which St. Thomas's reasoning is based. The force of education and habit is very great, and the imagination, when supported by these, is most fruitful in distinctions and subterfuges. But let it be borne in mind that the question now is not to demonstrate whether what St. Thomas affirms is true or not, but simply that St. Thomas affirms it thus.

We recommend to every sincere Thomist that he consult the parallel places to the cited article³.

In the second article of that passage from the Sentences, the following text will be found: "The believer trusts a man (a prophet, apostle, pope, or council) not insofar as he is a man, but insofar as God speaks in him"⁴.

And in the fourth article of that same place, one will find the following: "The motive (the formal reason) inclining the will to believe the articles is the First Truth itself, which is infallible; but the reason that inclines one to believe other things is either some fallible sign, or the statement of some learned person, who can both err and deceive. Hence the will does not give infallible truth to the intellect believing other credible things, as it gives infallible truth in believing the articles of faith; and for this reason this faith is a virtue and the other is not"⁵.

For St. Thomas, just as there is no middle ground between created and uncreated being, but every being is either created or uncreated, so too there are no specific mixtures or middle terms between created truth and uncreated truth, or between human authority or faith and divine authority or faith. All authority is either specifically human or specifically divine. If human authority is not completely rectified or guaranteed by divine authority, it is fallible authority, and therefore the faith is specifically human and fallible, whatever name, whether civil or ecclesiastical, one may wish to clothe it with. On the other hand, if human authority is completely rectified or guaranteed by divine authority, as it is in every infallible definition of the Church, then, according to St. Thomas, the authority is specifically divine, and in assenting to it we do not assent formally to the testimony of man, but to the very testimony of God, by whose divine authority the testimony of every infallible definition of the Church is covered, or rectified, or guaranteed, or divinized. That is the meaning of those words of the Holy Doctor: "Just as created being, in itself, is vain and defective unless it is contained by uncreated being, so too all created truth is defective unless it is rectified by uncreated Truth. Hence, neither to the testimony of man nor of angel would assent lead infallibly to truth, unless insofar as in them the testimony of God speaking is considered⁶

Let the reader, then, not forget this fundamental principle of Saint Thomas: “There is no infallible faith unless it has as its formal motive the testimony of God.” Which is exactly the same as saying: “All ecclesiastical faith, on pain of not being infallible faith, is divine faith”⁷

Since modern times when a distinction began to be made between definitions of divine faith and merely infallible definitions, certain theologians already regard the matter of infallible definitions as something of little importance, or as something that the Church would do frequently. Thus, for every doctrinal document of the Holy See, merely because it is addressed to the whole Church, there is almost always some theologian who immediately raises the question of whether such a document is infallible. The result is often that some theologians declare themselves for the affirmative and others for the negative, with which we are left, regarding infallibility, as before the dispute, since a document whose infallibility is not evident, but doubtful or disputable, is not infallibly certain, or is practically as if it were not. We believe that in these disputes two things are frequently forgotten: first, that infallible definitions, far from being an ordinary or frequent thing among the popes, are a rare thing and even extremely rare, as the most eminent Cardinal Van Rossum very wisely observes: “Thus the Supreme Pontiff is rather to be said to use his extraordinary teaching authority or his infallibility rarely, indeed extremely rarely”⁸. Second, that no pontifical document should be considered an infallible definition unless it is evidently established that it is: applying to infallible definitions, since the reason is the same, what the new Canonical Code so prudently teaches regarding dogmatic definitions: “Nothing is understood to be dogmatically declared or defined, unless this is manifestly established”⁹.

That inclination of some to regard all the Pope’s doctrinal documents as infallible is not always a sign of excessive faith and obedience to the Church, but rather is sometimes a sign of a lack of obedience and faith, since it stems from believing that the Church’s teachings do not merit faith and obedience unless they are infallible. Although they do not merit divine faith or infallible faith, they always merit human faith, and an internal and certain human faith, as long as it is not evidently established—and rarely will it be—that the Church has in fact erred. That human faith that we give to the Church’s non-infallible teachings, and which in modern times has received the name of pious assent, is what ought to be called ecclesiastical faith, just as we call ecclesiastical laws those human and changeable laws of the Church to distinguish them from laws that are truly divine and immutable.

240. THE SECOND PROOF, likewise taken from Saint Thomas, to demonstrate that the so-called ecclesiastical faith is true divine faith, may be formulated as follows: • Everything truly said by God, or everything that is nothing other than an explanation of what was said by God, is definable as divine faith and merits the assent of divine faith once defined: But everything revealed in a mediate or consequential manner is truly said by God, or is nothing other than an explanation of what was said by God:

Then the faith that must be given to the mediate or consequential revelation, once it has been defined by the Church, is divine faith. Or, what is the same: then ecclesiastical faith is divine faith.

