La evolución homogénea del dogma católico

135. ORDINARY MAGISTERIUM AND SOLEMN MAGISTERIUM OF THE CHURCH.—After having set forth what, according to Saint Thomas, are the true relations between theology and faith, it remains to see what are the true relations of both with the authority of the Church, that is, the organic place that the authority of the Church occupies in our divine faith and, consequently, in our theology. We shall begin with some simple preliminary notes, but indispensable for the proper framing and correct solution of this fundamental question.

The doctrinal authority or magisterium of the Church has as its proper and specific end the conservation and exposition of the revealed deposit. To determine or infallibly fix the true sense of the divine deposit is what is called the definition of faith by the Church ¹.

But this magisterium or definitions of faith can be exercised and in fact are exercised by the Church in two ways: first, by solemn magisterium, whether of the Ecumenical Council or of the Pope alone speaking from the chair; second, by ordinary magisterium, that is, by the ordinary teaching or preaching of the universal Church.

Both means of exercising the magisterium over the content and meaning of the revealed deposit are of equal dogmatic value, and both are true definitions of faith. There is only an accidental difference, namely that the magisterium of the Ecumenical Council or of the Pope speaking ex cathedra is exercised with greater solemnity and apparatus of formulas, and is easily discernible by all, whereas the ordinary magisterium is carried out without special apparatus or formalism through the universal teaching of the Church, and sometimes its scope and significance are not so easy to distinguish.

It is advisable to keep very clearly in mind these two different ways of exercising the doctrinal magisterium or of defining revealed truth, since frequently, when speaking of definitions of faith, the mind tends to focus only on definitions by solemn magisterium, without paying sufficient attention to the fact that there are also definitions by ordinary magisterium.

Truth, then, of the revealed deposit, whose meaning has not yet been infallibly fixed either by the solemn magisterium or by the ordinary magisterium of the Church, is revealed truth, but not defined. Truth of the revealed deposit, whose meaning has been infallibly fixed or determined, whether by the ordinary magisterium or by the solemn magisterium of the Church, is truth not only revealed, but also defined.

To ask, therefore, whether divine faith is possible regarding a truth of the revealed deposit before the definition of the Church, is equivalent to asking whether divine faith is possible regarding that truth before, or without, its meaning having been infallibly determined or taught, whether by the solemn magisterium or by the ordinary magisterium of the Church.

136. WHICH CHURCH IS MEANT.—From that inclination of our mind to fix only or preferably on solemn definitions, when speaking of definitions of faith, there also proceeds our sometimes not giving to the word Church all the extension it covers, unconsciously fixing on the Church not from its foundation, that is, from apostolic times, but on the Church of later centuries, when ecumenical councils and solemn definitions began. And yet, definitions of faith or the doctrinal authority of the Church over the revealed deposit are exercised, as we have said, by ordinary magisterium as much as or more than by the solemn one, and that ordinary magisterium began not in the era of the first ecumenical councils, but from the first moment of the nascent or primitive Church, from the first moment of the apostolic preaching or teaching.

A truth, then, of the revealed deposit, whose meaning has been infallibly fixed or determined, whether by apostolic preaching or the primitive Church, or by the Church of later centuries, is a truth not only revealed but defined. A truth of that deposit, whose meaning has not been infallibly determined either by apostolic preaching or by the Church of later centuries, is revealed truth, but not defined. To ask, therefore, whether divine faith can be given to a truth of the deposit without a definition of the Church, is to ask whether divine faith can be given to a truth whose meaning has not been fixed or determined infallibly either in apostolic teaching or in the teaching (by ordinary or solemn magisterium) of the later Church.

137. IMMEDIATE AND MEDIATE REVELATION “ON THE PART OF THE PERSON”.—In the previous sections we have spoken continually of immediate and mediate revelation, but it was on the part of the object; in this section it is necessary to speak also of immediate and mediate revelation, but from a different point of view, namely on the part of the person. This twofold division of revelation into immediate and mediate from two different points of view needs to be well understood if one is not to become entangled in reading the theologians’ treatises On Faith and the Church.

Two things enter into faith: the revealed object and the person to whom it is revealed.

The object can be revealed in itself or revealed in another truth, in which it is latently enveloped. Revelation, in the first case, is called immediate or formal, and in the second, mediate or virtual. If God has revealed the proposition: the human soul is spiritual, spirituality is revealed in itself or immediately; but immortality would be revealed not in itself, but mediately in spirituality, in which it is intrinsically and essentially included. This is immediate and mediate revelation on the part of the object.

But in revelation, in addition to the revealed object, enters the person to whom it is revealed. This person can receive divine revelation in two ways: first, directly from God, without any interposition of other men; second, not directly from God, but through other men to whom God communicated it, or perhaps through other men who, by successive generations, have been receiving it from those to whom God first and directly had communicated it. The first is called immediate revelation, because between God who reveals and the person to whom He reveals there is no man in between; the second is called mediate for the contrary reason. The angels, our first parent, the patriarchs and prophets, the apostles and evangelists, those who had the ineffable happiness of hearing the incarnate Word on earth, and even every soul to whom God, by Himself, or without the intervention of any man, has deigned to reveal His secrets, had immediate revelation; the rest, we, who have not had direct revelation from God, have only mediate revelation.

