La evolución homogénea del dogma católico

189. ANTI-INTELLECTUALIST TENDENCY.—Even among theologians who admit the evolution of dogma, there are some who believe that in that evolution the purely speculative or rational path, which they usually dismissively label as “pure dialectic,” has had little or no influence.

For those theologians, the development of dogma has occurred and occurs only, or almost exclusively, through the path of practice or Christian sense. They base this on the fact that, in their judgment, the primitive deposit, or revealed datum, consisted mainly of facts or institutions; and if it contained some intellectual statements, they were not explicit or clear, as needed for speculative reasoning to be possible, but rather vague and confused, more suited to being developed through the path of practice and experience of the whole Christian society than through the abstract speculative path of a few dialectical theorists.

190. AN INTERESTING LETTER.—So that it may be seen how deeply rooted these ideas are even in great Catholic theologians, we shall copy some interesting paragraphs from a letter with which a renowned professor and writer of theology honored us when years ago we wrote on these matters in La Ciencia Tomista. They read as follows: "Considering a priori dogmatic development, it indeed seems that it should be as you say, and so it will be in what is realized dialectically. But this process I believe to be very scarce or null. First, because, in my view, a great part of the deposit is not from the beginning, even implicitly, in intellectual statements, but only embodied in facts and institutions whose explanation, supported by sound experience and guaranteed by the Church, leads to recognizing such doctrines as contained therein virtually; thus I am accustomed to understand this word. Second, because what is implied in certain statements is not easily deduced from them by simple dialectic: a) because it is not in clear statements, like the first principles of a science, but in vague and even confused expressions, from which, without other light and guide than dialectic, I do not know that anything can be deduced in all rigor; b) because when dealing with ineffable or mysterious realities, where terms are not used in a univocal sense but an analogous one, the supposition sometimes varies a little, without our noticing it, and the propositions that appear to be equivalent are not entirely so. Hence a certain vice infiltrates the deduction, and this, however logical it may appear, does not conclude unless its legitimacy is well verified by Christian good sense and guaranteed by the Church. Hence also it is that dialectical development so often leads to a going astray, to a heresy, to an error, or to mere school doctrines, without hope of ever being defined. "In short, dogmatic development will very rarely or almost never be by pure dialectic. This usually comes afterward to justify what has been done spontaneously or intuitively with Christian practice or experience. Thus the saying of Saint Thomas is fulfilled: "Life comes before doctrine". Were it not so, it would be easy for you to point out concrete, real examples of that dialectical development; and you ought not to content yourself with some hypothetical one". As can be seen, our objector agrees with us that there exists in the Church, even after the Apostles, true dogmatic development and not merely theological development. He also agrees with us that the cause or principal agent of this dogmatic progress is the divine authority of the Church or, by another name, the assistance of the Holy Spirit, which the Church has not only to preserve, but also to explain or unfold or develop the revealed deposit.

The divergence, then, is not about the existence of dogmatic progress nor about its principal cause, but only about the instrument or way or human means of that progress. For since the Church has neither revelation nor even inspiration, but only assistance from the Holy Spirit, some human means must be indicated which the Church uses for that explanation or dogmatic development of the revealed deposit.

We said that the ordinary means used by the Church for that dogmatic development is reason, or, by another name, ratiocination, or, by another name, the path of theological conclusion. Our objector, on the contrary, says or seems to say that dogmatic progress is never or almost never verified by way of ratiocination.

At first glance, the divergence could not be more radical; but we suspect that this divergence is more in name than in reality, and that it lies only in the peculiar and limited sense that our objector gives to the word reasoning. This suspicion is inspired in us by the fact that, where we have always used the words reason, ratiocination, reasoning, our objector never uses such words, but only and exclusively those of dialectic, mere dialectic, pure dialectic, as if there were no reasoning other than the formal or that arranged in the form of a syllogism, which is what dialectic deals with.

So that a question as grave as that of dogmatic progress does not become a mere question of names, it is fitting to recall briefly what Saint Thomas understood and what we have understood by the words reason, reasoning, and ratiocination when affirming that this was the most common path of dogmatic progress.

191. INTUITION AND RATIOCINATION.—Every truth must be known either in itself or known in another truth. Between being known in itself or known in another, there is no middle ground.

This applies equally to intrinsic or scientific knowledge and to extrinsic knowledge or knowledge by authority. In intrinsic knowledge or knowledge by evidence, every truth is either evident in itself or evident through another truth. "Per se notum; notum per aliud," say the philosophers. In turn, in knowledge by revelation or faith, every truth is either revealed in itself or revealed in another. "Revelatum in se; revelatum in alio," say the theologians. Knowledge of a thing by itself and without the intervention of another objective truth in which it is enveloped is called simple intelligence or intuition. Knowledge of a truth not in itself, but through another virtually distinct truth in which it is enveloped, is called reason or reasoning¹.

According to this doctrine, which we have set forth in greater detail elsewhere, to reason is nothing other than to know one truth by means of another, or to pass from the knowledge of one truth or proposition to that of another, or to affirm one truth by relying on another. The kind of that other truth on which it relies or from which it proceeds is accidental. Whether it be revealed or unrevealed truth, whether it be metaphysical, physical, or moral truth, whether it be a speculative truth or a practical truth, whether it be a truth of fact or a truth of right, whether it be a theory or an experience, there will be different kinds of reasoning, but there will always be reasoning, because there will always be knowledge of a truth, not in itself, but by means of another virtually distinct from it. All of that is reasoning or argumentation, all of that is science, all of that is conclusion; in contrast to simple intelligence or intuition, which is knowledge of a truth in itself, and in contrast to faith, which is knowledge of a truth by simple and sole authority (61-64).

192. CONSCIOUS REASONING AND SPONTANEOUS OR UNCONSCIOUS REASONING.—We do not always perform this reasoning or this comparison of one truth with another consciously, but rather we very often practice it in a spontaneous or unconscious manner. Many truths that seem clear and obvious to us are so without doubt; but they are not so by themselves, but rather by virtue of other truths that our mind habitually possesses and with which we are continually comparing them without realizing it. And the proof is that, if someone doubts the truth of one of those affirmations of ours or asks us the reason why, we immediately give the reason or proof of our affirmation, thereby showing that what seemed clear to us by itself was so because of another truth that existed in our mind and on which our affirmation was supported, even without our expressly being aware of it.

Whenever, therefore, there is in our mind a why or an intrinsic reason for what we affirm or opine, there is reasoning. If we point out the why or become aware of it, the reasoning is conscious. If the why exists in our mind, but we are not expressly aware of it, the reasoning is unconscious or spontaneous. But, in any case, whenever there is in our mind an objective or intrinsic why for what we affirm, there is not simple intelligence or intuition, but reasoning.

193. REASONING IN FORM OR DIALECTICAL AND FORMLESS REASONING.—The same conscious reasoning in which we affirm the why of our affirmation or become aware of it may be done in form of reasoning or may be done without form. The various forms of reasoning are well known, and they are treated in dialectics. The primary one is that in which from a major proposition and from a minor one that carries an atqui or a sed a third proposition or conclusion is deduced with an ergo or igitur. When we reason in this way, our reasoning is not only real, since it is a passage from one truth to another, but it is also formal or dialectical, that is, done in dialectical form.

But this manner of reasoning is too technical, too formal, too artificial for the exercise of a function as natural and daily as reasoning is for our intelligence. Hence it is that we rarely use that formal manner of reasoning. In its place we ordinarily use formless reasoning, in which, instead of three distinct propositions with atquis and ergos, a single one suffices for us, in which we express our reason or our reasoning by a simple conjunction, by an adverb, by a participle. Instead of saying with the dialecticians: “Everything spiritual is immortal; now the human soul is spiritual, therefore it is immortal,” we say simply: “It must be immortal being spiritual,” or “Since it is spiritual, it is also immortal.” This is the common manner of reasoning; these are true reasonings, although they are not in dialectical form. Reasoning in dialectical form is so rare a case that it is almost reduced to scholastic books or to the intellectual gymnastics of the acts or conclusions of the schools.

We have, then, that one thing is intuition or simple intelligence and quite another is reason or reasoning. We also have that reasoning can be spontaneous and conscious, and that the conscious kind can be informal and dialectical. To know a truth in itself and not in another is intuition or simple intelligence. To know it not in itself, but in another truth in which it is intrinsically contained and from which we deduce it, is always reasoning, though not always formal or dialectical reasoning.

194. REPLY TO THE OBJECTION.—We said that the most common human instrument used by the Church for dogmatic development is reasoning or ratiocination. This means no more than that dogmatic development is ordinarily brought about by comparing some truths with others that are virtually distinct, whether by comparing the revealed truths among themselves, or by comparing them with truths of reason.

On the other hand, our illustrious correspondent says that it is never or almost never verified by dialectics, by pure dialectics.

If by dialectics our correspondent understands formal reasoning or reasoning in syllogistic form, we have no objection to telling him: let it pass. We could equally deny it, for there has been some case of dogmatic development carried out in dialectical form. But since we, when speaking of reasoning with respect to dogmatic development, have never taken it in that very narrow sense of reasoning in dialectical form, but rather in the broad and proper sense of knowing one truth through another virtually distinct from it, we therefore prefer to say: let it pass; for it is not fitting to mix the questions.

But if by dialectics or by the speculative path our correspondent were to understand any kind of true and proper reasoning, his assertion would amount to saying that the dogmatic development through the comparison of some truths with others or the rigorous deduction of some truths from others has never or rarely taken place. But in that case, this assertion goes against the common sentiment of traditional theology and against the patent facts of the history of dogmas.

Our correspondent asks us for concrete and real examples of dogmatic development by way of speculation or reasoning. We believe that this is not a difficult matter, although it is a most delicate one, and we will provide him with numerous examples in the following two sections. But let us first deal with his other two observations concerning the scarcity of speculative or intellectual statements in the revealed deposit and the obscurity and vagueness of such statements.

195. THE SCARCITY OF INTELLECTUAL STATEMENTS IN THE DEPOSIT OF REVEALED TRUTH.—There are two kinds of intellectual statements: some, expressed in abstract, conceptual, philosophical terms, which Cardinal Newman usually calls notional statements; others, expressed in concrete, individual, ordinary terms, which we all call terms of common sense.

When the Councils or the theologians say: "In God there is a trinity of hypostases in unity of essence," "the Son is consubstantial with the Father," "in Jesus Christ there are two natures and one single person," these are intellectual statements, but abstract or notional statements, because the terms "essence," "hypostasis," "nature," "consubstantial" are conceptual or philosophical terms, not vulgar or common ones.

On the other hand, when Holy Scripture says: "There is but one God," "Jesus Christ is the true Son of God," "He is like us in all things, except sin," these are also true intellectual statements, and no less intellectual than the former; but they are concrete and individual statements, not abstract or notional ones, because the terms "one God," "Son of God," "like us" are vulgar terms, of common sense, of universal use.

We readily concede, then, that the revealed deposit is not, as a rule, expressed in abstract or philosophical statements, but rather in concrete, singular, popular, common-sense statements. The reason for this is quite obvious. The revealed deposit was not written for the learned alone, like the works of Aristotle or Plato, but for all of humanity, for the simple people, as much as or more than for philosophers or theologians. And when one speaks or writes for everyone and not for an educated group, when one addresses popular intelligence and not specialists, the language is, and must be, concrete, singular, made up of common terms, of common sense. Such is, generally speaking, the language of Sacred Scripture and of divine tradition, and this is the surest guarantee of its perenniality and catholicity, since it makes it suited to every kind of person, place, and time.

But if abstract statements are scarce in the revealed deposit, concrete statements, on the other hand, abound. With these concrete statements which, because they are concrete or common, are no less intellectual than abstract or notional ones; with those statements overflowing with divine truth and divine life, and overflowing with life precisely insofar as they overflow with truth, the Holy Bible is filled, and above all the New Testament is filled, and most especially the fourth gospel and the epistles of Saint Paul are filled. For good reason today so much is said and written about the so-called "theology of Saint John and Saint Paul."

From those biblical statements, which do not cease to be, we repeat, intellectual statements because they are concrete; from those theologies of Saint John and Saint Paul, which are no less divine word and primitive datum than the simplest statements of the Synoptics, for all are equally inspired, the dogmatic reasoning takes its departure, whether by comparing some revealed statements with others, or by comparing them with the clear statements of human reason. As a basis or starting point for dogmatic reasoning or ratiocination, an abstract statement serves just as well as a concrete one, provided it is divinely revealed: and for a statement of reason to intervene as a minor premise without danger of objective inhomogeneity, it is indifferent whether it be of speculative reason or of practical reason, of external experience or of internal experience, of immediate evidence or of mediate evidence, provided it be evident, from wherever that evidence may come.

Thus, for example, if the abstract statement that "Jesus Christ is consubstantial with the Father" has not been explicitly revealed to us, the concrete statements have been revealed to us instead, namely, that "Jesus Christ is true Son of God" and that "there is but one only God," and from these concrete statements, compared with one another, there emerges by true reasoning the abstract statement of consubstantiality. If the abstract statement that in Christ there are two natures and two operations has not been revealed to us, the concrete statements have been revealed to us that Jesus Christ is not only God, but also man "in all things like unto us," and from these two statements, combined with the minor premise of natural reason that every man has a human nature and, if he is in a perfect or connatural state, also has a human will and other faculties, the abstract statement of the two natures and the two wills and operations has emerged. If the abstract statement that all sins must be confessed in species, number, and specific circumstances has not been explicitly revealed to us, the concrete statement has been revealed to us that the ministers of the Church are true judges of the retention or forgiveness of sins, and from that concrete statement, combined with the natural minor premise of the nature of judgment, the abstract statement of species, number, and circumstances has emerged. If the abstract statement of transubstantiation has not been explicitly revealed to us, the concrete statement This is my body has been revealed to us, and from that concrete statement, combined with what is evidently required for the truth of such a mystery, the abstract statement of transubstantiation has emerged. And so it is with very many dogmas or dogmatic developments, that is, with all or almost all derived dogmas.

It is true that this, which when stated in a few sentences seems so simple, has required long labors and experiences, countless trials and discussions, and sometimes entire centuries of slow and uneven gestation. But this very fact is further proof that the development has taken place by the intellectual path or that of knowledge rather than by the path of affection or devotion. For, as Saint Thomas notes with delicate analysis, it is precisely in this that both methods of development are distinguished: in that development by the intellectual path requires experience and time, while for development by the affective or devotional path, time, external experience, or any other external element are accidental ².

196. ANOTHER REPLY.—But let us grant, for the sake of argument, that in the revealed deposit there were scarcely any intellectual statements, whether abstract or concrete, and that almost the entire deposit had been reduced to facts and institutions, as our objector seems to suggest. Even starting from that hypothesis, entirely gratuitous as it is, we do not see that anything against dogmatic progress by way of reasoning would follow from it. For true theological reasoning to be possible, it makes no difference whether the starting point is an intellectual statement or whether it is a fact or an institution, provided that those facts or institutions are revealed or divine, as everything contained in the deposit must be.

Indeed, let us take as an example any one of those dogmas that seem not to be contained in the revealed deposit in the form of intellectual statements, but rather in the form of facts or of the Church’s constant practice. Let the dogma be that, already defined as of faith, of the validity of baptism administered by a heretic. That dogma does not appear to be contained, at least explicitly, in any statement of Sacred Scripture, but only in a fact or practice of apostolic-divine origin, in the Church’s constant practice of never rebaptizing, upon their conversion, those baptized in heresy. Now then: it is evident that that single fact or practice would have sufficed and does suffice to deduce, through genuine reasoning, the dogma of the validity of such baptism, merely by comparing that fact with another revealed truth, which is the necessity of baptism for salvation. Taking as the major premise that revealed truth of the necessity of baptism for salvation and as the minor premise the Church’s constant practice of not administering another baptism to those already baptized in heresy, it is evidently deduced that the Church had always held the previous baptism as valid, even though administered by heretics, which is the defined dogma.

In the same way, the dogma of the universality of original sin can be deduced from the mere fact of baptism administered to infants; or the dogma of the real presence from the mere fact of the worship always rendered to the host and to the blood after the consecration, or the dogma of papal infallibility from the mere fact that in the Church nothing was ever held as firm or definitive in matters of faith without the approval of the Supreme Pontiff. The same could be said of many other dogmas.

Indeed, nothing is more frequent in Saint Thomas than to rely on facts, rites, customs, or institutions of the Church in order to deduce by true and rigorous reasoning the dogmas we believe. Thus, in the Summa contra gentiles (bk. 3, ch. 1) he deduces the dogma of original sin from the universal custom (secundum communem Ecclesiae consuetudinem) of administering baptism to children. In the Summa Theologica (2-2, q. 75, a. 2) he proves that no bread or wine remains after the consecration from the Church's custom (ritui Ecclesiae) of the worship of latria and of the eucharistic fast. In q. 2, a. 1, he had proved that the making of a creed belongs to the Pope from the constant fact that the greater causes have always belonged to the Pope (ad quem maiores et difficiliores Ecclesiae quaestiones referuntur) and from the fact that no council, not even a general one, has ever been considered valid without his confirmation (cuius auctoritate Synodus congregatur et eius sententia confirmatur). In q. 10, a. 12, of the same part, to prove that the children of infidels or Jews should not be baptized against the will of their parents, he adduces as a fundamental reason the constant custom of the Church (Hoc autem Ecclesiae usus nunquam habuit... Praeter consuetudinem in Ecclesia hactenus observatam). So far is the Holy Doctor from believing that dogmatic reasoning cannot rely on facts, or institutions, or customs when they are of divine origin, that he places the custom of the Church above the very authority of the Holy Fathers... "The custom of the Church holds the greatest authority, which is always to be imitated in all things; because even the teaching of the Catholic Doctors itself derives its authority from the Church. Hence, one must stand more firmly on the authority of the Church than on the authority of Jerome or of any Doctor." ³

So that our objector may see tangibly how a true and rigorous reasoning can be founded on a fact, or rite, or institution, and how from it, through what our objector calls simple dialectics, a true dogma may emerge, we shall transcribe literally the reasoning by which Saint Thomas deduces original sin in children from the constant practice of the Church. He says thus:

"Baptism and the other Sacraments of the Church are certain remedies against sin, as will be made clear below. Moreover, baptism is administered, according to the common custom of the Church, to newly born infants. Therefore, it would be administered in vain unless there were some sin in them. There is moreover no actual sin in them, because they lack the use of free will, without which no act is imputed to a human being as fault. Therefore, it must be said that there is in them sin traced by origin, since in the works of God and of the Church nothing is vain or futile"⁴.

This is truly a dogma deduced by genuine reasoning, resting upon a custom or fact or institution. The particles autem, igitur, cum are the indelible marks of ratiocination, or the links comparing the different truths among themselves. If our objector prefers to call this simple dialectics at times and Christian sense or intuition at others, "de nominibus non est curandum." It has always been called reasoning, and the history of dogmatic progress is full of such reasonings.

As can be seen, true reasoning and true dogmatic progress or development are no less possible when one has facts or institutions at one's disposal than when one has intellectual statements. Saint Thomas gives us the profound reason for this when analyzing the value of facts, customs, or institutions. Man has two means of expressing his interior thought: one, words; the other, deeds. Both means, words or deeds, are equally signs of the thought of the one who says or does them or of the one who instituted them⁵.

If we suppose, then, that these are facts or institutions of divine origin, that is, of the revealed deposit, through them we come to know the mind of the inspired author, exactly as if the inspired author had expressed himself in words or through intellectual statements instead of expressing himself through facts or institutions. The words or intellectual statements of the Bible are objects of dogma and of faith insofar as they are signs or expressions of the thought of the inspired author or of the thought of God: and such thought is expressed no less by facts or institutions than by abstract or concrete statements.

To summarize, then, the two answers to the first objection, it turns out: a) that in the revealed deposit there may not be many abstract intellectual statements, but there are indeed very many concrete ones; b) that even if most of the revealed deposit were reduced to facts or institutions, those facts or institutions serve to develop the deposit dogmatically through reasoning just as much as if they were intellectual statements.

197. THE OBSCURITY AND VAGUENESS OF STATEMENTS.—The second difficulty against dogmatic progress by way of reasoning or conclusion is taken from the obscurity and vagueness of the statements of the revealed deposit, and our friend presents it in the following terms: “Secondly, because what is implied in certain statements is not easy to deduce from there by simple dialectics, because it is not in clear statements, like the principles of a science, but in vague and confused expressions, from which, without other light and guide than dialectics, I do not know that anything can be deduced in all rigor” (190). Response.—In every statement or principle, whether dealing with statements or principles of science or with statements or principles of faith or revelation, one must always distinguish two parts: an explicit, formal, determinate, clear part; another implicit, virtual, vague, obscure part. If everything were explicit, determinate, clear, there would be no room for progress, nor would such a statement be a principle. If everything were vague, indeterminate, obscure, there would be no room for understanding nor even for faith, nor would it merit even the name of statement or proposition, but rather of an undecipherable logogriph or puzzle ⁶ Nothing, in effect, can be deciphered if one does not start from something clear, just as no equation can be solved if all its quantities are unknowns or indeterminates. There must, therefore, be something clear (55).

