La evolución homogénea del dogma católico

226. THE MODERN OPINION.—Most theologians today teach and almost take for granted the following two propositions:

First. Truths mediately or virtually revealed cannot be defined by the Church as divine faith, although they can indeed be defined as infallible truths.

Second. When the Church infallibly defines such truths, we must give them assent, not of divine faith, but of ecclesiastical faith.

Of these two propositions, the second is but a corollary of the first. Having in the previous chapters attempted to show that the first proposition is contrary to all theological tradition prior to Molina and to all the principles of the Thomistic school, it is needless to say that we hold the same opinion regarding the second proposition. However, since we have several times promised to deal in particular with that faith called "ecclesiastical," we shall now fulfill that promise. Let us begin by setting forth what is understood today by ecclesiastical faith.

227. MATERIAL OBJECT OF ECCLESIASTICAL FAITH.—The material object of ecclesiastical faith encompasses, according to modern theologians, all those truths that are revealed only in a mediate or virtual manner. In other words: all those truths that, without being contained formally or immediately in the revealed deposit, are nevertheless necessarily connected with that deposit or are necessary for its preservation. It comprises, according to the classification of today's theologians, six things, namely: a) theological conclusions properly so called; b) condemned propositions with a censure inferior to heresy; c) the universal laws of the Church insofar as their morality; d) the definitive approval of the rule and constitutions of religious orders insofar as the same; e) dogmatic facts; f) the canonization of the saints.

This classification into six items seems to us extremely empirical, for it does not obey any intrinsic principle of division. Nevertheless, we accept that division, both because it is fairly common among modern authors and because it contributes to clarity. The more philosophical approach would seem to be to divide what is mediately revealed, and therefore the secondary object of infallibility, into two members: a) mediately revealed doctrines; b) mediately revealed facts. But for the case at hand, one division or the other matters little, provided that everything mediately revealed is included, or everything necessarily connected with the revealed deposit, or everything necessary for its preservation. That is the true material object of the so-called ecclesiastical faith. Since that very thing is precisely the material object of Sacred Theology, it could very well be said that the material object of ecclesiastical faith is nothing other than theology infallibly defined by the Church.

At this point, let the reader note the immense field of truths withdrawn from divine faith, and attributed by modern theologians to ecclesiastical faith. It is well known that Catholic doctrine, taken in all its breadth, encompasses four degrees: a) revealed datum; b) dogmas of faith; c) infallible truths; d) theological conclusions (3). According to the modern theory, the first and second degrees are constituted exclusively by immediately revealed truths, and the third and fourth degrees, by mediately revealed truths. Thus, the first and second degrees are the proper field of divine faith, and the third and fourth, the proper field of ecclesiastical faith. From which it is clearly seen that two entire degrees, that is, half of Catholic doctrine, belongs or can belong to ecclesiastical faith, but never to divine faith. And since, however much one may wish to play with names, between the divine and the human there is no middle ground, the question of ascertaining whether the faith called “ecclesiastical” is or is not true divine faith amounts to ascertaining whether half of the doctrine with which the Church of Jesus Christ nourishes our supernatural life, and to which she obliges us to give, under penalty of eternal condemnation, an absolutely unconditional assent, is divine doctrine or merely human doctrine.

In reality, every question about whether a doctrine is divine or human is always a question of great importance; for it is no less serious to wish to pass off as human what is truly divine, than it would be to give as divine what is only human¹. Much more so if, as we have said, it is not a matter of an isolated proposition or truth, but of half and even the greater part of Catholic doctrine.

228. FORMAL MOTIVE OF ECCLESIASTICAL FAITH.—The defenders of ecclesiastical faith consider the following two motives as specifically distinct: a) divine revelation; b) divine assistance. These two motives are also usually expressed in this other way: a) the authority of God; b) the infallible authority of the Church. Divine revelation or the authority of God is the formal motive of divine faith; the assistance of God or the infallible authority of the Church, they say, is the formal motive of ecclesiastical faith. The act, then, of divine faith is expressed thus: "I believe such a truth because God has revealed it." In contrast, the act of ecclesiastical faith is expressed, according to the moderns, in this other form: "I believe such a truth because Holy Mother Church infallibly teaches it thus."

Since habits are specified by their formal motives, and since those two motives are specifically distinct for modern theologians, divine faith and ecclesiastical faith also are and must be specifically distinct. And since what is specifically distinct from the divine is not divine, modern theologians generally admit that ecclesiastical faith is not divine faith.

229. NATURE OF ECCLESIASTICAL FAITH.—For if that ecclesiastical faith is not divine faith, what is it? Is it purely human? Is it some mixture of human and divine faith?

Here is where modern authors get tangled up, and it is delightful to contemplate their balancing acts of nomenclature in classifying this new species of faith. Some affirm that this ecclesiastical faith is almost divine; others, that it is mediately divine; others, that it is indirectly divine; others, that it lies between the divine and the human; others, that it is human; others, that it is divine-human; others, finally, that it is neither divine nor human faith, but science.

So that no one may think that we exaggerate or that we attempt to ridicule so serious a matter, it will be well to cite a few texts, chosen at random, but as short as possible. Here they are:

"Hanc quam aliqui appellant fidem ecclesiasticam, possumus dicere fidem mediate divinam" (Franzelin).

"Ecclesiastical faith, or mediately divine faith" (Vacant).

"Regarding faith mediately and indirectly divine, it does not seem to differ from ecclesiastical faith" (De Groot).

"Neither purely divine nor purely human" (Becanus).

Between divine faith and human faith (Antoine).

"Une foi humaine and ecclesiastical" (Péréfixe).

"Of ecclesiastical faith, or divine-human faith" (Pégues).

"Fides humana certissima, fere ad fidem divinam pertinens, et parum ab illa distans" (Granados).

"Assensus theologicus qui discursu innititur" (Molina).

As can be seen, the nomenclature of that new faith could not be more varied. For this reason, other authors, with the greatest prudence, content themselves with speaking to us at length about ecclesiastical faith, as if it were something "self-evident," without descending to tell us whether it is divine faith, human faith, or something midway between the two.

230. ORIGIN OF ECCLESIASTICAL FAITH.—One must distinguish between the origin of the name and the origin of the idea.

The origin of the name is very modern. It does not go back beyond the celebrated disputes with Jansenism concerning the faith that must be given to the definitions of the Church on dogmatic facts, and, therefore, it does not go back beyond the second half of the seventeenth century²

The first to employ it was the archbishop of Paris, Monsignor Pérfixe, in a pastoral letter against Jansenism bearing the date of June 7, 1664.

The occasion on which Archbishop Pérfixe adopted that name of ecclesiastical faith seems to be the following:

His predecessor on the see of Paris, Monsignor De Marca, had said in a pastoral letter against the Jansenists that the definition of dogmatic facts by the Church was a matter affecting the "substance of the dogma," and therefore divine faith was owed to it. This stirred up the Jansenists a great deal, and the worst of it was that there was no lack of orthodox theologians who shared the Jansenists' opinion against the archbishop. Archbishop Péréfixe, wishing to issue his pastoral of 1664 against the Jansenists, first gathered in council Grandin and other theologians of the Sorbonne. This archbishop, judging by what Fénelon indicates about him, had such narrow ideas about divine faith that he believed it could only concern what was revealed in an immediate, nominal, and express manner. Since it is evident that dogmatic facts are not revealed in that way, it was agreed that the assent of divine faith could not be given to definitions of dogmatic facts, as Archbishop De Marca had believed. On the other hand, the assent of human faith, as the Jansenists wanted, was also not sufficient, since an infallible faith was at issue. What was required, then, was a faith inferior to divine faith and superior to human faith. How was this faith, midway between divine and human, to be named? Because to hold the Jansenists' subtle cavils in check, the generic name of faith was not enough, and a specific name was needed. They consulted and disputed over several sessions, and since it was a question of the faith owed to the infallible authority of the Church, they agreed to call it ecclesiastical faith. The name, being short and expressive, was a success. The archbishop used it in his pastoral; the theologians who had agreed upon it in the conference with the archbishop dictated it and popularized it among their disciples in daily handwritten lessons, and soon the great writers of the Sorbonne, such as Tournely, D'Argentré, and Grandin, used it in their printed works, thus giving it letters of naturalization in the republic of theological letters. Such we believe to have been the origin of the name ecclesiastical faith, or at least what most contributed to its adoption and popularization, as is gathered from what the authoritative Fénelon recounts, and which Tournely and Grandin, both writers extremely versed in everything concerning the Jansenist disputes, in which they took part, seem to confirm.

231. TESTIMONIES OF FÉNELON, OF TOURNELY, AND OF GRANDIN. Here is how Fénelon expresses himself in his reply to the bishop of Saint-Pons: "You say that M. de Marca required this divine faith… But Monseigneur De Péréfixe, who examined what was the most rigorous language of the later scholastics, with M. Grandin, and with some other celebrated doctors, whom he was willing to admit to his council for this deliberation, believed that he should give the name of divine faith only to the belief of truths expressly, nominally, and immediately revealed. Now he did not find that the heretical character of the text of Jansenius was expressly, nominally, and immediately revealed. And in fact it is not in that manner. Hence M. De Péréfixe concluded that one could not, in all scholastic rigor, say that one must believe the heretical character of the text of Jansenius by divine faith. This is what M. Grandin, whom this prelate admitted with some other able doctors to his council on this question, very clearly disentangled in those writings dictated at the Sorbonne, which are still in the hands of a great number of bachelors. This worthy prelate and these grave doctors believed that, to close the mouths of the defenders of Jansenius, one must employ the terms of ecclesiastical faith.³

The celebrated theologian of the Sorbonne, Honorato Tournely, who wrote a few years after Fénelon, also clearly indicates that Mgr. De Marca, predecessor of Mgr. Péréfexe in the archbishopric of Paris, still taught that divine faith was owed to the definitions of the Church on dogmatic facts, and that his successor Mgr. Péréfexe, in order to appease the outcries of the Jansenists, was the first to use the term ecclesiastical faith. Tournely states the following:

Regarding this question as thus expounded, there are various opinions among theologians.

First among them is the opinion of those who not only acknowledge the Church as infallible in doctrinal facts, but also hold that these facts pertain to faith itself, and that they cannot be denied after the Church’s definition without the mark of heresy, because of the inseparable connection between fact and right, or dogma... It is remarkable with what impetus and ardor of soul the followers of Jansenius rose up against this opinion: with what gloomy colors they portrayed it, as if it utterly overthrew the foundations of divine faith, thrusting forward, namely, a new and unrevealed fact as the object of faith... The Most Illustrious De Marca, archbishop of Paris, seems to have inclined to this opinion when he said that definitions of this kind concerning doctrinal facts pertain to a part of the dogma“.

He then recounts four opinions extremely opposed to the previous one, held by those who, along with the Jansenists, deny the infallibility of the Church in dogmatic facts, and he sets forth his own opinion in the following form:

Sixth and finally, the opinion which we embrace here holds that the Holy Spirit so assists the Church, by a singular aid and assistance, in her judgment concerning the sense of propositions or books, that she can never deviate from the truth. Hence, the faithful are bound to acquiesce in her judgment not only by what is called religious silence, but by assent and approval from the depths of their soul. The motive, therefore, of this assent and interior adherence is the supreme authority of the Church itself. Some, following the most illustrious Archbishop of Paris, Péréfixe, call this faith ecclesiastical, which is intermediate between faith simply divine and simply human; just as ecclesiastical precepts are said to be neither simply divine nor simply human.

Whatever the mind of Mgr. Péréfixe may have been in inventing the name of ecclesiastical faith, Tournely sets it forth in the following text:

Instabis: The most illustrious Péréfixe, archbishop of Paris, in his mandate of the year 1664, on the 8th of June, said that it can be affirmed only through malice or through ignorance that definitions of fact pertain to faith.*

Respondeo illustrissimi archipraesulis mentem hanc dumtaxat fuisse aequalem scilicet non debere fidem definitioni facti, ac iuris seu dogmatis: quasi unum sit utriusque credendi motivum, et par in omnibus auctoritas: dogma siquidem creditur propter immediatam revelationem, factum propter auctoritatem Ecclesiae: the latter is believed with ecclesiastical, the former with divine faith. That the most illustrious archbishop demands obedience of mind toward definitions of fact, however, is declared by the following words immediately subsequent in the cited mandate, which ought not to have been omitted by the adversaries: "He requires, he says in French, only for this regard a human and ecclesiastical faith, which obliges one to submit sincerely one's judgment to that of legitimate superiors"⁴.

This claim of Fénelon and Tournely is confirmed by Grandin, who, as we have seen, was one of the theologians who attended the consultations of Archbishop Péréfixe. Here are his words: "You ask: by what name is that faith to be called which the Church's judgment and declaration concerning facts establishes? I answer that it may be called human and ecclesiastical... And indeed by that name the most illustrious archbishop (Péréfixe) called it in his mandate issued on June 7, in the year 1664, which name, if it seems new to anyone, the thing itself ought not to seem new"⁵. Péréfixe's pastoral letter bears exactly that date noted by Grandin: "Given at Paris, this seventh of June, sixteen hundred sixty-four"⁶.

The reader will pardon us for these lengthy quotations, given their supreme importance in establishing the origin of the name of the so-called ecclesiastical faith. With them, in our opinion, two things are clearly proven: first, that that name of ecclesiastical faith dates from June 7, 1664, the date of the pastoral letter of Archbishop Péréfixe; second, that the invention of that new ecclesiastical faith was due to an apologetic opportunism, to the desire to calm the outcries of the Jansenists, who could not bear that anyone should speak of divine faith when dealing with the dogmatic fact of the condemnation of Jansenius's book.

En parentheses, we have noted with satisfaction that, since the publication of this study of ours in La Ciencia Tomista, several theologians now take for granted, although without citing us, the origin, date, and author that we assigned to the modern ecclesiastical faith, and they even adduce in confirmation the very same authors and citations that we had adduced. With this, we consider well spent the not inconsiderable

And this is what could happen regarding the five propositions that have been extracted from the book entitled Augustinus, by Jansenius, bishop of Ypres...

It is for this reason that one cannot sufficiently praise the paternal wisdom and charity of our Holy Fathers the Popes Innocent X and Alexander VII, who, in order to remove every pretext from those who might in the future wish to sustain these five propositions, not only condemned them in themselves by their Constitutions of the years 1653 and 1656, but also declared, and particularly Alexander VII, that the five propositions were taken from the book of Jansenius, entitled Augustinus, and that they condemned them in the sense in which that author had taught them. Whereupon the Lords Archbishops and Bishops of this Kingdom, desiring to conform themselves, believed they could do nothing better than to draw up a Formulary of profession of faith in the very sense of the said Constitutions; and which, being signed, would make clearly known those who submitted sincerely to the said Constitutions: from which, as well as from the Formulary, it is certain that no occasion can be taken, unless one be malicious or ignorant, to say that they demand a submission of divine faith in what concerns the Fact, requiring only in that regard, as has been so often said, a human and Ecclesiastical faith, which obliges one to submit sincerely one's judgment to that of one's legitimate superiors, because otherwise it would be easy by this device to escape the condemnation of all sorts of errors: and that under the pretext of the question of Fact, one could always preserve the liberty of defending one's opinion concerning the Right...

Donné à Paris, ce septième Juin, mil six cens soixante quatre" (Ordinance of Monseigneur the most illustrious and most reverend Hardouin de Péréfixe, Archbishop of Paris. In Paris, at François Muget’s, 1664, pp. 3-4-5-7).

It seems evident that the phrase "comme il a esté si souvent dit" refers to the word "humaine," and not to the word "ecclésiastique," which appears here for the first time. The "sense" of this word is ancient, but the word is new, as Grandin observes (l. c.).

We warmly thank the learned Fr. Mandonnet, O. P., for having provided us with a copy of the letter of Mons. Péréfixe.

7 March 1921. Work and time that it took us to clarify that important historical fact, whose trace seemed to have been completely lost among theologians after the eighteenth century. We believe that the name of Archbishop Péréfice will not take long to become widespread among theologians as the father of the modern ecclesiastical faith.

232. THE FORERUNNERS OF ECCLESIASTICAL FAITH.—If the name of ecclesiastical faith is very modern, the origin of the thing signified is not much more ancient. It dates from the end of the sixteenth century.

Indeed, the first precursor of what today is understood by ecclesiastical faith is, without any doubt, the celebrated author of the Molina, Luis Molina. Before the renowned theologian from Cuenca, all theologians, without distinction of schools, had admitted that what is mediately or virtually revealed can be defined as of divine faith by the Church, and that, once defined, it merited the assent of true divine faith.

Molina was the first to deny that what is mediately or virtually revealed could ever pass into being of divine faith, even if the Church defined it as dogmatically as it defined the two wills in Christ. Then, if the definitions of such virtual revelation by the Church do not merit divine faith, what assent do they merit? Theological assent, Molina replies, for it is assent founded on reasoning. Theologians assent to what is defined, based on the very scientific reasoning by which the Church availed herself to declare and define such virtual revelation. For the faithful, the following simple reasoning suffices: “The Church cannot err in her definitions: but the Church has defined such a truth, therefore such a truth is certain” ⁷

The Thomist school always regarded it as de fide, and its denial as heretical, that the infallibility of the Church extends to the mediate or virtual revealed. Modern theologians also admit quite generally that this is of divine faith or, at least, that it is a revealed truth and definable as of divine faith. But they deny (although inconsistently, as we shall see in due time) that it follows from this that the defined thing itself is of divine faith. The infallible authority for defining the virtual is, they say, of divine faith; but the defined thing is only of ecclesiastical faith.

As can be seen, Molina does not yet call that assent ecclesiastical faith, but theological assent. But since the reasoning on which the faithful base that assent, according to Molina, is an improper reasoning, such assent is rather of faith than of science. And since, according to Molina, that assent is not of divine faith, because it deals with mediately revealed things, nor of purely human faith, because it is an infallible assent, we have an assent identical or very similar to what today is called ecclesiastical faith. Molina may well, therefore, be called the father or first forerunner of ecclesiastical faith.

The second precursor of ecclesial faith is Granados, also a Jesuit and a Spaniard like Molina. Granados⁸ devotes himself to defending Molina on the question of virtual revelation against the attacks, above all, of the distinguished Navarrete. However, he corrects Molina on two points: first, that the example Molina gives of the definition by the Church of the two wills in Christ does not please him, and he has every reason, for all theologians have always been unanimous in affirming that true divine faith must be given as assent to such a definition.

The second point on which Granados corrects Molina is that the assent we give to the infallible definitions of the Church concerning what is virtually revealed is a theological assent based on reasoning, as Molina would have it. Ordinary faithful, Granados rightly says, understand nothing of theologies or reasonings, and they simply restrict themselves to giving credence to what the infallible Church teaches them.

For then, what kind of faith is that, if, as Granados teaches with Molina, it is not divine faith? It is, says Granados, a most certain human faith, but so close to divine faith that when one does not speak with theological rigor, as was not spoken before Molina, it is usually called divine faith⁹

As can be seen, with Granados the seed of the future ecclesiastical faith has already taken another small step forward. In Molina it was still a theological or scientific assent. In Granados it is already true faith, but a faith midway between the divine and the human. Nothing is lacking now except the name ecclesiastical, with which it was later baptized in Paris by Archbishop Péréfixe.

The third precursor of ecclesiastical faith is the Jesuit Becanus, but in a very singular way. Instead of limiting what we today call ecclesiastical faith to virtually revealed truths, Becanus extends it even to formally revealed truths, such as the articles of faith. For Becanus, the distinction between divine faith and non-divine faith lies not at all in the matter, but in the motive. There are three specifically distinct motives of faith, namely: divine authority, human authority, and the authority of the Church, which is an authority intermediate between the human and the divine. If we believe, says Becanus, the articles of faith by divine authority, the act is of divine faith. If we believe them by human authority, the act is of human faith. If we believe them by the authority of the Church, the act is not of divine faith, but of a faith of a lower order, of a faith quasi intermediate between purely divine faith and purely human faith ¹⁰:

Here already appears, with even greater relief than in Granada, the future ecclesiastical faith. Becanus died in 1624, exactly forty years before the pastoral of Archbishop Péréfixe. His Summa Theologiae Scholasticae, one of whose numerous editions was made in Paris itself in 1658, must have been one of those scholastic books which, as Fénelon tells us, Grandin and his colleagues of the Sorbonne, consultors of Archbishop Péréfixe in the said conference of the year 1664, in which the name that should be given to that faith midway between the divine and the human was decided, turned over with eagerness.

