La evolución homogénea del dogma católico

207. SIXTH EXAMPLE.—The Fifth Lateran Council, the eighteenth among the ecumenical councils, defined as a dogma of faith that transcendental and fruitful truth that no true opposition can exist between science and faith, or between human reason and divine revelation.: “We define that every assertion contrary to the truth of enlightened faith is altogether false”¹ The same definition was repeated, and in more expressive terms, by the Vatican Council: “If anyone says that human disciplines are to be treated with such liberty that their assertions, even if they oppose revealed doctrine, can be retained as true, and cannot be proscribed by the Church, let him be anathema”²

This, then, is a revealed truth. But where and how is this truth revealed? It is in other truths, in which it is contained virtually and from which it is deduced by rigorous reasoning. Those other truths are: first, that both the affirmations of revelation and the legitimate demonstrations of reason or science are truths, and it is contradictory that one truth should oppose another truth. Second (and this is the root of the first), that both natural and revealed truth, or both the principles of reason and those of faith, proceed from God, and God cannot fail or deny himself. From this arises, by rigorous reasoning, the dogmatic truth defined by the Lateran and Vatican Councils.

This reasoning, which both Councils employed, had been set forth thus by St. Thomas: “For those things which are naturally instilled in reason are known to be most true, so much so that it is impossible even to think them false: nor is it lawful to believe that what is held by faith, since it has been so manifestly confirmed by God, is false. Since therefore only the false is contrary to the true, as is clearly apparent from an inspection of their definitions, it is impossible for the aforesaid truth to be contrary to those principles which reason knows naturally. Again: that same thing which is introduced into the soul of the disciple by the teacher is contained in the teacher’s knowledge, unless he teaches deceitfully: which it is impious to say of God. But the knowledge of naturally known principles is instilled in us by God, since God Himself is the author of our nature. These principles therefore are also contained in divine wisdom. Whatever therefore is contrary to such principles is contrary to divine wisdom: it cannot therefore be from God: those things therefore which are held by faith from divine revelation cannot be contrary to natural knowledge”³.

That very reasoning has been the human instrument the Church used for the definition of this dogma, as is clearly indicated by the very words of both Councils, which do little more than transcribe, in summary form, the reasoning of St. Thomas: “Cumque verum vero minime contradicat, omnem assertionem veritati illuminatae fidei contrariam omnino falsam esse definimus”⁴. “Verum, etsi fides sit supra rationem, nulla tamen unquam inter fidem et rationem vera dissensio esse potest, cum idem Deus qui mysteria revelat et fidem infundit, animo humano rationis lumen indiderit; Deus autem negare seipsum non potest, nec verum vero unquam contradicere. Omnem igitur assertionem veritati illuminatae fidei contrariam, omnino falsam esse definimus”⁵. As we already noted in the previous section, those enim, cum, autem, igitur are the marks of ordinary or informal reasoning in everyday language, just as atqui and ergo are those of dialectical or formal reasoning in logic texts. When they appear in dogmatic definitions, they are usually signs of derived dogmas, that is, dogmas contained implicitly in the revealed deposit, and known and defined by way of reasoning under the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit.

208. SEVENTH EXAMPLE.—The Council of Trent defined as a dogma of faith the most singular privilege of the immunity of the Most Holy Virgin from all actual sin, even venial: If anyone shall say that a man once justified... can avoid all sins, even venial ones, throughout his whole life, except by a special privilege of God, as the Church holds concerning the Blessed Virgin: let him be anathema⁶.

This is, then, a revealed truth. But where and how is this truth revealed? It is revealed in other truths, in which it is contained virtually and from which it proceeds by reasoning. Those other truths are: first, the Most Holy Virgin is a fitting Mother of God; second, she would not be a fitting or worthy Mother of God if she had been stained by even a single venial sin. From these two truths, the first of faith and the second of reason, there proceeds by reasoning the dogmatic truth defined by the Council.

This reasoning was thus set forth by Saint Thomas: “The Blessed Virgin was divinely chosen to be the Mother of God... Nor would she have been a suitable Mother of God if she had ever sinned... And therefore it is simply to be acknowledged that the Blessed Virgin committed no actual sin, neither mortal nor venial”⁷. That this reasoning was the human instrument by which the Church developed that dogma is well expressed by the following text of Ribalda: “The Apostles believed in the immunity of the Mother of God from actual sin and in their own future beatitude, because they perfectly knew the Scriptures expressing the dignity of the divine motherhood and their own confirmation in grace, on account of which the Church declared those truths to be of faith”⁸.