From this clear part—small • large—that exists in the primitive datum or deposit, reasoning sets out to clarify the obscure part, to determine the vague part, and to actualize the virtual part. Precisely in this does reasoning consist, and this is the condition of all progress. Provided that there is something clear, and without it faith would not be possible, the virtual and obscure part, however great it may be, may be the reason that more work and more time must be employed, but it will at the same time be the source of broader, more fruitful, more inexhaustible progress.

Indeed, the deeper, the higher, the more divine a principle is, the greater the share it contains of implicitness, of virtuality, of indeterminateness, of vagueness, of obscurity: clear and transparent waters are not usually a sign of great depth. Conversely, as a principle becomes clearer, more fixed, more determinate, it also loses implicitness, virtuality, fecundity, just as every force loses potential insofar as it actualizes its energy. For this reason, the statements of councils, of popes, of theologians are much clearer, more precise, less vague than those of the sacred deposit; but the latter are more suggestive, more fruitful, more pregnant with truth and life than those of the theologians and even than those of popes and ecumenical councils.

Thus, if one merely means that in the primitive deposit—even regarding truths that today we have defined as dogmas of faith—there was much that was implicit, virtual, indeterminate, and obscure, which has required great labor and time to be explained, actualized, determined, and defined, we have no difficulty in acknowledging it. But if it is claimed that everything in the primitive deposit was obscure, or vague, or indeterminate, or virtual, as it is in a seed or in a still formless embryo, that would not only make theology impossible, but also faith itself, and would place oneself in manifest contradiction with what the history of dogmas teaches and with what stands out even from a simple reading of Sacred Scripture.

It is clear that in the primitive deposit one should not expect to find explicitly or clearly the multitude of dogmatic developments that appear, for example, in the so-called Athanasian Creed, in the ecumenical councils, or in the pontifical definitions. If such developments were found clearly in the deposit, they would cease to be developments or progress, and there would have been no need for the Holy Fathers or theologians to clarify or determine them, nor for councils or popes to define them. To claim to find in an explicit manner, and not even (in our judgment) in a formal manner, in the primitive deposit all the dogmas defined, for example, by the Council of Trent, would be like claiming to find already in a shrub the varied and splendid branches of the centuries-old tree.

198. THE DOGMA OF THE MOST HOLY TRINITY.—But if we do not find such developments explicit and clear, we nevertheless always find certain fundamental concepts from which such developments have issued, clear and explicit. Thus, for example, in the statements of the primitive deposit concerning the Trinity, we do not find explicitly, nor by any means fully, all that the councils and theologians have defined or said about hypostases and natures, about processions and notions, about absolutes and relatives, about concepts in and concepts ad, about properties and appropriations. Not even the names of persons or of trinity are primitive. But if we do not find any of that explicitly, we do find, on the other hand, clearly and explicitly the unity of God, clearly and explicitly the distinction between the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, clearly and explicitly the procession of the Son and of the Holy Spirit from the Father, clearly and explicitly the divinity of the Father and that of the Son, and, in clearly equivalent terms, the divinity of the Holy Spirit.

Now then: from these four primitive and clear concepts of unity, distinction, procession, and divinity have come forth and continue to come forth by reasoning, and by rigorous reasoning, all the dogmatic developments pertaining to the most holy dogma of the divine Trinity and all the numerous and complicated Trinitarian formulas elaborated by councils and theologians, until reaching that master formula of "in divinis omnia sunt unum et idem ubi non obviat relationis oppositionis", the key and crown of the entire treatise De Trinitate.

It is clear that not all dogmas are of such a purely speculative character as that of the Most Holy Trinity, nor does the logical rigor that has presided over their development stand out in them, therefore, with the same evidence. But all, without exception, are based on one or several formal and explicit concepts of Sacred Scripture or divine tradition, and from these data theological reasoning, the ordinary instrument of dogmatic progress, has always started and has continually relied upon them, under the directive norm of the Christian sense and the authority of the Church.

199. FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS AND DERIVED CONCEPTS.—In summary: if not all the dogmatic concepts that we possess and believe today were explicitly contained in the primitive deposit or revealed data, neither were they all purely implicit; if not everything was formal in the deposit, neither was everything virtual; if not everything was clear from the beginning, neither was everything confused.

In the primitive deposit there is a set of actual, formal, explicit, clear, determinate concepts, and that was the starting point of theological reasoning and dogmatic progress.

In that formal and determinate manner—says Saint Thomas—there are found in the apostolic deposit not all dogmas or articles of faith, but indeed all the principal dogmas or articles of faith, understanding by articles of faith not the derived dogmas, but the fundamental dogmas, and in these fundamental dogmas, not the secondary or concomitant concepts, but the primary or essential concept, which is what Saint Thomas calls the essence of the articles. The secondary or derived concepts, although also contained in the deposit, are contained only by way of consequence (ea quae ex articulis consequuntur), and these are not of faith until the ordinary or solemn magisterium of the Church defines them (134).

**200. SCIENCE CAN EXIST WITHOUT HOLINESS.—**The beautiful phrase of Saint Thomas: "Life comes before doctrine; for life leads to the knowledge of truth", on which our objector relies to reject the speculative path, means nothing more than that goodness of conduct is one of the conditions that contribute to a greater penetration or deeper knowledge of supernatural truths, by helping to increase charity and the gifts of the Holy Spirit and with them the "sense of faith", which we will discuss shortly (216-220), which is something like the "common sense" of the supernatural order.

Therefore, all things being equal, a saint or a fervent soul will penetrate more deeply into the Bible or into sacred theology than a sinner or a lukewarm one. "Hence it follows that, all things being equal, he who has charity will be more learned in theology than he who does not have it. Because without charity, these gifts of the Holy Spirit are not united with faith, which enlightens the mind and gives understanding to the little ones"⁷. One need only read the biographies of the great theologians to notice at once that almost all of them were eminent in holiness of life or great supernatural fervor. Teachers and students of sacred theology should never forget this⁸.

But that does not mean that holiness is the only means or indispensable condition for being a great theologian or for developing dogma. Lack of holiness of life can be compensated for by greater talent or greater application, and a clever or diligent man can be a greater theologian, even if not fervent, than another who is fervent but short on talent or occupied with other things. Let us hear Saint Thomas: “Not everyone who is good is more apt for having prophecy than any sinner, since some lacking charity have minds more apt for perceiving spiritual things, as being free from carnal and earthly concerns, and endowed with natural clarity of intellect: while on the contrary some having charity are involved in earthly affairs and give themselves to carnal generation, and do not have a naturally perspicacious intellect”⁹. To believe that without being holy one cannot be wise, even in divine matters, would be an intolerable ultra-mysticism¹⁰.

201. IMPORTANCE OF EXAMPLES.—Let us now turn to historical and concrete examples of true dogmatic developments, after the Apostles, carried out by the speculative path of reasoning properly so called. Among many others that could be adduced, we will point out ten, choosing them from the various dogmatic treatises. At the same time, in each example we will point out the major premises of faith and the minor premises of inclusive reason that have intervened in these reasonings, and we will also cite testimonies from theologians of the first rank who have understood it in this way.

Of those ten examples, some may be disputed or fail to satisfy the reader, but we harbor the conviction that the set of these ten examples must produce in every theologian free from prejudice the conviction that the evolution of dogma by way of theological conclusion is not only possible, but is a patent historical fact admitted by all the great theologians.

202. FIRST EXAMPLE.—The first example of dogmatic development that we know of, so to speak, in a solemn and authentic form, is the famous homoousion or consubstantialem, defined by the first ecumenical council against Arius. In Sacred Scripture it was explicitly stated that Jesus Christ was the Only-Begotten of the Father, true Son of God, true God like the Father; but it was not explicitly stated that He was consubstantial. And yet, that concept of consubstantiality and that word homoousion was the very thing, as St. Athanasius observes, that needed to be defined as a matter of faith if the door was to be closed to the subtle and endless arguments of the impious Arius and his numerous followers. The teaching Church, therefore, assembled in the Council of Nicaea, and, relying as always on the data of Sacred Scripture and Tradition, explicitly defined the consubstantiality of the Word, adding to the traditional creed the famous formula of consubstantialem Patri.

With that celebrated formula, the Church solemnly initiated that series of dogmatic developments through philosophical concepts, or as Cardinal Newman would say, through notional propositions, or as our objector seems to call them, through intellectual statements (190); a series that was to grow in crescendo up to the Councils of Trent and the Vatican, and that has almost reached its culmination in the immortal encyclical Pascendi, where philosophy and theology, in all that is most technical and abstruse about them, are employed by the Church for the exposition and development of dogma. But let us not digress.

As we were saying, the Council of Nicaea defined as a matter of faith the consubstantiality of the Word with the Father. That was and is a revealed truth, for only what is revealed can be defined as a dogma of faith. But where and how was that truth revealed?¹ It was [revealed] in other truths in which it is implied, and from which it emerges by reasoning or ratiocination. Those other truths are the following two: first, "Jesus Christ is the true Son of God," or "He is true God"; second, "in God there is no division of substance, but simple unity."

Indeed, if to be a true son one must be of the substance of the father, since that is the definition of filiation or generation; and if to be a son of God there must be oneness of substance with God, since in the divine substance no division is possible, it follows that between the Father and the Son in the divinity there must be consubstantiality or oneness of substance.

This reasoning, or this combination of concepts, in which consubstantiality is deduced from the concepts of filiation and divinity, pulses and even stands out in all the Holy Fathers who, before and after the Council of Nicaea, have treated the consubstantiality of the Word. To avoid lengthening the section with endless texts from the Holy Fathers, let us limit ourselves to citing the summary that three great theologians make of them, of those who have distinguished themselves by their eminent knowledge of patristics and of the so-called history of dogmas. Two of them, Petavius and Bellarmine, are well known; the third, the celebrated Greek theologian Manuel Calecas ², may well be placed alongside Bellarmine and Petavius.

Let us begin with the immortal author of the Dogmata Theologica, who expresses himself thus: "The argumentation, which proves from this that the homoousion is one with another, since it arises from it, is common to all the Greek and Latin Fathers; who, against the Arians, from this very fact affirm the equality of the Son, and, so to speak, the identity of substance with the Father, as is clear from the second and fourth books of this work" ³.

Let us now hear Bellarmine: "When the Nicene Council defined that Christ is homoousion with the Father, it drew the conclusion from the Scriptures, in which it is directly contained that there is one God, and that the Son is God; from which it follows necessarily that the Father and the Son are of the same substance and divinity" ^{4 5}.

The eminent theologian Calecas expresses himself in the same way, for he not only affirms what Petavius and Bellarmine later affirmed, but also develops it beautifully: "It is not universally an evil to reason, but only to employ principles that are not suited to what is proposed, and to think that faith can be demonstrated by natural principles. But if anyone, for that which is in question, applies to it some of those common principles of faith which exist repeatedly concerning God, and the ratified and defined opinions of the Fathers, and once these are established and none of the things set down is overthrown, concludes something consistent with them, as happened to the ancient Fathers when they disputed about the consubstantial and many other questions of faith, it will nevertheless have to be admitted that that conclusion is the sense of Scripture, which indeed depends on those principles and agrees with those causes from which it arises; then the same theological conclusion will be called known by revelation, just as the conclusions of geometry are called those which are drawn from the principles of geometry. But unless this is so, we will do away with very many things that are certain by faith and are not expressly contained in the Scriptures."

Calecas then speaks of the reasoning from two premises of faith, or from one of faith and another of reason, which the Holy Fathers are accustomed to employ in the development of dogma, and he continues thus: "But in truth, if anyone thinks that every syllogism whose two propositions are not both expressed in the Sacred Scriptures concludes falsely, he is mistaken in his opinion, and he accuses all the Doctors of the Church slanderously, who have often used arguments of this kind to establish truth in divine matters. Let this serve as an example: 'What is begotten according to substance by someone is of the same substance as the begetter; but the Son is begotten by the Father; therefore the Son is of the same substance as the Father.' For the first [premise], which is called the major, is not taken from the Sacred Scriptures, but from natural science. And yet what is inferred from it, together with the other [premise] which is of faith and of Scripture, is held as certain in faith. And if it were not lawful to argue thus, God would in vain exhort us in the Scriptures to rise to the knowledge of God from those things which we know and which we hold as nature teaches"⁶.

Finally, let us listen to none other than the Fourth Lateran Ecumenical Council, which, in its dogmatic definition against Abbot Joachim, expresses itself thus: “We, however, with the approval of the Sacred Council, believe and confess with Peter Lombard that there is one supreme reality, incomprehensible indeed and ineffable, which truly is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Therefore, although the Father is one person, the Son another, and the Holy Spirit another, yet they are not another reality; but what the Father is, the Son and the Holy Spirit are the very same; so that according to the orthodox and catholic faith they are believed to be consubstantial. (Now comes the reason or the why of the consubstantiality.) For the Father, indeed, from eternity, in begetting the Son, gave him his substance, according to what he himself testifies: “The Father, what he has given me is greater “than all things”. And it cannot be said that he gave him a part of the substance and retained a part for himself, since the Father’s substance is indivisible, being entirely simple. But neither can it be said that the Father, in begetting, transferred his substance to the Son, as if he so gave it to the Son that he did not retain it for himself; otherwise he would have ceased to be substance. It is clear, therefore, that without any diminution the Son received the Father’s substance by being born, and thus the Father and the Son have the same substance... If anyone, therefore, presumes to defend or approve the opinion or doctrine of the aforesaid Joachim in this matter, let him be refuted by all as a heretic”⁷

If in all this our objector sees not only true reasoning, which is the only thing we are dealing with, but even dialectical reasoning, then we do not understand what he means by reasoning.

203. SECOND EXAMPLE.—The Council of Ephesus defined as a dogma of faith, against Nestorius, that the Most Holy Virgin was truly Mother of God. That truth was and is a revealed truth.

But where and how was it revealed? It was revealed in two other truths in which it is implied, and from which it follows by reasoning. These two truths are: first, “that the Most Holy Virgin is the Mother of Jesus Christ”; second, “that Jesus Christ is true God, there being in Him no other personality or hypostasis than the divine one.” From these two revealed truths there follows as a conclusion the truth that the Virgin is the true Mother of God, and not merely the Mother of Christ, as Nestorius maintained. Let us hear St. Thomas: “Although it is not found expressly in Scripture that the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God, it is nevertheless found in Scripture that Jesus Christ is true God, as is clear from 1 John, last chapter, and that the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of Jesus Christ, as is clear from Matthew 1. Hence it follows of necessity from the words of Scripture that she is the Mother of God⁸

This concluding character is seen even more clearly if one bears in mind that, in addition to the two revealed truths already mentioned, a truth of reason must also be brought into play for the Virgin to be truly the Mother of God. That truth of reason is that generation or maternity is not terminated in the nature, but in the person. If the action of begetting were abstractive, as is the action of understanding, and could be terminated in the nature, disregarding or abstracting from the person, the Virgin would still not be the true Mother of God, but only the mother of the humanity of Jesus Christ. Therefore, in order to deduce or develop the dogmatic truth of the divine maternity of Mary, this third truth came into play: “Being conceived or being a son is not attributed to the nature, but to the hypostasis.” Let us listen again to St. Thomas: “To be conceived and to be born is attributed to the hypostasis according to that nature in which it is conceived and born. Since therefore at the very beginning of conception the human nature was assumed by the divine person, as was said above, it follows that God can truly be said to have been conceived and born of the virgin... Hence it follows that the blessed Virgin is truly called the Mother of God”⁹

Moreover, the same Council of Ephesus, in defining the divine motherhood of Mary, clearly indicates the reasoning that has intervened in the development of that dogmatic truth. Here are the very words of the Council: “If anyone does not confess that God is truly Emmanuel, and therefore that the Holy Virgin is the Mother of God; for she gave birth according to the flesh to the Word of God made flesh; let him be anathema”¹⁰ Those therefores and those fors are the marks of informal reasoning, but true and proper reasoning, just as the buts and the therefores are of formal or dialectical reasoning. Both are the signs of human reason used as an instrument by the Church for the explanation or development of dogma, under the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit, who is the principal cause.

This character of reasoning or of logical derivation that exists in the dogma of the divine motherhood, as well as in very many other dogmas, we believe is well expressed by the wise modern theologian Fontaine in the following words:

One quickly realizes that some of these secondary dogmas proceed from the fundamental mysteries by a kind of deduction, at once logical and ontological... These explanations, however elementary they may be, suffice nevertheless to show that the dogma of the divine maternity emerges from the notion, thoroughly grasped and correctly analyzed, of the incarnation of the Word. We say, for this reason, that this is a secondary dogma and even derived from the first; the fact that this dogma expresses flows from the other dogma and remains dependent upon it; between the two there exists an essential and necessary relationship... To place the dogma of the divine maternity beyond indisputable evidence, the Church had to study the essence of the Word, His consubstantiality with the Father, His eternal generation, and His divine personality. Then it was necessary to specify the kind of union of this eternal Word, consubstantial with the Father, with human nature, which is what we call the hypostatic union. The Greek councils, in whose bosom this long work of elucidation was carried out, completed it by proclaiming Mary true Mother of the incarnate Word, in the year 431, at Ephesus ¹¹

**204. THIRD EXAMPLE.—**The Third Council of Constantinople, the sixth among the Ecumenical Councils, defined as a dogma of faith against the Monothelites that in Jesus Christ there were not only two natures, but also two distinct wills and two distinct operations. This was and is a revealed truth. But, where and how was this truth revealed? It was revealed in two other truths, in which it is contained and from which it follows by reasoning. These truths are: First, "that Jesus Christ is not only a true man, but also a perfect man, or in a connatural state, or like us in all things, except sin or in whatever is opposed to the end of redemption." Second, "that one cannot be a perfect man (although one can be a true or essential man), nor a man in a connatural state, nor a man like us in all things, unless one has a human will and the other natural-physical powers or properties."

This reasoning, from one premise of faith and another of reason, has been the human instrument that the Church, under the assistance of the Holy Spirit, has used to know and define the dogma of the two wills in Christ. In previous sections we have already indirectly examined this point, and we have adduced in its confirmation abundant texts from Saint Thomas (101). Let us now limit ourselves to adding some new texts.

Let us listen to St. Thomas: “It would be detrimental to the perfection of the Incarnation of the Word of God if anything of those things which are natural to man were lacking in Him... But faith confesses that He is in all things without sin like unto us in natural things”¹² “It must be said that Christ ought to be made like unto His brethren in all things (as the Apostle says in Hebrews, II, 17), in those things which were necessary for their reparation. Now such things are those in which the truth of human nature consists, namely, its essential parts, and natural properties and passions by which the work of redemption was to be accomplished”¹³

Let us listen to Báñez: “Before it was defined in the Council that there is in Christ the Lord a twofold will, it was a theological conclusion; Christ has two wills, the divine and the human. For from the principle of faith that Christ is perfect man, subsisting from a rational soul and human flesh, it was evidently gathered by good consequence: therefore Christ has a created will. By the fact that this truth was defined in the Council, the conclusion is now held as immediately de fide, and is proposed to all to be believed under threat of anathema”¹⁴

Belarmine expresses the same: “And similarly the Sixth Council, when it defined that there are in Christ two wills, the divine and the human, drew the conclusion from Scripture, in which it is held that Christ is *perfect God and perfect man”¹⁵

We could continue citing numerous classical theologians of traditional theology, but we would only be repeating texts similar to those already cited in other sections. Let us, therefore, limit ourselves to citing three illustrious modern theologians: one, a Thomist; another, from the Suárez school; and the third, independent of any school.

Let the first be Fr. Berthier, who expresses himself thus: “We call that theology mixed or intermediate which depends partly on a supernatural and partly on a natural principle; such will be that conclusion, namely, that Christ possessed two intellects, two wills, and operations connatural to them. This conclusion is derived first from the principle of supernatural theology, namely, that in Christ there were two natures, and indeed perfect ones; then from the natural principle, that is, that operations proper to a perfect nature belong to it¹⁶

Second, Cardinal Franzelin, who, in his remarkable introduction to the treatise De Deo Uno, expresses himself on this matter with considerably more depth and accuracy than in his much-cited work De Divina Traditione. He says the following: “Therefore, since it is established that each premise is a revealed truth, or when one revealed premise implicitly already contains that which is set forth in the conclusion, and the other, although not revealed, evidently manifests this comprehension of the conclusion in the revealed premise (this happens, according to the Thomists, in every true and rigorous theological conclusion); without doubt the truth which is set forth in such a conclusion is revealed... An example of a conclusion in the second form (that is, of one revealed premise and another of natural reason) can be adduced against the Monothelites. The revealed proposition, that Christ, besides the divine nature, has a perfect (Very good!) human nature through which He is a true (perfect, he means) man, already contains the other truth, that Christ, besides the divine will, also has a rational will and human volitions. When, therefore, the other proposition is assumed to complete the argument; Christ is a true (perfect would be more exact) man; but essential to man (perfect man, it is understood, as he said at the beginning) is the faculty of the rational will; therefore Christ has a human will (and the same could be said: “therefore He has risibility” or any other physical property); that assumed proposition only manifests the comprehension of this conclusion in the revealed proposition... In reality, however, in these theological syllogisms for the most part (always, if it is metaphysical), the naturally certain proposition, especially where the certainty is metaphysical, only manifests the comprehension of the consequent in the revealed premise (this is, according to St. Thomas, the true office of every minor premise of reason in theology); and therefore conclusions of this kind are contained implicitly in the objective revelation, and consequently can be explicitly proposed and defined by the Church as matters of faith to be believed”¹⁷

It is pleasing to see an author of the stature and affiliation of Franzelin acknowledge that the theological conclusion is most often (plerumque) definable as of divine faith, and that it is so especially when the minor premise of reason has metaphysical certainty.