Finally, one could also count—if not among the precursors, at least among those who have contributed to the modern idea of ecclesiastical faith—all those theologians who followed Molina in holding that theological conclusions can be infallibly defined by the Church, but not as being of divine faith; such were Kilber, among the great theologians of the Society [of Jesus], and the Salmanticenses (in appearance, at least), among the great Thomist theologians. But these theologians already belong to the second half of the seventeenth century, and their works are later than the pastoral letter of Archbishop Péréfixe, in which the name of ecclesiastical faith appears¹¹.

233. AMONG THE THOMISTS OF THE 18TH CENTURY.—At the beginning of the 18th century, ecclesiastical faith is already spoken of so commonly in many non-Thomist theological works, especially in Antoine and in Tournely¹²

In the Thomist school this new faith seems to be regarded with distrust, and its name does not yet appear even in Contenson, nor in the Salmanticenses, nor in Gonet, nor even in Gotti. The first among the classical Thomists to name it is Billuart, but without ever quite resolving to tell us clearly whether the dogmatic facts, on the sole occasion of which Billuart names ecclesiastical faith, deserve only ecclesiastical faith or, on the contrary, divine faith. Both in the treatise De Fide and in the De Incarnatione he touches on the question ex professo, but he contents himself with giving both resolutions (*Respondeo primo... Respondeo secundo), leaving the reader to adopt whichever he pleases ¹³

For the rest of the eighteenth century, the most reputable Thomists imitated the example of Billuart, while the other theologians, with the exception of St. Alphonsus Liguori, Muzzarelli, and a few others, gradually inclined toward ecclesiastical faith, which they first began to apply to dogmatic facts and ended up extending also to theological conclusions ¹⁴

In the nineteenth century, whose first half was so poor for theology, and in what we have covered so far of the twentieth, the idea of ecclesial faith has been gaining ground, and today it is almost general among authors. One must except, however, the Jesuit Schifini and the Dominican Tuyaerts, who combat it ex professo, as well as the reputed Fr. Gardeil and some others, who, without directly attacking it, make their displeasure with it quite clear.

Such seems to us to be, broadly speaking, the true history of the so-called ecclesiastical faith ¹⁵.

234. OBJECT OF THE PRESENT STUDY.—In this chapter, which deals entirely with ecclesiastical faith, and in which we shall endeavor to be as concise as possible, the question is not precisely about that modern name of ecclesiastical given to this faith, but about its true nature. We propose to examine in the light of the doctrine and principles of Saint Thomas whether this faith called ecclesiastical is specifically distinct from true divine faith or is the same divine faith under another name and with purely accidental differences. The question cannot be of greater importance, for what is not true and specifically divine, whether it be called ecclesiastical or civil, is essentially and infinitely distant from what is essentially and truly divine. Between what is truly divine and what is truly non-divine, the distance can never be merely one of degree, but of species, and even of genus, and more than of genus: the very radical and infinite distance that exists between God and the creature.

235. OUR POINT OF DEPARTURE.—In treating this question, we will always proceed from the principles of St. Thomas or from those principles that are admitted by all or by nearly all theologians.

All theologians admit, since it is already a dogma of faith, that truths formally or immediately revealed can be defined by the Church as of divine or Catholic faith, and not merely as of ecclesiastical faith. In discussing, therefore, ecclesiastical faith, there is no question at all of those truths, but only of truths revealed mediately or virtually.

All or nearly all theologians also admit that the Sacred Congregations, when they teach without the Pope, or that the Pope himself when he teaches without the intention of defining ex cathedra, are not infallible. In speaking, then, of ecclesiastical faith, no reference whatsoever is made to the faith we give to the non-infallible teachings of the Church, which is usually called “religious assent,” but rather to the faith we give to its infallible teachings or definitions.

Finally, all or almost all theologians admit that the extension of the Church's infallibility to mediately or virtually revealed matters is a truth of divine faith, already defined by the ordinary or practical magisterium of the Church or, at least, a truth truly revealed and definable as of divine faith¹⁶.

Therefore, whenever we speak of ecclesiastical faith we understand the assent owed to those truths which are: a) virtually revealed; b) already infallibly defined by the Church; c) and of which infallibility of the Church we are assured by divine revelation.

236. SOLUTION CRITERIA.—The essential or specific distinction between two habits can only come from one of these two sources: a) the formal object; b) the formal motive.

The formal object of divine faith is what is truly revealed by God. The formal motive of divine faith is the divine authority of God as revealer. We believe with divine faith only what God has revealed, and we believe what God has revealed because of the divine authority that the word of God possesses and deserves.

Therefore, all criteria for ascertaining whether the so-called ecclesiastical faith is of divine faith must be reduced to two: a) to ascertain whether the object of ecclesiastical faith, that is, what is mediately revealed, is truly revealed or not: if it is, it merits divine faith; if it is not, it neither merits it nor can it be given to it; b) to ascertain whether the authority of the Church, in defining what is mediately revealed, is truly divine authority or not: if it is, it merits divine faith; if it is not, it neither merits it nor can divine faith ever be given to it, but rather another faith of a lower order, essentially distinct from divine faith.

237. OUR OPINION.—Our opinion or, better said, our most intimate conviction is that, according to the doctrine and principles of Saint Thomas, the mediate or virtual revelation is implicitly and really revealed; that the authority with which the Church infallibly defines what is virtually or mediately revealed, whether doctrines or facts, is a real and truly divine authority; that the so-called ecclesiastical faith which we give or ought to give to such definitions is not essentially distinguished, but only accidentally, from the divine or Catholic faith which we give to definitions concerning what is formally revealed; in a word, that ecclesiastical faith is divine faith and not human faith nor a middle faith between the divine and human.

In the following sections we will set forth, with all the clarity and brevity that we can muster, both the principles of Saint Thomas and the theological reasons on which our conviction is based.

238. We will attempt to show in this section that, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, the so-called ecclesiastical faith which we give to the infallible definitions of theological conclusions by the Church is true divine faith, of the same species as that which we give to the articles of faith.

We will first adduce some proofs taken literally from Saint Thomas and then others taken from theological reason. So that these proofs may be clear, we will always begin by formulating them in a brief syllogism.

239. FIRST PROOF.—Ecclesiastical faith is infallible faith:

Thus, there can be no infallible faith unless its formal motive is the testimony of God.

Then ecclesiastical faith has as its formal motive the testimony of God. Or, what is the same: thus ecclesiastical faith is divine faith.

The major premise of that reasoning is admitted by all, for that is what we understand by ecclesiastical faith. The minor premise, in which lies the entire root of this question, is taught by Saint Thomas in the following words: “Neque hominis neque angeli testimonio assentire, infallibiliter in veritatem duceret, nisi quatenus in eo loquentis Dei testimonium consideratur.” Which, rendered into the vernacular, means: “The testimony of no man whatsoever, whether patriarch, prophet, apostle, or pope, nor the testimony of any angel or other creature whatsoever, can merit infallible faith unless that testimony is, at the same time and truly, the testimony of God.”

The text is perfectly clear. But since even the clearest texts can give rise to doubt or furnish occasion for quibbles and evasions when they are not studied in their true and complete context, we shall take the liberty of reproducing almost the entire article of St. Thomas in which these words are found. It is the eighth article of Question Fourteen among the disputed questions On Truth (De veritate). That fourteenth question is devoted entirely to divine faith, and the title of the eighth article is: "Whether the proper object of faith (proprium obiectum fidei) is the First Truth (Veritas Prima)." This is equivalent to asking whether the formal motive of divine faith is the testimony of God. Here is the Holy Doctor's reply:

"I answer that the proper object of faith is the First Truth. This can be understood as follows. No habit has the character of a virtue unless its act is always good. Otherwise it would not be the perfection of a faculty. Since, therefore, the act of the intellect is good insofar as it considers the truth, it follows that a habit existing in the intellect cannot be a virtue unless it is such that through it one infallibly judges the truth. For this reason opinion is not an intellectual virtue, whereas science and understanding are, as is stated in the sixth book of the Ethics."

"Now faith does not possess the character of a virtue by reason of the evidence of the things themselves, since it concerns things that are unseen. It must therefore derive this from adhering to a testimony in which truth is found infallibly."

"But just as created being, considered in itself, is empty and liable to fail unless it is sustained by uncreated being, so every created truth is liable to fail unless it is corrected by the uncreated Truth."

"Therefore, assent to the testimony of neither a man (for example, the Pope or a Council) nor an angel would lead infallibly to the truth except insofar as the testimony of God speaking is recognized in them."

"Hence, faith that is a virtue, that is, every faith by which one infallibly judges the truth, causes the human intellect to adhere to the truth that exists in the divine knowledge, transcending the truth of its own intellect..."

"And thus the faith that unites man to the divine knowledge through assent has God Himself as its principal object; everything else pertains to it only consequently."¹

"Accordingly, the First Truth (Veritas Prima) stands in relation to faith (that is, to every faith by which one infallibly judges the truth) both as its means (medium) and as its object (obiectum)." ²

We earnestly recommend that every reader, and especially every Thomist reader, read and reread, analyze and meditate upon the foregoing article of St. Thomas. It is one of fundamental importance, taken from the very treatise On Faith (De Fide), in which St. Thomas lays the foundation of the entire treatise by proving that the formal object, or formal motive, of every infallible faith must necessarily be the divine testimony.

The entire force of that article consists in the following proposition: "There is no infallible faith without an infallible testimony, and there is no infallible testimony except the divine testimony." And this is precisely the minor premise of the syllogism that we were seeking to prove.

For those unfamiliar with St. Thomas's language, the cited article could be summarized in the following propositions:

1. Divine faith is an intellectual virtue.
2. It cannot be an intellectual virtue unless it always inclines toward the truth.
3. It cannot always incline toward the truth unless it has as its formal motive an infallible testimony.
4. It cannot have as its formal motive an infallible testimony unless it has as its formal motive the very testimony of God.
5. Therefore, divine faith has as its formal motive the testimony of God, that is, the First Truth.

Let the reader note the fourth proposition, which is the basis of all of St. Thomas’s reasoning. If that fourth proposition is denied or distinguished, the conclusion and the entire article of St. Thomas collapse at their foundation. On the other hand, if that fourth proposition is admitted without distinctions, as it ought to be, it is proven that all infallible faith, and therefore ecclesiastical faith, is divine faith.

The Holy Doctor proves this fourth proposition with those beautiful words: “Just as created being, as far as it is in itself, is vain and defective, unless it is held together by uncreated being: so all created truth is defective, unless insofar as it is rectified by uncreated truth”.

With that principle established, which is evident, the Holy Doctor argues thus: “Either faith has as its formal motive the created truth in itself, and then it is not infallible faith nor, therefore, divine faith, or it has as its formal motive the created truth insofar as it is rectified by the uncreated truth, and then the true formal motive is not the created truth, but the Uncreated Truth, and, therefore, it is divine faith.”

If we apply that same doctrine of St. Thomas to ecclesiastical faith, it becomes evident that it is divine faith. The matter is clear. When we say that ecclesiastical faith has as its formal motive the authority of the Church, we need only apply St. Thomas's same reasoning. Either that authority of the Church is a created authority, not rectified by the uncreated authority, or it is a created authority, rectified by the uncreated authority. If the former, it is not infallible faith, nor, therefore, ecclesiastical faith. If the latter, it comes to the same thing, according to St. Thomas, whether the formal motive is created truth, rectified by uncreated truth, or the formal motive is uncreated truth, and therefore it is divine faith.

There will surely be no lack of readers who, accustomed by modern manuals to distinguish specifically between divine faith and infallible faith, will deny or distinguish some of those propositions on which St. Thomas's reasoning is based. The force of education and habit is very great, and the imagination, when supported by these, is most fruitful in distinctions and subterfuges. But let it be borne in mind that the question now is not to demonstrate whether what St. Thomas affirms is true or not, but simply that St. Thomas affirms it thus.

We recommend to every sincere Thomist that he consult the parallel places to the cited article³.

In the second article of that passage from the Sentences, the following text will be found: "The believer trusts a man (a prophet, apostle, pope, or council) not insofar as he is a man, but insofar as God speaks in him"⁴.

And in the fourth article of that same place, one will find the following: "The motive (the formal reason) inclining the will to believe the articles is the First Truth itself, which is infallible; but the reason that inclines one to believe other things is either some fallible sign, or the statement of some learned person, who can both err and deceive. Hence the will does not give infallible truth to the intellect believing other credible things, as it gives infallible truth in believing the articles of faith; and for this reason this faith is a virtue and the other is not"⁵.

For St. Thomas, just as there is no middle ground between created and uncreated being, but every being is either created or uncreated, so too there are no specific mixtures or middle terms between created truth and uncreated truth, or between human authority or faith and divine authority or faith. All authority is either specifically human or specifically divine. If human authority is not completely rectified or guaranteed by divine authority, it is fallible authority, and therefore the faith is specifically human and fallible, whatever name, whether civil or ecclesiastical, one may wish to clothe it with. On the other hand, if human authority is completely rectified or guaranteed by divine authority, as it is in every infallible definition of the Church, then, according to St. Thomas, the authority is specifically divine, and in assenting to it we do not assent formally to the testimony of man, but to the very testimony of God, by whose divine authority the testimony of every infallible definition of the Church is covered, or rectified, or guaranteed, or divinized. That is the meaning of those words of the Holy Doctor: "Just as created being, in itself, is vain and defective unless it is contained by uncreated being, so too all created truth is defective unless it is rectified by uncreated Truth. Hence, neither to the testimony of man nor of angel would assent lead infallibly to truth, unless insofar as in them the testimony of God speaking is considered⁶

Let the reader, then, not forget this fundamental principle of Saint Thomas: “There is no infallible faith unless it has as its formal motive the testimony of God.” Which is exactly the same as saying: “All ecclesiastical faith, on pain of not being infallible faith, is divine faith”⁷

Since modern times when a distinction began to be made between definitions of divine faith and merely infallible definitions, certain theologians already regard the matter of infallible definitions as something of little importance, or as something that the Church would do frequently. Thus, for every doctrinal document of the Holy See, merely because it is addressed to the whole Church, there is almost always some theologian who immediately raises the question of whether such a document is infallible. The result is often that some theologians declare themselves for the affirmative and others for the negative, with which we are left, regarding infallibility, as before the dispute, since a document whose infallibility is not evident, but doubtful or disputable, is not infallibly certain, or is practically as if it were not. We believe that in these disputes two things are frequently forgotten: first, that infallible definitions, far from being an ordinary or frequent thing among the popes, are a rare thing and even extremely rare, as the most eminent Cardinal Van Rossum very wisely observes: “Thus the Supreme Pontiff is rather to be said to use his extraordinary teaching authority or his infallibility rarely, indeed extremely rarely”⁸. Second, that no pontifical document should be considered an infallible definition unless it is evidently established that it is: applying to infallible definitions, since the reason is the same, what the new Canonical Code so prudently teaches regarding dogmatic definitions: “Nothing is understood to be dogmatically declared or defined, unless this is manifestly established”⁹.

That inclination of some to regard all the Pope’s doctrinal documents as infallible is not always a sign of excessive faith and obedience to the Church, but rather is sometimes a sign of a lack of obedience and faith, since it stems from believing that the Church’s teachings do not merit faith and obedience unless they are infallible. Although they do not merit divine faith or infallible faith, they always merit human faith, and an internal and certain human faith, as long as it is not evidently established—and rarely will it be—that the Church has in fact erred. That human faith that we give to the Church’s non-infallible teachings, and which in modern times has received the name of pious assent, is what ought to be called ecclesiastical faith, just as we call ecclesiastical laws those human and changeable laws of the Church to distinguish them from laws that are truly divine and immutable.

240. THE SECOND PROOF, likewise taken from Saint Thomas, to demonstrate that the so-called ecclesiastical faith is true divine faith, may be formulated as follows: • Everything truly said by God, or everything that is nothing other than an explanation of what was said by God, is definable as divine faith and merits the assent of divine faith once defined: But everything revealed in a mediate or consequential manner is truly said by God, or is nothing other than an explanation of what was said by God:

Then the faith that must be given to the mediate or consequential revelation, once it has been defined by the Church, is divine faith. Or, what is the same: then ecclesiastical faith is divine faith.

The major premise of that reasoning is common doctrine among theologians. In parentheses, let the reader note how we have formulated and how that major premise must be formulated so that it may be said to be common doctrine. If, instead of saying that it is "definable as a matter of faith," we had said that it is "of faith" (that is, formally of faith) even before the Church's definition, as is frequently said in the manuals, then that major premise would not be common doctrine, but rather the particular doctrine of Vázquez and Vega, which the Thomist school always opposed. But this is entirely accidental to our case. What is essential is that that major premise, as we have formulated it, is common doctrine among theologians.

The lesser premise, which is what matters and upon which the entire present question depends, is express doctrine of Saint Thomas, repeated by the Holy Doctor in various places and under varied forms. Let us cite some texts.

Let us begin with the article in which the Holy Doctor examines precisely the question of whether there can be true dogmatic progress, and which bears the title: “Utrum fides per successionem temporum profecerit.” In his reply to the fourth objection, he expresses himself thus:

“Ad quartum dicendum quod the article is indivisible truth, with respect to what is actually explicated in the article: but it is divisible (explicable, developable) with respect to those things which are potentially contained in the article, inasmuch as one who says one thing, in a certain way says many things, and these are what precede the article or follow from it: and with respect to this the article of faith can be explicated and divided”¹⁰.

In that text Saint Thomas clearly states the two things affirmed in our minor, namely: first, that truly spoken by God are not only the articles, that is, what is formally revealed, but also all the consequences of those articles (ea quae consequuntur ad ipsum), that is, what is mediately revealed. Second, that such consequences are nothing but an explanation of the articles (et quantum ad hoc potest explicari et dividi articulus fidei).

Let us hear another similar text, no less expressive than the previous one: “Explicare articulos fidei contingit dupliciter: in one way, as regards the very substance of the articles, according to which one knows the articles themselves distinctly; in another way, as regards what is contained implicitly in the articles themselves, which indeed happens when a person knows those things which follow from the articles¹¹

In this text, the Holy Doctor again affirms that everything mediate or consequential (ea quae ex articulis consequuntur) is truly implicit in the articles of faith, or in what God has said (*in ipsis articulis continentur implicite), and that, therefore, it is nothing other than an explanation of what God has said (explicare articulos fidei). Thus, both the theologian, when he draws out those consequences fallibly, and the Church, when she defines them infallibly, do nothing other than explain what was already implicitly said by God. With the sole difference that the theologian makes or gives this explanation with human authority, and the Church with divine authority.

Let us hear a third text, no less expressive than the previous ones, if not more so: “Something contained in an article can be explained in two ways: in one way, according as one article is sometimes contained in another, or two are contained in a common one, just as the resurrection of the dead is in a certain way contained in the Resurrection of Christ, and the Passion and the Incarnation in this common thing which is the mystery of Redemption. And thus faith implicit is made explicit in the determined articles of faith, and this explanation was completed through Christ, whence to his doctrine, as far as the essentials of faith are concerned, it is lawful neither to add nor to diminish, as is said in the last chapter of Revelation. But before the coming of Christ it was not complete; hence even among the greater [figures] it grew according to the different times”.

Thus far the Holy Doctor has spoken of the explanation of articles by articles that existed in the Old Testament and no longer fits in the New; now comes the explanation of articles by consequences, which is the explanation that still fits in the New Testament. The Holy Doctor continues thus:

“In another way, that which is contained in the article is not the article, but something accompanying the article, and in this respect the faith can be unfolded daily, and through the study of the Saints (the Fathers of the ecumenical councils) it has been more and more unfolded”¹² “Because faith, as far as it is in itself, sufficiently inclines toward all things that accompany, precede, or follow the faith”¹³. It is evident that St. Thomas, when he speaks of consequences of the articles, understands not only the improper consequences, but also the proper ones, that is, everything from the denial of which the denial of what is directly revealed would follow: “those things that are contained potentially in the article” (466-469).

We have, then, that the true object of ecclesiastical faith is implicitly spoken by God, and that, therefore, ecclesiastical faith is divine faith¹⁴

241. THIRD PROOF.—No one is truly a heretic unless he denies something that is truly of divine faith.

Thus, according to Saint Thomas, whoever denies what is mediately, consequently, or indirectly revealed after it has been infallibly defined by the Church would truly be a heretic.

Then ecclesiastical faith is, according to Saint Thomas, true divine faith.

The greater premise of that reasoning is evident and admitted by all. The lesser premise is expressly and repeatedly affirmed by Saint Thomas whenever he deals with one of these two questions: a) "whether it is lawful to hold contrary opinions about the notions"; b) "whether heresy properly concerns those things which are of the faith".

