La evolución homogénea del dogma católico

216. If progress by way of assimilation does not exist, there is, on the other hand, in dogma another way of development completely distinct from the way of reasoning. We refer to the way of affection, the way of will, the way of piety, the way of feeling, the way of experience, the mystical way; that way, in a word, of which Saint Thomas speaks so frequently, calling it the way per modum connaturalitatis, per quandam affinitatem, quasi experimentalis, per contactum, and other similar names, and which the holy Doctor always contrasts with the way per studium, per inquisitionem, per ratiocinium. To understand this new way well, one must fix attention on three points, namely: on the role that in our judgments is played by: a) affective life in general; b) natural habits; c) supernatural habits.

THE AFFECTIVE LIFE IN GENERAL.—Everyone knows the important role that the affective life plays in our judgments. Love excites and concentrates attention, causing one to think more constantly and with greater fixity on the beloved object, and concentrating attention is equivalent to increasing cognitive power, according to the well-known adage "pluribus intentus minor est ad singula sensus". This constitutes a great advantage for the knowledge and development of a truth. When the physicist or the chemist tries to study in depth the properties of a body or of any phenomenon whatsoever, they begin above all by seeking to isolate it from everything else in order to study it in all its purity, without any mixture of extraneous impressions, which are often a frequent cause of error or deception. That is precisely what love does with respect to the beloved object. The lover fixes his gaze with intensity and even with exclusivity upon what he loves, thus receiving its impressions with greater force and greater purity and discerning sooner properties or traits that others do not notice or take longer to discern¹. The beloved disciple is the first to recognize on the seashore the risen Jesus and to exclaim immediately: “Dominus est”.

But to this well-known advantage of love there is sometimes joined a great disadvantage no less well known. Objects, in order to be well and duly appreciated, frequently need to be compared with others, since our knowledge, unlike that of the angels, has a far greater share of the relative or comparative than of the absolute or intuitive. He who does not undertake diverse and comparative studies, he who limits himself to a single order of ideas and much more to a single object—the specialist, in a word—runs the danger of narrowness and shortsightedness of judgment, of exclusivism in appreciation, of despising and even of not seeing what does not interest him, of magnifying that very thing which interests him as if it were the only thing of value and worthy of attention². From specialist or enthusiast to shortsighted or visionary there is frequently but a single step, as experience shows only too well. It is not without reason that love is represented with a blindfold over its eyes.

In any case, if the advantages or disadvantages of love, whatever they may be, were reduced solely, as some believe, to facilitating or hindering attention, and through attention the speculative judgment, then the affective life would respectively be a spur or a hindrance to the intellectual path, but it would not come to constitute a second path, an autonomous path distinct from the path of reasoning. But in the affective life there is much more than that, as we are about to see.

217. NATURAL HABITS OR DISPOSITIONS.—Habit constitutes a second nature, and since a good or virtuous habit is one that conforms to reason, it follows that whoever possesses a virtuous habit or a good natural disposition possesses within himself and without leaving himself a real, physical, immanent element, and at the same time objective, for judging experimentally and without reasoning, with respect to the object of such a habit, as well as or better than one who, without possessing such a habit, tries to judge by mere science or speculative reasoning.

It may be said, and it is said, that he who possesses a virtuous habit or natural disposition possesses a new sense. Thus we generally speak of the sense of art, the sense of modesty, the sense of honor, the sense or feeling in all orders. In the same way that through the exterior senses we perceive external objects by immediate contact, without comparison or reasoning, by simple and true intuition, so too he who possesses, for example, the habit of chastity perceives spontaneously and intuitively the purity or impurity of an action or of a doctrine relating to that matter with more promptness and vivacity, and even at times with greater certainty, than the speculative moralist, if he is not chaste, with all his reasoning. We see the same thing daily in art, in education, in religion, and in all orders of life. It is an effect of natural disposition or acquired habit, a kind of sense or interior instinct by which we judge by an experiential or connatural way because we carry within ourselves in the habit a second nature, that is, a real and objective likeness or participation, and not merely intentional or ideal, of the object judged. As by the sense of taste, says Saint Thomas³, we perceive and discern flavors, so by the habits we perceive and discern without reasoning the suitability or unsuitability, the truth or falsity, of acts or doctrines referring to each habit.