But what is pertinent to us now is his testimony that the dogma of the two wills in Christ, defined by the Sixth Ecumenical Council, is a dogma known by reasoning, and even by reasoning in which one of the premises is not revealed, but rather of natural reason.

Let the third be the illustrious Cardinal Newman, distinguished for so many titles, the modern theologian who has had the clearest vision of the existence of dogmatic progress. In his brilliant work entitled An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, a work he wrote while still a Protestant and while writing which he was converted, he perhaps gave excessive importance to feeling, to life, to experience, to practice as instruments in the development of Catholic dogma, and very little or almost nothing to reasoning, toward which he almost apparently shows the same aversion that our objector seems to show. Whoever has read nothing of Newman but that work knows Newman only halfway, and will be tempted at times to see in Newman a phraseology somewhat similar to the Modernist one. But the years of Catholic life made Newman penetrate more deeply into the great problem of dogmatic development, and, instead of giving little or no importance to reasoning in that problem, he almost sometimes gives it excessive importance or, better said, gives it the importance it deserves and that St. Thomas and the great geniuses of Scholasticism always gave it. Thus, in his celebrated lectures delivered before the Catholic University of Dublin, quite a few years after his conversion, he writes the following: “Revelation is all in all in Catholic doctrine; the Apostles are its sole source; the illative method is its sole instrument, and the authority of the Church its sole sanction.” Many years still later he wrote regarding the dogma of the two wills in Christ: “The Sixth Ecumenical Council condemned the doctrine that there is but one will in Christ, although such doctrine was condemned neither by Scripture nor by tradition, except by inference ¹⁸

But before those theologians, the Prince of them all, Saint Thomas, had said it in the following words: “Nothing of natural things was lacking to Christ, who assumed the whole (entire) nature, as was said above. And therefore in the sixth council the position of those denying that there are in Christ two knowledges or two wisdoms was condemned”¹⁹²⁰

In short, even if theologians did not say so, it would suffice to look at the very words of the Council to see that reasoning was the instrument the Church used to know and define this dogma, deducing it from the revealed dogma that Christ is perfect man, or man like us in all things.

The Council says this: “This present holy and universal Synod, faithfully receiving and with open arms embracing the suggestion made by the most holy and blessed Agatho, Pope of ancient Rome... Moreover, following the synodal letters written by blessed Cyril against the impious Nestorius and to the Eastern Bishops; and also following the five holy universal Councils and the holy and approved Fathers, we define, confessing in harmony, that our Lord Jesus Christ, our true God, is one of the holy and consubstantial and life-giving Trinity, perfect in divinity and perfect in humanity, truly God and truly man, the same consisting of a rational soul and a body; consubstantial with the Father according to divinity, and consubstantial with us according to humanity, in all things like us, without sin”²¹ “And we proclaim in Him two natural wills and two natural operations, undividedly, inconvertibly, inseparably, inconfusedly, according to the teaching of the holy Fathers”²²

This reasoning or inference made by the Council, deducing the two wills and the two operations from the revealed principle of homo perfectus, is seen even more clearly in the dogmatic letter that Pope St. Agatho addressed to the Council, and which, as the Council itself confesses, was the basis of the dogmatic definition. The holy Pontiff speaks thus: “Unde consequenter, sicut duas naturas sive substantias, id est, deitatem et humanitatem, inconfuse, indivise, incommutabiliter eum habere veraciter confitemur, ita quoque duas naturales voluntates et duas naturales operationes habere, utpote perfectum Deum et perfectum hominem²³ It could not have been said more clearly²⁴

It is, therefore, beyond all doubt that reasoning, and even reasoning from one premise of faith and another of reason, has been the human instrument which the Church has used, under the assistance of the Holy Spirit, to know and define the dogma of the two wills in Jesus Christ.

AN OBJECTION.—Someone may object to me with the Gospel text: Non mea voluntas sed tua fiat, et non sicut ego volo, sed sicut tu²⁵, and that, consequently, no properly theological conclusion was necessary to define the dogma of the two wills in Christ. Here we must note three things:

First, the interpretation of these texts varies among the Holy Fathers. The term “will” can be taken in three different senses: a) free or rational will (voluntas rationis); b) necessary or natural will (voluntas naturae); c) will of sensuality or sensitive appetite (voluntas sensualitatis). If it is true that many Fathers have understood these texts in the first sense, it is no less true that others have interpreted them in the second and third senses. St. Thomas himself uses all three interpretations²⁶. The interpretation ordinarily given to these texts seems very clear to us, because we know beforehand that Our Lord was a perfect man. Without this, this interpretation would have no rigorously demonstrative value.

Second, as to what the sense of these texts may be (even if all three are admitted at once), it is beyond doubt that the councils, the popes, and a multitude of first-rate theologians expressly say—as we have seen—that the dogma of the two wills of Christ has been defined by the Church because it was deduced from another fundamental dogma: that of the "two perfect natures." But it is evident to every true Thomist that this dogma has been deduced by a conclusion properly so called²⁷

Third—and principal—that the Church has not only defined that in Christ there are two wills, but also that in Him there are two operations, two understandings, and even two kinds of knowledge. Now, this cannot be seen formally in the text Not my will but yours be done nor in any other evangelical text except by way of strict conclusion from the dogma perfect man, as Saint Thomas does: "Nothing of natural things was lacking to Christ, who assumed the whole (entire or perfect) nature, as was said above. And therefore in the Sixth Synod was condemned the position of those denying that in Christ there are two kinds of knowledge or two wisdoms"²⁸ . "Therefore, because from the fact that someone posits one action in Christ it follows that there is in Him only one nature and only one will: for this reason this position was condemned as heretical in the Sixth Synod"²⁹ .

It is, therefore, beyond doubt that reasoning, even that composed of one premise of faith and another of reason, has always been the human instrument that the Church, under the direction of the Holy Spirit, has used to know and define the dogma of the two wills, the two intellects, the two sciences, and the two operations in Jesus Christ.

205. FOURTH EXAMPLE.—The Fourth Council of Lateran, the twelfth among the ecumenical councils, defined as a dogma of faith the following proposition: "There is a certain supreme reality, the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and it is not generating, nor generated, nor proceeding."

This proposition had been denied by Abbot Joachim against the Master of the Sentences, and the Council was not content with giving the latter his due, but rather defined his doctrine as a dogma of faith and condemned as heretics all who might presume to defend or approve the contrary. "We therefore condemn and reprobate the book or treatise which Abbot Joachim published against Master Peter Lombard, on the unity or essence of the Trinity, calling him a heretic and a madman because he said in his Sentences: 'that there is a certain supreme reality which is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and that it is not generating, nor generated, nor proceeding...' We, however, with the approval of the sacred Council, believe and confess with Peter Lombard that there is one certain supreme reality, incomprehensible indeed and ineffable, which is truly the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit... and that reality is not generating, nor generated, nor proceeding... If anyone, therefore, shall presume to defend or approve the opinion or doctrine of the aforesaid Joachim in this regard, let him be confuted by all as a heretic"³⁰.

This, then, is a revealed truth. But where and how is this truth revealed? It is revealed in other truths, in which it is contained virtually and from which it proceeds, and can only proceed, by reasoning. Those other truths are: first, in the Trinity there is a real distinction of persons, but not of essence; second, if the essence were to beget or be begotten, to spirate or be spirated, there would be a real distinction in the essence, since neither generation nor spiration is possible without a real distinction of terms. From these two truths, one of faith and the other of reason, but of inclusive reason, there proceeds by rigorous reasoning the dogmatic truth defined by the Fourth Lateran Council, at least as that definition was understood by Saint Thomas Aquinas and by the generality of theologians.

This reasoning, simple in form, but full of metaphysical depth in substance, is set forth by Saint Thomas as follows: "I answer that, in this matter, Abbot Joachim erred, asserting that just as we say that God begot God, so it can be said that the essence begot the essence, considering that, on account of divine simplicity, God is not something other than the divine essence. But in this he was deceived, because for the truth of expressions, we must consider not only the things signified, but also the mode of signifying, as has been said. Although in reality God and the Godhead are the same, yet the mode of signifying is not the same in both cases. For this name, God, because it signifies the divine essence as existing in the one who has it, from its very mode of signification naturally has the property that it can stand for the person; and thus those things which are proper to the persons can be predicated of this name God, so that we may say that God is begotten or begetting, as has been said. But this name essence does not, from its mode of signification, have the property of standing for the person, because it signifies the essence as an abstract form; and therefore those things which are proper to the persons, by which they are distinguished from one another, cannot be attributed to the essence; for it would then be signified that there is a distinction in the divine essence, just as there is a distinction in the persons"³¹.

If all this is not reasoning, and even dialectical reasoning, then we do not know what some people understand by reasoning. Nor do we know what feeling can contribute to this class of purely speculative dogmas, where only the most profound metaphysical-dialectical speculations come into play as a means of explaining or developing the revealed doctrine on the unity of essence and distinction of persons in the august and fundamental dogma of the adorable Trinity.

The same line of reasoning, and how it was employed by the Council, is expressed by Melchor Cano in the following words: "Item, the Lateran Council under Innocent III, by theological reasoning against Joachim, established that the divine essence is neither begotten nor begetting. For a begotten thing and a begetting thing must be really distinct: therefore if the divine essence begot the essence, it would be distinct from itself, not by thought alone, but in reality"³².

206. FIFTH EXAMPLE.—The Second Council of Lyon, the fourteenth among the ecumenical councils, defined as a dogma of faith that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son not as from two principles, but as from one single principle: "Fideli ac devota professione fatemur quod Spiritus Sanctus aeternaliter ex Patre et Filio, non tamquam ex duobus principiis, sed tamquam ex uno principio, non duabus spirationibus, sed unica spiratione procedit"³³. This definition of faith was repeated by the Council of Florence: "Definimus quod Spiritus Sanctus ex Patre el Filio aeternaliter... tamquam ab uno principio et unica spiratione procedit"³⁴.

This is, therefore, a truth of faith, a revealed truth. But how and where is this truth revealed? It is revealed in other truths, in which it is contained virtually and from which it emerges by reasoning, and solely by proper and rigorous reasoning. Those other truths are: First, "In divinis omnia sunt unum et idem ubi non obstat relationis oppositio" . Second, between the spiration of the Father and that of the Son there is no relative opposition whatsoever. From these two truths, one of faith and one of reason, the defined dogma emerges by rigorous reasoning.

This reasoning, simple and brief in appearance, but also full of metaphysical depth, is set forth by Saint Thomas as follows: “I answer that it must be said that the Father and the Son are the same in all things in which the opposition of relation does not distinguish them: hence, since in the fact that they are the principle of the Holy Spirit they are not opposed relatively, it follows that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit”³⁵

Let us also hear Melchior Cano: “The Council of Lyon under Gregory X demonstrated by constant theological reasoning that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, not as from two principles, but as from one, not by two spiriations but by one. The Father indeed and the Son, according to the faith, are one God, one power, one wisdom, briefly one in all things in which the opposition of relation does not stand in the way; for otherwise the unity of the divine nature cannot be preserved in two persons. Therefore, since in spiring there is no distinction of the Son from the Father, it follows that the Father and the Son are not two principles of the Holy Spirit, but one. From this it is understood that both erred greatly: namely, Erasmus and Ambrosius Catharinus—the former, because he believed that this conclusion pertained nothing to the faith; the latter, because he numbered it, since it is a conclusion proper to theology, among the first principles, that is, the articles of faith (articles of faith or non-derived dogmas)”³⁶

The great commentator on St. Thomas, Domingo Báñez, is no less explicit nor less interesting: “The holy Church has many times defined propositions as being of faith which were not expressly contained in the Sacred Scriptures, but which were constantly affirmed by all theologians and doctors of the Church in common, and were theological propositions, such as that Christ has a human will, which the theologians gathered from the fact that Christ, according to the faith, is true man (homo perfectus, as Báñez repeats at every step), and every man has a will; and that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from one principle: which is proved from this, that in divine matters all things are one where the opposition of relation does not intervene. Therefore, since the Father and the Son in spirating the third person have no relative opposition between themselves, it follows that they are not two principles but one. Therefore, similarly, those truths in which the whole school of theologians agrees could now be defined as being of faith; therefore, to contradict them (even before the definition of the Church) is erroneous. For example, all theologians firmly teach that Christ the Lord saw the divine essence from the instant of his incarnation: this is not found in the divine Scriptures, nor has it been defined by the Church of God as being held as of faith: but the theologians gather it through a good consequence from other places in Scripture and from the foundations of the faith, and so it is commonly received that no one can deny it without the mark of error, and it could be defined by the Church as being of faith”³⁷

This text by Báñez, like so many others that we have cited and that are found in abundance in his invaluable commentaries on the Summa Theologica, is worthy of being meditated upon by all who seek to study the Thomistic doctrine on dogmatic progress by way of conclusion or reasoning.

207. SIXTH EXAMPLE.—The Fifth Lateran Council, the eighteenth among the ecumenical councils, defined as a dogma of faith that transcendental and fruitful truth that no true opposition can exist between science and faith, or between human reason and divine revelation.: “We define that every assertion contrary to the truth of enlightened faith is altogether false”¹ The same definition was repeated, and in more expressive terms, by the Vatican Council: “If anyone says that human disciplines are to be treated with such liberty that their assertions, even if they oppose revealed doctrine, can be retained as true, and cannot be proscribed by the Church, let him be anathema”²

This, then, is a revealed truth. But where and how is this truth revealed? It is in other truths, in which it is contained virtually and from which it is deduced by rigorous reasoning. Those other truths are: first, that both the affirmations of revelation and the legitimate demonstrations of reason or science are truths, and it is contradictory that one truth should oppose another truth. Second (and this is the root of the first), that both natural and revealed truth, or both the principles of reason and those of faith, proceed from God, and God cannot fail or deny himself. From this arises, by rigorous reasoning, the dogmatic truth defined by the Lateran and Vatican Councils.

This reasoning, which both Councils employed, had been set forth thus by St. Thomas: “For those things which are naturally instilled in reason are known to be most true, so much so that it is impossible even to think them false: nor is it lawful to believe that what is held by faith, since it has been so manifestly confirmed by God, is false. Since therefore only the false is contrary to the true, as is clearly apparent from an inspection of their definitions, it is impossible for the aforesaid truth to be contrary to those principles which reason knows naturally. Again: that same thing which is introduced into the soul of the disciple by the teacher is contained in the teacher’s knowledge, unless he teaches deceitfully: which it is impious to say of God. But the knowledge of naturally known principles is instilled in us by God, since God Himself is the author of our nature. These principles therefore are also contained in divine wisdom. Whatever therefore is contrary to such principles is contrary to divine wisdom: it cannot therefore be from God: those things therefore which are held by faith from divine revelation cannot be contrary to natural knowledge”³.

That very reasoning has been the human instrument the Church used for the definition of this dogma, as is clearly indicated by the very words of both Councils, which do little more than transcribe, in summary form, the reasoning of St. Thomas: “Cumque verum vero minime contradicat, omnem assertionem veritati illuminatae fidei contrariam omnino falsam esse definimus”⁴. “Verum, etsi fides sit supra rationem, nulla tamen unquam inter fidem et rationem vera dissensio esse potest, cum idem Deus qui mysteria revelat et fidem infundit, animo humano rationis lumen indiderit; Deus autem negare seipsum non potest, nec verum vero unquam contradicere. Omnem igitur assertionem veritati illuminatae fidei contrariam, omnino falsam esse definimus”⁵. As we already noted in the previous section, those enim, cum, autem, igitur are the marks of ordinary or informal reasoning in everyday language, just as atqui and ergo are those of dialectical or formal reasoning in logic texts. When they appear in dogmatic definitions, they are usually signs of derived dogmas, that is, dogmas contained implicitly in the revealed deposit, and known and defined by way of reasoning under the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit.

208. SEVENTH EXAMPLE.—The Council of Trent defined as a dogma of faith the most singular privilege of the immunity of the Most Holy Virgin from all actual sin, even venial: If anyone shall say that a man once justified... can avoid all sins, even venial ones, throughout his whole life, except by a special privilege of God, as the Church holds concerning the Blessed Virgin: let him be anathema⁶.

This is, then, a revealed truth. But where and how is this truth revealed? It is revealed in other truths, in which it is contained virtually and from which it proceeds by reasoning. Those other truths are: first, the Most Holy Virgin is a fitting Mother of God; second, she would not be a fitting or worthy Mother of God if she had been stained by even a single venial sin. From these two truths, the first of faith and the second of reason, there proceeds by reasoning the dogmatic truth defined by the Council.

This reasoning was thus set forth by Saint Thomas: “The Blessed Virgin was divinely chosen to be the Mother of God... Nor would she have been a suitable Mother of God if she had ever sinned... And therefore it is simply to be acknowledged that the Blessed Virgin committed no actual sin, neither mortal nor venial”⁷. That this reasoning was the human instrument by which the Church developed that dogma is well expressed by the following text of Ribalda: “The Apostles believed in the immunity of the Mother of God from actual sin and in their own future beatitude, because they perfectly knew the Scriptures expressing the dignity of the divine motherhood and their own confirmation in grace, on account of which the Church declared those truths to be of faith”⁸.

St. Augustine had already indicated the same with sufficient clarity in the following words: “Except, therefore, the Holy Virgin Mary, concerning whom, for the honor of the Lord, I wish to raise no question at all when dealing with sins: for from this we know that more grace was bestowed upon her to overcome sin in every respect, since she merited to conceive and bear him whom it is certain had no sin”⁹.

209. A DIGRESSION ON THE DOGMA OF THE IMMACULATE CONCEPTION.—In our judgment, the dogma of the immunity of the Mother of God from every stain of original sin proceeds from the same principle, by the same logical process, and with the same certainty or demonstrative value as the dogma of her immunity from all actual sin. To see this, one need only fix one's attention carefully on what constituted the obscure and controverted point in the dogma of the Immaculate Conception.

Indeed, all theologians, without distinction of schools, even those who seemed to have distinguished themselves most by their opposition to that dogma, always admitted as unquestionable the following principle: “To Mary, as the worthy Mother of God that she is, must be attributed all that grace and holiness, or all that immunity from sin, which is compatible with the honor of her Son, that is, with his redemption by Jesus Christ.” Concerning this principle there has never been doubt or discussion, for that principle is nothing other than the traditional understanding of the gratia plena of the Gospel.

The doubt and discussion did not concern the major premise of faith, but rather the minor premise of reason, which was the following: “It is the case that one can at once be conceived without original sin and be redeemed by Jesus Christ.” This minor premise of reason is what constituted the central point of the doubts and discussions in the history of the development of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception.

While in the idea of original sin the concepts of guilt and debt were not properly distinguished, and while in the idea of redemption the concepts of redemption post contractum peccatum and preservative redemption were not delimited, that lesser proposition formulated so absolutely and without distinctions proved false, and the conclusion had to be erroneous, if not heretical. Indeed, an Immaculate immune from everything contained in the idea of original sin, that is, immune from all guilt and all debt, is evidently an Immaculate not redeemed in any way whatsoever. And an Immaculate not redeemed by any kind of redemption, even by preservative redemption, is clearly an erroneous Immaculate. In short: an Immaculate without distinctions is an erroneous Immaculate, if not heretical.

Now then, without making any distinctions, since the spontaneous piety of the faithful people did not ordinarily make them, that doctrine began to be affirmed. Thus formulated, it was judged erroneous by St. Bernard, Albert the Great, St. Bonaventure, and St. Thomas, together with other saints no less eminent as theologians. In so doing, they rendered an inestimable service to the true progress of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, a service for which justice has only recently begun to be done to them.¹⁰ Even if they did not yet completely direct the progress of that dogma along its true course, they at least succeeded in closing off the false path once and for all. One may even say that they were the ones who truly set it on the right course, or were the cause of its being so directed, for by judging erroneous, if not heretical, the notion of an Immaculate Virgin who had not been redeemed, they compelled both the piety and the theological science of later generations to seek an Immaculate who had indeed been redeemed. That is, they stimulated theologians to find some way of reconciling the idea of the Immaculate Conception with the idea of redemption.

