La evolución homogénea del dogma católico

129. THE PASSAGE FROM THEOLOGICAL TRUTH TO TRUTH OF DIVINE FAITH.—It is possible that some readers are surprised at the very title of "passage from theological truth to truth of divine faith," that is, the passage from what—not for the intellect of God or of the Apostles, but for our intellect—was strictly, solely, and purely theology, to truth of divine faith, to dogma of faith. And yet that passage exists, and this is admitted by the traditional doctrine of Catholic theology. That is, in the end, the doctrine no less of St. Thomas than of St. Bonaventure and Scotus, no less of Vázquez and Vega than of Suárez and Lugo, no less of all the classical theologians of the sixteenth century before Molina than of ninety percent of those after him, when it is a question of true theology, of metaphysico-inclusive theology.

The surprise of some at this passage from theology to divine faith proceeds from the false idea that this ill-fated purely connective virtual has caused them to form of true theology, which, not being a true revealed virtual, nor therefore a rigorous theological virtual, can hardly pass into a dogma of faith.

On the other hand, if theology consists, as it truly does, in implicit or inclusive virtuality, the respective fields in which theology and divine faith move, although formally or specifically distinct, are materially or objectively identical. Such objective identity, or such implicitness of the object of theology in the object of faith, is what makes our theology not only depend essentially on divine faith, but also makes possible the passage from the one to the other through a new element or new means of knowledge. This new element is the authority of the Church; an authority not human, but divine, but which, because the Church possesses it not by revelation, as the Apostles did, but by assistance, needs to use as an instrument the human labor of theological reasoning, just as it uses any other instrument that leads to explaining or developing everything truly implicit in the revealed deposit. This will become clear by analyzing that human labor of the Church and comparing it with the equally human labor of theology.

• 130. Human Labor in Theological Reasoning and in

**THE DEFINITION OF THE CHURCH.—**Here is a most important point, and one upon which sufficient attention is not often fixed, despite the fact that the nature, course, and limits of progress, both theological and dogmatic, depend on it. Upon the slightest slip in examining the nature of that human labor, of that intellectual elaboration of the divine, depends falling into one of two extremes: modernist transformism or theologism, the denial of all true dogmatic progress or the making formally dogmatic of everything theological, the rupture or objective-real non-communication between faith and theology, or the absorption of theology by faith.

On its correct interpretation depends, instead, the profound and harmonious theory of St. Thomas, which unites theology with faith vitally, really, objectively, and homogeneously, while maintaining the formal, specific, and essential distinction between faith and theology, which admits true and perfect dogmatic development, not limiting it to the mere nominal explanation or to pure formulas, but to the intellectual development or explanation of the implicit virtuality of the revealed deposit, while safeguarding the homogeneity or objective-real identity and avoiding both modernist transformism and the theory of new revelations.

Indeed, for St. Thomas, both in theology and in the definition that the Church makes of the virtual inclusive there is true deductive human labor, not of pure nominal formalities of one and the same idea, but of distinct ideas or aspects within one and the same objectivity. But for St. Thomas, the nature and value of that true human labor is essentially distinct, although materially identical, in theology and in the definition of the Church, and, therefore, the resultant (theological conclusion) of that human labor in theology is essentially distinct from the resultant (definition of faith) of the human labor of the Church. The first resultant is scientific-human; the second, authoritative-divine. The first is formally theological; the second, formally dogmatic. Let us see why.

**131. IN WHAT THE TWO TASKS AGREE.—**The starting point, both for the theologian in deducing and for the Pontiff or Council in defining, is the same: the revealed datum alone if it concerns the first conclusions or definitions, and the revealed datum together with what has already been previously defined by the Church if it concerns later definitions. To reach from that starting point the theological conclusion or the definition, both the theologian and the Church need a human deductive means: the theologian, the minor premise of the reasoning; the Church, the reasons or considerations that in the

The definitions of the Council or of the Pontiff precede the definition. The human intellectual work in the theologian is represented by the theological minor; the intellectual work of the Church is represented by what we might designate, for short, by the name of ecclesiastical minor, and which represents the set of reasons (biblical, patristic, theological..., the so-called theological sources proper) that have preceded the definition for centuries, and which in the bulls themselves or dogmatic constitutions are usually recorded as preambles or justifications for the we declare and define.