The major premise of that reasoning is common doctrine among theologians. In parentheses, let the reader note how we have formulated and how that major premise must be formulated so that it may be said to be common doctrine. If, instead of saying that it is "definable as a matter of faith," we had said that it is "of faith" (that is, formally of faith) even before the Church's definition, as is frequently said in the manuals, then that major premise would not be common doctrine, but rather the particular doctrine of Vázquez and Vega, which the Thomist school always opposed. But this is entirely accidental to our case. What is essential is that that major premise, as we have formulated it, is common doctrine among theologians.

The lesser premise, which is what matters and upon which the entire present question depends, is express doctrine of Saint Thomas, repeated by the Holy Doctor in various places and under varied forms. Let us cite some texts.

Let us begin with the article in which the Holy Doctor examines precisely the question of whether there can be true dogmatic progress, and which bears the title: “Utrum fides per successionem temporum profecerit.” In his reply to the fourth objection, he expresses himself thus:

“Ad quartum dicendum quod the article is indivisible truth, with respect to what is actually explicated in the article: but it is divisible (explicable, developable) with respect to those things which are potentially contained in the article, inasmuch as one who says one thing, in a certain way says many things, and these are what precede the article or follow from it: and with respect to this the article of faith can be explicated and divided”¹⁰.

In that text Saint Thomas clearly states the two things affirmed in our minor, namely: first, that truly spoken by God are not only the articles, that is, what is formally revealed, but also all the consequences of those articles (ea quae consequuntur ad ipsum), that is, what is mediately revealed. Second, that such consequences are nothing but an explanation of the articles (et quantum ad hoc potest explicari et dividi articulus fidei).

Let us hear another similar text, no less expressive than the previous one: “Explicare articulos fidei contingit dupliciter: in one way, as regards the very substance of the articles, according to which one knows the articles themselves distinctly; in another way, as regards what is contained implicitly in the articles themselves, which indeed happens when a person knows those things which follow from the articles¹¹

In this text, the Holy Doctor again affirms that everything mediate or consequential (ea quae ex articulis consequuntur) is truly implicit in the articles of faith, or in what God has said (*in ipsis articulis continentur implicite), and that, therefore, it is nothing other than an explanation of what God has said (explicare articulos fidei). Thus, both the theologian, when he draws out those consequences fallibly, and the Church, when she defines them infallibly, do nothing other than explain what was already implicitly said by God. With the sole difference that the theologian makes or gives this explanation with human authority, and the Church with divine authority.

Let us hear a third text, no less expressive than the previous ones, if not more so: “Something contained in an article can be explained in two ways: in one way, according as one article is sometimes contained in another, or two are contained in a common one, just as the resurrection of the dead is in a certain way contained in the Resurrection of Christ, and the Passion and the Incarnation in this common thing which is the mystery of Redemption. And thus faith implicit is made explicit in the determined articles of faith, and this explanation was completed through Christ, whence to his doctrine, as far as the essentials of faith are concerned, it is lawful neither to add nor to diminish, as is said in the last chapter of Revelation. But before the coming of Christ it was not complete; hence even among the greater [figures] it grew according to the different times”.

Thus far the Holy Doctor has spoken of the explanation of articles by articles that existed in the Old Testament and no longer fits in the New; now comes the explanation of articles by consequences, which is the explanation that still fits in the New Testament. The Holy Doctor continues thus:

“In another way, that which is contained in the article is not the article, but something accompanying the article, and in this respect the faith can be unfolded daily, and through the study of the Saints (the Fathers of the ecumenical councils) it has been more and more unfolded”¹² “Because faith, as far as it is in itself, sufficiently inclines toward all things that accompany, precede, or follow the faith”¹³. It is evident that St. Thomas, when he speaks of consequences of the articles, understands not only the improper consequences, but also the proper ones, that is, everything from the denial of which the denial of what is directly revealed would follow: “those things that are contained potentially in the article” (466-469).

We have, then, that the true object of ecclesiastical faith is implicitly spoken by God, and that, therefore, ecclesiastical faith is divine faith¹⁴

241. THIRD PROOF.—No one is truly a heretic unless he denies something that is truly of divine faith.

Thus, according to Saint Thomas, whoever denies what is mediately, consequently, or indirectly revealed after it has been infallibly defined by the Church would truly be a heretic.

Then ecclesiastical faith is, according to Saint Thomas, true divine faith.

The greater premise of that reasoning is evident and admitted by all. The lesser premise is expressly and repeatedly affirmed by Saint Thomas whenever he deals with one of these two questions: a) "whether it is lawful to hold contrary opinions about the notions"; b) "whether heresy properly concerns those things which are of the faith".

Let us briefly cite some texts: "Idem iudicium est de his (concerning indirect revelation) et de illis (concerning direct revelation) quia ad unum sequitur alterum"¹⁵ "In this he cannot err except through heresy"¹⁶ "And for this reason many things are now considered heretical which were not previously so considered, because it is now more evident what follows from them" (ibid). "If anyone were to resist such an ordination, he would be deemed a heretic"¹⁷

242. A REMARK.—The observation that perhaps may occur to some is that, if this doctrine of St. Thomas is true, then not only the one who denies what the Church has defined as Catholic faith must be held as a heretic, but also the one who denies what has been defined as infallible truth.

