La evolución homogénea del dogma católico

89. THE VIRTUAL OF THE FOURTH TYPE.—We have seen how, from Suárez onward, what has been properly called the revealed or theological virtual is the physical-connective virtual, that is, the fourth virtual among the six types of reasoning or virtuality that we already know (45 and 73).

In this section we are going to try to show that this physical-connective reasoning is not rigorous theological reasoning; that it is not a rigorous theological conclusion; that it does not conclude in theology; that it is not virtual theological or revealed; that it is not necessarily connected with the revealed major premise or revealed deposit from which it is to be deduced. And if it is not virtual revealed or theological, if it is not necessarily connected with the revealed deposit, much less will it be an object of infallibility, and still less definable as divine faith. These assertions of ours will seem to many to clash with what, since Suárez, has been said in most theological manuals; but we believe that it is not difficult to give a conclusive demonstration of this and to show that in this whole question there is nothing but a confusion between pure essence or essence in the abstract and connatural or perfect essence¹.

90. THREE PRELIMINARY NOTES.—Let us recall, first of all, that in this physical-connexive reasoning the aim is to deduce, as a conclusion, not the metaphysical, or essential, or aptitudinal, or radical properties, but the physical-actual properties, and that we suppose these physical-actual properties are really distinct from the essence and absolutely, or by divine power, separable from it (44).

Let us recall, secondly, that to deduce such properties that are really distinct and in no way separable, we begin from the essence in its pure state or in the abstract, that is, we suppose that God has revealed nothing more to us than that N. has such an essence; but without saying a word to us, either expressly or implicitly, about whether that essence is in a connatural or preternatural state, in an integral or deficient state, in a perfect or imperfect state.

Let us recall, thirdly, that we are trying to deduce not a conditioned conclusion, but a simple or absolute conclusion. That is, assuming that we know by revelation that N. is a man (pure essence, or in the abstract), we are not trying to deduce “therefore N. is actually risible if he is in a connatural state,” but rather we are seeking to deduce in this way: “therefore N. is actually risible.” If we were trying to deduce the conditioned conclusion, we would also be outside the case, for deducing that “N. is actually risible if he is in a connatural state” becomes this other [proposition]: “N. is in a connatural state, therefore he is actually risible,” which is no longer the reasoning of the fourth, or physico-connective, type with which we are now dealing, but the reasoning of the fifth type, of which we grant not only that it is theological, but that it is definable as being of divine faith.

These preliminary remarks having been made, which, even at the risk of being accused of repeating too much, we have believed indispensable given the delicacy of the question, we are going to adduce the proofs on which we rely to believe that the reasoning of the fourth or physical-connective type does not conclude in theology nor can it, therefore, be or be called a true virtually revealed nor a true theological conclusion, except in the broad sense in which not only what is demonstrative or conclusive is called a conclusion, but also what is theologically uncertain and probable.

91. FIRST AND FUNDAMENTAL REASON.—It is an axiom in logic that from what is true nothing false can ever follow or be concluded, or that if a conclusion is false, it must be either because one of the premises is false, or because the reasoning is badly done. Let us, then, examine one or several reasonings of the true virtual physical-connective sort or of the fourth type, that is, reasonings in which, knowing by revelation the pure essence of a thing, one seeks to deduce in the conclusion a physical-actual property by means of a minor premise of physical necessity.

By revelation we know that the body of Jesus Christ in the Eucharist is true body; that the Eucharistic accidents are true accidents; that the fire of the Babylonian furnace was true fire, etc., etc. By physical science we know, with full certainty or physical necessity, that every body has local extension or occupation of place; that every accident has actual inherence in the subject; that every fire duly applied does in fact burn, etc. Let the following reasonings, then, be of the fourth type:

1.º The body of Jesus Christ in the Eucharist is a true body: now, every body in fact occupies a place, therefore the body of Jesus Christ in the Eucharist in fact occupies a place.

2nd. The Eucharistic accidents are true accidents: now, every accident has actual inherence in the subject; therefore, the Eucharistic accidents have actual inherence in the subject.

3rd. The fire of the Babylonian furnace was true fire and applied under the proper conditions: thus all true and well-applied fire burns in fact, therefore the fire of the Babylonian furnace burned in fact.

4th. The fire of hell or of purgatory is a true body: since nothing corporeal can torment or imprison a spirit, therefore the fire of hell or of purgatory does not torment or imprison spirits.

5.º Elijah was a true man: since every man dies in fact, therefore Elijah has died in fact.

6.º Jesus Christ is true man: now every man is a human person and is conceived by the work of a man; therefore Jesus Christ is a human person and conceived by the work of a man.