Without that theological labor or minor the theologian would never know his conclusion; without that ecclesiastical labor or minor the Church rarely proceeds to definition¹.

Neither the theologian with his theological minor premise nor the Church with her ecclesiastical minor premise attempts to add anything objective to the major premise or revealed datum, but rather to develop or deduce what is included in the revealed datum.

Since the reasoning employed is one of identity or inclusive analysis, the minor premise is used and functions not as an objective concause that adds something objective to the major premise, but as an intellectual instrument for ascertaining the objectivity that already exists in the major premise as revealed beforehand, an objectivity that the human intellect can find only through genuine deductive reasoning (96). In all this both tasks agree, that of the theologian and that of the Church.

132. HOW THEY DIFFER.—But the essential difference between both tasks is that on that theological minor which the theologian employs in his reasoning depends essentially

In theological reasoning, the conclusion will be, for the human intellect, certain, more or less probable, doubtful, or completely false, according as the minor premise employed is absolutely certain, more or less probable, doubtful, or false. "The whole force of the argument is in the middle term"². Suppose for a moment that in a theological syllogism to whose conclusion we had assented because we believed it to be fully demonstrative, we later find that the minor premise, which we believed absolutely certain, is only probable. The conclusion loses, by that very fact, its certainty for us, and is only probable. Suppose we find reasons so strong against the minor premise that they make it doubtful: the conclusion becomes by that very fact doubtful. Suppose that this minor premise turns out not only probable or doubtful, but it comes to be demonstrated that it was absolutely false: the conclusion loses by that very fact all its certainty.

Result: In theological reasoning, in the theological conclusion, in theology, however inclusive the procedure may be, the species of knowledge or certainty, of the means of cognition, of what is formal in every habit, depends essentially, for the human intellect, on the minor premise of the reasoning, on human labor.

That, then, is not formally divine; that is not formally faith. What is human can enter into the divine as a divinely rectified instrument, never as something formal or as something on which what is formal depends. And the faith in question is divine, and its formal object must be characterized by absolute, infallible truth, by the First Truth itself; therefore, nothing that does not fall under the absolute, infallible, First Truth—nothing that can fail from any point of view—falls or can fall formally under divine faith. 'Nothing is subject to any power or habit or even act except by virtue of the formal aspect of the object... But it has been said that the formal aspect of the object of faith is the First Truth: hence nothing can fall under faith except insofar as it stands under the First Truth'³. 'Faith rests on the divine Truth itself as its medium'⁴. And the theological conclusion, known only by means of reasoning, however superior it may be to the physical conclusion, and to the mathematical conclusion, and to the metaphysical conclusion, agrees with all those conclusions in one thing: in not enjoying a guarantee of infallibility, exclusive character of the divine medium or of the human medium, when it enters only as a mere instrument directed and infallibly rectified by the divine.

It is not that theology is denied true demonstration and the supreme one in the genus of demonstration and scientific certainty; it is not that it is denied that it deals with divine things; what is denied is that anything known scientifically or by demonstration is absolutely infallible; what is affirmed is that every proposition known by reasoning alone can be erroneous, and much more if it deals with divine things, where human reason errs very easily. “For human reason is greatly deficient in divine matters... Man is frequently deceived in this, that he thinks to be a demonstration what is not”⁵. AND A FALLIBLE PROPOSITION (FROM WHATEVER POINT OF VIEW IT MAY BE SO) IS NOT A PROPOSITION FORMALLY OF FAITH.

133. THE OPPOSITE, COMPLETELY THE OPPOSITE happens in the human reasoning or labor that precedes the definition of the Church. While in theology the nature of knowledge, certainty, and assent of the conclusion depends essentially on the value of the theological minor premise, in the definition of faith by the Pontiff or the Council the nature of knowledge, certainty, and assent of the definition is absolutely independent of the value of the human labor or ecclesiastical minor premise that precedes it.

Let us suppose for a moment that after a truth of that inclusive or analytic kind has been defined as a matter of faith by a Council or Pontiff, that is, one of those truths found in the revealed deposit through real identification with the formal statements of the deposit, it is discovered that one, several, many, or all of the preambles or reasonings of the dogmatic definition are not as certain as was believed, that they are only probable, that they are doubtful, that they are false. Does the definition or defined truth thereby remain false, doubtful, probable, or less certain? NO.