St. Augustine had already indicated the same with sufficient clarity in the following words: “Except, therefore, the Holy Virgin Mary, concerning whom, for the honor of the Lord, I wish to raise no question at all when dealing with sins: for from this we know that more grace was bestowed upon her to overcome sin in every respect, since she merited to conceive and bear him whom it is certain had no sin”⁹.

209. A DIGRESSION ON THE DOGMA OF THE IMMACULATE CONCEPTION.—In our judgment, the dogma of the immunity of the Mother of God from every stain of original sin proceeds from the same principle, by the same logical process, and with the same certainty or demonstrative value as the dogma of her immunity from all actual sin. To see this, one need only fix one's attention carefully on what constituted the obscure and controverted point in the dogma of the Immaculate Conception.

Indeed, all theologians, without distinction of schools, even those who seemed to have distinguished themselves most by their opposition to that dogma, always admitted as unquestionable the following principle: “To Mary, as the worthy Mother of God that she is, must be attributed all that grace and holiness, or all that immunity from sin, which is compatible with the honor of her Son, that is, with his redemption by Jesus Christ.” Concerning this principle there has never been doubt or discussion, for that principle is nothing other than the traditional understanding of the gratia plena of the Gospel.

The doubt and discussion did not concern the major premise of faith, but rather the minor premise of reason, which was the following: “It is the case that one can at once be conceived without original sin and be redeemed by Jesus Christ.” This minor premise of reason is what constituted the central point of the doubts and discussions in the history of the development of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception.

While in the idea of original sin the concepts of guilt and debt were not properly distinguished, and while in the idea of redemption the concepts of redemption post contractum peccatum and preservative redemption were not delimited, that lesser proposition formulated so absolutely and without distinctions proved false, and the conclusion had to be erroneous, if not heretical. Indeed, an Immaculate immune from everything contained in the idea of original sin, that is, immune from all guilt and all debt, is evidently an Immaculate not redeemed in any way whatsoever. And an Immaculate not redeemed by any kind of redemption, even by preservative redemption, is clearly an erroneous Immaculate. In short: an Immaculate without distinctions is an erroneous Immaculate, if not heretical.

Now then, without making any distinctions, since the spontaneous piety of the faithful people did not ordinarily make them, that doctrine began to be affirmed. Thus formulated, it was judged erroneous by St. Bernard, Albert the Great, St. Bonaventure, and St. Thomas, together with other saints no less eminent as theologians. In so doing, they rendered an inestimable service to the true progress of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, a service for which justice has only recently begun to be done to them.¹⁰ Even if they did not yet completely direct the progress of that dogma along its true course, they at least succeeded in closing off the false path once and for all. One may even say that they were the ones who truly set it on the right course, or were the cause of its being so directed, for by judging erroneous, if not heretical, the notion of an Immaculate Virgin who had not been redeemed, they compelled both the piety and the theological science of later generations to seek an Immaculate who had indeed been redeemed. That is, they stimulated theologians to find some way of reconciling the idea of the Immaculate Conception with the idea of redemption.

To the illustrious Scotus and to his, on this question, immortal school, undoubtedly belongs the glory of having initiated the true solution of the problem, by applying to the idea of original sin the distinction between guilt and debt, and to the idea of redemption the distinction between redemption after the contracted fault and preservative redemption¹¹

Without intending thereby to diminish in any way the undeniable merits of Scotus in this question, we have said that the glory is due to him of having initiated, and nothing more than initiated, the true solution of the problem. Although he already distinguishes in this question between guilt and debt, he still does not speak clearly about the necessity of personal or proximate debt, without which it hardly seems possible to safeguard a true and proper personal redemption. The wise Father Honorato del Val, whom no one will accuse of partiality in this case, has rightly written: "Sub hoc aspectu argumentatio Scoti forsan limites excessit, quatenus a B. Virgine excludere videtur debitum proprie dictum incurrerendi peccatum. Unde non sat explicatur, quemadmodum B. Virgo fuerit proprie a Christo redempta" (Fr. HONORATO DEL VAL, O. S. A., Sacra Theol. Dogmatica, vol. 2, no. 265, Madrid 1906). In our judgment, the one who, among all theologians, best delimited the terms and posed the problem of a truly redeemed Immaculate Conception was Cardinal Cajetan in his celebrated opuscule De Conceptione B. Virginis, to such an extent that later theologians have done nothing but copy his distinctions. In that sense, Cajetan, without defending the Immaculate Conception, and even impugning it, contributed as much as or more than any other theologian to the evolution and definition of the dogma of the true Immaculate Conception.