7th. The Most Holy Virgin is a descendant of Adam and conceived by the work of a man: thus under those conditions original guilt is in fact contracted, therefore the Most Holy Virgin in fact contracted original guilt.

8th. Jesus Christ and His Most Holy Mother really and truly died: since no dead person resurrects or returns to life, therefore neither Jesus Christ nor the Virgin resurrected, etc., etc.

Let anyone consider carefully all these reasonings. They are true reasonings of the physical-connective virtual. In the major we know by revelation the essence; in the minor we lay down a physically necessary or certain principle. The conclusion, however, far from being a true theological conclusion, far from having theological certainty, far from having theological necessity or connection, is a theological error. Therefore the physical-connective virtual is not a true theological conclusion, has no theological certainty, has no theological necessity, has no necessary connection with the theological; that is, with the divine; that is, with the revealed major or the revealed deposit.

We are sure that anyone who, without worries or preconceived ideas, carefully reflects on those reasonings and does not let himself be deluded by considerations that are foreign to their intrinsic value will soon understand the radical difference that exists between physics and theology and that physical-connexive reasoning has no demonstrative value whatsoever in theology.

Indeed, all those reasonings we have just cited are true reasonings, or virtual physical-connective ones, and yet, far from concluding in theology, they lead to false conclusions. It is an evident principle that the falsity of a conclusion always proceeds from one of these two sources: either from one of the premises being false, or from the syllogism being badly formed. In the cited syllogisms none of the premises is false, for the major premises are revealed and the minor premises are physically certain. It follows, then, that those syllogisms are badly formed. That is to say, it follows that in theology a syllogism is not well formed in which the major expresses only the pure essence and the minor is not an essential minor, but one of pure physical connection. And since this is precisely what the virtual physical-connective reasoning, or the fourth type, consists in, it evidently follows that that power does not conclude in theology; it is not a theological conclusion.

92. A DODGE.—Let no one think of replying that those reasonings are not conclusive or that those conclusions are false, because we know, by revelation, the contrary of those conclusions.

In the first place, that would be an answer proper to simple believers, not to true philosophers or theologians, as Báñez, with Cardinal Cajetan, observes very well on another similar point².

Secondly and chiefly, those conclusions are not false because God has revealed the contrary; rather, the reverse is the case. God has revealed the contrary because they were false. Their intrinsic falsity is not caused by the revelation, but by their lack of necessary connection with the principles or premises from which they are intended to be deduced. God could surely have revealed to us only the major premises of those reasonings, and said not a word as yet about the conclusions, and yet such conclusions would still be just as false as they are. God could have revealed to us the real presence of the body of Jesus Christ in the Eucharist and kept silent about whether it has local extension or not. He could have revealed to us the real existence of the Eucharistic accidents without telling us anything about their inherence. He could have revealed the death of the Virgin and told us nothing about her resurrection. He could have revealed the fact that the three children were cast into the Babylonian furnace without telling us anything about whether the fire burned them or not.

He could have kept silent about those supernatural facts, in which the connatural state of the essence is suspended by divine will, just as He must have kept silent about so many other supernatural facts of His supernatural providence; and yet, the facts would remain as true whether we know them or not, and the physical-connexive reasonings and conclusions in which those facts are denied would continue to be as false without His revelation, as we know they are by revelation. Revelation does not change the value of reasoning; it does no more than make us know what was already true or false, and which perhaps without revelation we would not know, or would not know so well.

Reasoning, therefore, of the physical-connective or fourth type neither leads nor can lead to theologically certain conclusions, nor does it conclude in theology.

93. WHY DO SUCH REASONINGS NOT CONCLUDE IN THEOLOGY? These reasonings do not conclude in theology or in metaphysics simply because they are badly made, because under the appearance of an impeccable form they are composed, at bottom, of four feet. In the major premise of these reasonings only the pure or abstract essence is affirmed, an essence that abstracts from the natural or preternatural order, from the state of integrity or the defective state, from the perfect or imperfect state.

In contrast, in the minor premises there is set down an affirmation which is not true of the essence in every state, but only and exclusively of the essence in the connatural state, not in the supernatural state. These arguments, then, have four terms. The middle term is not taken in the same sense in the major and in the minor; in the major it is taken in an essential or abstract sense, and in the minor it is taken not in an essential sense, but in a connatural sense. The reasoning thus consists of four terms instead of three. It is no wonder that it does not conclude.