218. SUPERNATURAL HABITS.—What happens in the natural order happens with much greater truth in the supernatural order. Rather, what is only likeness in the natural order is reality and identity in the supernatural order.

Indeed: according to Catholic doctrine, grace and the virtues and gifts derived from it are a real participation in the Divinity. Moreover: by sanctifying grace, the Divinity itself in its Unity and Trinity of persons dwells in our soul, not in a purely similitude-based or metaphorical manner, but in an objective and most real manner, however mysterious and ineffable it may be. This indwelling of the Divinity itself in the most intimate depth of our own being begins virtually with the supernatural faith possessed by every Christian, even if a sinner, and is consummated formally with sanctifying grace and with the virtues and gifts possessed by every just man.

He, then, who possesses divine faith, and much more he who possesses sanctifying grace with its virtues and gifts, possesses and bears within himself, after the manner of a nature, the very object from which all the affirmations of faith are born and upon which they turn, and from which all dogmatic developments spring and from which alone they can spring, since nothing is or can be dogmatic or of divine faith that is not a real expression of the divinity. The believer, then, and much more the saint, possesses within himself a new sense, which Saint Paul calls the sense of Christ, and which we might well call the sense of faith or the eyes of faith.

Now then: in the natural order, we know from history and experience that the aesthetic sense, for example, or the moral sense have contributed or contribute as much as or more than speculative rules to appreciating and developing the arts or ethics. Let us now imagine what would happen if artistic feeling or moral virtue, instead of being the heritage of a few geniuses or elevated souls, were universal, and if the world were a society composed exclusively of brilliant artists or of souls with a lofty and delicate moral sense.

Now then: what is only a supposition in the natural order is a reality in the supernatural order. All Christians carry within themselves, along with the habit of faith, an inchoate but real participation in divinity: countless among them possess sanctifying grace, and with grace, charity and supernatural virtues and gifts, and through grace and charity, divinity itself and its divine life; and some, many more than we believe, possess that life and those gifts in the heroic degree that we call holiness, which makes the life of God almost normal in them.

That faith, that grace, that charity, those virtues, those gifts, especially the gifts of wisdom, of understanding, and of knowledge, are objective supernatural realities, second natures that we carry grafted into what today we would call the subconsciousness of our very being, and through which we can perceive, judge, and develop by way of connaturalness, by way of intuition, by way of contact, by way of what is almost experimental, many supernatural truths that the speculative theologian perceives only by way of science, by way of conclusion, by way of study, by way of laborious reasoning.

This often happens, as the history of dogmas shows, that before speculative theology has deduced, or even sometimes so much as glimpsed, a conclusion or dogmatic development, a holy soul or a simple faithful believer of lively and simple piety has felt or sensed that development, has communicated it to other believers, and they have spontaneously accepted it as the faithful expression of their own feeling or faith, and that this feeling has finally come to spread so widely as to become the common feeling of the whole Christian people.

It is clear that scarcely has such a sentiment, with its appearance of novelty, begun to manifest itself and become widespread, when speculative theology seizes upon it to subject it to rigorous examination, comparing it with the revealed sources of divine Scripture and tradition and with the authentic criteria of the Holy Fathers, councils, and popes. Frequently it will happen that speculative theology will demonstrate that this sentiment of the faithful, which seemed new, is nothing other than an explanation or conclusion of what was already implicitly contained in the revealed sources and in defined formulas. At other times, on the contrary, speculative theology will not be able to demonstrate it with rigorous proof and will limit itself to a greater or lesser probability. But whether speculative theology demonstrates it or not, that common sentiment of the faithful people is by itself alone a sufficient criterion, even without theological reasoning, for the pope or the council, under the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit, to be able to define such a truth as a dogma of faith, as a legitimate dogmatic development. The Church is not bound, in order to define a truth, either to the reasoning of theologians or to the sentiment of the faithful, for she is not a disciple, but a teacher, of both the faithful and the theologians. Any human means that certifies to her the explicit or implicit existence of a truth in the revealed deposit is a sufficient means for her, assisted by the Holy Spirit, to be able to define that truth. Among these means is the sentiment of the faithful people as much as or more than theological reasoning; and to forming that sentiment the habits of faith, grace, charity, the virtues, and the gifts contribute in a connatural way or without reasoning, as much as or more than speculative theology contributes through the path of study and reasoning.