With these two distinctions, which time and disputes eventually delimited with perfect exactness and clarity, the famous minor premise of reason was formulated in this way: “It is thus that immunity from all original fault, provided that a true personal or proximate debt is contracted, is compatible with the true and proper preservative redemption by Jesus Christ.” This minor premise, thus distinguished and formulated, is no longer false, no longer doubtful, no longer even merely probable: it is certain, clear, evident, and even Cajetan himself is forced to confess it. With, therefore, a major premise of faith and admitted by all, and an evident minor premise, the dogmatic conclusion of the Immaculate Conception was assured. In order to finally impose itself on all and be defined as a matter of faith, it only needed to overcome still the terrible dead weight of school and party prejudices, which are so innate and deep-rooted that they frequently cause many to continue for a long time upholding a doctrine, even after the support and principal foundation on which its original authors based it has already failed. These are, in our judgment and in general terms, the course and progress followed in history by the dogma of the Immaculate Conception.

The reasoning of theologians, the assent of the faithful, and the authority of the Church in this dogma.—We are not, therefore, in agreement with those who believe that in the development of this dogma there has been no logical process, nor with those who, while admitting that there has been one, suggest that, from the standpoint of that process, the dogma of the Immaculate Conception is not contained in the dogma of the divine motherhood, or does not emerge from it except in a probable manner. In our judgment, it is contained in it and emerges from it in a certain manner and by a rigorous and conclusive theological process; by exactly the same process that Tradition and theology employed to demonstrate that the Mother of God had to be immune from all actual sin.

In short, neither are we entirely in agreement with those who, in the development and definition of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, attribute everything or almost everything to the common feeling of the faithful, and nothing, or little, to theological reason. That there was a common, fervent, and overwhelming feeling among the faithful regarding this dogma, there is no doubt. But, for us, it is also undoubted that such feeling would never have become unanimous, nor would it have been able to sustain itself for a long time, nor, above all, would it have been able to avoid losing its way and going astray without the restraint, help, and direction of theological reason. The theological reason of the great masters of the thirteenth century, demonstrating that an Immaculate Conception not redeemed was erroneous, placed insurmountable sluice gates to that feeling when it threatened to rush along false paths. The theological reason of later theologians, pointing out the true distinctions with which an Immaculate Conception redeemed could and should be defended, opened to that feeling a broad and safe channel, which is the only thing it needed to become universal, ardent, irresistible. All this, without forgetting the principal factor, namely the authority of the Church, which under the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit was gently, but constantly and surely, guiding both the feeling of the faithful and the reason of theologians toward the development and dogmatic definition of the true Immaculate Conception of Pius IX.

Parallel between the Thomist and Scotist schools regarding the dogma of the Immaculate Conception.—In our judgment, St. Thomas and Scotus, with their two powerful and faithful schools, have respectively played the same role in this question of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception as the rudder and the steam play in the movement and direction of a ship. It is to the steam, and not to the rudder, that the ship owes its movement; but it is the rudder, and not the steam, that makes it move in the proper direction and reach the true port without going astray.

Scotus and his school, supporting in this the fervent sentiment of the faithful, cried out with all their might that the Mother of God had to be, and was, immaculate, and in order to reach that port, which their burning piety toward the Virgin made them glimpse, they took more care to stoke the steam and hasten the ship's course than to chart well the route by which they ought to sail.