Let us briefly cite some texts: "Idem iudicium est de his (concerning indirect revelation) et de illis (concerning direct revelation) quia ad unum sequitur alterum"¹⁵ "In this he cannot err except through heresy"¹⁶ "And for this reason many things are now considered heretical which were not previously so considered, because it is now more evident what follows from them" (ibid). "If anyone were to resist such an ordination, he would be deemed a heretic"¹⁷

242. A REMARK.—The observation that perhaps may occur to some is that, if this doctrine of St. Thomas is true, then not only the one who denies what the Church has defined as Catholic faith must be held as a heretic, but also the one who denies what has been defined as infallible truth.

The answer is that for one to be formally a heretic, it is not enough that Saint Thomas says so, but rather it is necessary that the Church says or teaches so. Now then: up to the present, the Church already teaches that whoever denies what is defined as Catholic faith is a heretic, but it does not yet teach that whoever denies what is defined as infallible truth is a heretic.

But one thing is that the Church does not yet teach this, and another thing is that it may not be able to teach it someday. In the Vatican Council, the following dogmatic canon was already prepared: "If anyone says that the infallibility of the Church is restricted only to those things contained in divine revelation (formal revelation), and that it does not extend also to other truths which are necessarily required so that the deposit of revelation may be kept intact: let him be anathema"¹⁸.

Because the Vatican Council was suspended, that dogmatic canon which was already prepared could not be discussed. On the day—perhaps not very distant—when the Church resumes the suspended council and approves or defines that dogmatic canon, we will hold as a matter of divine faith that the Church is infallible in defining consequential revelation, or what is the same thing, that consequential revelation defined by the Church is infallibly true. Consequently, we will have it defined as heretical to deny that the Church is infallible in defining the consequential, or what is the same thing, to deny that the consequential defined by the Church is infallibly true.

As the mediate or consequential revelation, after being infallibly defined by the Church, is precisely the proper object of what is called ecclesiastical faith, the not-distant day on which the Church defines that dogmatic canon will indirectly define that what is called ecclesiastical faith is truly divine faith. It amounts to the same, we shall repeat, to define that it is of divine faith that the Church is infallible in what is mediately revealed, as to define that it is of divine faith that what is mediately revealed, once defined, is infallibly true, or to define that one must assent with divine faith to the truth of what is mediately revealed once defined by the Church.

This is without counting that in past centuries the Church has already defined as true dogmas of divine faith many theological conclusions and various dogmatic facts, as traditional theology has always recognized and as is evident from the history of dogmas¹⁹.

243. FOURTH PROOF.—Every theological conclusion deduced from two formally revealed premises is definable by divine faith and not merely by ecclesiastical faith: But the theological conclusion deduced from one formally revealed premise and another of natural reason is of the same specific nature as that deduced from two formally revealed premises: Therefore every truly theological conclusion is definable by divine faith and not merely by ecclesiastical faith. The major premise of this argument is commonly admitted by theologians. The minor premise is the current and perpetual doctrine of St. Thomas and of all Thomists. It is founded upon the specific unity and indivisibility of Sacred Theology, and, therefore, upon that of all its conclusions, whether they be conclusions from two premises of faith, or one of faith and another of reason. “Theology is one according to the infima species, whether it proceeds from both premises being of faith, or one of faith and the other of natural reason, or whether it is concerned with speculative matters, or with moral ones. It is taken from St. Thomas” ²⁰. If some imagine that there is a specific difference between conclusions from two premises of faith and those from one of faith and another of reason, it is because in this, as in so many other similar questions, they are accustomed to fix their attention upon the purely material point of view, without noting that the nature and specific distinction of cognitive habits does not come from the matter or reality of the thing known, but from the formal medium of knowledge. Now: either the formal medium of knowledge is diverse in some conclusions and others, or it is the same. If it is diverse, then one must distinguish diverse species of theology against the clear and perpetual doctrine of St. Thomas. If it is the same, it is impossible that some conclusions be definable by divine faith and others not, since, divine faith being specifically distinct from theology, the being or not being definable by divine faith constitutes a distinct species. Many imagine they escape this inescapable dilemma by distinguishing, in the style of Vázquez, conclusions as conclusions and conclusions as truths or consequents. Or, as it is commonly said: conclusions formaliter and conclusions specificative. Having made this distinction, they usually reply that conclusions from two premises of faith are definable by divine faith considered specificative or insofar as they are revealed truths, but not considered formaliter or insofar as they are deduced conclusions. Hence the distinction of two assents: an assent to conclusions considered formaliter or insofar as they are conclusions, and this is a theological assent, and another assent to conclusions considered specifically or insofar as they are revealed truths, and this, they say, is an assent of divine faith.

Firstly, if that distinction between two assents, one of theology and another of divine faith, were valid for the conclusions of two premises of faith, it would be equally valid for the conclusions inclusive of one premise of faith and another of reason, since both one and the other are known by reasoning, and neither one nor the other can be known without reasoning. Therefore, if for assent one could dispense with reasoning in some cases, one could equally do so in all.

Secondly and principally, the possibility of considering one and the same conclusion in two different senses and thus being able to give it two specifically distinct acts of assent is true or takes place when that conclusion is knowable to us by two means or ways that are specifically different, that is, when we can know it without ratiocination and with ratiocination. This occurs when a truth is contained in one part of the deposit expressly or without ratiocination and in another part of the deposit virtually or with ratiocination; for example, the eternity of God. This also occurs when we know a truth by the definition of the Church or without ratiocination and moreover by theological deduction or with ratiocination; for example, the two wills in Christ.

But when we know a truth only by means of deductive reasoning, and therefore know it only through a single means of knowledge, that is, as a conclusion, it is an absurdity in Thomist doctrine to say that two assents (127) can be given to it. If it is known only insofar as it is a conclusion, only the assent insofar as it is a conclusion can be given to it, which is theological assent, whether it is a question of a conclusion from two premises of faith or from one of faith and another of reason. "There is not given a double assent regarding the conclusion, one about it in itself, another about it as inferred; because the conclusion, whether it is considered in itself or as inferred, always pertains to the same habit, namely, science"²¹ "As for the conclusions themselves, there is given only a single

assensus, qui pertinet ad theologiam, et per quem fertur ad conclusiones et illative et entitative sumptas²². This is elementary and perpetual doctrine in the Thomist school, with no exception other than the Salmanticenses, because they did not distinguish the Suarezian confusion about the virtually revealed²³.

Therefore, before the definition of the Church, all true theological conclusions—whether those from two premises of faith or those from one of faith and one of reason—are known solely by means of theology, that is, by revelation explained by reason. After the definition of the Church, all are known, moreover, by another new means, that is, by revelation explained by the Church, which is the means of divine faith. Hence, before the definition of the Church, all true conclusions merit one and the same single assent, the theological assent, never that of divine faith. After the definition of the Church, they merit two specifically distinct assents: the theological assent and the assent of divine faith.

This is the only theory in which the two fundamental theses of St. Thomas are preserved: a) the specific unity of theology, and therefore of all true theological conclusions; b) the specific distinction between theology and divine faith.

244. FIFTH PROOF.—Everything really identical with the revealed deposit, or everything that pertains to the essence of the revealed deposit, is definable as of divine faith:

Thus all true and rigorous theological conclusion must be truly identical with the revealed deposit or with the essence of the revealed deposit.

Then every true and rigorous theological conclusion is definable as of divine faith and not merely of ecclesiastical faith.

The greatest part of that reasoning is admitted by almost all theologians, both ancient and modern. That is precisely what Suárez and Lugo called formal-confused, and what moderns usually call virtual implicit, or virtual identical, or virtual connective-essential (73).

The minor premise of that reasoning we have already proven in various earlier sections (109). For now, let it suffice to recall the following: There is no rigorous theological conclusion without theological certainty; no conclusion can have theological certainty if it can fail in any way; every conclusion can fail in any way if it is not deduced through bonds of real identity or essential connection; therefore, where there is no bond of real identity or of essential connection, there is no true and rigorous theological conclusion.

Anyone who doubts this has a very simple remedy. Let them present to us a single argument in which the conclusion is absolutely certain and yet has no real identity or essential connection with the principle from which such a conclusion is deduced. That would be a discovery that would overthrow everything that Aristotle and Saint Thomas teach about the nature of absolute certainty and about the radical difference that exists between the sciences or conclusions of absolute certainty, such as mathematics, metaphysics, or theology, and the sciences or conclusions of non-absolute certainty, such as the physical or moral sciences or conclusions (39).

In the well-worn example of "Christ is man: therefore he has actual risibility," an example in which so many become confused, the word man does not mean man simply, but rather whole and perfect man. Now, although risibility or any other actual property is not essential for being man, it is essential for being whole and perfect man. Between the predicate "actual risibility" of the theological conclusion and the predicate "whole and perfect man" of the revealed premise, there is true and real inclusion or identity. This always happens in every rigorous theological conclusion.

Then every true and rigorous theological conclusion is really identical with the revealed major premise or is of the essence of the revealed major premise, and, therefore, definable by divine faith and not only by ecclesiastical faith.

**245. SIXTH PROOF.—**Everything that is really and truly within the revealed deposit is definable as of divine faith: But everything necessarily or theologically connected with the revealed deposit is really and truly within the revealed deposit: Therefore, everything necessarily connected with the revealed deposit is definable as of divine faith.

The greater premise is generally admitted by theologians. The difficulty, then, lies only in the lesser premise. Indeed: many believe that what is connected or related to the deposit is not within, but outside the deposit. They believe that it is not something of the deposit itself, but something else really distinct, although necessary for its conservation and defense. They imagine that the connected truths relate to the revealed deposit somewhat as walls relate to a city, or even better, as a fence or enclosure relates to an orchard. The fence serves and is necessary to guard and defend the orchard, but it does not form part of it. It is something exterior, not interior, to the plants that grow and develop within the orchard. In the same way, they say, what is connected to the deposit is necessary for the conservation and defense of the deposit, but it does not form part of it. It is something from outside, not from within, the deposit.

In our judgment this is a very great error into which a multitude of theologians have fallen and continue to fall by viewing things from a material point of view. The formal point of view from which truths connected with the deposit fall under the infallibility of the Church is not their matter, but their connection or relation to the deposit. Now, and this no theologian should ever lose sight of, that relation is mutual. It is not only a relation of other things to the revealed deposit, but also a relation of the revealed deposit to other things. From this latter point of view, and solely and exclusively from it, do such relations fall under the infallibility of the Church; that is, not insofar as they are relations of other things, but insofar as they are relations of the revealed deposit. They are, therefore, relations of the revealed deposit, something or a part of the revealed deposit, something within the revealed deposit, and, consequently, something definable as of divine faith.

The same or analogous confusion is present in what we all say when speaking of ecclesiastical power. It is customary to say that ecclesiastical power extends not only to spiritual things, but also to certain non-spiritual, that is, temporal things. Such language is materially true, and therefore very convenient and very useful in canon law and in every science of a practical or empirical character; but it is formally false, and consequently very apt to mislead the mind of the philosopher or theologian, who ought to fix his attention only on the formal point of view, which is what specifies and distinguishes powers and habits. Since the Church is a formally spiritual society, its power cannot extend, formally speaking, except to the spiritual. If we say popularly that it extends also to something temporal, it is not insofar as it is temporal, but insofar as it is related to the spiritual. Now, and this is what many do not notice: the power of the Church does not look, nor can it look, at such relations insofar as they are relations of the temporal, but it looks at them exclusively insofar as they are relations of the spiritual. They are, therefore, relations of the spiritual, spiritual relations. Thus, and only thus, the object of the Church's power proves to be truly homogeneous, namely: a) the spiritual things; b) their relations, that is, the spiritual relations.

In short, the same happens in every power or habit, for example, in the visual power. Sight does not formally have as its object color and other things, but rather color and the colored. Thus, what we call other things, such as extension and substance, do not fall under sight insofar as they are extension or substance, but insofar as they are related to color, which is the same as saying insofar as they are colored.

In the same way, the infallibility of the Church has as its object not revelation and other non-revealed things, but revelation and its relations. These relations infallibility does not create or invent, but only discovers and defines. They were already beforehand in the revealed deposit, and for this reason St. Thomas calls them by the classic name of revealables, that is, discoverable in the revealed deposit, where from the beginning they are found. They are, therefore, relations or conclusions of the revealed deposit, relations implicit in what was said by God, and for that reason definable as of divine faith. Their definition by the Church gives us something new as regards explanation, but not new as regards substance or objectivity, for they were already implied or implicit in what was originally revealed.

246. SEVENTH PROOF.—When a conclusion is entirely included in the premise of faith in such a way that the premise of reason merely explains or manifests that inclusion, such a conclusion is definable as of divine faith, and not only of ecclesiastical faith.

Thus it is that in all truly and rigorously theological reasoning the conclusion is entirely included in the premise of faith, and the premise of reason does nothing but explain or unfold that inclusion.

Then every true and rigorous theological conclusion is definable by divine faith, and not only by ecclesiastical faith.

The greater part of that reasoning is commonly admitted by theologians. Here is how Cardinal Franzelin formulates it: "When one premise, being revealed, implicitly already contains what is set forth in the conclusion, and the other, although not revealed, evidently manifests this comprehension of the conclusion in the revealed premise, without doubt the truth that is set forth in such a conclusion is revealed." And he gives as an example of such a class of conclusions, and very aptly so, the conclusion that "Christ has two wills," which is deduced from the revealed major premise "Christ is perfect God and perfect man," and from the minor premise of reason "Every perfect man has a human will"²⁴. In that major premise, we repeat, theologians commonly agree.

The difficulty, then, lies only in the minor premise. Many, not to say almost all modern theologians, believe that in theology there can and must be distinguished between explicative and completive minor premises. The former only explain or unfold what was already really contained or implicit in the revealed major premise, and, therefore, the conclusion is also revealed and definable by divine faith. The latter, called completive, are not limited to unfolding or explaining what was already implicit in the revealed major premise, but rather add something objectively distinct. Therefore, the conclusion is neither revealed nor definable by faith, since it is not entirely contained in the revealed major premise, but partly in it and partly in the minor premise of natural reason.

In that division of lesser matters, and therefore of conclusions into explicative and completive, we are in agreement, and it is a fundamental division that must never be forgotten. But the modern error, stemming from Suárez, lies in having reduced theology properly so called to that class of completive conclusions, when such conclusions, far from being the only properly theological ones, are not, on the contrary, rigorously theological, but purely physical, incapable by their nature of theological certainty. This we believe we have fully demonstrated in several of our previous sections. All rigorous theological conclusions are explicative (89-109).

Those who think otherwise have reflected little on the nature of true theology or on the radical distinction that exists between the sciences of physical-contingent certainty and the sciences of metaphysical or absolute certainty, such as metaphysics and theology; for Sacred Theology is nothing other than supernatural metaphysics, just as natural theology or Theodicy is nothing other than natural metaphysics.

In the purely physical sciences, the minor premises, and therefore the conclusions, always express something really distinct from the major premises, and, therefore, they are minor premises and completive conclusions, never explicative ones. On the contrary, in the mathematical, metaphysical, or theological sciences, the minor premises, and therefore the conclusions, always express something that is of the essence of the major premises, something really implicit in the major premises, something that issues from the major premises, and from the major premises alone, not by addition, but by analysis. For this reason, in mathematics as in metaphysics, as in theology, true, proper, and rigorous conclusions are explicative conclusions, never completive ones: they are analytical conclusions.

Therefore, in the true Thomistic school and in every school that knows how to distinguish true theology and true metaphysics from the poor and contingent physical sciences, it has always been taught that the theological conclusion is completely contained in the revealed major premises and not at all in the minor premises drawn from reason, the latter being instruments or causes of explanation, not of objectivity²⁵

247. EIGHTH PROOF.—The eighth proof can be clearly formulated in the following propositions:

1.ª. The Church cannot condemn a proposition as infallibly erroneous if between that proposition and the deposit of faith there is no true opposition. 2.ª. There can be no true opposition between a proposition and the deposit of faith unless between that proposition and the deposit of faith there is really implicitly a true contradiction of meaning. 3.ª. There can be no implicit true contradiction of meaning between the erroneous proposition and the deposit of faith if the erroneous proposition is not the denial of a meaning identical to that affirmed in the deposit of faith. 4.ª. The erroneous proposition cannot be the denial of a meaning identical to that affirmed in the deposit of faith if the theological conclusion is not an affirmation of a meaning identical to that affirmed in the deposit of faith. 5.ª. Therefore every theological conclusion is an affirmation of a meaning identical to the deposit of faith, and, consequently, it is definable by divine faith and not merely by ecclesiastical faith.

The first proposition is evident and admitted by all. The Church cannot define a truth nor condemn an error by reason of the conformity or opposition that this truth or this error may have with the principles of natural reason, but only with the revealed principles or the revealed deposit.

The second proposition is also clear. In every opposition there is implicit a contradiction. This we will demonstrate at length elsewhere (340-351) with numerous reasons and abundant texts from Saint Thomas. It suffices to recall the following: "Contradictio includitur in omnibus aliis generibus oppositionis"²⁶.

The third proposition is the very definition of contradiction: "affirmation and negation of the same thing, about the same thing, in the same respect".

Without affirming and denying the same thing between two extremes, contradiction is impossible.

The fourth is the very definition of an erroneous proposition. Every erroneous proposition must be contradictory to a theological conclusion.

The fifth is evident. It amounts to the same whether one says identical sense to the revealed deposit or definable sense of divine faith.

In a word: every opposition includes a contradiction, and every contradiction is founded on an identity²⁷

248. NINTH PROOF.—Although the preceding proofs, and especially the first and third proofs, taken from St. Thomas, extend not only to theological conclusions properly so called, but also to dogmatic facts, they apply, nevertheless, more directly to the former than to the latter. The proofs that now follow apply equally both to the doctrines mediately revealed, which we call theological conclusions, and to the facts mediately revealed, called dogmatic facts. Let us begin with a proof taken from the very doctrine of the Vatican Council, which can be formulated as follows:

Everything that is not new doctrine as regards substance, but rather the same doctrine revealed by God to the Apostles and preserved and explained by the Church, can be defined as of divine faith:

Thus the infallibility of the Church cannot give us or propose to us new doctrine, but rather the same doctrine revealed by God to the Apostles.

Then every truth infallibly defined by the Church is of divine faith and not merely of ecclesiastical faith.

The major premise is evident and admitted by all theologians. The minor premise is taught quite clearly, in our judgment, in the following two texts of the Vatican Council: "For the doctrine of faith, which God has revealed, has not been proposed, like a philosophical invention, to human minds to be perfected, but has been entrusted as a divine deposit to the Spouse of Christ, to be faithfully guarded and infallibly declared... Let it therefore grow... and make much and vigorous progress, both for individuals and for all, as for one man and for the whole Church, through the stages of ages and centuries, in understanding, knowledge, and wisdom: but only in its own kind, namely, in the same dogma, the same sense, and the same judgment"²⁸. "For the Holy Spirit was promised to the successors of Peter not that, by His revelation, they might reveal a NEW DOCTRINE, but that, with His assistance, they might holily guard and faithfully expound the revelation handed down through the Apostles, or the deposit of faith"²⁹.

Let the unprejudiced theologian read and reread these two texts of the Vatican Council, and above all, the second. In them it is expressly stated that the assistance of the Holy Spirit, which is the same as infallibility, was not promised to the Church, nor does the Church possess it, for new doctrine, but for the same apostolic doctrine, holily preserved and faithfully expounded.

Therefore, either the doctrine defined by the Church is, as to its substance or meaning, the same as that which God revealed to the Apostles, or it is new doctrine. If the former, it is evident that it is definable by divine faith and not merely by ecclesiastical faith. If the latter, it does not fall under infallibility, for the Council says expressly that infallibility was not promised to the Church for new doctrines.

Some may perhaps think of saying that the Council does not precisely state that the Church cannot infallibly teach us new doctrine, but rather that, in order to teach it to us, it does not have new revelation at its disposal, but rather new assistance or infallibility. Such a response would be a puerile evasion. The Council expressly teaches that precisely for this very reason—because it does not have new revelation, but only mere assistance to preserve and explain the doctrine already revealed to the Apostles—therefore the Church cannot give us new doctrine, but rather the same apostolic doctrine, holily preserved and faithfully explained.

Thus, any doctrine of which it can truly be affirmed that it is nothing more than tradita per apostolos revelatio sancte custodita et fideliter exposita (Vatican Council) is evidently a doctrine of divine faith. On the other hand, a doctrine of which this cannot be affirmed cannot be an object of infallibility, nor therefore of ecclesiastical faith, according to the Vatican Council.