As can be seen, this division of revelation into immediate and mediate is on the part of the person, not on the part of the object. In it no regard is paid at all to whether the object has been revealed in itself or in another, but rather to whether the person has received the revelation immediately from God or has received it through other men. It is of this immediate or mediate revelation on the part of the person that we will speak in this section whenever, without expressing the contrary, we employ the words immediate and mediate.

138. IMPORTANTISSIME COROLLARY.—Our faith, then, that is, the divine faith which all the faithful of the Christian world give and must give to the truths of the revealed deposit, is (setting aside the unique case of private or special revelation) faith of MEDIATE revelation. This mediate character must never be lost sight of, for it is the key or formal reason for the necessity or existence of the ecclesiastical magisterium and for the nature and extent of its relations with our faith.

"To some, indeed, credible things are revealed immediately by God, as they were revealed to the Apostles and Prophets; but to others they are proposed by God sending preachers of the faith"². "Since those things which are from God are done according to a certain order, in the manifestation of those things which pertain to the faith, a certain order had to be observed, namely, that some would receive immediately from God, while others would receive from these, and thus in order down to the last"³. "Faith is twofold, namely, according to a twofold hearing and a twofold speech; for faith comes from hearing, as it is said (Rom. 10:17). There is a certain exterior speech by which God speaks to us through preachers; and a certain interior speech by which He speaks to us through internal inspiration. From both hearings faith arises in the hearts of the faithful. Through the interior hearing it arises in those who first received the faith and taught it, such as the Apostles and Prophets. Through the second hearing, however, faith arises in the hearts of other faithful who receive the knowledge of faith through other men"⁴. "We have the knowledge of faith, not through a revelation made to us, but through the fact that we adhere to revelations made to others"⁵. For our faith rests upon the revelation made to the Apostles and Prophets, who wrote the canonical books"⁶.

The failure of certain theologians to pay sufficient attention to this mediate character of the revelation on which our faith is founded (a character that is precisely the root of the necessity of the ecclesiastical magisterium and, therefore, of its nature and extent) has been the cause of their not having understood the great theory of St. Thomas on the relations of the Church with our faith and of their having taken as the criterion for determining those relations the question of whether private revelations are or are not of divine faith. The question of private revelations, by the mere fact of their being immediate, is completely irrelevant to the question of the relations of the Church with our faith to the revealed deposit, which is faith of mediate revelation. The nature of the faith that we must give to the revealed deposit, a deposit that is the formal reason of the doctrinal authority of the Church, and not the nature of the faith that we must give to private revelations, which are in themselves foreign to that authority, is the course that every true theologian must take in order to study the relations of the Church with our faith.

It therefore causes genuine surprise to see a theologian of Suárez's stature raise and frame the question in this manner: “Whether private divine revelation pertains to the formal object of faith and consequently (!!) whether the authority of the Church pertains to this formal object, and how faith is resolved into it”⁷. That consequently explains everything; with it Suárez closes the way for himself to understand St. Thomas's theory on the relations of the authority of the Church with our faith, which is of mediate revelation. Suárez, like Lugo and Ripalda, do not seem to have paid sufficient attention to the radical difference between faith and our faith, and to the mediate character of the latter, which is the key to the Angelic Doctor's treatise On Faith, as we shall attempt to show in this section.

139. REVEALED OBJECT AND ITS PROPOSITION AND EXPLANATION.—In faith, two essentially distinct elements must be distinguished: first, the revealed object; second, the proposition and explanation of that object.

In immediate revelation, both elements are divine. God is the one who reveals the object, and God is also the one who proposes and explains it.

In mediate revelation, the second element, that is, the proposition and explanation of the revealed truth, is made by men who, however much holiness and learning they are supposed to possess, are always of themselves fallible, unless they possess the divine assistance to propose and explain all and only what is revealed by God, without any human admixture or misrepresentation whatsoever⁸.

The essential or formal element in the assent of divine faith is, then, the revealed object; the proposition or explanation are conditions without which there would be no faith.

140. FIRST COROLLARY.—Although in faith, both by immediate and by mediate revelation, two elements enter, namely: the revealed object and its proposition or explanation, what is truly believed and to which assent is given is the revealed object, although one could not assent to it without prior proposition and explanation. The essential or formal element, therefore, in the assent of divine faith is the revealed object; the proposition or explanation are conditions without which there would be no faith.

141. SECOND COROLLARY.—Since divine faith founded on immediate revelation is as true as that founded on mediate revelation, if the latter requires some element that the former does not require, this element will belong to it not by being revelation, but by being mediate revelation; not by being divine faith, but by being ours.