219. TEXTS OF ST. THOMAS.—In confirmation of all that has been said in this section, we shall here transcribe, gathered together, some texts from the Angelic Doctor. We will choose only a few, and the shortest, but sufficient to show what those two ways of knowledge consist of, which we have called the way of reasoning and the affective way. They read as follows:

“Rectitude of judgment can come about in two ways: in one way, according to the perfect use of reason; in another way, because of a certain connaturality with the things about which judgment is to be made.

Sicut of those things that pertain to chastity, he who has learned moral science judges rightly through rational inquiry: but he who possesses the habit of chastity judges rightly through a certain connaturality with them”⁴

“Just as taste judges flavors according to its own disposition, so does the mind of man judge concerning something to be done according to its habitual disposition”⁵

“Duplex is knowledge... One kind is speculative...; another however is affective or experiential, when one experiences in oneself the taste of divine sweetness”⁶

“Haec autem sufficientia (in cognoscendo) in quibusdam est per studium et doctrinam, adiuncta vivacitate intellectus: sed in quibusdam accidit per quamdam affinitatem ad divina, ut Dionysius dicit de Hierotheo”⁷

“And in this way too the moral virtues are said to operate more certainly as a skill, insofar as they are moved by reason to their acts in the manner of nature”⁸

“Some have certain virtues from natural disposition... and consequently they have naturally right judgment”⁹

“Habitus scientiae inclines toward the knowable in the manner of reason...; but the habit of faith, since it does not rely on reason, [inclines] in the manner of nature, just as do the habits of the moral virtues and the habits of the first principles”¹⁰

“But the light of faith is like a certain seal of the First Truth. Hence this light suffices for judging. Yet this habit does not move through the way of the intellect, but rather through the way of the will”¹¹

“The human soul is not moved by the Holy Spirit unless it is in some way united to Him, just as an instrument is not moved by the craftsman except by contact, or through some other union. Now the first union of man is through faith, hope, and charity”¹²

“For first, man is joined to God through faith”¹³

“Faith indeed is the life of the soul, according to that passage in Romans: The just shall live by faith¹⁴

“Therefore, by the fact that charity is in the will, it is not alien to reason... Through a certain affinity to reason”¹⁵

“And this is what God does by increasing charity, so that the likeness of the Holy Spirit is participated in the soul more perfectly”¹⁶

“Gratia et gloria ad idem genus referuntur”¹⁷

"Wisdom which is a gift is more excellent than wisdom which is an intellectual virtue, since it attains God more intimately, through a certain union of the soul with Him"¹⁸

“Out of a certain connaturality or union with divine things which comes about through charity”¹⁹

“Through a certain union with divine things to which we are united only through love”²⁰

“Uncreated Wisdom which first unites itself to us through the gift of charity, and from this reveals to us the mysteries, whose knowledge is infused wisdom. And therefore infused wisdom is not the cause of charity, but rather its effect”²¹

“But that man may be united to those most high causes, transformed into their likeness, in the manner in which he who is joined to God is one spirit”²², “so that thus, as it were, from his inmost self he may judge other things..., this is brought about through the gift of wisdom”²³

“As wisdom, which is an intellectual virtue, relates to the understanding of principles because it in some way comprehends them, so does wisdom, which is a gift, relate to faith, which is the simple knowledge of the articles [of faith], which are the principles of all Christian wisdom. For the gift of wisdom proceeds to a certain deiform contemplation and in some way explicit [understanding] of the articles, which faith holds in a certain veiled manner according to the human mode”²⁴

“Unde if there are some things which are apprehended immediately without rational discourse, this is not called reason, but intellect... And this is what the gift of understanding does: it illumines the mind regarding what is heard (concerning faith), so that in the manner of first principles what is heard is immediately approved”²⁵

“The soul is conformed to God by grace. Hence, for a divine Person to be sent to someone by grace, it is necessary that the soul be made assimilated to the divine Person who is sent, through some gift of grace. And since the Holy Spirit is love, the soul is assimilated to the Holy Spirit through the gift of charity. Therefore, the mission of the Holy Spirit is understood according to the gift of charity. But the Son is the Word, not any kind of word, but one that breathes forth love... And therefore Augustine fittingly says that “the Son is sent when He is known and perceived by anyone.” Moreover, perception signifies an experiential kind of knowledge. And this is properly called wisdom, as it were, savory knowledge”²⁶.

