La evolución homogénea del dogma católico

213. Having already examined the speculative path, or that of inclusive reasoning, and before entering upon the study of the affective path, or that of vital experience—these being the two great paths along which dogmatic development takes place—let us say a few words concerning the so-called path of assimilation.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MATERIAL LIFE AND OF INTELLECTUAL LIFE.—Ever since Cardinal Newman wrote his brilliant Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, there has been talk, even among Catholic writers, of assimilation as one of the paths of dogmatic development. In our judgment, such assimilation does not exist, not only in dogma, but not even in the sciences; and whatever has been said to the contrary comes from improperly extending to the spiritual life of the intellect the laws and material processes of vegetative and animal life.

Indeed, for a principle or intellectual statement, whether abstract or concrete, to develop and grow in the human intellect, there is no need whatsoever for the assimilation of extraneous matter, but only for simple comparison with other intellectual statements, whether these come from the speculative or the practical reason, or from internal or external experience. As St. Thomas rightly observes¹, every intellectual statement is light, and the contact or application of light, without increasing or modifying the objectivity of what is seen, increases the visual power of the seer and even the visibility of the object or of what in the object was latent, implicit, virtual. In this lies the force and value of what in ordinary language we call comparison or contact of two or more truths with one another, and which in logic is known by the technical name of reasoning. Every statement, upon coming into contact or comparison with another, or every major premise, upon coming into comparison with an inclusive minor, develops: because the contact of the light of the minor makes new aspects, new relations, new predicates, new truths, new statements appear visible in the major that before, although they were there, did not appear; as upon contact of the plate with the reagent the features that were on the plate are drawn out or become clear, or better, as upon contact of known quantities the true values of the unknown in an equation are revealed.

That is, according to St. Thomas, the true psychology of intellectual progress and of the life of our intelligence, and that is, therefore, the true psychology of the progress and life of faith and of dogma, since faith is formally an intellectual virtue. To speak of assimilations in dogmatic progress is to confuse the life of the intelligence with animal or vegetative life. In the vegetative or animal organism, by reason of its material character, no development or evolution is possible except through intussusception and assimilation of foreign elements, and whoever says assimilation says transformism. On the other hand, intellectual life develops, not by transforming the primitive principles or propositions, but by comparing them with one another or with other propositions so that, in the light of some, what is hidden in others may appear. Intellectual life resembles, not chemical assimilation or combination, nor even mathematical addition or subtraction, but the development of an equation, whose end and whose process is not to increase or diminish in any way the true value of the unknowns, but to resolve or explain their implicit or latent values by means of known values.

214. Such is, according to the Thomist school, the true and only office of the much-discussed inclusive minor premises of reason in the development of dogma. The most serious problems related to what is today called the evolution of dogma, which many treat as new problems and even almost accuse the great geniuses of Scholasticism of having ignored, were treated and resolved in principle by them and, above all, by St. Thomas and his school, with a depth and breadth that contrasts with the superficiality with which they are treated not only in heterodox works, but also in many Catholic manuals. What we today call the contact of revelation with the various philosophies and civilizations, the Scholastics called the contact of the major premises of faith with the minor premises of reason; what we today study under the name of dogmatic evolution, they studied under the name of theological conclusion; just as today we discuss whether dogmatic progress is the result of an assimilation of rational data by the truths of faith, they discussed it under the heading of whether the minor premise of reason is a true principle or a concause or merely an auxiliary or instrument of the conclusion; the modern question of whether there can be true development or evolution in dogma, they discussed under the formula of whether theological conclusions are of divine faith or definable as being of faith.

The solution of St. Thomas and his school to these problems was always that the minor premises of reason are in theological reasoning merely an instrument of the major premises of faith or mere auxiliaries of our reason to develop what already exists latent in the major premises of faith, which have as their object neither to increase, diminish, nor modify the objectivity of those major premises of faith, but only to explain or develop their implicitness or virtuality; that the conclusion is found not at once in the major premise of faith and in the minor premise of reason, but solely and exclusively in the major premise of faith; that the conclusion does not issue from the major and the minor, but from the major alone through the aid of the minor; that the minor premises of reason are not proper theological sources or formal principles of the conclusion, but mere auxiliary principles; that, therefore, the theological conclusion or theology is not an objective addition to the major premise of faith or revealed deposit, but an intellectual explanation²; that, finally, this explanation is a divine-human explanation or an explanation of the divine deposit by human reason, when it is made solely through the deduction of mere men, that is, of theologians; but it is a divine-divine explanation, that is, an explanation of the divine deposit by the authority of God Himself, when it is made under the assistance of the Holy Spirit, as it is in every infallible definition of the Church.

Thus, both the truths of revelation and the truths of reason are for our intellect sources of light, of very different natures and values, but always light. Brought into contact, they could not but illuminate one another mutually³. The truths of faith have served to advance those of reason; the truths of reason, in turn, have served to advance those of faith. With the truths of faith we have been able to discover in those of reason what philosophers would never have managed to discover without them; with the truths of reason we have discovered in those of faith or in the revealed deposit what would always have remained hidden from the faithful or theologians without them. There is in neither case an assimilation of the truths of reason by those of faith, or vice versa, but a mutual illumination. The assimilation of a truth of reason by another of faith would not advance faith, nor even theology, but would corrupt them; for nothing is truly of faith or of theology unless it is truly included in the principles of theology and of faith, and the true principles of faith, as of theology, are not nor will ever be the truths of reason, but the truths of divine faith.