142. THIRD COROLLARY.—Our divine faith is from mediate revelation, and mediate revelation necessarily requires human proposition and explanation. One cannot, therefore, argue: if it is divine faith, nothing human can enter into it; nor can one argue: if something human enters in, divine faith is no longer possible (but only human or ecclesiastical...); but one can and must say: divine faith is not possible if the human explanation that enters into it is of such a nature that it can alter or modify the divine object, the revealed meaning. For the object is essential to faith, and the object of faith is exclusively divine: nothing other than the First Truth.

143. STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION.—Having made these preliminary remarks, which were perhaps unnecessary for many readers, we shall enter upon an important and delicate question; we shall study the organic place that the infallible authority of the Church occupies in OUR FAITH, noting, once and for all, that by our faith we mean that divine faith which we, who have not had nor have immediate revelation from God, give to the truths revealed by God to the Apostles, and by them entrusted to the Church in the sacred deposit of divine Scripture and Tradition.

The questions that present themselves to the theologian are the following: Is the authority of the Church an indispensable element for every act of our divine faith in the revealed deposit? Can there be an act of divine faith in a truth of the deposit before it is defined by the Church? Is the act of our faith only I believe because God has revealed it or is it necessarily I believe because God has revealed it and because Holy Mother Church so teaches? In a word, setting aside a special revelation or intervention of God, is the Church the only means that unites our divine faith with the revealed deposit, or are there other means by which the human intelligence can come into contact, with divine faith, with the revealed deposit?

144. THE VÁZQUEZ-SUÁREZ THEORY.—The theologian Vázquez, illustrious on so many counts, was the first to respond clearly and openly in the negative to all these questions or aspects of one and the same question. For Vázquez, the authority of the Church is not an indispensable element for every act of our divine faith, except for the ignorant, for those who lack sufficient theology or learning to see or deduce with evidence the latent depths of the revealed deposit. But for the wise man, for the theologian, for the one who through his theological, exegetical, historical, and critical knowledge of the Bible and Tradition can by himself deduce with evidence the meaning of the revealed deposit, the authority of the Church is not indispensable.

The theological demonstration or individual reason is in such cases for the theologian what the authority of the Church is for the ordinary faithful. Nor let it be objected, says Vázquez, that what is known by science or by reasoning cannot merit greater assent than the scientific or theological, for the theologian who by evident reasoning deduces something from what has been revealed has at hand two assents: one, theological, founded on reasoning, which is the means by which he deduces it, and another, of divine faith, founded on divine revelation, which is the starting point from which he deduces it. And these two acts are possible, and are at the theologian’s disposal, and in no way require the authority of the Church. This is, laid bare, the famous theory of Vázquez, a theory to which everyone must come who formally makes theological conclusions a matter of faith without definition by the Church (85).

Suárez, in his eagerness to explain or soften a theory of Molina, came to fall into the said theory of Vázquez, admitting that the inclusive virtuality (which he calls formal-confused) of what is revealed is formally of faith, and presenting as possible for the theologian the two famous assents, one of them of divine faith, without any intervention of the authority of the Church (74, 86). In this matter Suárez was followed by Lugo and Ripalda, and since most modern theology textbooks are more or less influenced by those great theologians, it is not uncommon to find in them, as common currency, the following affirmations: The authority or definition of the Church is not indispensable for the act of our faith, since our faith is the same as that of the angels, patriarchs, and prophets, and these did not need any proposition or explanation from the Church in order to believe. The act, then, of our faith does not necessarily include the 'I believe...' because the Church so teaches, although the authority of the Church is ordinarily or for a better state necessary, especially for the simple faithful, who cannot rise without the Church to the pure motive of divine authority. But the theologian who, with his individual reason (theological demonstration), discovers with evidence a truth, or virtuality, or latent meaning of the deposit, must or may give to it an assent of divine faith (in addition to and distinct from the theological one) without any definition of the Church. That is what the two assents are for.

145. TEXTS OF VÁZQUEZ, SUÁREZ, RIPALDA AND FRANZELIN.— “A theological demonstration stands in the same relation to the theologian demonstrating as a Council, when it declares something to be of faith, stands to the whole Church. The only difference is that the Council proposes what it defines to all as to be believed, so that all are bound to believe; theological reason, however, proposes it only to those for whom the consequence from the articles of faith is evident”⁹.

“Nihilominus tamen, as far as we are concerned, the Church is proposed as governed by the Holy Spirit, as the proximate and sufficient rule of belief, because all the faithful cannot by themselves examine the doctrine of faith nor always make their resolution of faith in an expressly conceived divine authority, which is too excellent and spiritual; but the Church is a sensible rule which they more easily hear”¹⁰. “Lastly, it must be noted that we can use discourse in two ways to assent to a proposition inferred: one way, as the formal reason for assenting, and the proper and per se cause of the assent itself to the inferred conclusion; the other way, as proposing and explaining (here is the theological reason, as Vázquez says, substituting for the Council) what is contained and in what manner, under divine revelation, so that afterward we rely on that alone in assenting, as the formal reason and per se cause: for these two ways are possible, as is evident per se, and they depend on the will of man, and thus Vázquez correctly distinguished them, and others do not contradict”¹¹.