249. TENTH PROOF.—Every truth expressly taught by the Apostles to the Church is definable as of divine faith and not merely of ecclesiastical faith:

Thus the Apostles taught or could teach the Church many truths not known immediately by revelation or inspiration, but by simple infallibility or assistance of the Holy Spirit.

Next, the object of infallibility or assistance, which is the same as the object of ecclesiastical faith, is definable as of divine faith.

The greater one is commonly admitted by theologians, and it is established by the practice of the Church. Apostolic doctrine and doctrine definable as of divine faith have always been regarded by the Church as identical things, and this has been the criterion by which the Church has always been guided in its definitions of faith³⁰.

The lesser point will also be clear to anyone who considers these two things: first, that the Apostles during their entire life had no less authority than that which councils or popes now possess. Hence, if councils or popes can define and teach infallibly not only what is expressly revealed or inspired by God, but also what is necessarily connected with it, then all or each one of the Apostles could do the same. When Pope Saint Clement and the Apostle Saint John lived at the same time, there was nothing that the former could teach that the latter could not; hence, if Saint Clement could define and teach a theological conclusion or a dogmatic fact, the Apostle Saint John could do the same.

Second, that, in the opinion of numerous and grave modern theologians, it is not necessary that the Apostles, when preaching and even when writing, should always have had the gift of revelation or inspiration, as did those who were sacred writers, but rather it suffices that they had divine assistance or infallibility (176, note).

Now then: it is evident that the Church has always regarded as definable as of divine faith everything taught by the Apostles, without ever requiring that the Apostles have declared that they taught it by revelation or inspiration and not by mere assistance or infallibility. It is clear, therefore, that infallibility or divine assistance is sufficient for divine faith. Otherwise, one would have to say that the Church lacks any criterion for discerning which things were of divine faith and which were of ecclesiastical faith in the apostolic preaching.

This same point we have just made regarding apostolic preaching is seen even more clearly when applied to the later preaching or tradition of the Church, or to the unanimous consent of the Holy Fathers. On this tradition of the Church, on this unanimous consent of the Holy Fathers, the Ecumenical Councils have always based their definitions of divine faith. Now then, let all the acts of the councils be read, from Nicaea to the Vatican, and let all the testimonies of tradition or of the Holy Fathers that those councils cite be examined, and it will be seen as clear as the light of day that the councils never require that the constant tradition of the Church or the unanimous testimony of the Holy Fathers have taught such a truth as a matter of divine faith or as formally revealed, but simply that they have taught it as doctrine of the Church or as doctrine necessary for salvation, or as indubitable and binding doctrine for the Christian, or other similar formulas, but formulas that apply equally to doctrines of divine faith and to those of ecclesiastical faith. And yet, that, and that alone, has sufficed for all the councils to define such truths as dogmas of faith, as truths of divine and Catholic faith. If to define as dogmas of faith the consubstantiality of the Word at the Council of Nicaea, or the divine motherhood at that of Ephesus, or the two understandings and two wills of Christ at that of Constantinople, or transubstantiation at the Council of Trent, or the Immaculate Conception in the bull of Pius IX, or pontifical infallibility at the Vatican, the Church had had to rely on a constant tradition or on a unanimous testimony of the Holy Fathers, in which it was said that those truths were of divine faith or formally revealed, such dogmas could never have been defined.

Moreover, not only would the Ecumenical Councils have no criterion whatsoever for distinguishing which things are of divine faith and which things are of ecclesiastical faith in the apostolic preaching, in the tradition of the Church, or in the doctrine of the Holy Fathers, but we ourselves would be left without any certain criterion for knowing which things are of divine faith and which things are of ecclesiastical faith in the definitions of councils or popes. It is true that in the dogmatic definitions that have been given after this dispute over the distinction between divine and ecclesiastical faith arose, the Church has frequently taken care to express in the very definition that the defined truth was a revealed truth, as it has expressed, for example, in the definition of the Immaculate Conception by Pius IX, or of pontifical infallibility by the Vatican Council³¹

But it is no less certain that before that new faith called ecclesiastical was invented, and, therefore, before the seventeenth century, dogmatic definitions or those of divine faith were frequently made by the Church through the simple formulas of "firmiter credimus," or of "declaramus," or "definimus," or others similar, without adding at all whether such a truth was revealed or not. And yet, all those definitions have always been regarded as definitions of divine faith, as true dogmas of faith.

In the same professions of faith, such as, for example, the profession of faith of Pius IV, which we all make, and which no one will deny is a profession of divine faith, we simply say "I believe and profess" or "I constantly hold," without adding that it is a matter of divine faith. And that "I believe and profess" extends in those professions of faith not only to what the councils may have defined as of divine faith, but to everything that the councils may have defined, clearly giving to understand that everything defined by the councils is of divine faith³².

250. ELEVENTH PROOF.—Setting aside, in order not to lengthen this chapter excessively, several other proofs or confirmations ³³, we are going to conclude with one that is, in our judgment,

(Professio fidei tridentina: DENZINGER, nn. 994-1.000). Finally, pushing things to the limit, it will turn out that if that modern ecclesiastical faith were not truly divine faith, we would be left doubting whether the very Athanasian Creed itself is of divine faith or not. In that Creed nothing more is said than haec est fides catholica quam nisi quisque fideliter firmiterque crediderit, salvus esse non poterit. Now then: according to the language of the Church, ecclesiastical faith is just as Catholic as public divine faith. Let us hear the following text: Tertio decimo: si credidisti et adhuc credis, solum Romanum Pontificem, dubiis emergentibus circa fidem CATHOLICAM posse per determinationem authenticam, cui sit inviolabiliter adhaerendum, finem imponere, et esse verum et CATHOLICUM quidquid ipse auctoritate clavium sibi traditarum a Christo determinat esse verum (Summus Pontifex Clemens VI, epist. Super quibusdam, ad Consolatorem, Catholicum Armenorum, 29 sept. 1351: DENZINGER, n. 3.022). The phrases infallible faith, divine faith, Catholic faith, when dealing with doctrine defined by the Church, have always been regarded as identical or synonymous in all the documents of ecclesiastical antiquity and in all theologians prior to Molina. Another, most clear and fully conclusive argument. It can be formulated from the following five propositions:

1st God has revealed that the Church is infallible in definitions of what is mediate or connected. 2nd Therefore God has revealed that the definitions of what is mediate or connected by the Church are infallibly true. 3rd Therefore it is of divine faith that the definitions of what is mediate or connected by the Church are infallibly true. 4th It is thus that the definitions of what is mediate or connected by the Church are the proper and specific object of ecclesiastical faith. 5th Therefore ecclesiastical faith is divine faith.

The first proposition is admitted by all or nearly all theologians, both ancient and modern.

The second is nothing more than the first itself in a different form or turned into the passive voice. It is evident that it makes no difference to say that “the Church is infallible in definitions of what is mediate or connected” or to say that “definitions of what is mediate or connected by the Church are infallibly true.”

The third is the same as the second, with no difference other than substituting the phrase "God has revealed" with the phrase "it is of divine faith."

The fourth is the very definition of ecclesiastical faith.

It is therefore evident that the fifth proposition holds, namely, that ecclesiastical faith is divine faith.

We are completely certain that every reader who examines these five propositions without prejudice will see with evidence that they are truly identical and that some are nothing more than a simple explanation of the others. To say, as some do, that the infallibility of the Church is of divine faith is to define the mediate or connected thing, but that the infallibility or truth of what is defined is not of divine faith but rather of ecclesiastical faith, makes no sense. It is the same to say: “the Church is infallible in what it defines,” as to say: “what is defined by the Church is true.” Therefore, it is the same to say: “it is of divine faith that the Church is infallible in what it defines,” as to say: “it is of divine faith that what is defined by the Church is true,” or “the truth of what is defined by the Church is of divine faith,” or “what is defined by the Church is of divine faith.”

251. LUMINOUS CONFIRMATION.—Finally, even at the risk of making less clear a thing that is in itself most clear, we shall add a confirmation. Let us suppose that God or Jesus Christ Himself were now to come and say to us: “I bear witness that all that the Church has defined up to now is true.” We believe that there is no theologian who would dare to say seriously that, in such a hypothesis, those definitions of the Church would not be of divine faith, but of ecclesiastical faith ³⁴.

Now then, that which God would tell us now, He had already told us before, and every theologian knows that the difference of before or after does not change in any way the kind of faith. Instead of telling us now that "everything that the Church has defined is true," He had already told us from the beginning that "everything that the Church will define is true." Therefore, such definitions are of divine faith, not precisely because the Church says so, but because God had said it.

In summary, the formal motive of the faith we give to infallible definitions is not really the authority of the Church nor even precisely the authority of assisting God, but rather it is really and formally the authority of revealing God. That act of faith, nowadays called ecclesiastical faith, is not formulated by saying: "I believe such a thing because the Church is infallible in teaching it to me," nor is it even formulated by saying: "I believe such a thing because God assists the Church in teaching it to me," but rather it is formulated and must be formulated with full truth in the following way: "I believe such a thing because God has revealed that the Church is infallible in teaching it to me." Which is exactly the same as saying: "I believe with divine faith that what is defined by the Church is true, because God has revealed that what is defined by the Church is true." Such an act is, by all accounts, one of divine faith and not merely ecclesiastical faith.

If, then, divine faith extends to the theological conclusions defined by the Church, the evolution of dogma also extends to them, and the modern ecclesiastical faith is useless.

252. WHETHER DOGMATIC FACTS ARE OF DIVINE FAITH.—All theologians agree with St. Thomas that nothing can be¹ an object of divine faith unless it has been really and truly revealed by God. "For faith, of which we speak, assents to something only because it is revealed by God"². This is the foundation that St. Thomas lays from the very first article of his immortal treatise on divine faith.

So that dogmatic facts, or any other of the objects of so-called ecclesiastical faith, may be of true divine faith, it is indispensable that they have been truly revealed by God. Now, have dogmatic facts truly been revealed by God? And if they have been, in what way have they been so, or in what way are they truly contained in the deposit of revelation?

Here is the object of the present section. The importance of the question is evident to every theologian.

253. THREE KINDS OF FACTS.—First of all, let us say just a few words about what is meant by dogmatic facts.

There are three kinds of facts: a) expressly revealed facts; b) merely particular facts; c) dogmatic facts. The questions that deal with these various kinds of facts are usually called, respectively, by theologians: a) quaestio facti revelati; b) quaestio facti particularis; c) quaestio facti dogmatici.

By facts expressly revealed, as the name itself indicates, are understood those facts which were expressly entrusted by the Apostles to the Church in the deposit of Sacred Scripture or divine Tradition. Such are, for example, the facts that our most beloved Savior was born in Bethlehem, or that His Most Holy Mother remained always a virgin.

By particular facts are understood all those which not only are not expressly contained in the revealed deposit, but also have no necessary relation to it. They are facts having no connection whatsoever with the doctrine of faith and morals, or which, if they have some connection, concern only particular persons and not the whole Church, not being, therefore, absolutely necessary for the preservation or explanation of the revealed deposit. Such are, for example, besides all exclusively secular facts, the facts of whether a certain marriage was valid or null, whether a certain person committed or did not commit the crime of which he is accused, or whether a certain property belongs to one individual or another. "Ut cum agitur—says Saint Thomas—de possessionibus, vel de criminibus, vel de huiusmodi"³.

Between those two extreme classes—of expressly revealed facts and merely particular facts—there lies the other class of facts which, since the times of Jansenism, has received the name of dogmatic facts. These are those which are likewise not expressly contained in the deposit of revelation, and in this they agree with particular facts; but they differ from the latter in having a necessary relation to the preservation, explanation, or application of revealed doctrine, and they therefore interest not only one or several particular persons, but the whole Church. Such are, among others, the facts referring to the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of texts or books, such as whether the book of Jansenius is heretical or not, or whether it contains or does not contain the five famous heretical propositions which the Church declared that it contained⁴.

254. WHAT IS CERTAIN AND WHAT IS DISPUTABLE.—Concerning the first class of facts, that is, facts explicitly revealed, all theologians agree, and it is self-evident, that they are not only the object of infallibility or of ecclesiastical faith, but also of divine and Catholic faith, at least when the Church defines them, whether by solemn magisterium or by ordinary magisterium. "Fide divina et catholica ea omnia credenda sunt, quae in verbo Dei scripto vel tradito continentur, et ab Ecclesia, sive solemni iudicio, sive ordinario et universali magisterio, tamquam divinitus revelata credenda proponuntur"⁵. If everything divinely revealed can be the object of divine faith, then what is explicitly revealed merits it with all the more reason. When it is a matter of divine revelation or inspiration, doctrines deserve the same faith as facts. The word of God has divine authority, and equal authority in all things.

Regarding the second class of facts, called particular facts, all theologians are likewise agreed in affirming, with St. Thomas, quite the opposite, namely, that not only can they not be the object of divine faith, but not even of ecclesiastical faith or of the infallibility of the Church. "In aliis vero sententiis, quae ad facta particularia pertinent, ut cum agitur de possessionibus, vel de criminibus, vel de huiusmodi, possibile est iudicium Ecclesiae errare⁶"

Finally, regarding the third class of facts, the so-called dogmatic facts, and which is the one that now interests us, there is something on which all theologians agree, from the time of the Jansenist disputes, and something on which they differ. They agree that such facts can be infallibly defined by the Church and that to such infallible definitions there must be given, at least, an assent of faith that is absolutely certain and unconditional, which they call ecclesiastical faith. But they differ as to whether such faith, called ecclesiastical, is truly divine faith or is, on the contrary, a new kind of faith, intermediate between divine faith and human faith.

As we said, nothing can ever be a matter of divine faith unless it is divinely revealed, so the whole question depends on knowing whether such dogmatic facts are or are not truly revealed by God. If they are, they can become a matter of divine faith, and not merely of ecclesiastical faith. We shall endeavor to show that dogmatic facts are truly revealed and how they are revealed.

255. IMPLICIT REVELATION OF THE PARTICULAR IN THE UNIVERSAL.—The first and most essential of the divisions of divine revelation is into explicit revelation and implicit revelation. It is evident that dogmatic facts have not been revealed in an explicit manner. If, therefore, they are revealed at all, they can only be so in an implicit manner.

What is meant by implicit revelation, or how far the implicitness of divine revelation extends, is a question on which, from Molina onward, theologians are not unanimous. However, there is one point on which all or nearly all theologians agree, namely that, once a universal proposition has been explicitly revealed, all the particular propositions certainly contained within it remain implicitly and truly revealed, and are definable as of divine faith.

Thus, once it is revealed that all things were created by God, it is implicitly revealed, and definable as divine faith, that such a particular thing, the angels, for example, have been created. Once it is revealed that all men have been redeemed by Jesus Christ, it is implicitly revealed, and definable as divine faith, that such a man has been redeemed. Once it is revealed that all ecumenical Councils are infallible rules of faith, it is implicitly revealed, and definable as divine faith, that such a Council, the Council of Trent for example, is an infallible rule of faith. Once it is revealed that all Popes accepted by the universal Church are successors of Saint Peter, it is implicitly revealed that such a Pope, our Most Holy Father Pius XI, for example, is a successor of Saint Peter, or a true Pope. On this point, all or nearly all theologians today agree. But precisely because nearly all theologians agree on this, it is necessary to pause briefly to analyze it, in order then to pass from what all admit to what all ought to admit, if they were logical.

We are told, and it is true, that it is implicitly revealed that the Council of Trent is infallible, that the Vulgate is authentic in matters of faith and morals, that the current Pope is the true Pope. Now: we all know that the deposit of divine revelation was closed with the death of the last of the Apostles, and that after that no new public or catholic revelation is possible. How, then, can facts that, like the Vulgate, the Council of Trent, or the current Pontiff, took place many centuries after the Apostles, be truly revealed by God? Is this not a true addition to the revealed deposit? Is this not admitting that the Church can give us new dogmas?

Every student of theology knows what answer is given, and well given, to such questions. The revealed deposit was closed with the Apostles with regard to new Catholic revelation; but it was not closed, but rather continues and will continue to be open, with regard to the infallible explanation or application of the ancient revelation. The Church cannot give us new dogmas in the sense that they are new simpliciter, or new as to their substance; but it can give us new dogmas in the sense that they are only new secundum quid (secundum quid, that is, secundum aliquid, namely, new as to their explanation, provided that this explanation is not made through new revelations, as was done until the death of the last of the Apostles, but through mere infallibility or assistance of the Holy Spirit⁷. Well then: that, and nothing more than that, is what the Church does when it applies the proposition already revealed in universal to a particular proposition.

256. CONDITIONED PROPOSITIONS.—To see clearly that such particular propositions are nothing but a mere explanation and application of the revealed universal proposition, one need only consider the nature or meaning of those universals. They are conditioned universals. The universal proposition that "every ecumenical Council is a rule of faith" means that "every Council is a rule of faith, if it is ecumenical." Thus, then, it is true that a particular Council, for example, the Council of Trent, was not held until many centuries after the Apostles or after the closing of the deposit of revelation; but it is no less true that before the deposit of revelation was closed, and in the time of the Apostles, it was already truly revealed "that any Council, for example, the Council of Trent, is a rule of faith, if it is ecumenical." By merely purifying or infallibly fulfilling that condition, the conditioned proposition that "it is revealed that the Council of Trent is a rule of faith if it is ecumenical" is converted into this absolute proposition: "It is revealed that the Council of Trent is a rule of faith."

Therefore, without any new revelation, and merely by purifying or verifying a condition, any particular proposition contained in a universal or conditional proposition can become a matter of divine faith, at least when there is infallibility to verify or purify the condition, as there is in the Church, according to all theologians.

Even at the risk of being labeled as verbose or tedious, let us put the preceding observations into the form of reasoning, for once this is well understood, it will be easy to understand the nature of every truly dogmatic fact. Let the following reasoning be:

It is revealed that "every ecumenical council is infallible," or what is the same, it is revealed that "every council is infallible if it is ecumenical".

Thus such a Council is certainly ecumenical:

Then such a Council is infallible.

Note the reader the conclusion, which is precisely the fact of which we treat, and he will see clearly that it is but a particular case of the more universal revealed major, with no difference save that the condition has disappeared. Note likewise the minor, and he will also see that in that minor nothing doctrinal is added to or removed from the major: nothing is done but to verify or purify the condition.

Therefore, the minor premise does not enter into that reasoning as a formal motive or as a cause of the conclusion, but merely as a condition. Now, it is a very common doctrine among theologians that when in a reasoning the minor premise does not enter as a formal motive, but as a mere condition for explaining or applying the revealed major, the conclusion is also revealed and definable by divine faith. Hence theologians commonly admit that the Church can define as a matter of divine faith, and not only as a matter of ecclesiastical faith, that such a Council, for example the Vatican, is infallible, or that such a Pope, for example the current Pope, is a true Pope ⁸.

257. THE FAMOUS BOOK OF JANSENIUS.—Everything said thus far, when applied to those two well-known facts of the ecumenicity or infallibility of such a Council, or of the legitimacy of such a Pope, is generally admitted by modern authors. When addressing whether such facts are of divine faith or only of ecclesiastical faith, they answer that they are of divine faith, without any distinction between a question of right and a question of fact.

Despite all this, when they later deal with other dogmatic facts, known under the general name of “orthodoxy or heterodoxy of books or texts,” such as, for example, whether the book of Jansenius called Augustinus contains or does not contain the five heretical propositions that the Church declared it contained, they suddenly change their opinion, distinguishing between a question of right and a question of fact. The question of right is “whether such propositions are or are not heretical,” and this the Church can define as a matter of divine faith. The question of fact is “whether such propositions are or are not found in the book of Jansenius,” and this, they say, the Church cannot define as a matter of divine faith, but only as a matter of ecclesiastical faith. The reason for this, they say, is that the question of right is revealed, while the question of fact is not, and it is well known that nothing that is not truly revealed can be defined or believed as a matter of divine faith.

For starters, we could ask such theologians why, when dealing with the case of whether such a Council is truly infallible, they have not made that same distinction, and why they have not answered that the question of right, that is, that “every ecumenical Council is infallible,” was of divine faith, and that the question of fact, that is, whether “such a Council is ecumenical,” was only of ecclesiastical faith.

They will surely tell us that they have not made such a distinction, because the question of fact is but a particular case of a revealed universal proposition, and that, therefore, it is likewise revealed and of divine faith. Let us also proceed to show that the question of fact concerning the book of Jansenius, or any other dogmatic fact of any kind whatsoever, provided it is truly dogmatic, is nothing other than a particular case of a revealed universal, and that, therefore, the fact of Jansenius is as truly revealed by God as the fact of such a Council, and that it is so in exactly the same manner, that is, as particular within the universal. But let us first make four brief observations.