The definition is preceded by those preliminaries, those reasonings, that human labor, that ecclesiastical minor premise; but the definition is not founded upon them nor is it their conclusion. The definition is founded formally upon the divine assistance, and that divine assistance exists for defining, not for reasoning; it guarantees, divinely and infallibly, the truth of the definition, not the truth of the reasoning. It is true that, precisely because it is assistance and not revelation, it requires reasoning as a prior human condition; but reasoning with respect to which the assistance has no other purpose than to prevent that reasoning from ever leading to a false definition, not to ensure that the reasoning itself is true. Whereas, with respect to the definition or defined truth, the purpose of the divine assistance is to guarantee divinely not only that what is defined as of divine faith is true, but that it is revealed truth, that is, implicitly contained or included in the deposit or datum of revelation, in the common starting point of both theological labor and the work of the Church.

Thus, in the Church’s definition reasoning precedes, but it does not influence formally the definition; the definition, although not made without reasoning, is not made by reasoning. A minor premise precedes the definition, but it is mere material precedence, without formal influence on the definition. The definition succeeds and follows the minor premise, but without a formal bond with it: it is not the conclusion of that minor premise. Materially, externally, the Church’s work in defining the virtual implicit has the same procedure (starting from the revealed datum or major premise, positing an inclusive minor premise, and drawing a conclusion that in the datum was included by the virtuality of real identity) and the same visible appearance as the human-theological work: but formally there is no reasoning or work whatsoever. The nature and value of the knowledge, certainty and assent of that definition or defined truth is effected formally without any human means, by mere divine authority; divine authority not to reveal anything new nor even to reason about what has already been revealed, but to be infallibly right, by divine assistance, in discerning what is revealed from what is not, what is included in the deposit from what is not; to discover, in a word, what was already in the deposit, but which, because it is not formally stated in itself, but rather included in other formal statements of the deposit, is therefore said to be in the deposit not formally but mediately or virtually: because only by means of reasoning and in virtue of reasoning can weak human intelligence come to know it, for which not only what is not included in the principles, but also what is truly included, is mediate, virtual, and scientific knowledge, but whose inclusion is not knowable by simple intelligence, for it requires true deduction and true science, which are the opposite poles of faith.

Whereas, in the definition of the Church, the same included object, which the theologian only knew mediately and virtually by scientific reasoning, is now known immediately, formally, by divine authority, which is the character of faith.

134. THE "EXPLANATION OF FAITH" OF TRADITIONAL DOCTRINE.—This task of the Church which we have expounded is the meaning of the celebrated explanation of faith of traditional theology. That the Church has the assistance and divine mission, without new revelations or objective increase of the deposit, not only to preserve holily but also to expound faithfully and with dogmatic authority the revealed deposit, all theologians admit this, and it is defined by the Vatican Council: "For the Holy Spirit was promised to the successors of Peter, not that by His revelation they might reveal new doctrine, but that by His assistance they might holily keep and faithfully expound the revelation delivered through the Apostles, or the deposit of faith"⁶. Dogmatic definitions are not, then, a definition of new things or doctrines, but an authentically divine explanation or exposition of what is implicit in the revealed deposit. "And this was the reason why it was necessary to publish several creeds, which differ in nothing else except that what is contained implicitly in one is more fully explained in another"⁷. "For the later creed does not abolish the earlier, but expounds it"⁸. "The Creed of the Fathers is a declaration of the Apostles' Creed"⁹. "Explanation of faith against insurgent errors"¹⁰. "The same faith more fully expounded"¹¹.

But this explication of faith is not limited to a simple change of formulas or a mere nominal unfolding among things distinct only by a distinction of ratiocinating reason, but rather extends to what is deduced by a procedure of inclusion or real identity, to what is distinct with a virtual distinction or one "of reasoned reason," that is, to the inclusive-intellectual virtuality of the deposit. This is what traditional theology understands by expounding the implicit of the deposit: "To explain the articles of faith happens in two ways: one way as regards the substance of the articles themselves, inasmuch as one knows the articles distinctly. Another way as regards those things which are contained implicitly in the articles themselves, which indeed happens when one knows those things which follow from the articles"¹².