To the illustrious Scotus and to his, on this question, immortal school, undoubtedly belongs the glory of having initiated the true solution of the problem, by applying to the idea of original sin the distinction between guilt and debt, and to the idea of redemption the distinction between redemption after the contracted fault and preservative redemption¹¹

Without intending thereby to diminish in any way the undeniable merits of Scotus in this question, we have said that the glory is due to him of having initiated, and nothing more than initiated, the true solution of the problem. Although he already distinguishes in this question between guilt and debt, he still does not speak clearly about the necessity of personal or proximate debt, without which it hardly seems possible to safeguard a true and proper personal redemption. The wise Father Honorato del Val, whom no one will accuse of partiality in this case, has rightly written: "Sub hoc aspectu argumentatio Scoti forsan limites excessit, quatenus a B. Virgine excludere videtur debitum proprie dictum incurrerendi peccatum. Unde non sat explicatur, quemadmodum B. Virgo fuerit proprie a Christo redempta" (Fr. HONORATO DEL VAL, O. S. A., Sacra Theol. Dogmatica, vol. 2, no. 265, Madrid 1906). In our judgment, the one who, among all theologians, best delimited the terms and posed the problem of a truly redeemed Immaculate Conception was Cardinal Cajetan in his celebrated opuscule De Conceptione B. Virginis, to such an extent that later theologians have done nothing but copy his distinctions. In that sense, Cajetan, without defending the Immaculate Conception, and even impugning it, contributed as much as or more than any other theologian to the evolution and definition of the dogma of the true Immaculate Conception.

With these two distinctions, which time and disputes eventually delimited with perfect exactness and clarity, the famous minor premise of reason was formulated in this way: “It is thus that immunity from all original fault, provided that a true personal or proximate debt is contracted, is compatible with the true and proper preservative redemption by Jesus Christ.” This minor premise, thus distinguished and formulated, is no longer false, no longer doubtful, no longer even merely probable: it is certain, clear, evident, and even Cajetan himself is forced to confess it. With, therefore, a major premise of faith and admitted by all, and an evident minor premise, the dogmatic conclusion of the Immaculate Conception was assured. In order to finally impose itself on all and be defined as a matter of faith, it only needed to overcome still the terrible dead weight of school and party prejudices, which are so innate and deep-rooted that they frequently cause many to continue for a long time upholding a doctrine, even after the support and principal foundation on which its original authors based it has already failed. These are, in our judgment and in general terms, the course and progress followed in history by the dogma of the Immaculate Conception.

The reasoning of theologians, the assent of the faithful, and the authority of the Church in this dogma.—We are not, therefore, in agreement with those who believe that in the development of this dogma there has been no logical process, nor with those who, while admitting that there has been one, suggest that, from the standpoint of that process, the dogma of the Immaculate Conception is not contained in the dogma of the divine motherhood, or does not emerge from it except in a probable manner. In our judgment, it is contained in it and emerges from it in a certain manner and by a rigorous and conclusive theological process; by exactly the same process that Tradition and theology employed to demonstrate that the Mother of God had to be immune from all actual sin.

In short, neither are we entirely in agreement with those who, in the development and definition of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, attribute everything or almost everything to the common feeling of the faithful, and nothing, or little, to theological reason. That there was a common, fervent, and overwhelming feeling among the faithful regarding this dogma, there is no doubt. But, for us, it is also undoubted that such feeling would never have become unanimous, nor would it have been able to sustain itself for a long time, nor, above all, would it have been able to avoid losing its way and going astray without the restraint, help, and direction of theological reason. The theological reason of the great masters of the thirteenth century, demonstrating that an Immaculate Conception not redeemed was erroneous, placed insurmountable sluice gates to that feeling when it threatened to rush along false paths. The theological reason of later theologians, pointing out the true distinctions with which an Immaculate Conception redeemed could and should be defended, opened to that feeling a broad and safe channel, which is the only thing it needed to become universal, ardent, irresistible. All this, without forgetting the principal factor, namely the authority of the Church, which under the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit was gently, but constantly and surely, guiding both the feeling of the faithful and the reason of theologians toward the development and dogmatic definition of the true Immaculate Conception of Pius IX.

Parallel between the Thomist and Scotist schools regarding the dogma of the Immaculate Conception.—In our judgment, St. Thomas and Scotus, with their two powerful and faithful schools, have respectively played the same role in this question of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception as the rudder and the steam play in the movement and direction of a ship. It is to the steam, and not to the rudder, that the ship owes its movement; but it is the rudder, and not the steam, that makes it move in the proper direction and reach the true port without going astray.

Scotus and his school, supporting in this the fervent sentiment of the faithful, cried out with all their might that the Mother of God had to be, and was, immaculate, and in order to reach that port, which their burning piety toward the Virgin made them glimpse, they took more care to stoke the steam and hasten the ship's course than to chart well the route by which they ought to sail.

Saint Thomas and his school, accustomed to restraining sentiment with reason and to taking no new step in the delicate dogmatic terrain without the beacon of the ancient dogmas already defined, cried out, with no less vigor, that the Mother of God, like every child of Adam, had to be truly and personally redeemed by the blood shed on Calvary, and that they were prepared to bar the way even to the Mother of God herself unless they saw her march frankly and clearly along the path of personal debt, which is the only path of the Cross and of Calvary, the only path of redemption: Between these two factors—the Scotist wind and the Thomist brake or rudder—the ship of the Immaculate Conception moved slowly, but surely, for centuries. Without Scotus and his school, the ship would have advanced little or nothing; without Saint Thomas and his, the ship would almost certainly have gone astray. After God and His Church, we owe it to Scotus and his school that the Immaculate Conception was defined, but we owe it to Saint Thomas and his school that the true Immaculate Conception was defined. Other schools also intervened, and very gloriously, but all of them taking from the Scotist school the fervor of the movement and from the Thomist school the sure lines of direction. Thus the human factors seemingly most opposed all contribute to the development of the dogma, harmonized by the visible magisterium of the Church and by the invisible, but perpetual, assistance of the Holy Spirit.

By what inclusive reasoning the dogma of the Immaculate Conception has been deduced from revealed data.—After writing the foregoing, we see that the wise Fr. Gardeil, approving our doctrine in this question of the evolution of dogma, indicates to us that it would be interesting to make clearly evident what is the process or reasoning by which the dogma of the Immaculate Conception emerges by way of inclusion from the dogma of the divine motherhood. (Revue des Sc. Philos. et Theol., Oct. 1922, p. 689.)

In the preceding paragraphs we believe we have already shown how the dogma of the Immaculate Conception is deduced from that of the divine motherhood by the very same process and with the same certainty as the dogma of immunity from all actual sin. If this latter deduction encountered no difficulties, while the former encountered very great ones, this did not arise from any difference in regard to their content or to their deduction, but from the fact that the first deduction, although as logical as the second, seemed unable to be reconciled with the dogma of redemption; and in dogmatic progress one must attend not only to the speculative logic between the conclusion and the dogma or principle from which it is deduced, but also to the agreement of that conclusion with all the other dogmas. The difficulties, disputes, and delays did not consist in changing the process of deduction or in making it more evident, but in making its apparent opposition to another dogma disappear. As soon as it became clear that Immaculate and redeemed were not contradictory things, the conclusion was assured and definable. One only needs to bear in mind that, both in the deduction of the exemption from actual sin and from original sin, it is necessary that the Christian sense be joined to speculative reasoning.

Both dogmas are deduced from the fundamental dogma expressed by the traditional formula of "worthy Mother of God." Now, determining or deducing what is or is not due to a "worthy mother," and much more to a "worthy Mother of God," is better appreciated by the loving heart of a son than by the cold logic of a scholar. Hence, the Christian sense of the "children of God," that is, the filial faith and fervor of the Christian people toward their Mother, and Mother of God, Mary, has been in this dogma the best and greatest aid of speculative logic, as it has been and will be in all dogmas that affect not exclusively the intellect, but also the heart.

In summary, then, the dogma of the Immaculate Conception was contained, in our judgment, in the revealed deposit as a particular within the universal conditioned, and its process of deduction is as follows:

All degrees of purity are owed to the Mother of God, provided they are compatible with her redemption by Jesus Christ.

Thus original purity, with personal debit, is compatible with redemption through Jesus Christ.

Original purity is owed to the Mother of God with a personal debt.

The major premise of that reasoning is a universal revealed conditional, and it is admitted by all the Holy Fathers and theologians, even by those who seem opposed to that dogma. St. Thomas formulates it thus: "Sub Christo, qui salvari non indiguit (that is the condition for the Virgin) tamquam universalis Salvator, maxima fuit B. Virginis puritas"¹². The minor premise merely purifies the condition included in the revealed major premise. Therefore, the conclusion is also implicitly revealed and definable as of divine faith, for, as we shall see further on (256), everything contained in the revealed deposit as a particular within the universal is definable as of divine faith.

And yet, the conclusion is not implicit-formal, but implicit-virtual, because the universal in which it is implicitly contained is not an unconditioned universal (32), but a conditioned one, and of such a condition that its purification requires its own reasoning, and even profound and most difficult reasoning. It requires the intervention of a new concept, namely the concept of "conception with debt and without stain." In revelation, the dogmatic concept of "conception with debt and with stain" was already known, which is the concept of ordinary conception; the dogmatic concept of "conception without stain and with debt" was also known, which is the concept of the conception of Jesus Christ; but the concept of "conception with debt and without stain" was not yet known, which was precisely the concept needed to reconcile the concept of the Immaculate with the concept of redemption, that is, to purify the condition of the revealed major premise. All the doubts, disputes, and delays reduced themselves to arriving at that new concept, which is precisely the new dogma of the Immaculate: new in terms of explanation, but not new in terms of objectivity or substance, for it was already implicit in the revealed major premise.

But it must be remembered that in the deduction by which the exemption is inferred, whether from actual sin or from original sin, the Christian sense must be added to speculative reasoning. These two dogmas are derived from the fundamental dogma expressed by the traditional formula of "worthy Mother of God": idonea Mater Dei. Now, when it is a question of deducing what is or is not due to a "worthy mother," and still more to a "worthy Mother of God," the loving heart of a son is a better judge than the cold logic of the wise man. This is why the Christian sense of the "children of God," that is, the filial faith and piety of the Christian people toward Mary, their Mother and Mother of God, has been for this dogma the best and most powerful aid to speculative logic, as it has been and will be for all dogmas that concern not exclusively the intellect, but also the heart of man.

210. EIGHTH EXAMPLE.—The same Council of Trent defined as a dogma of faith the conversion, in the Eucharist, of the whole substance of the bread into the body of Jesus Christ, and of the whole substance of the wine into his blood, which is what is called the dogma of transubstantiation. “If anyone says that, in the most holy Sacrament of the Eucharist, the substance of bread and wine remains together with the Body and Blood of our Lord Jesus Christ, and denies that wonderful and singular conversion of the whole substance of the bread into the Body and of the whole substance of the wine into the Blood, the species of bread and wine alone remaining, which conversion the Catholic Church most fittingly calls transubstantiation: let him be anathema.” (DENZINGER, no. 884.)

This, then, is a revealed truth. But where and how is that truth revealed? It is revealed in other truths in which it is included, and from which it is derived by reasoning. Those other truths are: first, that in the consecration the words of Jesus Christ must be truly verified: “This is my body,” “This is my blood”; second, that without transubstantiation such words of Jesus Christ cannot be truly verified. From these two truths, one of faith and one of reason, the defined dogma is derived by reasoning.

St. Thomas expounds this reasoning as follows: “I answer that, some have held that after consecration the substance of bread and wine remains in this Sacrament. But this position... is contrary to the form of this Sacrament, in which it is said: This is My Body, which would not be true if the substance of bread remained there; for the substance of bread is never the Body of Christ; rather it would have to be said: Here (this) is My Body¹³

The Council of Trent itself makes it quite clear that this is the reason or line of reasoning that the Church employed to know and define that dogma: “For since Christ our Redeemer said that what He offered under the species of bread was truly His own Body, therefore it has always been the conviction of the Church of God, and this holy Synod now declares it anew, that by the consecration of the bread and wine a conversion takes place of the whole substance of the bread into the substance of the Body of Christ our Lord, and of the whole substance of the wine into the substance of His Blood. This conversion is fittingly and properly called by the holy Catholic Church transubstantiation”¹⁴. Those for since and those therefore are, we shall never tire of repeating, the marks of the reasoning.^62.

How that reasoning was the instrument of that dogmatic definition is also expressed by Melchor Cano in the following words: “Likewise, the Fathers, all to a man, reasoned from this principle: ‘This is my Body’, that the conversion of bread into the Body of Christ takes place, without which they could neither grasp the truth of those words, nor the other things that the Catholic faith confesses concerning the true inclusion of the Body of Christ under the species of bread”¹⁵

The following paragraph from the incomparable Domingo Soto is also worthy of meditation:

“But Scotus says: The Church received this (namely, transubstantiation) by the revelation of the Holy Spirit. We too indeed confess it as most true. Nevertheless, because the Church does not enjoy an immediate revelation as the Apostles did, but rather divine aid and assistance (asistencia divina) lest it err in drawing out the articles of faith from the sacred page, it is not enough for the theologian to say: “The Church has so decreed in matters of faith”; rather, his task is to show from which passages of Sacred Scripture it derived this. For that word “homoousios,” that is, consubstantial with the Father, the Nicene Synod would never have adopted into use had it not drawn it out from the very word of the Gospel: “I and the Father are one.” In like manner, the holy Fathers would never have employed the name of conversion and transubstantiation had they not weighed in the words of Christ “This is my body.” For when He took bread, and gave nothing but the body, by the best consequence the Fathers understood that by the very word He had converted the bread into the body. Wherefore I do not know why Scotus said that whether Christ said “this is” or “here is” my body makes no difference to the question: since it matters so much that He said “this is,” that had He said only “here,” that is, in this place, the Church would never have received the sacramental conversion. Therefore, to value “this” no more than “here” is to cut the fibers and sinews of the truth. Unless from this we elicit that the bread does not remain with the body, the authority against heretics, who reject the sanctions of the Church unless they are founded in Scripture, withers and languishes. Let a third point finally be stated: that after the holy Fathers derived this conversion from the Gospel, they most aptly accommodated to it the name of transubstantiation... For if you review all the canons of the Saints cited above, the Church came to a knowledge of the conversion by no other means than by verifying the word of Christ: “This is my body”¹⁶

Even more important and profound, as usual, are the following words of the distinguished John of Saint Thomas: "Nothing of the substance of bread and wine remains after the consecration, but the whole is converted into Christ. This is the second and third point that we set forth above as being of faith in this Sacrament. Both are expressly defined in the Council of Trent, session 13, chapter 4, where it is defined that the substance of bread and wine does not remain with the Body and Blood of Christ, but is converted into His Body and Blood, while the appearances of bread and wine remain. And the Council adds the reason and foundation from which the Church gathers that this conversion must be affirmed: 'Since (it says) Christ our Redeemer said that His Body, that which He offered under the appearance of bread, was truly [His Body], therefore it has always been persuaded in the Church'", etc., etc.

He then enumerates certain objections that may be raised against this reasoning of the Church and of the Council, and adds: "His fundamentis adducti, aliqui ex catholicis sentiunt, that although it is established by the definition of the Church that the substance of bread and wine does not remain in this Sacrament, this nevertheless is not deduced from the precise meaning of the words... Nonetheless, this opinion overturns the entire foundation of the Council and therefore is to be wholly rejected... Nor can it be said that it is not inferred from this precisely because it is truly said absolutely, but because it is truly said in such a manner, namely, as de facto Christ willed it and the Church understood it. For this very thing the Council wishes to prove, why the Church thus understood it"¹⁷

In our judgment, the last words of the foregoing passage from John of St. Thomas are very worthy of note: "For this very thing the Council wishes to prove, WHY the Church so understood it."

Indeed, there are theologians who, when they examine the factors of dogmatic progress, or when they study the question of how such and such a truth (which does not seem to be found formally, at least at first glance, in the primitive deposit) could later be defined as a dogma of faith, content themselves with adducing more or less texts from the Holy Fathers that affirm such a truth, and end up so satisfied saying: "That is of tradition, because the Holy Fathers so teach it and the Church so understood and understands it."

All that is very well. But such theologians do not seem to realize that in tradition, as in the understanding of the Church, there is room for progress or development, and that, therefore, there remains yet another further question, namely: “Why did the Holy Fathers and the Church understand it this way?”

The true answer to this last question, when it comes to developed or derived dogmas, is almost always that the Church and the Holy Fathers understood it thus, and not otherwise, for such and such a reason. Which amounts almost always to saying that they understood it thus by reasoning or ratiocination, although always, as is clear, under the assistance of the Holy Spirit, when it is a matter of dogmatic definitions. Such is, in our judgment, what is gathered from the history of dogmas and what is very clearly discernible in the very words of the Ecumenical Councils¹⁸.

211. NINTH EXAMPLE.—Our divine Savior, before His ascension into heaven, said to His Apostles, and in them to His legitimate successors, the following words: “Receive the Holy Spirit: whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained”¹⁹.

Based on these words, as they have always been understood by the Holy Fathers and by the Church, the same Council of Trent defined as dogmas of faith, in addition to the institution of the sacrament of Penance, the following four truths: a) sacramental confession is by divine right necessary for salvation; b) by divine right this confession must include all and each of the mortal sins committed after baptism of which one is conscious; c) even hidden or internal sins; d) and also the circumstances that change the species. Let us hear the Council itself: "If anyone denies that sacramental confession was either instituted or necessary for salvation by divine right: let him be anathema. If anyone says that in the Sacrament of Penance it is not necessary by divine right to confess all and each of the mortal sins, of which one has memory with due and diligent premeditation, even hidden sins and those against the last two precepts of the Decalogue, and the circumstances which change the species of sin: let him be anathema"²⁰.

These four truths are, then, revealed truths. But how and where are these truths revealed? They are revealed in other truths in which they are contained virtually, and from which they emerge by reasoning. These truths are: first, that Jesus Christ instituted the Apostles and their successors as true judges of sins, with the power to absolve or retain them; second, that this power of judging, or of absolving or retaining, cannot be exercised equitably without confession, and without confession of each and every mortal sin, even hidden ones, and of their specific circumstances. From these two truths, the first of faith and the second of reason, the four defined dogmas have emerged by reasoning.

This reasoning is expressed thus briefly by the Salmanticenses moralists: "Sacramental confession was not only instituted by Christ the Lord, but also commanded; and so there is a divine precept concerning it... Now this divine precept is gathered from those words of John 20: 'Receive the Holy Spirit: whose sins you forgive, they are forgiven them; and whose sins you retain, they are retained', as the Council of Trent teaches in the said session four, chapter 5. For the power of retaining could not exist without the necessity of the judgment of the priests themselves for remission and absolution; and therefore when Christ signifies that the priests have the power of retaining sins, He also signified that their judgment is necessary for absolution, and consequently that mortal sins are never remitted without ordination to such a judgment. Thus all theologians... Nor will it suffice to confess all mortal sins in general, but one is bound to confess them according to number and species, insofar as it is morally possible, as the same Council of Trent sufficiently indicates in chapter 5, when it says that all sins must be declared not only in general, but specifically and individually. The Council gives the reason for this truth: because priests were constituted judges by Christ in the tribunal of Penance; and this judgment they cannot rightly exercise, nor preserve equity in imposing penalties, if sins are declared to them only in general and not rather specifically and individually²¹.

But no one better than the Council of Trent itself set forth the reason or the why of all these dogmas. Let us hear its very words: “From the institution of the Sacrament of Penance already explained, the universal Church has always understood that a complete confession of sins was instituted also by the Lord and is by divine law necessary for all who have fallen after baptism, because (here comes the major of faith) our Lord Jesus Christ, about to ascend from earth to heaven, left his priests as vicars of himself, as presidents and judges, to whom all mortal crimes are to be brought, into which the faithful of Christ may have fallen, so that by the power of the keys they may pronounce sentence of remission or retention of sins. For it is evident (this is the reason, that is, the minor of evident reason) that priests could not exercise this judgment without knowing the case, nor could they indeed observe equity in imposing penalties, if the penitents had declared their sins only in general, and not rather in particular and singly one by one. From these things it is gathered (another dogmatic corollary or another derived dogma) that it is necessary for penitents to enumerate in confession all mortal sins of which, after diligent self-examination, they have a conscience, even if those sins be most hidden... It is moreover gathered (another corollary or derived dogma) that those circumstances are also to be explained in confession which change the species of the sin, because without them (again the same minor of reason) the sins themselves are neither fully set forth by the penitents, nor made known to the judges, and it is impossible that they can rightly assess the gravity of the crimes and impose for them the penalty that is fitting upon the penitents”²².