**258. FIRST OBSERVATION.—**When the Church defines that these or those heretical propositions are in such a book, she does not understand, nor is it necessary, that they be there according to the material words, but only according to the sense. The reason for this is very obvious. In revelation, as in faith, what is essential is the sense. The words, provided they express the same sense, are accidental.

Therefore, to define that such a book contains such propositions means no more than that it contains the same meaning as those propositions. And conversely, to contain the same meaning as those propositions is to contain those propositions. On this point all theologians agree.

**259. SECOND OBSERVATION.—**Not only is the deposit of Sacred Scripture and divine tradition revealed or inspired in general, but also each one of the parts, or truths, or propositions of which said deposit consists is revealed.

Therefore, not only is that heretical which is contradictorily opposed to the entire deposit, but also that which is contradictorily opposed to this or that part, or truth, or proposition of the deposit.

**260. THIRD OBSERVATION.—**The Church can, therefore, condemn a book as heretical in two ways: first, by condemning it simply as heretical, or as contradictorily opposed to the revealed deposit in general, that is, without specifying which particular heresy it contains or to which particular doctrine or proposition of the revealed deposit it is opposed; second, by condemning it as heretical in particular, that is, by pointing out which particular heresy it contains, or to which particular portion or proposition of the revealed deposit it is opposed.

**261. FOURTH OBSERVATION.—**The following two universal propositions are truly revealed by God: first, "every book that contains a sense contradictorily opposed to the sense of the revealed deposit contains heresy"; second, "every book that contains a sense contradictorily opposed to the sense of such a truth or proposition of the revealed deposit contains such heresy or such a heretical proposition"; for, as we said in the first observation, to contain such a proposition means nothing other than to contain the sense of such a proposition.

Having made these four observations, which we believe every theologian will admit, and we even fear that some will label them truisms, we shall set forth two examples or lines of reasoning: one in which the Church condemns a book as containing heresy in general, and another in which it condemns it as containing such-and-such heresy or such-and-such heretical propositions in particular. These are the two ways in which the Church is accustomed to condemn the books of heretics. In the first way it condemned very many books or writings, before and after Jansenius, and in the second way it condemned the Augustinus of Jansenius. In both we shall see how the so-called question of fact, that is, whether such a book contains heresy, or whether it contains such heresy or such heretical propositions, is, no more and no less, a proposition or particular case of a revealed universal.

262. FIRST EXAMPLE.—Every book that contains a meaning contradictorily opposed to the meaning of the revealed deposit contains heresy. Or, what is the same, every book contains heresy if it contains a meaning contradictorily opposed to the meaning of the revealed deposit.

Thus this book contains a meaning contradictory and opposed to the meaning of the revealed deposit:

Then this book contains heresy.

263. SECOND EXAMPLE.—Any book that contains a meaning contradictorily opposed to the meaning of such particular propositions of the revealed deposit contains such heretical propositions. Or, what is the same: any book contains such heretical propositions if it contains such a meaning contradictorily opposed to the meaning of such propositions of the revealed deposit.

Thus, this book (that of Jansenius, for example) contains a meaning contradictorily opposed to the meaning of such propositions of the revealed deposit.

Then this book contains such heretical propositions.

The reader should note these conclusions and will see that they are precisely the matter of fact in question. Let him then compare them with the greater revealed universals, and he will see clearly that they are, neither more nor less, a particular case of those universals (all — this), with no other difference than that the condition has disappeared. Finally, let him note the minors, and he will see that they add or subtract nothing doctrinal from the majors, and that they are limited exclusively to verifying or purifying a condition of those revealed majors.

Since, then, it is the common doctrine of theologians that every proposition contained in the revealed deposit as a particular in the universal is of divine faith, and not merely of ecclesiastical faith; since, moreover, it is common doctrine that every conclusion in which the minor premise enters only as a condition is of divine faith, and not merely of ecclesiastical faith, every theologian must admit that dogmatic facts are of divine faith, and not merely of ecclesiastical faith.

Inconsistencies of some theologians.—We believe that almost all modern manuals fall into a manifest inconsistency on this matter. When they try to prove the infallibility of the Church in dogmatic facts, they adduce as an argument the constant practice of the Church, and as examples of this practice they cite the condemnation of Arius’s book by the Council of Nicaea, that of the writings of Nestorius by the Council of Ephesus, the declaration of the authenticity of the Vulgate by the Council of Trent, the absence of all error in the canon of the Mass, declared by the same Council, and other infallible definitions of dogmatic facts given by the Church.

Listen, for example, to the ever clear and concise Van Noort: "It is proved secondly from the practice of the Church, which often in a definitive manner rejected heretical writings, as, for instance, Thalia of Arius at the Council of Nicaea, the writings of Nestorius at the Council of Ephesus: at the Council of Trent it declared the Vulgate authentic, and the canon of the Mass free from every error"⁹.

The same is expressed by De Groot¹⁰ and by almost all the manuals. Now, let anyone consult the acts of those cited Councils and he will see that such facts have been defined by the Church, not only as infallible or as matters of ecclesiastical faith, but also with the very same formula of anathema sit, which is the classic formula for definitions of heresy and divine faith. It suffices to cite the definition of the Council of Trent regarding the canon of the Mass: "If anyone says that the canon of the Mass contains errors, and therefore ought to be abrogated: anathema sit"¹¹. There the reader has a true dogmatic fact, and yet it is defined, not only as a matter of ecclesiastical faith, but as a matter of divine faith. With the same formula of anathema sit or anathematizamus, the Church has condemned the book of Nestorius, the writings of Arius, the writings called "the Three Chapters," and other dogmatic facts. This constitutes new proof that dogmatic facts can be defined as a matter of divine faith, and, therefore, that so-called ecclesiastical faith is truly divine faith.

Almost all the manuals, especially the Thomistic ones, also fall into another contradiction. After denying that theological conclusions and dogmatic facts are definable as of divine faith, they affirm, as is natural, that they are objects of infallibility, and to prove this latter point they cite the texts of St. Thomas referring to the indirect revealed¹², in which St. Thomas expressly affirms that the denial of the indirectly revealed corrupts the faith. Now, either under the name of "indirect" St. Thomas includes the conclusions and the facts, or he does not. If he does not include them, such texts are irrelevant, and, moreover, there are no other texts in the Holy Doctor than those applicable to the secondary object of infallibility. If he does include them, then they are definable as of divine faith, since St. Thomas expressly says that the indirectly revealed, once defined by the Church, is of divine faith, and its denial is true heresy.

264. THE ROOT OF THE CONFUSION.—The root of the confusion into which many theologians fall on this matter lies, in our judgment, in poorly making or not properly understanding the aforementioned division of the dogmatic fact into a question of right and a question of fact. They make or understand this division in the following way:

Question of right: "Whether these or the other propositions are heretical". Question of fact: "Whether these or the other propositions are contained in such a book". (Let the reader note that in the question of fact, thus formulated, the word heretical no longer enters, nor the word erroneous, nor anything indicating a relation to the revealed deposit).

Once thus formulated, that division, they grant that the question of right is definable as a matter of divine faith; but they deny that the question of fact can ever be a matter of divine faith, although they grant that it can be, and is, a matter of ecclesiastical faith.

To this we respond, and every theologian ought to respond, that the question thus formulated is not, nor can it be, of divine faith; but neither is it, nor can it be, of ecclesiastical faith, since it does not fall under the infallibility of the Church. The reason is very simple. That question of fact, thus formulated, is not a matter of dogmatic fact, but merely of particular fact, and where there is no dogmatic fact, but only a particular one, there is no room for divine faith, nor is there room for infallibility. They have failed to notice that in this division, of Jansenist origin, and which countless theologians continue to make in the same manner, all the dogmatic character that the fact possessed has been placed in one of the members (in the question of right), while the other member (the question of fact) has been left without a trace of the dogmatic, and so it is hardly surprising that that question of fact, as thus formulated, is not of divine faith, since neither is it of any infallible faith, because it is not a matter of dogmatic fact. Let us see if we can explain this question with something of the evident clarity that it possesses in itself, and with which we believe we see it.

What makes a question fall under the infallible authority of the Church is not precisely its character as a matter of right nor its character as a matter of fact, but exclusively its character as dogmatic, or necessarily connected with the deposit of revelation. Without that dogmatic character, no question falls under the infallibility of the Church, whether it is a question of right or a question of fact. On the other hand, with that dogmatic character, every question, whether of right or of fact, falls under infallibility.

Thus, the question of "whether such a mathematical proposition is true or false" is a question of right; the question of "whether that same proposition is found or not in such a book of Euclid" is a question of fact; and neither one nor the other falls under the infallible authority of the Church. They lack a dogmatic character.

On the other hand, the question of whether such a question is heretical is a question of right; the question of whether that same heretical question is found in such a book is a question of fact; and both fall under the infallibility of the Church, but they fall under it exclusively by reason of their dogmatic character, that is, by that character of being heretical or opposed to the deposit of revelation which they possess. Remove that character from either of these two questions, and infallibility disappears.

Therefore, if one wishes to divide the dogmatic fact of Jansenius into two questions, and that both fall under infallibility, it is necessary to divide it, not into a question of right and a question of fact, but into a question of dogmatic right and of dogmatic fact, making the character of heretical, or opposed to the revealed deposit, enter into both in the following manner: Question of dogmatic right: "Whether such propositions are heretical". Question of dogmatic fact: "Whether such heretical propositions are contained in the book of Jansenius".

If from either of those two questions we remove that word heretical or opposed to the deposit of revelation, their dogmatic character disappears, and with it there disappears not only divine faith, but also infallibility or ecclesiastical faith. On the other hand, if we leave that dogmatic character in both, then not only is the question of right a matter of divine faith, but so also is the question of fact, since such a question of dogmatic fact is nothing but a particular case of a revealed universal, as every reader will see with evident clarity merely by rereading the second example of reasoning set forth above. The conclusion, which is precisely the question of fact, but of dogmatic fact, is nothing but a particular case (all — this) of the major premise, which is a revealed universal.

265. THE DOGMATIC FACT IS INDIVISIBLE.—In reality, the dogmatic fact, in its relations with the authority of the Church or with our faith, is indivisible or indecomposable. It could be divided only in two ways: a) into a question of dogmatic right and a question of non-dogmatic fact; b) into a question of dogmatic right and a question of dogmatic fact.

The first division is useless for the end we are pursuing, since over a non-dogmatic fact infallibility cannot apply. The second is purely nominal, and sins against the elementary rules of logic, which teaches that none of the members of the division should include another of the members, nor should it exhaust the thing divided. It is as if we divided man into animal and rational animal, that is, into animal and man, where there would be no true division, since the second member includes the first and exhausts the thing divided.

Thus also the so-called question of fact, if it is in fact dogmatic, essentially and inseparably includes the question of right, and therefore the one is just as much of divine faith as the other, since both constitute one and the same judgment; just as the act by which the eye sees the color and the act by which it sees the existence or location of the colored thing are no more than one and the same act of vision, because color is the ratio sub qua of all vision of the bodily eye. "Sicut materia et forma," says St. Thomas, "sunt unum in esse, ita ratio cognoscendi et res cognita sunt unum cognitum, et propter hoc utriusque est una cognitio secundum actum et secundum habitum"

Therefore, anyone who does not lose sight of the fact that this dogmatic character is the ratio sub qua of all the Church’s authority will see that every question of right, if it is truly a question of dogmatic right, is at the same time a question of fact; and conversely, any question of fact, if it is truly a dogmatic fact, is at the same time a question of right.

Indeed: to say that "such a proposition is (a matter of right) heretical" is exactly the same as saying that "such a proposition contains (a matter of fact) a meaning contradictorily opposed to the meaning of such a portion or proposition of the revealed deposit."

In the same way, to say that "such a book contains (a question of fact) such a heretical proposition" is exactly the same as saying that "the meaning of such a book is (a question of right) contradictorily opposed to such a portion or proposition of the revealed deposit."

266. DEEPER ROOT OF THIS CONFUSION.—The ultimate root of all this lies in the fact that the judgments of the Church are not judgments of mere law, or of intrinsic analysis of the subject or predicate of a proposition, but judgments of fact, or of comparison between the proposition or book, on the one hand, and the revealed deposit, on the other. For that comparison the Church has divine authority. If it did not have it, no divine faith could be placed in any decision of the Church, neither in those we call de jure nor in those we call de facto. If it has it, it has it equally for all comparisons, unless someone imagines that for comparing a short proposition or five isolated propositions with the revealed deposit it has divine authority; and that when those propositions are longer or are joined or bound in a book, it has only ecclesiastical authority.

It is being forgotten that the eyes or eyeglasses of the Church are the revealed deposit, and only the revealed deposit. If it looks without those eyeglasses, it sees nothing, whether the matter be one of right or of fact, of a single proposition or of an entire book. If it looks through those eyeglasses, it sees everything and only what is dogmatic, with no distinction between facts or rights. Place before the Church this proposition: "A triangle equals two right angles," and, despite the evidence of such a proposition, the Church, as Church, sees nothing, because there is nothing dogmatic. Place before it this other: "Christ is (or is not) God," and the Church immediately sees its orthodox or heterodox character. Its divine eyeglasses mark it.

Likewise, place before him a profane book, and he sees nothing. Place before him a dogmatic book or a mixture of profane and dogmatic, and the divine lens immediately marks the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of however many dogmatic propositions exist in the book.

Where the Church sees these propositions as orthodox or heterodox is in the book of Jansenius; but the means or eyeglasses through which it sees them is the revealed deposit, divine revelation. Grammar, philology, history, all the labor of human reason that the Church employs, are not the eyeglasses nor the act of vision, for they precede the Church's definition or vision, and are not even required of the Church except as prior conditions. Infallibility itself is not a means of vision, but a simple assistance: assistance to verify infallibly well the act of vision, to apply perfectly and without error to the book of Jansenius the eyeglass of the revealed deposit.

Let the reader, if not, return to read the two cited examples of reasoning, and he will clearly see that the minor premises of those reasonings, in which the labor of the Church consists, are nothing more than a confrontation between the book of Jansenius and the revealed deposit. The book of Jansenius is the subject or object of those minor premises; the sense of the revealed deposit is the predicate or eyeglasses; the verb or copula is nothing but the result of the act of confrontation: the vision.

267. REFLECTOR OF DIVINE LIGHT.—If we did not fear, then, that some, for not knowing how to properly transpose certain sensible images or metaphors to the intellectual order, might regard them as anthropomorphic, we would compare the revealed deposit to a focus or reflector of divine light which, projected with infallible certainty by the Church upon the book of Jansenius, reveals or colors, in the manner of certain chemical reagents, all and only those passages or propositions in the book that are written in orthodox ink or in heterodox ink. Whatever in the book is written in another ink remains blank for the Church, insofar as it is the Church, however colored and legible it may appear to human reason. Infallibility (we will not tire of repeating it) is not for increasing, diminishing, or modifying the light of that divine focus of the greater revealed universal, but for projecting or applying it without error to the particular conclusion. Hence, what the Church sees, which is precisely the particular conclusion or dogmatic fact, it sees with divine light, with the very light of the revealed deposit or of the revealed universal. Hence, finally, that conclusion or dogmatic fact is nothing human nor ecclesiastical, but something divine: because it is nothing other than the infallible application of the revealed universal to a particular case or proposition.

268. ANOTHER DEMONSTRATION.—There is another, even simpler means of proving that the dogmatic fact, once infallibly defined by the Church, is not only a matter of ecclesiastical faith, but also of true divine faith.

Let us take the following universal proposition: “It is revealed that the Church is infallible in the definition of every dogmatic fact.” This proposition is commonly admitted by theologians, even by those who deny or seem to deny the definability as a matter of faith of theological conclusions¹³

That universal proposition, merely by turning it into the passive voice, is exactly the same as this other one: “It is revealed that every dogmatic fact defined by the Church is infallibly true”; or, what is the same thing: “It is revealed that every dogmatic fact is infallibly true if the Church defines it.”

With this presupposed, which is evident, it is easy to show that the question of dogmatic fact, and not only the question of right, is truly revealed as a particular in the universal, and that, therefore, it is of divine faith. Let the following reasoning be:

It is revealed that every dogmatic fact is infallibly true, if the Church defines it.

Thus the Church has defined this dogmatic fact, for example, the containment of the five heretical propositions in the book of Jansenius.

It is then revealed that this dogmatic fact is infallibly true.

We beg every reader to read and reread the foregoing reasoning without prejudice. In it he will see that the conclusion is, no more and no less, a particular case (all — this one) of the greater universal revealed. In it he will likewise see that the minor premise only purifies or infallibly certifies a condition of the major.

Then if, according to all theologians, everything contained in revelation is truly revealed as the particular in the universal; if, moreover, and also according to all theologians, every conclusion is revealed when the minor premise enters only as a condition, it follows that every dogmatic fact defined by the Church is of divine faith.

In short, let the reader note how in that reasoning the formal motive for assenting to the conclusion is the major premise, since the minor enters only as a condition. Since all the work of the authority or infallibility of the Church is reduced to that minor premise, that is, to purifying the condition, it is clearly seen how in the act of faith that we give to this conclusion, which is precisely the dogmatic fact, the authority of the Church enters not as a formal motive, but as a condition. The formal motive is the containment in a greater universal revealed, that is, divine revelation.

269. If, despite all this, we do not call heretic the one who denies a dogmatic fact, it is because, although the major premise, and therefore the particular conclusion, are truly revealed, nevertheless it is not yet defined, at least clearly, that they are revealed. And to call someone a heretic, it is not enough that the thing he denies is truly revealed, but it is necessary that it has been defined by the Church as revealed. Now, the major premise of this reasoning is commonly admitted by theologians as revealed; but its revelation has not yet been, at least clearly, defined by the Church.

270. AN OBJECTION.—A most learned theologian who treats all questions with notable profundity seems to have realized the inescapable force of this second reason that we have just adduced, and tries to respond indirectly to it in the following manner:

“You will object: Nothing of those things which have been defined by the infallible teaching authority of the Church can be rejected without heresy, because from the very fact that it would be rejected, the infallibility of the Church, which is revealed by God, would also be denied: But whatever cannot be rejected without heresy must be believed with divine faith: therefore.

“Nunc autem vitium is, as it seems, in a lesser degree than this way you may distinguish: by divine faith one must believe that which cannot be rejected without heresy; I distinguish: directly incurred by the rejection of such an object, I concede; without merely concomitant heresy, I deny. Moreover, even if it were granted that heresy would be incurred from the denial of a dogmatic fact defined by the Church, this would not be because of the rejection of the dogmatic fact in itself, but only because of the concomitant denial.

In contrast, in the case of facts such as whether a given Council is ecumenical or infallible; whether a given Pope is a true Pope; whether a given version of the Bible is authentic; whether such orthodox or heterodox propositions are contained in such a creed or book, etc., etc., before the definition or acceptance or approval of the Church, it is also possible to be mistaken or to err, and therefore no divine faith is admissible, despite all universal revelations. But since such facts are related to the doctrine or faith of the whole Church, and not only to that of these or those particular persons, they can be infallibly defined by the Church, and after such definition they are of divine faith. That divine faith comes to such facts not precisely from the definition or authority or infallibility of the Church, but from their own containment in the universal revelation, a containment that is infallibly made known to us by the definition. The authority, then, or definition of the Church is not the cause of their containment, but only of our infallible knowledge of that containment. of the infallibility of the Church in defining such matters, which infallibility could indeed be defined as a dogma of faith, although it has not so far been expressly defined. And therefore it was cautiously stated in the thesis that the things in question here cannot be matter of heresy per se and by reason of themselves.

First, that videtur and that caute already clearly indicate that the author himself does not have full confidence in that solution. They give the impression that the author, seeing that the argument was conclusive, and yet being unable to admit the conclusion, does not know whether to distinguish the major or the minor premise, and decides, albeit cautiously, to distinguish the minor one. "The flaw is, as it seems, in the minor premise."

Secondly, our objector, after so much caution, comes to concede that dogmatic facts are truly of divine faith, since he only denies that they are so by reason of themselves; but he does not deny that they are so, even if they are so by reason of another truth. What matters for us to know is whether or not they are of true divine faith; whether they are so for one reason or another matters little.