The answer is that for one to be formally a heretic, it is not enough that Saint Thomas says so, but rather it is necessary that the Church says or teaches so. Now then: up to the present, the Church already teaches that whoever denies what is defined as Catholic faith is a heretic, but it does not yet teach that whoever denies what is defined as infallible truth is a heretic.

But one thing is that the Church does not yet teach this, and another thing is that it may not be able to teach it someday. In the Vatican Council, the following dogmatic canon was already prepared: "If anyone says that the infallibility of the Church is restricted only to those things contained in divine revelation (formal revelation), and that it does not extend also to other truths which are necessarily required so that the deposit of revelation may be kept intact: let him be anathema"¹⁸.

Because the Vatican Council was suspended, that dogmatic canon which was already prepared could not be discussed. On the day—perhaps not very distant—when the Church resumes the suspended council and approves or defines that dogmatic canon, we will hold as a matter of divine faith that the Church is infallible in defining consequential revelation, or what is the same thing, that consequential revelation defined by the Church is infallibly true. Consequently, we will have it defined as heretical to deny that the Church is infallible in defining the consequential, or what is the same thing, to deny that the consequential defined by the Church is infallibly true.

As the mediate or consequential revelation, after being infallibly defined by the Church, is precisely the proper object of what is called ecclesiastical faith, the not-distant day on which the Church defines that dogmatic canon will indirectly define that what is called ecclesiastical faith is truly divine faith. It amounts to the same, we shall repeat, to define that it is of divine faith that the Church is infallible in what is mediately revealed, as to define that it is of divine faith that what is mediately revealed, once defined, is infallibly true, or to define that one must assent with divine faith to the truth of what is mediately revealed once defined by the Church.

This is without counting that in past centuries the Church has already defined as true dogmas of divine faith many theological conclusions and various dogmatic facts, as traditional theology has always recognized and as is evident from the history of dogmas¹⁹.

243. FOURTH PROOF.—Every theological conclusion deduced from two formally revealed premises is definable by divine faith and not merely by ecclesiastical faith: But the theological conclusion deduced from one formally revealed premise and another of natural reason is of the same specific nature as that deduced from two formally revealed premises: Therefore every truly theological conclusion is definable by divine faith and not merely by ecclesiastical faith. The major premise of this argument is commonly admitted by theologians. The minor premise is the current and perpetual doctrine of St. Thomas and of all Thomists. It is founded upon the specific unity and indivisibility of Sacred Theology, and, therefore, upon that of all its conclusions, whether they be conclusions from two premises of faith, or one of faith and another of reason. “Theology is one according to the infima species, whether it proceeds from both premises being of faith, or one of faith and the other of natural reason, or whether it is concerned with speculative matters, or with moral ones. It is taken from St. Thomas” ²⁰. If some imagine that there is a specific difference between conclusions from two premises of faith and those from one of faith and another of reason, it is because in this, as in so many other similar questions, they are accustomed to fix their attention upon the purely material point of view, without noting that the nature and specific distinction of cognitive habits does not come from the matter or reality of the thing known, but from the formal medium of knowledge. Now: either the formal medium of knowledge is diverse in some conclusions and others, or it is the same. If it is diverse, then one must distinguish diverse species of theology against the clear and perpetual doctrine of St. Thomas. If it is the same, it is impossible that some conclusions be definable by divine faith and others not, since, divine faith being specifically distinct from theology, the being or not being definable by divine faith constitutes a distinct species. Many imagine they escape this inescapable dilemma by distinguishing, in the style of Vázquez, conclusions as conclusions and conclusions as truths or consequents. Or, as it is commonly said: conclusions formaliter and conclusions specificative. Having made this distinction, they usually reply that conclusions from two premises of faith are definable by divine faith considered specificative or insofar as they are revealed truths, but not considered formaliter or insofar as they are deduced conclusions. Hence the distinction of two assents: an assent to conclusions considered formaliter or insofar as they are conclusions, and this is a theological assent, and another assent to conclusions considered specifically or insofar as they are revealed truths, and this, they say, is an assent of divine faith.

Firstly, if that distinction between two assents, one of theology and another of divine faith, were valid for the conclusions of two premises of faith, it would be equally valid for the conclusions inclusive of one premise of faith and another of reason, since both one and the other are known by reasoning, and neither one nor the other can be known without reasoning. Therefore, if for assent one could dispense with reasoning in some cases, one could equally do so in all.

Secondly and principally, the possibility of considering one and the same conclusion in two different senses and thus being able to give it two specifically distinct acts of assent is true or takes place when that conclusion is knowable to us by two means or ways that are specifically different, that is, when we can know it without ratiocination and with ratiocination. This occurs when a truth is contained in one part of the deposit expressly or without ratiocination and in another part of the deposit virtually or with ratiocination; for example, the eternity of God. This also occurs when we know a truth by the definition of the Church or without ratiocination and moreover by theological deduction or with ratiocination; for example, the two wills in Christ.