In the preceding example, what we have already noted in other examples appears clearly: namely, the reason or reasoning used by the Church under the assistance of the Holy Spirit as a human instrument of dogmatic development. The process, as the Councils themselves explain it, is quite simple. Certain truths are defined as dogmas of faith or as contained in the revealed deposit, “because the Holy Fathers or the tradition of the Church understood them thus.” This is the common criterion or touchstone that the Church generally employs for the definition of dogmas, whether they be primary or derived dogmas. But when it comes to derived dogmas (and these precisely constitute dogmatic progress), there is another step that some do not seem to notice, namely, that the fact that the Holy Fathers and the Church understood it thus was owing to a reason. That is precisely what is meant or what we mean by reasoning. Although these reasons are, as they are, intrinsic to the revealed datum, or implicit in the revealed datum, or intellectually explanatory of the revealed datum, since they are drawn from the very core or essence of the revealed datum itself, it is clear that they do not objectively add to that datum, but merely explain it, or unfold it, or develop it in a continuous line of real identity or objective homogeneity. And, parenthetically, here too we have the answer to a very common objection raised by those who deny all true dogmatic progress, at least by way of reasoning or argumentation. They say that the best proof that there is no development in dogma, or that reasoning does not intervene in that development, lies in the fact that the Ecumenical Councils, when they seek to define a dogma, always and above all attend to ascertaining what the Holy Fathers and the tradition of the Church thought on the matter. This is true, but those who raise such an objection fail to notice that reasoning had often already intervened beforehand in forming that sentiment of the Holy Fathers and that tradition of the Church on which the Councils precisely rely. This, as we have seen, is recognized by the Councils themselves. 212. TENTH EXAMPLE.—It would be easy to continue offering many more examples of that kind of dogma, known and defined by the Church by way of reasoning ²³ . The Council of Trent, in declaring that the truths of faith are contained "in the written books and in the unwritten traditions" (Denzinger, n. 783), and that the Church is the infallible guardian and interpreter of this deposit, does not thereby exclude the possibility that the Church may propose as dogma a truth that is only virtually revealed, since the Council itself, in defining the canon of Scripture and the number of the sacraments, did not limit itself to repeating what was formally contained in the sources, but, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, drew out what was implicit in them. Hence, the objection falls to the ground, because the very practice of the Councils shows that they do not stop at merely ascertaining what the Fathers and tradition have said, but they also exercise their own judgment in drawing out and defining the truth, which is a genuine act of reasoning, albeit one guided by the Holy Spirit, and it is precisely this that constitutes the human instrument of dogmatic progress.

dentino is a very rich mine of them. In the Vatican Council, a few could also be gleaned. But we believe that the examples adduced suffice for our purpose, and we shall add only one more example, which we consider to be of no small importance.

Many, and indeed most theologians, regard as proximate to faith or as definable by divine faith, and consequently as revealed, the following most fundamental truth: “The infallibility of the Church is not limited to what is formally or immediately revealed, but extends also to what is virtual or mediately revealed.” This same truth is also commonly expressed in this other form: “The infallibility of the Church is not limited to what is revealed in itself, but extends to everything necessarily connected with the revealed deposit or necessary for the preservation of said deposit.” Let us hear the illustrious Cardinal Franzelin: “This extension of infallibility, by the consensus of all theologians, is a truth so theologically certain that its denial would be a most grave error, or even, in the opinion of many, heresy, although it has not so far been explicitly condemned as heresy”²⁴. The no less illustrious Cardinal Billot expresses the same: “This infallibility is indeed most certainly gathered from revealed principles, but it is also by most held as formally revealed, although it has not yet been authentically proposed as a dogma of divine faith”²⁵.

Now then: how and where is this truth revealed? It is revealed in other truths, in which it is contained virtually, and from which it emerges only by reasoning. Those other truths are: first, the Church has received the divine commission to safeguard the revealed deposit; second, the Church could not safeguard that deposit without infallibility regarding what is mediately revealed. From these two propositions, one of faith and one of reason, the truth in question follows by rigorous reasoning.

This reasoning, which can be found in any theology manual, is thus set forth by the always concise and clear De Groot: “The means must be proportioned to the end; but if the deposit of faith is to be safeguarded, the proportioned means are lacking unless infallibility is extended to theological conclusions: therefore the object of infallibility is also theological conclusions”²⁶. The theological conclusion is the type of everything mediately revealed, and that same reasoning applies to all of it, even to dogmatic facts.

Surely there will be someone who says: “That reasoning of De Groot and of all the theologians is very good; but, besides that reasoning, we have the sentiment of the Holy Fathers and the practice of the Church, and on that sentiment and on that practice, and not on any reasoning, rests the truth we are dealing with, assuming that it is dogmatic.”

Very well; but we ask again: and from where did that sentiment of the Holy Fathers and that practice of the Church arise? They arose from a principle of faith, which is the divine commission to preserve the deposit; and from a truth of reason, which is the natural, speculative, and practical evidence that it is impossible to guard the deposit without infallibility regarding mediately revealed matters. That is, they arose precisely from the cited reasoning, which is a reasoning explanatory of the revealed major premise, but a true, proper, and rigorous reasoning. In every similar objection concerning the sentiment of the Holy Fathers and of the Church, as if that were contrary to the intervention of reason or reasoning, the theologian must always recall that luminous observation already cited from John of Saint Thomas: “For indeed the Council wishes to prove this very thing, namely, why the Church so understood it” (210).

Whatever judgment may be formed of the ten preceding examples, no one will be able to tell us again that we confine ourselves to some hypothetical example, without descending to concrete and real examples, as our wise objector told us in his cited letter (190).

213. Having already examined the speculative path, or that of inclusive reasoning, and before entering upon the study of the affective path, or that of vital experience—these being the two great paths along which dogmatic development takes place—let us say a few words concerning the so-called path of assimilation.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MATERIAL LIFE AND OF INTELLECTUAL LIFE.—Ever since Cardinal Newman wrote his brilliant Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, there has been talk, even among Catholic writers, of assimilation as one of the paths of dogmatic development. In our judgment, such assimilation does not exist, not only in dogma, but not even in the sciences; and whatever has been said to the contrary comes from improperly extending to the spiritual life of the intellect the laws and material processes of vegetative and animal life.

Indeed, for a principle or intellectual statement, whether abstract or concrete, to develop and grow in the human intellect, there is no need whatsoever for the assimilation of extraneous matter, but only for simple comparison with other intellectual statements, whether these come from the speculative or the practical reason, or from internal or external experience. As St. Thomas rightly observes¹, every intellectual statement is light, and the contact or application of light, without increasing or modifying the objectivity of what is seen, increases the visual power of the seer and even the visibility of the object or of what in the object was latent, implicit, virtual. In this lies the force and value of what in ordinary language we call comparison or contact of two or more truths with one another, and which in logic is known by the technical name of reasoning. Every statement, upon coming into contact or comparison with another, or every major premise, upon coming into comparison with an inclusive minor, develops: because the contact of the light of the minor makes new aspects, new relations, new predicates, new truths, new statements appear visible in the major that before, although they were there, did not appear; as upon contact of the plate with the reagent the features that were on the plate are drawn out or become clear, or better, as upon contact of known quantities the true values of the unknown in an equation are revealed.

That is, according to St. Thomas, the true psychology of intellectual progress and of the life of our intelligence, and that is, therefore, the true psychology of the progress and life of faith and of dogma, since faith is formally an intellectual virtue. To speak of assimilations in dogmatic progress is to confuse the life of the intelligence with animal or vegetative life. In the vegetative or animal organism, by reason of its material character, no development or evolution is possible except through intussusception and assimilation of foreign elements, and whoever says assimilation says transformism. On the other hand, intellectual life develops, not by transforming the primitive principles or propositions, but by comparing them with one another or with other propositions so that, in the light of some, what is hidden in others may appear. Intellectual life resembles, not chemical assimilation or combination, nor even mathematical addition or subtraction, but the development of an equation, whose end and whose process is not to increase or diminish in any way the true value of the unknowns, but to resolve or explain their implicit or latent values by means of known values.

214. Such is, according to the Thomist school, the true and only office of the much-discussed inclusive minor premises of reason in the development of dogma. The most serious problems related to what is today called the evolution of dogma, which many treat as new problems and even almost accuse the great geniuses of Scholasticism of having ignored, were treated and resolved in principle by them and, above all, by St. Thomas and his school, with a depth and breadth that contrasts with the superficiality with which they are treated not only in heterodox works, but also in many Catholic manuals. What we today call the contact of revelation with the various philosophies and civilizations, the Scholastics called the contact of the major premises of faith with the minor premises of reason; what we today study under the name of dogmatic evolution, they studied under the name of theological conclusion; just as today we discuss whether dogmatic progress is the result of an assimilation of rational data by the truths of faith, they discussed it under the heading of whether the minor premise of reason is a true principle or a concause or merely an auxiliary or instrument of the conclusion; the modern question of whether there can be true development or evolution in dogma, they discussed under the formula of whether theological conclusions are of divine faith or definable as being of faith.

The solution of St. Thomas and his school to these problems was always that the minor premises of reason are in theological reasoning merely an instrument of the major premises of faith or mere auxiliaries of our reason to develop what already exists latent in the major premises of faith, which have as their object neither to increase, diminish, nor modify the objectivity of those major premises of faith, but only to explain or develop their implicitness or virtuality; that the conclusion is found not at once in the major premise of faith and in the minor premise of reason, but solely and exclusively in the major premise of faith; that the conclusion does not issue from the major and the minor, but from the major alone through the aid of the minor; that the minor premises of reason are not proper theological sources or formal principles of the conclusion, but mere auxiliary principles; that, therefore, the theological conclusion or theology is not an objective addition to the major premise of faith or revealed deposit, but an intellectual explanation²; that, finally, this explanation is a divine-human explanation or an explanation of the divine deposit by human reason, when it is made solely through the deduction of mere men, that is, of theologians; but it is a divine-divine explanation, that is, an explanation of the divine deposit by the authority of God Himself, when it is made under the assistance of the Holy Spirit, as it is in every infallible definition of the Church.

Thus, both the truths of revelation and the truths of reason are for our intellect sources of light, of very different natures and values, but always light. Brought into contact, they could not but illuminate one another mutually³. The truths of faith have served to advance those of reason; the truths of reason, in turn, have served to advance those of faith. With the truths of faith we have been able to discover in those of reason what philosophers would never have managed to discover without them; with the truths of reason we have discovered in those of faith or in the revealed deposit what would always have remained hidden from the faithful or theologians without them. There is in neither case an assimilation of the truths of reason by those of faith, or vice versa, but a mutual illumination. The assimilation of a truth of reason by another of faith would not advance faith, nor even theology, but would corrupt them; for nothing is truly of faith or of theology unless it is truly included in the principles of theology and of faith, and the true principles of faith, as of theology, are not nor will ever be the truths of reason, but the truths of divine faith.

In sum, the relationship of the premises of faith to those of reason, or of the revealed deposit to the various human philosophies or civilizations with which it has come into contact, is not the assimilating relationship of the stomach to food, but rather the instrumental or auxiliary relationship of the telescope or microscope to vision, or that of the chemical reagent to the already exposed plate, or that of the known quantities to the unknowns in a mathematical equation. Its purpose is not to add, nor to remove, nor to change, nor to assimilate anything, but solely and exclusively to discover or develop what was already implied, and for this reason the ancients very aptly called it explicating the revealed datum.

THE PHOTOGRAPHIC PLATE IMPRESSED BY DIVINE THOUGHT

215. When a photographic plate has already been impressed by an object, it needs no new impression, but only to be developed. It is, then, already a developable plate. But to develop it, it is not a matter of indifference to use just any liquid or any kind of manipulation, but rather such liquids and such manipulations as do not erase, mix, or modify the image already impressed, but only develop it, explain it. What we call the revealed deposit is nothing other than the photographic plate impressed by the word of God. On that plate there are already from the beginning certain features clearly perceptible and which, therefore, do not need, in order to be seen and understood, any manipulation or development whatsoever. That is what we call explicit development, or, more briefly, the revealed, as Saint Thomas calls it. But on that plate there are many other features, already really impressed upon it, but still hidden, deep, not perceptible to the naked eye, implicit. These do need to be manipulated, to be explained, to be developed. That is the implicit-virtual development, or, more briefly, the revealable of the plate, as it is called in the language of Saint Thomas. The liquids or manipulations used to develop or explain that divine plate, that premise of faith, are what we call reasoning or premises of reason. But not just any liquid or any manipulation suffices; not just any premise suffices, but one that does not erase, mix, or modify the features already impressed upon the premise of faith. And this is achieved when the premise of reason is of the essence or of the intellectu of the premise of faith, when it is perfectly suited or proportioned to its nature (96 and 107). Then it is certain that the features of the image that appear explained or developed in the conclusion would not have been known without the manipulation or without the liquid of the minor premise of reason; but it is no less certain that the features do not come from the liquid or from the manipulations of the developer of the plate, but from the plate itself, that is, from the object that impressed the plate. This is the profound and most real meaning of those golden phrases of Saint Thomas in describing the nature of theology and of the properly so-called theological conclusion: «Quia igitur Sacra Doctrina (the Sacred Theology, insofar as it is a properly so-called science) considerat aliqua secundum quod sunt divinitus revelata (that is, the explicitly revealed, the features already perceptible on the plate from the beginning, the features already revealed), omnia divinitus revelabilia (all the features already impressed, but still implicit, and which are explicable or revealable by human reason) communicant in una ratione huius scientiae⁴. Ut sic sacra doctrina sit velut IMPRESSIO DIVINAE SCIENTIAE, quae est una et simplex omnium"⁵. Every theological conclusion, properly and rigorously such, like every definition of the Church, is therefore nothing more than an explanation or development of the plate impressed by God of the revealed deposit. Hence, what theology gives us, as what the Church gives us, is nothing other than the implicitly revealed. Omnia implicite continentur in S. Biblia, says Capreolus commenting on that same article (378).

215. NEWMAN'S TRUE THOUGHT.—If the learned Cardinal Newman speaks of a process of assimilation, it is because he is dealing not only with development in doctrine, but also in rites or disciplines and other accidental things of Christianity, in which, being for the most part external things, not only assimilation is possible, but also transformation, just as a living being transforms its clothing or its nourishment without transforming its specific nature.

In reality, Newman understands by “additions” or by “assimilations,” when dealing with doctrines, the same thing that traditional theology understands by “development” or “explanations” of implicit virtuality. This habit of calling everything that was not “explicit” from the beginning “additions” or “assimilations” was maintained by Cardinal Newman throughout his entire life; but sometimes he explains himself with such clarity that he leaves no doubt whatsoever about the meaning he gives to such words.

Here is how Newman expressed his thought in 1849, four years after his conversion: "It is well known that although the belief of the Church has been one and the same from the beginning, nevertheless it has been so deeply hidden in her bosom, that it has only been shared by her members individually, in a more or less implicit manner, rather than being proposed from the very beginning in those special determinations, called definitions, as it is now presented to us, to guard us against error or ignorance. These definitions, which are but the expression of a single dogma, always admitted by the Church, are the work of time; they have increased in the course of eighteen centuries until acquiring their present form and number, following the exigencies of fortuitous events, such as heresies and other similar things, and, naturally, they may receive in time further additions"⁶

Thus, twenty-five years after his conversion he wrote to Dr. Whitty: "A time will come when it will be seen how those traditions are compatible with additions, that is, with true developments, which those traditions do not explicitly teach in themselves"⁷.

Let us add this note from his Essays critical and historical, published in 1871: "The hypothesis about the depositum fidei, to which I gradually adhered, is that of doctrinal development, or the evolution of doctrine starting from certain original and fixed dogmatic truths, which from the first day to the last are held as inviolable and ever more firmly established and illustrated by a true process of enlargement." And he adds that, in speaking of "new forms, distinct from one another" (in the first edition of this work), he has plagiarized the language of a theory that is not his own: "I have given utterance to a theory, not mine"⁸.

Here is a new text no less interesting. We find it in Newman's lectures on the "Difficulties of the Anglicans": "The whole revelation was made to the Apostles, but it is the Church who transmits it to us. Absolutely no new truth has been proposed to us since the death of Saint John. The Church's sole function is to 'guard this noble deposit of the truth.'"

—as St. Paul says to Timothy—that the Apostles have bequeathed to her in its fullness and integrity⁹

Finally, let us recall in what terms Newman expresses his thought on the development of dogma: "Revelation is everything in Catholic doctrine: the Apostles are the sole source; the deductive method, its only instrument, and the authority of the Church, the only sanction" (204).

When in his famous book, entitled An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, in fixing the seven notes or characteristics of legitimate or homogeneous development, he sets as the third note "the power of assimilation" and as the sixth note "preservative additions," Newman expressly requires that those truths which he calls assimilations or additions not only do not oppose the primitive datum either by excess or by defect (as happens in every contrary concept), nor even be completely disconnected or foreign (as happens in every diverse concept), but that they be truly akin, which is precisely the same thing that the great Scholastics called conforming concepts (consona) or mutually implicit ones (20). In reality, among ideas there can be no affinity without internal connection, and if that connection is absolute or metaphysical, such affinity is nothing other than a true implicit identity (247), and then what psychologists like Newman call, in physiological language, assimilation or addition, is not, in the truly philosophical and theological language of the school, anything other than a true explanation of the implicit. That is also the sense that Newman gives to his phrase "new dogmas," that is, not objectively new, but explicitly new.

Therefore, we believe that a great injustice has been done to Newman not only by the modernists, who pretend to see in him a precursor of their doctrines, but also by certain Catholic theologians who have believed that Newman's ideas on the evolution of dogma were not in perfect agreement with Catholic doctrine, solely because his peculiar phraseology in this matter differs considerably from that commonly used by scholastic theologians¹⁰. With great

reason wrote of Newman His Holiness Pius X the following words: "Indeed, in such a great abundance of his (Newman's) lucubrations, something can be found that may seem foreign to the customary method of theologians; nothing can be found that would bring suspicion upon his faith itself"¹¹.

In our judgment, Newman’s ideas on the evolution of dogma are not only perfectly orthodox, but also completely traditional at bottom; although his theological-philosophical nomenclature is sometimes as poor and deficient as his psychological observation and his historical synthesis of dogmatic evolution are always rich and penetrating. His immortal book Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine (An Essay on the Development of Christian doctrine), which he wrote while still an Anglican, and while writing which he converted to Catholicism, constitutes, in our opinion, the clearest vision that a stranger to the Catholic Church can have of its nature and development, one who looks at it from outside, but so closely that he is already almost touching it with his hand. That book of Newman’s constitutes something like the bridge by which one passes from Anglicanism to Catholicism, and therein lies its great merit. But, for that very reason, it also constitutes the bridge by which, if one is careless or mistaken, one can pass from Catholicism to Anglicanism or to Modernism, and therein lies its possible danger. For a Catholic, approaching that conception of the Catholic Church seen from outside that Newman presents to us there is like approaching the extreme limit where Catholicism borders on Protestantism; just as for a Protestant it is approaching the extreme limit where Protestantism borders on Catholicism.

That is the reason why we do not customarily advise every young Catholic indiscriminately to read that and some other work of Newman without being well grounded in a solid philosophical-theological culture, and, on the contrary, we would advise and have always advised every Protestant or agnostic to read, and to read frequently, that and all the other works of Newman, certain that such reading must draw them toward Catholicism more than all the theological and philosophical apologies, but of a speculative and intellectualist character, that the greatest Catholic theologians and metaphysicians have written.

If the illustrious Newman had been as great a theologian or philosopher as he was a psychologist and historian, we believe that he could have written one of the best apologies for the Catholic religion that could be imagined.

But he himself recognized, and was not ashamed to confess it, that he was neither a good theologian nor did he ever hope to become one. Writing to Sister María Pía in February 1869, he expresses himself thus: "Really and truly, I am not a theologian... I am not, and never shall be" (Really and truly I am not a theologian... I am not, and never shall be)¹².

From that lack of theology, or rather of precision in theological nomenclature, it has come about that Newman speaks of additions or assimilations in dogma, when in his mind such words mean no more than developments or homogeneous explanations of what was already contained in a virtual but truly implicit manner in the primitive datum. That is the only evolution possible in dogma. To speak of additions or assimilations in another sense would not be homogeneous or explanatory evolution, but transformationist.

216. If progress by way of assimilation does not exist, there is, on the other hand, in dogma another way of development completely distinct from the way of reasoning. We refer to the way of affection, the way of will, the way of piety, the way of feeling, the way of experience, the mystical way; that way, in a word, of which Saint Thomas speaks so frequently, calling it the way per modum connaturalitatis, per quandam affinitatem, quasi experimentalis, per contactum, and other similar names, and which the holy Doctor always contrasts with the way per studium, per inquisitionem, per ratiocinium. To understand this new way well, one must fix attention on three points, namely: on the role that in our judgments is played by: a) affective life in general; b) natural habits; c) supernatural habits.