"Although that proposition is not necessary for the Church, nevertheless it is, for the faithful who know the infallible authority of the Church, sufficient and more fitting for the assent of faith" ¹². "Of those truths which the Church defines, some are contained in the things believed by faith through evident consequence... Therefore these truths..., even before they are defined by the Church, can be believed by many of the faithful, namely the wiser theologians, apart from the authority of the Church, by divine faith, because they evidently see through theological reasonings that they are contained in the other things believed by faith" ¹³.

But Ripalda was, at least, frank and logical, as usual, in drawing the consequences of that doctrine. “You will object, first: If the Church’s proposition is not required per se for believing, a heretic who denies one article can still believe the others through faith; because, setting aside the Church’s authority, he can still have other motives that sufficiently render them credible. Second, that he who is ignorant of the Church’s authority, or of something being proposed by the Church, can lose faith without heresy, by dissenting from some article sufficiently proposed to him through other means. I admit both consequences” ¹⁴.

It may sometimes happen that although the truth, about which a theological demonstration is sought, is not yet sufficiently proposed in the Catholic faith, yet for those who are able to perceive the force of the arguments, it is certain from a diligent examination of either Scripture or Tradition that this truth is contained in the revealed word of God. This being so, the arguments which demonstrate the truth contained in revelation are for them a sufficient application and proposal of revelation to elicit the assent of divine faith ¹⁵. "That which is enunciated in the conclusion is already implicitly contained as said in the premises, either in both taken together or in one alone, so that the other is assumed only to manifest that the conclusion is comprehended in that prior one. Hence, when it is established that both premises are revealed truth, or when one revealed premise already implicitly contains what is enunciated in the conclusion, and the other, although not revealed, evidently manifests this comprehension of the conclusion in the revealed premise, then without doubt the truth enunciated in such a conclusion is revealed... This being so, the truth following from revealed premises can be considered in two ways: either formally as revealed by God; then to the proposition corresponds the assent of faith because of the authority of God revealing; or it can be considered formally as a truth understood from the truth of the premises and from legitimate consequence and deduction; then to the proposition corresponds the theological assent" ¹⁶.

It is useless to adduce more authors, for this is already current doctrine in the theological manuals of today, and its influence is still felt in quite a few Thomistic manuals.

As can be seen, in this theory of Vázquez-Suárez, already current today, the explanation of the revealed deposit made by fallible human reason is of divine faith and merits for the wise man the assent of divine faith. In the proposition, then, and explanation of the revealed, reason is for the wise man what the Church is for the ignorant or for the common run of the faithful. The authority of the Church in the conservation and exposition of the deposit, of which the Vatican Council speaks, proves necessary for us; but in this theory by us is understood not all who receive the revelation mediately (a mediation which can only be saved by the infallible definition of the Church or by a new revelation or extraordinary intervention of God), but by us is understood only those who are not sufficiently theologians or exegetes to save by their own reason that mediation or distance, to propose and explain to themselves the meaning of the revealed deposit.

146. THE TRUE THOMISTIC THEORY.—All this, which is quite common in modern theological manuals after Suárez, is, in our judgment, a deviation from the true theory of St. Thomas and a failure to recognize the sublime and necessary place that the authority of the Church occupies in our faith.

For St. Thomas, and for all his faithful commentators, the authority or definition of the Church is indispensable for every act of our divine faith in any truth of the revealed deposit. The act of our divine faith is not merely "I believe because God has revealed it," but it is necessarily "I believe because God has revealed it and because Holy Mother Church so teaches"; the first because being essential to our divine faith, not because it is ours, but because it is divine; and the second because being necessary (and only replaceable by special revelation or divine intervention), not because it is divine faith, but because it is ours.

In a word: although science (theology, philosophy, exegesis, criticism, history...) has many means of arriving at the scientific, human, acquired knowledge of the truth of the deposit, and of making with respect to it acts of science or of human faith, without any intervention of the Church, our divine faith has only one single means, and this is the authority of the Church; that is, humanity has no other means than the authority of the Church to arrive at the truth revealed by the assent of divine faith.

As for many, perhaps, these affirmations will be novel, and even daring, let us first attempt to set forth the literal doctrine of the Holy Doctor, turning to the finished and immortal treatise De Fide from the Summa Theologica.

147.—THE FORMAL OBJECT OF FAITH.—The Holy Doctor begins his first question and his first article with the formal object of faith. St. Thomas never beats around the bush: from his very first article he places himself at the central, fundamental, formal, essential point of the question: the object. And since the essence of a thing is immutable and must be found whole and invariable wherever the thing is found, the object of divine faith is defined in that first article in itself, formally, without any relation to angels or to men: it is defined with the laconic and lapidary phrase NIHIL ALIUD QUAM VERITAS PRIMA.

In the formal object, in the essence of faith, according to St. Thomas, nothing created can enter, nor can there be the slightest mixture of creature; nothing of angels, nor of men, of patriarchs, nor of prophets, of apostles, nor of the Church. All of that lies outside the formal object of faith, outside the object of divine faith in itself, outside the object of divine faith insofar as it is divine. God, and God alone, is its author, its object, its end, and its rule. In divine faith, therefore, conceived from that formal point of view, the "I believe... because the Church, or the Bible, or Tradition so teach" enters not at all, but solely and exclusively I believe because God has revealed it. Nihil aliud quam Veritas Prima¹⁷.