Why do they conclude in physics?—Because in physics, as the physicist understands them, they are well made. In physics there are no essential or abstract premises of the natural and the supernatural. In physics, by its very formal object, every premise and every assertion is taken or assumed by the physicist in a connatural sense. The physicist, insofar as he is a physicist, does not know the supernatural. When physics and the physicist say: “N. is a man,” they take the word “man” not in an essential or abstract sense, but in a connatural sense; they take the essence insofar as it is subject to and governed by physical or natural laws. The physicist’s starting point is not the essence, but the nature. With the essence thus taken and understood in the major premise of the reasoning, the minor premise is irreproachable. In that minor premise it is said that every essence (that is, assuming it connatural, as the physicist assumes it) has always and unfailingly the actual properties. The conclusion, in that supposition of connaturality from which the physicist always starts and which he always tacitly assumes, is most correct. The conclusion has no more meaning than “N. will actually be risible in the supposition (starting point of the physicist) that the natural laws are fulfilled or that the connatural state is verified.”

But, as can be seen, the reasoning, in that hypothesis, is no longer physical-connective, but physical-connatural; it is no longer the fourth type of reasoning, but the fifth (90). The physical-connective reasoning, therefore, does not conclude in theology; and if it concludes in physics, it is because it ceases to be physical-connective, since poor physics is limited to the natural or connatural state and cannot rise to the supernatural or essential state in which theology and metaphysics, respectively, move.

94. WHERE IS THE THEOLOGICAL DEFECT OF PHYSICAL-ABSTRACT REASONING?—To see clearly where the defect of such theological arguments lies, one need only look at the middle term man, which is the predicate of the major premise and the subject of the minor. In this major premise it is only said, or we suppose that it is only said, that “N. is essentially man” or that he has the true essence of man. The word “man,” taken essentially, does not determine any of the states in which the human essence may be found, but rather abstracts from all states. For man is as essentially man in the natural state as in the preternatural or supernatural state, in the integral state as in the maimed or defective state, in the most perfect state as in the imperfect state, with all actual properties or without them. Since, therefore, man can have all these states without losing the essence of man, in the major premise of the reasoning we suppose that only the essence is affirmed and that the state is completely abstracted.

But then in the minor premise it is said that “every man has the actual properties.” That phrase “every man”—for whom does it stand? Does it stand perhaps for every man both in the natural state and in the supernatural state, both under the ordinary laws of nature and under the miraculous action of God? No. In that sense, that minor premise, far from being true, would be a very great falsehood; it would be the rationalist error; it would be the very negation of the supernatural order.

When in that minor premise, then, we say that every man has these or those actual properties, that every accident has actual inherence, that every fire burns, that every dead person remains dead, that every body occupies a place and is impenetrable, that every human nature has human personality, etc., etc., we say it of every being provided that be in a connatural state, provided that God has not intervened by a miraculous act. Then, either we must deduce the conclusion in conditional form, that is, “N. is actually risible, provided that God has not intervened” miraculously, and then we have already departed from physical-connective reasoning; or, if we deduce it in absolute and unconditional form, we draw in the conclusion something that is not in the premises.

One can also clearly see the theological defect of those physico-connective reasonings by noting how the physicist grants them and how every theologian distinguishes them. If we propose the following argument to a physicist: “The eucharistic accidents are true accidents: now every true accident has inherence in a subject, therefore the eucharistic accidents have inherence in a subject,” the physicist will reply: I concede the whole, and as a physicist, he will have replied well. On the other hand, if we propose this same reasoning or argument to a theologian, the theologian must distinguish and will immediately distinguish the minor premise and the conclusion in the following manner: “They have inherence in a subject,” I distinguish; inherence aptitudinal, I concede; inherence actual, I distinguish further; if they are in a connatural state, I concede; if they are not in a connatural state, but a supernatural or miraculous one, I DENY.

This elementary distinction, which every theologian makes and must make, clearly shows three things:

1st. That the reasoning in which from the essence of a thing its aptitudinal, or radical, or essential properties (first, second, and third types) are deduced must be granted in theology, that is, it is a theological conclusion.

2nd. That the reasoning in which its actual properties are deduced from the essence, under the condition that that essence be in a connatural or perfect state (fifth and sixth types), must also be granted in theology, that is, it is a theological conclusion.

3rd. That the argument in which, from the essence alone of a thing, one tries to deduce the actual properties in an unconditional way (fourth type) must be denied in theology, that is, it is not a true theological conclusion.

These three assertions sum up our opinion, and we believe that the true Thomistic doctrine on the nature of true and false revealed or theological virtuality.

95. THE SO-CALLED “PHYSICAL NECESSITY”.— But someone will say: physical necessity, is it not perhaps true necessity? Yes. Physical necessity is true necessity, but physical necessity, not metaphysical or theological, just as moral necessity is true necessity, but moral necessity, not physical or metaphysical.