But when we know a truth only by means of deductive reasoning, and therefore know it only through a single means of knowledge, that is, as a conclusion, it is an absurdity in Thomist doctrine to say that two assents (127) can be given to it. If it is known only insofar as it is a conclusion, only the assent insofar as it is a conclusion can be given to it, which is theological assent, whether it is a question of a conclusion from two premises of faith or from one of faith and another of reason. "There is not given a double assent regarding the conclusion, one about it in itself, another about it as inferred; because the conclusion, whether it is considered in itself or as inferred, always pertains to the same habit, namely, science"²¹ "As for the conclusions themselves, there is given only a single

assensus, qui pertinet ad theologiam, et per quem fertur ad conclusiones et illative et entitative sumptas²². This is elementary and perpetual doctrine in the Thomist school, with no exception other than the Salmanticenses, because they did not distinguish the Suarezian confusion about the virtually revealed²³.

Therefore, before the definition of the Church, all true theological conclusions—whether those from two premises of faith or those from one of faith and one of reason—are known solely by means of theology, that is, by revelation explained by reason. After the definition of the Church, all are known, moreover, by another new means, that is, by revelation explained by the Church, which is the means of divine faith. Hence, before the definition of the Church, all true conclusions merit one and the same single assent, the theological assent, never that of divine faith. After the definition of the Church, they merit two specifically distinct assents: the theological assent and the assent of divine faith.

This is the only theory in which the two fundamental theses of St. Thomas are preserved: a) the specific unity of theology, and therefore of all true theological conclusions; b) the specific distinction between theology and divine faith.

244. FIFTH PROOF.—Everything really identical with the revealed deposit, or everything that pertains to the essence of the revealed deposit, is definable as of divine faith:

Thus all true and rigorous theological conclusion must be truly identical with the revealed deposit or with the essence of the revealed deposit.

Then every true and rigorous theological conclusion is definable as of divine faith and not merely of ecclesiastical faith.

The greatest part of that reasoning is admitted by almost all theologians, both ancient and modern. That is precisely what Suárez and Lugo called formal-confused, and what moderns usually call virtual implicit, or virtual identical, or virtual connective-essential (73).

The minor premise of that reasoning we have already proven in various earlier sections (109). For now, let it suffice to recall the following: There is no rigorous theological conclusion without theological certainty; no conclusion can have theological certainty if it can fail in any way; every conclusion can fail in any way if it is not deduced through bonds of real identity or essential connection; therefore, where there is no bond of real identity or of essential connection, there is no true and rigorous theological conclusion.

Anyone who doubts this has a very simple remedy. Let them present to us a single argument in which the conclusion is absolutely certain and yet has no real identity or essential connection with the principle from which such a conclusion is deduced. That would be a discovery that would overthrow everything that Aristotle and Saint Thomas teach about the nature of absolute certainty and about the radical difference that exists between the sciences or conclusions of absolute certainty, such as mathematics, metaphysics, or theology, and the sciences or conclusions of non-absolute certainty, such as the physical or moral sciences or conclusions (39).

In the well-worn example of "Christ is man: therefore he has actual risibility," an example in which so many become confused, the word man does not mean man simply, but rather whole and perfect man. Now, although risibility or any other actual property is not essential for being man, it is essential for being whole and perfect man. Between the predicate "actual risibility" of the theological conclusion and the predicate "whole and perfect man" of the revealed premise, there is true and real inclusion or identity. This always happens in every rigorous theological conclusion.

Then every true and rigorous theological conclusion is really identical with the revealed major premise or is of the essence of the revealed major premise, and, therefore, definable by divine faith and not only by ecclesiastical faith.

**245. SIXTH PROOF.—**Everything that is really and truly within the revealed deposit is definable as of divine faith: But everything necessarily or theologically connected with the revealed deposit is really and truly within the revealed deposit: Therefore, everything necessarily connected with the revealed deposit is definable as of divine faith.

The greater premise is generally admitted by theologians. The difficulty, then, lies only in the lesser premise. Indeed: many believe that what is connected or related to the deposit is not within, but outside the deposit. They believe that it is not something of the deposit itself, but something else really distinct, although necessary for its conservation and defense. They imagine that the connected truths relate to the revealed deposit somewhat as walls relate to a city, or even better, as a fence or enclosure relates to an orchard. The fence serves and is necessary to guard and defend the orchard, but it does not form part of it. It is something exterior, not interior, to the plants that grow and develop within the orchard. In the same way, they say, what is connected to the deposit is necessary for the conservation and defense of the deposit, but it does not form part of it. It is something from outside, not from within, the deposit.

In our judgment this is a very great error into which a multitude of theologians have fallen and continue to fall by viewing things from a material point of view. The formal point of view from which truths connected with the deposit fall under the infallibility of the Church is not their matter, but their connection or relation to the deposit. Now, and this no theologian should ever lose sight of, that relation is mutual. It is not only a relation of other things to the revealed deposit, but also a relation of the revealed deposit to other things. From this latter point of view, and solely and exclusively from it, do such relations fall under the infallibility of the Church; that is, not insofar as they are relations of other things, but insofar as they are relations of the revealed deposit. They are, therefore, relations of the revealed deposit, something or a part of the revealed deposit, something within the revealed deposit, and, consequently, something definable as of divine faith.