THE AFFECTIVE LIFE IN GENERAL.—Everyone knows the important role that the affective life plays in our judgments. Love excites and concentrates attention, causing one to think more constantly and with greater fixity on the beloved object, and concentrating attention is equivalent to increasing cognitive power, according to the well-known adage "pluribus intentus minor est ad singula sensus". This constitutes a great advantage for the knowledge and development of a truth. When the physicist or the chemist tries to study in depth the properties of a body or of any phenomenon whatsoever, they begin above all by seeking to isolate it from everything else in order to study it in all its purity, without any mixture of extraneous impressions, which are often a frequent cause of error or deception. That is precisely what love does with respect to the beloved object. The lover fixes his gaze with intensity and even with exclusivity upon what he loves, thus receiving its impressions with greater force and greater purity and discerning sooner properties or traits that others do not notice or take longer to discern¹. The beloved disciple is the first to recognize on the seashore the risen Jesus and to exclaim immediately: “Dominus est”.

But to this well-known advantage of love there is sometimes joined a great disadvantage no less well known. Objects, in order to be well and duly appreciated, frequently need to be compared with others, since our knowledge, unlike that of the angels, has a far greater share of the relative or comparative than of the absolute or intuitive. He who does not undertake diverse and comparative studies, he who limits himself to a single order of ideas and much more to a single object—the specialist, in a word—runs the danger of narrowness and shortsightedness of judgment, of exclusivism in appreciation, of despising and even of not seeing what does not interest him, of magnifying that very thing which interests him as if it were the only thing of value and worthy of attention². From specialist or enthusiast to shortsighted or visionary there is frequently but a single step, as experience shows only too well. It is not without reason that love is represented with a blindfold over its eyes.

In any case, if the advantages or disadvantages of love, whatever they may be, were reduced solely, as some believe, to facilitating or hindering attention, and through attention the speculative judgment, then the affective life would respectively be a spur or a hindrance to the intellectual path, but it would not come to constitute a second path, an autonomous path distinct from the path of reasoning. But in the affective life there is much more than that, as we are about to see.

217. NATURAL HABITS OR DISPOSITIONS.—Habit constitutes a second nature, and since a good or virtuous habit is one that conforms to reason, it follows that whoever possesses a virtuous habit or a good natural disposition possesses within himself and without leaving himself a real, physical, immanent element, and at the same time objective, for judging experimentally and without reasoning, with respect to the object of such a habit, as well as or better than one who, without possessing such a habit, tries to judge by mere science or speculative reasoning.

It may be said, and it is said, that he who possesses a virtuous habit or natural disposition possesses a new sense. Thus we generally speak of the sense of art, the sense of modesty, the sense of honor, the sense or feeling in all orders. In the same way that through the exterior senses we perceive external objects by immediate contact, without comparison or reasoning, by simple and true intuition, so too he who possesses, for example, the habit of chastity perceives spontaneously and intuitively the purity or impurity of an action or of a doctrine relating to that matter with more promptness and vivacity, and even at times with greater certainty, than the speculative moralist, if he is not chaste, with all his reasoning. We see the same thing daily in art, in education, in religion, and in all orders of life. It is an effect of natural disposition or acquired habit, a kind of sense or interior instinct by which we judge by an experiential or connatural way because we carry within ourselves in the habit a second nature, that is, a real and objective likeness or participation, and not merely intentional or ideal, of the object judged. As by the sense of taste, says Saint Thomas³, we perceive and discern flavors, so by the habits we perceive and discern without reasoning the suitability or unsuitability, the truth or falsity, of acts or doctrines referring to each habit.

218. SUPERNATURAL HABITS.—What happens in the natural order happens with much greater truth in the supernatural order. Rather, what is only likeness in the natural order is reality and identity in the supernatural order.

Indeed: according to Catholic doctrine, grace and the virtues and gifts derived from it are a real participation in the Divinity. Moreover: by sanctifying grace, the Divinity itself in its Unity and Trinity of persons dwells in our soul, not in a purely similitude-based or metaphorical manner, but in an objective and most real manner, however mysterious and ineffable it may be. This indwelling of the Divinity itself in the most intimate depth of our own being begins virtually with the supernatural faith possessed by every Christian, even if a sinner, and is consummated formally with sanctifying grace and with the virtues and gifts possessed by every just man.

He, then, who possesses divine faith, and much more he who possesses sanctifying grace with its virtues and gifts, possesses and bears within himself, after the manner of a nature, the very object from which all the affirmations of faith are born and upon which they turn, and from which all dogmatic developments spring and from which alone they can spring, since nothing is or can be dogmatic or of divine faith that is not a real expression of the divinity. The believer, then, and much more the saint, possesses within himself a new sense, which Saint Paul calls the sense of Christ, and which we might well call the sense of faith or the eyes of faith.

Now then: in the natural order, we know from history and experience that the aesthetic sense, for example, or the moral sense have contributed or contribute as much as or more than speculative rules to appreciating and developing the arts or ethics. Let us now imagine what would happen if artistic feeling or moral virtue, instead of being the heritage of a few geniuses or elevated souls, were universal, and if the world were a society composed exclusively of brilliant artists or of souls with a lofty and delicate moral sense.

Now then: what is only a supposition in the natural order is a reality in the supernatural order. All Christians carry within themselves, along with the habit of faith, an inchoate but real participation in divinity: countless among them possess sanctifying grace, and with grace, charity and supernatural virtues and gifts, and through grace and charity, divinity itself and its divine life; and some, many more than we believe, possess that life and those gifts in the heroic degree that we call holiness, which makes the life of God almost normal in them.

That faith, that grace, that charity, those virtues, those gifts, especially the gifts of wisdom, of understanding, and of knowledge, are objective supernatural realities, second natures that we carry grafted into what today we would call the subconsciousness of our very being, and through which we can perceive, judge, and develop by way of connaturalness, by way of intuition, by way of contact, by way of what is almost experimental, many supernatural truths that the speculative theologian perceives only by way of science, by way of conclusion, by way of study, by way of laborious reasoning.

This often happens, as the history of dogmas shows, that before speculative theology has deduced, or even sometimes so much as glimpsed, a conclusion or dogmatic development, a holy soul or a simple faithful believer of lively and simple piety has felt or sensed that development, has communicated it to other believers, and they have spontaneously accepted it as the faithful expression of their own feeling or faith, and that this feeling has finally come to spread so widely as to become the common feeling of the whole Christian people.

It is clear that scarcely has such a sentiment, with its appearance of novelty, begun to manifest itself and become widespread, when speculative theology seizes upon it to subject it to rigorous examination, comparing it with the revealed sources of divine Scripture and tradition and with the authentic criteria of the Holy Fathers, councils, and popes. Frequently it will happen that speculative theology will demonstrate that this sentiment of the faithful, which seemed new, is nothing other than an explanation or conclusion of what was already implicitly contained in the revealed sources and in defined formulas. At other times, on the contrary, speculative theology will not be able to demonstrate it with rigorous proof and will limit itself to a greater or lesser probability. But whether speculative theology demonstrates it or not, that common sentiment of the faithful people is by itself alone a sufficient criterion, even without theological reasoning, for the pope or the council, under the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit, to be able to define such a truth as a dogma of faith, as a legitimate dogmatic development. The Church is not bound, in order to define a truth, either to the reasoning of theologians or to the sentiment of the faithful, for she is not a disciple, but a teacher, of both the faithful and the theologians. Any human means that certifies to her the explicit or implicit existence of a truth in the revealed deposit is a sufficient means for her, assisted by the Holy Spirit, to be able to define that truth. Among these means is the sentiment of the faithful people as much as or more than theological reasoning; and to forming that sentiment the habits of faith, grace, charity, the virtues, and the gifts contribute in a connatural way or without reasoning, as much as or more than speculative theology contributes through the path of study and reasoning.

219. TEXTS OF ST. THOMAS.—In confirmation of all that has been said in this section, we shall here transcribe, gathered together, some texts from the Angelic Doctor. We will choose only a few, and the shortest, but sufficient to show what those two ways of knowledge consist of, which we have called the way of reasoning and the affective way. They read as follows:

“Rectitude of judgment can come about in two ways: in one way, according to the perfect use of reason; in another way, because of a certain connaturality with the things about which judgment is to be made.

Sicut of those things that pertain to chastity, he who has learned moral science judges rightly through rational inquiry: but he who possesses the habit of chastity judges rightly through a certain connaturality with them”⁴

“Just as taste judges flavors according to its own disposition, so does the mind of man judge concerning something to be done according to its habitual disposition”⁵

“Duplex is knowledge... One kind is speculative...; another however is affective or experiential, when one experiences in oneself the taste of divine sweetness”⁶

“Haec autem sufficientia (in cognoscendo) in quibusdam est per studium et doctrinam, adiuncta vivacitate intellectus: sed in quibusdam accidit per quamdam affinitatem ad divina, ut Dionysius dicit de Hierotheo”⁷

“And in this way too the moral virtues are said to operate more certainly as a skill, insofar as they are moved by reason to their acts in the manner of nature”⁸

“Some have certain virtues from natural disposition... and consequently they have naturally right judgment”⁹

“Habitus scientiae inclines toward the knowable in the manner of reason...; but the habit of faith, since it does not rely on reason, [inclines] in the manner of nature, just as do the habits of the moral virtues and the habits of the first principles”¹⁰

“But the light of faith is like a certain seal of the First Truth. Hence this light suffices for judging. Yet this habit does not move through the way of the intellect, but rather through the way of the will”¹¹

“The human soul is not moved by the Holy Spirit unless it is in some way united to Him, just as an instrument is not moved by the craftsman except by contact, or through some other union. Now the first union of man is through faith, hope, and charity”¹²

“For first, man is joined to God through faith”¹³

“Faith indeed is the life of the soul, according to that passage in Romans: The just shall live by faith¹⁴

“Therefore, by the fact that charity is in the will, it is not alien to reason... Through a certain affinity to reason”¹⁵

“And this is what God does by increasing charity, so that the likeness of the Holy Spirit is participated in the soul more perfectly”¹⁶

“Gratia et gloria ad idem genus referuntur”¹⁷

"Wisdom which is a gift is more excellent than wisdom which is an intellectual virtue, since it attains God more intimately, through a certain union of the soul with Him"¹⁸

“Out of a certain connaturality or union with divine things which comes about through charity”¹⁹

“Through a certain union with divine things to which we are united only through love”²⁰

“Uncreated Wisdom which first unites itself to us through the gift of charity, and from this reveals to us the mysteries, whose knowledge is infused wisdom. And therefore infused wisdom is not the cause of charity, but rather its effect”²¹

“But that man may be united to those most high causes, transformed into their likeness, in the manner in which he who is joined to God is one spirit”²², “so that thus, as it were, from his inmost self he may judge other things..., this is brought about through the gift of wisdom”²³

“As wisdom, which is an intellectual virtue, relates to the understanding of principles because it in some way comprehends them, so does wisdom, which is a gift, relate to faith, which is the simple knowledge of the articles [of faith], which are the principles of all Christian wisdom. For the gift of wisdom proceeds to a certain deiform contemplation and in some way explicit [understanding] of the articles, which faith holds in a certain veiled manner according to the human mode”²⁴

“Unde if there are some things which are apprehended immediately without rational discourse, this is not called reason, but intellect... And this is what the gift of understanding does: it illumines the mind regarding what is heard (concerning faith), so that in the manner of first principles what is heard is immediately approved”²⁵

“The soul is conformed to God by grace. Hence, for a divine Person to be sent to someone by grace, it is necessary that the soul be made assimilated to the divine Person who is sent, through some gift of grace. And since the Holy Spirit is love, the soul is assimilated to the Holy Spirit through the gift of charity. Therefore, the mission of the Holy Spirit is understood according to the gift of charity. But the Son is the Word, not any kind of word, but one that breathes forth love... And therefore Augustine fittingly says that “the Son is sent when He is known and perceived by anyone.” Moreover, perception signifies an experiential kind of knowledge. And this is properly called wisdom, as it were, savory knowledge”²⁶.

“The divine persons themselves, by a certain sealing of themselves, leave in our souls certain gifts... Hence this knowledge is quasi-experimental”²⁷.

“Wisdom is called an intellectual virtue insofar as it proceeds from the judgment of reason: it is, however, called a gift insofar as it operates from divine instinct”²⁸.

“And therefore divine knowledge is not discursive or ratiocinative, but absolute and simple: to which is similar the knowledge that is posited as a gift of the Holy Spirit, since it is a certain participated likeness of it”²⁹.

“Non quicumque intelligit habet donum intellectus, sed qui intelligit quasi ex habitu gratiae: ita etiam illi solum donum scientiae habent qui ex infusione gratiae rectum iudicium habent circa credenda et agenda... Et haec est scientia Sanctorum”³⁰.

Finally, these two ways of knowing and developing dogma had already been pointed out by Saint Thomas on the very frontispiece of his masterwork, the Summa Theologica, that is, in the very first question, where he expresses himself thus:

“Since judgment pertains to wisdom, according to a twofold manner of judging, wisdom is taken in two ways. For it happens that one judges in one way by way of inclination; just as one who has the habit of virtue rightly judges of those things which are to be done according to virtue, inasmuch as he is inclined to them. Hence also in the Ethics, book X, chapter 5, it is said that the virtuous man is the measure and rule of human acts. In another way by way of knowledge, just as someone instructed in moral science could judge of acts of virtue, even if he did not have the habit of virtue. The first manner, therefore, of judging of divine things pertains to that wisdom which is set down as a gift of the Holy Spirit, according to that text of 1 Corinthians 2:15: The spiritual man judges all things. And Dionysius, in On the Divine Names, ch. 12, says: “Hierotheus was taught not only by learning, but also by suffering “divine things”. The second manner of judging, however, pertains to this doctrine (that is, to speculative theology) insofar as it is possessed through study: although its principles are had from revelation”³¹

We have already seen that what the Holy Doctor says here about the gift of wisdom he applies proportionally to all the other habits of faith, grace, charity, virtues, and gifts, since every supernatural habit is a real participation in the Divinity, and the Divinity is the formal object of dogma and of all dogmatic developments.

220. TWO SOURCES AND TWO PATHS.—There are, then, two sources of dogma and of dogmatic development: a derived and conceptual source, which consists of the revealed formulas; and a primordial and real source, which is the Divinity itself. These two sources, although distinct, are not independent either in their origin or in their possession by us. Not in their origin, for the first is derived from and springs forth from the second, since the revealed statements or dogmatic formulas are nothing but conceptual and partial, yet true, expressions of the Divinity. Not in their possession by us, for there can be no possession of the Divinity through grace without faith in the revealed statements, at least in the two most general statements of the existence of a God, supernatural and rewarder.

Corresponding to those two sources, there must also exist, and there do exist, two different ways of perceiving, judging, and developing dogma. The first is the way of statements or revealed formulas, comparing them with one another or with the statements of reason, which is what constitutes the way of reasoning. The second is the way of Divinity itself, with which we enter into immediate contact through the habits of faith, grace, virtues, and gifts, which is what constitutes the affective way.

As can be seen by reviewing the texts cited in the previous paragraph, Saint Thomas calls the first way by the following names: a) per usum rationis; b) per rationis inquisitionem; c) per modum cognitionis; d) cognitio speculativa; e) per studium et doctrinam; f) per modum rationis; g) per viam intellectus; h) secundum humanum modum; i) ex iudicio rationis; l) scientia discursiva vel ratiocinativa.

He designates the second way by an even greater variety of names, namely: (a) through connaturality (per connaturalitatem); (b) by way of inclination (per modum inclinationis); (c) affective knowledge (cognitio affectiva); (d) experimental knowledge (notitia experimentalis); (e) through affinity with divine things (per affinitatem ad divina); (f) by way of nature (per modum naturae); (g) by way of the will (per viam voluntatis); (h) through contact (per contactum); (i) through union with God (per unionem ad Deum); (l) through love (per amorem); (m) from the depths of oneself (ex intimo sui); (n) through God-like contemplation (per deiformem contemplationem); (o) after the manner of first principles (ad modum primorum principiorum); (p) without discursive reasoning (sine discursu); (q) by divine instinct (ex instinctu divino); (r) absolute and simple knowledge (cognitio absoluta et simplex); (s) as though from a habit (quasi ex habitu).

Of these two ways, the first is the way of reason; the second, the way of the heart. The first is the logical way; the second is the experimental way or, as is often said today, the vital way. The first is the way of speculative theology, of the science of the wise; the second is the way of mystical theology, of the science of the saints.

Through both channels runs and develops the dogmatic sap, the supernatural life; every true theologian, like every true historian of dogmas, must attend to both and appreciate both equally; but always and above all looking, if he does not wish to go astray, to the beacon that illuminates both channels, which is none other than the infallible authority of the Church, assisted by the Holy Spirit, the sole principal cause of dogmatic development, and of which the learning of the scholar as well as the piety of the saint are but instruments.

Two EXAMPLES OF THE LIVELINESS OF THE SENSE OF FAITH.—To show how strong and lively this sense of faith is in some cases, even without any speculative reasoning, we will cite only two examples.

First, the dogma of the Immaculate Conception. The sense of the faithful regarding this dogma was so strong, even many centuries before it was defined, that the Christian people could not, without true torment and scandal, so much as hear the contrary. Even the adversaries of the definability of this dogma were forced to acknowledge this. Let us hear Melchor Cano: "Quod si propositionum absonarum consonarumque iudicium Ecclesia in vulgi auribus collocasset, illam certe propositionem: "Beata Virgo peccatum originis a primo parente contraxit", male sonare et pias aures offendere iudicaremus. Illa enim audita, vulgus sine dubio perstringitur, percutitur, *torquetur"³² What Cano there calls with a certain disdain "the common people" was in the sixteenth century the entire Christian people, both simple villagers and educated persons alike, provided that the latter were not excessively preoccupied by the passions of the schools. Let us hear the no less wise than pious Archbishop of Valencia, Saint Thomas of Villanova: "Et quomodo obsecro, non gloriabitur serpens, cuius ipsa fregit caput, si eam vel per instans vel per momentum habuit captivam suam? Nolo audire, non tolerant aures nostrae Virginem fuisse daemonio subiectam, vel per instans, vel per momentum"³³

A similar thing has happened in almost all the other dogmas concerning the most holy Mother of God and ours, both in the dogma of her perpetual virginity, and in that of her divine maternity, and in that of her exemption from all actual sin, dogmas that have already been defined, and in that of her glorious Assumption into heaven, which we hope will one day be defined³⁴

It seems as if all the dogmas referring to Mary had been entrusted to the custody and explanation of the loving heart of the simple and faithful Christian people, as much as or more than to the reasoning of speculative theology. The fact is that, as we said (209), all the dogmas referring to the Virgin have as their source her worthy divine motherhood, and the requirements or postulates of the "worthy motherhood" are perceived better with the loving and living heart of the son than with the cold and dry logic of the scholar.

The other typical example of the strength and vividness of the sense of the faith will be given to us by Saint Teresa of Jesus. For some time, and deceived by what certain books and masters of the spiritual life taught or seemed to teach, the Saint had persuaded herself that when one reaches certain elevated states of prayer, it was fitting to dispense entirely with the meditation of every sensible thing, even of the most sacred Humanity of our Savior, and to meditate only upon the Divinity. But soon the experiential and ever more vivid sense of her faith and of her holiness made her see with meridian clarity how erroneous and dangerous such a doctrine was, and that the Humanity of Jesus Christ, and not only His Divinity, was the way and the sure guide of all the degrees, whether small or great, of contemplation or the supernatural life. The Saint had such a vivid and clear intuition of this that, despite all the arguments to the contrary posed by her theologians and confessors, she maintained and defended it with that energy and decision with which things that are felt and experienced are defended, and which rarely exists in things perceived only through reasoning. Let us hear the Saint herself:

“It will also seem to you that one who has enjoyed such lofty things (that is, the divine communications of the Sixth Mansions) will no longer engage in meditation on the mysteries of the most sacred humanity of Our Lord Jesus Christ, because such a soul will now be exercised entirely in love. This is something I wrote at length elsewhere, for although I have been contradicted in this, and told that I do not understand it (because these are paths along which Our Lord leads, and once one has passed beyond the beginnings it is better to treat of matters of the divinity and flee from corporeal ones), they will never make me confess that this is a good path... For the same Lord, who says that He is the way, also says that He is the light and that no one can come to the Father except through Him; and whoever sees me, sees my Father. They will say that another meaning is given to these words. I know no other meanings... With this one, which MY SOUL ALWAYS FEELS TO BE TRUE, I have fared very well... Nor will anyone make me understand, no matter how spiritual he may claim to be, that one will fare well along this path ³⁵

Here is a woman without letters defending against numerous and wise adversaries a most important dogmatic truth and supporting her interpretation of Sacred Scripture with a decision and energy unusual in this supreme reason: this is what my soul always FEELS to be true.

That is the attitude and the formula of the sense of the faith, a sense that existed in the Saint, despite her lack of speculative learning, with more liveliness and more sure penetration than in all the confessors and theologians who surrounded her.