The word necessity, as Cardinal Cajetan already noted³, is not a univocal term but an analogous one, which does not apply and cannot be applied equally to all orders of beings or sciences. A thing "morally necessary" or necessary in morals is not physically necessary, but is contingent or uncertain in physics. A thing "physically necessary" or necessary in physics is not necessary in metaphysics, and much less in theology; rather, in theology or metaphysics it is contingent or uncertain. Hence, a line of reasoning can conclude in morals and not in physics; it can conclude in physics and not in metaphysics or theology. A conclusion can be true or certain in morals and be an uncertain or probable conclusion (which is the same as not being a true conclusion) in physics; just as it can be a true and certain conclusion in physics and be an uncertain or probable conclusion in metaphysics and theology, which is the same as not being a rigorous metaphysical or theological conclusion.

Thus, for example, the principle that “every mother loves her children” is a necessary and certain principle in morals, but uncertain and contingent in physics, in metaphysics, and in theology. The reasoning “A. was the mother of B.; therefore A. loved B.” is a necessary, true, proper, and certain conclusion in morals; but it is not a true conclusion either in physics, or in metaphysics, or in theology. The principle that “every fire, applied under the appropriate physical conditions, actually burns” is a certain and necessary principle in physics, but contingent or uncertain in metaphysics or in theology. The conclusion of “N. is”

fire and is duly applied to a combustible, then "it actually burned" is a necessary, certain, proper, and rigorous conclusion in physics, but it is contingent and uncertain (and, therefore, not a true conclusion) in metaphysics and theology.

If God, then, has revealed to us that "A. is the mother of B." without telling us more, that is, without telling us that she was a good mother or that she behaved according to the impulses or moral laws of maternal love, the moralist will be certain, with moral certainty, that A. loved B. But the physicist will not be certain, but uncertain, because no physical principle falls to the ground whether A. loved or did not love B. And the metaphysician will be even more uncertain, because none of his principles is destroyed if A. did not love B. Since the theologian starts, as from a principle, from the revealed major premise, and the revealed major premise only says that she was mother (essentially, not good mother), the theologian is as uncertain as the metaphysician, for the revealed principle that A. was the mother (essentially) of B. remains completely intact and standing, whether A. loved or did not love her son.

96. THE MINOR PREMISES OF REASON.—The confusion in this matter stems, in our judgment, from not having understood or having forgotten the true function of the human sciences or of the minor premises of reason in the reasoning of the science of the revealed, or Sacred Theology. Theology, it is true, makes use of all kinds of sciences or minor premises of reason, whether metaphysical, physical, or moral. But it has frequently been overlooked that the starting point, the true principles, and the formal subject of theology are not those human sciences or minor premises of reason, but the major premises of faith, the revealed ones. The purpose of theological reasoning is not, then, to make use of the revealed major premises in order to extract or deduce the virtuality that may exist in the minor premises of reason, but, on the contrary, to make use of the minor premises of reason in order to extract, or deduce, or intellectually explain the virtuality contained in the principles or major premises of faith. The revealed major premises, then, are not instruments of the minor ones, nor do they even enter on an equal footing with the minor premises of reason in theological reasoning; rather, the minor premises of reason are mere intellectual instruments for developing or making explicit the objective virtuality with which the revealed major premises are pregnant, although they do not express it. Those minor premises of reason are in themselves or objectively unnecessary; if theology needs them, or rather, our theology, or rather, the theologian, it is only because of the weakness of our intellect, which cannot see intuitively or all at once everything that is really included in the revealed major premises, and needs those instruments or minor premises of reason in order to go on developing or discovering piecemeal what was already enclosed in the major premises revealed in the revealed deposit. This is the only true Thomistic conception of Sacred Theology ⁴

In theological reasoning, therefore, the revealed major premises must never be accommodated or subordinated to the rational minor premises; rather, the rational minor premises must be subordinated and accommodated to the revealed major premises. If the revealed principle gives us only the essence of a thing, the minor premise can be no more than essential. If the revealed principle gives us not only the essence but its connatural state, the minor premise can be physical or natural. If the revealed principle gives us the essence in a perfect or moral state, the minor premise can be moral.

Thus, and only thus, is preserved the subordination of the lesser truths of reason to the greater revealed truths, the subordination of reason to faith, in that most special and sovereign science in which faith and reason must function together, but not as equals. That is precisely what Saint Thomas Aquinas and all Thomists understood when speaking of the elevation of the lesser truths of reason by the greater truths of faith, which is precisely what makes theology have a certainty superior to moral, physical, and metaphysical certainty, even when employing lesser metaphysical, physical, or moral means.

Thus, one thing is to reveal that “A. was truly or essentially mother of B.”; quite another to reveal that she was not only essentially mother, but mother with all the physical or connatural laws of motherhood, and quite another that she was a good mother or with all the moral laws and instincts of motherhood. Fixing the sense of revelation belongs, as we said, to the Church; deducing the consequences is the function of theology.