“The divine persons themselves, by a certain sealing of themselves, leave in our souls certain gifts... Hence this knowledge is quasi-experimental”²⁷.

“Wisdom is called an intellectual virtue insofar as it proceeds from the judgment of reason: it is, however, called a gift insofar as it operates from divine instinct”²⁸.

“And therefore divine knowledge is not discursive or ratiocinative, but absolute and simple: to which is similar the knowledge that is posited as a gift of the Holy Spirit, since it is a certain participated likeness of it”²⁹.

“Non quicumque intelligit habet donum intellectus, sed qui intelligit quasi ex habitu gratiae: ita etiam illi solum donum scientiae habent qui ex infusione gratiae rectum iudicium habent circa credenda et agenda... Et haec est scientia Sanctorum”³⁰.

Finally, these two ways of knowing and developing dogma had already been pointed out by Saint Thomas on the very frontispiece of his masterwork, the Summa Theologica, that is, in the very first question, where he expresses himself thus:

“Since judgment pertains to wisdom, according to a twofold manner of judging, wisdom is taken in two ways. For it happens that one judges in one way by way of inclination; just as one who has the habit of virtue rightly judges of those things which are to be done according to virtue, inasmuch as he is inclined to them. Hence also in the Ethics, book X, chapter 5, it is said that the virtuous man is the measure and rule of human acts. In another way by way of knowledge, just as someone instructed in moral science could judge of acts of virtue, even if he did not have the habit of virtue. The first manner, therefore, of judging of divine things pertains to that wisdom which is set down as a gift of the Holy Spirit, according to that text of 1 Corinthians 2:15: The spiritual man judges all things. And Dionysius, in On the Divine Names, ch. 12, says: “Hierotheus was taught not only by learning, but also by suffering “divine things”. The second manner of judging, however, pertains to this doctrine (that is, to speculative theology) insofar as it is possessed through study: although its principles are had from revelation”³¹

We have already seen that what the Holy Doctor says here about the gift of wisdom he applies proportionally to all the other habits of faith, grace, charity, virtues, and gifts, since every supernatural habit is a real participation in the Divinity, and the Divinity is the formal object of dogma and of all dogmatic developments.

220. TWO SOURCES AND TWO PATHS.—There are, then, two sources of dogma and of dogmatic development: a derived and conceptual source, which consists of the revealed formulas; and a primordial and real source, which is the Divinity itself. These two sources, although distinct, are not independent either in their origin or in their possession by us. Not in their origin, for the first is derived from and springs forth from the second, since the revealed statements or dogmatic formulas are nothing but conceptual and partial, yet true, expressions of the Divinity. Not in their possession by us, for there can be no possession of the Divinity through grace without faith in the revealed statements, at least in the two most general statements of the existence of a God, supernatural and rewarder.

Corresponding to those two sources, there must also exist, and there do exist, two different ways of perceiving, judging, and developing dogma. The first is the way of statements or revealed formulas, comparing them with one another or with the statements of reason, which is what constitutes the way of reasoning. The second is the way of Divinity itself, with which we enter into immediate contact through the habits of faith, grace, virtues, and gifts, which is what constitutes the affective way.

As can be seen by reviewing the texts cited in the previous paragraph, Saint Thomas calls the first way by the following names: a) per usum rationis; b) per rationis inquisitionem; c) per modum cognitionis; d) cognitio speculativa; e) per studium et doctrinam; f) per modum rationis; g) per viam intellectus; h) secundum humanum modum; i) ex iudicio rationis; l) scientia discursiva vel ratiocinativa.