Saint Thomas and his school, accustomed to restraining sentiment with reason and to taking no new step in the delicate dogmatic terrain without the beacon of the ancient dogmas already defined, cried out, with no less vigor, that the Mother of God, like every child of Adam, had to be truly and personally redeemed by the blood shed on Calvary, and that they were prepared to bar the way even to the Mother of God herself unless they saw her march frankly and clearly along the path of personal debt, which is the only path of the Cross and of Calvary, the only path of redemption: Between these two factors—the Scotist wind and the Thomist brake or rudder—the ship of the Immaculate Conception moved slowly, but surely, for centuries. Without Scotus and his school, the ship would have advanced little or nothing; without Saint Thomas and his, the ship would almost certainly have gone astray. After God and His Church, we owe it to Scotus and his school that the Immaculate Conception was defined, but we owe it to Saint Thomas and his school that the true Immaculate Conception was defined. Other schools also intervened, and very gloriously, but all of them taking from the Scotist school the fervor of the movement and from the Thomist school the sure lines of direction. Thus the human factors seemingly most opposed all contribute to the development of the dogma, harmonized by the visible magisterium of the Church and by the invisible, but perpetual, assistance of the Holy Spirit.

By what inclusive reasoning the dogma of the Immaculate Conception has been deduced from revealed data.—After writing the foregoing, we see that the wise Fr. Gardeil, approving our doctrine in this question of the evolution of dogma, indicates to us that it would be interesting to make clearly evident what is the process or reasoning by which the dogma of the Immaculate Conception emerges by way of inclusion from the dogma of the divine motherhood. (Revue des Sc. Philos. et Theol., Oct. 1922, p. 689.)

In the preceding paragraphs we believe we have already shown how the dogma of the Immaculate Conception is deduced from that of the divine motherhood by the very same process and with the same certainty as the dogma of immunity from all actual sin. If this latter deduction encountered no difficulties, while the former encountered very great ones, this did not arise from any difference in regard to their content or to their deduction, but from the fact that the first deduction, although as logical as the second, seemed unable to be reconciled with the dogma of redemption; and in dogmatic progress one must attend not only to the speculative logic between the conclusion and the dogma or principle from which it is deduced, but also to the agreement of that conclusion with all the other dogmas. The difficulties, disputes, and delays did not consist in changing the process of deduction or in making it more evident, but in making its apparent opposition to another dogma disappear. As soon as it became clear that Immaculate and redeemed were not contradictory things, the conclusion was assured and definable. One only needs to bear in mind that, both in the deduction of the exemption from actual sin and from original sin, it is necessary that the Christian sense be joined to speculative reasoning.

Both dogmas are deduced from the fundamental dogma expressed by the traditional formula of "worthy Mother of God." Now, determining or deducing what is or is not due to a "worthy mother," and much more to a "worthy Mother of God," is better appreciated by the loving heart of a son than by the cold logic of a scholar. Hence, the Christian sense of the "children of God," that is, the filial faith and fervor of the Christian people toward their Mother, and Mother of God, Mary, has been in this dogma the best and greatest aid of speculative logic, as it has been and will be in all dogmas that affect not exclusively the intellect, but also the heart.

In summary, then, the dogma of the Immaculate Conception was contained, in our judgment, in the revealed deposit as a particular within the universal conditioned, and its process of deduction is as follows:

All degrees of purity are owed to the Mother of God, provided they are compatible with her redemption by Jesus Christ.

Thus original purity, with personal debit, is compatible with redemption through Jesus Christ.

Original purity is owed to the Mother of God with a personal debt.

The major premise of that reasoning is a universal revealed conditional, and it is admitted by all the Holy Fathers and theologians, even by those who seem opposed to that dogma. St. Thomas formulates it thus: "Sub Christo, qui salvari non indiguit (that is the condition for the Virgin) tamquam universalis Salvator, maxima fuit B. Virginis puritas"¹². The minor premise merely purifies the condition included in the revealed major premise. Therefore, the conclusion is also implicitly revealed and definable as of divine faith, for, as we shall see further on (256), everything contained in the revealed deposit as a particular within the universal is definable as of divine faith.

And yet, the conclusion is not implicit-formal, but implicit-virtual, because the universal in which it is implicitly contained is not an unconditioned universal (32), but a conditioned one, and of such a condition that its purification requires its own reasoning, and even profound and most difficult reasoning. It requires the intervention of a new concept, namely the concept of "conception with debt and without stain." In revelation, the dogmatic concept of "conception with debt and with stain" was already known, which is the concept of ordinary conception; the dogmatic concept of "conception without stain and with debt" was also known, which is the concept of the conception of Jesus Christ; but the concept of "conception with debt and without stain" was not yet known, which was precisely the concept needed to reconcile the concept of the Immaculate with the concept of redemption, that is, to purify the condition of the revealed major premise. All the doubts, disputes, and delays reduced themselves to arriving at that new concept, which is precisely the new dogma of the Immaculate: new in terms of explanation, but not new in terms of objectivity or substance, for it was already implicit in the revealed major premise.