If, according to the sense or doctrine of the Church, only that “A. is the true mother of B.” has been revealed to us, it follows theologically that A. has all the essential attributes or properties of motherhood; for example: consubstantiality of nature; but it does not follow with theological necessity that she has all the physical-natural requirements and attributes; for example: the company of a man, the loss of virginity, etc., etc. If the mere knowledge that she is truly or essentially a mother sufficed for it to be theologically certain or necessary that she is not a virgin, we would be theologically certain that the Mother of Jesus Christ was not a virgin, for we know by revelation that she was a mother.

If, on the other hand, it has been revealed to us that A. was not only the true mother of B., but was so in the connatural or ordinary manner that other mothers are, then we will be theologically certain of any conclusion that has a physical connection with motherhood; for example: that she conceived by the work of a man, etc., etc.; but we will still be uncertain of the moral attributes or conclusions, such as whether she loved her son or not.

In short, if it has been revealed to us not only that she was a true mother and in a connatural way, but that she was a good mother, then we will be theologically certain that she loved her son.

There can be, then, in theology minor premises (and, therefore, reasonings and conclusions), whether metaphysical, physical, or moral, but applied proportionally to the nature or sense of the revealed major. To set up as a revealed major a thing of purely essential sense and to attach to it an accidental minor is to ignore the homogeneity of all science, and far more to ignore the subordination of the minors of reason to the majors of faith; it is to make a reasoning that is neither theological, nor metaphysical, nor physical, but a hybrid amalgam of theology or metaphysics with physics. If in physics that class of arguments seem to conclude, it is, as we have already said, because the physicist supposes a priori, or by his very formal object, the connaturality of the essence, and excludes a priori the

Preternatural and supernatural state. But neither metaphysics nor theology can do that without destroying themselves.

97. THE ANALOGY OF BEING.—The same must be said of the word "being" that we have said of the word "necessity"; they are analogous words and concepts, not univocal; and therefore, when transferring them from one science to another, one must preserve their analogy of proportionality, that is, they must be applied in proportion to the being or science in question. If in the revealed major premise only essential being is affirmed (essentially man, essentially accident, essentially fire, etc.), in the minor premise it is not enough that being be affirmed in any way, but rather it is necessary that essential being be affirmed; for otherwise, under a common term "being" in the major and the minor, there will be two distinct concepts, and the reasoning will consist of four terms.

If in reasoning I say: "N. is (essentially) a man; therefore N. is (essentially) risible," which is the same as "therefore N. has radical or essential risibility," the reasoning is well made. The verb is not only has the same name in the major and in the minor, but it also has the same sense, an essential or radical or aptitudinal sense.

But if I say: "N. is (essentially) a man; now every man is (actually) risible; therefore N. is (actually) risible"; in that reasoning the verb is, with the same name in the major as in the minor, has a different sense, an essential sense in the major and an actual or accidental sense in the minor. With the same word is two different senses have slipped into the reasoning. With the appearance of three terms, the reasoning has four. But that does not conclude in theology⁵. If it concludes in physics, it is because the physicist takes the word is, like any other word or concept, in a connatural or accidental sense, and then there are no more than three terms. The essential concepts, like the preternatural or supernatural ones, are unknown to the physicist; they are ultraphysical, that is, metaphysical or theological. The necessity, therefore, of deduction or consequence in physical-connective reasoning is not theological necessity.

98. ANOTHER CONCLUSIVE PROOF.—Another proof, in our judgment completely conclusive, that physical-connective reasoning is not a true theological conclusion or a true virtually revealed truth, will be given to us by the Angelic Doctor. According to St. Thomas, it is of the very essence of true reasoning that, when the conclusion is destroyed or denied, the principle from which it is deduced is destroyed or denied. If, when a conclusion is denied, the principle does not remain denied, it is an infallible sign that such a purported conclusion is not a true conclusion of such a principle⁶

Now then: examine any physical-connective reasoning, that is, a reasoning in which the major premise affirms only the essence of an individual thing and in the conclusion its physical-actual properties are affirmed, and one will palpably see that the conclusion can be denied and be false without the major premise or principle being denied or false. Let us focus on the very classic example: “N. is a true man or essentially a man; therefore he is actually risible.” Does one cease to be essentially a man because one ceases to be actually risible? Does an accident cease to be a true and essential accident because it ceases to have actual inherence? Does a body cease to be essentially and truly a body because in fact it does not occupy a place or is interpenetrated by another body? Does fire cease to be true and essentially fire because in fact it does not burn? Does, in general, any thing cease to have the essence it had because it ceases to have the actual properties which, by supposition, are really distinct from it? Evidently not. Therefore, the actual properties are not a true theological conclusion from the essence. Therefore, the physical-connective reasoning, in which the revealed major premise only affirms the essence of an individual, and in the conclusion one seeks to deduce its actual properties, is not a true virtually revealed or theological truth, nor a true theological conclusion, but a hybrid mixture of theology with physics, which is neither physics nor theology.