The same or analogous confusion is present in what we all say when speaking of ecclesiastical power. It is customary to say that ecclesiastical power extends not only to spiritual things, but also to certain non-spiritual, that is, temporal things. Such language is materially true, and therefore very convenient and very useful in canon law and in every science of a practical or empirical character; but it is formally false, and consequently very apt to mislead the mind of the philosopher or theologian, who ought to fix his attention only on the formal point of view, which is what specifies and distinguishes powers and habits. Since the Church is a formally spiritual society, its power cannot extend, formally speaking, except to the spiritual. If we say popularly that it extends also to something temporal, it is not insofar as it is temporal, but insofar as it is related to the spiritual. Now, and this is what many do not notice: the power of the Church does not look, nor can it look, at such relations insofar as they are relations of the temporal, but it looks at them exclusively insofar as they are relations of the spiritual. They are, therefore, relations of the spiritual, spiritual relations. Thus, and only thus, the object of the Church's power proves to be truly homogeneous, namely: a) the spiritual things; b) their relations, that is, the spiritual relations.

In short, the same happens in every power or habit, for example, in the visual power. Sight does not formally have as its object color and other things, but rather color and the colored. Thus, what we call other things, such as extension and substance, do not fall under sight insofar as they are extension or substance, but insofar as they are related to color, which is the same as saying insofar as they are colored.

In the same way, the infallibility of the Church has as its object not revelation and other non-revealed things, but revelation and its relations. These relations infallibility does not create or invent, but only discovers and defines. They were already beforehand in the revealed deposit, and for this reason St. Thomas calls them by the classic name of revealables, that is, discoverable in the revealed deposit, where from the beginning they are found. They are, therefore, relations or conclusions of the revealed deposit, relations implicit in what was said by God, and for that reason definable as of divine faith. Their definition by the Church gives us something new as regards explanation, but not new as regards substance or objectivity, for they were already implied or implicit in what was originally revealed.

246. SEVENTH PROOF.—When a conclusion is entirely included in the premise of faith in such a way that the premise of reason merely explains or manifests that inclusion, such a conclusion is definable as of divine faith, and not only of ecclesiastical faith.

Thus it is that in all truly and rigorously theological reasoning the conclusion is entirely included in the premise of faith, and the premise of reason does nothing but explain or unfold that inclusion.

Then every true and rigorous theological conclusion is definable by divine faith, and not only by ecclesiastical faith.

The greater part of that reasoning is commonly admitted by theologians. Here is how Cardinal Franzelin formulates it: "When one premise, being revealed, implicitly already contains what is set forth in the conclusion, and the other, although not revealed, evidently manifests this comprehension of the conclusion in the revealed premise, without doubt the truth that is set forth in such a conclusion is revealed." And he gives as an example of such a class of conclusions, and very aptly so, the conclusion that "Christ has two wills," which is deduced from the revealed major premise "Christ is perfect God and perfect man," and from the minor premise of reason "Every perfect man has a human will"²⁴. In that major premise, we repeat, theologians commonly agree.

The difficulty, then, lies only in the minor premise. Many, not to say almost all modern theologians, believe that in theology there can and must be distinguished between explicative and completive minor premises. The former only explain or unfold what was already really contained or implicit in the revealed major premise, and, therefore, the conclusion is also revealed and definable by divine faith. The latter, called completive, are not limited to unfolding or explaining what was already implicit in the revealed major premise, but rather add something objectively distinct. Therefore, the conclusion is neither revealed nor definable by faith, since it is not entirely contained in the revealed major premise, but partly in it and partly in the minor premise of natural reason.

In that division of lesser matters, and therefore of conclusions into explicative and completive, we are in agreement, and it is a fundamental division that must never be forgotten. But the modern error, stemming from Suárez, lies in having reduced theology properly so called to that class of completive conclusions, when such conclusions, far from being the only properly theological ones, are not, on the contrary, rigorously theological, but purely physical, incapable by their nature of theological certainty. This we believe we have fully demonstrated in several of our previous sections. All rigorous theological conclusions are explicative (89-109).

Those who think otherwise have reflected little on the nature of true theology or on the radical distinction that exists between the sciences of physical-contingent certainty and the sciences of metaphysical or absolute certainty, such as metaphysics and theology; for Sacred Theology is nothing other than supernatural metaphysics, just as natural theology or Theodicy is nothing other than natural metaphysics.

In the purely physical sciences, the minor premises, and therefore the conclusions, always express something really distinct from the major premises, and, therefore, they are minor premises and completive conclusions, never explicative ones. On the contrary, in the mathematical, metaphysical, or theological sciences, the minor premises, and therefore the conclusions, always express something that is of the essence of the major premises, something really implicit in the major premises, something that issues from the major premises, and from the major premises alone, not by addition, but by analysis. For this reason, in mathematics as in metaphysics, as in theology, true, proper, and rigorous conclusions are explicative conclusions, never completive ones: they are analytical conclusions.