But it must be remembered that in the deduction by which the exemption is inferred, whether from actual sin or from original sin, the Christian sense must be added to speculative reasoning. These two dogmas are derived from the fundamental dogma expressed by the traditional formula of "worthy Mother of God": idonea Mater Dei. Now, when it is a question of deducing what is or is not due to a "worthy mother," and still more to a "worthy Mother of God," the loving heart of a son is a better judge than the cold logic of the wise man. This is why the Christian sense of the "children of God," that is, the filial faith and piety of the Christian people toward Mary, their Mother and Mother of God, has been for this dogma the best and most powerful aid to speculative logic, as it has been and will be for all dogmas that concern not exclusively the intellect, but also the heart of man.

210. EIGHTH EXAMPLE.—The same Council of Trent defined as a dogma of faith the conversion, in the Eucharist, of the whole substance of the bread into the body of Jesus Christ, and of the whole substance of the wine into his blood, which is what is called the dogma of transubstantiation. “If anyone says that, in the most holy Sacrament of the Eucharist, the substance of bread and wine remains together with the Body and Blood of our Lord Jesus Christ, and denies that wonderful and singular conversion of the whole substance of the bread into the Body and of the whole substance of the wine into the Blood, the species of bread and wine alone remaining, which conversion the Catholic Church most fittingly calls transubstantiation: let him be anathema.” (DENZINGER, no. 884.)

This, then, is a revealed truth. But where and how is that truth revealed? It is revealed in other truths in which it is included, and from which it is derived by reasoning. Those other truths are: first, that in the consecration the words of Jesus Christ must be truly verified: “This is my body,” “This is my blood”; second, that without transubstantiation such words of Jesus Christ cannot be truly verified. From these two truths, one of faith and one of reason, the defined dogma is derived by reasoning.

St. Thomas expounds this reasoning as follows: “I answer that, some have held that after consecration the substance of bread and wine remains in this Sacrament. But this position... is contrary to the form of this Sacrament, in which it is said: This is My Body, which would not be true if the substance of bread remained there; for the substance of bread is never the Body of Christ; rather it would have to be said: Here (this) is My Body¹³

The Council of Trent itself makes it quite clear that this is the reason or line of reasoning that the Church employed to know and define that dogma: “For since Christ our Redeemer said that what He offered under the species of bread was truly His own Body, therefore it has always been the conviction of the Church of God, and this holy Synod now declares it anew, that by the consecration of the bread and wine a conversion takes place of the whole substance of the bread into the substance of the Body of Christ our Lord, and of the whole substance of the wine into the substance of His Blood. This conversion is fittingly and properly called by the holy Catholic Church transubstantiation”¹⁴. Those for since and those therefore are, we shall never tire of repeating, the marks of the reasoning.^62.

How that reasoning was the instrument of that dogmatic definition is also expressed by Melchor Cano in the following words: “Likewise, the Fathers, all to a man, reasoned from this principle: ‘This is my Body’, that the conversion of bread into the Body of Christ takes place, without which they could neither grasp the truth of those words, nor the other things that the Catholic faith confesses concerning the true inclusion of the Body of Christ under the species of bread”¹⁵

The following paragraph from the incomparable Domingo Soto is also worthy of meditation:

“But Scotus says: The Church received this (namely, transubstantiation) by the revelation of the Holy Spirit. We too indeed confess it as most true. Nevertheless, because the Church does not enjoy an immediate revelation as the Apostles did, but rather divine aid and assistance (asistencia divina) lest it err in drawing out the articles of faith from the sacred page, it is not enough for the theologian to say: “The Church has so decreed in matters of faith”; rather, his task is to show from which passages of Sacred Scripture it derived this. For that word “homoousios,” that is, consubstantial with the Father, the Nicene Synod would never have adopted into use had it not drawn it out from the very word of the Gospel: “I and the Father are one.” In like manner, the holy Fathers would never have employed the name of conversion and transubstantiation had they not weighed in the words of Christ “This is my body.” For when He took bread, and gave nothing but the body, by the best consequence the Fathers understood that by the very word He had converted the bread into the body. Wherefore I do not know why Scotus said that whether Christ said “this is” or “here is” my body makes no difference to the question: since it matters so much that He said “this is,” that had He said only “here,” that is, in this place, the Church would never have received the sacramental conversion. Therefore, to value “this” no more than “here” is to cut the fibers and sinews of the truth. Unless from this we elicit that the bread does not remain with the body, the authority against heretics, who reject the sanctions of the Church unless they are founded in Scripture, withers and languishes. Let a third point finally be stated: that after the holy Fathers derived this conversion from the Gospel, they most aptly accommodated to it the name of transubstantiation... For if you review all the canons of the Saints cited above, the Church came to a knowledge of the conversion by no other means than by verifying the word of Christ: “This is my body”¹⁶