In sum, the relationship of the premises of faith to those of reason, or of the revealed deposit to the various human philosophies or civilizations with which it has come into contact, is not the assimilating relationship of the stomach to food, but rather the instrumental or auxiliary relationship of the telescope or microscope to vision, or that of the chemical reagent to the already exposed plate, or that of the known quantities to the unknowns in a mathematical equation. Its purpose is not to add, nor to remove, nor to change, nor to assimilate anything, but solely and exclusively to discover or develop what was already implied, and for this reason the ancients very aptly called it explicating the revealed datum.

THE PHOTOGRAPHIC PLATE IMPRESSED BY DIVINE THOUGHT

215. When a photographic plate has already been impressed by an object, it needs no new impression, but only to be developed. It is, then, already a developable plate. But to develop it, it is not a matter of indifference to use just any liquid or any kind of manipulation, but rather such liquids and such manipulations as do not erase, mix, or modify the image already impressed, but only develop it, explain it. What we call the revealed deposit is nothing other than the photographic plate impressed by the word of God. On that plate there are already from the beginning certain features clearly perceptible and which, therefore, do not need, in order to be seen and understood, any manipulation or development whatsoever. That is what we call explicit development, or, more briefly, the revealed, as Saint Thomas calls it. But on that plate there are many other features, already really impressed upon it, but still hidden, deep, not perceptible to the naked eye, implicit. These do need to be manipulated, to be explained, to be developed. That is the implicit-virtual development, or, more briefly, the revealable of the plate, as it is called in the language of Saint Thomas. The liquids or manipulations used to develop or explain that divine plate, that premise of faith, are what we call reasoning or premises of reason. But not just any liquid or any manipulation suffices; not just any premise suffices, but one that does not erase, mix, or modify the features already impressed upon the premise of faith. And this is achieved when the premise of reason is of the essence or of the intellectu of the premise of faith, when it is perfectly suited or proportioned to its nature (96 and 107). Then it is certain that the features of the image that appear explained or developed in the conclusion would not have been known without the manipulation or without the liquid of the minor premise of reason; but it is no less certain that the features do not come from the liquid or from the manipulations of the developer of the plate, but from the plate itself, that is, from the object that impressed the plate. This is the profound and most real meaning of those golden phrases of Saint Thomas in describing the nature of theology and of the properly so-called theological conclusion: «Quia igitur Sacra Doctrina (the Sacred Theology, insofar as it is a properly so-called science) considerat aliqua secundum quod sunt divinitus revelata (that is, the explicitly revealed, the features already perceptible on the plate from the beginning, the features already revealed), omnia divinitus revelabilia (all the features already impressed, but still implicit, and which are explicable or revealable by human reason) communicant in una ratione huius scientiae⁴. Ut sic sacra doctrina sit velut IMPRESSIO DIVINAE SCIENTIAE, quae est una et simplex omnium"⁵. Every theological conclusion, properly and rigorously such, like every definition of the Church, is therefore nothing more than an explanation or development of the plate impressed by God of the revealed deposit. Hence, what theology gives us, as what the Church gives us, is nothing other than the implicitly revealed. Omnia implicite continentur in S. Biblia, says Capreolus commenting on that same article (378).

215. NEWMAN'S TRUE THOUGHT.—If the learned Cardinal Newman speaks of a process of assimilation, it is because he is dealing not only with development in doctrine, but also in rites or disciplines and other accidental things of Christianity, in which, being for the most part external things, not only assimilation is possible, but also transformation, just as a living being transforms its clothing or its nourishment without transforming its specific nature.

In reality, Newman understands by “additions” or by “assimilations,” when dealing with doctrines, the same thing that traditional theology understands by “development” or “explanations” of implicit virtuality. This habit of calling everything that was not “explicit” from the beginning “additions” or “assimilations” was maintained by Cardinal Newman throughout his entire life; but sometimes he explains himself with such clarity that he leaves no doubt whatsoever about the meaning he gives to such words.

Here is how Newman expressed his thought in 1849, four years after his conversion: "It is well known that although the belief of the Church has been one and the same from the beginning, nevertheless it has been so deeply hidden in her bosom, that it has only been shared by her members individually, in a more or less implicit manner, rather than being proposed from the very beginning in those special determinations, called definitions, as it is now presented to us, to guard us against error or ignorance. These definitions, which are but the expression of a single dogma, always admitted by the Church, are the work of time; they have increased in the course of eighteen centuries until acquiring their present form and number, following the exigencies of fortuitous events, such as heresies and other similar things, and, naturally, they may receive in time further additions"⁶

Thus, twenty-five years after his conversion he wrote to Dr. Whitty: "A time will come when it will be seen how those traditions are compatible with additions, that is, with true developments, which those traditions do not explicitly teach in themselves"⁷.