“Although contemplative and, so to speak, experimental knowledge is so little identical with knowledge acquired chiefly by rigorous scientific study that it can subsist without it; nevertheless, as a general rule, it proceeds in close connection with it. Except in the case where the former had been produced by a formal miracle, it must be prepared and supported by the latter. And conversely, the former not only gives the latter greater liveliness and depth (Innigkeit, intimacy), but also so powerfully favors its acquisition and perfection, that there have been saints who, with relatively very brief studies, have attained greater heights than others endowed with great natural faculties and aided by the most diligent labor” ³⁶.

This doctrine, which, supported by her lively experimental sense of faith, the Saint defends here, is almost the same as that which the Church defined a century later, when condemning the following proposition of Molinos: “It is not fitting for souls of this inward way... nor ought they to elicit acts of love towards.”

B. Virgin, the saints, or the humanity of Christ: because since these objects are sensible, such is the love for them³⁷. And another similar doctrine had already been defined by the Council of Vienne when it condemned the following proposition of the Beguards and Beguines: “That at the elevation of the body of Jesus Christ they should not rise, nor show reverence to it: asserting that it would be an imperfection for them if they descended from the purity and height of their contemplation to think upon the ministry or sacrament of the Eucharist or upon the passion of the humanity of Christ”³⁸.

In reality, very many dogmatic propositions defined or infallibly condemned by the Church, which today seem to us so clear and even so easy to prove from Sacred Scripture or from theological reasons, are only clear given our living and universal Christian sense. That Christian sense was often the first to discover them, although later reasoning, more or less conclusive, came to confirm them and the Church, assisted by the Holy Spirit, to define them. But perhaps they would not have been known or defined without the sense of faith, a sense that exists in a very special way in the saints, but which is also present in all souls who are in grace and even in some manner in all Christian faithful.

Hence all the great theologians have recognized the great value that the common sense of the faithful has for dogmatic development. Let us cite a few brief texts: “In a question of faith, the common sense of the faithful people is no slight authority in establishing the faith”³⁹. “For in the definitions of faith, account must be taken of the consensus of the faithful: since they indeed, insofar as the Church consists of them, with the assistance of the Holy Spirit, so purely preserve the divine revelations that all of them cannot err”⁴⁰. “The Church can declare which book is to be held as canonical, and this not rashly or at will, but from the testimonies of the ancients and from the similarity of the books in question to those not in question, and finally from the common sense and, as it were, taste of the Christian people”⁴¹. “For this definition it suffices that some supernatural truth be implicitly contained in tradition or Scripture, so that with the growing common consent of the Church, through which the Holy Spirit often explains traditions or declares Scripture, the Church may at length apply its definition”⁴². “Something can be established as a matter of faith by the consent of the universal Church, when all the faithful concur in firmly believing some dogma, with which unanimous consent falsity and deception cannot stand, because God assists the Church, lest it be wholly deceived”⁴³ “Make an exception for the case in which all the faithful, or the greater and better part of them, namely of all the theologians and the experts in canon law, would concur in believing or teaching that some truth is contained in the Sacred Scriptures, or in the traditions of the Church and the common doctrine of the Fathers, and would make that estimation known in writings and public discourses; for then the pontiff could, without any other prior examination, define that truth as a matter of faith”⁴⁴ “For whence, if not from the common sense of the faithful, is the certainty drawn that the Mother of God was sanctified, at least before the nativity? Whence are we certain that the same Blessed Virgin was assumed into heaven in both soul and body? If, therefore, no one doubts these things, how can there be doubt about the Immaculate Conception, which all the faithful hold and defend?⁴⁵ The generality of modern theologians express the same thing.

While this “sense of the faith” is found only in a few isolated believers—even if they are holy—or in only a part of the Church, its theological value is very weak.

But from the moment it becomes widespread and comes to be the common patrimony of bishops, theologians, and the faithful, it constitutes by itself and before any definition an argument whose value is equal to that of the most evident theological reasoning.

Thus one or the other—the evident reasoning or the certain and universal sentiment of Christendom regarding the inclusion of a doctrine in the revealed deposit—is for the Church a sufficient criterion of its definability.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE SENSE OF THE FAITH AND THE ORDINARY MAGISTERIUM.—It is fitting, however, to distinguish carefully between the sense of the faith, of which we have spoken in this section, and the ordinary magisterium of the Church, of which we have spoken elsewhere (135).

The first is found in all the faithful, especially in the faithful who are in a state of grace, and much more so in true saints, even if they are neither theologians nor bishops. The second is exclusive to bishops or pastors.

The first is not teaching nor magisterium, but simple experimental persuasion of a truth, and although, when it belongs to all the faithful, it is a sufficient criterion or preparation for its definition by the Church, it is not by itself a definition. The second is not only persuasion of a truth, but also magisterium or teaching of it, and when that magisterium is universal and definitive, it constitutes a true definition of faith by ordinary magisterium, of the same value as the definitions of faith by solemn magisterium.

To possess the first, that is, the sense of the faith, it suffices to be in the grace of God or at least to have true divine faith; to possess the second, that is, the power of ordinary magisterium, it is necessary and sufficient to have episcopal jurisdiction, which is by its very nature doctrinal jurisdiction, even if one lacks grace and even faith.

Neither should the common consent of the faithful, when it is consequent upon a definition of the solemn or ordinary magisterium of the Church, be confused with that same consent when it is antecedent to any definition or teaching of the Church. The former concerns a truth already defined and is, therefore, infallible, just as the definition itself is. The latter concerns a truth not yet defined or taught and cannot, therefore, be grounded except in one of two things: either in the speculative reasoning of theology, or in the intuitive and experiential sense of faith—both of which are absolutely fallible as long as the definition of the solemn or ordinary magisterium of the Church does not intervene, to which alone the divine assistance or infallibility is promised and bound.

THE PRINCIPAL FACTOR OF DOGMATIC PROGRESS.—From this, it is clearly seen how the only principal or truly effective factor of dogmatic progress is the definition of the Church or the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit, for these two things, definition and assistance, are indissolubly united and form but one single thing. On the other hand, all other factors, whether speculative or practical, are nothing but mere ways or human and fallible instruments of the infallible action of the Church's magisterium.

Therefore, the magisterium or dogmatic definition of the Church is not merely a recording apparatus nor a center for reflecting the social consciousness of the Christian community, as modernism heretically maintains⁴⁶, but it is, above all, a true source, from which, explicitly or implicitly, all subsequent consent arises, and a true judge and true divine rule of all antecedent consent of the social consciousness or Christian people, whether such consent has been formed by theological reasoning or by the practical and experimental sense of faith. Therefore, every definition of the ecclesiastical magisterium, whether solemn or ordinary, is infallible in itself and independent of the antecedent, concomitant, or subsequent consent of theologians or of the faithful. In contrast, no consent of theologians or of the faithful, however unanimous and permanent it may be, is nor can it be infallible except insofar as it is an expression of a prior definition or insofar as it is confirmed by a subsequent definition of the solemn or ordinary magisterium of the Church.

220¹. THE AFFECTIVE WAY AND THE DEPOSIT OF FAITH.—What we have been saying shows how the affective way, no less than the speculative, is grounded on faith and lives by it. "The gifts of the present life are compared to the end, as to the principle which they presuppose"¹ "And faith itself is, for all supernatural illuminations as long as we are pilgrims from the Lord, both the stabilizing foundation, the diligent lamp, and the door that leads in; according to the measure of which (faith) the wisdom divinely given to us must necessarily be measured"²

Neither the speculative theologian nor the mystic sees divinity itself³ nor, consequently, any truth directly in God. Biblical statements are, here on earth, the only objective source of supernatural knowledge⁴.

What differentiates the speculative from the mystic, from the standpoint of penetrating the truths implicit in the revealed deposit, is that the former, as such, has at his disposal only study and reasoning to attain them, while the latter relies more on grace and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which enable him to reach by the experimental way a number of latent truths either completely unknown to the speculative or won only at the price of costly labor.

God is not, then, like the revealed deposit, an immediate objective source of knowledge for the mystic; He is only the efficient cause of the revealed statements—the objective source—and of grace, gifts, and supernatural lights—subjective aids that introduce the mystic into the depths of the sacred deposit.

Because the role of the intellectual gifts of the Holy Spirit—chiefly the gift of understanding—is to penetrate the treasures of truths hidden in the revealed datum. “Multa genera eorum, quae interius latent, quasi intrinsecus penetrare”⁵.

The mystic makes use—thanks to the gifts of wisdom, knowledge, and counsel—of this connatural penetration of the truths of faith, due to the gift of understanding, in order to judge connaturally divine and created things and human acts. “Thus, regarding those things that are proposed for belief concerning the faith (the deposit of faith), two things are required on our part. First, that what is understood be penetrated or grasped, and this pertains to the gift of understanding. Second, that one have a right judgment about them... this judgment, therefore, insofar as it concerns divine things, pertains to the gift of wisdom; insofar as it concerns created things, pertains to the gift of knowledge; and insofar as it concerns particular works, pertains to the gift of counsel”⁶.

Of the seven gifts that constitute the basis of all mystical life, these four belong to the order of knowledge; the other three—fortitude, piety, and fear of God—to the appetite⁷.

The first four have the intellect as their subject, for it is evident that the mystical knowledge constituting the affective way resides essentially in it, and as their cause they have the will, that is, charity. “Sic ergo sapientia, quae est donum, causam quidem habet in voluntate, scilicet charitatem; sed essentiam habet in intellectu, cuius actus est recte iudicare⁸.

The experiential way is, therefore, caused by love, but it is by essence a sharper intellectual penetration and a more correct judgment of the implicit content of the revealed deposit. It is thus that it contributes to the development of dogma⁹.

It is very important never to lose sight of this doctrine of St. Thomas: the only objective source of all supernatural knowledge is the truth of faith; from this arise the special relations of dependence and subordination that unite speculative or mystical theology to the revealed deposit and to the authority of the Church.

From this it follows that mystical theology, although enabled by the intuitive path of the gifts of the Holy Spirit to comprehend more easily and more quickly a greater number of truths, cannot, nevertheless, attain them unless they are implicitly contained in the revealed datum. The extension of a knowledge, says Saint Thomas, is measured by the objective medium: "The perfection of knowledge, as far as the known object is concerned, is measured by the medium"¹⁰. Since the revealed deposit is here the only objective resource of knowledge, neither mystical theology nor speculative theology, whatever the development of their subjective means, will be able to exceed the implicit virtuality.

Thus, St. Thomas concludes that the relationship these two theologies have to the deposit of faith is exactly the same as that which conclusions have to their principles. "Tota certitudo intellectus et scientiae, secundum quod sunt dona, procedit a cognitione fidei, sicut certitudo conclusionum a certitudine principiorum"¹¹. The sap that nourishes them and the source from which they flow is the same: revealed virtuality, the "revealable." But the process of deduction is different: for the speculative theologian, it is abstract study; for the mystic, it is immediate and living experience. The principal agents differ even more: in the first case, it is the theologian with his own reason; in the second, it is the Holy Spirit, whose gifts are nothing more than the instrument. But in both cases the objective source from which everything springs is the same: the revealed deposit, the sole starting point of all dogmatic progress; any attempt at development, speculative or affective, will not exceed its inexhaustible virtuality.

220². THE AFFECTIVE WAY AND PRIVATE REVELATIONS.—So, what is the role of private revelations, visions, and other analogous phenomena so frequent in the lives of the saints? Do they not constitute an objective source of dogmatic knowledge that overflows the limits of the revealed deposit?

Here is a triple response to this difficulty.

Firstly, the phenomena in question do not in themselves belong to the mystical life, since they require in the subject neither grace nor even faith, and God can grant them to a sinner and even to an unbeliever. They do not, therefore, reveal the "sense of faith," since they do not originate in a life or in a habit intrinsic to the subject. They come extrinsically from God and are added to the graces gratis datae. In contrast, the sense of faith, the principle of the affective way, is vital, and proceeds from the supernatural habits, which make the Christian, and above all the saint, capable of judging connaturally the content of the revealed deposit. Only of this "sense of faith" have we affirmed—is it not evident?—that it cannot exceed the limits of the revealed virtual object, and this by the very fact of being a sense¹².

Secondly, we see that these private revelations, although by right, owing to their divine origin, could extend to new doctrines, not contained in the revealed deposit; nevertheless, in fact they never extend to them. After the Apostles, they are limited to the revealed doctrine or to directing human acts; such is, according to St. Thomas, the divine economy: "There were, however, in the New Testament also some possessing the spirit of prophecy, who foretold many future events... and at individual times there were not lacking some having the spirit of prophecy, not for setting forth new doctrine of the faith, but for the direction of human acts"¹³.

Thirdly, and above all, we respond that the Church, instead of using private revelations to judge the content of revelation, always proceeds in the opposite direction.

Private revelations are never for the Church a source of its definitions; they can, however, become an occasion for examining whether a doctrine, perhaps unsuspected by theologians, is or is not contained in revelation.

Once this is verified, the Church can define it not as a private revelation but as contained in the apostolic revelation¹⁴.

Even if one admits the hypothesis of some theologians that many saints have contemplated in life, for brief moments, the divine essence, this would never constitute a new objective source of dogma or of dogmatic evolution. There is no revelation other than the Catholic one, definitively constituted and sealed with the death of the Apostles, and there are no other guides for dogmatic evolution than those that consist in explaining the content. "For our faith rests on the revelation made to the Apostles and prophets, who wrote the canonical books, and not on any revelation made to other teachers"¹⁵. "In the time of grace, on the revelation made to the Apostles... is founded the entire faith of the Church"¹⁶.

220³. MECHANISM AND OPERATION OF THE AFFECTIVE PATH.—From what precedes, some light is already shed on the mechanism and operation of the twofold speculative and affective path.

In the speculative path, the objective source is the inexhaustible fecundity of the revealed datum, whose first principles are known to every believer. The subjective instrument of development is the intelligence "informed" by faith and acting as reason. The more active and constant the use of the instrument, the more the acquired light will increase with it, along with the penetration of the revealed and the number of truths discovered therein.

In the affective way, the objective source is the same, but the subjective instruments are, besides faith, grace, charity, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, the patrimony of every just person, which operate through acts of love of God. The more intense and permanent this love is, the greater is the experimental light of the intelligence, its depth of penetration, and the number of truths connaturally understood within the revealed deposit¹⁷

Indeed, since according to Saint Thomas the Divinity itself dwells in us through sanctifying grace and charity, it follows that every member of it, through acts of love, necessarily produces in the soul a more profound rooting of God, a more intense supernatural light, and a more comprehensive penetration of the revealed deposit¹⁸

In summary, here is everything that is increased in the soul by acts of love for God: first, sanctifying grace; then, the habit of charity; next, the possession of the divinity; and, lastly, intellectual gifts, true intellectual light, which increases the penetration of the implicit virtuality of the revealed deposit.

This concatenation is clarified by the following comparison of Saint Thomas. Just as the more perspicacious the spirit is, the more it penetrates the virtuality of the principles of reason, so likewise, the more intense the supernatural light of the spirit is, the more it can penetrate the virtuality of the principles of faith. For—he says—the supernatural light is to the revealed principles what the natural light is to the principles of reason¹⁹.

This indicates that in both ways the progress of knowledge is intrinsic and vital. In the speculative way, because from its essence the intellect, subject of divine faith, proceeds in a connatural manner, and because this intellect, actuated by the comparative study of revealed principles and the principles of reason, in turn produces a more luminous and more extensive speculative knowledge. Likewise, in the other way sanctifying grace, soul of the supernatural life, gives rise to charity and to the gifts of the Spirit, from which, through the exercise of love, there proceeds an increase of light and of affective knowledge.

But let us repeat it once more: Christian reason and study on the speculative path, grace, gifts, and love on the affective path are nothing more than subjective principles: the objective source upon which they act is the revealed datum, pa-

“Ita se habet lumen superadditum (the gift of understanding) to those things which are supernaturally made known to us (the revealed deposit) as the natural light is disposed to those things which we know primarily" (ST. THOMAS, loc. cit., q. 8, a. 1, ad 2).

"For it is the common teaching of the saints, indeed of the scholastics, that whoever has sanctifying grace and charity also has the seven gifts to some degree: And the more one grows and is perfected in charity, the more one also does so in the gifts".

“Of these gifts, moreover, one is the gift of understanding, by which those things that pertain to faith are in some manner penetrated, perceived, and understood, inasmuch as the reasons of faith are acknowledged. Hence, just as heroic men perfected in charity, through the gift of wisdom which they possess according to a perfect degree, are like counselors and secretaries of God, and His familiar friends, by whom they are continually enlightened, standing in a certain contact with the sun of uncreated wisdom: who, through an internal and abundant supernatural taste, both know and savor the divine truths to be believed, and judge well and certainly concerning them by the conformity and connaturalness of their affection to them: so through the gift of understanding, by which they are adorned according to a perfect degree, they most clearly, most certainly, and most subtly understand those things that pertain to faith, as well as the connection and order of things to be believed, and the supernatural credibility of Catholic truth: and they possess faith together with the reasons of the things to be believed and the understanding of a purified mind...”

“And in general all those who continually experience mystical theology are such. Hence this illumination is not given to all who study theology or to those equally gifted, but to those who make greater progress in purity of heart and charity. One of these was the holy brother Giles, who refused to say, “I believe in God,” but rather, “I know God.” And especially that seraphic Francis” (DIONYSIUS THE CARTHUSIAN, 1 Sent., prol., q. 1: “Complete Works” [Montsolii], vol. 19, p. 65).

“How will that undeniable fact be explained, indeed, that so many simple and unlettered souls, at a moment of their most exalted contemplation, acquire such prodigious knowledge with which they later come to surpass the greatest theologians? And these souls exist in abundance, and they are called Hildegard, Angela of Foligno, Catherine of Siena, of Genoa, or of Bologna; Ruusbroec, Joseph of Cupertino, Nicholas Factor, Teresa of Jesus, Rose of Lima, Marina de Escobar, Ágreda, Emmerich, Taigi, Sister Barbara, Gemma Galgani, Benigna Consolata, etc., etc., for even in our own days there are many.

We have had occasion to deal with some who, without reading any other books than Jesus crucified, the true book of life, left us astonished to see how sublime and wonderful experiential knowledge they had of the adorable mystery of the Trinity and of the mysterious work of the Spirit of love in righteous hearts" (ARINTERO, J. Evolución mística [Salamanca 1908], 5th ed., c. 8, p. 519). Intimate testimony of every believer, speculative or mystical. Consequently, the development in both cases can only concern the implicit content of the revealed deposit.

It is true that the source of the mystical life is the Holy Spirit, God Himself, but God known through the veil of faith and not seen face to face, because the mystical life, being divine, does not cease to be a life of faith. When the Council of Trent teaches, with all the Fathers and theologians, that faith is the root of justification and, consequently, of the supernatural life, including the mystical life, it does not intend to say that the truths of faith are only a point of departure, quickly left behind and abandoned, but rather the true root of all the sap of our supernatural life in this world, while charity or the action of the Holy Spirit plays the role of assimilating heat.

In summary, Christianity could be compared, with its two branches of knowledge, speculative and mystical, with all the progressive manifestations of its supernatural life—purgative, illuminative, unitive—to a living tree, unique and homogeneous, whose roots are sunk in the revealed deposit. The Catholic Church, infallibly assisted by the Holy Spirit, guards and cultivates it. The light of faith and of study, the warmth of grace and of love, effectively contribute to its growth, but they always leave it rooted in the revealed deposit, from which it draws all the sap by which it lives.

In this way, every explicitly new dogma—like each new saint—is nothing more than a new fruit of this germ (the revealed datum) that Christ and His Apostles have deposited in the bosom of the Church. Under the perpetual assistance of the Holy Spirit, akin to light and heat, the Church preserves and develops this divine germ.

2204. COMPARISON OF THE TWO WAYS, AFFECTIVE AND SPECULATIVE.

If we have said that the affective path, or “feeling of faith,” has contributed to dogmatic development as much as or more than reasoning, this does not mean that there are many dogmas developed by it alone; it is due to the frequent and notable services it renders to the speculative path.

The sense of faith is in the supernatural order what common sense is in the natural order. Almost always they intervene in speculation, and in three ways:

First, by anticipating the solution to the problem before knowing the demonstrative reasons.

Second, rejecting by instinct, as inadmissible, certain solutions, grounded, nevertheless, in specious reasons; and this solely because they clash with common sense.

Thirdly, by making accept a doctrine by the whole Christian society, even by those members incapable of understanding the force of its reasons.

And facilitating this acceptance is to favor its definition. Where the influence of the sense of faith appears most clearly is in questions that refer to the affective order, to Christian morality or piety. Read again in Denzinger one of the series of propositions on morality or mysticism upheld by Baius, Molinos, and the laxists, and condemned by the Church ²⁰, and it will be seen that there are many whose error leaps out at the eye of Christian feeling, and yet they are difficult to refute by the sole path of reasoning. For example: "fornication and 'mollities' are intrinsically evil" ²¹ is a proposition engraved on the heart of every devout person; and nevertheless, it does not escape the obsession of a theologian obliged to demonstrate it with evidence and to answer the objections.