Even more important and profound, as usual, are the following words of the distinguished John of Saint Thomas: "Nothing of the substance of bread and wine remains after the consecration, but the whole is converted into Christ. This is the second and third point that we set forth above as being of faith in this Sacrament. Both are expressly defined in the Council of Trent, session 13, chapter 4, where it is defined that the substance of bread and wine does not remain with the Body and Blood of Christ, but is converted into His Body and Blood, while the appearances of bread and wine remain. And the Council adds the reason and foundation from which the Church gathers that this conversion must be affirmed: 'Since (it says) Christ our Redeemer said that His Body, that which He offered under the appearance of bread, was truly [His Body], therefore it has always been persuaded in the Church'", etc., etc.

He then enumerates certain objections that may be raised against this reasoning of the Church and of the Council, and adds: "His fundamentis adducti, aliqui ex catholicis sentiunt, that although it is established by the definition of the Church that the substance of bread and wine does not remain in this Sacrament, this nevertheless is not deduced from the precise meaning of the words... Nonetheless, this opinion overturns the entire foundation of the Council and therefore is to be wholly rejected... Nor can it be said that it is not inferred from this precisely because it is truly said absolutely, but because it is truly said in such a manner, namely, as de facto Christ willed it and the Church understood it. For this very thing the Council wishes to prove, why the Church thus understood it"¹⁷

In our judgment, the last words of the foregoing passage from John of St. Thomas are very worthy of note: "For this very thing the Council wishes to prove, WHY the Church so understood it."

Indeed, there are theologians who, when they examine the factors of dogmatic progress, or when they study the question of how such and such a truth (which does not seem to be found formally, at least at first glance, in the primitive deposit) could later be defined as a dogma of faith, content themselves with adducing more or less texts from the Holy Fathers that affirm such a truth, and end up so satisfied saying: "That is of tradition, because the Holy Fathers so teach it and the Church so understood and understands it."

All that is very well. But such theologians do not seem to realize that in tradition, as in the understanding of the Church, there is room for progress or development, and that, therefore, there remains yet another further question, namely: “Why did the Holy Fathers and the Church understand it this way?”

The true answer to this last question, when it comes to developed or derived dogmas, is almost always that the Church and the Holy Fathers understood it thus, and not otherwise, for such and such a reason. Which amounts almost always to saying that they understood it thus by reasoning or ratiocination, although always, as is clear, under the assistance of the Holy Spirit, when it is a matter of dogmatic definitions. Such is, in our judgment, what is gathered from the history of dogmas and what is very clearly discernible in the very words of the Ecumenical Councils¹⁸.

211. NINTH EXAMPLE.—Our divine Savior, before His ascension into heaven, said to His Apostles, and in them to His legitimate successors, the following words: “Receive the Holy Spirit: whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained”¹⁹.

Based on these words, as they have always been understood by the Holy Fathers and by the Church, the same Council of Trent defined as dogmas of faith, in addition to the institution of the sacrament of Penance, the following four truths: a) sacramental confession is by divine right necessary for salvation; b) by divine right this confession must include all and each of the mortal sins committed after baptism of which one is conscious; c) even hidden or internal sins; d) and also the circumstances that change the species. Let us hear the Council itself: "If anyone denies that sacramental confession was either instituted or necessary for salvation by divine right: let him be anathema. If anyone says that in the Sacrament of Penance it is not necessary by divine right to confess all and each of the mortal sins, of which one has memory with due and diligent premeditation, even hidden sins and those against the last two precepts of the Decalogue, and the circumstances which change the species of sin: let him be anathema"²⁰.