148. THE FORMAL OBJECTS "IN THEMSELVES" AND THE FORMAL OBJECTS "OURS" OR "IN US".—But the formal objects themselves, although they do not admit variations or changes in themselves, can admit conditions that are not essential to the object in itself, but are absolutely necessary for the object in us.

Thus, for example, the formal object of the intellect in itself or of the intellect as intellect is being; the formal object of our intellect is also being, but with an essential condition or addition for us: it is being abstracted from sensible things. Without that abstraction, our intelligence could never come into contact with its object: with being.

The formal object of science in itself, or insofar as it is science, is the certain knowledge of one truth by means of another, or of one truth in another; the object of our science is the same, but with an essential condition for us: it is knowing one truth through another, but by means of reasoning or succession. Without this, our science is not possible.

The specific or formal principles of theology in itself are the divine supernatural truths; the principles of our theology are those same truths, but believed with divine faith, that is, obscurely seen. Without that condition of being believed or obscurely seen, our theology would never come into contact with its object: the divine-supernatural truths¹⁸.

Now then: the formal object of divine faith in itself is, as we have seen, nihil aliud quam Veritas Prima. What, then, will be the formal object of our divine faith, of that divine faith which we give, not by a revelation that we ourselves have received immediately from God, but mediately through the channel of the Apostles? Does the formal object of faith receive some condition or addition indispensable for it to be considered, not in itself, but in us; as the formal object, not of divine faith in itself, but of our divine faith?

149. THE FORMAL OBJECT OF “OUR” FAITH.—We pass to the fifth question, where St. Thomas treats of faith in relation to the various subjects in which it can be found: De habentibus fidem, concerning the diverse subjects of faith.

Let us pass over articles 1 and 2, in which he deals with faith in relation to the angels and to the demons, and let us stop at article 3, in which he treats of faith in relation to ourselves: of our faith. The Holy Doctor asks whether in the heretic who denies a single article of faith, divine faith with respect to the others remains. For this purpose, the Holy Doctor needs to fix all the elements that necessarily enter into the formal object of our faith. If, by denying a single article, all the indispensable elements of our faith nevertheless remain, faith remains. If, on the contrary, whoever denies an article thereby destroys some indispensable element of our faith; the faith is destroyed. What, then, are the indispensable elements of the formal object of our divine faith? Let us hear the Holy Doctor:

“The formal object of divine faith is the First Truth AS IT IS MANIFESTED in the Sacred Scriptures and the DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH, which proceeds from the First Truth”¹⁹. The formal object of faith in relation to us is no longer the First Truth simply, but the First Truth with a condition sine qua non, with an integral condition: the authority of the Church. “The First Truth as it is manifested... in the doctrine of the Church”. Not the First Truth alone, nor even the First Truth contained in Scripture and Tradition, but the First Truth contained in Scripture and Tradition, but as the Church understands and interprets it.

What follows from this for St. Thomas? Well, just as a habit disappears when something of the formal object—which is what gives the essence or species—disappears, so whoever tries to adhere to the First Truth of Scripture and Tradition by some channel other than the authority of the Church does not have true divine faith, but rather another faith of his own, created, human: scientific or acquired faith. "The species of any habit depends on the formal ratio of the object, and once this is removed, the species of the habit cannot remain. Hence, whoever does not adhere, as to an infallible and divine rule, to the doctrine of the Church, which proceeds from the First Truth made manifest in the Sacred Scriptures, does not have the habit of faith; but he holds the things of faith in a manner other than through faith"²⁰.

But does man have other means, apart from that of the Church, to know the meaning of the revealed deposit and to give it the assent of divine faith? Scientific, human means that lead to acts of human science or acquired faith regarding the revealed deposit, man has many, says the Holy Doctor; but to the assent of divine faith man can come only by one single means: the authority of the Church. Without that means, the act of our divine faith is totally impossible. “In diversis conclusionibus unius scientiae sunt diversa media, per quae probantur, quorum unum potest cognosci sine alio... sed OMNIBUS articulis fidei inhaeret fides propter UNUM medium, scilicet propter Veritatem Primam propositam nobis in Scripturis SECUNDUM DOCTRINAM ECCLESIAE intelligentis sane; et ideo qui ab hoc medio decidit, totaliter fide caret”²¹.

150. CARDINAL CAJETAN.—Though St. Thomas's thought appears quite clear to anyone who reads the two questions cited carefully and without prejudice, ²² it will be useful to present the interpretation of its most authoritative commentators, beginning with the prince of commentators. Whoever wishes to form a true idea of the analysis and economy of divine faith, and of the primacy that the infallible authority of the Church, or of the Holy Spirit who assists her, occupies in our faith, should read Cajetan's entire commentary on the two articles of St. Thomas already cited. We shall have to content ourselves with summarizing them.