On the other hand, if instead of deducing in the conclusion the actual properties, we tried to deduce the aptitudinal or radical properties, or also, if we wished to deduce in the conclusion the actual properties, but placing in the revealed major premise not the pure or abstract essence, but the connatural or perfect essence, we would immediately see that in neither of those two cases could the conclusion be denied or destroyed without denying or destroying the principle. The radical risibility cannot be denied without denying or destroying the very essence of man, with which we suppose it really identifies itself. Nor can the actual risibility or any other physical-natural property be denied without denying or destroying the connatural or perfect state of the essence. Therefore the conclusions in which the radical or essential properties are deduced from a revealed major premise in which the essence is affirmed, or the conclusions in which the actual properties are deduced from a revealed major premise in which the connatural or perfect state of the essence is affirmed, are true theological conclusions or true revealed virtuality; but the conclusions in which the actual properties are deduced from a revealed major premise in which only the essence is affirmed, are not.

The same exactly as we have said about the aphorism "deduction of properties from essence" applies to the aphorism "deduction of effect from cause".

There is a metaphysical cause, which is also called virtual, and a physical or real cause. The first is really identical, although conceptually distinct, to its effect, as, for example, absolute immutability is the metaphysical or virtual cause of eternity, and spirituality the cause of immortality. The second is really distinct from its effect, as the essence of fire is really distinct from its effect or action of burning (50). This physically-distinct cause can (as we said of the essence) be considered in a pure or abstract state or in a connatural or perfect state. Hence the following three consequences:

1st The conclusion in which the metaphysical effect is deduced from its metaphysical or virtual cause is a true, proper, and rigorous theological conclusion, such as: "N. is absolutely immutable, therefore he is eternal"; or "he is spiritual, therefore he is immortal."

2nd. The conclusion in which the physical-actual effect is deduced from its physical cause in a connatural or integral or perfect state is also a true, proper, and rigorous theological conclusion, as for example: “N. is fire in a connatural state and is well applied, therefore it burns in fact”, or “Christ had the powers in a most perfect state, therefore He had the acts of knowing and willing”.

3rd. The conclusions in which one seeks to deduce the physical-actual effect of the pure or abstract cause are not strictly theological or do not have theological certainty, such as: "N. was fire and well applied, therefore it actually burned"; "N. was a heavy body, therefore it sank in the water"; "N. was composed of contrary or corruptible elements, therefore it actually decayed." All these effects can fail in the supernatural or theological order; they are not, therefore,

rigorous theological conclusions nor revealed virtuality. With this, we believe that the traditional definition of the theological conclusion or revealed virtuality is perfectly explained, namely: "what is contained in the revealed deposit as a property in the essence, or an effect in the cause." Now then: to explain or understand well the definition of a thing is to explain and understand its true nature or essence. For definition signifies the form and essence of a thing."⁷

99. THE PHYSICAL-CONNECTIVE VIRTUALITY AND THE INFALLIBILITY OF THE CHURCH.—Then, cannot the Church infallibly define that "N. is risible," or that it has any other property, on the supposition that it is revealed that "N. is true man," that is, that "N. has the essence of man"? .

The answer to this question, in our judgment, already follows from everything that has been said. If the question is to define radical risibility, or any other radical, aptitudinal, or essential properties, the Church can define them infallibly merely by knowing through revelation that he is essentially man. The revealed major premise that N. is a man cannot be saved or preserved if it is denied that N. is essentially or radically risible. This conclusion is therefore necessary for the preservation of the revealed deposit. It is, consequently, an object of infallibility.

If the matter concerns actual risibility or any other of the physical-actual properties, the Church can also define them infallibly provided that the sense of the revealed major premise is not only that N. is essentially a man, but that he is a man in a connatural state, or an integral state, or without defect, or like the common run of men, or in a perfect state. The revealed truth that N. is a man in a connatural, integral, or perfect state can be neither saved nor preserved if he is deprived of any connatural property, attribute, or perfection. This conclusion, therefore, is also an object of infallibility⁸.