He designates the second way by an even greater variety of names, namely: (a) through connaturality (per connaturalitatem); (b) by way of inclination (per modum inclinationis); (c) affective knowledge (cognitio affectiva); (d) experimental knowledge (notitia experimentalis); (e) through affinity with divine things (per affinitatem ad divina); (f) by way of nature (per modum naturae); (g) by way of the will (per viam voluntatis); (h) through contact (per contactum); (i) through union with God (per unionem ad Deum); (l) through love (per amorem); (m) from the depths of oneself (ex intimo sui); (n) through God-like contemplation (per deiformem contemplationem); (o) after the manner of first principles (ad modum primorum principiorum); (p) without discursive reasoning (sine discursu); (q) by divine instinct (ex instinctu divino); (r) absolute and simple knowledge (cognitio absoluta et simplex); (s) as though from a habit (quasi ex habitu).

Of these two ways, the first is the way of reason; the second, the way of the heart. The first is the logical way; the second is the experimental way or, as is often said today, the vital way. The first is the way of speculative theology, of the science of the wise; the second is the way of mystical theology, of the science of the saints.

Through both channels runs and develops the dogmatic sap, the supernatural life; every true theologian, like every true historian of dogmas, must attend to both and appreciate both equally; but always and above all looking, if he does not wish to go astray, to the beacon that illuminates both channels, which is none other than the infallible authority of the Church, assisted by the Holy Spirit, the sole principal cause of dogmatic development, and of which the learning of the scholar as well as the piety of the saint are but instruments.

Two EXAMPLES OF THE LIVELINESS OF THE SENSE OF FAITH.—To show how strong and lively this sense of faith is in some cases, even without any speculative reasoning, we will cite only two examples.

First, the dogma of the Immaculate Conception. The sense of the faithful regarding this dogma was so strong, even many centuries before it was defined, that the Christian people could not, without true torment and scandal, so much as hear the contrary. Even the adversaries of the definability of this dogma were forced to acknowledge this. Let us hear Melchor Cano: "Quod si propositionum absonarum consonarumque iudicium Ecclesia in vulgi auribus collocasset, illam certe propositionem: "Beata Virgo peccatum originis a primo parente contraxit", male sonare et pias aures offendere iudicaremus. Illa enim audita, vulgus sine dubio perstringitur, percutitur, *torquetur"³² What Cano there calls with a certain disdain "the common people" was in the sixteenth century the entire Christian people, both simple villagers and educated persons alike, provided that the latter were not excessively preoccupied by the passions of the schools. Let us hear the no less wise than pious Archbishop of Valencia, Saint Thomas of Villanova: "Et quomodo obsecro, non gloriabitur serpens, cuius ipsa fregit caput, si eam vel per instans vel per momentum habuit captivam suam? Nolo audire, non tolerant aures nostrae Virginem fuisse daemonio subiectam, vel per instans, vel per momentum"³³

A similar thing has happened in almost all the other dogmas concerning the most holy Mother of God and ours, both in the dogma of her perpetual virginity, and in that of her divine maternity, and in that of her exemption from all actual sin, dogmas that have already been defined, and in that of her glorious Assumption into heaven, which we hope will one day be defined³⁴

It seems as if all the dogmas referring to Mary had been entrusted to the custody and explanation of the loving heart of the simple and faithful Christian people, as much as or more than to the reasoning of speculative theology. The fact is that, as we said (209), all the dogmas referring to the Virgin have as their source her worthy divine motherhood, and the requirements or postulates of the "worthy motherhood" are perceived better with the loving and living heart of the son than with the cold and dry logic of the scholar.

The other typical example of the strength and vividness of the sense of the faith will be given to us by Saint Teresa of Jesus. For some time, and deceived by what certain books and masters of the spiritual life taught or seemed to teach, the Saint had persuaded herself that when one reaches certain elevated states of prayer, it was fitting to dispense entirely with the meditation of every sensible thing, even of the most sacred Humanity of our Savior, and to meditate only upon the Divinity. But soon the experiential and ever more vivid sense of her faith and of her holiness made her see with meridian clarity how erroneous and dangerous such a doctrine was, and that the Humanity of Jesus Christ, and not only His Divinity, was the way and the sure guide of all the degrees, whether small or great, of contemplation or the supernatural life. The Saint had such a vivid and clear intuition of this that, despite all the arguments to the contrary posed by her theologians and confessors, she maintained and defended it with that energy and decision with which things that are felt and experienced are defended, and which rarely exists in things perceived only through reasoning. Let us hear the Saint herself:

“It will also seem to you that one who has enjoyed such lofty things (that is, the divine communications of the Sixth Mansions) will no longer engage in meditation on the mysteries of the most sacred humanity of Our Lord Jesus Christ, because such a soul will now be exercised entirely in love. This is something I wrote at length elsewhere, for although I have been contradicted in this, and told that I do not understand it (because these are paths along which Our Lord leads, and once one has passed beyond the beginnings it is better to treat of matters of the divinity and flee from corporeal ones), they will never make me confess that this is a good path... For the same Lord, who says that He is the way, also says that He is the light and that no one can come to the Father except through Him; and whoever sees me, sees my Father. They will say that another meaning is given to these words. I know no other meanings... With this one, which MY SOUL ALWAYS FEELS TO BE TRUE, I have fared very well... Nor will anyone make me understand, no matter how spiritual he may claim to be, that one will fare well along this path ³⁵

Here is a woman without letters defending against numerous and wise adversaries a most important dogmatic truth and supporting her interpretation of Sacred Scripture with a decision and energy unusual in this supreme reason: this is what my soul always FEELS to be true.

That is the attitude and the formula of the sense of the faith, a sense that existed in the Saint, despite her lack of speculative learning, with more liveliness and more sure penetration than in all the confessors and theologians who surrounded her.

“Although contemplative and, so to speak, experimental knowledge is so little identical with knowledge acquired chiefly by rigorous scientific study that it can subsist without it; nevertheless, as a general rule, it proceeds in close connection with it. Except in the case where the former had been produced by a formal miracle, it must be prepared and supported by the latter. And conversely, the former not only gives the latter greater liveliness and depth (Innigkeit, intimacy), but also so powerfully favors its acquisition and perfection, that there have been saints who, with relatively very brief studies, have attained greater heights than others endowed with great natural faculties and aided by the most diligent labor” ³⁶.

This doctrine, which, supported by her lively experimental sense of faith, the Saint defends here, is almost the same as that which the Church defined a century later, when condemning the following proposition of Molinos: “It is not fitting for souls of this inward way... nor ought they to elicit acts of love towards.”

B. Virgin, the saints, or the humanity of Christ: because since these objects are sensible, such is the love for them³⁷. And another similar doctrine had already been defined by the Council of Vienne when it condemned the following proposition of the Beguards and Beguines: “That at the elevation of the body of Jesus Christ they should not rise, nor show reverence to it: asserting that it would be an imperfection for them if they descended from the purity and height of their contemplation to think upon the ministry or sacrament of the Eucharist or upon the passion of the humanity of Christ”³⁸.

In reality, very many dogmatic propositions defined or infallibly condemned by the Church, which today seem to us so clear and even so easy to prove from Sacred Scripture or from theological reasons, are only clear given our living and universal Christian sense. That Christian sense was often the first to discover them, although later reasoning, more or less conclusive, came to confirm them and the Church, assisted by the Holy Spirit, to define them. But perhaps they would not have been known or defined without the sense of faith, a sense that exists in a very special way in the saints, but which is also present in all souls who are in grace and even in some manner in all Christian faithful.

Hence all the great theologians have recognized the great value that the common sense of the faithful has for dogmatic development. Let us cite a few brief texts: “In a question of faith, the common sense of the faithful people is no slight authority in establishing the faith”³⁹. “For in the definitions of faith, account must be taken of the consensus of the faithful: since they indeed, insofar as the Church consists of them, with the assistance of the Holy Spirit, so purely preserve the divine revelations that all of them cannot err”⁴⁰. “The Church can declare which book is to be held as canonical, and this not rashly or at will, but from the testimonies of the ancients and from the similarity of the books in question to those not in question, and finally from the common sense and, as it were, taste of the Christian people”⁴¹. “For this definition it suffices that some supernatural truth be implicitly contained in tradition or Scripture, so that with the growing common consent of the Church, through which the Holy Spirit often explains traditions or declares Scripture, the Church may at length apply its definition”⁴². “Something can be established as a matter of faith by the consent of the universal Church, when all the faithful concur in firmly believing some dogma, with which unanimous consent falsity and deception cannot stand, because God assists the Church, lest it be wholly deceived”⁴³ “Make an exception for the case in which all the faithful, or the greater and better part of them, namely of all the theologians and the experts in canon law, would concur in believing or teaching that some truth is contained in the Sacred Scriptures, or in the traditions of the Church and the common doctrine of the Fathers, and would make that estimation known in writings and public discourses; for then the pontiff could, without any other prior examination, define that truth as a matter of faith”⁴⁴ “For whence, if not from the common sense of the faithful, is the certainty drawn that the Mother of God was sanctified, at least before the nativity? Whence are we certain that the same Blessed Virgin was assumed into heaven in both soul and body? If, therefore, no one doubts these things, how can there be doubt about the Immaculate Conception, which all the faithful hold and defend?⁴⁵ The generality of modern theologians express the same thing.