Commenting on article 1 of the first question On Faith, in which St. Thomas defines the formal object of faith in itself by the phrase Nihil aliud quam Veritas Prima, he writes:

"Third, there arises a doubt as to how the First Truth alone is posited as the formal object of faith, when it is said that it is nothing other than the First Truth. And the doubt is considered both absolutely and ad hominem. Absolutely, because faith rests upon the judgment and doctrine of the Church as upon an infallible rule; otherwise heretics, who rely on the First Truth alone while rejecting the judgment of the Church, would be believers. And Augustine says: 'I would not believe the Gospel unless the authority of the Church moved me to do so.' Yet it is evident that the judgment and authority of the Church are something other than the First Truth, since they are created realities. Therefore, the First Truth alone is not the object of faith.

*To the third doubt it is answered that, insofar as faith can depend upon a created cause, it can also have some created rule. Now it is evident that two things concur in faith, as will become clear below: namely, assent, and the proposal and explanation of the things to be believed. On the side of assent, faith depends upon God alone as efficient cause, object, end, and rule. But on the side of the proposal of the things to be believed, it can depend upon angels and men, through whom God proposes this or that to be believed. Hence, from this point of view, faith comes by hearing the word of God, as is said in Romans 10. Therefore, lest error should occur in proposing and explaining the things to be believed, the Holy Spirit has provided an infallible created rule, namely, the judgment and doctrine of the Church, so that the authority of the Church is the infallible rule for proposing and explaining those things that must be held by faith. Thus, since two infallible rules concur in faith, namely, divine revelation and the authority of the Church, there is this great difference between them: divine revelation is the formal reason of the object of faith, whereas the authority of the Church is the minister of the object of faith. For the act of faith is joined to its material object, that is, the things believed, through this medium, namely, that God has spoken or revealed them. And the habit of faith itself inclines the mind to assent to the things proposed because God has so revealed them. But we believe that this or that, understood in this or that sense, has been revealed because the Church so hands it down. Again, divine revelation is an infallible rule belonging to faith per se; whereas the judgment of the Church belongs to faith only per accidens, that is, on account of us, to whom these things are proposed. For the angels, to whom God Himself revealed and explained the mystery of the Trinity, had no need of this rule. Likewise, the first Fathers, to whom the mysteries of faith were revealed, had no need of this rule for the same reason, namely, because God Himself revealed these things to them and gave them the understanding of them by enlightening their minds, as is shown below in the treatise On Prophecy."

Thus far Cardinal Cajetan commenting on article 1 of the first question, in which St. Thomas, speaking of the formal object of faith in itself, defines it as Nihil aliud quam Veritas Prima. When he then comments on article 3 of the fifth question, in which St. Thomas, defining the formal object of our faith, appears as though he were correcting the statement Nihil aliud quam Veritas Prima, while in fact doing nothing more than introducing an addition or condition that belongs not to the formal object of faith in itself, but to the formal object of our faith, Cajetan writes:

"In the third article of the same fifth question two great doubts arise. One is how it is to be understood that the doctrine of the Church is an infallible rule, such that whoever departs from it departs from the formal reason of the object of faith. But since this has already been explained in the first question, article one, there is no need of repetition, but only of an addition. For the Church is a rule in proposing and explaining the things to be believed, modifying the divine Truth as Revealer in this respect, at least for us. Therefore, whoever departs from the condition modifying the formal reason, namely, the divine revealing Truth, departs from the formal reason of the object of faith. Thus, one departs from the formal reason of the object of faith not only because one departs from the rule of the Church by rejecting one revealed article, as we said above, but also because one departs from the condition or mode of the formal reason of the object of faith with respect to us. And this corresponds plainly to the meaning of the text. For it posits the First Truth in Scripture and in the doctrine of the Church as the formal reason of faith: the First Truth indeed as the very reason for believing; but the manifestation through Scripture and the Church as the condition by which the First Truth proposes and explains itself and the other things to be believed. Such a condition, although with respect to faith simply considered it does not belong to the integrity of the formal object of faith (as is clear in the case of the faith of the first man, had he remained alone forever, and in the faith of the angels during their earthly state), nevertheless does belong to the integrity of the formal object OF OUR FAITH." ²³

151. LET US HEAR BAÑEZ.—"Third conclusion: The testimony of the Church, insofar as it is governed by the Holy Spirit and insofar as believing the Holy Catholic Church is one of the articles of faith, is that into which our faith is ultimately resolved with regard to the distinction and explication of the things to be believed. For the understanding of this, note that the conclusion is understood of our faith, we who have not received the revelation from God immediately with the distinction of the things to be believed"²⁴ "For we gladly confess that the testimony of the Church determines the potentiality of the light of faith with regard to proposing and distinguishing those things which pertain to faith"²⁵ "Secondly, it is answered that in the acquired sciences there are many material means which vary according to the variety of the quiddity and essence of things for inferring distinct conclusions. But nevertheless in faith there are not many means, neither formal nor material, for assenting to the things revealed by God: but all things are immediately believed from divine revelation manifested through the ministry of the Church"²⁶