But if the question is to define the actual risibility or any other of the actual properties of an individual, starting solely from a revealed major premise in which nothing more is said than “N. is essentially or truly a man,” without saying whether he is in the connatural or preternatural state, in the integral or defective state, in the perfect or imperfect state, our opinion is that neither can the theologian conclude with theological certainty, nor can the Church define infallibly that N. in fact has these or those actual physical properties. It may define that he requires connaturally to have them (radical property); it may define that he has them in fact, yes, provided that he is in the connatural state (reasoning of the fifth type, not of the fourth type); but to define infallibly that he has them in fact and unconditionally, that is impossible for it to be an object of theological science nor of infallibility unless one starts from other data than a revealed major premise in which only the essence is affirmed and a minor premise in which a physical law is affirmed.

It is perfectly preserved that something is essentially man, essentially accident, essentially body, essentially fire, without being actually risible, without having actual inherence in the subject, without having occupation of place, without actually burning. Therefore, to save or preserve the greater revealed truths or the revealed deposit that N. is essentially man, accident, body, fire, the truth or conclusion that N. is actually risible, actually inherent, that he actually occupies place, that he actually burns is not indispensable. If they are not indispensable for the preservation of the revealed deposit, if the truth of the revealed deposit is saved and preserved without such conclusions, they are not an object of infallibility as erroneous, although they may be so as rash, imprudent, etc. If revelation only states the essence of a thing, one who affirmed that such essence was not in a connatural and integral state, but in a preternatural or defective state, that is, one who affirmed that such essence, by miracle or divine intervention, was deprived of this or that actual property, could be imprudent, rash, foolish in affirming a miracle without that; such reasonings are not only perfectly theological, but are, as we shall see, definable as matters of faith, because they are inclusive.

If instead of saying: “N. is a being, contingent, therefore it is a created being”, we were to say: “N. is a being, therefore it is a created being”, that reasoning would not be conclusive in either metaphysics or theology, although there is room for only one exception, which is God, regarding a thing being “being” and not being “created”. In the same way, if instead of saying: “N. is a whole or perfect man, therefore he is actually risible”, or “therefore he has any other actual property”, we were to say: “N. is essentially man, therefore he is actually risible”, that reasoning is not theologically conclusive, for not only is there room for one exception in the matter of being “man” without being actually “risible”, but there is room for as many exceptions as God pleases.

reason. But one thing is to be without reason or rash, and quite another is to be against reason or, rather, against revelation, which is the only thing that constitutes what is erroneous in theology⁹.

100. THE ACTUAL PROPERTIES IN JESUS CHRIST.—For how has the Church defined as infallible, and even as of divine faith, certain actual properties of Jesus Christ, for example, the human powers of intellect and will? Here, in our judgment, lies the origin of the error or oversight of so many modern treatise writers. The Church has defined these actual properties of the most sacred humanity of our Savior because we have revealed not only that Jesus Christ is man essentially or in the abstract, but that He is man in an integral and connatural state and without defect, and not only that, but man perfect or most perfect in all senses not opposed to the hypostatic union or to the end of redemption. Starting from that revealed major premise of “integral and perfect man,” the Church can define as infallible, and even as of divine faith, not only the intellect and will of Christ, but each and every one of the properties or attributes that integrate or perfect human nature, such as actual risibility, the interior or exterior senses, quantity, gravity, and the other properties of the soul or of the body.

But if God had only revealed that Christ is essentially man, without telling us either explicitly or implicitly

whether that human essence was or was not in an integral or defective state, connatural or preternatural, perfect or imperfect, no theological certainty or infallibility could be had regarding any of its actual properties, just as none can be had regarding many other individuals of whom we know from Sacred Scripture that they were men, and yet the Church, like theology, does not know whether they were integral or without defect.

Of our adorable Savior it was necessary or fitting for us to know not only the essence in the abstract, but also His properties and perfections, and therefore God revealed to us not only the essence, but His state, connatural and perfect. Of very many other individuals or things revelation has told us only the essence, because it was not necessary for us to know divinely or theologically more. And from the revealed, and only from the revealed, proceed both theology and infallibility; and only that is theological or an object of infallibility, in the order of reasonings or conclusions, without which the revealed truth cannot be saved or preserved. And the essence can be perfectly preserved even if God has taken away from it some or all of its actual properties.

101. THE TREATISE "ON THE INCARNATION".—In the treatise "On the Incarnation" of the Theological Summa anyone can see how the Angelic Doctor carefully distinguishes the three revealed principles (Christ is true, or essentially, man—Christ is whole, or perfect, man—Christ is most perfect man) and how he uses each of them differently, depending on whether he is deducing essential parts or properties, connatural properties, or accidental perfections. When it is a question of whether Christ had something essential to humanity, for example, a true body, he has recourse to the first revealed principle of the essence of man: "Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed a true body. I answer that it should be said that... a threefold reason can be assigned for this. Of these the first is from the notion (essence) of human nature, to which it belongs to have a true body. Therefore, supposing from the premises that it was fitting for the Son of God to assume human nature, it follows that He assumed a true body"¹⁰