Thirdly, it also seems to have been momentarily forgotten that being of true divine faith, and yet being so not by reason of themselves, but by reason of another truth, is proper not only to dogmatic facts, but to everything indirectly revealed, even to what is expressly contained in the Bible. The fact that Samuel was the son of Elkanah, and all the other secondary facts of Sacred Scripture, are of true divine faith, and yet they are so not by reason of themselves, but by reason of another revealed truth that is wrapped up in them, or in which they are wrapped up, and which is affirmed or denied by affirming or denying such facts. That other revealed truth is the following: "Sacred Scripture is inspired by God and, therefore, cannot be false." And since that revealed truth would be denied by denying the fact that Samuel was the son of Elkanah, for that reason, and only for that reason, and not by reason of themselves, are these facts of divine faith. "Indirectly, indeed, those things pertain to faith from which something contrary to faith follows: as if someone were to say that Samuel was not the son of Elkanah; for from this it follows that divine Scripture is false"¹⁴

Fourthly, and this is the main point, the wise theologian has not noted that the fact that Samuel was the son of Elkanah is of divine faith, not precisely because the Bible is revealed or inspired in general, but because it is so in everything, and, therefore, it is also so in that particular fact. Without that, that fact would not be of faith.

Therefore, in affirming or denying that fact, we not only affirm or deny the revelation of another truth, but we deny the revelation of that fact. Hence, that fact is capable of divine faith and of heresy, not only in a concomitant manner, but in an immediate manner or in itself. Although the fact is not revealed for its own sake, the fact itself is revealed.

In exactly the same way, not only is the infallibility of the Church in general revealed, but also the infallibility of the Church in every dogmatic fact, and, therefore, in this dogmatic fact. By denying, then, that dogmatic fact after it has been defined, one denies not only the revelation of another truth, but also of that truth. The fact itself is revealed, although it is not so for its own sake.

They are therefore mistaken who believe that the formal motive for assenting to the definitions of a dogmatic fact is the infallibility of the Church, and that for this reason it is ecclesiastical faith. It is not the infallibility of the Church, but the divine revelation of that infallibility in every dogmatic fact, and therefore in this dogmatic fact. Because it is divine revelation, it is divine faith, and because it is of this dogmatic fact, it is divine faith, not concomitant, but proper, formal, and immediate.

In truth, let any theologian tell us: if Jesus Christ Himself were now to descend from heaven and tell us that such a dogmatic fact, for example, the containment of the five propositions in the book of Jansenius, was true, would that fact be of divine faith or not? For the same thing that He would tell us now He had already told us twenty centuries ago. In telling us or revealing to us that the Church was infallible in every dogmatic fact, and, therefore, in that dogmatic fact of Jansenius, He had told us that that dogmatic fact of Jansenius, once defined, was true.

271. This also resolves another objection raised by the wise theologian, namely: that for a particular proposition to be revealed in the universal, the universal and the particular must have the same subject, as they do in the propositions “every Council is infallible” and “this Council is infallible”; whereas in dogmatic facts the revealed universal is “the Church is infallible,” and the particular is “this dogmatic fact is infallible,” where the subjects are distinct.

From what has been said, the reader knows the solution to that dialectical subtlety. The revealed universal proposition is not merely that "the Church is infallible," but that "the Church is infallible in all dogmatic facts," or, what amounts to the same thing, that "all dogmatic facts, once defined, are infallible." And that proposition has the same subject as the following: "this defined dogmatic fact is infallible." Therefore, it is of divine faith.

272. THE THOMIST OPINION.—Those Thomists of today who deny that the theological conclusion is definable by divine faith also deny, and with even greater vigor, the definability by divine faith of dogmatic facts. We believe that in this they are consistent.

But since those Thomists, when denying the definability of faith of theological conclusions, usually cite Billuart to us and attach great importance to him as a representative of the Thomistic tradition, it will not be amiss for us also to cite, briefly, what Billuart thinks about the definability of dogmatic facts. Here are his words:

“You press: Faith comes from hearing, and hearing through the Word of God; but the fact of Jansenius is not contained in the Word of God: therefore.
“Again, the Church has no new revelations, nor do the articles of faith grow with the succession of times; but these two things seem to have to be admitted, if the fact of Jansenius is revealed and of divine faith: therefore.
“I reply that the solutions to these objections flow from what has been said.
“To the first, I distinguish the minor premise: The fact of Jansenius is not contained in the Word of God explicitly and immediately, I grant; implicitly and mediately, I deny. For it is contained in this universal revealed proposition: Every text condemned by the Church is condemnable.
“To the second. This universal revelation just mentioned is not new, but has existed from the beginning; consequently, the condemnation of the text of Jansenius is not a new article of faith, but an explanation and application of the universal revelation to a particular and determinate object: just as when a man is born, it is a matter of faith that he has sinned in Adam; yet it is not a new revelation, nor a new article of faith, but only an explanation and application of this universal revelation, all have sinned in Adam, to a particular object”.

And shortly before he had said: “Porro revelatum est universaliter omnem textum, omnem propositionem, omnem librum ab Ecclesia damnatum, esse vero damnabilem, id namque comprehenditur sub infallibilitate Ecclesiae revelata: ergo et hunc textum huius propositionis, puta Iansenii”¹⁵

Now then: how has Billuart, who so clearly seems to deny the definability by divine faith of theological conclusions, been able to arrive at admitting the definability by divine faith of dogmatic facts? Because one must note—and therein lies the amusing part—that to admit the definability by divine faith of dogmatic facts, Billuart relies, and relies well, on the reason that "the infallibility of the Church in every dogmatic fact is truly revealed," without noticing that in the same way the infallibility of the Church in everything truly connected with the revealed deposit is revealed, and therefore in every true theological conclusion, as almost all theologians today recognize (212).

273. The explanation of this oversight on Billuart’s part is quite simple. It is well known that Billuart frequently does little more than summarize, albeit with his truly French clarity, the doctrines of John of Saint Thomas and of the Salmanticenses. These two eminent theologians, having failed to discern properly the Suarezian tangle concerning the virtual revealed or theological conclusion, denied, and rightly denied, the definability de fide of the purely virtual (virtuale tantum — connexive tantum), since it is not a rigorous theological conclusion, but rather a purely physical conclusion; yet they used such phrases that they seem to deny the definability de fide of every true virtual, even of the identical or implicit virtual, and therefore of every true and rigorous theological conclusion. Billuart, in this as in almost everything else, did nothing but summarize those two theologians.

On the other hand, the question of dogmatic facts was not treated by John of Saint Thomas or by the Salmanticenses, since that question did not occupy theologians until the Jansenist evasions prompted it. This meant that in the question of dogmatic facts Billuart could reason on his own and came to the conclusion, as every Thomist must come, that dogmatic facts are implicitly revealed as the particular in the universal, and are therefore definable as of divine faith. Hence the two times he treats this question¹⁶ he places that solution that dogmatic facts are of divine faith alongside the then quite common one that they were of ecclesiastical faith, and he takes pleasure in giving an extensive solution to all the objections that the Jansenists raised against it.

274. If John of St. Thomas and the Salmanticenses had lived a little later and treated this question, it is certain that they would have arrived at the same conclusion. In treating whether it is of divine faith that "the present pope is the true pope" or that "the Council of Trent is a legitimate council," the only facts that were then usually discussed in speaking of faith, both answer affirmatively, basing themselves on the fact that these facts are truly contained in divine revelation as the particular in the universal¹⁷

For in the very same way is contained every dogmatic fact, and for that reason it is definable by divine faith and not only by ecclesiastical faith.

275. If the older Thomists, such as Torquemada, Cajetan, Cano, etc., denied that certain dogmatic facts, even the fact that "such a pope is the true pope," were of divine faith, it is because it was not yet clear that the infallibility of the Church in such facts was revealed. Those great Thomists never fell into the flagrant inconsistency of admitting the revelation of the Church's infallibility in one thing and denying that such a thing was of divine faith after it had been defined. Since today Thomists and non-Thomists alike already admit that infallibility in dogmatic facts is revealed, all must admit that such facts, once defined, are of divine faith.

276. THE ATTITUDE OF THE CHURCH.—Regarding this question of facts, as with so many others, there has been progress in Catholic theology, and to this the practice or attitude of the Roman Church has contributed chiefly, as almost always happens. The energetic attitude of Clement VIII at the beginning of the seventeenth century against the defenders of the celebrated thesis of Alcalá ("It is not of faith that this man, e.g., Clement VIII, is the true Pope"), oriented the thought of theologians toward the study of that particular dogmatic fact, and since then almost all admit that this fact is of divine faith¹⁸.

The subsequent and no less vigorous attitude of Popes Innocent X, Alexander VII, and Clement XI against the resistance and interminable Jansenist quibbling also directed Catholic theology in the study of the dogmatic fact in general, and since then there is scarcely any theologian who does not admit that the infallibility of the Church in every dogmatic fact is revealed. This amounts, for every Thomist, to saying that every dogmatic fact is revealed, and, therefore, that it is revealed that this dogmatic fact, once defined, is infallibly true. In other words, that it is a matter of divine faith, since what God reveals is just as much of divine faith as what God reveals to be true. The only thing is that, although this is of divine faith because it is contained as a particular in a universal revealed truth, it is not of divine faith that it is of divine faith, because that universal revelation is not yet defined. Hence, he who denies it is not a heretic.

May the reader excuse so much insistence or repetition, for all of it is necessary when it comes to uprooting ideas as vulgarized as that modern and heterogeneous ecclesiastical faith. On the other hand, we believe that that name of ecclesiastical faith would have come in handy to designate the kind of faith or human, and not divine, religious assent that we give to the non-infallible teachings of the Church.

277. APPLICATIONS.—Everything said in this section about dogmatic facts applies equally to the facts of whether a given law or discipline or custom of the universal Church or whether a given rule or constitutions of a religious Order are moral (for the question is not whether they are opportune or prudent) or to any other fact that is truly dogmatic, that is, that is necessarily connected with the revealed deposit or that is necessary for its preservation, explanation, or application and has been infallibly defined or approved by the Church. The morality of such a fact is of divine faith and not merely of ecclesiastical faith.

There is not the slightest difference between defining the truth of such a conclusion or fact and defining the morality of such a rule or constitutions, of such a law or discipline, of such a practice or custom. In the same way that it can be defined as of divine faith that "such a council is infallible," because it is but a particular case or application of this universal revealed principle: "every ecumenical council is infallible," in that same way it can be defined as of divine faith, and not merely as of ecclesiastical faith, that "such a law or custom or rule, etc., is moral," because it is but a particular case of application of this universal revealed principle: "every law or custom or rule, etc., in conformity with the morality of the revealed deposit is moral." The divine faith of such a particular proposition does not come from the authority or infallibility of the Church, but from its containment in the universal revealed principle or revealed deposit. The authority or infallibility of the Church does not cause that containment; it causes nothing more than our infallible knowledge of that containment. It enters not as the formal motive, but as a condition or application of the formal motive, which is divine revelation. It is, therefore, divine faith, not ecclesiastical faith nor human faith¹⁹.

277. Finally, the canonization of the saints is not, in all probability, anything but an accidental variant of a dogmatic fact, and, therefore, of divine faith. But since its dogmatic character, that is, its necessary relation to a universal revealed truth or revealed deposit, is not, at first glance, so clear, and, above all, since this question has been expressly treated by St. Thomas and by almost all Thomists (although we have already noted that in these questions of facts there has been progress in theology), we shall deal with it in a separate section, for we believe it deserves it.

For now, let it suffice that we have shown, as we believe, that every truly dogmatic fact is implicitly revealed by God as the particular in the universal, and that, therefore, once infallibly defined, it is of true and proper divine faith, and not merely of that modern faith called ecclesiastical. With this it is demonstrated that the evolution of dogma extends not only to theological conclusions, but also to dogmatic facts.

278. MEANING OF THE QUESTION.—In our previous section we tried to show that every dogmatic fact was definable by divine faith, and not only by the so-called ecclesiastical faith. Since the canonization of the saints is but a particular case of dogmatic fact, it did not require a separate study, for it sufficed to apply to it the doctrine set forth in that section. We shall nevertheless devote a separate study to it in order to deal with the mind of St. Thomas, who expressly treated this question of canonization.

First of all, one thing is the power of canonizing and quite another is the infallibility in canonizing. That the Church has the power of canonizing is a truth of Catholic faith, and its denial would be heresy. "In this question it must be assumed as certain de fide that the Pontiff and the Church have the power of canonizing Saints. For it is quite different for the Church to have the power of canonizing Saints, and for the Church not to be able to err in the very act of canonizing"¹. "It is heretical to deny the authority in the Church and in the Pontiff for canonizing Saints"².

Secondly, one thing is canonization and another is beatification. Canonization is a definitive judgment of the Church concerning the sanctity and eternal glory of the one canonized, and it also involves a precept to render him cult. In contrast, beatification is a non-definitive judgment, being reformable, and it carries not a precept but permission to render cult to the one beatified. Since without a definitive judgment there can be no infallibility, almost all theologians agree that the Church is not infallible in beatification, although it would be rash to affirm that she has in fact erred in this or that beatification. "Quamvis ex hoc inferri possit, temeritatis aut gravioris theologicae censurae nota esse afficiendum, qui auderet asserere Romanum Pontificem in hac vel illa formali Beatificatione errasse..., concludi tamen certo non potest vel ipsum iudicium esse infallibile aut ad fidem pertinere; cum semper sit permittens, nunquam praecipiens, et ad finem utique conducat, sed non sit extremum"³.

Thirdly, canonization is one thing, and the miracles, private revelations, apparitions, historical facts, or relics of the canonized saint are another. When the Church approves the miracles of a saint in the process of his canonization, or inserts them into the lessons of the breviary, or institutes a special feast to honor the apparition of some saint, such as the feasts of the apparition of Lourdes, the apparition of Saint Michael the Archangel, the translation of the House of Loreto, etc., etc., or approves the private revelations of some saint, such as those of Saint Bridget, or the authenticity or cult of his relics, it is a rather common opinion that such miracles, apparitions, revelations, historical facts, or relics are not infallibly defined, although they always deserve the pious assent and the respect due to all the teachings of the Church, even to those that are not infallible. "When the Church inquires into or pronounces upon revelations, apparitions, miracles, it intends to have only human probability or certainty, and that practical certainty, which is surely sufficient to foster worship. Likewise, when it deals with the authenticity of relics" ⁴

Fourthly, one thing is canonization and another is insertion into the martyrology. Since in the martyrology the Church inscribes the names not only of the canonized, but also of the beatified and even of the merely venerable, it is evident that mere insertion into the Martyrology is not an infallible argument of sanctity.

The present question, therefore, does not concern any of those things mentioned, but exclusively canonization, which is usually defined as: "The ultimate and definitive sentence, by which the Church declares that someone has led a holy life and has been received among the heavenly inhabitants, and proposes him to all the faithful to be venerated and invoked" ⁵

280. STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION.—As we saw in our previous section, modern theologians, when dealing with dogmatic facts, usually distinguish two questions: the question of right and the question of fact. "To the first," they say, "we give assent of divine faith, but to the second, of ecclesiastical faith" (257).

Since canonization is but a variant of a dogmatic fact, they usually do something similar when dealing with canonization. Although they do not speak expressly of a question of right nor of fact, whoever reads them attentively will notice that they regard these two questions as distinct: a) what kind of faith we give to the question of "whether the Church is infallible in the canonization of the saints," which is a question of right; b) what kind of faith we give to the question of "whether such a canonized saint is a true saint or is truly in heaven," which is a question of fact.

Not only do they distinguish these two questions, although without expressly speaking of rights or of facts, but they give them different answers. The faith we give to the first question of "whether the Church is infallible in canonization" is, they say, divine faith. In contrast, the faith we give to the second question of whether "such a canonized saint is truly a saint or is truly in heaven" is, according to them, ecclesiastical faith.

Thus, despite the fact that modern theologians usually distinguish between dogmatic facts and the canonization of saints, the force of logic has led them, and very rightly so, to apply to the canonization of saints the same or a similar solution as to dogmatic facts.

In our previous section we saw that the question of fact, if it is truly a dogmatic fact, includes the question of right, and therefore the one is as much of divine faith as the other. In this chapter we hope to show the same regarding canonization, demonstrating that the question of "whether such a canonized saint is in heaven" merits the same kind of faith as the question of "whether the Church is infallible in canonization," and that, therefore, it is of divine faith.

Indeed, anyone who reads St. Thomas attentively, and even all the Thomists prior to the Jansenist disputes, will immediately notice that these theologians always regard as identical the faith we give to those two questions. Hence they always reduce the question to ascertaining whether the Church has or does not have infallibility or divine assistance in canonization, and what kind of faith we give to that infallibility; for, once it has been ascertained what faith we give to the infallibility of the Church in one question, it is already ascertained what faith we give to that question when the Church infallibly defines it. Let us hear John of St. Thomas: "Dubium ergo ad hoc reducitur an ipsum iudicium quod Ecclesia profert in canonizando Sanctum sit infallibile, et quo gradu certitudinis tenendum sit non posse Pontificem in eo errare⁶.

On this question—that is, on the kind of faith by which we believe the authority and infallibility of the Church in matters connected with the revealed deposit—everything depends, as we shall see. But since there has been an evolution or progress in Catholic theology on this question from the time of St. Thomas, and even from the time of John of St. Thomas, we shall briefly set forth: a) the mind of St. Thomas; b) the opinions of later theologians down to the disputes about the authority of the Church in dogmatic facts, that is, down to Jansenism; c) the opinion of modern theologians.

281. THE MIND OF ST. THOMAS.—One thing is the doctrine, another thing is the facts.

That the Church is infallible in defining the doctrine of faith and morals is a fundamental dogma always believed in the Catholic Church, without there having been any need for a council to define it. It was defined from the beginning in the apostolic teaching itself, since it is like the basis or indispensable condition of every other dogma. The Vatican Council did not define the infallibility of the Church, which it takes for granted, but rather the infallibility of the Pope, declaring that he possesses the same infallibility that Jesus Christ gave to His Church. «We define that the Roman Pontiff... when... he defines a DOCTRINE of faith and morals... enjoys that infallibility with which the divine Redeemer willed that His Church should be endowed»⁷.

But although all believed in the infallibility of the Church in matters of doctrine, Saint Thomas was the first, as far as we know, to deal expressly with the infallibility of the Church in matters of facts, devoting an entire article to the infallibility of the Church in the fact of the canonization of the saints. As was his custom, when treating a particular point such as that of canonization, he rose to the general sphere of principles, and, distinguishing for the first time in the history of theology between doctrine of faith and morals, particular facts, and facts connected with doctrine, he laid the future foundations of an entirely new treatise: the treatise on dogmatic facts, of which the canonization of the saints is but a particular case. Let us, then, carefully examine the method employed by the Angelic Doctor, for that is the surest means of penetrating his mind well.

The question of canonization is treated by Saint Thomas in the Quodlibet 9, a. 16, under the title "Whether the saints who are canonized by the Church are in glory, or whether some of them are in hell." We give the entire article in the note, so that the reader may judge for himself the analysis of the article that we are going to make⁸

After a brief preamble noting that every man is fallible if considered in himself and that he can only be infallible by divine assistance, the Holy Doctor begins his reasoning by positing as the major premise the following three propositions: a) "It is certain that the judgment of the universal Church in those matters which pertain to faith (doctrine of faith or morals) cannot err." b) "But in other opinions which pertain to particular facts... it is possible to err." c) "The canonization of the Saints is a middle course between these two."

Up to this point, the major premise of the reasoning. With it alone we could not draw any conclusion about the infallibility or non-infallibility of the Church in canonization. If we knew nothing more about canonization than that it is a middle term between doctrine, which is the object of infallibility, and particular facts, which are not the object of infallibility, we would remain without knowing whether infallibility could apply to canonization or not.

Hence the Holy Doctor adds a minor premise, which is the root and center of the whole article, and reads as follows: "Quia tamen (let the reader note that tamen, which means: in spite of the "medium est inter haec duo") honor quem Sanctis exhibemus quaedam professio fidei est qua Sanctorum gloriam credimus". That is: although canonization is a middle term between the doctrine of faith and particular facts, nevertheless (tamen), it is a particular application of the doctrine of faith (quaedam professio fidei est); it is something related to the dogma of faith concerning the glory of the saints (qua sanctorum gloriam credimus). Although, then, it is not pure doctrine, but fact, it is a doctrinal fact or, as we would say today, a dogmatic fact.

In this way, although canonization appeared in the major premise as a means between the doctrine of faith and particular facts, or as an island isolated from those two extremes, the Holy Doctor has managed, through the minor premise, to discover a bridge, namely, the doctrinal character of the fact of canonization. This bridge or doctrinal character unites canonization not with particular facts, and therefore with things in which infallibility has no place, but with the doctrine of faith, and, consequently, with things that by their nature fall under the infallibility of the Church.