Just as in ancient times the Christian sensibility rejected with horror the heresies of Arius and of Nestorius, from the moment they appeared, and well before their condemnation in the Councils of Nicaea and Ephesus, because they went against dogmas perceptible to the heart, so too did the Christian sensibility reject by instinct and from the beginning the aberrations of the mystics and moralists before their falsehood was demonstrated by the theologians and condemned by the Church.

The "sense of faith" does not attain its perfection except in souls in whom faith, grace, charity, and the gifts reside, without which there is no true experience of divine things at all ²².

It can be said that it is found, albeit imperfectly, in every believer, even in one who is transiently in a state of mortal sin. And this for three reasons: First, because faith, after the Council of Trent, is the principle, the foundation and the root of grace, of charity and of the gifts. With faith, then, one possesses everything else in germ ²³.

Second, because, according to St. Thomas, the virtue of faith is by nature a tendency toward everything that is contained—in whatever manner—in the revealed deposit. "Quia fides, quantum in se est, ad omnia quae fidem concomitantur, vel sequuntur, vel praecedunt sufficienter inclinat²⁴. If every habit is a second nature that instinctively inclines toward its object, as chastity, for example, makes one judge connaturally concerning what pertains to it both as much as science alone does, and sometimes better than all of it, so the virtue of faith frequently enables us to appreciate instinctively what pertains to faith itself. "Sicut enim gustus diiudicat sapores secundum suam dispositionem, ita mens hominis diiudicat de aliquo faciendo secundum suam habitalem dispositionem... sicut de his quae ad castitatem pertinet per rationis inquisitionem recte iudicat ille qui habet scientiam moralem; sed per quamdam connaturalitatem ad ipsam recte iudicat ille qui habet habitum castitatis. For just as taste judges flavors according to its disposition, so the mind of man judges concerning something to be done according to his habitual disposition... thus, concerning those things that pertain to chastity, he who has moral science judges rightly through rational inquiry; but he who has the habit of chastity judges rightly through a certain connaturality with it²⁵.

Finally, the acts of the supernatural habits, although they do not engender another habit, nevertheless create a disposition or natural facility that persists even when the supernatural habit has disappeared. It is not, therefore, surprising that any Christian who has been in a state of grace sometimes retains inclinations similar to those of grace and the supernatural virtues, even when he is then momentarily in a state of mortal sin ²⁶.

In any case, it is a historical fact that, when it comes to dogmas "sensitive to the heart," the sense of the faith has manifested itself in all the Christian people, without distinction between the just and sinners, although more intensely in the former than in the latter, in the fervent than in the lukewarm. Thus it has happened with the dogmas of the consubstantiality of the Word, of the divine Maternity of the Virgin Mary, and of the Immaculate Conception.

If in dealing with the affective path we have almost always used the expression "sense of the faith," and not "sense of the faithful," it has been to avoid the danger of making it exclusive to the simple faithful, to the detriment of theologians, bishops, and the Pope.

In all believers—regardless of their rank—this sense is proportioned to the degree of faith, charity, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Hence some, like Father Gardeil, have aptly called it the “social sense of the Church” (10).

Let us note, however, that if in some theologians it may be neutralized by the frequency or excess of speculative reasoning, on the contrary, in some simple faithful it may sometimes be maintained more purely and intensely, though less safeguarded against deviations, than when it is guided by speculative reason.

220⁵. COMPARISON OF THE TWO WAYS.—The term “mystical theology” can signify two different kinds of knowledge: a) that which results in the saints and contemplatives from their personal mystical experience; b) that which is engendered by the study of the mystical experiences of another.

In the first sense it is distinguished specifically from speculative theology and is superior to it. Thus did the ancients understand it, and St. Thomas is accustomed to call it “Sapientia quae est donum Spiritus Sancti” ²⁷

In the second sense, more common today, of human science acquired through study, it is inferior to speculative theology, since it is but a branch or offshoot of it ²⁸.

Speculative theology is indeed divided into: a) dogmatic theology, and b) moral theology. The former studies God in Himself, and as the principle of creatures; the latter studies God as the ultimate end of human acts. These acts, if they are ordinary, produced “in a human manner,” that is, under the influence of the virtues, form the object of ordinary or ascetical moral theology. If they are perfect, produced “in a divine manner,” that is, under the predominant influence of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, they form the object of mystical theology.

Considered ontologically in itself, mystical knowledge resulting from personal experience of divine things surpasses—as we have already said—in nobility and value the speculative knowledge acquired through study. The reason is clear. Mystical knowledge resulting from the motion of the Holy Spirit exercised through the gifts is formally infused, supernatural, and divine. Speculative knowledge, on the other hand, resulting from study and the product of human reason—"informed" by faith—is formally natural, acquired, and human, although materially or objectively divine and supernatural (309).

But in the evolution of dogma the speculative path has played a more important part, or at least a more visible one, than the mystical path. For the latter develops through subjective or personal experiences, very clear perhaps to the favored subject, but which are difficult for others to ascertain, whereas the speculative path is founded on objective reasons that everyone can examine and appreciate. Moreover, history shows us that Councils and Popes, whenever they have to define a dogma of faith, consult speculative theologians, even non-mystics, before pious or mystical persons without theological learning.

220. COMPARISON OF THE TWO WAYS WITH THE AUTHORITY OF THE CHURCH.—The two ways, the speculative and the affective, depend, therefore, equally on the deposit of faith. Now, since this deposit was entrusted by God exclusively to the Church to guard and explain it, it follows that all theology depends on her authority intrinsically and essentially, and not only extrinsically and accidentally, like the human sciences.

Moreover, every theologian, compared with the simple faithful, far from depending less than he does on the Church and having less need of her, depends, on the contrary, more on her and is more indebted to her, in direct proportion to the depth of his learning. The faithful does not, in any way, go beyond the surface of the revealed datum, whereas the theologian is the more eminent the more he penetrates the riches of this treasure entrusted by God to the exclusive guardianship of the Church, falling under her jurisdiction in proportion to his teaching office.

Not to mention that wanting to explore the depths of a supernatural deposit—that is, one superior to human reason and of a different order than it—is always dangerous. It is easy, on this mysterious and slippery ground, to lose oneself or fall if one does not have the divine assistance, which Christ promised not to anyone, however wise and holy he may be, but to the Church, his bride.

There exists for the theologian, frequently, the danger of being mistaken about the value of a demonstration: "Frequenter in hoc homo fallitur, quod putat esse demonstrationem quod non est"²⁹

For the mystic, the danger, no less frequent, consists in taking for divine experiences the weaknesses of his imagination or the excitements of his sensibility—not to mention that the angel of darkness very often transfigures himself into an angel of light. "For Satan himself transforms himself into an angel of light"³⁰ In short, since both deal with divine things, the deficiency of reason is very pronounced. "Human reason in divine matters is greatly deficient"³¹

Here is why the sentire cum Ecclesia will always be the most essential norm, both for the wise and for the holy, in everything pertaining to revelation, the source of theology.

2207. THE UNITY OF CHRISTIAN LIFE AND DOCTRINE.

In man three principles of action are distinguished: a) natural reason, with the acquired virtues; b) Christian reason, with the supernatural or infused virtues; c) the Holy Spirit, using Christian reason as an instrument through the gifts.

From this arise three kinds of acts: a) completely natural as to substance and manner; b) supernatural as to substance and natural as to manner; c) completely supernatural as to substance and manner.

In the first class, the substance and the mode are human; in the second, the substance is divine and the mode human; in the third, the substance and the mode are divine³²

Ethics deals with the first class; ascetical moral theology, with the second; mystical theology, with the third.

Between first and second acts—those of an infidel and those of a Christian—there is an essential difference; between second and third acts—those of an ordinary or lukewarm Christian and those of a perfect or mystical Christian—, the difference is modal.

Likewise, there is an essential difference between ethics and ascetical or mystical moral theology; modal, between these two branches of theology, as well as between the ascetical and mystical life. They differ as the imperfect from the perfect, in the same species; as the shrub from the tree, the child from the adult. The mystic is nothing more than a perfect Christian, and the mystical life, the Christian life in its full development.

In this way, unity appears not only of doctrine, but also of life, in the Christian. These are two realities that correspond to each other. For just as the degrees of the former are nothing but stages in the homogeneous development of the same doctrine, in the same way, all the degrees of the latter represent the homogeneous evolution of the same life.

What the Holy Spirit communicates to the mystics is not another life, but only another mode of acting, the divine one. Likewise, in the definitions of faith, what the Holy Spirit provides to the Church is not another doctrine, but a new mode of knowing, the divine or dogmatic mode.

Thanks to the intervention of the Holy Spirit, the ascetic life—already substantially supernatural—is changed into the mystical; just as theological knowledge—substantially revealed—is changed into the dogmatic. There is, on both sides, a change of mode, and not of substance (304, 309).

There are, then, not two lives, nor two Christian doctrines, but different degrees of the same life and of the same doctrine.

2208. THE PRIMARY ROOT OF THE TWO PATHS OF DOGMATIC DEVELOPMENT.—Since the Divinity itself is the immediate origin and central subject of the revealed statements, and since it is also the source and principal cause of faith, grace, and the supernatural habits, it may be said with all truth that, even in this life, although known obscurely through the veil of faith, it is the first root from which the tree of doctrine and of Christian life draws its sap and warmth, in all the paths of its evolution.

In the next life, it will not be necessary to change the root, nor the sap, nor the tree, but only to remove the veil of faith, so that from the Divinity seen intuitively there may flow the torrent of light, of love, and of divine life that will flood and divinize eternally the soul of the elect and all its powers³³.

In heaven the two paths, speculative and mystical, sometimes separated on earth, will be definitively united. Then there will no longer be non-mystical theologians, nor non-theological mystics. The beatific vision will necessarily produce love, and speculative intuition will always be accompanied by mystical experience.

Then evolution will no longer be possible, for the supernatural tree will have attained in every sense the fullness of its development; there will be no implicit potentiality, not because it has disappeared from the object, but because it no longer exists for the subject, for the human spirit, which, obliged here below to unfold little by little, and piecemeal, the inexhaustible "divine revealable," will contemplate it fully manifested in the beatific vision³⁴.

In heaven there will be no need for ecclesiastical magisterium or for an external rule; first, because the formal reason for that magisterium—preserving and explaining the revealed datum—will not exist; second, because each blessed one will possess in himself, in the vision of God, the first rule of all judgment and of all truth, which guarantees in all his acts, speculative and affective, their absolute rectitude, without any external regulation whatsoever.

But before the beatific vision, the obscurely revealed deposit is the only objective source, and the authority of the Church the only proximate rule of all our dogmatic development. Hence follows the necessity, for the two ways, speculative and affective, as for the two lives, ascetic and mystical, of having faith as their foundation and the Church as their rule. "For we walk by faith, and not by sight"³⁵. "But faith adheres to all the articles of faith on account of one medium, namely, on account of the First Truth proposed to us in the Sacred Scriptures, according to the sound understanding of the doctrine of the Church"³⁶.

**221. NOTABLE ANALOGIES.—**As a complement to the ways by which the evolution of dogma takes place, it will be well to say something about the various analogies that this evolution has with the various natural evolutions we observe in the natural order. These analogies give rise to the various metaphors with which dogmatic evolution is usually represented.

Among these images, only three seem to us worthy of consideration:

1. The image of the seed, or better yet, of the plant.
2. The image of the human body.
3. The image of the first principles of a science.

One is taken from vegetative life; the second, from animal life; the third, from intellectual life.

These three metaphors or images are commonly admitted and used; but their meaning is very diverse, depending on whether only purely subjective progress, or of formulas, is admitted in the dogma, or whether subjective-objective progress, or of true implicit virtuality, is also admitted¹.

222. THE IMAGE OF THE PLANT OR SEED.—Those who reduce dogmatic progress to purely subjective progress or of ratiocinative reason compare it to a field or panorama of which a spectator saw one part today and another tomorrow, or saw it first in dim light and then in full daylight. The field or panorama would be exactly the same, without any development; the development or progress lies solely and exclusively in the vision of the spectator. This image of dogmatic progress seems to us somewhat childish, and in no way conformable either to traditional theology or to the history of dogmas.

In our judgment, if one wishes to compare dogmatic progress to a field or garden, it ought to be compared to a field or garden whose plants, when a spectator visits them today, are at a certain degree of development, and when he visits them another day, he finds the same plants, but more developed, with new branches, flowers, and fruits. Because they are the same plants (and not new plants or new seeds surreptitiously introduced), the progress is fully homogeneous; but because they are more developed plants, the progress is not purely subjective or of mere vision, but rather progress of intrinsic and inclusive virtuality. And this second image, and not the first, is the traditional image of dogmatic progress.

Let us hear the great Doctor of dogmatic progress, whose doctrine has merited the rare privilege of being cited by the Vatican Council: “For example. Our ancestors of old sowed in this ecclesiastical field the seeds of wheat-like faith. It is exceedingly unjust and unfitting that we, their descendants, should gather, instead of the genuine truth of wheat, the counterfeit error of tares. Rather, this is right and fitting, that, with the first and the last not disagreeing with each other, we may reap from the growths of the wheat-like Institution the harvest of a wheat-like dogma as well; so that when something from those first beginnings of seeds unfolds with the passage of time, and now flourishes and is cultivated, yet nothing of the property of the shoot is changed. Let species, form, and distinction be added; still, the same nature of each kind remains. For far be it that those rosy plantings of Catholic understanding should turn into thistles and thorns. Far be it, I say, that in that spiritual paradise, from the juices of cinnamon and balsam, tares and aconites should suddenly spring forth. What therefore in this agriculture of God’s Church was sown by the faith of the fathers, the same it is fitting that by the industry of the children be cultivated and observed; the same let it flourish and mature; the same let it advance and be perfected. For it is lawful that those ancient dogmas of heavenly philosophy, with the passage of time, be elaborated, polished, and refined; but it is unlawful that they be changed; unlawful that they be truncated, that they be mutilated. Let them receive clarity, light, and distinction; but they must retain fullness, integrity, and propriety” (VINCENT OF LÉRINS, Commonitorium, 22: MIGNE, PL 50, 668).

223. THE IMAGE OF THE HUMAN BODY.—In the same way, if we wished to take as an image of dogmatic progress, not plants, but the human body, the image of purely subjective progress would be that of the body of a fully developed man, but of whom today we see some members and tomorrow others, or now we see them in partial light and later in a fully illuminated environment. Here the progress would be purely and exclusively of vision, without any progress or development whatsoever of the thing seen.

In contrast, the image of virtual-inclusive progress would be that of a child or a young person whose limbs we see today at a certain degree of development, and after some time we see him again with the same limbs, but more developed. Here, progress has not been purely that of our vision, but also of the thing seen, although it is inclusive and homogeneous progress of the same organism we saw before. And this second image, and not the first, is the traditional image of dogmatic progress.

“Let religion imitate the principle of bodies, which, although they unfold and develop their numbers over the course of years, nevertheless remain the same as they were. There is great difference between the flower of childhood and the maturity of old age; yet the same individuals who were adolescents are now old men, so that although the state and condition of one and the same man changes, there is nonetheless one and the same nature, one and the same person. The small limbs of infants, the large ones of youths: the same they are, nevertheless. As many joints as little children have, so many do adults have; and if there are any things which are produced at a more mature age, their principles were already sown in the seeds; so that nothing new is later brought forth in the elderly which had not already lain hidden before in children. Hence it is not doubtful that this is the legitimate and correct rule of progress, this the ratified and most beautiful order of growth, if the number of years always reveals in the more grown those parts and forms which the wisdom of the Creator had preformed in the little ones. But if the human species should afterwards be turned into some image not of its own kind, or something were certainly added to or subtracted from the number of limbs, it would be necessary that the whole body either perish, or become monstrous, or certainly be weakened; so also the dogma of the Christian religion ought to follow these laws of progress, namely that it be consolidated by years, expanded by time, elevated by age, yet remain uncorrupted and unimpaired, and be full and perfect in all the measures of its parts and in all its members and, as it were, its own senses, admitting nothing further of change, suffering no loss of property, no variety of definition (VINCENT OF LÉRINS, loc. cit.).

This is the most beautiful figure of dogmatic progress taken from the young body, a figure more perfect than the previous one of the same Lirinense taken from the seed, for in the seed everything is virtual, while in the young body there are already actual and formed members that contain virtually the future homogeneous developments of the organism.

And it would be an error to affirm that in the deposit or revealed datum everything is virtual, when the articles or fundamental dogmas were from the beginning in an actual and formal state (in articulis determinatis; ST. THOMAS), containing virtually and inclusively many later dogmatic developments²

But it must be borne in mind that these two images of dogmatic progress, taken from the development of the plant and of the human body, are metaphorical, as indeed every figure that, being taken from corporeal or physical things, is applied to what is divine, must of necessity be metaphorical. Those metaphors well express the existence of a true development in dogma itself within the identity of nature; but they fail or are incomplete on two points, relating to the manner in which that development takes place. In the plant and in the human body, development occurs through the absorption and assimilation of foreign materials, and not by the pure inner unfolding of the material itself and alone of the primitive germ. At the same time, the development of the plant and of the human body takes place in the external world of objective reality, and not in the purely inner world of intellectual ideality. If vegetable and animal life could develop without the absorption of anything foreign, and that development were to take place within, and solely within, the human intelligence, then we would have a perfect image of dogmatic development, such as the Vincentian described it and Saint Thomas explained it.

224. THE IMAGE OF HUMAN INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT.—Now then: that which does not happen in vegetable or animal life, happens literally in the intellectual life of man, in which there occurs true development or progress of inclusive virtuality with respect to any primordial or fruitful truth, or with respect to any first intellectual principle, without the need for the absorption of anything foreign, without addition, subtraction, or any mixture of objective reality, by the simple conceptual and homogeneous development of the virtuality already implicit from the beginning in the one and same known object.

Therefore, according to St. Thomas, the true image of dogmatic progress must be taken from intellectual progress rather than from vegetable or animal progress, since faith is intellectual knowledge, and the life of faith and of dogma is, above all, intellectual life. The revealed deposit was communicated by God to the Prophets and Apostles, not as a set of experiences or of life of feeling—as modernism would have it—but as a set of objective, intellectual statements; and, therefore, the reception, life, and development of the revealed deposit must follow laws analogous to the reception, life, and development of every intellectual statement. The law of every intellectual statement in man is to contain really greater objectivity than what it formally expresses (hence what we call the fecundity or virtuality of a principle or idea) and to go developing little by little in the intelligence itself that fecundity, which it really includes, without need of absorption or mixture of anything foreign, by simple development of its own virtuality, at the mere contact with, or comparison to, the transcendent principles of human intelligence, principles that are not physically connective with anything, but that are inclusive and really applicable, though analogically, to everything, whether human or divine, whether natural or revealed.

For St. Thomas, then, the proper and real image of dogmatic progress—although an analogical image (since everything created, whether bodily or intellectual, applied to what is divine, is analogical)—is human intellectual progress, that is, the progress of inclusive virtuality or of intellectual explication which takes place in man with respect to the inclusive consequences of the first principles of natural reason.

“Ita se habent in doctrina fidei articuli fidei sicut principia per se nota in doctrina quae per naturalem rationem habentur”³. “Potentia intellectiva cum sit collativa, ex quibusdam in alia devenit; unde non se habet aequaliter ad omnia intelligibilia cognoscenda; sed statim quaedam videt ut quae sunt per se nota, in quibus implicite continentur quaedam alia quae intelligere non potest nisi per officium rationis, ea quae in principiis implicite continentur explicando”⁴. “And this was the reason why it was necessary to issue several creeds, which differ in nothing else except that in one is more fully explained what is contained implicitly in another”⁵. “When many things are contained virtually in one, they are said to be in it implicitly, as conclusions are in principles”⁶.

Through this procedure, which is not one of addition, nor of subtraction, nor of change, nor of mixture, but rather of inclusive-intellectual explanation, the two characteristics of substantial immutability and explanatory progress, proper to every homogeneous evolution, are maintained in dogma.

From this we see how rightly the following proposition has been condemned by the Church, which is the fifty-fourth of the antimodernist Syllabus of Pius X: “Dogmata, Sacramenta, hierarchia, tum quoad notionem, tum quoad realitatem attinet, non sunt nisi intelligentiae christianae interpretationes evolutionesque, quae exiguum germen latens externis incrementis auxerunt perfeceruntque”⁷. In this proposition there are at least three errors. First, that it posits as its starting point a small, hidden, or potential germ, when what must be posited as the starting point is something actual and explicit, and in such quantity that it already contains implicitly and intrinsically all subsequent developments. Second, that it posits development through extrinsic additions, when dogma admits only intrinsic development. Third, that it posits progress not only notional, but also of objective reality, when dogmatic progress can only be notional, not objective real (182).