Therefore, in the true Thomistic school and in every school that knows how to distinguish true theology and true metaphysics from the poor and contingent physical sciences, it has always been taught that the theological conclusion is completely contained in the revealed major premises and not at all in the minor premises drawn from reason, the latter being instruments or causes of explanation, not of objectivity²⁵

247. EIGHTH PROOF.—The eighth proof can be clearly formulated in the following propositions:

1.ª. The Church cannot condemn a proposition as infallibly erroneous if between that proposition and the deposit of faith there is no true opposition. 2.ª. There can be no true opposition between a proposition and the deposit of faith unless between that proposition and the deposit of faith there is really implicitly a true contradiction of meaning. 3.ª. There can be no implicit true contradiction of meaning between the erroneous proposition and the deposit of faith if the erroneous proposition is not the denial of a meaning identical to that affirmed in the deposit of faith. 4.ª. The erroneous proposition cannot be the denial of a meaning identical to that affirmed in the deposit of faith if the theological conclusion is not an affirmation of a meaning identical to that affirmed in the deposit of faith. 5.ª. Therefore every theological conclusion is an affirmation of a meaning identical to the deposit of faith, and, consequently, it is definable by divine faith and not merely by ecclesiastical faith.

The first proposition is evident and admitted by all. The Church cannot define a truth nor condemn an error by reason of the conformity or opposition that this truth or this error may have with the principles of natural reason, but only with the revealed principles or the revealed deposit.

The second proposition is also clear. In every opposition there is implicit a contradiction. This we will demonstrate at length elsewhere (340-351) with numerous reasons and abundant texts from Saint Thomas. It suffices to recall the following: "Contradictio includitur in omnibus aliis generibus oppositionis"²⁶.

The third proposition is the very definition of contradiction: "affirmation and negation of the same thing, about the same thing, in the same respect".

Without affirming and denying the same thing between two extremes, contradiction is impossible.

The fourth is the very definition of an erroneous proposition. Every erroneous proposition must be contradictory to a theological conclusion.

The fifth is evident. It amounts to the same whether one says identical sense to the revealed deposit or definable sense of divine faith.

In a word: every opposition includes a contradiction, and every contradiction is founded on an identity²⁷

248. NINTH PROOF.—Although the preceding proofs, and especially the first and third proofs, taken from St. Thomas, extend not only to theological conclusions properly so called, but also to dogmatic facts, they apply, nevertheless, more directly to the former than to the latter. The proofs that now follow apply equally both to the doctrines mediately revealed, which we call theological conclusions, and to the facts mediately revealed, called dogmatic facts. Let us begin with a proof taken from the very doctrine of the Vatican Council, which can be formulated as follows:

Everything that is not new doctrine as regards substance, but rather the same doctrine revealed by God to the Apostles and preserved and explained by the Church, can be defined as of divine faith:

Thus the infallibility of the Church cannot give us or propose to us new doctrine, but rather the same doctrine revealed by God to the Apostles.

Then every truth infallibly defined by the Church is of divine faith and not merely of ecclesiastical faith.

The major premise is evident and admitted by all theologians. The minor premise is taught quite clearly, in our judgment, in the following two texts of the Vatican Council: "For the doctrine of faith, which God has revealed, has not been proposed, like a philosophical invention, to human minds to be perfected, but has been entrusted as a divine deposit to the Spouse of Christ, to be faithfully guarded and infallibly declared... Let it therefore grow... and make much and vigorous progress, both for individuals and for all, as for one man and for the whole Church, through the stages of ages and centuries, in understanding, knowledge, and wisdom: but only in its own kind, namely, in the same dogma, the same sense, and the same judgment"²⁸. "For the Holy Spirit was promised to the successors of Peter not that, by His revelation, they might reveal a NEW DOCTRINE, but that, with His assistance, they might holily guard and faithfully expound the revelation handed down through the Apostles, or the deposit of faith"²⁹.

Let the unprejudiced theologian read and reread these two texts of the Vatican Council, and above all, the second. In them it is expressly stated that the assistance of the Holy Spirit, which is the same as infallibility, was not promised to the Church, nor does the Church possess it, for new doctrine, but for the same apostolic doctrine, holily preserved and faithfully expounded.

Therefore, either the doctrine defined by the Church is, as to its substance or meaning, the same as that which God revealed to the Apostles, or it is new doctrine. If the former, it is evident that it is definable by divine faith and not merely by ecclesiastical faith. If the latter, it does not fall under infallibility, for the Council says expressly that infallibility was not promised to the Church for new doctrines.

Some may perhaps think of saying that the Council does not precisely state that the Church cannot infallibly teach us new doctrine, but rather that, in order to teach it to us, it does not have new revelation at its disposal, but rather new assistance or infallibility. Such a response would be a puerile evasion. The Council expressly teaches that precisely for this very reason—because it does not have new revelation, but only mere assistance to preserve and explain the doctrine already revealed to the Apostles—therefore the Church cannot give us new doctrine, but rather the same apostolic doctrine, holily preserved and faithfully explained.