It is natural, then, that, once this bridge is established, the Holy Doctor should draw with the greatest naturalness the following conclusion: "Pie credendum est quod nec etiam in his iudicium Ecclesiae errare possit".

Having summarily examined the process that the Holy Doctor employs in his reasoning, let us briefly consider the exact meaning of those two famous phrases: a) "canonizatio medium est inter haec duo", which is found in the major premise; b) "pie credendum est", which is found in the conclusion. On these two phrases, the defenders of the modern ecclesiastical faith have made endless conjectures.

282. MEANING OF “CANONIZATIO MEDIUM EST INTER HAEC DUO”.

Above all, let the reader note the complete article of the Holy Doctor, and he will see confirmed what we said before, namely, that for St. Thomas the following two questions are identical: a) what certainty do we have that such a canonized saint is in heaven; b) what certainty do we have that the Church is infallible in canonization. For this reason, he places the first question in the title of the article, and then in the objections, in the sed contra arguments, in the body of the article, and in the replies to the objections, he always answers with the second question. The kind of faith, then, that we give to the first depends on the kind of faith we give to the second. The two questions are one and the same for St. Thomas.

Secondly, let the reader note that the phrase “medium est inter haec duo” does not bear upon the phrase “pie credendum est,” but rather bears upon the word “canonizatio.” Saint Thomas does not, then, say that the “pie credendum est” occupies a middle place; rather, what he says is that that middle place is occupied by the canonization. Canonizatio medium est inter haec duo.

Thirdly, let the reader note that the minor premise or key of the reasoning is not the proposition that “canonization is a middle ground between these two,” but rather the proposition that canonization or the cult of the saints “is a certain profession of faith.” The conclusion, therefore, of “it is piously to be believed” is not deduced by St. Thomas from “canonization holds a middle place,” but from “canonization is a certain profession of faith.” So far is St. Thomas from saying that the “it is piously to be believed” is deduced from “it is a middle ground between these two,” that he expressly says it is deduced in spite of this: “Because nevertheless,” etc.

We insist so much on such an obvious point, because certain defenders of the modern ecclesiastical faith understand this article of St. Thomas as if the Holy Doctor had reasoned thus: “Canonizatio medium est inter haec duo: ergo pie credendum est.” From which they derive that this pious faith of which St. Thomas speaks is a faith midway between divine faith and human faith, that is, the modern ecclesiastical faith. And they fail to notice that St. Thomas reasoned in a completely opposite way, namely: “Canonizatio medium est inter haec duo: atqui tamen professio quaedam fidei est: ergo pie credendum est,” etc. That is: one must not believe it piously because it occupies a middle place, but despite that; for although it is midway between the doctrine of faith and particular facts, nevertheless (tamen) it belongs in a certain way (quaedam professio fidei est) to the first member, the doctrine of faith, because it is necessarily related to the dogma of the glory of the saints.

The Holy Doctor reasons, then, in the following manner: We know for certain that the Church is infallible in one kind of thing, that is, in the doctrine of faith and morals; we also know for certain that the Church is not infallible in another kind of thing, that is, in particular facts. If canonization belonged directly to either of these two kinds of things, we would have the question resolved in the sense of infallibility if it belonged to the first kind, or in the sense of non-infallibility if it belonged to the second. But we find that canonization belongs neither directly to the first nor to the second of these two kinds of things, but rather it is something midway between the two: "Canonization is a middle ground between these two". Therefore, with only those two principles or kinds of things alone, we could draw nothing certain about the infallibility or non-infallibility of the Church in canonization.

Despite this (tamen)—continues the Holy Doctor—there is a third principle or way to ascertain it: that way is the indirect path of relation or consequence. Although canonization is not directly the doctrine of faith itself, since it is a fact, it is nonetheless necessarily related to the doctrine of faith. Why? Because in canonization the cult of the canonized saint is prescribed to all the Church, and that cult or honor is like a profession of faith of the dogma of the glory of the saints. Therefore, if the Church is infallible in the doctrine of faith, it would be impious to believe that she is fallible in the profession of that same faith, that is, in canonization.

In summary: in the phrase "canonizatio medium est inter haec duo," the duo are not two faiths, one divine and the other human, nor is the medium a third faith, intermediate between the divine and the human. Such a notion, invented four centuries later, never crossed the mind of the Holy Doctor. Rather, the duo are two kinds of objects, namely, the doctrine of faith and particular facts; and the medium is a third kind of object, that is, doctrinal facts related, like the fact of canonization, to the doctrine of faith, or in other words, to the first kind. The aim and the merit of Saint Thomas were not to invent a third faith or a middle faith, but to examine that middle object and find for it a relationship or bridge by which, emerging from the middle or from its isolation, it would be united to the first extreme. The synthesis, then, of the entire article of the Holy Doctor, set forth in the form of a simple enthymeme, is as follows: Canonization is necessarily connected with the doctrine of faith: therefore one must piously believe (pie credendum est) that the Church is infallible in it.

**283. MEANING OF “PIE CREDENDUM EST”.—**What value or what meaning does that phrase “pie credendum est” have for Saint Thomas?

It is clear that it does not have the sense that it must be believed with divine faith, since it is a simple consequence deduced exclusively through reasoning or connection with the doctrine of faith, and it is well known that for St. Thomas and his school no consequence or connection is of divine faith unless it is defined by the Church.

Much less still does it make sense that it must be believed with ecclesiastical faith. The reason is quite clear. Ecclesiastical faith, as its defenders understand it, presupposes the infallibility of the Church, since it is founded on that infallibility. Now, that infallibility of the Church is precisely what the Holy Doctor seeks to prove, and it is of that infallibility that he says it must be believed piously. Therefore, to say that one must piously believe the infallibility of the Church and to understand by that "pious belief" believing it with ecclesiastical faith would be equivalent to saying that one must believe the infallibility of the Church because of... the infallibility of the Church. Such theological absurdities are never committed by Saint Thomas.

Thus, that “pie credendum est,” deduced as a mere consequence of a line of reasoning, has for St. Thomas no other meaning or value than the scientific-theological value: the value of a theological conclusion: the same value as everything indirectly revealed or necessarily connected with what is revealed; the same value as everything that “ex quibus sequitur aliquid contrarium vel inconveniens fidei,” which, as long as no definition of the Church intervenes, does not belong to divine faith but “indirectly” or “reductively,” and belongs directly and formally to theology for the one who knows the connection with evidence, or to human faith for the one who, without knowing that connection, assents to it on the authority of theologians who do know it.

For the same reason that this consequence, not yet being defined by the Church, was not yet of divine faith, St. Thomas did not say, nor could he yet say: fide divina credendum est" or "haereticum est". But since such a consequence was quite certain, and moreover it concerned not a purely speculative matter, such as the conclusion, for example, that divine grace is a quality, but rather a matter of piety, such as the cult of the saints, for that reason the holy Doctor did not content himself with the phrase "certum est", but employed the phrase "pie credendum est", thereby qualifying the contrary as impious.

All that has been said has been well expressed by John of St. Thomas in the following words: “That causal [clause] of St. Thomas (namely, “because, however, the honor which we show to the saints is a certain profession of faith, by which we believe in the glory of the saints, it must be piously believed,” etc.) must be explained thus: that *because canonization is a judgment concerning the honor and veneration to be shown to the Saints, in whose very exercise we profess the special glory of some saint, therefore it pertains reductively to faith, and consequently it is piously believed that in such matters the Pope cannot err... We say, therefore, that it is... impious, because it is against the veneration and worship due to the saints themselves... We do not, however, expressly say that he who denies this is a heretic... because it has not been certainly and expressly defined in particular that such canonization is a definition of faith, but only as an inconvenient conclusion it follows from those things which are of faith, that in such canonization error could occur... And therefore it is not directly of faith, but reductively”⁹

In summary, then, the "pie credendum est" that Saint Thomas applies to the infallibility of the Church in canonization means human certainty or human faith, for it is formally human, although materially divine, every certainty or every faith that is founded solely on theological reasoning. Such is, for example, the certainty that theologians today have, or the faith that the faithful have, regarding the theological conclusion that "the soul of Christ enjoyed the beatific vision from the first instant of His conception," or any other theological conclusion that has not yet been defined by the Church. Such conclusions are certain, but they are not infallibly certain or certain with divine faith. To deny them is rash or impious, but it is not heretical.

284. LATER THEOLOGIANS UP TO THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.—Since St. Thomas dealt with the canonization of the saints, almost all later theologians took up the subject. The vast majority maintained the same position that St. Thomas had defended, namely, that the infallibility of the Church in canonization and, therefore, the holiness and glory of the canonized saint were theologically certain, but not infallibly certain or certain by divine faith.

No few theologians, however, were lacking who denied that infallibility, just as there were no lack of others who, from the opposite extreme, affirmed that this infallibility was already a matter of divine faith and that its denial was heresy.

Thus there resulted three opinions, which John of St. Thomas concisely sets forth in the following words: “The first opinion teaches that the Pope can err in the canonization of saints. The second opinion, going to the other extreme, holds that it is of faith that the Pope cannot err in the canonization of saints, and thus, once canonization has taken place, it is of faith that such a saint is in glory. The third opinion is a middle one: that it is indeed certain that the Pope cannot err in the canonization of saints, and that he who would say the opposite is worthy of censure, yet he would not be a heretic, but reckless, impious, and scandalous, indeed close to error or savoring of heresy. This opinion is the more common among the recent authors... and is drawn from St. Thomas” (Quodlib. 9, a. 16)¹⁰. In the same manner, though much more fully, Benedict XIV describes these three opinions¹¹.

The first opinion, which denies the infallibility of the Church in canonization, is followed by few and not very illustrious theologians, although the eminent Cardinal Cajetan is often cited among them. The third, which not only affirms that the infallibility of the Church in canonization is certain, but also that it is already of divine faith, is also affirmed by relatively few, although among them are names as illustrious as the Franciscan Alfonso de Castro and the Jesuits Valencia and Tirso González. Finally, the second, which is that of St. Thomas, and which affirms that the infallibility of the Church in canonization is certain, but is not yet infallibly certain or of divine faith, is followed by the vast majority of theologians, not only Thomists, but from all schools. The names and citations of all these theologians are given by Benedict XIV in chapters 43 and 45 of his cited work¹².

The Thomistic opinion, which we have already seen expressed by John of Saint Thomas, is also expressed by Suárez in the following words: “Likewise, it is not lawful for the faithful to doubt the glory of a canonized saint: for the Pontiffs command this under a precise obligation in the canonization itself: therefore it is necessary that error cannot underlie that precept, otherwise God would have failed in a matter most necessary to the Church, which is contrary to His providence and promises. And therefore, although this INFERENCE is not of faith, I judge it to be sufficiently certain, and the contrary to be impious and rash¹³.”

Although in this period, then, which runs from Saint Thomas to the second half of the seventeenth century, the question may have remained almost in the same state, two things are worthy of note:

1. That all these theologians, of whichever of the three opinions mentioned, continue to regard with Saint Thomas as identical these two questions: a) with what certainty we believe the infallibility of the Church in canonization; b) with what certainty we believe the sanctity or glory of the canonized saint.
2. That all those who continue to deny with Saint Thomas that the second question is of divine faith, do so because they continue to deny with Saint Thomas that the first is of divine faith, that is, that the infallibility of the Church in canonization is of divine faith.

285. FROM THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY TO OUR DAYS.—As we said when reviewing the history of ecclesial faith, the disputes over the question of fact concerning the five propositions of Jansenius’s book, which took place in the second half of the seventeenth century and even continued for a long time afterward, were fruitful for the study of the question of “the infallibility of the Church in dogmatic facts,” and likewise gave rise to the introduction into Catholic theology of what is called ecclesial faith. Since the canonization of the saints is neither more nor less than a dogmatic fact or a fact connected with dogma, every advance in the doctrine on dogmatic facts was bound to be reflected, sooner or later, if theologians were logical, in the doctrine on canonization.

Faced with the repeated papal bulls infallibly defining not only the question of right regarding the propositions of Jansenius's book, but also the question of fact, and requiring of all the faithful not only an external obedience or a religious silence, but also an internal and unconditional obedience, all Catholic theologians, some later than others, agreed on the following proposition: "It is absolutely certain that the Church is infallible in the definition of dogmatic facts", that is, in the definition of any fact necessarily connected with the preservation or explanation of the revealed deposit. Since the canonization of saints is but a particular case of dogmatic fact, there was no longer any theologian after that date who denied the infallibility of the Church in canonization.

Once the question of the Church's infallibility in dogmatic facts was thus resolved, a second question arose, namely, “what kind of faith such dogmatic facts deserve once infallibly defined.”

On this question the theologians were divided. Some said that this faith was divine faith, founded on divine revelation; others that it was ecclesiastical faith, founded on the infallibility of the Church. Those who applied so-called ecclesiastical faith to dogmatic facts also applied it, and very logically, to the canonization of the saints.

Finally, from this question there necessarily arose, though somewhat later, a third one, namely: “with what kind of faith do we believe the infallibility of the Church in dogmatic facts.” If we believe dogmatic facts because of the infallibility of the Church, with what faith do we believe that infallibility?

The answer to this third question necessarily had to be unanimous. Those who maintained that dogmatic facts were of divine faith, and therefore that they were truly revealed, had all the more reason to maintain that the infallibility of the Church in these facts was also of divine faith, since the infallibility of the Church in all that is revealed has always been regarded as of divine faith. In turn, those who maintained that dogmatic facts were of ecclesiastical faith had to arrive, sooner or later, at the same conclusion. To say that we believe dogmatic facts with ecclesiastical faith means that we believe them by reason of the infallibility of the Church. If we were also to believe that infallibility of the Church with ecclesiastical faith, we would have the absurdity or vicious circle of believing the infallibility of the Church by reason of the infallibility of the Church. Therefore, that infallibility of the Church cannot be believed with ecclesiastical faith, but with divine faith. Which is the same as saying that that infallibility of the Church is a truth truly revealed.

With this the reader can already note the immense progress made in Catholic theology since the seventeenth century on the question of “whether the Church is infallible in the facts connected with the revealed deposit.” To that question, St. Thomas and the vast majority of Catholic theologians before Jansenism answered that “pie credendum est,” that is, that this infallibility was theologically certain, but that it was not yet of divine faith. After the definitions and attitude of the Church against Jansenism, and much more so after the Vatican Council, all or almost all theologians answer that the infallibility of the Church in facts connected with dogma is a truth of divine faith, already defined by the practice or ordinary magisterium of the Church, or at least a revealed and definable truth of divine faith.

Although this is clear and although we are accused of repeating the same things, let us briefly cite some texts:

“Infertur hinc primo: Pontificem, etiam extra Concilium errare non posse in canonizatione Sanctorum; quod communius cum Bonaventura, Valentia, Belarmino, Amico docent esse de fide; alii vero cum Suario, Azorio, Granados, esse fidei proximum”¹⁴ “Which infallibility, indeed, is held by most as also formally revealed...; which infallibility could be defined as a dogma of faith”¹⁵ “In the opinion of many, it is heresy, although it has not so far been explicitly condemned as heresy”¹⁶ “This faith (that is, the ecclesiastical faith we give to dogmatic facts) is said to be mediately revealed, because the assent to it rests on the infallible authority of the Church, which we believe by divine and catholic faith”¹⁷ “If anyone denies that the Church is infallible in defining these things, he is by that very fact formally a heretic”¹⁸ “Perhaps this controversy could be settled by noting that it is one thing that the Supreme Pontiff is infallible in decreeing the canonization of some Saint, but another thing that it is of faith that this Saint, whom the Pontiff canonizes, is blessed in heaven. And the first is indeed of divine-catholic faith”¹⁹

286. ANSWER TO THE QUESTION.—This being presupposed, it is very easy to show that the fact that “such a canonized saint is in heaven” is an implicitly revealed truth and, therefore, definable by divine faith and not only by ecclesiastical faith.

To do so, it suffices to apply to that fact the same principles that in the previous section we have applied to dogmatic facts in general, and that all theologians today apply in particular to the facts of whether such a council is a rule of faith or whether such a pope is a true pope.

These principles, as the reader will recall, are two, namely: a) once a universal proposition is revealed, all the particular propositions contained within it are revealed; b) the minor premise of the reasoning, in such cases, does not enter as a formal motive, but rather as an explanation or application of the universal major to the particular conclusion. These two principles are generally admitted by all theologians.

By that path of containment of the particular in the universal, we could adduce numerous proofs to demonstrate that it is of divine faith that such a canonized saint is in heaven. We will limit ourselves to two proofs: one taken from the universal revealed truth that the Church is infallible in the canonization of every saint, and another, taken from the universal, also revealed truth, of the glory of all the saints in heaven.

287. FIRST PROOF.—According to all or nearly all theologians of today, it is truly revealed that “the Church is infallible in the canonization of the saints” or, what is the same thing, in the canonization of every saint.

This proposition, simply by turning it around, is exactly the same as the following: “It is revealed that every saint canonized by the Church is infallibly a saint and is infallibly in heaven,” for that is what we understand by canonization.

Put in conditional form, in order to better see the structure of the reasoning and the function of the minor premise in such reasoning, the following proposition results exactly: “It is revealed that every saint, if the Church canonizes him, is infallibly a saint or is infallibly in heaven”.

Let this, then, be the following reasoning:

It is revealed that every saint, if the Church canonizes him, is infallibly holy or is infallibly in heaven.

Thus this saint (Saint Isidore, for example) has been canonized by the Church.

Then it is revealed that this saint is infallibly holy or is infallibly in heaven.

We invite every reader to examine without prejudice the three propositions of this reasoning. The major is a universal revealed and definable truth of divine faith, if it is not already defined, according to almost all modern theologians. The minor comes down to verifying a condition of the revealed major. The conclusion is exactly the same revealed major, with no difference (all — this) other than that of universal and particular. Therefore, if a universal proposition being revealed entails that all the particular propositions contained within it are revealed, it is as clear as the light of day that the conclusion that “such a canonized saint is in heaven” is also revealed and is credible by divine faith.

If St. Thomas and the vast majority of theologians before Jansenism did not yet admit as a matter of divine faith that particular conclusion, it is because they did not yet admit as a matter of divine faith, but only as pious faith, the universal major premise. But today such a universal major premise is already admitted as a matter of divine faith by almost all theologians.

288. SECOND PROOF.—Instead of taking as the universal major premise of the reasoning the infallibility of the Church in the canonization of every saint, let us take as the universal major premise the glory due in heaven to every saint, which is also a truth of divine faith. Let the following reasoning, then, be:

It is of divine faith that the souls of all the true saints are enjoying God in heaven. Put in conditional form for greater clarity, the following results: It is of divine faith that every soul is enjoying God in heaven if it was truly holy.

Thus this soul (that of Saint Isidore or of any other canonized saint) is truly holy.

It is therefore a matter of divine faith that this soul is enjoying God in heaven.

We ask the reader once again to examine the three propositions of that reasoning. The major is a universal revealed and defined as of divine faith by Benedict XII²⁰. The minor is the very formula that the Church uses in the canonization of the saints, and it has no other purpose than to fulfill a condition of the major of faith. The conclusion is exactly the same as the major of faith, with no difference other than that between universal and particular (all — this).

Then, either one must deny the principles commonly admitted by all theologians, or one must admit that the fact that "such canonized saint is in heaven" is of divine faith or definable as of divine faith, and not merely of ecclesiastical faith.

289. THE SALMANTICENSES AND JOHN OF SAINT THOMAS.—As confirmation of what has been said, we shall adduce the testimony of two theologians, precisely the two from whom this would least be expected on this question. They are the Salmanticenses and John of Saint Thomas.

These theologians, like almost all those before the Church’s decisions on dogmatic facts, defended with Saint Thomas that the dogmatic fact of canonization was not a matter of divine faith, but of theological certainty or human faith; yet they already made it quite clear that this fact of canonization was not of divine faith, because the infallibility of the Church was not yet a matter of divine faith.

In defending the claim that it is of divine faith that "this pope is a true pope," the Salmanticenses pose to themselves the following objection: "Just as the universal Church accepts Innocent XI as Supreme Pontiff, so it accepts, for example, St. Isidore among the number of Saints existing in glory: but it is not immediately of faith that this man has been canonized and exists in glory: therefore it is not immediately of faith that Innocent XI is Supreme Pontiff."