These four truths are, then, revealed truths. But how and where are these truths revealed? They are revealed in other truths in which they are contained virtually, and from which they emerge by reasoning. These truths are: first, that Jesus Christ instituted the Apostles and their successors as true judges of sins, with the power to absolve or retain them; second, that this power of judging, or of absolving or retaining, cannot be exercised equitably without confession, and without confession of each and every mortal sin, even hidden ones, and of their specific circumstances. From these two truths, the first of faith and the second of reason, the four defined dogmas have emerged by reasoning.

This reasoning is expressed thus briefly by the Salmanticenses moralists: "Sacramental confession was not only instituted by Christ the Lord, but also commanded; and so there is a divine precept concerning it... Now this divine precept is gathered from those words of John 20: 'Receive the Holy Spirit: whose sins you forgive, they are forgiven them; and whose sins you retain, they are retained', as the Council of Trent teaches in the said session four, chapter 5. For the power of retaining could not exist without the necessity of the judgment of the priests themselves for remission and absolution; and therefore when Christ signifies that the priests have the power of retaining sins, He also signified that their judgment is necessary for absolution, and consequently that mortal sins are never remitted without ordination to such a judgment. Thus all theologians... Nor will it suffice to confess all mortal sins in general, but one is bound to confess them according to number and species, insofar as it is morally possible, as the same Council of Trent sufficiently indicates in chapter 5, when it says that all sins must be declared not only in general, but specifically and individually. The Council gives the reason for this truth: because priests were constituted judges by Christ in the tribunal of Penance; and this judgment they cannot rightly exercise, nor preserve equity in imposing penalties, if sins are declared to them only in general and not rather specifically and individually²¹.

But no one better than the Council of Trent itself set forth the reason or the why of all these dogmas. Let us hear its very words: “From the institution of the Sacrament of Penance already explained, the universal Church has always understood that a complete confession of sins was instituted also by the Lord and is by divine law necessary for all who have fallen after baptism, because (here comes the major of faith) our Lord Jesus Christ, about to ascend from earth to heaven, left his priests as vicars of himself, as presidents and judges, to whom all mortal crimes are to be brought, into which the faithful of Christ may have fallen, so that by the power of the keys they may pronounce sentence of remission or retention of sins. For it is evident (this is the reason, that is, the minor of evident reason) that priests could not exercise this judgment without knowing the case, nor could they indeed observe equity in imposing penalties, if the penitents had declared their sins only in general, and not rather in particular and singly one by one. From these things it is gathered (another dogmatic corollary or another derived dogma) that it is necessary for penitents to enumerate in confession all mortal sins of which, after diligent self-examination, they have a conscience, even if those sins be most hidden... It is moreover gathered (another corollary or derived dogma) that those circumstances are also to be explained in confession which change the species of the sin, because without them (again the same minor of reason) the sins themselves are neither fully set forth by the penitents, nor made known to the judges, and it is impossible that they can rightly assess the gravity of the crimes and impose for them the penalty that is fitting upon the penitents”²².

In the preceding example, what we have already noted in other examples appears clearly: namely, the reason or reasoning used by the Church under the assistance of the Holy Spirit as a human instrument of dogmatic development. The process, as the Councils themselves explain it, is quite simple. Certain truths are defined as dogmas of faith or as contained in the revealed deposit, “because the Holy Fathers or the tradition of the Church understood them thus.” This is the common criterion or touchstone that the Church generally employs for the definition of dogmas, whether they be primary or derived dogmas. But when it comes to derived dogmas (and these precisely constitute dogmatic progress), there is another step that some do not seem to notice, namely, that the fact that the Holy Fathers and the Church understood it thus was owing to a reason. That is precisely what is meant or what we mean by reasoning. Although these reasons are, as they are, intrinsic to the revealed datum, or implicit in the revealed datum, or intellectually explanatory of the revealed datum, since they are drawn from the very core or essence of the revealed datum itself, it is clear that they do not objectively add to that datum, but merely explain it, or unfold it, or develop it in a continuous line of real identity or objective homogeneity. And, parenthetically, here too we have the answer to a very common objection raised by those who deny all true dogmatic progress, at least by way of reasoning or argumentation. They say that the best proof that there is no development in dogma, or that reasoning does not intervene in that development, lies in the fact that the Ecumenical Councils, when they seek to define a dogma, always and above all attend to ascertaining what the Holy Fathers and the tradition of the Church thought on the matter. This is true, but those who raise such an objection fail to notice that reasoning had often already intervened beforehand in forming that sentiment of the Holy Fathers and that tradition of the Church on which the Councils precisely rely. This, as we have seen, is recognized by the Councils themselves. 212. TENTH EXAMPLE.—It would be easy to continue offering many more examples of that kind of dogma, known and defined by the Church by way of reasoning ²³ . The Council of Trent, in declaring that the truths of faith are contained "in the written books and in the unwritten traditions" (Denzinger, n. 783), and that the Church is the infallible guardian and interpreter of this deposit, does not thereby exclude the possibility that the Church may propose as dogma a truth that is only virtually revealed, since the Council itself, in defining the canon of Scripture and the number of the sacraments, did not limit itself to repeating what was formally contained in the sources, but, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, drew out what was implicit in them. Hence, the objection falls to the ground, because the very practice of the Councils shows that they do not stop at merely ascertaining what the Fathers and tradition have said, but they also exercise their own judgment in drawing out and defining the truth, which is a genuine act of reasoning, albeit one guided by the Holy Spirit, and it is precisely this that constitutes the human instrument of dogmatic progress.