On the other hand, when the Holy Doctor tries to deduce some of the connatural properties of Christ, for example, whether He had the powers of the intellect, or of the will, or of the concupiscible and irascible appetite, he no longer has recourse to the revealed principle that "Christ is true or essentially man", but rather to the other principle that "Christ is man whole or perfect". "Whether in Christ there are two wills. I answer that it must be said that... For it is manifest that the Son of God assumed perfect human nature, as was shown above. But the will pertains to the perfection (not to the essence) of human nature, which is its natural power, as also is the intellect, as is evident from those things that have been said in the first part. Therefore it is necessary to say that the Son of God assumed a human will in human nature¹¹.

"Then it is urged by the reasoning of St. Thomas in this article. Because the faculty of willing is a perfection of human nature, without which it would not be integral and perfect: But the Word assumed human nature perfect and integral with all its properties: Therefore the Word assumed human nature with its own proper and connatural faculty of willing.”¹².

Finally, when the Holy Doctor attempts to deduce the accidental or acquirable perfections of human nature, such as knowledge or virtue, he likewise does not resort to the principle that “Christ is true man,” but rather to that of “Christ is perfect or most perfect man.” “Whether Christ had any knowledge besides the divine. I answer that... it was necessary that (Christ) have created knowledge for three reasons. First, indeed, for the perfection of the soul. For the soul, considered in itself, is in potentiality to know intelligible things. But that which is in potentiality is imperfect, unless it is reduced to act. Moreover, it was not fitting that the Son of God should assume human nature imperfect, but perfect. And therefore it was necessary that the soul of Christ be perfect through some knowledge”¹³.

“Then the conclusion is proved by the discourse of St. Thomas in this article, which we can reduce to this form: For Christ the Lord had a human nature whole and perfect: But without a created act of understanding, the aforesaid nature would not have had whole and perfect being: Therefore...”¹⁴

The same, and more clearly still, can be seen where the Holy Doctor asks: “Whether there were virtues in Christ. I answer that... the more perfect a principle is, the more it imprints its effects: hence, since the grace of Christ was most perfect, it follows that from it there came virtues to perfect the individual powers of the soul, as regards all the acts of the soul, and thus Christ had all virtues”¹⁵.

In the treatise, then, on the Incarnation, in which the properties or perfections of our Savior’s humanity are determined by reasoning, one starts not solely from the principle “Christ is essentially man,” but rather from these three principles: first, Christ is man in essence; second, Christ is man in His integrity, or without physical defect, in everything that does not oppose the hypostatic union or the end of redemption; third, Christ is a most perfect man, with all the perfections not opposed to that same end. From the first principle are deduced all the essential properties; from the second, all the actual or connatural ones; from the third, all the accidental or acquirable ones. Whoever denied any of the essential properties would oppose the first principle, that Christ is true man. Whoever denied any of the actual properties, by supposing that God had suspended them in the humanity of our adorable Savior, just as He suspended human personality, would not oppose the principle that Christ is essentially man, since being essentially man is preserved without having this or that actual property; but he would oppose the revealed principle that Christ is man in a connatural or integral state, or without defect, or like other men. Finally, whoever denied any of the accidental perfections, such as the knowledge or virtue of Christ, would oppose neither the principle that Christ is man nor the principle that He is man in a connatural state; but he would oppose the principle that He is a most perfect man. Because these three concepts—pure essence, connatural essence, and most perfect essence—have not been well distinguished, many have not rightly understood the aphorism “deduction of property from essence,” which is the classical definition of the virtually revealed or theological truth and the specific constitutive and distinguishing element between divine faith and theology.

**102. COROLLARIES.—**From all that has been said, we believe that these two corollaries are evidently deduced:

1st. They are true and proper revealed virtuality and true and proper and rigorous theological conclusions: a) all the conclusions in which, from the revelation of the essence (even pure or in the abstract), any of its essential or metaphysical or aptitudinal or radical properties are deduced by reasoning, that is, all the conclusions of the first, second and third types (45); b) all the conclusions in which, from the revelation of the integral or connatural or perfect essence, any of its physical or actual properties are deduced by reasoning, that is, all the conclusions of the fifth and sixth types (45). This is the true Thomistic understanding of the revealed virtual or of the "deduction of property from essence", the classical definition of the true and proper and rigorous and specific theological conclusion.

2nd. Neither true and proper virtual revelation nor true and proper theological conclusions are the conclusions in which, from the revelation of the pure essence or abstract essence of an individual, the physical-actual properties are deduced, that is, all the conclusions of the fourth type, which are those that constitute the physical-connective virtuality and the only ones that correspond to the third degree of the scale of progress (46).