152. LET US HEAR JOHN OF ST. THOMAS.—"A heretic does not accept divine testimony as proceeding from God, but as it seems to him, and therefore he does not lean on divine testimony, but is borne toward the thing testified from his own judgment, by which he persuades himself that that thing was said by God, not through that medium by which God speaks, namely through the Church; hence he believes fallibly, because dependently on his own judgment, by which he wishes to discern divine testimony, and this judgment is fallible; hence if it seems good to him, he will change it and will not believe; wherefore the heretic does not regard divine testimony as from God, and in the manner in which it is from God, but as subject to his own fallible judgment; and therefore such faith of the heretic is not infused by God, but acquired by himself, like other human faith"²⁷

We recommend that the reader meditate carefully on the preceding paragraph, substituting the word haereticus with theologus, if he wishes to understand well what kind of faith must be given to the virtual inclusive (or formal confusum of Suárez), or to any other theological conclusion before the definition of the Church. But let us continue by quoting John of St. Thomas:

“But if you insist: therefore faith does not have as its formal reason the testimony of God, but rather the proposition of the Church. The consequence is proved, because this man is not a heretic because he denies the testimony of God, but because he does not accept the proposition of the Church... It is answered that the heretic denies and destroys the true testimony of God by denying the proposition of the Church to which the true testimony of God is attached, not as to the formal reason, but as to the applying condition and instrument of the divine testimony. Nor is it required, in order to destroy a form, that one oppose it directly; it is sufficient to destroy the necessary conditions without which such a thing cannot subsist. Thus, one who removed obscurity from faith would destroy faith, although obscurity is only a condition; and one who destroys the dispositions required for the soul to be in the body kills the man.” ²⁸

“Faith is not directed to the proposition of things as made by this or that particular proposer, who is an inferior minister and can err or be deceived, nor does he possess the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit. Rather, it is directed immediately to the proposition of the Catholic Church, as it comes from the Pontiff, who cannot err. Therefore, if what such a minister proposes is false, faith is not endangered, because it does not elicit assent concerning the thing proposed absolutely and as proposed by that minister, but as it is proposed by the Church; and this is virtually included in every act of believing. Thus, if such a thing has not been defined, it is not believed by him. But if someone assents to that thing absolutely, and without presupposing the condition that it has truly been defined by the Catholic Church, he does not believe with infused faith but with acquired faith.” ²⁹

“The material object of faith, that is, the thing to be believed and attained through such a revelation, in order to be matter of faith, requires two conditions, which St. Thomas explains here. First, that such a thing be not evident... The second condition required for the matter of faith, which pertains to our present purpose, is that it be proposed by the Catholic Church and by her Head, in whom resides the infallible rule of faith and of those things that pertain to faith. This is what we are treating here. In order that you may understand this, note that this condition and this visible rule are not required in faith in just any way, but in relation to us, because God does not speak to us immediately, nor does He immediately propose revealed truths by Himself, but through the mediation of men... But if God were also to propose immediately to us those things that are to be believed, there is no doubt that we would have no need of a visible rule proposing them, but would be certified immediately by the very Spirit of God concerning the matter proposed for belief, just as the Apostles and Prophets were instructed, who did not receive these things from the Church, but rather themselves handed down the matters of faith to the Church.” ³⁰sunt, qui non ab Ecclesia acceperunt, sed ipsi potius tradiderunt Ecclesiae res fidei”³¹.

153. GONET AND CONTENSON.—Let us likewise hear the commentary of two other Thomists, Gonet and Contenson: “A believer cannot assent to God revealing His mysteries, unless the divine revelation be proposed to him and made known through the Church”³². “The formal reason of faith is divine revelation as notified through the altogether infallible doctrine of the Church, so that such doctrine and the persuasion of its infallibility is a condition altogether necessary for us in order that divine revelation may move our intellect to assent to the truths revealed by God”³³. “Wherefore divine authority is the formal reason of believing: ecclesiastical authority, however, is the condition without which we would by no means believe: just as proposed goodness is the motive attracting and drawing the will to itself; but the proposal of goodness exhibited by the intellect is the condition without which the goodness shown would in no way ensnare the will”³⁴. “The second condition of the object of faith is: formal or virtual revelation declared by the Church. The object of faith must be not only virtually, but formally revealed, or at least expressly declared by the Church... and then the proposition begins to pertain to the object of our faith, not precisely because it is virtually revealed: but because, since it is virtually revealed, it is formally declared by the Church and drawn forth from an article”³⁵.

154. THE SALMANTICENSES.—The same Salmanticenses, who in this matter of the virtual revealed or theological conclusion employed, as we said elsewhere, the nomenclature of Suárez, and even came to admit the doctrine of the two assents, although only for conclusions deduced from two premises of faith (80-85), remained, nevertheless, faithful and profound expositors of the doctrine of St. Thomas on the question of the relations of the authority of the Church with our faith.