Here now is his truly remarkable reply: "Ad confirmationem neganda est maior, quia haec propositio omnis homo rite canonizatus et acceptus ab Ecclesia in numerum Sanctorum, est Sanctus et existit in gloria", is not immediately de fide, as Ferre rightly shows. Hence the consequent that is drawn, namely that St. Isidore is truly holy and exists in heaven, is not immediately de fide. (Now comes the good part.) But if the contrary supposition be made and that universal proposition be said: "Every man duly canonized", etc., to be immediately de fide, consequently it must be said to be immediately de fide that St. Isidore is in glory and is truly holy"²¹.

Let the reader note that concession which the Salmanticenses already made in their time, namely, that if it is admitted that it is of divine faith that all canonized saints are in heaven, one must also logically admit that it is of divine faith that this particular saint is in heaven. Now, the majority of modern theologians already admit that it is of divine faith that all canonized saints are infallibly in heaven, by admitting that the infallibility of the Church in the canonization of all saints is of divine faith²².

Another no less clear confirmation is given to us by John of Saint Thomas. Answering an objection of Granados, who, in order to deny that theological conclusions were of divine faith even after the definition of the Church, had adduced the example of the canonization of the saints, he expresses himself thus: “For the canonization of the saints it is piously believed that the Holy Spirit assists, lest the Church err, as St. Thomas says, Quodlibet 9, a. 16, but it is not certain by faith, as he says there: but in defining matters of faith it is certain by faith that the Holy Spirit assists, and that that definition proceeds from His direction: whence (let the reader note that whence) the assent to it does not rest on human authority, but on divine”²³.

As can be seen, John of Saint Thomas’s reply amounts to the following: If, instead of being only a “credible fact,” it were of divine faith that the Holy Spirit assists the Church in canonization, then the fact of the canonization, or that such a canonized saint is in heaven, would also be of divine faith and not human. Now, we all know that the theologians of today admit that the assistance of the Holy Spirit to the Church in canonization is of divine faith, inasmuch as they admit that the infallibility of the Church is of divine faith, for infallibility and assistance of the Holy Spirit amount to the same thing.

In a word, St. Thomas and all the ancient theologians always regarded as identical the faith by which we believe the infallibility of the Church in canonization and the faith by which we believe the glory of the canonized saint, but since the former was not yet of divine faith, for that reason they did not admit the latter as of divine faith²⁴.

Today it is generally admitted as being of divine faith the first point. Hence, whoever wishes to follow the principles and the spirit of Saint Thomas and of the great theologians must admit that the second point is also of divine faith. The contrary is to cling to the material letter of traditional theology, abandoning its spirit and its guiding principles in the treatise on faith.

290. ANOTHER CONFIRMATION.—As a final confirmation, we will briefly indicate another proof that we have already adduced when dealing with dogmatic facts in general.

Suppose that Jesus Christ in person were now to come down from heaven and say to His Church: “All the saints you have canonized up to now are with Me in heaven.” No one will deny that, in such a hypothesis, this would be of divine faith, because it is “spoken by God.”

Now then, let every theologian note that the very same thing Jesus Christ would tell us now He had already told us before, and the question of now and before does not change the kind of faith. It is the same to admit that “it is revealed that the Church is infallible in the canonization of all the saints,” as most theologians admit today, as to admit that “God has said it,” and to what God has said corresponds divine faith and not merely ecclesiastical faith.

The act, then, of faith that we give to the canonization of the saints (or to any other infallible definition of the Church) is not well formulated by saying: "I believe that such a saint is in heaven, because the Church says so." Nor is it exactly formulated by saying: "I believe that such a saint is in heaven, because the Holy Spirit assists the Church in canonization." Rather, it is formulated and must be formulated with full truth by saying: "I believe that such a canonized saint is in heaven, because God has revealed that the Church is infallible in the canonization of every saint." Such an act is evidently of divine faith.

291. RESPONSE TO OBJECTIONS.—Almost all the objections usually raised on this question reduce to the following: that holiness is an internal fact or phenomenon, incapable of being verified with full certainty; that witnesses can deceive; that even the holiest person may fall into mortal sin at the last moment and be damned, despite all external appearances to the contrary; that, even supposing he has not been damned, it is impossible to know whether he is still in purgatory, etc., etc.

All these objections, as any discerning reader who examines them will note, are out of tune with the question we are treating here, for they would prove not only that no divine faith is possible regarding the fact that such a saint is in heaven, but they would equally prove that neither is infallibility possible, nor, therefore, ecclesiastical faith.

Thus, the answer to all objections of this kind is one and the same, and very simple. Either divine assistance is admitted in canonization, which is the same as infallibility, or it is not. If divine assistance is not admitted, then evidently there can be no divine faith, but neither can there be ecclesiastical faith. On the other hand, if divine assistance is admitted, all those objections fall to the ground, for although holiness is an internal fact about which any man can be deceived, it is not a fact about which God—or the man assisted by God—can be deceived.

Also, if it had no divine assistance, the Church could be deceived in judging whether such a council was ecumenical or not (and even whether such a council existed or not): whether such a pope is a true pope; whether such a translation of Sacred Scripture, for example, the Vulgate, is well made, etc., etc., and where deception is possible, divine faith is not possible. But since there is divine assistance to verify the particular fact, no deception or fallibility is possible in such a fact, and since, on the other hand, that particular fact forms part of a revealed universal (every council, every pope, every translation of the Bible, every canonized saint...), for that reason, and not precisely because of divine assistance, although not without that assistance, such particular facts, once defined, are of divine faith ²⁵.

292. ANOTHER OBJECTION that could be raised is the following: the fact that this particular saint is in heaven is something more than the universally revealed truth that every saint in general is in heaven. Now, if it is something more and is of divine faith, which is the same as being revealed, then we will have some increase, however small, in revelation after the Apostles, which cannot be admitted.

We confess that every time we read or hear such an objection, we cannot help forming a very poor opinion of those who raise it. It reveals, in our judgment, an extremely narrow theological criterion regarding the divine authority of the Church, as if her only function were to preserve the revealed deposit and not also to explain and apply it. Such theologians seem to imagine that for something to be of divine faith, it must have come from the lips of the Apostles with all its particulars and details, and that the Church has no other function than to transmit or faithfully repeat, like a phonograph, what the Apostles said, without the slightest increase, development, or novelty. This extremely narrow conception of the Church's dogmatic function and of the development of dogma causes many modern theologians, out of a puerile fear of falling into transformist modernism, to fail to grasp the full scope of the broad theory of the Lirinense and of Saint Thomas, the only theory that can successfully explain the authentic facts that history presents of true dogmatic development by way of genuine connection or theological conclusion or by way of dogmatic fact.

We concede, then, that the theological conclusion is something more than the revealed principle from which it is deduced. But if that conclusion is deduced by an inclusive or implicit route, and only thus is it definable as of divine faith, that something more is not something more of doctrine or objectivity, but something more of explanation of the same and only revealed doctrine. We also concede that every dogmatic fact and every canonization of saints is something more than the universal revealed truth with which such facts are connected; but that something more is not something more of objectivity or doctrine, but of application to particular cases of the same and only doctrine already revealed in universal terms.

The only thing, then, deduced from this is that the Church has divine authority for something more than conserving the revealed deposit, for it also has it for explaining and applying it, provided this can be done without new revelation.

293. THE THIRD OBJECTION.—Finally, some will raise the point that if the canonization of the saints and every infallible definition of the Church is a matter of divine faith, then all distinction seems to disappear between what is defined as a dogma of faith and what is defined as merely infallible, or between what is condemned as heretical and what is condemned as erroneous, or with some other censure lower than that of heresy.

The response to this objection is that, although both classes of definitions are of divine faith and, therefore, there is no specific or formal difference between them, there have always been and continue to be between them two accidental or material differences.

The first difference is that what the Church expressly defines as a dogma of faith or condemns its contradiction as heretical is not only of divine faith, but also it is of divine faith that it is of divine faith, and therefore, whoever denies it is a heretic. Whereas what it defines simply as an infallible truth or condemns its contrary with a note inferior to heresy is also of divine faith, but it is not of divine faith that it is of divine faith, and for that reason whoever denies it is not a heretic. The reason for this difference is that the Church has already defined that one must believe with divine faith, and under pain of heresy, everything that she defines as revealed, but she has not yet defined that there is an obligation to believe with divine faith or under pain of heresy what she defines as infallible²⁶.

The second difference is that what the Church defines as a dogma of faith or condemns the contrary as heretical is of divine faith that it is revealed truth, whereas what the Church defines only as infallible truth or condemns the contrary with a note inferior to heresy is of divine faith that it is infallible truth, but it is not yet of divine faith that it is revealed truth. The reason for this second difference is that faith, not being discursive, limits itself to assenting to what is defined, and only to what is defined. Now, in the first kind of definitions, the Church not only defines the truth, but also the revelation of such truth. While in the second kind of definitions, the Church defines the truth, without yet expressly defining the revelation of such truth. But the one kind is just as revealed as the other. The former God has revealed in particular; the latter He has revealed in universal. In revealing that the Church is infallible in the definition of every dogmatic fact and in the canonization of every saint, God revealed implicitly, but truly, that this dogmatic fact or this saint are infallibly certain once defined.

Thus, between so-called ecclesiastical faith and divine faith the differences are accidental or material. What is essential or formal in faith in both—that is, the formal motive for believing them—is the same: divine revelation. Both, therefore, are divine faith.

294. SUMMARY.—With this question of the canonization of the saints and with the questions previously studied on the theological conclusion and dogmatic facts, we believe that the nature of modern ecclesiastical faith, and with it the extension of dogmatic progress, has been sufficiently examined.

As the reader will have noticed, especially the reader who is truly Thomistic, the nature of the faith called ecclesiastical depends necessarily and entirely upon the nature of the faith by which we assent to the following proposition: "The Church is infallible in everything necessarily connected with the revealed deposit." If this proposition is of divine faith, as is admitted today by almost all theologians, then every true Thomist who knows not only the letter but also the spirit of St. Thomas's principles must admit that the so called ecclesiastical faith is truly divine faith. If, on the other hand, someone believes that the Church's infallibility in such matters is not yet of divine faith, but merely a theological conclusion (as the ancients believed with regard to dogmatic facts), then he must logically admit that ecclesiastical faith is formally human, since every faith or certainty founded solely upon theological connection is formally human. In any case, whatever supposition one adopts, ecclesiastical faith must be, for every true Thomist, either divine faith or human faith. A faith specifically intermediate between divine faith and human faith is an evident contradiction within Thomistic doctrine.²⁷

Thus, although the definability by divine faith of dogmatic facts and of the canonization of the saints is intimately linked with the definability by divine faith of the true and rigorous theological conclusion, the Thomistic theologian must not confuse these two questions as if they were of equal value.

That genuinely and rigorously theological conclusions—that is, conclusions absolutely connected with the revealed deposit—are definable as divine faith, we regard as an evident and fundamental truth; as a truth expressly affirmed by Saint Thomas and by all traditional theology up to the confusion introduced in the seventeenth century concerning the “virtually revealed”; as a truth without which the authentic facts of the history of dogmas cannot be explained.

On the other hand, we consider the question of whether dogmatic facts, and consequently the canonization of the saints, are of divine faith or only of human faith as a secondary question and of little importance or relevance for the fundamental question of dogmatic progress. Although we are persuaded, and believe we have proven, that the faith we give to dogmatic facts and to the canonization of the saints is truly divine faith, it would matter little to us if someone denied this, provided that they affirm that the Church can define as a dogma of divine and Catholic faith all those theological conclusions that are deduced from the revealed deposit through a process of real identity, or essential connection, or absolute certainty ²⁸. That is what Suárez and Lugo called this formal- confused revealed, what moderns call virtual identical-material or connective-essential, and what traditional theology had called by the simple names of implicit or virtual, since implicitness, to be rigorously scientific or theological, must be virtual, and virtuality, to be rigorously theological, and not purely physical, must be connective-essential, and therefore objectively implicit.

295. THE CONCLUSION to be drawn from this chapter on ecclesiastical faith is that the evolution of dogma is so great that it extends to the four grades of Catholic doctrine. These four grades are: a) revealed datum or truths expressly revealed; b) truths already defined as dogmas of faith; c) truths defined as infallible, although not yet as dogmas; d) truths not yet defined, but necessarily connected with any of the three preceding grades, and which we call theological conclusions and dogmatic facts.

The difference between those four grades is not a difference between revealed and unrevealed, but between explicitly revealed and implicitly revealed. Since everything truly revealed by God, whether explicit or implicit, is infallible truth, all the truths of those four grades of Catholic doctrine combine two characteristics: a) they are revealed truths; b) they are infallible truths.

The Church can, if it so wishes, define at one stroke the revealed character or of divine faith of any of the propositions of those four degrees, without any prior definition having been made concerning their character as infallible truth. Thus, for example, it defined as of divine faith the theological conclusions of the two understandings and two wills in Christ, or the obligation of confessing the circumstances that change the species of sin, and the dogmatic facts that the Vulgate is authentic or that the canon of the Mass is free from all error.

On the other hand, it can also—and this is the most ordinary procedure—first define a conclusion or dogmatic fact as an infallible truth, without yet defining it as revealed or of divine faith. Thus, for example, it has already defined as an infallible truth the theological conclusion of the necessity of jurisdiction in the confessor, or the dogmatic fact of the book of Jansenius, without having so far defined them as revealed or of divine faith. But although it has not yet defined them as revealed, it can define them on whatever day it pleases or is necessary. Just as the Church has said: "If anyone shall say that in the sacrament of Penance, for the remission of sins, it is not necessary by divine law to confess... the circumstances that change the species of the sin: let him be anathema," and "If anyone shall say that the canon of the Mass contains errors and therefore ought to be abrogated: let him be anathema," in the same way it could say: "If anyone shall say that in the sacrament of Penance jurisdiction in the confessor is not necessary: let him be anathema," or "If anyone shall say that the Symbol commonly called of St. Athanasius contains errors, or that the book of Jansenius, called Augustinus, does not contain errors: let him be anathema." The necessity of confessing the specific circumstances of sins is as much a theological conclusion as the necessity of jurisdiction in the confessor, and the purity of the canon of the Mass is as much a dogmatic fact as the orthodoxy of the Symbol of St. Athanasius or the heterodoxy of the book of Jansenius. The same may be said of any other conclusion, provided it is rigorously theological, and of any other fact, provided it is truly dogmatic.

The difference, then, between infallible definitions and definitions of divine faith, and therefore between ecclesiastical faith and divine faith, is not a specific difference of doctrine or of objectivity, but a difference of degree through which one and the same doctrine passes or may pass before reaching the supreme degree of dogma of faith. There is no truth definable as of divine faith that cannot beforehand be defined as an infallible truth; nor is there any truth defined or definable as infallible that cannot be defined as of divine faith. This is, in our judgment, a most certain and traditional doctrine, if we are dealing with rigorously theological conclusions, and a most probable doctrine, not to say certain, if we are dealing with truly dogmatic facts²⁹.

296. THE CAUSE OF THE TWO TENDENCIES.—If certain modern Thomists do not accept this doctrine, it is because they imagine that for something to be implicitly revealed and definable as of divine faith, it must be contained in the revealed datum in a direct manner, and not merely indirectly; in a formal manner, and not merely virtually or consequentially.

On the other hand, we hold it as evident that for Saint Thomas and for all traditional theology prior to the confusion introduced on this question in the seventeenth century, everything contained in the apostolic deposit in an indirect manner is also implicitly revealed and definable by divine faith, everything contained in a rigorously theological, or virtual, or consequential manner, everything from the denial of which the denial of what is formally revealed necessarily follows with absolute necessity. Let us hear Saint Thomas: “It must be said that an article is an indivisible truth, as regards what is actually set forth in the article: but it is divisible as regards those things which are potentially contained in the article, inasmuch as he who says one thing, in a certain way says many things: and these are the things which precede the article or follow from it: and in this respect the article of faith can be set forth and divided”³⁰ “To set forth the articles of faith can happen in two ways: in one way...: in another way, as regards those things which are implicitly contained in the articles themselves: this indeed happens when a man knows those things which follow from the articles”³¹ “And in this respect faith can be set forth daily, and through the study of the saints it has been more and more set forth” (ibid.). “Something pertains to faith in two ways... Indirectly, however, those things pertain to faith from the denial of which something contrary to faith follows”³² “Those things from which the corruption of some article follows”³³ “Those things from which follows something inconvenient and contrary to faith”³⁴

When this inclusive, or indirect, or consequential revelation is defined by the Church, “the judgment is the same regarding these (the indirect) and those (the direct) which have been determined in the faith, because one follows from the other” (last cited place). “And for this reason many things are now reputed heretical which were not previously reputed so, because it is now more manifest what follows from them”³⁵ “It is answered that St. Thomas understands by indirectly pertaining to the faith that which is gathered by necessary consequence from some proposition immediate according to the faith. As if someone denies that Christ is capable of laughter, he errs in the Catholic faith consequently and indirectly... For it has not thus far been defined by the Church that Christ is capable of laughter. But if it were defined by the Church, then he who would deny that Christ is capable of laughter would be a heretic”³⁶ All the ancient Thomists express the same thing³⁷.

297. THE THOMISTIC FORMULA.—The formula, therefore, that is truly Thomistic and traditional regarding the extension of dogmatic progress is not the narrow formula of the Salmanticenses, which says: “The Church never defines as a dogma of faith that which is not presupposed to its definition as formally revealed” ³⁸, but rather that other truly broad one of Báñez: “The Church has so far proposed or defined nothing for the faithful to believe that was not contained in Sacred Scripture or the traditions of the Apostles expressly or virtually, so that it might be drawn from them by evident consequence” ³⁹.

This formula of Báñez is the true formula of traditional theology: the formula of St. Thomas, of St. Bonaventure, and of Scotus; the formula of all theologians before Molina; the formula of Suárez and Lugo; the formula, in short, of the immense majority of later theologians, although many of these, by using the new and ambiguous nomenclature of Suárez, may sometimes seem to say the opposite.

The extension, then, of dogmatic progress is as great as the virtuality implicit in the revealed deposit ⁴⁰. That implicit virtuality, explained or developed by the individual reason of theologians through reasoning of real identity or essential connection, constitutes the true and rigorous theology or theological conclusion. That same implicit virtuality, explained or developed by the divine authority of the Church, under the assistance of the Holy Spirit, constitutes the dogma of faith. The explanation made by the individual reason of theologians, however evident and clear the reasoning may be, is a formally human or theological explanation, never of divine faith (neither for oneself nor for others), as long as the definition of the Church does not intervene. On the other hand, the Church has divine authority, and not merely human or ecclesiastical authority, to explain or unfold, and not merely to preserve, everything truly implicit in the revealed datum. Whether that implicitness is formal or virtual is indifferent, provided that it be true implicitness and can be explained or unfolded without new revelation.

1st If it is a matter of an article of faith defined by the Church, it is clear that its formulation is immutable in its substantial sense. What the Church has defined, it has defined forever, and no one can alter its meaning.

2nd. If it is a question of a theological truth, that is, of a truth deduced from the articles of faith, its formulation may vary, but its meaning remains the same. The variation in formulation does not imply a variation in meaning, but rather greater clarity and precision in the expression of the same truth.

3rd If it is a theological opinion, that is, a truth that is not necessarily deduced from the articles of faith, but is proposed as probable, its formulation and its meaning may vary. What is held today as probable may be rejected tomorrow, and vice versa.

4th. If it is a question of a philosophical truth, that is, a truth known by natural reason, its formulation and its meaning may vary, but its content remains the same. Philosophy advances and progresses, but its fundamental truths are immutable.

5th If it is a question of a historical truth, that is, a truth known through human testimony, its formulation and its meaning may vary, but its content remains the same. History is written and rewritten, but historical facts are immutable.

6th If it is a matter of a scientific truth, that is, a truth known through observation and experimentation, its formulation and its meaning may vary, but its content remains the same. Science advances and progresses, but its fundamental laws are immutable.

7th If it is a question of a moral truth, that is, of a truth known by natural reason and divine revelation, its formulation and its meaning may vary, but its content remains the same. Morality is immutable in its fundamental principles, but its application may vary according to circumstances.

8th. If it is a liturgical truth, that is, a truth expressed in the liturgy of the Church, its formulation and its meaning may vary, but its content remains the same. Liturgy is immutable in its essence, but its form may vary according to times and places.

9th If it is a canonical truth, that is, a truth expressed in the canon law of the Church, its formulation and its meaning may vary, but its content remains the same. Canon law is immutable in its fundamental principles, but its application may vary according to circumstances.

10th. If it is a matter of a spiritual truth, that is, of a truth known through spiritual experience, its formulation and its meaning may vary, but its content remains the same. Spirituality is immutable in its essence, but its expression may vary according to times and places.