Thus, any doctrine of which it can truly be affirmed that it is nothing more than tradita per apostolos revelatio sancte custodita et fideliter exposita (Vatican Council) is evidently a doctrine of divine faith. On the other hand, a doctrine of which this cannot be affirmed cannot be an object of infallibility, nor therefore of ecclesiastical faith, according to the Vatican Council.

249. TENTH PROOF.—Every truth expressly taught by the Apostles to the Church is definable as of divine faith and not merely of ecclesiastical faith:

Thus the Apostles taught or could teach the Church many truths not known immediately by revelation or inspiration, but by simple infallibility or assistance of the Holy Spirit.

Next, the object of infallibility or assistance, which is the same as the object of ecclesiastical faith, is definable as of divine faith.

The greater one is commonly admitted by theologians, and it is established by the practice of the Church. Apostolic doctrine and doctrine definable as of divine faith have always been regarded by the Church as identical things, and this has been the criterion by which the Church has always been guided in its definitions of faith³⁰.

The lesser point will also be clear to anyone who considers these two things: first, that the Apostles during their entire life had no less authority than that which councils or popes now possess. Hence, if councils or popes can define and teach infallibly not only what is expressly revealed or inspired by God, but also what is necessarily connected with it, then all or each one of the Apostles could do the same. When Pope Saint Clement and the Apostle Saint John lived at the same time, there was nothing that the former could teach that the latter could not; hence, if Saint Clement could define and teach a theological conclusion or a dogmatic fact, the Apostle Saint John could do the same.

Second, that, in the opinion of numerous and grave modern theologians, it is not necessary that the Apostles, when preaching and even when writing, should always have had the gift of revelation or inspiration, as did those who were sacred writers, but rather it suffices that they had divine assistance or infallibility (176, note).

Now then: it is evident that the Church has always regarded as definable as of divine faith everything taught by the Apostles, without ever requiring that the Apostles have declared that they taught it by revelation or inspiration and not by mere assistance or infallibility. It is clear, therefore, that infallibility or divine assistance is sufficient for divine faith. Otherwise, one would have to say that the Church lacks any criterion for discerning which things were of divine faith and which were of ecclesiastical faith in the apostolic preaching.

This same point we have just made regarding apostolic preaching is seen even more clearly when applied to the later preaching or tradition of the Church, or to the unanimous consent of the Holy Fathers. On this tradition of the Church, on this unanimous consent of the Holy Fathers, the Ecumenical Councils have always based their definitions of divine faith. Now then, let all the acts of the councils be read, from Nicaea to the Vatican, and let all the testimonies of tradition or of the Holy Fathers that those councils cite be examined, and it will be seen as clear as the light of day that the councils never require that the constant tradition of the Church or the unanimous testimony of the Holy Fathers have taught such a truth as a matter of divine faith or as formally revealed, but simply that they have taught it as doctrine of the Church or as doctrine necessary for salvation, or as indubitable and binding doctrine for the Christian, or other similar formulas, but formulas that apply equally to doctrines of divine faith and to those of ecclesiastical faith. And yet, that, and that alone, has sufficed for all the councils to define such truths as dogmas of faith, as truths of divine and Catholic faith. If to define as dogmas of faith the consubstantiality of the Word at the Council of Nicaea, or the divine motherhood at that of Ephesus, or the two understandings and two wills of Christ at that of Constantinople, or transubstantiation at the Council of Trent, or the Immaculate Conception in the bull of Pius IX, or pontifical infallibility at the Vatican, the Church had had to rely on a constant tradition or on a unanimous testimony of the Holy Fathers, in which it was said that those truths were of divine faith or formally revealed, such dogmas could never have been defined.

Moreover, not only would the Ecumenical Councils have no criterion whatsoever for distinguishing which things are of divine faith and which things are of ecclesiastical faith in the apostolic preaching, in the tradition of the Church, or in the doctrine of the Holy Fathers, but we ourselves would be left without any certain criterion for knowing which things are of divine faith and which things are of ecclesiastical faith in the definitions of councils or popes. It is true that in the dogmatic definitions that have been given after this dispute over the distinction between divine and ecclesiastical faith arose, the Church has frequently taken care to express in the very definition that the defined truth was a revealed truth, as it has expressed, for example, in the definition of the Immaculate Conception by Pius IX, or of pontifical infallibility by the Vatican Council³¹

But it is no less certain that before that new faith called ecclesiastical was invented, and, therefore, before the seventeenth century, dogmatic definitions or those of divine faith were frequently made by the Church through the simple formulas of "firmiter credimus," or of "declaramus," or "definimus," or others similar, without adding at all whether such a truth was revealed or not. And yet, all those definitions have always been regarded as definitions of divine faith, as true dogmas of faith.