While this “sense of the faith” is found only in a few isolated believers—even if they are holy—or in only a part of the Church, its theological value is very weak.

But from the moment it becomes widespread and comes to be the common patrimony of bishops, theologians, and the faithful, it constitutes by itself and before any definition an argument whose value is equal to that of the most evident theological reasoning.

Thus one or the other—the evident reasoning or the certain and universal sentiment of Christendom regarding the inclusion of a doctrine in the revealed deposit—is for the Church a sufficient criterion of its definability.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE SENSE OF THE FAITH AND THE ORDINARY MAGISTERIUM.—It is fitting, however, to distinguish carefully between the sense of the faith, of which we have spoken in this section, and the ordinary magisterium of the Church, of which we have spoken elsewhere (135).

The first is found in all the faithful, especially in the faithful who are in a state of grace, and much more so in true saints, even if they are neither theologians nor bishops. The second is exclusive to bishops or pastors.

The first is not teaching nor magisterium, but simple experimental persuasion of a truth, and although, when it belongs to all the faithful, it is a sufficient criterion or preparation for its definition by the Church, it is not by itself a definition. The second is not only persuasion of a truth, but also magisterium or teaching of it, and when that magisterium is universal and definitive, it constitutes a true definition of faith by ordinary magisterium, of the same value as the definitions of faith by solemn magisterium.

To possess the first, that is, the sense of the faith, it suffices to be in the grace of God or at least to have true divine faith; to possess the second, that is, the power of ordinary magisterium, it is necessary and sufficient to have episcopal jurisdiction, which is by its very nature doctrinal jurisdiction, even if one lacks grace and even faith.

Neither should the common consent of the faithful, when it is consequent upon a definition of the solemn or ordinary magisterium of the Church, be confused with that same consent when it is antecedent to any definition or teaching of the Church. The former concerns a truth already defined and is, therefore, infallible, just as the definition itself is. The latter concerns a truth not yet defined or taught and cannot, therefore, be grounded except in one of two things: either in the speculative reasoning of theology, or in the intuitive and experiential sense of faith—both of which are absolutely fallible as long as the definition of the solemn or ordinary magisterium of the Church does not intervene, to which alone the divine assistance or infallibility is promised and bound.

THE PRINCIPAL FACTOR OF DOGMATIC PROGRESS.—From this, it is clearly seen how the only principal or truly effective factor of dogmatic progress is the definition of the Church or the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit, for these two things, definition and assistance, are indissolubly united and form but one single thing. On the other hand, all other factors, whether speculative or practical, are nothing but mere ways or human and fallible instruments of the infallible action of the Church's magisterium.

Therefore, the magisterium or dogmatic definition of the Church is not merely a recording apparatus nor a center for reflecting the social consciousness of the Christian community, as modernism heretically maintains⁴⁶, but it is, above all, a true source, from which, explicitly or implicitly, all subsequent consent arises, and a true judge and true divine rule of all antecedent consent of the social consciousness or Christian people, whether such consent has been formed by theological reasoning or by the practical and experimental sense of faith. Therefore, every definition of the ecclesiastical magisterium, whether solemn or ordinary, is infallible in itself and independent of the antecedent, concomitant, or subsequent consent of theologians or of the faithful. In contrast, no consent of theologians or of the faithful, however unanimous and permanent it may be, is nor can it be infallible except insofar as it is an expression of a prior definition or insofar as it is confirmed by a subsequent definition of the solemn or ordinary magisterium of the Church.