The articles are substantial to the faith, and therefore the unfolding of some articles into others was completed in Christ and the Apostles: “This explanation, insofar as one article is contained in another, or two in one common article, was completed by Christ; hence, with regard to the essentials of the faith, it is not lawful to add to or subtract from His teaching”¹³. By contrast, the development or explanation by way of consequences is, as it were, accidental. “But those things that follow from these truths of faith are, as it were, accidental” ¹⁴ And what is accidental in the faith is not a matter of faith until it is defined by the ordinary or solemn magisterium of the Church. “But those things that are accidental to the faith are not necessary for salvation, except after they have been determined by preaching and teaching” ¹⁵

Treating of what things are definable as matters of faith, Cardinal Cajetan says: “Nor does it matter in Sacred Scripture and the others (that is, the traditions of the Apostles and the Creed) whether something be revealed explicitly, such as the creation of the world, the incarnation of the Word of God, and other things of this kind, or implicitly, as are all those things whose opposites cannot be maintained with the truth of Sacred Scripture and of the other things which we hold with certain faith: except that there is need of talent, labor, reason, and understanding to make manifest that these things which are said to be contained implicitly are necessarily connected to those in which they are said to be contained” ¹⁶ Or as Báñez says: “Because the Church has never proposed or defined anything for the faithful to believe that was not contained in the Sacred Letters or apostolic traditions, expressed or virtually contained, so that it could be drawn out from them by an evident consequence” ¹⁷ The same is said by all the theologians before Molina and most of those after him, whose texts the reader will find in chapter 7 of this work (352-448). We will also give later on eleven distinct proofs of this same truth (239-250).

Thus, then, divine faith is not limited to the articles of faith, nor even to what is explicitly revealed, but extends of itself, says St. Thomas, to everything truly implicit, whether it is implicit as an antecedent, as a concomitant, or as a consequence of what is explicitly revealed, provided that the Church explains or defines it: “Because faith, as far as it is in itself, sufficiently inclines toward all things that accompany, follow, or precede faith” ¹⁸ “And the same judgment is about these (the consequential or accidental) and about THOSE (the articles or the substantial) which are determined in the faith because one follows from the other” ¹⁹ There is no further difference except that the substantial or articles were defined or explained by the Apostles themselves, and the Church has always been teaching or preaching them by its ordinary magisterium, and therefore they have been from the beginning not only matter of faith, but formally of faith, whereas the accidental or consequential, although of itself matter of faith, does not become formally of faith until the Church defines or determines it by her ordinary or solemn magisterium. "Unless after they have been determined by preaching and teaching"²⁰. The Holy Doctor also expressly teaches both things in the following text: "It must be said that in faith there are some things (the articles) which every man is bound to know explicitly; hence if anyone errs in these, he is considered an unbeliever, and a heretic if he adds obstinacy. But if there are some things (the secondary or accidental) which man is not bound to believe explicitly, he will not become a heretic by erring in these, as if some simple person believes that Jacob was the father of Abraham, which is against the truth of Holy Scripture, which faith professes, until it becomes known to him that the faith of the Church holds the contrary"²¹."

And so that no one, paying more attention to the particular example adduced here by the Holy Doctor than to the general doctrine he sets forth, might think that this had no application to theological conclusions or to the inclusive virtuality of the deposit, the Holy Doctor continues: "And because certain things are contained implicitly IN THE FAITH OF THE CHURCH, just as CONCLUSIONS are contained in principles, therefore in these diverse opinions are tolerated until it is determined by the Church that something among them is against the faith of the Church, BECAUSE FROM IT FOLLOWS something contrary to the faith directly"²².

Therefore, in regard to divine faith, these two things are exactly equivalent for Saint Thomas: a) formal or immediate revelation, proposed by the Church; b) implicit-virtual or implicit-mediate revelation, explained by the Church.

But then, it will be said, is this not making the Church a formal element of divine faith? Is this not attributing to the Church the conversion of what is mediately or virtually revealed into what is immediately or formally revealed? We shall see this in the following sections.