In the same professions of faith, such as, for example, the profession of faith of Pius IV, which we all make, and which no one will deny is a profession of divine faith, we simply say "I believe and profess" or "I constantly hold," without adding that it is a matter of divine faith. And that "I believe and profess" extends in those professions of faith not only to what the councils may have defined as of divine faith, but to everything that the councils may have defined, clearly giving to understand that everything defined by the councils is of divine faith³².

250. ELEVENTH PROOF.—Setting aside, in order not to lengthen this chapter excessively, several other proofs or confirmations ³³, we are going to conclude with one that is, in our judgment,

(Professio fidei tridentina: DENZINGER, nn. 994-1.000). Finally, pushing things to the limit, it will turn out that if that modern ecclesiastical faith were not truly divine faith, we would be left doubting whether the very Athanasian Creed itself is of divine faith or not. In that Creed nothing more is said than haec est fides catholica quam nisi quisque fideliter firmiterque crediderit, salvus esse non poterit. Now then: according to the language of the Church, ecclesiastical faith is just as Catholic as public divine faith. Let us hear the following text: Tertio decimo: si credidisti et adhuc credis, solum Romanum Pontificem, dubiis emergentibus circa fidem CATHOLICAM posse per determinationem authenticam, cui sit inviolabiliter adhaerendum, finem imponere, et esse verum et CATHOLICUM quidquid ipse auctoritate clavium sibi traditarum a Christo determinat esse verum (Summus Pontifex Clemens VI, epist. Super quibusdam, ad Consolatorem, Catholicum Armenorum, 29 sept. 1351: DENZINGER, n. 3.022). The phrases infallible faith, divine faith, Catholic faith, when dealing with doctrine defined by the Church, have always been regarded as identical or synonymous in all the documents of ecclesiastical antiquity and in all theologians prior to Molina. Another, most clear and fully conclusive argument. It can be formulated from the following five propositions:

1st God has revealed that the Church is infallible in definitions of what is mediate or connected. 2nd Therefore God has revealed that the definitions of what is mediate or connected by the Church are infallibly true. 3rd Therefore it is of divine faith that the definitions of what is mediate or connected by the Church are infallibly true. 4th It is thus that the definitions of what is mediate or connected by the Church are the proper and specific object of ecclesiastical faith. 5th Therefore ecclesiastical faith is divine faith.

The first proposition is admitted by all or nearly all theologians, both ancient and modern.

The second is nothing more than the first itself in a different form or turned into the passive voice. It is evident that it makes no difference to say that “the Church is infallible in definitions of what is mediate or connected” or to say that “definitions of what is mediate or connected by the Church are infallibly true.”

The third is the same as the second, with no difference other than substituting the phrase "God has revealed" with the phrase "it is of divine faith."

The fourth is the very definition of ecclesiastical faith.

It is therefore evident that the fifth proposition holds, namely, that ecclesiastical faith is divine faith.

We are completely certain that every reader who examines these five propositions without prejudice will see with evidence that they are truly identical and that some are nothing more than a simple explanation of the others. To say, as some do, that the infallibility of the Church is of divine faith is to define the mediate or connected thing, but that the infallibility or truth of what is defined is not of divine faith but rather of ecclesiastical faith, makes no sense. It is the same to say: “the Church is infallible in what it defines,” as to say: “what is defined by the Church is true.” Therefore, it is the same to say: “it is of divine faith that the Church is infallible in what it defines,” as to say: “it is of divine faith that what is defined by the Church is true,” or “the truth of what is defined by the Church is of divine faith,” or “what is defined by the Church is of divine faith.”

251. LUMINOUS CONFIRMATION.—Finally, even at the risk of making less clear a thing that is in itself most clear, we shall add a confirmation. Let us suppose that God or Jesus Christ Himself were now to come and say to us: “I bear witness that all that the Church has defined up to now is true.” We believe that there is no theologian who would dare to say seriously that, in such a hypothesis, those definitions of the Church would not be of divine faith, but of ecclesiastical faith ³⁴.

Now then, that which God would tell us now, He had already told us before, and every theologian knows that the difference of before or after does not change in any way the kind of faith. Instead of telling us now that "everything that the Church has defined is true," He had already told us from the beginning that "everything that the Church will define is true." Therefore, such definitions are of divine faith, not precisely because the Church says so, but because God had said it.

In summary, the formal motive of the faith we give to infallible definitions is not really the authority of the Church nor even precisely the authority of assisting God, but rather it is really and formally the authority of revealing God. That act of faith, nowadays called ecclesiastical faith, is not formulated by saying: "I believe such a thing because the Church is infallible in teaching it to me," nor is it even formulated by saying: "I believe such a thing because God assists the Church in teaching it to me," but rather it is formulated and must be formulated with full truth in the following way: "I believe such a thing because God has revealed that the Church is infallible in teaching it to me." Which is exactly the same as saying: "I believe with divine faith that what is defined by the Church is true, because God has revealed that what is defined by the Church is true." Such an act is, by all accounts, one of divine faith and not merely ecclesiastical faith.

If, then, divine faith extends to the theological conclusions defined by the Church, the evolution of dogma also extends to them, and the modern ecclesiastical faith is useless.