Let us add this note from his Essays critical and historical, published in 1871: "The hypothesis about the depositum fidei, to which I gradually adhered, is that of doctrinal development, or the evolution of doctrine starting from certain original and fixed dogmatic truths, which from the first day to the last are held as inviolable and ever more firmly established and illustrated by a true process of enlargement." And he adds that, in speaking of "new forms, distinct from one another" (in the first edition of this work), he has plagiarized the language of a theory that is not his own: "I have given utterance to a theory, not mine"⁸.

Here is a new text no less interesting. We find it in Newman's lectures on the "Difficulties of the Anglicans": "The whole revelation was made to the Apostles, but it is the Church who transmits it to us. Absolutely no new truth has been proposed to us since the death of Saint John. The Church's sole function is to 'guard this noble deposit of the truth.'"

—as St. Paul says to Timothy—that the Apostles have bequeathed to her in its fullness and integrity⁹

Finally, let us recall in what terms Newman expresses his thought on the development of dogma: "Revelation is everything in Catholic doctrine: the Apostles are the sole source; the deductive method, its only instrument, and the authority of the Church, the only sanction" (204).

When in his famous book, entitled An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, in fixing the seven notes or characteristics of legitimate or homogeneous development, he sets as the third note "the power of assimilation" and as the sixth note "preservative additions," Newman expressly requires that those truths which he calls assimilations or additions not only do not oppose the primitive datum either by excess or by defect (as happens in every contrary concept), nor even be completely disconnected or foreign (as happens in every diverse concept), but that they be truly akin, which is precisely the same thing that the great Scholastics called conforming concepts (consona) or mutually implicit ones (20). In reality, among ideas there can be no affinity without internal connection, and if that connection is absolute or metaphysical, such affinity is nothing other than a true implicit identity (247), and then what psychologists like Newman call, in physiological language, assimilation or addition, is not, in the truly philosophical and theological language of the school, anything other than a true explanation of the implicit. That is also the sense that Newman gives to his phrase "new dogmas," that is, not objectively new, but explicitly new.

Therefore, we believe that a great injustice has been done to Newman not only by the modernists, who pretend to see in him a precursor of their doctrines, but also by certain Catholic theologians who have believed that Newman's ideas on the evolution of dogma were not in perfect agreement with Catholic doctrine, solely because his peculiar phraseology in this matter differs considerably from that commonly used by scholastic theologians¹⁰. With great

reason wrote of Newman His Holiness Pius X the following words: "Indeed, in such a great abundance of his (Newman's) lucubrations, something can be found that may seem foreign to the customary method of theologians; nothing can be found that would bring suspicion upon his faith itself"¹¹.

In our judgment, Newman’s ideas on the evolution of dogma are not only perfectly orthodox, but also completely traditional at bottom; although his theological-philosophical nomenclature is sometimes as poor and deficient as his psychological observation and his historical synthesis of dogmatic evolution are always rich and penetrating. His immortal book Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine (An Essay on the Development of Christian doctrine), which he wrote while still an Anglican, and while writing which he converted to Catholicism, constitutes, in our opinion, the clearest vision that a stranger to the Catholic Church can have of its nature and development, one who looks at it from outside, but so closely that he is already almost touching it with his hand. That book of Newman’s constitutes something like the bridge by which one passes from Anglicanism to Catholicism, and therein lies its great merit. But, for that very reason, it also constitutes the bridge by which, if one is careless or mistaken, one can pass from Catholicism to Anglicanism or to Modernism, and therein lies its possible danger. For a Catholic, approaching that conception of the Catholic Church seen from outside that Newman presents to us there is like approaching the extreme limit where Catholicism borders on Protestantism; just as for a Protestant it is approaching the extreme limit where Protestantism borders on Catholicism.

That is the reason why we do not customarily advise every young Catholic indiscriminately to read that and some other work of Newman without being well grounded in a solid philosophical-theological culture, and, on the contrary, we would advise and have always advised every Protestant or agnostic to read, and to read frequently, that and all the other works of Newman, certain that such reading must draw them toward Catholicism more than all the theological and philosophical apologies, but of a speculative and intellectualist character, that the greatest Catholic theologians and metaphysicians have written.

If the illustrious Newman had been as great a theologian or philosopher as he was a psychologist and historian, we believe that he could have written one of the best apologies for the Catholic religion that could be imagined.

But he himself recognized, and was not ashamed to confess it, that he was neither a good theologian nor did he ever hope to become one. Writing to Sister María Pía in February 1869, he expresses himself thus: "Really and truly, I am not a theologian... I am not, and never shall be" (Really and truly I am not a theologian... I am not, and never shall be)¹².

From that lack of theology, or rather of precision in theological nomenclature, it has come about that Newman speaks of additions or assimilations in dogma, when in his mind such words mean no more than developments or homogeneous explanations of what was already contained in a virtual but truly implicit manner in the primitive datum. That is the only evolution possible in dogma. To speak of additions or assimilations in another sense would not be homogeneous or explanatory evolution, but transformationist.