For this, note that the formal motive of believing by theological faith is not the testimony of God taken in a signified sense, but as applied to the article which we believe by such faith... Hence, in order that the assent of faith may become certain and firm, and may consequently be elicited by theological faith, it is necessary that the testimony of God be certainly and infallibly applied: otherwise, the aforesaid assent will waver on this part. Moreover, that this application may be certain and infallible, it can happen in a twofold manner: in one way, by the fact that a man evidently knows that divine revelation or

Deum sibi loqui, as happened to the prophets and to those who received knowledge of the mysteries of faith immediately from God. In another way, insofar as the aforesaid revelation is asserted and applied through an infallible rule established for this purpose by God, which is the Church. Hence, the formal motive of theological faith with respect to us is the testimony of God proposed and applied through the Church, so that the aforesaid testimony is the formal reason for believing; while the proposition or application made by the Church is a necessary condition so that the aforesaid testimony is applied infallibly... For since theological faith is an intellectual virtue, it entails an infallible ordering toward the true and cannot elicit a false assent: but in a heretic it cannot entail such an ordering, because for faith to entail an infallible ordering toward the true, it is not enough that the motive of assent be in itself infallible, but it is required that it be infallibly applied to the object of assent; indeed, it matters little that the motive be in itself infallible if it has no or only a contingent connection with the object; for this reason, many times an opinionable or contingent conclusion is inferred from a necessary principle, due to its non-necessary connection with the object. But the testimony of God, although in itself infallible, in a heretic cannot be infallibly applied to the object of assent: since such an application is not made through the evidence that the heretic has of divine revelation, nor is it made through the infallible rule of the Church... It remains, therefore, that the testimony of God is not applied with a certain and infallible application, either of evidence (of revelation) or of the Church's proposition; but that it is applied because he himself so judges³⁶

As we have already said, change in these texts the word haereticus to that of theologus, and it will be seen what kind of assent can be given to theological conclusions deduced by means of fallible human reasoning before the definition of the Church.

155. CARDINAL GOTTI.—To avoid wearying the reader with citations from other commentators, we shall conclude with the words of Cardinal Gotti, who, speaking of the twofold assent, theological and of faith, says: "There is not a twofold assent concerning a conclusion, one concerning it in itself, the other concerning it as inferred; for a conclusion, whether considered in itself or as inferred, always belongs to the same habit, namely, science*."* ³⁷ And concerning the necessity of the Church's definition for every act of our divine faith, he concludes: "These and other similar things can easily be inferred by the student of theology, provided he always keeps before his eyes that nothing can be immediately of faith unless it has been proposed by the universal Church as revealed in the word of God." ³⁸

156. SUMMARY.—In a word: for St. Thomas, in the act of divine faith nothing purely human can enter, but all its elements must be divine, and whatever is human must of necessity enter only as directed by God or as a mere instrument of the divine. Now, since faith has two elements, the object and its proposition or explanation, both elements must be divine. In immediate revelation, both elements are of themselves divine; both the revealed truth and its proposition and explanation come immediately from God; for those, therefore, who received immediate revelation, no Church is needed. But since in mediate revelation, although the revealed truth comes from God, its proposition and explanation comes from men, from a human element; for divine faith to be possible, that proposition and explanation must be made not by the fallible human reason (theology, exegesis, history, etc.), but by God Himself, that is, by the human reason assisted by God, or namely by the definition of the Church, which alone has the divine assistance, not to reveal anything new, but indeed to set forth and explain infallibly the revealed truth.

In this way, according to Saint Thomas, the Church becomes a true rule and a true reason why for every act of our divine faith. A rule and a reason why, not of our faith insofar as it is divine, or of divine faith in itself, but of divine faith insofar as it is ours. A rule and a reason why that conditions or modifies the First Truth itself or the revealed deposit, not in themselves, but in relation to us. A rule and a reason why, not of the formal object of faith, but of its proposition and explanation. A rule and a reason why, finally, as necessary for every act of our divine faith as the proposition of the object by the intellect is necessary for the act of the will, so that there can be no true act of will, but only of passion or sensitive appetite, when that proposition of the intellect is lacking and there is only the proposition of the lower order of the senses. The proposing or proximate rule must belong to the same order as that which is regulated.

Therefore, whoever performs an act against this rule of the Church's definition performs an act against divine faith: an act of heresy. Whoever performs an act without this rule performs an act without divine faith: an act of science or human faith.

All explanation, therefore, of the implicit or inclusive virtuality of the revealed deposit, made against the definition of the Church is a heretical explanation. Made without the definition of the Church, it is purely scientific or human. Made by the definition of the Church, it is a divine explanation, a dogma of faith.

The theological conclusions, then, arrived at through lesser reasonings that are inclusive or explicative (and even, in our judgment, those deduced from two revealed premises, although this is secondary for our purpose) do not belong to our faith, nor can they merit from anyone (without special divine revelation) a true act of divine faith, before the definition, whether by solemn magisterium or by ordinary magisterium, of the Church. Before that definition, they certainly possess the formal motive of our theology, which is the inclusive deduction from what is revealed; but they lack one of the indispensable conditions of the formal motive of our faith: the definition of the Church.