dentino is a very rich mine of them. In the Vatican Council, a few could also be gleaned. But we believe that the examples adduced suffice for our purpose, and we shall add only one more example, which we consider to be of no small importance.

Many, and indeed most theologians, regard as proximate to faith or as definable by divine faith, and consequently as revealed, the following most fundamental truth: “The infallibility of the Church is not limited to what is formally or immediately revealed, but extends also to what is virtual or mediately revealed.” This same truth is also commonly expressed in this other form: “The infallibility of the Church is not limited to what is revealed in itself, but extends to everything necessarily connected with the revealed deposit or necessary for the preservation of said deposit.” Let us hear the illustrious Cardinal Franzelin: “This extension of infallibility, by the consensus of all theologians, is a truth so theologically certain that its denial would be a most grave error, or even, in the opinion of many, heresy, although it has not so far been explicitly condemned as heresy”²⁴. The no less illustrious Cardinal Billot expresses the same: “This infallibility is indeed most certainly gathered from revealed principles, but it is also by most held as formally revealed, although it has not yet been authentically proposed as a dogma of divine faith”²⁵.

Now then: how and where is this truth revealed? It is revealed in other truths, in which it is contained virtually, and from which it emerges only by reasoning. Those other truths are: first, the Church has received the divine commission to safeguard the revealed deposit; second, the Church could not safeguard that deposit without infallibility regarding what is mediately revealed. From these two propositions, one of faith and one of reason, the truth in question follows by rigorous reasoning.

This reasoning, which can be found in any theology manual, is thus set forth by the always concise and clear De Groot: “The means must be proportioned to the end; but if the deposit of faith is to be safeguarded, the proportioned means are lacking unless infallibility is extended to theological conclusions: therefore the object of infallibility is also theological conclusions”²⁶. The theological conclusion is the type of everything mediately revealed, and that same reasoning applies to all of it, even to dogmatic facts.

Surely there will be someone who says: “That reasoning of De Groot and of all the theologians is very good; but, besides that reasoning, we have the sentiment of the Holy Fathers and the practice of the Church, and on that sentiment and on that practice, and not on any reasoning, rests the truth we are dealing with, assuming that it is dogmatic.”

Very well; but we ask again: and from where did that sentiment of the Holy Fathers and that practice of the Church arise? They arose from a principle of faith, which is the divine commission to preserve the deposit; and from a truth of reason, which is the natural, speculative, and practical evidence that it is impossible to guard the deposit without infallibility regarding mediately revealed matters. That is, they arose precisely from the cited reasoning, which is a reasoning explanatory of the revealed major premise, but a true, proper, and rigorous reasoning. In every similar objection concerning the sentiment of the Holy Fathers and of the Church, as if that were contrary to the intervention of reason or reasoning, the theologian must always recall that luminous observation already cited from John of Saint Thomas: “For indeed the Council wishes to prove this very thing, namely, why the Church so understood it” (210).

Whatever judgment may be formed of the ten preceding examples, no one will be able to tell us again that we confine ourselves to some hypothetical example, without descending to concrete and real examples, as our wise objector told us in his cited letter (190).